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The Problem of War in Hegel's ThoughtAuthor(s): Shlomo AvineriSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1961), pp. 463-474Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press

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2/13

THE

PROBLEM OF

WAR IN HEGEL'S

THOUGHT

BY

SHLOMOAVINERI

Oneoften

ncountershe ssumption

hat

Hegel's olitical

hought

pavedthewayfor hecrystallizationf a theory f statebothna-

tionalist nd totalitarian.

his

view has been

presented

n a

par-

ticularlyorceful anner

ince he

rise

o power

f the

Nazis n

Ger-

many,when many

efforts ere

made on the part

of

enemies f

Nazism

to find imilarities

etween he

philosophical remises

f

Hegel'sthoughtnd

the nstitutionalmage f the

nationalistic

tate

in

its

extreme

anifestations.1

This opinionneeds

re-examination,s is often he case with

a

hypothesis hich as taken oot, ained cceptance,ndbecome ixed

to

such a

degree hat

t seems o require o

proof

r confirmation.

One

can,

without

much

difficulty,ndicate he historical

ssociations

which

ontributedo

the

understanding

f

Hegel's

philosophy

n

a

nationalistpirit,ust

as one canshow hat his

s notthe

only nter-

pretation

pplicable o Hegel's

thought. udolfHaym's

Hegel

und

seineZeit

(Berlin,

857) s a bitternvective

gainstHegel,

ccusing

him

of

being lind o

thenational

spirationsfGerman

nity; nd

Haym'sbook s only ne example.

We

shall

not

undertake erean exhaustive

ttempt

o examine

afresh

egel'sconnection ith

German

ationalism.he aimof this

paper s

to trace hemeaning f

war n

Hegel'sthoughtnd try o

find ut,

whetherhismeaning an

be assumed

o havecontributed

towards

nationalistic-militaristicdeology

ulminatingn

Nazism

and

Fascism.

It

wouldnot be

difficulto find assages n

Hegel which

eemto

justifyrima acie heopinion fthose cholars hohavefound hat

the

Hegelian

oncept f

warresembles,n a way

that eaves

no room

for

doubt,

he new

totalitarian-etatistic

r

fascistdeas.2 n

one of

his

early

works, alled The System

f Ethics

System erSittlich-

keit),writtenbout

1801-1802,

egel says: Moralitymust

display

'See

e.g. H. Heller,

Hegel

und der nationale

Machtstaatsgedanken Deutsch-

land

(Leipzig & Berlin,

921),

118; W. M.

McGovern, rom Luther

o

Hitler

(N.

Y.,

1941); K. R.

Popper, he OpenSocietynd ts EnemiesPrinceton,950),259.This

opinion,

ncritically

ccepted, ound

ts way

ntogeneral

ext

books

of

political

hilosophy,

.g.

J. Bowle,

olitics nd

Opinion n the 19th

CenturyLon-

don,

1951),

43.

The

opposite pinion s

no

lesswidespread;

ee F.

Rosenzweig,

Hegel

und

der

Staat,

2

vols.

(Munich&

Berlin, 920);

H.

Marcuse,

Reason

and

Revolution,

nded.

(London, 955); E.

Weil,

Hegel

et '1tat

(Paris,

1950). Cf. also

Georg ukacs'

Der

deutscheaschismus

nd

Hegel, n his

SchicksalswendeBer-

lin,

1948),

37-67.

I

wish

o

expressmy

gratitudeo Prof.J.

L. Talmonfor

he help and advice

I was

privileged

o receive rom

im

while oing

esearchn

this ubject nder

his

supervision.

2D. A.

Routh, The

Philosophy f

International

elations,

olitica (Sept.

1938),

223-35.

463

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3/13

464

SHLOMO AVINERI

its vitality

n

something ifferentrom tself. . . This something if-

ferents theenemy,nd thedissociationrom im,which akes hape

in

relation o one's fellowman as the opposite of survival . . is the

fear ffighting. In another ork ating rom he ameperiod, On

theMethods f Scientificreatmentf Natural aw (Uberdie wis-

senschaftlichen

ehandlungen

es Naturrechts),hese criteria re

transferredromhe nter-personalo the nter-stateevel: War s

themoralhealth fpeoples n their trugglegainst etrifaction....

Just s the breeze aves the sea from oulness, hich s the result f

continued

omplacency,o doeswarfor eoples.

But

the mostextreme ormulations that which ppears

n

the

PhenomenologyfMind Phdnomenologiees Geistes),whichwas

completed

n

1806-precisely

n

the eve of the Battle

of

Jena-and

whose utlook s stronglynfluencedy thecharismaticxperiencef

theNapoleonic ersonalitynd tshistoricalperation:

In

order ot

to

let [the citizens] etrooted nd settled

n

this solation nd thus

break

up

the

whole ntofragmentsnd et the common pirit vapo-

rate,Governmentas from ime o time o shake hem o the very

centre yWar.By thismeans t confoundshe order hathas beenestablished nd arranged,nd violates heir ight o independence,

while he

ndividuals

who,being bsorbed

herein, et adrift

rom

the

whole, trivingfter nviolable elf-existenceFiirsichsein)

nd

personal ecurity) re made, y thetaskthus mposed ponthem y

Government,

o

feel

he

power

f

their

ord nd

master,

eath....

5

These

formulations,

n

all their ntensity,an be taken

s

the

un-

mitigatedonsecrationf the force f war, nd t might ppear

from

them hat here s no distinctionetween egeland theformulations

of Treitschkeor

eventhoseoftheFascists.7 ut thosequotations

should

be

studiedwithin he context f Hegel's general heory

f

state,

most

maturelyxpressed

n

his

PhilosophyfRight.

Here

we encounter egel accepting he challenge f one of the

mostdifficult,nd perhapsmost hankless,heoreticalasks: namely,

the

painstaking

fforto

try

nd

give meaning,

n a

general hilo-

sophical ontext,

o the

phenomenon

fwar.

He

was notthe

only

ne

3Hegels Schriftenur Politikund Rechtsphilosophie,d. G. Lasson (Leipzig,

1913),470.

4

Ibid.,432.

5

G.

W.

F.

Hegel,

The

Phenomenologyf Mind,

rans.

y

J.

B.

Baillie,

nd ed.

(London, 949),474.

6

H. v. Treitschke,olitik, d. M. Cornicelius,thed. (Leipzig, 922), , 24, 39,

60; II, 362,371,

519.

7

Cf.

Mussolini's

rticle

Fascismo n the

Enciclopedia

taliana

(Rome,1932),

XIV, 847-850, orthe strong mphasis n 'positive' alues

of

war. See

also

W.

Ebenstein, odern olitical houghtNew York, 958),330-337.



4/13

PROBLEM OF WAR IN

HEGEL

465

to

do so in his

generation;

contemporary

f

his,

Adam

Muller,

ried

to

tackle he

ame

problem

na series f

ectures,

elivered

n

1808/9

and later

published

nder he

general

itle

of

Elemente

er

Staats-

kunst. ut Mullerreached uite differentonclusionsn the moral

plane:

he recognized

heexpansionistrgeof

the

state and

distin-

guished

etween just

and

unjust

wars-a distinction hich

s

completely

lien o

Hegel's hought,

s willbe shown

ater.8

Hegel,on the other

and, ttempts o

understand

ar

n

its

hu-

man

setting, to recognize he

rose

n

the

crossof thepresent.

Hegel realizes hat

we

customarilyvaluatewar as a

deviation rom

the

normal

onditionf

peace;

under he

nfluencef various chools

ofNatural aw,war s conceiveds a reversion,regressiono some-

thing rior o the

rational

ocio-political

rder, reversiono an ele-

mental, arbaric tate.'0

Thisexplanation

eems o

Hegel nsufficient:he

moral

negation

of

wardoes

notexplain t away.

War seems

o be theproduct fsome

specific

uman

ngredient,

nd

seeing t as a mere

ccident, product

ofsheer

rbitrariness,nly egs hequestion

s to the

motives fthis

outrageous

ruption.

eeing ightings a

departurerom henorm

f

peacemeans lidingntowishfulhinking.hismight e laudedfrom

thepoint fviewof

personalubjective

morality,ut t

cannot e an

adequate

philosophical

xplanation, hen

philosophy eans

ompre-

hending

hat

which

s.

Here, s with

ther

ocialphenomena,

egel

holds

hatmoral

ndignationannot uffice.

He does xplicitly

ondemn

ar: Hence n war,war

tselfs

char-

acterized s

somethingwhich

ought to pass away . . .

implying .

.

thatthepossibilityf peace be retained. He doesnotrest nthis

but

goesfurther

n

order o explain he

nner ecessity

f thecauses

which

ring

boutwar

as partofthe

culturalworld

hapedbyman.

8

A.

Muller,

lemente er

Staatskunst,d.

J.Baxa

(Jena,

1922), , 5,

7, 85ff.

Meinecke,

n his

Weltbiirgertum

nd

Nationalstaat,46,

ees

in

Miiller

he fore-

runner

f

Ranke's

houghtsn

war,

while

Hegel's

hought,

hichs

free

rom he

romantic

bsession ith

he

vitalistic

nd

organic

rowth

fthe

tate, s of a

com-

pletely

ifferent

old.This

seems

obe

true

nspite

f

Hegel's

emark

hat

itera-

ture, nd mainly pic literature,s nourishedy wars of conquestWerke, d.

Glockner

Stuttgart,

928],

XIV, 354,

recentlyuoted

nd

discussed

y

W.

Kauf-

mann, rom

Shakespeare o

Existentialism,

22-124). It

seems

hathere,

nce

more,

mere

tatementf

what

eemed

o

Hegel to

be

a

historical act

was

con-

strued s if t

meantmoral

pproval.

9Hegel's

Philosophy

fRight,

rans. y

T. M.

Knox

Oxford,

945),

12.On

the

specific utheran

onnotationsf

this

expression,hich

ccurs lso

in

Goethe, f.

K.

Lowith,

onHegel

bis

Nietzsche

Zurich,

941),24.

10

Montesquieu

s

perhaps

he

first

mong

he

moderns ho

ees n

war

a

result

of the

social

conditionf

man,

and

not a

relapse

nto some

traumatic

re-social

state.L'EspritdesLois, , ch. i-iii.

11

hilosophy

f

Right,

338;

see also

addition

o

?

339.



5/13

466 SHLOMO

AVINERI

That our ideas about

how

this world

should have

been

are

different

fromhistorical eality, s

in

itself

proof

of

the

human

capacity

for

working

ut the ideal out of the

actual.

First of all, Hegel goeson to explainthatwarcannot be justified

by

the utilitarianmotive of the defenseof life and

property.

his

idea, whichHegel recognizes s one

of the commonplace

nswersto

the

question

of

the moral

ustification

f

war,

would

ead

to

an

absurd

situation:

for

t is

impossible

o demand

that men

sacrifice,

n the

act

of

war,

those

very

things

towards

the preservation

f which

it

is

waged.12 very attempt

o

justify

war

by

reference

o

needs will

nec-

essarilyculminate

n

a dubious code

of

ethics

according

o which

A

will have to pay withhis life to preserveB's life ormerelyproperty.

This amounts,

n

other

words, o

an

absoluteviolation

of Kant's cate-

gorical mperative,which is also the basis

of

Hegel's personal

mo-

rality: Be a person and respectothers s persons.

3

Where war is

defended

from he

point

of view of

Civil Society (i.e., the

realm of

needs), therenecessarily merges his violation of the

basic impera-

tive of

morality,

ince

man

thus

serves as

a mere

tool and means at

the hands

of his

fellowman.'4

Howeverstrange his

may seem primafacie,Hegel's

theory f war

tries

o avoid this

difficultynd

find

n explanation, nd

justification,

forwar without

nfringing

n the Kantian

imperative.

According

o

Hegel, there ies in war

an ethical (sittlich) element nasmuchas it

exposes

the

accidental, hearbitrary,nd finite n life. t

prevents he

particular nterest rom

ecoming he masterof the

universe.By de-

manding everything

rom ll, it places the concreteworld of phe-

nomena n its true transitory lace, it serves as an ethical memento

morz:

The ethical moment n war is implied n this....

War is not to

be

regarded

s

an

absolute

evil

and as a

purely external

accident,

which

tself

herefore

as

some

accidental cause, be it injustices, he

passionsof nationsor theholders f power,&c., or n short,

omething

or

other

whichought not to be. It is to what is by nature

accidental

that

accidents

happen, and the fate

whereby hey happen is thus a

necessity.Here as elsewhere, he point of view fromwhich things

seem

pure

accidentsvanishes

f we

look at

them

n

the

light

of

the

12

Ibid.,

? 324.

Without irectly

rawing

n this

paragraph, his

utilitarian-

liberal

rgument as

criticizedn the

more

generalevel

of

political

bligation

y

Hegel's

English

isciple, .

Bosanquet,

he

Philosophical

heory f

the

State,

new

editionLondon,

958),

76, n. 1.

13

Philosophy

fRight, 36;

Hegel's

Enzyklopddie,49.

Compare his

with he

Nazi maxim: The

individuals

such

has

neither

right

or

duty

o

exist,

s

all

therightsnd duties erive xclusivelyromhecommunity,tatedbytheNazi

juristOtto

Dietrich n his

article

n

the Volkischer

eobachter

November

1,

1937).

14

Philosophyf

Right, 324.



6/13

PROBLEM

OF

WAR IN

HEGEL

467

concept

and

philosophy,

because

philosophy

knows

accident for

a

show

and sees

in

it its

essence,

necessity.

t is

necessary

hat the

finite

-property

and

life

should be

definitely stablished

as

accidental,

because accidentalitys the conceptof the finite.

5

Hegel

himself

ees the

affinity

f his

train of

thought

with

re-

ligion,

nd

comments hat one

often

hears

sermons f

this

sort from

the

pulpit.

But,

he

goes

on to

remark,

very

one

hearing

n

church

that all the

goods

of

this world re

ephemeral,

till

thinks

hat on

the

day

of

judgment

his life

and

property

will be

spared.

But when

the

day

of

wrath

does come

and

shows

up

here,

n

this

world,

nd

not

in

some

remote

other-worldly

xistence,

if

this

insecurity

ow

comes

on the scenein the form fhussarswithshining abresand theyac-

tualize

in

real

earnest

what the

preachers

ave

said,

then

the

moving

and

edifying

discourses

which

foretold

ll these

events turn

into

curses

gainst

the

invader.

6

According

o these

paragraphs,war is

only

the

permanent

writing

on

the

wall,

the

embodiment f

unto

dust thou

shalt

return.

Thus

it is

not an

outcome

of a real

will of

any concrete

human

being,

nor

is

it

waged

withan

eye

towards heaggrandizementfanyparticular

personor

group.

t

is,

in

a

way,

a rod

of

anger,

o use

the

biblical ex-

pression,

unrelatedby

itself

to

any

goal,

just

as

the

wars of

Nebu-

chadnezzar

were

unrelated

o

anyethical

purpose,

hough

n

the

eyes

of

the

pious

they

always

had, behind

the

scene, the

hidden

meaning

of

providential

corn.

This

metaphysical

explanation

will

not

receive

much

approval

nowadays

and

may

certainly

eem

dated if

not

obscurantist.

n

the

otherhand, t would notbe welcomeby anyideologywhichmightbe

termed

militaristic,

s

it

is

completely

evoid

of

the

ethos of

war it-

self.

t

is,

however, elated

only to the

concept

ofwar,

and does

not

yet

refer

o

any

concrete,

istorical

war.

Hegel

distinguishes,

n an-

other

evel,

between

the

conceptof

the

state

and

the

concrete

tate;

the

latter

belongs

ultimately o the

realm

of

the

accidental

and

the

arbitrary,

nd

so

this

distinction

erves

Hegel

here

also:

This [con-

cept

of

war],

however,

s said

to

be only

a

philosophic

dea,

or, to

use

anothercommon xpression, 'justification f Providence,' nd it is

maintained

hat

actual

wars

require

ome

other

ustification.

7

Ob-

viously

this

mplies

that

the

philosophical

ignificance

f

the

concept

of

war

cannot

serve

as a

justification

or

waging ny

concrete

war.In

this

regard

here

was

a

marked

development

n

Hegel's

thought

fter

the

Phenomenology

f

Mind

had

been

written;

here

Hegel

had

not

yet

arrived at

a clear

distinction

etween

the

conceptualization

f

war

and

its

concrete

ncidence.

'5

Ibid.

16

bid.,

ddition

o

?

324.

17

Ibid.,

?

324.

It is

interesting

o note

that

Popper,

op.

cit.,

62,

269, did

not



7/13

468

SHLOMO

AVINERI

What, hen,

s theessence fconcrete ars or

Hegel?

Hegel asserts hat he

essence

f

a state's xistence

s

a

unity,

n

individuality,

ies

n its relations ith ther

tates.18

his

personality

of thestate, his fictitious an, o use Hobbes' anguage,mustbe

distinguished

rom ther

personalities

n order o find ts

identity:

The

nation

s a state

s

mind

n

its substantive

ationality

nd

im-

mediate ctuality

nd

s

thereforehe bsolute

ower

n earth. t fol-

lows

that

every

tate s

sovereign

nd

autonomous

gainst

ts

neigh-

bors.

19

This absolute

ower

f

the statederives

rom

he

empirical

act

thatnations

ave no

praetor

o

preside

ver

them,

s

Spinoza

once

put it,for here s no judicial nstitutioneforewhichnations an

litigate ;

but it should

be

emphasized

hat

this absolute

power

s

on

earth,

nd

notto be viewed s

eternal,

ub

specie

eternitatis.

his

is

a

factual, escriptive

tatementboutthe non-existence

f an

in-

stitutionalized

upranational

aw. That we

may

want

things

o be

different,egel

would

rgue, elongs

o

the

realm f

hope,

nd not

to the

province

f

reality.

Whatmakes

Hegel's

tatements

ound s

if

theymeant

hatwar

couldnever e avoided andhence heywere iewed s obnoxious)s

thefact hat

he criticizes

ven

he

possibility

f

ever

chievingasting

peace.

To understandhereason

or

his

position,

t s

necessary

o ex-

amine

arefully

he

anguage egel

uses

to

explain

t:

But

the

state

is an

individual,

nd

ndividualityssentiallymplies egation. ence

even

f

a

number f statesmake hemselves

nto

family,

his

group

as an individual

must

ngender

n

opposite

nd create

n

enemy.

1

A proper nderstandingfthis sentences possible nly n the

light

f

Hegel's

pistemology,

hereasmost f

thosewho

have relied

upon

t

have not

understood

he

connection. s

thestate

s seen by

Hegel

as a

person,

n 'individual

writ

arge,'we should turn to

Hegel'snotion fhow

persondentifiesimself. ut into nutshell,

Hegel's answer s that the

individual s a personby virtue f his

being recognized y

others nd

thus

distinguishing

imself rom

them

2

and thisholds rue

lso

for

he tate

which as the ttribute

ofa person.ts existences possible nly hroughheobjectification

of

ts desires s

they

ome nto

ontactwith

heworld xternal o it.

This

contact

s

possible nlyby meansof oppositionnd

struggle-

-just

as with he

ndividual,

ho

distinguishesimself rom is fel-

lowman,

ets

himselfn

opposition

o

him,

nd

n

doing o attains o

make the

distinction,alling

herefore

nto

the

pitfall

f

identifying

egel with

Treitschke

nd Moeller

an

den

Bruck.

18

Philosophy

fRight,

323.

19

bid., ? 331. Hegel

writes:

Das Volk als Staat

. .

. ; since

Knox

translated

this s thenation-state, hich nlybegsthequestion, havehad to rendermy

own

translationf

thisphrase. 20

bid.,addition

o

? 324.

21

Ibid.

The Korean

nd

Congolese xperiences

ight

erhaps

e

cited

s

illus-



8/13

PROBLEM OF

WAR IN HEGEL

469

self-identification.o makethe

point

learer,

ne

may

paradoxically

say that

f

states,

nthe

plural, ease

to

exist,

here

annot, ydefini-

tion, emain

state

n

the

ingular.

But thiscomplication,nwhichHegelbecame nmeshed ecause

of the

dialectical ature f

his

epistemology,

s

apt

to lead to

yet n-

other

urprising

onclusion:

f

the tate xists

ecause

t is

recognized

as

such

by

other

tates,23

t follows hat he tate s not

ndependent,

sovereign, monad

nclosed

withintself.t seems

o be

limited

n

its

omnipotence,

ts

sovereignty,s it

needs or

ts

very

xistencehe

co-existence

f ts

fellow-states.his s the

tartlingoint

rom hich

Hegel

derives ialecticallyheneed

for he

existencef nternational

lawas of vital mportanceor hevery xistence f the states hem-

selves.The

negation

f

thepossibilityfa

comprehensivend

per-

petual

nternational

rder oesnottherefore,

ccordingo

Hegel, on-

stitute hedenial f

theexistencef

nternationalaw itself.24

The

dialectical

aradox s thatHegel'sstate

s sovereign

nly n

so

far

s the

other

tates

ecognize

t as

such, nd the essential

eed

for

he xistencefa

comitas

entium

rises romust the

pparently

unlimitedovereigntyfthe tate.To theuninitiated,hismay ound

a bit

overstrained;o

Hegel, his

would nlyprove hatthe

nfinite

must

necessarilye

limited ndrestrictedy ts

own

dialectical ea-

son.

And so

Hegel comes o the

treatmentf

Internationalaw

in

that

section f the

Philosophy f

Right ntitled

Sovereigntyis-a-

vis

foreign

tates.

Here clearly t is incorrecto

assume hatHegel

denied he

xistencef

nternational

aw.

He

only enies he

existence

of

an

aprioristic

nternationalaw,which

wouldbe based

only on

abstractionsf things-as-they-ought-to-be.egel stresses, owever,

the

difference

etweennternational

nd

intranationalositive aw.

As

internationalaw derives ts

authority ot

from ts essence ut

rather romhe

particular ills f

thepartiesnvolved,t is

more ike

a

contract

han

aw.25But tsvery

xistenceand

Hegel

here

mploys

a

concept

with

he

intense oncreteignificance

f

Wirklichkeit)s

never

enied y him.26

Hegel even

goesfurthero

prove hat the

norm f nternational

behaviors inherentnwhat eems rima acie tsvery egation:

trations

o Hegel's

contentionow the

existence f an

international

rganization

might

nmeshhis

very

rganizationn

what s

to all

practical

urposesn act

of

war.

Assertionshatthose

xperiencesend o

strengthenhe

authorityf the UN

only

orroborate

egel's nsight,

s the same

might

e said of an

individualtate

confrontedy the

challenge

f war.

22Ibid., 71.

23Ibid.,

323.

24 Cf. the

interesting

tudy n

thissubject

by Dr.

Adam von

Trott zu

Solz,

Hegels

taatsphilosophie

ind

as

Internationale

echt,Abhandlungen

es

Seminars

fuir 6lkerrechtndDiplomatie, eft6 (Gottingen,932),87-91.

25For the

difference,

ccording o

Hegel,

betweenaw

and

contract,

ee his

Enzyklopddie,?

493-495.

26Philosophy

fRight, 333.



9/13

470

SHLOMO

AVINERI

Even

in war-the state of affairswhen

rights isappear

nd force

nd

chancehold

sway-a

bondwherein ach counts

o the restas

something

absolute

lways

remains. ence n

war,

war

tself

s characterizeds

some-

thingwhich ught opass away. t implieshereforeheproviso f the us

gentiumhat

he

possibility

f

peace

be retained

and so,

for

xample,

hat

envoys

mustbe

respected),nd,

n

general,

hatwar be not

waged gainst

domesticnstitutions,gainst

he

peace

offamily

nd

private

ife,

r

against

persons

n

their

rivate apacity.27

Here

the non-totalitarian spect of Hegelian war is

emphatically

stressed,

nd this stands miles

apart

from

he

prevailing

utlook

of

that

period

as characterized

y

the German

Romantics,e.g.

Adam

Muller, who complains hat warwas still consideredn Germany he

exclusive

business

of

the

standing rmy; according ohim, thefire f

war should

penetrate

ll

the

families,

ll

the laws

and

institutions f

peacetime

ife.

8

It is

in

Muller's

expressions hat

we

encounter he

roots of

the ideologyof total war. Hegel's distinction,

n the other

hand,

between State and Civil Society enables

him

to

safeguard n

autonomous

region, minently ersonal

and

particular,

which

should

be

respected

ven

in

war-as

war

is waged

between

tates,

never

be-

tween ndividuals.Hegel even comes to the conclusion hat modern

warfare

haracterized y the

anonymity f battlemade

possibleby the

discovery

f

gunpowder xpels personalenmity

rom

he

act

of

fight-

ing itself.29

his might eem a rathernaive

appreciation f the hor-

rible

possibilties f modern

warfare, nd it mightbe that Hegel be-

came himself

victimof thatwishful hinking o much

obnoxious o

him.

But

this

attests o the factthat Hegel wantedto

see war human-

ized or minimized n spite of his convictionthat it could not be

abolished

altogether.

n

anycase, the individualmust

be safeguarded

from heemotionalhorror f

warfare.

This

cannot

be

interpreted s the modernconcept

of a people's

nationalistwar, whichneeds the

concentration f everyhuman effort

in

the

community. s a consequenceHegel stresseshis

point that the

term f

patriotism hould

not

mean

the rrational

nthusiastic attle-

cry,

but ratherthe

day-to-day dentification

ith the

laws, institu-

tions, nd values ofthestate n peace

time.30

Moreover, ccording o

Hegel war and victory n war can never

suffice

o indicate which

party

was right.

A

concretewar can never

decide

matters f

justice;

the victors re

never

necessarily heright-

eous, nor thevanquishedthe

villains n the piece: Might s not Right.

Hegel

first ook this position as to the ethically

neutral outcome of

27

bid., ?

338

(my

talics).

Cf.

also

the addition o

this

paragraph,

s well

as

?

339.

This s

strikinglyimilar

o clause

6

of Kant's

Preliminary

rticles f Per-

petualPeace n hisPerpetual eace,trans. yM. SmithLondon, 903),114.

28

Elemente der

Staatskunst,

,

9.

29

Philosophy f

Right,

addition

o

?

338.

30

Ibid.,?

268.



10/13

PROBLEM

OF WAR IN

HEGEL

471

war in

his

essay

On

the

Constitution f

Germany

Die

Verfassung

Deutschlands) in

1802,

aying:

The

various

ossibilitiesfconflict

re so

numeroushat

t is

impossibleo

express hem t theoutset nthebasis ofhuman eason. he more hey re

explicitly

tated

nd

formulated,.e.,

hemore

ights hat

reset

down, he

more

readilywill

conflict

pring p

between

heserights. . .

Each

side

bases its

position

nthe right

which

t claims s

its ownand

charges

he

other artywith

iolating his r

that

right.... The

public akes ides

nd

each

party rgues hat

ustice

s his, nd

both

ides reright:

hedifficulty

is that

hese ust

rights

hemselves

avecaused

he

conflict.... Law

is the

utility fthe

tate s

assertednd

confirmedncontracts

nd treatises.

ut

since n these ontractshedifferentnterestsfthe state are stated n a

generalway,

while s

rightshey

re

exceptionally

any-sided,hese n-

terests,

nd with

hem

herights

hemselves, ust ome

o

conflict.t de-

pendsonlyon

the

combinationf

forces,

.e. on the

udgment

f

politics,

whetherhe

nterests

ndrights

hich re

thus

ndangered ill

bedefended

by

all

availablemeans

nd

force, rnot.

n such

case it is

obvious

hat

thisright

s also

reserved y

theother

arty, s it

hasthe

nterest

pposite

to

it,as

well as

theright o

this

nterest.nd

war, r

anyother

means,s

whatwilldecide hematter: otwhich fthetwo ightss themoreust-forboth ides

have ust

rights-but

which f

the

rightswillyield

to the

other.

War must

ecide his,

or ust

thereason

hat he

twomutually

on-

tradictory

ightsre

equally

rue nd ust.3'

The

same

principles,

ut in less

cumbersome nd

more

mature

philosophical

garb, Hegel

expressedtwenty

years later

in

his

Phi-

losophy

ofRight:

A state

through ts

subjects has

widespread on-

nections

nd

many-sided

nterests, nd

these

may be

readily nd

con-

stantly njured: but it remains nherentlyndeterminablewhich of

these

njuries s to be

regarded s a

specific

reach

of

treaty

r

an

in-

jury

to

the honor

and

autonomy f the

state. The

reason

for

this

is

that a

state

may

regard ts

infinity nd

honor as at stake

in

each of

its

concerns,

owever

minute,

nd it is

all the

more

nclinedto sus-

ceptibilties

o

injury

he

more tsstrong

ndividualitys

impelled

s a

resultof long

domesticpeace to

seek

and create a

sphere of

activity

abroad.

32

This is a rare nsight nto theself-righteousttitude very tate s

apt

to

adopt towards

real

or

imagined

nfringement

n what

t con-

siders ts

rights.33 hus

everywar creates the unfortunate ituation

wherein

both

sides

may

have a

claim to

a certain

portion

of

justice,

and

as a

result war

cannot

be

justified

from

he

point

of view

of

one

party

lone.

This

assumption

recluded

ny

possibility

f

relating

the

Hegelian

concept

of

war to the

idea

of

a

national

war,

since

the

national

movement,

ven

in

its

humanitarian

hase,e.g.

Mazzini,

has

had recourse to the concept of a 'just' war: otherwise t cannot

31

Hegels

chriften

ur Politik

nd

Rechtsphilosophie,

9-101

my

talics).

32Philosophy

f

Right,

334.

33Ibid., ?

335.



11/13

472

SHLOMO

AVINERI

justify

national

evee en

masse,

or a

people's

war

against

he

na-

tional

enemy,'

ottomention

ars

waged

on

pretexts

f

rectifying

historicalnjustices rpreventive

ars.

Accordingo Hegel,no warcan be inherentlyust,for concrete

wardoesnottake

place

n a realmwhich

s at all relevant o the

con-

cept

of

ustice.

Thus the circle as been closed:

first

he

conceptof

war has been understoodn the ethical

sphere

of

generalphilo-

sophical

peculation,nd then

oncrete

war retreatso the realm f

the

accidental. he

philosophicalolution,

n

spite

of its dialectical

brilliance, ay

eem

unsatisfactory,

ut

f

so,

the

failure

erives

rom

Hegel'sunwillingnesso

consecratehephenomenonf

concrete ar.

Thesolutiondopted yTreitschke,ho awa positivemoral ngredi-

ent n nationalwarsor warsof

conquest, r Carl

Schmitt's

adical

treatment

f war as

the

essence

f a

human

nd

political

reature

might emore onsistent,

houghmorally bhorrent.

or Hegel con-

cretewar s alwaysa conflict

etween ccidental-particularesires

which

ontain

nothing ecessary,34nd thus

no

philosophicalusti-

fication

an be

given o that

r

anyotherwar.35

From this Hegel draws ome nstitutionalonclusions: s war

should

ot

be

part

nd

parcel

fthe

ife

fthe

community

t

large,

t

should e

conductedy

a

standing rofessionalrmy,

nd not

hrough

a levee

en

masse.36

Universal

onscription

houldbe

avoided,

s the

couragend skillneeded

n

war

are themselvesndividual haracter-

istics

nd not collective

mass-psychologyirtues.37

n

harmony ith

this, he

militaryower hould

e

absolutely

nder

ivilian

uthority,

and a

militarytate

ike

the ateRomanpraetorian

mpire s cited

by Hegel as the nversionf thenormal rder f things.38

This is unquestionably

radically ifferent

onclusion rom he

prima

acie mpressionne getsfrom he passages

uoted t the be-

ginning f

thisessay, ut the

distinction,ccurringverand again,

between he

concept nd theconcrete henomenons

essential o the

understanding

f

Hegel'sposition.

hus Hegel

can exaltthe

concept

of

war,

without

dentifying

imself

ith

ny

concrete ar.This am-

bivalence

might erhaps

e

comparedon

a

rather

uperficialevel,

ofcourse) o the Christianttitude o sin.The

concept

of sin s the

cornerstonefChristian

heology,

nd

ssine

qua

non

to

the

oncept f

grace.

et everyoncrete in s a subject or egative

moral valuation.

Thus

Hegel concludes he

passages

n war

n

a vein

which or-

rectly

xpresses is feeling fcrucifixionnface fthe

fact hatwar s

so much

with

us; yet

n

spite

of

his assertion ot to

turn

o wishful

thinking,

e

sees

n

Europeof the

post-Napoleoniceriod

he possi-

bility

f

minimizinghe incidence

f

war:

The

Europeanpeoples

34

Ibid.,

?

334. 35

Ibid.,

?

337.

36

Ibid.,

??

325,

328.

37

Ibid., ? 327.

38

Ibid.,

addition

to

?

271.



12/13

PROBLEM

OF

WAR IN

HEGEL

473

form

family

n accordance

ith he universal

rinciple

nderlying

their

egal

codes,

heir

ustoms,

nd their

ivilization.

his

principle

has

accordingly

odifiedheir

nternational

onduct

n

the state

of

affairsi.e. war] otherwiseominated y the mutual nflictingf

evil.

1

This

universalistic

ttitude owards he

unifying

oncept

f

the

modern

world, f

contemporary

urope,

Hegel

also

uses

n

order

o

stress he

fact

hat

the

politico-national

oundaries

ividing

he

Eu-

ropean tates

re

of

secondary

mportance,

ince he

cultural

artner-

ship s dominant.

olitical

nity

s

secondary

o cultural

nity,

s the

realm f the

state tself

s

philosophically

ubordinatedo the

realm

of theabsolute pirit. husHegelputs t inhisPhilosophy fHis-

tory:

States

n

theModernWorld

eek

ndependence

f

one

another,

and this s their onor.

his

obstinate

endency

oward

n

absolute

position

f

autonomyhey

have in

common

with

the

Greek

ity-

states.

. . .

But

despite

all

the

differences

etween

the

individual

states

..

,

there

lso obtains a

unity

mong them, nd

therefore

e

should iew ven

political

ndependence

s

a

merely

ormal

rinciple.

Todaythere

s

notthe same

absolute

hasm

between he

statesof

Europewhich revailed etween reece ndPersia.Whenonestate

is

annexed o the

territoryf the

other,t

loses,

o

be

sure,ts

formal

independence:

ut

ts

religion,ts

aws, he

concrete

n

its

ife emain

intact.The

trendof

the

states

s,

therefore,

owards

niformity.

There

prevails

mong

hem

ne

aim,

ne

tendency,

hichs

the

cause

of

wars,

riendships,

nd

the

needsof

dynasties.

ut

there lso

pre-

vails

among

hem

nother

niformity,

hich

parallels he

idea of

hegemonynGreece,xcept hatnow t is thehegemonyfSpirit.

0

Although

egel

does

not

ccept, n

what

eems o

him

olidphilo-

sophical

considerations,

he

vision

of an

aprioristic

ternalpeace

scheme

uch

s

Kant's

or

that

of the

Holy

Alliance, is

empirical e-

3I9bid.,

ddition

o

? 339.

Hegel uses

a

similar

xpression

n

his

lectures n

aesthetics hen

he

remarks:

In

contemporary

urope

every

nation s

limited

y

another

ne, and

cannot,

herefore,

mbark

n

a

course f

war

against

nother

Europeannation

Werke,

d.

Glockner,

IV,

355).

40

G. W. F. Hegel,VorlesungenlberdiePhilosophieerWeltgeschichte,d.G.

Lasson,

Leipzig,

920),

761

(my

talics).

have

had to

render

my own

transla-

tion, s

this

passage,

ike

o

many

thers,

oesnot

ppear

n

Sibree's

nglish rans-

lation,

which

was

based on the

very

fragmentary

arly

German

dition

f

Hegel's

lectures

n the

Philosophy

f

History.

nly

t

the

beginning

f

this

centuryid

Lasson

compare his

dition

with

Hegel's

wn

notes

nd

publish

he

fuller

dition.

It

is

a

pity

hat

he

English-readingublic

has

to

rely

n

such

n

incomplete

er-

sion.

Cf.

also

Hegel's

opposition

o the

claimfor

natural'

rontiers,

ost

vocifer-

ously

laimed n

Germanyy

Arndt.

Hegel

contends

n his

Philosophy

f

Right,

?

247, hat uch claim

nly

auses

ndless

angers

nd

provokes

urther

ars, s

there xists o objectiveriterionor he naturalness'fthefrontiers.t is fasci-

nating

ow

deeply

n

early

XIX-century

hilosopher

ould

foresee

he

hollowness

of

thisnationalistic

atchword,

o much

till n

vogue

n our

own

century.



13/13

474 SHLOMO AVINERI

scription

f

contemporary

urope

s much n the samevein. f

there

might e raised bjections o it, they re on the ground hathe

has

notrightlyensed hepulseof his time.

For it seemsdoubtfulhatHegel's position boutwarcould, r

should,

e

defended.

t

might

eemhardly raiseworthyo explain

the mmanence

f war n human

history y

reference

o its

being

continuous

emento

ori;

till, t should e rememberedhatby

this

notionHegeldid

not

try

o defend ny actualwar, nly o explain

t

conceptually.imilarly,

t

may

be

questioned

hetherhere

eally

re

no just' wars

n the

sense hat

n

any warboth ideshave an equal

portion

f

justice.Contemporary

istory ertainly

ould

supply

us

withamplecases in whichHegel'snotionwould not stand when

tested

y

hisown tandards.

Yet, apart

from

he

question

whether

egel has supplied s

with

an

adequatephilosophical

xplanation

f

war,

t

mustbe

maintained

that,

nthe

other

and,

he did not

upply rguments

rom hich he

nationalist ase

for war could be sustained.The last paragraphs

quoted mply uggest

hat

Hegel did

not

speakthe anguage f

na-

tionalism

r

expansionist

ilitarism.is dream f

a

relatively

ran-

quil Europewasshattered,ikeall the other reams f theRestora-

tion

period,

n 1830 nd

ater,

with

reater orce,

n 1848.

At that ime

a new

chordwas

struck,

hich nabledmento

praisewaras morally

justified

nder

hose ircumstances

hich

uited hem

deologically.

Thus

Mazzini,

the

humanitarian

ationalist, ncouraged

is fol-

lowers

n

hisDuties

ofMan,

written

n

1844,

o

be concernedhat

he

blood

spilt by

them should

be ad

magnam

patriae gloriam;

Wilhelm

Jordan,member f theGerman onstituentssemblyn Frankfort,

justified

he

continued

ccupation

f Polish areas

by a unified

a-

tional

Germany

ith

he

following

ords: Our

right

n

Poland s

the

right

f

conquest,

he

right

f the

stronger

. .,

and

I

am

proud

of

t

1;

and the

Student

raternities

Burschenschafen) which e-

clared we

believe

hatwar

puts

n

endto conditionsf degeneration

and

that

t is the first nd

irrepressibleay to the final oalof na-

tional

unity

2

all

those arious

rends f

thought

o not

peak

he

language fHegel,and the philosophicalineage f those ttitudes

cannot e

ascribed

o him.

The HebrewUniversity,erusalem.

41

Cited

in T.

Klein, 1848-Der

Vorkampf eutscher inheitund

Freiheit

(Munich, 914),294-295.On this

problem

n

the

history

f

modern,nd

especially

German, ationalism,

f.

J.

L.

Talmon,

olitical

Messianism: he

Romantic hase

(London, 960),

479-486.

42H.

Haupt, Quellenund

Darstellungen

ur Geschichte

erBurschendschaft

und der deutscheninheitsbewegungHeidelberg,911), I, 37. For Hegel's tti-

tude to the extreme

ationalismf the

Fraternities,

ee

my The Hegelian

osi-

tion on

the

Emancipation

f

the

Jews,

ion, Quarterlyor

Research n

Jewish

History Jerusalem,

960),XXX, 134-136 in Hebrew).

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