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ACTUALITEITEN STRAFRECHT

SPREKERS MR. M.M. KUYP, ADVOCAAT JEBBINK SOETEMAN ADVOCATEN

MR. C.W. NOORDUYN, ADVOCAAT SJÖCRONA VAN STIGT ADVOCATEN

11 DECEMBER 2013

15:00 – 17:15 UUR

Inhoudsopgave

Mr. M.M. Kuyp

Mr. C.W. Noorduyn

Jurisprudentie

Effectieve bestand

EHRM, 24 november 1993, Imbrioscia v. Zwitserland, 13972/88 p. 4

Actieve rol Staat

EHRM, 17 juli 2012, Radu Pop v. Roemenië, 1433704 p. 22

Recht op bijstand bij verhoor

EHRM, 27 november 2008, Salduz v. Turkije, 36392/02 p. 45

EHRM, 11 december 2008, Panovits, 4268/04 p. 73

EHRM, 16 juni 2009, Karabil v. Turkije, 5256/02 p. 114

EHRM, 26 juli 2011, Sebalj v. Kroatië, 4429/09 p. 125

EHRM, 14 oktober 2010, Brusco v. Frankrijk, 1466/07 p. 182

Alledaagse handelingen- verhoogd strafrechtelijk risico

Hof Den Bosch, 11 september 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:4240 p. 202

Rechtbank Amsterdam, 1 november 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:7269 p. 209

Rechtbank Zeeland/West-Brabant, 19 november 2013,

ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:8352 p. 223

Ne bis in idem

Rechtbank Den Haag, 16 oktober 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14150 p. 233

COURT (CHAMBER)

CASE OF IMBRIOSCIA v. SWITZERLAND

(Application no. 13972/88)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

24 November 1993

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In the case of Imbrioscia v. Switzerland,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with

Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant

provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the

following judges:

Mr R. RYSSDAL, President,

Mr F. GÖLCÜKLÜ,

Mr L.-E. PETTITI,

Mr J. DE MEYER,

Mr I. FOIGHEL,

Mr R. PEKKANEN,

Mr A.B. BAKA,

Mr M.A. LOPES ROCHA,

Mr L. WILDHABER,

and also of Mr M.-A. EISSEN, Registrar, and Mr H. PETZOLD, Deputy

Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 22 April and 28 October 1993,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-

mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission

of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 11 September 1992, within the

three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art.

32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no.

13972/88) against the Swiss Confederation lodged with the Commission

under Article 25 (art. 25) by an Italian national, Mr Franco Imbrioscia,

on 5 May 1988.

The Commission‟s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art.

48) and to the declaration whereby Switzerland recognised the

compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of

the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case

disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under

Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.

2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para.

3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he wished to take

part in the proceedings and communicated the name of the lawyer who

was to represent him (Rule 30). Before the Commission the applicant

The case is numbered 32/1992/377/451. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission. As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which came into force on 1 January 1990.

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had been designated by the initial "I.", but he now agreed to the

disclosure of his identity.

The Italian Government, who had been informed by the Registrar of

their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 48 (b) of the

Convention and Rule 33 para. 3 (b)) (art. 48-b), gave no indication that

they wished to do so.

3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr L. Wildhaber,

the elected judge of Swiss nationality (Article 43 of the Convention)

(art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3

(b)). On 26 September 1992, in the presence of the Registrar, the

President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely

Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr L.-E. Pettiti, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr I. Foighel, Mr R.

Pekkanen, Mr A.B. Baka and Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha (Article 43 in fine of

the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).

4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal, acting

through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Swiss Government

("the Government"), the applicant‟s lawyer and the Delegate of the

Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1

and 38). Pursuant to the orders made in consequence, the Registrar

received the Government‟s memorial on 21 December 1992 and the

applicant‟s memorial on 4 January 1993. On 24 February the Secretary

to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would

address the Court at the hearing; subsequently, he produced various

documents requested by the Registrar on the instructions of the

President.

5. In accordance with the President‟s decision, the hearing took

place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 April

1993. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.

There appeared before the Court:

- for the Government

Mr P. BOILLAT, Head

of the European Lawand International Affairs Section,

Federal Office of Justice, Agent,

Mr F. SCHÜRMANN, Deputy Head

of the European Law and International Affairs Section,

Federal Office of Justice, Counsel;

- for the Commission

Mr B. MARXER, Delegate;

- for the applicant

Mr C.F. FISCHER, Rechtsanwalt, Counsel.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Boillat, by Mr Marxer and by Mr

Fischer, as well as their replies to its questions.

6. On 19 May the Agent of the Government filed a number of

documents, as requested by the Registrar on the Court‟s instructions.

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AS TO THE FACTS

7. Mr Franco Imbrioscia, a commercial traveller of Italian nationality,

resided at Barletta (Italy) at the material time.

I. THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. The applicant’s arrest

8. On 2 February 1985 the applicant arrived at Zürich airport from

Bangkok. The customs officers found 1.385 kg of heroin in the suitcase

of another passenger on the same flight, M. When asked whether he

had been travelling with someone else, the latter pointed out the

applicant. Mr Imbrioscia explained that they were both part of a group;

he was searched and, when nothing was found, released.

9. After further investigations, he was none the less suspected of

being linked to M., as a result of which he was arrested on the same day

at Lugano, on the train on which he was returning to Italy.

B. The investigation

10. Mr Imbrioscia immediately sought the help of Mrs S. C., who

contacted a lawyer, Ms B. G.

11. On Sunday 3 February the applicant was questioned by the

Zürich district prosecutor (Bezirksanwalt) with the assistance of an

interpreter. He stated that he had caught the plane at Zürich because it

was the cheapest way of travelling to Bangkok. By pure coincidence

another person had also bought a ticket at Barletta for the same flight,

but they had never sat next to each other during the trip. In addition,

he denied that he had been involved in importing drugs into

Switzerland. When he was advised that he was being remanded in

custody, he requested that a lawyer be assigned to him as he did not

know any lawyers in Zürich.

He remained in custody in the building of the Bülach district

prosecutor‟s department.

12. On 8 February Ms B. G. wrote to Mr Imbrioscia offering to

represent him. He returned the necessary authority to act to her after

signing it.

13. On 13 and 15 February the police interrogated him without his

lawyer being present.

On 18 February 1985 he was questioned by a Bülach district

prosecutor and he asked to be confronted with M., in order to prove his

innocence.

14. On 25 February Ms B.G. withdrew as the applicant‟s lawyer. The

available documents do not show to what extent she had participated in

his defence, but it is apparent from the prison register that she never

visited him.

On the same day Mr Fischer was officially assigned to act for Mr

Imbrioscia and on 27 February was given permission to visit him, which

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he did for the first time on 1 March 1985. On 4 March 1985 the case file

that had been sent to him for inspection on 27 February was returned

by him to the district prosecutor‟s office .

15. Mr Imbrioscia was questioned again by the district prosecutor on

8 March. Mr Fischer had not been invited to attend the interview and

does not seem to have asked to be present, but he received a transcript

of it. On 15 March he visited the applicant.

16. On 2 and 3 April 1985 the district prosecutor and two police

officers went to Barletta to examine several witnesses, including two

travel agents.

17. On 9 April 1985 Mr Imbrioscia‟s lawyer had a conversation with

the district prosecutor, the subject of which is a matter of dispute.

According to the judgment delivered by the Zürich Court of Appeal

(Obergericht) on 17 January 1986 (see paragraphs 23-24 below), the

district prosecutor told the lawyer that his client would be questioned

again on 11 April. Mr Fischer denies this and claims that the discussion

centred on the applicant‟s detention.

In any event, he was not present on 11 April when Mr Imbrioscia was

questioned about the inconsistencies in his statements and disputed the

findings of the inquiries made in Italy.

18. By a letter of 17 April 1985 Mr Fischer acknowledged receipt of

the transcripts of the witnesses‟ statements in Barletta and of the

questioning on 11 April (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above), and

complained that he had not been invited to attend. He visited Mr

Imbrioscia the next day.

19. Mr Fischer was, on the other hand, present on 6 June 1985 when

the applicant was informed that the preliminary investigation had been

concluded and that he faced possible charges of heroin smuggling and

forgery. Mr Imbrioscia stated that he had had nothing to do with the

matters of which he was accused under the first head and that he had

acted in good faith as regards the second. His lawyer remained silent.

C. The court proceedings

1. In the Bülach District Court

20. On 10 June 1985 the district prosecutor‟s office committed Mr

Imbrioscia and M. for trial in the Bülach District Court (Bezirksgericht)

for drug trafficking.

On 13 June Mr Fischer visited his client in prison.

21. At the hearing on 26 June 1985 the two accused were again

questioned about the facts, and their counsel made their submissions.

Mr Fischer also examined M.

The court convicted the applicant and his co-defendant of offences

against the dangerous drugs legislation (Betäubungsmittelgesetz). It

sentenced Mr Imbrioscia to seven years‟ imprisonment and banned him

from residing in Switzerland for fifteen years; his co-defendant was

given a six-year prison sentence. The defendants were each ordered to

pay half the costs of the proceedings.

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22. The court noted that the applicant had contradicted himself on

several occasions - as to whether he knew M.‟s first name and surname,

whether he had sat next to him in the aeroplane and so on. Having

regard to these inconsistencies, it considered that the accused‟s claim

that he was innocent could no longer be taken seriously (nicht mehr

ernstgenommen werden kann).

M., who was illiterate, had also made such contradictory statements

that there were doubts as to his mental capacity; he could not therefore

be regarded as having been the organiser of the drug smuggling. On the

last occasion he was questioned, on 15 May 1985, he had moreover

stated that his co-defendant had been with him continuously and had

told him when he should take delivery of the suitcase. Mr Imbrioscia‟s

role had therefore been to assist and supervise M.

The court found that the applicant had knowingly and willingly

participated in committing the offence.

2. In the Zürich Court of Appeal

23. On 17 January 1986, after a hearing during which Mr Imbrioscia

was again questioned by the judges, in Mr Fischer‟s presence, the Zürich

Court of Appeal (Obergericht) dismissed his appeal (Berufung). It

upheld the sentence imposed by the District Court (see paragraph 21

above) and in addition ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the

appeal proceedings.

24. As regards his lawyer‟s absence during the interviews it observed

that the lawyer had been informed of the date of the one on 11 April

1985 but had not attended, and that he had not put any questions at

the last interview on 6 June 1985, which he had attended (see

paragraph 19 above). Nor had the appellant shown how his defence had

been adversely affected.

On the merits, the court followed the trial court‟s reasoning; it

considered it scarcely plausible that two people who did not know each

other should have travelled together from Barletta to Bangkok and back

via Zürich and have stayed in Thailand in the same hotel.

3. In the Zürich Court of Cassation

25. An application by Mr Imbrioscia to the Zürich Court of Cassation

(Kassationsgericht) for a declaration of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde)

was dismissed on 8 October 1986.

With regard to the complaint based on the fact that no lawyer was

present at the interviews, the Court of Cassation referred to the case-

law of the Federal Court (see paragraph 27 below). The applicant had

not alleged that he had asked to have his lawyer present and that his

request had been rejected on irrelevant grounds (unsachliche Gründe);

his lawyer had, moreover, attended the interview on 6 June 1985 and

the hearing on 26 June (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above).

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4. In the Federal Court

26. On 5 November 1987 the Federal Court dismissed a public-law

appeal by the applicant against the judgments of 17 January 1986 and 8

October 1986 (see paragraphs 23-25 above).

The Federal Court referred to its case-law concerning Article 17 para.

2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canton of Zürich (see

paragraph 27 below). It stressed that Mr Imbrioscia had not complained

that a request to have his lawyer present had been arbitrarily rejected;

the lawyer had attended the last questioning and had been sent the

transcripts of the previous ones. There had therefore been no

infringement of the defence rights guaranteed to Mr Imbrioscia under

the Swiss Federal Constitution and the Convention.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

27. At the material time Article 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

of the Canton of Zürich was worded as follows:

"During the investigation counsel for the defence must be granted

access to the file in so far as the purposes of the investigation are

not thereby jeopardised. He cannot be refused the right to inspect

reports by experts or transcripts of interviews at which he is entitled

to be present.

The investigating law officer may give counsel leave to attend

personal interviews with the person charged.

Once the investigation is concluded, counsel for the defence shall

have unrestricted access to the file."

According to the Federal Court‟s case-law, the second paragraph of

this provision permits the prosecuting authorities to refuse to allow a

lawyer to be present on the first occasion when a suspect is questioned

without giving reasons, but requires them to give reasons if they intend

to exclude the lawyer from subsequent interviews.

The practice in Zürich is that the lawyer does not generally attend

when his client is interrogated by the police, but he is usually sent the

transcripts.

28. The first two paragraphs of the Article cited above were

amended on 1 September 1991 and now provide:

"During the investigation access to the file must be granted to the

person charged and to his defence counsel on request, if and in so

far as the purposes of the investigation are in no way thereby

jeopardised. The right to inspect documents already communicated

to the person charged as well as experts‟ reports and the transcripts

of investigation interviews which counsel for the defence has been

given leave to attend cannot be refused.

The investigating law officer must give counsel for the defence an

opportunity to attend examinations of the person charged if the

latter so wishes and if the purposes of the investigation are not

10

likely to be jeopardised. Members of the cantonal Bar must be

admitted to examinations once the person charged has made his

first statement to the investigating law officer or if he has been in

custody for fourteen days. A defence counsel who attends an

examination must be able to put questions to the person charged

that are likely to throw light on the case."

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

29. Mr Imbrioscia lodged his application with the Commission on 5

May 1988. He complained that his lawyer had not been present at most

of his interrogations; he also complained, inter alia, that the lawyer had

not attended the examination of various witnesses in Italy and that an

appeal judge had been biased; he relied on Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3

(b), (c) and (d) (art. 6-1, art. 6-2, art. 6-3-b, art. 6-3-c, art. 6-3-d) of

the Convention.

30. On 31 May 1991 the Commission declared the application (no.

13972/88) admissible as regards the first complaint and dismissed it, as

being manifestly ill-founded, in respect of the others.

In its report of 14 May 1992 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), it

expressed the opinion, by nine votes to five, that there had been no

violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) of the

Convention. The full text of the Commission‟s opinion and of the three

dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to

this judgment.

THE GOVERNMENT‟S FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT

31. In their memorial, the Government requested the Court

"to hold that the Swiss authorities had not infringed the ...

Convention ... on account of the facts which gave rise to the

application lodged by Mr Imbrioscia".

AS TO THE LAW

32. The applicant complained that he had not been assisted by a

lawyer during several of his interrogations by the police and by the

Bülach and Zürich district prosecutors; he relied on Article 6 paras. 1

and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, which provides:

Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 275 of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is available from the registry.

11

"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable

time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ...

...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his

own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so

require;

..."

33. According to the applicant, he was, despite his express request,

unassisted by counsel when he was questioned by the police or the

district prosecutor on 3, 13, 15 and 18 February, 8 March and 11 April

1985, since his successive lawyers had not been invited to attend. The

lawyer he had first instructed, Ms B. G., had withdrawn soon after her

appointment. Indeed, he had effectively had no lawyer at all until 27

February 1985, when Mr Fischer was informed that he had been

officially assigned; and at that time most of the interviews had already

taken place. Mr Imbrioscia also drew attention to the importance of the

investigation in Zürich criminal procedure; he inferred that in order to

be effective, the right to defend oneself must cover not only the trial,

but also the preceding interrogations by the police and the phase which

took place before the district prosecutor.

34. The Government submitted first that preliminary investigations

were not covered by Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (art. 6-1, art. 6-3). They

also maintained that neither the Swiss Constitution nor the Convention

directly guaranteed defence lawyers the right to be present at the

interrogations of their clients during criminal investigations. Admittedly,

the applicant had requested the assistance of counsel at the outset, but

he had not asked for counsel to be present while he was being

questioned, and neither Ms B. G. nor Mr Fischer had taken any steps to

that end. Furthermore, as soon as he had been assigned, Mr Fischer had

received the case file and obtained permission to visit his client, which

he did on four occasions. Lastly, as was shown by the transcripts, the

hearings in the Bülach District Court and the Zürich Court of Appeal

were taken up mainly with the same points as the interrogations, and

counsel for the applicant had participated in them and had every

opportunity to challenge the evidence gathered at an earlier stage.

35. Taking the proceedings as a whole, the Commission was of the

view that the absence of a lawyer at the applicant‟s various

interrogations did not lead to a disadvantage which was likely to affect

the position of the defence at the trial and thus also the outcome of the

proceedings.

36. The Court cannot accept the Government‟s first submission

without qualification. Certainly the primary purpose of Article 6 (art. 6)

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as far as criminal matters are concerned is to ensure a fair trial by a

"tribunal" competent to determine "any criminal charge", but it does not

follow that the Article (art. 6) has no application to pre-trial

proceedings. The "reasonable time" mentioned in paragraph 1 (art. 6-

1), for instance, begins to run from the moment a "charge" comes into

being, within the autonomous, substantive meaning to be given to that

term (see, for example, the Wemhoff v. Germany judgment of 27 June

1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 26-27, para. 19, and the Messina v. Italy

judgment of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-H, p. 103, para. 25);

the Court has occasionally even found that a reasonable time has been

exceeded in a case that ended with a discharge (see the Maj v. Italy

judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 196-D, p. 43, paras. 13-15)

or at the investigation stage (see the Viezzer v. Italy judgment of 19

February 1991, Series A no. 196-B, p. 21, paras. 15-17). Other

requirements of Article 6 (art. 6) - especially of paragraph 3 (art. 6-3) -

may also be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and in so far as the

fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure

to comply with them (see, inter alia, the following judgments: Engel and

Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 38-39,

para. 91; Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç v. Germany, 28 November 1978,

Series A no. 29, p. 20, para. 48; Campbell and Fell v. the United

Kingdom, 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, pp. 44-45, paras. 95-99; Can

v. Austria, 30 September 1985, Series A no. 96, p. 10, para. 17; Lamy

v. Belgium, 30 March 1989, Series A no. 151, p. 18, para. 37; Delta v.

France, 19 December 1990, Series A no. 191-A, p. 16, para. 36;

Quaranta v. Switzerland, 24 May 1991, Series A no. 205, pp. 16-18,

paras. 28 and 36; and S. v. Switzerland, 28 November 1991, Series A

no. 220, pp. 14-16, paras. 46-51).

37. The right set out in paragraph 3 (c) of Article 6 (art. 6-3-c) is

one element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal

proceedings contained in paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) mutatis mutandis, the

Artico v. Italy judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 15, paras.

32-33, and the Quaranta judgment, cited above, Series A no. 205, p.

16, para. 27).

38. While it confers on everyone charged with a criminal offence the

right to "defend himself in person or through legal assistance ...", Article

6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) does not specify the manner of exercising this

right. It thus leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of

ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems, the Court‟s task

being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is

consistent with the requirements of a fair trial (see the Quaranta

judgment previously cited, Series A no. 205, p. 16, para. 30). In this

respect, it must be remembered that the Convention is designed to

"guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are

practical and effective" and that assigning a counsel does not in itself

ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused

(see the Artico judgment previously cited, Series A no. 37, p. 16, para.

33).

In addition, the Court points out that the manner in which Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) is to be applied during the

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preliminary investigation depends on the special features of the

proceedings involved and on the circumstances of the case; in order to

determine whether the aim of Article 6 (art. 6) - a fair trial - has been

achieved, regard must be had to the entirety of the domestic

proceedings conducted in the case (see, mutatis mutandis, the Granger

v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174, p.

17, para. 44).

39. At the end of his first examination by the Zürich district

prosecutor on 3 February 1985 Mr Imbrioscia requested that counsel

should be assigned to him as he did not know any lawyers in Zürich (see

paragraph 11 above). However, immediately after his arrest he had

taken steps, with the help of a friend, to instruct counsel of his own

choosing; and on 8 February Ms B. G. offered her services, whereupon

the applicant returned to her the necessary authority to act after signing

it (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above).

Ms B. G. ceased to act for the applicant on 25 February (see

paragraph 14 above), without having visited him. In the meantime Mr

Imbrioscia had been interviewed three times, firstly by the police, on 13

and 15 February 1985, and then by the Bülach district prosecutor on 18

February (see paragraph 13 above). Ms B. G. had not been invited to

attend any of these interviews, since Zürich cantonal legislation and

practice did not require her to be present (see paragraph 27 above),

and she had, moreover, not asked to attend.

40. The applicant and the Government held each other responsible

for the inactivity of the defence over that period. Counsel for the

applicant pleaded the complexity of the assignment procedure, which he

said had prevented his colleague from being able to prepare herself in

time to be able to attend the interviews in question; furthermore, the

authorities had done nothing to postpone them. In the Government‟s

view, it was for Mr Imbrioscia, and also for Ms B. G., to react, yet

neither of them had protested.

41. However that may be, the applicant did not at the outset have

the necessary legal support, but "a State cannot be held responsible for

every shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal aid

purposes" (see the Kamasinski v. Austria judgment of 19 December

1989, Series A no. 168, p. 33, para. 65) or chosen by the accused.

Owing to the legal profession‟s independence, the conduct of the

defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his

representative; under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) the Contracting

States are required to intervene only if a failure by counsel to provide

effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their

attention (ibid.).

Since the period in question was so short and the applicant had not

complained about Ms B. G.‟s inactivity, the relevant authorities could

scarcely be expected to intervene. When she informed them of her

withdrawal on 25 February 1985, they at once officially assigned a

lawyer for his defence (see paragraph 14 above).

42. Mr Fischer received the case file on 27 February 1985 and went

to see his client in prison on 1 March. When he returned it to the district

prosecutor on 4 March, he did not raise the issue of the non-attendance

14

by a lawyer at the earlier interrogations of which he had inspected the

transcripts (see paragraph 14 above).

The district prosecutor questioned Mr Imbrioscia on 8 March, 11 April

and 6 June 1985. It appears that the applicant was able to talk to his

counsel before and after each of these interviews (see paragraphs 14,

15 and 18 above). Mr Fischer did not, however, attend the first two. It

was not until 17 April that he complained that he had not been given

notice that they were taking place (see paragraph 18 above). Thereupon

the district prosecutor allowed him to attend the last interview, which

concluded the investigation; the lawyer did not then put any questions,

nor did he challenge the findings of the investigation (see paragraph 19

above), which he was aware of as he had received the relevant

transcripts.

43. Furthermore, the hearings in the Bülach District Court and the

Zürich Court of Appeal were attended by adequate safeguards: on 26

June 1985 and 17 January 1986 the judges heard the applicant in the

presence of his lawyer, who had every opportunity to examine him and

his co-defendant (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above) and to challenge

the prosecution‟s submissions in his address.

44. A scrutiny of the proceedings as a whole therefore leads the

Court to hold that the applicant was not denied a fair trial.

There has thus been no breach of paragraphs 1 and 3 (c) of Article 6

(art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) taken together.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

Holds by six votes to three that there has been no breach of Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in

the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 November 1993.

Rolv RYSSDAL

President

Marc-André EISSEN

Registrar

In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the Convention

and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting opinions of Mr

Pettiti, Mr De Meyer and Mr Lopes Rocha are annexed to this judgment.

R. R.

M.-A. E.

15

IMBRIOSCIA v. SWITZERLAND JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

12

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

(Translation)

I voted with the minority, being of the opinion that there had been a

clear violation of Article 6 (art. 6). While it may be accepted that Article

6 (art. 6) does not formally require the assistance of a lawyer for an

initial period of detention, the Convention does require such assistance

for the phase of the preliminary investigation. Even though the specific

legislation of the Canton of Zürich does not appear to provide for a

period of police custody and entrusts to the district prosecutor the task

of carrying out the first inquiries, the accused was questioned by the

police during the first twenty-four hours and then on several occasions

under the responsibility of the prosecutor. The phase of the preliminary

investigation, which lasted some weeks, was the equivalent of an

investigation conducted by an investigating judge under the continental

inquisitorial system.

Even if it may be accepted that within the Zürich system the first

stage of this phase can be conducted by a prosecutor rather than by a

member of the judiciary, it remains evident that the assistance of a

lawyer is indispensable if the proceedings are to be fair and the rights of

the defence respected for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6).

It is clear that the lawyer, Mr Fischer, after his appointment, was not

invited to attend the second series of interrogations effected by the

prosecutor, who was aware that Ms B. G. had withdrawn her services.

That a lawyer should be so summoned is essential for examining

whether the principle that proceedings must be adversarial has been

complied with. The lawyer cannot be expected to ask to be summoned

when he does not know the date of the interrogation. If the lawyer does

not comply with such a summons, it will be for the judge to take any

appropriate measures: postponement, appointment of a replacement

lawyer and so on. Ultimately this question may be relevant to

proceedings brought to establish nullity on the ground of breach of an

essential procedural requirement.

In any event it is absolutely necessary for the summons to be issued.

Yet there was no express provision to this effect in the relevant

legislation of the Canton of Zürich. In order to reach its finding that

there had been no violation, the Court took the following view:

"42. Mr Fischer received the case file on 27 February 1985 and

went to see his client in prison on 1 March. When he returned it to

the district prosecutor on 4 March, he did not raise the issue of the

non-attendance by a lawyer at the earlier interrogations of which he

had inspected the transcripts (see paragraph 14 above).

The district prosecutor questioned Mr Imbrioscia on 8 March, 11

April and 6 June 1985. It appears that the applicant was able to talk

to his counsel before and after each of these interviews (see

paragraphs 14, 15 and 18 above). Mr Fischer did not, however,

attend the first two. It was not until 17 April that he complained that

he had not been given notice that they were taking place (see

16

IMBRIOSCIA v. SWITZERLAND JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

13

paragraph 18 above). Thereupon the district prosecutor allowed him

to attend the last interview, which concluded the investigation; the

lawyer did not then put any questions, nor did he challenge the

findings of the investigation (see paragraph 19 above), which he

was aware of as he had received the relevant transcripts.

43. Furthermore, the hearings in the Bülach District Court and the

Zürich Court of Appeal were attended by adequate safeguards: on

26 June 1985 and 17 January 1986 the judges heard the applicant

in the presence of his lawyer, who had every opportunity to examine

him and his co-defendant (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above) and to

challenge the prosecution‟s submissions in his address."

However, in my opinion, a violation should be found on the basis of

other elements in the file and the practice of the Canton of Zürich. The

interrogations were effected without a lawyer being present or being

invited to attend between 13 February and May 1985, after the

interrogation carried out by the police on 2 February. Mr Fischer did not

have access to the file until 27 February 1985. The change of lawyers,

Mr Fischer‟s visit to the prison, his presence at the final interrogation of

the investigation and even his failure to lodge a protest or to express

reservations on 6 June cannot justify the earlier infringements of the

rights of the defence. The wording of Article 17 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of the Canton of Zürich, as applicable at the material time (it

has since been amended), made no reference to an obligation to invite

the lawyer to attend.

The legislation of the different cantons is supposed to conform to the

European Convention on Human Rights and to the case-law of the

European Court and that conformity is subject to the supervision of the

Swiss Federal Court. In my opinion the present case shows that at the

material time the judicial practice of the Canton of Zürich did not take

full account of Article 6 (art. 6).

This situation runs counter to all the recent developments in

European criminal procedure, which are directed towards recognising

the crucial position of the defence throughout the investigation and the

criminal trial.

Admittedly the circumstances of the present case limit the scope of

the Court‟s decision. The fact remains, none the less, that the above-

mentioned lacunae in the legislation of the Canton of Zürich are evident

and in the instant case resulted in an infringement of the rights of the

defence.

That is why I voted in favour of finding a violation of Article 6 (art.

6).

The legislation of the different member States of the Council of

Europe is also developing towards securing better protection of the

rights of the defence in accordance with the spirit of Article 6 (art. 6).

Thus as regards police custody, Germany provides for the intervention

and presence of a lawyer immediately and France, following a recent

reform, after nineteen hours.

In any event, this intervention is indispensable at the stage of the

preliminary investigation, the investigation into the merits of the case.

17

IMBRIOSCIA v. SWITZERLAND JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

14

To comply with this requirement the summons must be a compulsory

step in the proceedings so that the completion of this formality can be

noted in the official record and to leave open the possibility of

subsequently pleading the nullity of the proceedings.

The fact that the proceedings are adversarial in nature at the final

stage and at the trial cannot cure earlier irregularities in this respect,

because statements obtained in the absence of a lawyer can be decisive

in reaching a verdict.

The proceedings in the Imbrioscia case provide an example of the

difficulty encountered, even in the member States of the Council of

Europe, in securing, after forty years, recognition in the legislation and

in the attitudes of the legislators and lawyers of the guiding principles of

the notion of fair trial derived from the European Convention on Human

Rights.

18

IMBRIOSCIA v. SWITZERLAND JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI

15

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

On the 13th of June 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States of

America delivered its well-known Miranda judgment, in which the rules

governing custodial interrogation were summarised as follows:

"(U)nless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the

person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the

right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are

required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has

the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against

him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an

attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be

appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him

throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given,

and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly

and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions

or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver

are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained

as a result of interrogation can be used against him".

In the same judgment it was also stated that there can be no

questioning if the person "indicates ... that he wishes to consult with an

attorney before speaking" or if, being alone, he "indicates ... that he

does not wish to be interrogated".

These principles, then clearly defined, belong to the very essence of

fair trial.

Therefore I cannot agree with the present judgment, in which our

Court fails to recognise and apply them.

Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States and California v. Stewart, 384 US 436, at 478-479, 16 LEd 2d 694, at 726. 384 US at 444-445, 16 LEd 2d at 706-707. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr Loucaides, annexed to the Commission's report in the present case.

19

20

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOPES ROCHA

(Translation)

I subscribe fully to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions of

Judge Pettiti and Judge De Meyer, to which I would add the following

comments.

The most modern European codes of criminal procedure recognise

that the right of an accused to legal assistance at each stage of the

proceedings is an established one which is considered to be the most

perfect embodiment of the rights of the defence and therefore of fair

proceedings intended to secure for the accused an ever stronger and

more effective position as a party to the trial.

The enjoyment of such a right is undoubtedly justified, especially in

the initial stages of the proceedings when the accused has to confront

the prosecuting authorities on rather unequal terms, and the fact that

he is allowed the assistance of a legal specialist at the subsequent

interrogations cannot effectively cure this defect.

Admittedly, at the trial the accused has the right to seek to refute the

evidence obtained, including any confession that he may have made,

but experience shows that at this stage of the proceedings that right is

frequently insufficient to overturn opinions formed on the basis of

statements made in the absence of a lawyer.

That is why, in the present case, I took the view that there had been

a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c) of the

Convention

21

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF RADU POP v. ROMANIA

(Application no. 14337/04)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

17 July 2012

FINAL

17/10/2012

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.

It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Radu Pop v. Romania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a

Chamber composed of:

Josep Casadevall, President,

Alvina Gyulumyan,

Egbert Myjer,

Ján Šikuta,

Ineta Ziemele,

Nona Tsotsoria,

Kristina Pardalos, judges,

and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 26 June 2012,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

22

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 14337/04) against

Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for

the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

(“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Radu Pop (“the

applicant”), on 15 March 2004.

2. The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented

by their Agent, Mr Răzvan-Horaţiu Radu, of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.

3. As Mr Corneliu Bîrsan, the judge elected in respect of Romania,

had withdrawn from the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court), the

President of the Chamber appointed Mrs Kristina Pardalos to sit as

ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 of the

Rules of Court).

4. The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been ill-treated by

police officers on 18 August 2003 and that the investigation into

his allegations of ill-treatment had been inadequate and ineffective. He

also complained about the material conditions of detention in different

prisons where he had been detained and a lack of appropriate medical

treatment while in detention. He also claimed that his court-appointed

legal-aid defence counsel had not provided effective legal assistance to

him in the preparation and conduct of the case before the High Court of

Cassation and Justice, with the result that he had been denied the

benefit of a fair trial.

5. On 15 June 2009 the President of the Third Section decided to

give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to

rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time

(Article 29 § 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The applicant was born in 1967 and is curently detained in

Gherla Prison.

A. The incident of 18 August 2003

7. On 2 April 2003 the applicant was convicted of vandalism, assault

and disturbance of public order and sentenced to 472 days‟

imprisonment by a judgment rendered by the Zalău District Court. The

judgment became final on 2 July 2003 when the Sălaj County Court

dismissed the appeal lodged against it by the prosecutor‟s office.

8. During the criminal proceedings the applicant was detained in

Satu Mare Prison in connection with another offence he had committed,

23

but he attended the hearings before the court of first instance. He was

released from that prison on 18 May 2003.

9. According to the information provided by the applicant, he did not

attend the final hearings before the Sălaj County Court. He admitted

that he had received a copy of the final decision, which had been

delivered to his home on 2 July 2003, informing him that he had been

convicted and sentenced to 472 days‟ imprisonment.

10. On 28 July 2003 an arrest warrant for the execution of the

sentence was issued in respect of the applicant but could not be

executed as he had absconded.

11. Acting on information that the applicant was at his home in the

village of Creaca, on the morning of 18 August 2003, at about 6 a.m.,

eight police officers, together with the head of the local police and

his deputy, went to the applicant‟s home in order to arrest him. The

decision to operate in such a large number was taken on the ground

that the applicant had antecedents of aggressive behaviour, his previous

conviction being for assaulting a police officer.

12. When they arrived outside the applicant‟s home, the police

officers ordered the applicant to surrender to custody, but he did not

reply. Knowing that he was inside, an operational group composed of

four police officers forced the door and entered. As it was dark in the

house, police officer L.L. did not see the applicant, who hit him on the

head with a stone. While the other police officers were trying to

immobilise him the applicant tried to seize an axe and, before being

immobilised, he bit one of police officer H.N.‟s fingers. He was

handcuffed and transported by car to the Sălaj Police Station.

13. The injured police officer was immediately hospitalised.

According to a forensic report drafted after the events, he had suffered

a cranial trauma and a fractured skull, which put his life in danger, and

he needed between forty and forty-five days of medical treatment to

recover.

14. According to the applicant, he was beaten by the police both on

his arrest on 18 August 2003 and in the course of police questioning at

the police station.

B. The criminal proceedings against the applicant for

attempted murder and assault

15. Following the incident, the prosecutor‟s office attached to the

Sălaj District Court initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant

for attempted murder and assault.

16. He was heard first on 19 August 2003 at the police station. He

stated that he was aware that he had been sentenced to imprisonment

in July 2003 for previous offences he had committed.

17. On 13 November 2003 the applicant gave a statement to the

prosecutor‟s office. He stated again that he knew about his conviction

and expressly refused to appoint a lawyer of his choice. On the same

day a new arrest warrant relating to the new charges against him was

issued.

24

18. On 19 November 2003 the applicant was informed that the

investigation was complete. He was invited to study the case file. He

again refused to appoint a lawyer, and was assisted by a court-

appointed lawyer, P.M.

19. At the last hearing, held on 17 December 2003 before the

Sălaj County Court, the applicant agreed to pay the victim L.L.

compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage amounting to

3,000 euros (EUR). His lawyer, P.M., asked the court to take

his behaviour into consideration as a mitigating factor in determining his

punishment.

20. On 17 December 2003 the Sălaj County Court found the

applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years‟

imprisonment, taking into account the previous non-executed sentence.

The judgment was based on extensive evidence: a report drafted on

18 August 2003 immediately after the events and at the site of the

incident (raport de constatare la faţa locului), a forensic report, the

applicant‟s statements, and the statements of all the police officers

present during the applicant‟s arrest, including those of the two victims,

L.L. and H.N.

21. The applicant appealed against the judgment. He maintained

that the statements on the basis of which he had been convicted were

subjective as the witnesses were colleagues of the victims. He asked to

be acquitted on the ground that, on the one hand, it had not been his

intent to kill the police officer and, on the other, because he had not

been aware that the persons who had forced their entry into his house

were police officers acting in their official capacity.

22. In the appeal proceedings the applicant was represented by a

lawyer appointed at his request, P.P. At the hearing of 3 March 2004 the

lawyer made a request for a psychiatric report in respect of the

applicant.

23. The psychiatric report, drafted on 28 April 2004, stated that the

applicant suffered from a personality disorder of the impulsive type but

that he retained his mental capacity for critical appreciation.

24. On 12 May 2004 the Cluj Court of Appeal dismissed the

applicant‟s appeal as unfounded. It held that it could not accept the

applicant‟s account in respect of his alleged error as to the purpose of

the police officers‟ visit to his home, especially since the applicant

acknowledged that he had known that an arrest warrant for the

execution of an imprisonment sentence against him had been issued. It

also noted that the claim of lack of intent to kill the police officer was

not tenable, taking into account the circumstances under which the

offence had been committed, namely, that the police officer had been

struck with considerable force in a vital region of the body, the head,

with an object capable of causing lethal injuries. Moreover, the forensic

report confirmed that the injuries caused by the applicant had put the

victim‟s life in danger.

25. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law requesting

his acquittal and, failing that, the reduction of his sentence.

26. The applicant was represented before the High Court of

Cassation and Justice by two court-appointed lawyers. The first one,

25

T.B., was appointed on 7 June 2004 in order to assist the applicant at

the hearing of 16 June 2004 and the other one, M.B., was appointed on

24 June 2004 and assisted him on 7 July 2004.

27. On 7 July 2004 the High Court of Cassation and Justice

dismissed the appeal as unfounded.

C. Criminal proceedings initiated by the applicant against the

police officers

28. On 5 January 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint against the

police officers who had arrested him, accusing them of abuse on account

of the ill-treatment to which he said he had been subjected on

18 August 2003.

29. Initially the complaint was lodged with the prosecutor‟s office

attached to the Sălaj County Court, which relinquished jurisdiction in

favour of the military prosecutor‟s office attached to the Cluj

Military Tribunal as the defendants were professional soldiers.

30. A forensic report drafted immediately after the incident of

18 August 2003, at the prosecutor‟s order, on the basis of all the

medical documents stated that the applicant had suffered “cranial

trauma without concussion, contusion of the nasal pyramid with

secondary epistaxis, and thorax contusion without bone injuries”, and

he had needed three-four days of medical treatment to recover.

31. On 15 December 2005 the prosecutor‟s office decided not to

initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers. It held that they

had acted in self defence and that the applicant‟s injuries had been

incurred while they were trying to immobilise him as he had resisted

arrest and been aggressive.

32. On 16 December 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the

Cluj Military Tribunal against the prosecutor‟s decision. By a judgment

rendered on 23 January 2007 the Tribunal relinquished jurisdiction in

favour of the chief prosecutor of the Cluj military prosecutor‟s office.

33. On 27 March 2007 the military prosecutor dismissed the

applicant‟s complaint, upholding the decision not to initiate criminal

proceedings. The applicant did not lodge any complaint against his

decision on the basis of Article 2781of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

D. Conditions of detention

34. Since 18 August 2003 the applicant has been held in a number

of different detention centres. Initially he was detained in Zălau

Police Station and then transferred to Satu Mare, Baia Mare, Jilava and

Gherla Prisons. In respect of the establishments in which he was

detained, the applicant alleged that he had been kept in overcrowded

cells in poor conditions of hygiene. He claimed that there were rats and

parasites in his cell. In all the prisons hot water was available only once

a week. He also claimed that he received poor food and that the

opportunity to take outdoor exercise was limited to one ten-minute walk

per day.

26

35. The Government supplied the following details concerning the

conditions of the applicant‟s detention in each establishment:

1. Zalău Police Station

36. The applicant was detained in Zalău Police Station from

18 August to 11 December 2003.

37. He was detained in cells nos. 7, 8 and 11.

38. All three cells had a length of 4 m, a width of 3 m and a height

of 3 m and were occupied as follows: cell no. 7 by six to

seven detainees, cell no. 8 by three to six detainees and cell no. 11 by

two to four detainees.

2. The Satu Mare Prison

39. The applicant was detained in Satu Mare Prison during the

following periods: between 11 December 2003 and 2 February 2004,

23 August 2004 and 24 January 2005, 22 March and 30 August 2005,

and between 17 and 23 October 2006.

The cells in which the applicant was detained were as follows:

- cell no. 8 with a surface area of 12.54 square metres and occupied

by six to eleven detainees;

- cell no. 71 with a surface area of 24.72 square metres and

occupied by thirty-four detainees;

- cell no. 56 with a surface area of 8.2 square metres and occupied

by seven detainees;

- cell no. 59 with a surface area of 27.78 square metres and

occupied by twenty-seven detainees;

- cell no 53 with a surface area of 8.2 square metres and occupied

by five detainees.

3. The Baia Mare Prison

40. The applicant was detained in Baia Mare Prison from

30 August 2005 to 1 August 2006.

He was detained in cells nos. 14 and 29.

Cell no. 14 had a length of 7.75 m, a width of 5.2 m and a height of

2.75 m and was occupied by between thirty-one and

thirty-seven detainees.

Cell no. 29 had a length of 5.2 m, a width of 3.85 m and a height of

2.9 m and was occupied by thirteen detainees.

4. The Jilava Prison

41. The applicant was detained in Jilava Prison between 29 March

and 13 April 2004 and again from 14 June to 23 August 2004, in

cells nos. 612 and 619.

42. Both cells had the same dimensions, namely: a length of 9.5 m,

a width of 4.5 m and a height of 3 m. The number of detainees in the

first cell was on average thirty-seven, and in the second, forty-two.

27

5. Gherla Prison

43. The applicant was detained in Gherla Prison during the following

periods: from 2 February to 11 March 2004, from 14 April to

14 June 2004, from 24 January to 22 March 2005, from

23 October 2006 to 29 October 2007, from 6 November to 12 November

2007, from 18 December 2007 to 25 May 2008, from 3 June to

25 August 2008, from 16 December 2008 to 19 February 2009, from

27 February to 10 April 2009, and from 6 July 2009 until the present.

44. In respect of Gherla prison, the Government submitted

information concerning the numbers of the cells the applicant had been

detained in and their surface area, but they did not submit any

information on the occupancy rate of those cells.

E. Medical care in prison

45. The diagnoses of personality disorder and chronic gastritis were

made on the applicant‟s arrest.

46. From the information submitted by the Government, it appears

that the applicant received treatment for his various conditions,

especially for chronic gastritis, personality disorder of the unstable-

impulsive type and epilepsy. It also appears that he was often admitted

to the hospitals of the prisons where he was detained. Thus, he was

hospitalised in the medical unit of Dej Prison between 11 and

29 March 2004, 9 and 17 October 2006, and 9 and 16 June 2009. In

Jilava Prison he was hospitalised between 30 March and 13 April 2004,

30 October and 5 November 2007, 27 May and 2 June 2008, and 20 and

27 February 2009.

47. The applicant was also examined by different specialists. Thus,

he underwent psychiatric medical examinations on 9 November 2006,

and 21 and 23 May 2008. He underwent surgical interventions for

self-inflicted injuries on 16, 17 and 18 May 2007.

48. On 12 December 2007 the applicant was hospitalised in the

medical unit of Dej Prison after falling out of bed during an epileptic fit.

On 18 December 2007 he was sent back to Gherla Prison, where he had

been detained before hospitalisation. He refused to stay in the medical

unit as recommended by the doctor, preferring to stay in his cell and

signing a statement to that effect.

49. He systematically refused hospitalisation and the medical

treatment he was offered. In this connection, the Government

submitted a copy of minutes drafted by the Gherla prison authorities

(notably on 11, 14, 16 and 18 July 2008, on 27, 29 and 30 January

2009, and on 2 February 2009) noting the refusal by the applicant of his

medication.

50. Moreover, the applicant frequently refused food.

51. On 6 November 2007 he was hospitalised in the medical unit of

Dej Prison because of the voluntary ingestion of medicines. He refused

medical assistance.

52. According to the applicant‟s prison medical record, his treatment

for his various conditions was continuing.

28

F. The applicant’s complaints concerning the conditions of

his detention

1. The complaint concerning the conditions of detention in

Baia Mare Prison

53. On 10 January 2006, while detained in Baia Mare Prison, the

applicant lodged a complaint against the prison authorities, relying on

Ordinance no. 56/2003. He requested, inter alia, to be transferred to

another cell with fewer detainees and to be provided with a diet better

suited to his medical condition. He also complained of infringements of

his right of access to his prison file and of his right to respect for his

correspondence, that is, the right to send applications and documents to

the Court. He further complained of a lack of adequate medical

treatment.

54. The judge of the Baia Mare District Court dismissed his complaint

on 9 March 2006 on the grounds that the applicant‟s food was in

accordance with the norms adopted by the National Administration of

Penitentiaries and that the applicant‟s cell was similar to other cells in

the prison, only the medical unit of the prison having cells designed for

fewer detainees. With regard to his right to have access to his file, the

judge noted that the applicant had submitted only one request in this

regard, on 23 October 2005, and that it had been granted. He also

noted that the applicant‟s request for copies from his file lodged on

23 December 2005 had been granted.

55. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was

dismissed by the MaramureĢ County Court on 23 May 2006 as

unfounded.

2. The criminal complaint against the doctors of

Gherla Prison

56. On 10 December 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint

with the prosecutor‟s office attached to the Cluj Court of Appeal against

three doctors working for the hospital of Gherla Prison for abuse and

ill-treatment. He claimed that they had not provided him with the

medication he needed for his epilepsy and personality disorder, causing

him severe pain and mental suffering.

57. The complaint was dismissed on 19 February 2008 on the

ground that there was no evidence to support the applicant‟s

allegations. The applicant challenged the decision not to initiate a

criminal investigation but it was upheld by the chief prosecutor on

21 March 2008.

58. The applicant‟s complaint against the prosecutor‟s decision was

allowed by the Cluj Court of Appeal on 15 May 2008. It held that the

investigation conducted by the prosecutor had not been effective as the

file had not contained enough evidence for any conclusion to be drawn.

It remitted the case to the prosecutor‟s office for further investigation.

59. The prosecutor‟s office appealed, claiming that the applicant‟s

initial complaint had been totally unsubstantiated. The High Court of

Cassation and Justice allowed the appeal on 11 September 2008, finding

29

that the applicant had submitted no evidence justifying further

investigation, his allegations being unsubstantiated.

G. The applicant’s correspondence with the domestic

authorities and the Court

60. The Government submitted copies of several requests lodged by

the applicant with different domestic authorities in order to obtain

information concerning proceedings to which he was a party. They also

provided the Court with copies of letters addressed by the domestic

authorities to the applicant providing the requested information.

61. According to the information provided by Baia Mare Prison, the

applicant received stamps and envelopes for correspondence on 5, 8

and 15 June 2006. On 5 June 2006 he received copies of documents

from his personal file.

62. According to the information submitted by Satu Mare Prison, the

applicant received letters from the Court on 5 October 2004,

25 November 2005, 27 April and 29 June 2006, 5 April 2008, and

7 March 2009. They also stated that the letters had never been opened.

63. The authorities of Gherla Prison maintained that the applicant

had been provided with stamps and envelopes in order to send

correspondence to the Romanian authorities and the Court.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

64. Article 3 of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 56 of

27 June 2003 (“Ordinance no. 56/2003”) regarding certain rights of

convicted persons states that convicted persons have the right to bring

legal proceedings before a court of first instance concerning measures

taken by the prison authorities in connection with their rights.

Ordinance no. 56/2003 has been repealed and replaced by Law no. 275

of 20 July 2006, which restates the content of the above-mentioned

Article 3 in Article 38, which provides that a judge has jurisdiction over

complaints by convicted persons against measures taken by the prison

authorities (see also Petrea v. Romania, no. 4792/03, §§ 21-23,

29 April 2008).

65. The Government submitted to the Court copies of judicial

decisions delivered by the domestic courts concerning the application of

Ordinance no. 56/2003 and Law no. 275/2006 in practice. The decisions

mainly concern complaints lodged by prisoners in respect of disciplinary

sanctions imposed on them by the prison authorities, lack of adequate

medical treatment, and breaches of their rights to receive visits, to

correspondence, to the confidentiality of telephone conversations, to

take walks outside their cell, and to be placed in a non-smoking cell.

66. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are set

out in Dumitru Popescu v. Romania ((no. 1), no. 49234/99, §§ 43-46,

26 April 2007), and Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania (no. 46430/99, § 40,

5 October 2004). In paragraphs 43-45 of the judgment in

Dumitru Popescu (no. 1), cited above, there is a description of the

30

development of the law concerning complaints against prosecutors‟

decisions (Article 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 2781

introduced by Law no. 281/24 June 2003, applicable from

1 January 2004 – “Law no. 281/2003”).

III. REPORTS ON THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN ROMANIAN

PRISONS

67. The relevant findings and recommendations of the European

Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) are to be found in the Court‟s

judgments in the cases of Bragadireanu v. Romania (no. 22088/04,

§§ 73­76, 6 December 2007), and Artimenco v. Romania

(no. 12535/04, §§ 22-23, 30 June 2009).

68. The CPT report published on 11 December 2008 following a visit

to different police detention facilities and prisons in Romania (including

Jilava Prison), from 8 to 19 June 2006, indicated that overcrowding was

a persistent problem. The same report concluded that in the light of the

deplorable material conditions of detention in some of the cells of the

establishments visited, the conditions of detention could be qualified as

inhuman and degrading.

69. In the same report the CPT declared itself gravely concerned by

the fact that a lack of beds remained a constant problem, not only in the

establishments visited but nationally, and that this had remained the

case since its first visit to Romania in 1999. The CPT welcomed the

changes introduced in domestic legislation providing for personal space

of four square metres for each prisoner. The CPT therefore

recommended that the Romanian authorities take the necessary

measures to ensure compliance with this requirement, as well as to

ensure that each detainee had his or her own bed.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

70. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention of

ill-treatment by police officers on 18 August 2003 and lack of an

effective investigation into the incident. He also complained about the

conditions of detention in different prisons where he had been detained,

and of a lack of medical treatment.

Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment.”

31

A. Admissibility

1. The parties’ arguments

71. The Government raised a preliminary objection of

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and argued that for the 18 August

2003 incident the applicant should have used the appeal provided for in

Article 2781 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to challenge the

military prosecutor‟s decision not to press charges.

Furthermore, for the complaint concerning the conditions of detention

and the alleged lack of adequate medical treatment in all places of

detention the applicant could have lodged a complaint under the

provisions of Emergency Ordinance no. 56/2003.

72. The applicant did not submit any observation in this regard.

2. The Court’s assessment

73. At the outset, the Court reiterates that the purpose of the

exhaustion rule is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of

preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before

those allegations are submitted to it. However, the only remedies which

Article 35 of the Convention requires to be used are those that relate to

the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient.

The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in

theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite

accessibility and effectiveness; it falls to the respondent State to

establish that these various conditions are satisfied (see, among many

other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, §§ 74-75,

ECHR 1999-IV).

74. In order for the exhaustion rule to come into operation, the

effective remedy must exist at the date when the application is lodged

with the Court. However, this rule is subject to exceptions which might

be justified by the specific circumstances of each case (see Baumann

v. France, no 33592/96, § 47, 22 May 2001, and Brusco v. Italy, (dec.),

no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001 IX).

(a) The incident on 18 August 2003

75. The Court observes that Article 2781 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure provides that prosecutor‟s decisions can be challenged before

the domestic courts.

76. However, the Court notes that the applicant failed to challenge

the military prosecutor‟s decision of 27 March 2007 not to prosecute the

police officers, although he had an effective remedy at his disposal

(Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722/02, § 109, 4 March 2008).

77. It follows that this part of the complaint must be rejected under

Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic

remedies.

32

(b) The material conditions of detention

78. The Court notes that the applicant‟s complaint concerns the

material conditions of his detention and, in particular, overcrowding and

poor sanitary facilities. In this connection, it observes that in recent

applications against Romania concerning similar complaints it has

already found that, given the specific nature of this type of complaint,

the legal actions indicated by the Government, including a civil action in

damages, did not constitute effective remedies (see Petrea, cited above,

§ 37; Eugen Gabriel Radu v. Romania, no. 3036/04, § 23,

13 October 2009; Iamandi v. Romania, no. 25867/03, § 49, 1 June

2010; Cucolaş v. Romania, no. 17044/03, § 67, 26 October 2010; Ogică

v. Romania, no. 24708/03, § 35, 27 May 2010; and Dimakos v.

Romania, no. 10675/03, § 38, 6 July 2010).

79. The Court further notes that the domestic decisions submitted by

the Government in support of its plea of non-exhaustion relate to

specific prisoners‟ rights, such as the right to medical assistance or the

right to receive visits, but they do not relate to structural issues, such as

overcrowding.

80. The Court therefore concludes that these decisions do not

demonstrate how the legal actions proposed by the Government could

have afforded the applicant immediate and effective redress for the

purposes of his complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Marian Stoicescu

v. Romania, no. 12934/02, § 19, 16 July 2009, and Ogică v. Romania,

cited above, § 35).

It therefore rejects the Government‟s plea of non-exhaustion of

domestic remedies.

81. Noting further that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and that it is not

inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court concludes that it must be

declared admissible.

(c) The alleged deterioration of the applicant’s health and

the alleged lack of medical treatment

82. In the case of Petrea, cited above, the Court concluded that

before the entry into force of Ordinance no. 56/2003, on 27 June 2003,

there was no effective remedy for situations such as the one complained

of by the applicant. However, after that date persons in the applicant‟s

situation had an effective remedy for complaining about lack of medical

treatment.

(i) Baia Mare and Gherla Prisons

83. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant

lodged a complaint about lack of adequate medical treatment on the

basis of Ordinance no. 56/2003 on 10 January 2006. However, it notes

that he made reference only to a lack of medical treatment in relation to

detention in Baia Mare Prison (see paragraph 53).

84. The Court also observes that the applicant lodged a criminal

complaint against the doctors working for the Gherla prison hospital

(see paragraph 56), claiming that they had not provided him with the

33

medication he needed for his medical conditions. In this regard the

Court is not convinced of the necessity of lodging another request on

the basis of Ordinance no. 56/2003 with largely the same object.

It therefore rejects the Government‟s plea of non-exhaustion of

domestic remedies in respect of the alleged lack of medical treatment

while in detention in Baia Mare and Gherla Prisons.

Noting further that this part of the complaint is not manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and

that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court concludes

that it must be declared admissible.

(ii) Satu Mare and Jilava Prisons

85. The Court further notes that the applicant did not refer in the

two above-mentioned complaints to the alleged lack of proper medical

treatment in Satu Mare and Jilava Prisons.

86. It considers that the applicant should have lodged complaints

with the domestic courts about the alleged lack of medical treatment in

the two above-mentioned prisons.

It follows that this part of the complaint must be rejected for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

B. Merits

1. The material conditions of detention

(a) The parties’ submissions

87. The applicant contested the Government‟s submissions and

reiterated that he had been held in precarious conditions, that the cells

had been overcrowded, the food of poor quality, and that the conditions

for maintaining proper hygiene had been lacking.

88. The Government contended that the conditions of detention in all

the prisons in which the applicant had been detained were adequate and

did not raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.

(b) The Court’s assessment

89. The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most

fundamental values of democratic societies. The Convention prohibits in

absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment, irrespective of the victim‟s conduct (see Labita v. Italy

[GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).

90. Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve an

inevitable element of suffering or humiliation. Nevertheless, the

suffering and humiliation involved must not go beyond the inevitable

element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of

legitimate treatment or punishment.

91. In the context of prisoners, the Court has already emphasised in

previous cases that a detained person does not, by the mere fact of

his incarceration, lose the protection of his rights guaranteed by the

34

Convention. On the contrary, people in custody are in a vulnerable

position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Under

Article 3 the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions

which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the

manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him

to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of

suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of

imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see

Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 102, ECHR 2001-VIII, and Kudła

v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 94, ECHR 2000-XI).

92. When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken

of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific

allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98,

§ 46, ECHR 2001-II).

93. An extreme lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a

factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether

impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view

of Article 3 (see Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, 7 April 2005).

94. In previous cases where applicants have had at their disposal

less than three square metres of personal space the Court has found

that the overcrowding was so severe as to justify of itself a finding of a

violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see, among many other

authorities, Iamandi v. Romania, no. 25867/03, §§ 59-61, 1 June 2010;

Răcăreanu v. Romania, no. 14262/03, §§ 49-52, 1 June 2010; and

Flamînzeanu v. Romania, no. 56664/08, § 98, 12 April 2011).

95. The focal point in the case at hand is the assessment by the

Court of the living space afforded to the applicant in the detention

centres where he was held, namely Zalău Police Station and Baia Mare,

Satu Mare, Jilava and Gherla Prisons.

96. The Court notes that even at the occupancy rate put forward by

the Government, the applicant‟s living space seems to have been less

than three square metres in Zalău Police Station and Baia Mare,

Satu Mare and Jilava Prisons, which falls short of the standards imposed

by the case-law (see Kokoshkina, cited above, § 62, and Orchowski v.

Poland, no. 17885/04, § 122, ECHR 2009 ... (extracts)).

97. The Court further observes that despite the fact that the

applicant complained about the improper sanitary facilities and the poor

quality of the food, the Government did not make any submissions in

this respect.

98. In this respect the Court reiterates that Convention proceedings,

such as the present application, do not in all cases lend themselves to a

rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who

alleges something must prove that allegation), because in certain

instances the respondent Government alone have access to information

capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. A failure on a

Government‟s part to submit such information without a satisfactory

explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-

foundedness of the applicant‟s allegations (see Kokoshkina, cited above,

§ 59).

35

99. However, there is no need for the Court to establish the

truthfulness of each and every allegation, since it considers that the

overcrowding of the applicant‟s cell give it sufficient grounds to make

substantive conclusions on whether the conditions of the applicant‟s

detention amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the

Convention.

100. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant was transferred many

times during his detention. Such frequent transfers may increase the

feelings of distress experienced by a person deprived of liberty and held

in conditions which fall short of the Convention‟s standards (see,

mutatis mutandis, Orchowski, cited above, § 133, and Khider v. France,

no. 39364/05, §§ 110­111, 9 July 2009).

101. In the light of the above, the Court considers that the

conditions of the applicant‟s detention caused him suffering that

exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and

that attained the threshold of degrading treatment proscribed by

Article 3.

There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

2. The alleged lack of proper medical treatment in Baia Mare and

Gherla Prisons

(a) The parties’ submissions

102. The applicant did not agree with the Government‟s

submissions. He claimed that he had not received proper medical

treatment while in detention in Baia Mare and Gherla Prisons.

103. The Government submitted that the applicant had received

constant medical treatment and that he had been hospitalised whenever

it had been necessary. They further claimed that the applicant had not

managed to prove his allegations concerning lack of medical treatment.

b) The Court’s assessment

104. The Court observes at the outset that it cannot be ruled out

that the detention of a person who is ill may raise issues under Article 3

(see Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 38, ECHR 2002-IX). Although

this Article cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to

release detainees on health grounds, it nonetheless imposes an

obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons

deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with

the requisite medical assistance (see Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456/05,

§ 77, 4 October 2005, and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696/00, § 93,

ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).

105. The Court reiterates that a lack of appropriate medical care

and, more generally, the detention in inappropriate conditions of a

person who is ill, may in principle amount to treatment contrary to

Article 3 (see, for example, İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 87,

ECHR 2000­VII). In particular, the assessment of whether the treatment

or punishment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3

has, in the case of mentally ill persons, to take into consideration their

36

vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain coherently or

at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment

(see Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, § 66, Reports of Judgments and

Decisions 1998-V).

106. The Court observes that in the present case it was not

contested that the applicant had suffered from chronic gastritis both

before and during his detention. His mental state was also diagnosed as

a personality or neurotic disorder.

107. The Court further observes that the medical evidence which the

Government produced shows that during his detention the applicant

regularly sought, and obtained, medical treatment. He was examined by

specialist doctors and frequently received psychiatric assistance. He was

hospitalised in the medical unit of the prison concerned whenever it was

necessary.

108. Moreover, the Court notes that the adequacy of the medical

treatment of the applicant when detained in Baia Mare and Gherla

Prisons was examined by the Romanian authorities, which dismissed the

applicant‟s complaints. He was also regularly examined in the prison

hospitals.

109. In this connection, the Court has previously held that where

domestic proceedings have taken place it is not its task to substitute

its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and that,

as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before

them (see Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, § 29, Series A

no. 269). Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic

courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to

depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see Klaas,

cited above, § 30).

110. In the present case, the case file reveals that the authorities

took all necessary steps to ensure that the applicant received adequate

treatment for his illnesses in Baia Mare and Gherla Prisons.

In conclusion, there was no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in

respect of lack of medical treatment in Baia Mare and Gherla Prisons.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION

111. The applicant complained that he had not been informed of the

reasons for his arrest or of the charges brought against him on

18 August 2003. He relied on Article 5 § 2 of the Convention.

112. The Government submitted that during the investigation it had

been established on the basis of the witness statements given by the

persons present at the applicant‟s arrest that the police officers had

informed him twice before entering the house that their presence

concerned the execution of a sentence of imprisonment.

113. The Court reiterates that two aspects of the application of

Article 5 § 2 are at the heart of its case-law: firstly, whether the

information provided to a person concerning the reasons for his arrest is

sufficient, and secondly, whether such information has been promptly

provided (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom

(30 August 1990, § 40, Series A no. 182).

37

114. In the instant case, the Court considers that the applicant was

promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest: it notes that the police

officers informed the applicant even before entering his home on the

morning of 18 August 2003 about their intent to enforce a sentence of

imprisonment imposed on him. Moreover, the applicant acknowledged in

his first statement on 19 August 2003 before the investigation body that

he knew that he had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in

July 2003.

115. Taking into account the particular circumstances under which

the applicant was arrested on 18 August 2003, the Court considers that,

although the Government did not submit a formal document signed by

the applicant containing the reasons for his arrest, the applicant was

aware that his arrest was related to the enforcement of the decision

rendered on 2 July 2003.

Therefore, in the light of the foregoing considerations and of all the

material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of

are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any

appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be

rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE

CONVENTION

116. The applicant further complained about the unfairness of the

criminal proceedings against him, referring mainly to his difficulty in

adducing evidence in his defence and the allegedly insufficient

assistance offered by his court­appointed counsel before the High Court

of Cassation and Justice. He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the

Convention.

A. Complaint concerning the alleged impossibility of calling

and questioning witnesses

117. The applicant complained that he and his counsel had not had

the opportunity to obtain the examination of all the witnesses on his

behalf and against him.

118. The Government submitted that the applicant had had the

opportunity to propose evidence and to ask questions of all the

witnesses. They also maintained that the applicant had been able to see

all the documents in the files and make comments with respect to each.

119. The Court stresses, firstly, that it is not its task to act as a

court of appeal or, as is sometimes said, as a court of fourth instance,

for the decisions of domestic courts, which, according to the case-law,

are best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the relevance

of evidence to the issues in the case (see, amongst many authorities,

Vidal v. Belgium, 22 April 1992, § 32, Series A no. 235-B, and Edwards

v. the United Kingdom, 16 December 1992, § 34, Series A no. 247-B).

38

The Court further reiterates that the principle of equality of arms, one of

the broader concepts of a fair hearing, requires each party to be given a

reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that do

not place them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent.

120. Turning to the facts of the case, the Court observes that the

domestic courts based the applicant‟s conviction on a wide range of oral,

material and expert evidence. The evidence which the applicant sought

to adduce was admitted and he had the opportunity to question all the

witnesses. At the various stages of the proceedings he was able to

submit the arguments he considered relevant to his case. The applicant

himself gave a full statement before the first-instance court, and in the

appeal proceedings he was given the last word. Moreover, in his appeals

the applicant, even though he was represented by counsel, failed to

make any complaint in respect of his right to be heard by the courts or

to call and question witnesses (see paragraphs 20-26).

121. Therefore in the light of all the material in its possession, and in

so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court

finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the

rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be

rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

B. Complaint concerning the alleged refusal of

court-appointed counsel

122. The applicant claimed that he had asked all the domestic courts

to allow him to represent himself without being assisted by a lawyer,

but that his requests had not been mentioned in the minutes and

decisions of the courts and they had been orally dismissed on the

ground that his assistance by a lawyer was compulsory. He added that

in any case such lawyers were appointed by the courts with the sole

purpose of obstructing the establishment of the truth.

123. With respect to the judicial assistance offered by the lawyers

appointed by the courts, the Government averred that the applicant had

expressly waived the opportunity to choose a lawyer himself on

13 November 2003 when he gave a statement before the prosecutor‟s

office. He had again refused to appoint a lawyer on 19 November 2003,

when he was presented with the results of the investigation. The

Government also submitted that they had had enough time to prepare

the applicant‟s defence and they had played an active role.

124. The Court firstly notes that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of

Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial in criminal

proceedings as set forth in paragraph 1 of the same Article. Accordingly,

the applicant‟s complaint will be examined under these provisions taken

together (see, among other authorities, Bobek v. Poland, no. 68761/01,

§ 55, 17 July 2007).

125. The Court reiterates that assigning counsel to represent a party

to the proceedings does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the

assistance (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, § 38,

Series A no. 275). There may be occasions when the State should act

39

and not remain passive when problems of legal representation are

brought to the attention of the competent authorities. It will depend on

the circumstances of the case whether, taking the proceedings as a

whole, the legal representation may be regarded as practical and

effective.

126. The Court observes in this context that the applicant had the

legal assistance throughout the proceedings of officially appointed

representatives who played an active role in his defence.

It also notes that the applicant did not bring to the attention of the

authorities any concrete shortcomings in the defence provided by

his appointed counsels. Moreover, there is no indication that in the

proceedings conducted against the applicant the Romanian authorities

had cause to intervene in respect of the applicant‟s legal representation.

127. On the basis of the information available, the Court considers

that the circumstances of the applicant‟s representation at the trial do

not reveal a failure to provide him with practical and effective legal

assistance.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be

rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 34 OF THE CONVENTION

128. The applicant further complained that his right to respect for

his correspondence had been infringed by the prison authorities,

claiming that letters received from the Court had been opened before

being handed to him, and making particular reference to a letter sent to

him by the Court on 29 September 2004, while he was detained in

Satu Mare Prison. The applicant also complained that the prison

authorities had hindered him in bringing his case before the Court by

withholding a letter sent to him by the Court on 6 November 2006. He

further claimed in this connection that the authorities had failed to assist

him in obtaining copies of the documents necessary for lodging his

application and that he had not received the stamps and envelopes he

needed for his correspondence with the Court. He relied on Articles 8

and 34 of the Convention.

129. The Government raised a preliminary objection of non-

exhaustion of domestic remedies, in so far as the applicant had not

complained to the authorities about the alleged breach of his right to

respect for his correspondence with the Court or the refusal of the

prison authorities to provide him with copies from his files and with

stamps and envelopes while he was detained in Satu Mare, Jilava and

Gherla Prisons. They relied mainly on Article 8 of Emergency

Government Ordinance no. 56/2003 concerning the right to

correspondence of detained persons, and also on Article 46 of

Law no. 275/2006.

130. The applicant did not agree with the Government‟s

submissions.

131. The Court has already had the opportunity to examine a similar

objection raised by the Government in the case of Petrea, cited above.

It concluded in that case that before the entry into force of

40

Ordinance no. 56/2003, on 27 June 2003, there was no effective

remedy for the situation complained of by the applicant. However, after

that date, persons in the applicant‟s situation did have an effective

remedy for complaining about alleged interference with their

correspondence (see Petrea, cited above, §§ 35-36, and Dimakos v.

Romania, no. 10675/03, §§ 54-56, 6 July 2010).

132. The Court sees no reason to depart in the present case from

the conclusions it reached in Petrea.

133. It therefore considers that after the entry into force of

Ordinance no. 56/2003 the applicant should have lodged a complaint

with the domestic courts about the alleged interference with his Article 8

rights. There is no evidence in the file that he did so while detained in

Satu Mare, Jilava and Gherla Prisons.

It follows that the part of the complaint concerning the alleged

breach of Article 8 while detained in Satu Mare, Jilava and Gherla

Prisons must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

134. In respect of the infringement of the applicant‟s right to

correspondence while detained in Baia Mare Prison, the Government

submitted that, even if with short delays, all the applicant‟s requests for

copies from his file and stamps and envelopes for his correspondence

had been granted. They maintained that the applicant had had

extensive correspondence with the Court. Thus, the applicant had

received letters from the Court on 5 October 2004, 25 November 2005,

27 April and 29 June 2006, 5 April 2008, 7 March and 19 June 2009,

and 16 and 23 July 2009. They further claimed that the prison

authorities had not held back any letter sent by the Court to the

applicant.

135. The applicant contested the Government‟s submissions.

136. The Court observes that Article 34 of the Convention imposes

an obligation on a Contracting State not to hinder the right of individual

petition. While the obligation imposed is of a procedural nature,

distinguishable from the substantive rights set out in the Convention

and Protocols, it flows from the very essence of this procedural right

that it is open to individuals to complain of its alleged infringement in

Convention proceedings (see Manoussos v. the Czech Republic and

Germany (dec.), no. 46468/99, 9 July 2002). The Court also reiterates

that the undertaking not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of

individual application precludes any interference with the individual‟s

right to present and pursue his complaint before the Court effectively

(see Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, § 130, ECHR 1999-IV and

Kornakovs v. Latvia, no. 61005/00, § 164, 15 June 2006).

137. As to the alleged monitoring of the applicant‟s communications

with the Court, the Court notes that the applicant has not submitted any

direct proof in respect of the alleged opening of letters by the prison

administration.

Therefore, it concludes that there is nothing to indicate that the

applicant was in any way frustrated in the exercise of his right to

respect for his correspondence or of his right of petition (contrast

Petra v. Romania, 23 September 1998, §§ 41­44, Reports 1998-VII, and

Cotleţ v. Romania, no. 38565/97, § 71, 3 June 2003).

41

138. The Court also notes that the applicant periodically received

stamps and envelopes from the prison authorities and was able to

obtain copies of documents in support of his application and submit

them to the Court.

139. Therefore in the light of all the material in its possession, and in

so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court

finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the

rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must

be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the

Convention.

V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

140. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the

Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the

High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to

be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party.”

A. Damage

141. The applicant claimed a total amount of 210,000 euros (EUR) in

respect of non-pecuniary damage. He claimed EUR 20,000 for the

alleged infringement of Article 5 § 2, EUR 50,000 for the ill-treatment to

which he claimed to have been subjected on 18 August 2003,

EUR 70,000 for the inhuman conditions of detention, EUR 10,000 for

infringement of his right to correspondence, and EUR 60,000 for the

alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention. He did not claim any

amount in respect of pecuniary damage.

142. The Government considered that the amount requested by the

applicant was exorbitant, and that a conclusion of a violation of the

Convention would suffice to compensate him for the non-pecuniary

damage allegedly suffered.

143. The Court finds that the conditions in which the applicant was

detained must have caused him serious physical discomfort and mental

suffering which cannot be compensated by the mere finding of a

violation. Ruling on an equitable basis, it therefore awards the applicant

EUR 8,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

B. Costs and expenses

144. The applicant did not claim any amount for costs and expenses

incurred.

42

C. Default interest

145. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest

should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaints under Article 3 concerning the conditions of

detention and the medical treatment admissible and the remainder

of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention

on account of the conditions of detention;

3. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention

on account of lack of medical treatment in Baia Mare and Gherla

Prisons;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within

three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in

accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 8,400 (eight

thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,

in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the

respondent State‟s national currency at the rate applicable on the

date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until

settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at

a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

43

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant‟s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 July 2012, pursuant to

Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Santiago Quesada Josep Casadevall

Registrar President

.

44

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF SALDUZ v. TURKEY

(Application no. 36391/02)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

27 November 2008

45

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 25

In the case of Salduz v. Turkey,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber

composed of:

Nicolas Bratza, President,

Christos Rozakis,

Josep Casadevall,

Rıza Türmen,

Rait Maruste,

Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,

Stanislav Pavlovschi,

Alvina Gyulumyan,

Ljiljana MijoviĤ,

Dean Spielmann,

Renate Jaeger,

Davíd Thór Björgvinsson,

Ján Šikuta,

Ineta Ziemele,

Mark Villiger,

Luis López Guerra,

Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,

and Vincent Berger, Jurisconsult,

Having deliberated in private on 19 March and on 15 October 2008,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-

mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

146. The case originated in an application (no. 36391/02) against

the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Yusuf Salduz

(“the applicant”), on 8 August 2002.

147. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his defence rights had

been violated in that the written opinion of the Principal Public

Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had not been communicated to him

and that he had been denied access to a lawyer while in police custody.

In respect of his complaints, he relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the

Convention.

148. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the

Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court).

149. By a decision dated 28 March 2006, the application was

declared partly inadmissible by a Chamber of that Section, composed of

Jean-Paul Costa, Andras Baka, Rıza Türmen, Karl Jungwiert, Mindia

Ugrekhelidze, Antonella Mularoni, Elisabet Fura-Sandström, judges, and

Sally Dollé, Section Registrar.

150. In its judgment of 26 April 2007 (“the Chamber judgment”),

the Chamber, made up of Françoise Tulkens, Andras Baka, Ireneu

Cabral Barreto, Rıza Türmen, Mindia Ugrekhelidze, Antonella Mularoni

46

and Danutė JoĦienė, judges, and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar, held

unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the

Convention on account of the non-communication of the Principal Public

Prosecutor‟s written opinion and further held by five votes to two that

there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention on

account of the lack of legal assistance to the applicant while in police

custody.

151. On 20 July 2007 the applicant requested that the case be referred

to the Grand Chamber (Article 43 of the Convention).

152. On 24 September 2007 a panel of the Grand Chamber decided

to accept his request (Rule 73).

153. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according

to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.

154. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the

merits.

155. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,

Strasbourg, on 19 March 2008 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government

Mr M. ÖZMEN, Co-Agent,

Ms N. ÇETIN,

Ms A. ÖZDEMIR,

Ms Ġ. KOCAYIĞIT,

Mr C. AYDIN, Advisers;

(b) for the applicant

Mr U. KILINÇ, Counsel,

Ms T. ASLAN, Adviser.

The Court heard addresses by Mr Kılınç and Mr Özmen, as well as

their replies to questions put by the Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

156. The applicant was born on 2 February 1984 and lives in Ġzmir.

A. The applicant’s arrest and detention

157. On 29 May 2001 at about 10.15 p.m., the applicant was taken

into custody by police officers from the anti-terrorism branch of the

Ġzmir Security Directorate on suspicion of having participated in an

unlawful demonstration in support of an illegal organisation, namely the

PKK (the Workers‟ Party of Kurdistan). The applicant was also accused

of hanging an illegal banner from a bridge in Bornova on 26 April 2001.

47

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 27

158. At about 12.30 a.m. on 30 May 2001 the applicant was taken to

the Atatürk Teaching and Research Hospital, where he was examined by

a doctor. The medical report stated that there was no trace of ill-

treatment on his body.

159. Subsequently, at about 1 a.m., the applicant was interrogated at

the anti-terrorism branch in the absence of a lawyer. According to a

form explaining arrested persons‟ rights which the applicant had signed,

he had been reminded of the charges against him and of his right to

remain silent. In his statement, the applicant admitted his involvement

in the youth branch of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – the People‟s

Democracy Party). He gave the names of several persons who worked

for the youth branch of the Bornova District Office. He explained that he

was the assistant youth press and publications officer and was also

responsible for the Osmangazi neighbourhood. He further stated that it

had been part of his job to assign duties to other members of the youth

branch. He admitted that he had participated in the demonstration on

29 May 2001 organised by HADEP in support of the imprisoned leader of

the PKK. He said that there had been about sixty demonstrators present

and that the group had shouted slogans in support of Öcalan and the

PKK. He had been arrested on the spot. He also admitted that he had

written “Long live leader Apo” on a banner which had been hung from a

bridge on 26 April 2001. The police took samples of the applicant‟s

handwriting and sent it to the police laboratory for examination.

160. On 1 June 2001 the Ġzmir Criminal Police Laboratory issued a

report after comparing the applicant‟s handwriting to that on the

banner. It concluded that although certain characteristics of the

applicant‟s handwriting bore similarities to the handwriting on the

banner, it could not be established whether or not the writing on the

banner was in fact his.

161. At 11.45 p.m. on 1 June 2001 the applicant was again

examined by a doctor, who stated that there were no traces of ill-

treatment on his body.

162. On the same day, the applicant was brought before the public

prosecutor and subsequently the investigating judge. Before the public

prosecutor, he explained that he was not a member of any political

party, but had taken part in certain activities of HADEP. He denied

fabricating an illegal banner or participating in the demonstration on 29

May 2001. He stated that he was in the Doğanlar neighbourhood to visit

a friend when he was arrested by the police. The applicant also made a

statement to the investigating judge, in which he retracted his

statement to the police, alleging that it had been extracted under

duress. He claimed that he had been beaten and insulted while in police

custody. He again denied engaging in any illegal activity and explained

that on 29 May 2001 he had gone to the Doğanlar neighbourhood to

visit a friend and had not been part of the group shouting slogans. After

the questioning was over, the investigating judge remanded the

applicant in custody, having regard to the nature of the offence of which

he was accused and the state of the evidence. The applicant was then

allowed to have access to a lawyer.

48

B. The trial

163. On 11 July 2001 the public prosecutor at the Ġzmir State

Security Court filed an indictment with that court accusing the applicant

and eight other accused of aiding and abetting the PKK, an offence

under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of

Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713).

164. On 16 July 2001 the State Security Court held a preparatory

hearing. It decided that the applicant‟s detention on remand should be

continued and that the accused be invited to prepare their defence

submissions.

165. On 28 August 2001 the State Security Court held its first

hearing, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. It heard

evidence from the applicant in person, who denied the charges against

him. The applicant also rejected the police statement, alleging that it

had been extracted from him under duress. He explained that while he

was in custody, police officers had ordered him to copy the words from a

banner. He also stated that he had witnessed the events that had taken

place on 29 May 2001; however, he had not taken part in the

demonstration as alleged. Instead, he had been in the neighbourhood to

visit a friend named Özcan. He also denied hanging an illegal banner

from a bridge on 26 April 2001.

166. At the next hearing, which was held on 25 October 2001, the

applicant and his lawyer were both present. The court also heard from

other accused persons, all of whom denied having participated in the

illegal demonstration on 29 May 2001 and retracted statements they

had made previously. The prosecution then called for the applicant to be

sentenced pursuant to Article 169 of the Criminal Code and the

applicant‟s lawyer requested time to submit the applicant‟s defence

submissions.

167. On 5 December 2001 the applicant made his defence

submissions. He denied the charges against him and requested his

release. On the same day, the Ġzmir State Security Court delivered its

judgment. It acquitted five of the accused and convicted the applicant

and three other accused as charged. It sentenced the applicant to four

years and six months‟ imprisonment, which was reduced to two and a

half years as the applicant had been a minor at the time of the offence.

168. In convicting the applicant, the State Security Court had regard

to the applicant‟s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the

investigating judge respectively. It also took into consideration his co-

defendants‟ evidence before the public prosecutor that the applicant had

urged them to participate in the demonstration of 29 May 2001. The

court noted that the co-defendants had also given evidence that the

applicant had been in charge of organising the demonstration. It further

took note of the expert report comparing the applicant‟s handwriting to

that on the banner and of the fact that, according to the police report on

the arrest, the applicant had been among the demonstrators. It

concluded:

49

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 29

“... in view of these material facts, the court does not accept the

applicant‟s denial and finds that his confession to the police is

substantiated.”

C. The appeal

169. On 2 January 2002 the applicant‟s lawyer appealed against the

judgment of the Ġzmir State Security Court. In her notice of appeal, she

alleged a breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, arguing that the

proceedings before the first-instance court had been unfair and that the

court had failed to assess the evidence properly.

170. On 27 March 2002 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court

of Cassation lodged a written opinion with the Ninth Division of the

Court of Cassation in which he submitted that the Division should uphold

the judgment of the Ġzmir State Security Court. This opinion was not

served on the applicant or his representative.

171. On 10 June 2002 the Ninth Division of the Court of Cassation,

upholding the Ġzmir State Security Court‟s reasoning and assessment of

the evidence, dismissed the applicant‟s appeal.

II. RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Domestic law

1. The legislation in force at the time of the application

172. The relevant provisions of the former Code of Criminal

Procedure (Law no. 1412), namely Articles 135, 136 and 138, provided

that anyone suspected or accused of a criminal offence had a right of

access to a lawyer from the moment they were taken into police

custody. Article 138 clearly stipulated that for juveniles, legal assistance

was obligatory.

173. According to section 31 of Law no. 3842 of 18 November 1992,

which amended the legislation on criminal procedure, the above-

mentioned provisions were not applicable to persons accused of offences

falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts.

2. Recent amendments

174. On 15 July 2003, by Law no. 4928, the restriction on an

accused‟s right of access to a lawyer in proceedings before the State

Security Courts was lifted.

175. On 1 July 2005 a new Code of Criminal Procedure entered into

force. According to the relevant provisions of the new Code (Articles 149

and 150), all detained persons have the right of access to a lawyer from

the moment they are taken into police custody. The appointment of a

lawyer is obligatory if the person concerned is a minor or if he or she is

accused of an offence punishable by a maximum of at least five years‟

imprisonment.

50

176. Finally, section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law

no. 3713), as amended on 29 June 2006, provides that for terrorist-

related offences, the right of access to a lawyer may be delayed for

twenty-four hours on the order of a public prosecutor. However, the

accused cannot be interrogated during this period.

B. Relevant international law materials

1. Procedure in juvenile cases

(a) Council of Europe

177. The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member

States of the Council of Europe concerning new ways of dealing with

juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile justice (Rec(2003)20),

adopted on 24 September 2003 at the 853rd meeting of the Ministers‟

Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

“15. Where juveniles are detained in police custody, account

should be taken of their status as a minor, their age and their

vulnerability and level of maturity. They should be promptly

informed of their rights and safeguards in a manner that ensures

their full understanding. While being questioned by the police they

should, in principle, be accompanied by their parent/legal guardian

or other appropriate adult. They should also have the right of access

to a lawyer and a doctor ...”

178. The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member

States of the Council of Europe on social reactions to juvenile

delinquency (Recommendation No. R (87) 20), adopted on 17

September 1987 at the 410th meeting of the Ministers‟ Deputies, in so

far as relevant, reads as follows:

“Recommends the governments of member States to review, if

necessary, their legislation and practice with a view:

8. to reinforcing the legal position of minors throughout the

proceedings, including the police interrogation, by recognising, inter

alia:

– the right to the assistance of a counsel who may, if necessary,

be officially appointed and paid by the State.”

(b) United Nations

(i) Convention on the Rights of the Child

179. Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in so

far as relevant, reads as follows:

“States Parties shall ensure that: ...

(d) every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to

prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as

51

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 31

the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her

liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial

authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.”

(ii) General Comment No. 10 of the Committee on the Rights of

the Child, dated 25 April 2007 (CRC/C/GC/10)

180. The relevant part of this text concerning legal assistance to minors

in police custody provides as follows:

“49. The child must be guaranteed legal or other appropriate

assistance in the preparation and presentation of his/her defence.

CRC does require that the child be provided with assistance, which is

not necessarily under all circumstances legal but it must be

appropriate. It is left to the discretion of the States Parties to

determine how this assistance is provided but it should be free of

charge ...

...

52. The Committee recommends that the States Parties set and

implement time-limits for the period between the communication of

the offence and the completion of the police investigation, the

decision of the prosecutor (or other competent body) to bring

charges against the child, and the final adjudication and decision by

the court or other competent judicial body. These time-limits should

be much shorter than those set for adults. But at the same time,

decisions without delay should be the result of a process in which

the human rights of the child and legal safeguards are fully

respected. In this decision-making process without delay, the legal

or other appropriate assistance must be present. This presence

should not be limited to the trial before the court or other judicial

body, but also applies to all other stages of the process, beginning

with the interviewing (interrogation) of the child by the police.”

(iii) Concluding Observations of the Committee on the

Rights of the Child: Turkey, dated 9 July 2001

(CRC/C/15/Add.152)

181. The relevant part of this text provides as follows:

“66. The Committee recommends that the State Party continue

reviewing the law and practices regarding the juvenile justice

system in order to bring it into full compliance with the Convention

[on the Rights of the Child], in particular Articles 37, 40 and 39, as

well as with other relevant international standards in this area, such

as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the

Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) and the United

Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the

Riyadh Guidelines), with a view to raising the minimum legal age for

criminal responsibility, extending the protection guaranteed by the

Juvenile Law Court to all children up to the age of 18 and enforcing

this law effectively by establishing juvenile courts in every province.

52

In particular, it reminds the State Party that juvenile offenders

should be dealt with without delay, in order to avoid periods of

incommunicado detention, and that pre-trial detention should be

used only as a measure of last resort, should be as short as possible

and should be no longer than the period prescribed by law.

Alternative measures to pre-trial detention should be used whenever

possible.”

2. Right of access to a lawyer during police custody

(a) Council of Europe

(i) Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers

182. Rule 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of

Prisoners (Resolution (73) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council

of Europe) provides:

“An untried prisoner shall be entitled, as soon as he is imprisoned,

to choose his legal representation ... and to receive visits from his

legal adviser with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand to

him and to receive, confidential instructions. At his request, he shall

be given all necessary facilities for this purpose. ... Interviews

between the prisoner and his legal adviser may be within sight but

not within hearing, either direct or indirect, of a police or institution

official.”

183. Furthermore, the Recommendation of the Committee of

Ministers to member States of the Council of Europe on the European

Prison Rules (Rec(2006)2), adopted on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd

meeting of the Ministers‟ Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as

follows:

“Legal advice

23.1 All prisoners are entitled to legal advice, and the prison

authorities shall provide them with reasonable facilities for gaining

access to such advice.

23.2 Prisoners may consult on any legal matter with a legal

adviser of their own choice and at their own expense.

...

23.5 A judicial authority may in exceptional circumstances

authorise restrictions on such confidentiality to prevent serious

crime or major breaches of prison safety and security.”

(ii) European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman

or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)

184. Following its visit to Turkey in July 2000, the CPT published its

report dated 8 November 2001 (CPT/Inf(2001)25). It stated:

53

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 33

“61. Despite the many changes to legislation in recent years,

certain weaknesses remain as regards formal safeguards against ill-

treatment. Perhaps the most important shortcoming is that persons

detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the

jurisdiction of the State Security Courts are still not entitled to

access to a lawyer during the first four days of their custody.

Further, despite earlier affirmations to the contrary, the Turkish

authorities made clear in their response to the report on the

February/March 1999 visit that such persons are being denied

during the first four days of their custody the possibility to inform a

relative of their situation. Such incommunicado detention can only

facilitate the infliction of ill-treatment.

The CPT must therefore reiterate once again the recommendation

that all persons deprived of their liberty by the law enforcement

agencies, including persons suspected of offences falling under the

jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, be granted as from the

outset of their custody the right of access to a lawyer. The CPT

recognises that in order to protect the legitimate interests of the

police investigation, it may exceptionally be necessary to delay for a

certain period a detained person‟s access to a lawyer of his choice;

however, in such cases, access to another independent lawyer

should be arranged.

The implementation of the above recommendation will require

legislative measures. However, in the meantime, immediate steps

should be taken to ensure that existing legal provisions are complied

with. Indeed, the information gathered during the July 2000 ad hoc

visit clearly indicates that even after the first four days of police

custody, access to a lawyer for persons suspected of State Security

Court offences is in practice the exception rather than the rule. The

CPT recommends that the officials responsible for carrying out

checks and inspections under the previously-mentioned compliance

monitoring procedure be instructed to pay particular attention to

whether persons suspected of collective offences falling under the

jurisdiction of the State Security Courts are being informed of their

right to have access to a lawyer after the first four days of their

custody and are being placed in a position effectively to exercise

that right.”

185. The CPT visited Turkey again in September 2001 and in its

report dated 24 April 2002 (CPT/Inf(2002)8) stated:

“12. The amendments made to Article 16 of the Law on the

Organisation and Trial Procedures of State Security Courts have also

introduced an improvement as regards access to a lawyer for

persons detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the

jurisdiction of State Security Courts. For such persons, the right of

access to a lawyer becomes operative after the prosecutor has

issued a written order for the extension of police custody beyond

forty-eight hours; in other words, they are now denied access to a

54

lawyer only for two days as compared to four days under the

previous law.

Whilst welcoming this step forward, the CPT regrets that the

opportunity was not taken to guarantee to persons detained for

collective State Security Court offences a right of access to a lawyer

as from the very outset of their custody (and hence align their rights

in this respect with those of ordinary criminal suspects). The CPT

trusts that the Turkish authorities will in the near future implement

the Committee‟s long-standing recommendation that all persons

deprived of their liberty by law enforcement agencies, including

persons suspected of offences falling under the jurisdiction of the

State Security Courts, be granted as from the outset of their

custody the right of access to a lawyer.

...

46. Reference has been made earlier to recent positive legislative

developments concerning the rights of access to a lawyer and to

have one‟s custody notified to a relative (cf. paragraphs 12 to 14).

They have further improved an already impressive legal and

regulatory framework to combat torture and ill-treatment.

Nevertheless, the CPT remains very concerned by the fact that

persons detained on suspicion of collective offences falling under the

jurisdiction of State Security Courts are still denied access to a

lawyer during the first two days of their custody; its position on this

point has been made clear in paragraph 12.

Further, the actual content of the right of access to a lawyer for

persons suspected of State Security Court offences remains less well

developed than in the case of ordinary criminal suspects. In

particular, as far as the CPT can ascertain, it is still the case that

such suspects are not entitled to have the lawyer present when

making a statement to the police and that the procedure allowing

for the appointment of a lawyer by the Bar Association is not

applicable to them. Similarly, the provision making obligatory the

appointment of a lawyer for persons under 18 still does not apply to

juveniles who are detained on suspicion of State Security Court

offences. In this regard, the CPT reiterates the recommendation

already made in the report on the October 1997 visit, that the

relevant provisions of Articles 135, 136 and 138 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure be rendered applicable to persons suspected of

offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts.”

(b) United Nations

(i) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

186. Article 14 § 3 (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence is

to be entitled “[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation

of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing”.

55

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 35

(ii) United Nations Committee against Torture

187. In its Conclusions and Recommendations on Turkey, dated 27

May 2003 (CAT/C/CR/30/5), the Committee stated the following:

“5. The Committee expresses concern about

...

(c) allegations that persons in police custody have been denied

prompt and adequate access to legal and medical assistance and

that family members have not been promptly notified of their

detention;

...

7. The Committee recommends that the State Party

(a) ensure that detainees, including those held for offences under

the jurisdiction of State Security Courts, benefit fully in practice

from the available safeguards against ill-treatment and torture,

particularly by guaranteeing their right to medical and legal

assistance and to contact with their families;

...”

188. In its General Comment No. 2, dated 24 January 2008

(CAT/C/GC/2), the Committee stated:

“13. Certain basic guarantees apply to all persons deprived of

liberty. Some of these are specified in the Convention, and the

Committee consistently calls upon the States Parties to use them.

The Committee‟s recommendations concerning effective measures

aim to clarify the current baseline and are not exhaustive. Such

guarantees include, inter alia, ... the right promptly to receive

independent legal assistance ...”

(c) European Union

189. Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that

“[r]espect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged

shall be guaranteed”. Article 52 § 3 further states that the meaning and

scope of the right guaranteed under Article 48 are the same as the

equivalent right laid down by the European Convention on Human

Rights.

56

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

A. Access to a lawyer during police custody

190. The applicant alleged that his defence rights had been violated

as he had been denied access to a lawyer during his police custody. He

relied on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, which provides:

“3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his

own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so

require.”

1. The Chamber judgment

191. In its judgment of 26 April 2007, the Chamber held that there

had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. In that

connection, it pointed out that the applicant had been represented

during the trial and appeal proceedings by a lawyer and that the

applicant‟s statement to the police was not the sole basis for his

conviction. According to the Chamber, the applicant had had the

opportunity of challenging the prosecution‟s allegations under conditions

which did not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his

opponent. The Chamber also noted that in convicting the applicant, the

Ġzmir State Security Court had had regard to the circumstances in which

the applicant was arrested, the expert report concerning the handwriting

on the banner, and witness statements. In view of the above, it

concluded that the fairness of the applicant‟s trial had not been

prejudiced by the lack of legal assistance during his police custody.

2. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

192. The applicant contested the grounds on which the Chamber had

found that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the

Convention. He stated that the assistance of a lawyer in police custody

was a fundamental right. He reminded the Court that all the evidence

which had been used against him had been collected at the preliminary

investigation stage, during which he had been denied the assistance of a

lawyer. At this point, the applicant also argued that although the

domestic court had convicted him, there had been no evidence to prove

that he was guilty. He also stated that he had been ill-treated during his

police custody and had signed his statement to the police under duress.

That statement had been used by the Ġzmir State Security Court,

57

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 37

although he had clearly retracted it before the public prosecutor, the

investigating judge and at the trial. The applicant also stressed that he

had been a minor at the material time and had no previous criminal

record. In his submission, in view of the serious charges that had been

brought against him, the lack of legal assistance had breached his right

to a fair trial. He also argued that the Government had failed to submit

any good reason to justify the lack of legal assistance.

(b) The Government

193. The Government asked the Grand Chamber to endorse the

Chamber‟s finding that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of

the Convention. They stated, firstly, that the legislation had been

changed in 2005. Furthermore, in their submission, the restriction

imposed on the applicant‟s access to a lawyer had not infringed his right

to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. Referring to the case-law

of the Court (see, in particular, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November

1993, Series A no. 275; John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February

1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I; Averill v. the United

Kingdom, no. 36408/97, ECHR 2000-VI; Magee v. the United Kingdom,

no. 28135/95, ECHR 2000-VI; and Brennan v. the United Kingdom,

no. 39846/98, ECHR 2001-X), they maintained that in assessing

whether or not the trial was fair, regard should be had to the entirety of

the proceedings. Thus, as the applicant had been represented by a

lawyer during the proceedings before the Ġzmir State Security Court and

the Court of Cassation, his right to a fair hearing had not been violated.

The Government further drew attention to several Turkish cases (see

Saraç v. Turkey (dec.), no. 35841/97, 2 September 2004; Yurtsever v.

Turkey (dec.), no. 42086/02, 31 August 2006; Uçma v. Turkey (dec.),

no. 15071/03, 3 October 2006; Yavuz and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no.

38827/02, 21 November 2006; and Yıldız v. Turkey (dec.), nos.

3543/03 and 3557/03, 5 December 2006), in which the Court had

declared similar complaints inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded

on the ground that, since the police statements had not been the only

evidence to support the convictions, the lack of legal assistance during

police custody had not constituted a violation of Article 6 of the

Convention.

194. Turning to the facts of the instant case, the Government

maintained that when the applicant was taken into police custody, he

was reminded of his right to remain silent and that during the ensuing

criminal proceedings his lawyer had had the opportunity to challenge the

prosecution‟s allegations. They further emphasised that the applicant‟s

statement to the police was not the sole basis for his conviction.

3. The Court’s assessment

(a) The general principles applicable in this case

195. The Court reiterates that, even if the primary purpose of Article

6 of the Convention, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, is to

ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal

58

charge”, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial

proceedings. Thus, Article 6 – especially paragraph 3 thereof – may be

relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the

trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply

with its provisions (see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 36). As the Court has

already held in its previous judgments, the right set out in Article 6 § 3

(c) of the Convention is one element, among others, of the concept of a

fair trial in criminal proceedings contained in Article 6 § 1 (see

Imbrioscia, cited above, § 37, and Brennan, cited above, § 45).

196. The Court further reiterates that although not absolute, the

right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively

defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the

fundamental features of a fair trial (see Poitrimol v. France, 23

November 1993, § 34, Series A no. 277-A, and Demebukov v. Bulgaria,

no. 68020/01, § 50, 28 February 2008). Nevertheless, Article 6 § 3 (c)

does not specify the manner of exercising this right. It thus leaves to

the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is

secured in their judicial systems, the Court‟s task being only to ascertain

whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the

requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be remembered that

the Convention is designed to “guarantee not rights that are theoretical

or illusory but rights that are practical and effective” and that assigning

counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he

may afford an accused (see Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38).

197. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an

accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for

the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In

such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be

allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial

stages of police interrogation. However, this right has so far been

considered capable of being subject to restrictions for good cause. The

question, in each case, has therefore been whether the restriction was

justified and, if so, whether, in the light of the entirety of the

proceedings, it has not deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a

justified restriction is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (see

John Murray, cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above, § 45; and Magee,

cited above, § 44).

198. These principles, outlined in paragraph 52 above, are also in

line with the generally recognised international human rights standards

(see paragraphs 37-42 above) which are at the core of the concept of a

fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to the protection of the

accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities. They

also contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the

fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the

investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused.

199. In this respect, the Court underlines the importance of the

investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as

the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in

which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (see Can v.

Austria, no. 9300/81, Commission‟s report of 12 July 1984, § 50, Series

59

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 39

A no. 96). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a

particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the

effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal

procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect

to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases,

this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the

assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to

ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This

right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to

prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained

through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the

accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 100, ECHR

2006-IX, and Kolu v. Turkey, no. 35811/97, § 51, 2 August 2005). Early

access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the

Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure

has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-

incrimination (see, mutatis mutandis, Jalloh, cited above, § 101). In this

connection, the Court also notes the recommendations of the European

Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment (CPT) (see paragraphs 39-40 above), in which

the CPT repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to have access to

legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment. Any

exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed

and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are

particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face

of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be

ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies.

200. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the

right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective” (see

paragraph 51 above), Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a

lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by

the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular

circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict

this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify

denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification

– must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6

(see, mutatis mutandis, Magee, cited above, § 44). The rights of the

defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating

statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer

are used for a conviction.

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

201. In the present case, the applicant‟s right of access to a lawyer

was restricted during his police custody, pursuant to section 31 of Law

no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the

jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. As a result, he did not have

access to a lawyer when he made his statements to the police, the

public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively. Thus, no

other justification was given for denying the applicant access to a lawyer

than the fact that this was provided for on a systematic basis by the

60

relevant legal provisions. As such, this already falls short of the

requirements of Article 6 in this respect, as set out at paragraph 52

above.

202. The Court further observes that the applicant had access to a

lawyer following his detention on remand. During the ensuing criminal

proceedings, he was also able to call witnesses on his behalf and had

the possibility of challenging the prosecution‟s arguments. It is also

noted that the applicant repeatedly denied the content of his statement

to the police, both at the trial and on appeal. However, as is apparent

from the case file, the investigation had in large part been completed

before the applicant appeared before the investigating judge on 1 June

2001. Moreover, not only did the Ġzmir State Security Court not take a

stance on the admissibility of the applicant‟s statements made in police

custody before going on to examine the merits of the case, it also used

the statement to the police as the main evidence on which to convict

him, despite his denial of its accuracy (see paragraph 23 above). In this

connection, the Court observes that in convicting the applicant, the

Ġzmir State Security Court in fact used the evidence before it to confirm

the applicant‟s statement to the police. This evidence included the

expert‟s report dated 1 June 2001 and the statements of the other

accused to the police and the public prosecutor. In this respect,

however, the Court finds it striking that the expert‟s report mentioned in

the judgment of the first-instance court was in favour of the applicant,

as it stated that it could not be established whether the handwriting on

the banner matched the applicant‟s (see paragraph 15 above). It is also

significant that all the co-defendants, who had testified against the

applicant in their statements to the police and the public prosecutor,

retracted their statements at the trial and denied having participated in

the demonstration.

203. Thus, in the present case, the applicant was undoubtedly

affected by the restrictions on his access to a lawyer in that his

statement to the police was used for his conviction. Neither the

assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature

of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects which had occurred

during police custody. However, it is not for the Court to speculate on

the impact which the applicant‟s access to a lawyer during police

custody would have had on the ensuing proceedings.

204. The Court further notes that neither the letter nor the spirit of

Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own

free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of

a fair trial (see Kwiatkowska v. Italy (dec.), no. 52868/99, 30 November

2000). However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver

of the right to take part in the trial must be established in an

unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards

commensurate to its importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.

56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-II; Kolu, cited above, § 53; and Colozza v.

Italy, 12 February 1985, § 28, Series A no. 89). Thus, in the present

case, no reliance can be placed on the assertion in the form stating his

rights that the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent

(see paragraph 14 above).

61

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 41

205. Finally, the Court notes that one of the specific elements of the

instant case was the applicant‟s age. Having regard to a significant

number of relevant international law materials concerning legal

assistance to minors in police custody (see paragraphs 32-36 above),

the Court stresses the fundamental importance of providing access to a

lawyer where the person in custody is a minor.

206. Still, in the present case, as explained above, the restriction

imposed on the right of access to a lawyer was systematic and applied

to anyone held in police custody, regardless of his or her age, in

connection with an offence falling under the jurisdiction of the State

Security Courts.

207. In sum, even though the applicant had the opportunity to

challenge the evidence against him at the trial and subsequently on

appeal, the absence of a lawyer while he was in police custody

irretrievably affected his defence rights.

(c) Conclusion

208. In view of the above, the Court concludes that there has been a

violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention in conjunction with Article

6 § 1 in the present case.

B. The non-communication of the written opinion of the

Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation

209. The applicant complained that the written opinion of the

Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had not been

communicated to him. In this respect, he relied on Article 6 § 1 of the

Convention, the relevant part of which provides:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

1. The Chamber judgment

210. In its judgment of 26 April 2007, the Chamber found that, in

the light of the established case-law on the matter, the non-

communication to the applicant of the written opinion of the Principal

Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had infringed his right to

adversarial proceedings. It therefore concluded that there had been a

violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. The parties’ submissions

211. The parties filed no further observations on this question.

3. The Court’s assessment

212. The Court considers, for the reasons given by the Chamber,

that the applicant‟s right to adversarial proceedings has been breached.

There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

62

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

213. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the

Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the

High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to

be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party.”

A. Damage

1. The parties’ submissions

214. The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of

pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

215. The Government contended that the amounts claimed were

excessive and unacceptable.

2. The Chamber judgment

216. The Chamber did not award any pecuniary compensation to the

applicant, holding that he had failed to substantiate his claims. It

considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient

just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the

applicant.

3. The Court’s assessment

217. The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress

for a violation of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as

far as possible, is put in the position in which he would have been had

this provision not been disregarded (see Teteriny v. Russia, no.

11931/03, § 56, 30 June 2005; Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no.

41183/02, § 53, ECHR 2006-XII; and Mehmet and Suna Yiğit v. Turkey,

no. 52658/99, § 47, 17 July 2007). The Court finds that this principle

applies in the present case as well. Consequently, it considers that the

most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in

accordance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,

should the applicant so request (see, mutatis mutandis, Gençel v.

Turkey, no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003).

218. As regards the remaining non-pecuniary damage, ruling on an

equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,000.

B. Costs and expenses

1. The parties’ submissions

219. The applicant claimed EUR 3,500 for the costs and expenses

incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Chamber, without

submitting any documents in support of his claims. It is to be noted that

the applicant has not amended the initial claim he made before the

63

SALDUZ v. TURKEY JUDGMENT 43

Chamber, but has submitted a legal-aid request for the expenses

incurred before the Grand Chamber.

220. The Government contested the claim, arguing that it was

unsubstantiated.

2. The Chamber judgment

221. The Chamber awarded the applicant EUR 1,000 for costs and

expenses.

3. The Court’s assessment

222. The Court observes that the applicant had the benefit of legal

aid for the costs and expenses incurred during the Grand Chamber

proceedings. As a result, the costs and expenses only include those

incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts and the

Chamber.

223. According to the Court‟s established case-law, costs and

expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established

that they were actually and necessarily incurred and are also reasonable

as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far

as they relate to the violation found (see, among other authorities,

Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May

2002, and Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 105, ECHR

2003-VIII).

224. In the light of the above, the Court awards the applicant the

sum already awarded by the Chamber, namely EUR 1,000.

C. Default interest

225. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate

should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the

Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1, on account of the lack

of legal assistance to the applicant while he was in police custody;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the

Convention, in respect of the non-communication of the written

opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three

months, the following amounts, to be converted into Turkish liras at

the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

64

(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be

chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be

chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until

settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at

a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant‟s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in

the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 27 November 2008.

Vincent Berger Nicolas Bratza

Jurisconsult President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2

of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to

this judgment:

(a) concurring opinion of Judge Bratza;

(b) joint concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann, Ziemele

and Lazarova Trajkovska;

(c) concurring opinion of Judge Zagrebelsky, joined by

Judges Casadevall and Türmen.

N.B.

V.B.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BRATZA

The central issue in the present case concerns the use made in

evidence against the applicant of a confession made during the course

of police interrogation at a time when he had been denied access to a

lawyer. The Grand Chamber has found that the restriction on such

access irretrievably prejudiced the applicant‟s rights of defence and that

neither the legal assistance subsequently provided to the applicant nor

the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects

which had occurred while the applicant was in police custody. The

applicant‟s rights under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, read in

conjunction with Article 6 § 1, were accordingly violated on account of

this lack of legal assistance. I am in full agreement with this conclusion.

In paragraph 55 of the judgment, the Court states as a general

principle that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently

“practical and effective”, Article 6 requires that, as a rule, access to a

lawyer should be provided “as from the first interrogation of a suspect

by the police”. This principle is consistent with the Court‟s earlier case-

law and is clearly sufficient to enable the Court to reach a finding of a

violation of Article 6 on the facts of the present case. However, I share

the doubts of Judge Zagrebelsky as to whether, in appearing to hold

that the right of access to a lawyer only arises at the moment of first

interrogation, the statement of principle goes far enough. Like Judge

Zagrebelsky, I consider that the Court should have used the opportunity

65

to state in clear terms that the fairness of criminal proceedings under

Article 6 requires that, as a rule, a suspect should be granted access to

legal advice from the moment he is taken into police custody or pre-trial

detention. It would be regrettable if the impression were to be left by

the judgment that no issue could arise under Article 6 as long as a

suspect was given access to a lawyer at the point when his interrogation

began or that Article 6 was engaged only where the denial of access

affected the fairness of the interrogation of the suspect. The denial of

access to a lawyer from the outset of the detention of a suspect which,

in a particular case, results in prejudice to the rights of the defence may

violate Article 6 of the Convention whether or not such prejudice stems

from the interrogation of the suspect.

66

CONSEILDE L’EUROPE

COUNCILOF EUROPE

COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMMEEUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES ROZAKIS, SPIELMANN,

ZIEMELE AND LAZAROVA TRAJKOVSKA

1. We agree in all respects with the Court‟s conclusions as to the

violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the

Convention.

2. We would, however, have liked the reasoning set out in

paragraph 72 of the judgment, on account of its importance, to have

been included in the operative provisions as well, for reasons which

have already been explained to a certain extent in the joint concurring

opinion of Judges Spielmann and Malinverni in Vladimir Romanov v.

Russia (no. 41461/02, 24 July 2008), as well as the concurring opinion

of Judge Spielmann in Polufakin and Chernyshev v. Russia (no.

30997/02, 25 September 2008), and are now repeated here.

3. Firstly, it is common knowledge that while the reasoning of a

judgment allows the Contracting States to ascertain the grounds on

which the Court reached a finding of a violation or no violation of the

Convention, and is of decisive importance on that account for the

interpretation of the Convention, it is the operative provisions that are

binding on the parties for the purposes of Article 46 § 1 of the

Convention.

4. And indeed, what the Court says in paragraph 72 of the judgment

is in our view of the utmost importance. It reiterates that when a person

has been convicted in breach of the procedural safeguards afforded by

Article 6, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he

would have been had the requirements of that Article not been

disregarded (the principle of restitutio in integrum).

5. The principle of restitutio in integrum has its origin in the

judgment of 13 September 1928 of the Permanent Court of

International Justice (PCIJ) in the case concerning the Factory at

Chorzów (claim for indemnity) (merits), where the Court held as

follows:

“The essential principle is ... that reparation must, as far as

possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-

establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if

that act had not been committed.” (Collection of Judgments, Series

A no. 17, p. 47)

6. This principle, namely that restitutio in integrum is considered to

be the primary remedy for effecting reparation for breaches of

67

international law, has been constantly reaffirmed by international case-

law and practice, and is recalled in Article 35 of the Draft Articles on

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which reads as

follows:

“A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an

obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation

which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and

to the extent that restitution:

(a) is not materially impossible;

(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit

deriving from restitution instead of compensation.”

There is no reason not to apply this principle to make reparation for

internationally wrongful acts in the field of human rights (see Loukis G.

Loucaides, “Reparation for Violations of Human Rights under the

European Convention and Restitutio in Integrum”, [2008] European

Human Rights Law Review, pp. 182-92).

In Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece ((Article 50), 31 October

1995, Series A no. 330-B) the Court held:

“34. The Court points out that by Article 53 of the Convention the

High Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the decision of the

Court in any case to which they were parties; furthermore, Article

54 provides that the judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to

the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its execution. It

follows that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes

on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the

breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as

to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach.

The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle

free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment

in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the

manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice

attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under

the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed

(Article 1). If the nature of the breach allows of restitutio in

integrum, it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having

neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If,

on the other hand, national law does not allow – or allows only

partial – reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach,

Article 50 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such

satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate.”

7. In the present case, and given that the absence of a lawyer while

the applicant was in police custody irretrievably affected his defence

rights (see paragraph 62 of the judgment), the best means of achieving

this is the reopening of the proceedings and the commencement of a

new trial at which all the guarantees of a fair trial would be observed,

provided, of course, that the applicant requests this option and it is

available in the domestic law of the respondent State.

68

CONSEILDE L’EUROPE

COUNCILOF EUROPE

COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMMEEUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

8. The reason why we wish to stress this point is that it must not be

overlooked that the damages which the Court orders to be paid to

victims of a violation of the Convention are, according to the terms and

the spirit of Article 41, of a subsidiary nature. This is in line with the

subsidiary character attributed to compensation of damages in

international law. Article 36 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states:

“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is

under an obligation to compensate the damage caused thereby,

insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. ...”

It is therefore right that, wherever possible, the Court should seek to

restore the status quo ante for the victim. However, the Court should

also take into consideration that “Wiping out all the consequences of the

wrongful act may ... require some or all forms of reparation to be

provided, depending on the type and extent of the injury that has been

caused” (see J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles

on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries,

Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 211, (2)) and in view of the

remedies available at the domestic level (Article 41).

9. Admittedly, States are not required by the Convention to

introduce procedures in their domestic legal systems whereby

judgments of their Supreme Courts constituting res judicata may be

reviewed. However, they are strongly encouraged to do so, especially in

criminal matters.

10. In Turkey, Article 311 § 1 (f) of the Turkish Code of Criminal

Procedure provides that the reopening of domestic proceedings which

are found to be unfair by the European Court of Human Rights can be

requested within one year following the final decision of the European

Court of Human Rights.

There is, however, a temporal limitation for the applicability of this

provision. Article 311 § 2 states that the above-mentioned provision is

not applicable to applications which were lodged with the European

Court of Human Rights before 4 February 2003 and for those judgments

which became final before 4 February 2003. We believe that where, as

in the present case, the respondent State has equipped itself with such

a procedure it is the Court‟s duty not only to suggest timidly that

reopening is the most appropriate form of redress, as paragraph 72 of

the judgment does, but also to urge the authorities to make use of that

procedure, however unsatisfactory it may appear, or to adapt existing

69

procedures, provided, of course, that the applicant so wishes. However,

this is not legally possible unless such an exhortation appears in the

operative provisions of the judgment.

11. Moreover, the Court has already included directions of this

nature in the operative provisions of judgments. For example, in Claes

and Others v. Belgium (nos. 46825/99, 47132/99, 47502/99, 49010/99,

49104/99, 49195/99 and 49716/99, 2 June 2005) it held in point 5 (a)

of the operative provisions of its judgment that “unless it grants a

request by [the] applicants for a retrial or for the proceedings to be

reopened, the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the

date on which the applicant in question indicates that he does not wish

to submit such a request or it appears that he does not intend to do so,

or from the date on which such a request is refused”, sums in respect of

non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses. Similarly, in Lungoci v.

Romania (no. 62710/00, 26 January 2006) the Court held in point 3 (a)

of the operative provisions of its judgment that “the respondent State is

to ensure that, within six months from the date on which the judgment

becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the

proceedings are reopened if the applicant so desires, and at the same

time is to pay her EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of non-

pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that

amount, to be converted into Romanian lei at the rate applicable at the

date of settlement”.

12. By virtue of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, supervision of the

execution of the Court‟s judgments is the responsibility of the

Committee of Ministers. That does not mean, however, that the Court

should not play any part in the matter and should not take measures

designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers‟ task in discharging

these functions. In fact, there is nothing in Article 41 or anywhere else

in the Convention that would prevent the Court from assessing the issue

of full reparation in accordance with the principles outlined above. Since

the Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Convention, it also

has jurisdiction to assess “the form and quantum of reparation to be

made” (see J. Crawford, ibid., p. 201). As was explained by the PCIJ in

the Factory at Chorzów case: “Reparation ... is the indispensable

complement of a failure to apply a convention ...” (p. 21).

13. To that end, it is essential that in its judgments the Court should

not merely give as precise a description as possible of the nature of the

Convention violation found but should also indicate to the State

concerned in the operative provisions, if the circumstances of the case

so require, the measures it considers the most appropriate to redress

the violation.

70

CONSEILDE L’EUROPE

COUNCILOF EUROPE

COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMMEEUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE ZAGREBELSKY,

JOINED BY JUDGES CASADEVALL AND TÜRMEN

(Translation)

To my vote in favour of the judgment‟s operative provisions, I would

like to add a few words to explain the meaning of the Court‟s reasoning,

as I understand it.

The Court found a violation “of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention in

conjunction with Article 6 § 1, on account of the lack of legal assistance

to the applicant while he was in police custody” (point 1 of the operative

provisions). It thus replied to the applicant‟s complaint “that his defence

rights had been violated in that ... he had been denied access to a

lawyer while in police custody”. That complaint, raised by the applicant

under Article 6 § 3 (c), was rightly formulated more precisely by the

Court, which linked it with Article 6 § 1.

To my mind, the meaning of the Court‟s judgment is quite clear. If

there is any doubt at all, what the Court says in paragraph 53, referring

back to paragraph 37, makes things clearer still. The generally

recognised international standards, which the Court accepts and which

form the framework for its case-law, provide: “An untried prisoner shall

be entitled, as soon as he is imprisoned, to choose his legal

representation ... and to receive visits from his legal adviser with a view

to his defence and to prepare and hand to him and to receive,

confidential instructions ...”

It is therefore at the very beginning of police custody or pre-trial

detention that a person accused of an offence must have the possibility

of being assisted by a lawyer, and not only while being questioned.

The importance of interrogations in the context of criminal procedure

is obvious, so that, as the judgment makes clear, the impossibility of

being assisted by a lawyer while being questioned amounts, subject to

exceptions, to a serious failing with regard to the requirements of a fair

trial. But the fairness of proceedings against an accused person in

custody also requires that he be able to obtain (and that defence

counsel be able to provide) the whole wide range of services specifically

associated with legal assistance, including discussion of the case,

organisation of the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the

accused, preparation for questioning, support to an accused in distress,

checking his conditions of detention and so on.

71

The legal principle to be derived from the judgment is therefore that,

normally and apart from exceptional limitations, an accused person in

custody is entitled, right from the beginning of police custody or pre-

trial detention, to be visited by defence counsel to discuss everything

concerning his defence and his legitimate needs. Failure to allow that

possibility, regardless of the question of interrogations and their use by

the courts, amounts, subject to exceptions, to a violation of Article 6 of

the Convention.

I would add that, naturally, the fact that defence counsel may see the

accused throughout his detention in police stations or in prison is more

apt than any other measure to prevent treatment prohibited by Article 3

of the Convention.

The foregoing considerations would not have been necessary if the

Court‟s reasoning had not contained passages capable of suggesting to

the reader that the Court requires accused persons to be assisted by

defence counsel only from the start of and during interrogation (or even

only during an interview of which a formal record is to be produced to

be used as evidence by the court). From paragraph 55 onwards the text

adopted by the Court concentrates entirely on the answers given by the

applicant when questioned which were later used against him.

I would find such a reading of the judgment too reductive. The

importance of the Court‟s decision for the protection of an accused

person deprived of his liberty would be severely weakened thereby. And

wrongly so, to my mind, since the reasoning linked to the questioning of

the applicant and the way his answers were used by the courts is easily

explained by the Court‟s concern to take into consideration the specific

facts of the case before it.

72

CONSEILDE L’EUROPE

COUNCILOF EUROPE

COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMMEEUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF PANOVITS v. CYPRUS

(Application no. 4268/04)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

11 December 2008

FINAL

11/03/2009

This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.

73

PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 1

In the case of Panovits v. Cyprus,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a

Chamber composed of:

Christos Rozakis, President,

Nina VajiĤ,

Khanlar Hajiyev,

Dean Spielmann,

Sverre Erik Jebens,

Giorgio Malinverni, judges,

George Erotocritou, ad hoc judge,

and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2008,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

226. The case originated in an application (no. 4268/04) against the

Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Cypriot national, Mr Andreas Kyriakou

Panovits (“the applicant”), on 31 December 2003.

227. The applicant was represented by Mr E. Efstathiou, a lawyer

practising in Nicosia. The Cypriot Government (“the Government”) were

represented by their Agent, Mr P. Clerides, Attorney-General of the

Republic of Cyprus.

228. The applicant complained, in particular, about the fairness of

criminal proceedings at the pre-trial stage and before the domestic

courts.

229. On 16 January 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the

application and communicate the complaints under 6 § 1 concerning the

pre-trial stage of the proceedings together with the fairness of the trial

before the Assize Court and the Supreme Court to the Government.

Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to

examine the merits of the application at the same time as its

admissibility. On 31 January 2008 the Court decided to invite the parties

to submit supplementary observations under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the

Rules of Court.

230. Mr G. Nicolaou, the judge elected in respect of Cyprus,

withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of Court). The

Government accordingly appointed Mr G. Erotocritou to sit as an ad hoc

judge (Rule 29).

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2 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

231. The applicant was born on 14 August 1982 and is currently

serving concurrent sentences of imprisonment at the Nicosia Central

Prison.

A. The applicant’s arrest

232. In the context of a police investigation concerning a murder

and robbery which took place on 19 April 2000, the police contacted the

applicant‟s father and invited him and the applicant to visit the Limassol

police station. At the time the applicant was just over 17 years old. The

applicant went to the police station accompanied by his father. The

Limassol District Police Director (hereinafter “the Police Director”)

informed the applicant‟s father, in the presence of the applicant, about

the crime that had been committed, the seriousness of the case, and

the fact that there was evidence involving the applicant and that an

arrest warrant had been issued against him.

233. According to the applicant, he immediately stated that he was

innocent. Another police officer told him that his friend had already

confessed to murdering the victim together with the applicant. The

police officer added that the applicant‟s friend was crying and hitting his

head against a wall while he (the applicant) was merely lying to them.

Then, another police officer came into the Police Director‟s room holding

an arrest warrant and informed the applicant that he was under arrest

for murder. The applicant replied that he had nothing to add to his

statement that he was innocent. The police officer then told the

applicant to follow him into a different office. There there were 5 or 6

officers who started asking him questions and inducing him to confess,

promising that if he did so they would assist him. They questioned him

for approximately 30-40 minutes but he kept saying that he could not

remember anything as he had been very drunk the night before. At

some stage during the interrogation a police officer put his gun on the

desk and told the applicant that he should hurry up as they had other

things to do. The police officers told him that if he wanted to go he

should confess. Subsequently a police officer suggested that they take a

written statement from the applicant and that the police officers would

remind him of anything he could not remember. The applicant then

agreed to make a written statement. He denied having made any prior

oral admission.

234. According to the Government, relying on the testimonies of the

police officers participating in the interrogation, the applicant was shown

the arrest warrant and informed of the reasons for his arrest, and had

his attention drawn to the law. The applicant replied that he had nothing

to say other than that he was innocent. He was then taken to a different

room for questioning. Before the applicant was questioned the arresting

officer explained again the reasons for his arrest, repeated that there

75

PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 3

was evidence involving the applicant in the circumstances under

investigation and cautioned him that anything he said could be used

against him in subsequent proceedings. There were four police officers

present in the room. The applicant replied that he had not intended to

kill anyone and started to give an explanation of the events. According

to the arresting officer, the applicant was interrupted and his attention

was drawn to the law. During the questioning the applicant confessed

his guilt.

235. The parties agreed that when the applicant was taken away for

questioning, his father remained in the Police Director‟s office. He was

shocked and after a couple of minutes told the Police Director that they

should not use violence against his son. The Police Director replied that

the police did not use such practices and added that the case was

serious, that there was evidence linking the applicant with the crime and

that it was important to seek the advice of a lawyer. He asked the

applicant‟s father whether he wanted to be present while his son was

questioned. The father declined the offer. A few minutes afterwards, a

police officer entered the room and informed the Police Director and the

applicant‟s father that the applicant had confessed. The Police Director

invited the applicant‟s father to join his son in the interview room so

that he could hear what his son had admitted. The applicant‟s father

preferred to wait outside.

236. The applicant was charged with manslaughter and robbery

under the Criminal Code (Cap. 154). On 9 May 2000 the applicant noted

in an additional written statement: “I did not hit him (the victim) with

the stone but only kicked him a couple of times.”

B. Proceedings before the Limassol Assize Court

237. The applicant and his co-accused were brought for trial before

the Limassol Assize Court.

238. During the trial the applicant maintained that his confession to

the police had not been voluntary but the product of deception,

psychological pressure, promises, threats and other tactics aimed at

creating fear. He also argued that at the time he had made his

statement to the police he had been drunk and, therefore, he had not

been in a position to remember accurately the facts described in that

statement. Furthermore, the applicant argued that he had not had legal

advice immediately after his arrest and before being questioned and

induced to sign the written statement.

239. On 11 and 12 January 2001 the court heard the evidence of the

Police Director concerning the applicant‟s arrest and questioning. The

Director confirmed that he had invited the applicant and his father to his

office, where he had told the father, without addressing the applicant,

that an arrest warrant had been issued against the applicant in

connection with a murder and that there was evidence linking the

applicant to the crime. The applicant had then been cautioned, arrested

and taken into a separate room for questioning. Shortly after the

applicant left the room the Director had explained to the applicant‟s

76

4 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

father the seriousness of the case and suggested that they find a

lawyer.

240. On 7 February 2001 the Assize Court, having considered all the

evidence put before it, found that the applicant‟s confession had been

voluntary and that he had not been subjected to any undue or improper

pressure by the police to secure it. The evidence of the prosecution gave

a clear picture of the events that had taken place and the court

dismissed the applicant‟s allegations that, at the time of his confession,

he had suffered loss of memory due to drunkenness. The confession

was, therefore, admissible as evidence.

241. As regards the applicant‟s claims concerning the lack of legal

representation before his questioning, the court noted that the defence

had not relied on any provision or authority recognising a right to have

legal advice as a condition for receipt of an accused‟s statement. Nor

had the applicant or his father requested a lawyer and been refused one

by the police. Moreover, the Director of Police had advised the

applicant‟s father that he and his son should seek legal representation.

Overall, there had been no inappropriate action on the part of the police

in this respect.

242. Subsequently, on 14 February 2001, during the main trial, the

following exchange took place between the applicant‟s lawyer,

Mr Kyprianou, and the bench (translation of verbatim record of the

proceedings):

“Mr Kyprianou: I will ask the prosecution to give me all the

statements of suspects who made a statement about this case so

that I can continue my cross-examination of this witness. The

prosecution is obliged to supply me with all the statements taken

from other suspects and it is not permissible in our view for the

prosecution to hide behind this.

Court: First we want you to lower the tone of your voice. You do

not let slip an opportunity to attack the prosecution who we believe

is trying to present its case in a fair way, at least as the facts so far

show. If you asked at some stage for the statements to be given to

you and the prosecution refused, that is another matter.

Mr Kyprianou: I believed that I would get this from the case file,

now I am deprived of this right. I want the complete case file. I

cannot continue my cross-examination of this witness if I do not

have the complete case file.

Ms Kyriakidou (prosecutor): The position of the prosecution on the

basis of Article 7 of the Law on Criminal Procedure (is that) to make

any complaint the Defence must apply in writing to the prosecution

to ask for any statement in the file and if the Prosecution refuses,

then the defence is entitled to complain.

Here, the defence did not apply in writing; certain particulars,

photographs, plans were asked for verbally and whatever was asked

for was given and the prosecution never refused to give anything to

the defence. This process did not happen and it is my position that

this attitude of the defence is not justified.

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 5

Court: We have considered the request of the learned counsel of

accused no. 2 for the Court to interrupt the proceedings so that he

can get statements of persons who gave statements during the

investigation of the case from his opponents. As stated earlier

today, the defence had a right, on the basis of Article 7 of the Law

on Criminal Procedure, Cap.155, to request to be supplied with the

said copies from the day when the accused pleaded not guilty, but

failed to do so.

We do not consider it expedient to break after so much delay and

to create a fresh delay for this purpose. In any case, the Court in

the present case is occupied with whether the prosecution will

succeed in proving the guilt of the accused, who we note are

presumed innocent until the prosecution, with their evidence, prove

their guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.

Whether the examination was unsatisfactory or not is a matter

which will be decided at the end of the case. The request is

therefore refused.

Mr Kyprianou: I would ask for a break of five minutes in view of

your ruling to gather my thoughts and see how I shall proceed

because I believed that there would be disclosure of all the

documents, for this reason I want five minutes to think about what I

shall do in view of your ruling, that is to say how I shall proceed

with the cross-examination. The cross-examination will take another

sitting of the court. So the five minutes I am asking for are not

unjustifiable.

Court: We will approve a break of ten minutes but we will remind

(the defence) that it is the second time that an interruption of the

proceedings has been requested for inspecting the case file. We had

a break in a previous session and gave a sufficient interval for them

to see the file.”

243. Following the break, the proceedings were resumed. At one

point a confrontation occurred between the applicant‟s lawyer, Mr

Kyprianou, and the court. Mr Kyprianou was at the time cross-examining

a police officer who had taken the applicant‟s written statement and was

asking him about the manner in which an indication by another police-

officer to insert the time of taking the statement was made. The court

interrupted Mr Kyprianou and noted that they found his questions

unnecessary. Mr Kyprianou then sought leave to withdraw from the case

which was refused. The verbatim record of the proceedings reports the

following exchange (translation):

“Court: We consider that your cross-examination goes beyond the

detailed cross-examination that can take place at the present stage

of the main trial in issues...

Mr Kyprianou: I will stop my cross-examination...

Court: Mr Kyprianou...

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6 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

Mr Kyprianou: Since the Court considers that I am not doing my

job properly in defending this man, I ask for your leave to withdraw

from this case.

Court: Whether an advocate is to be granted leave to withdraw or

not, is a matter within the discretionary power of the court and, in

the light of what we have heard, no such leave is granted. We rely

on the case of Kafkaros and Others v. the Republic and do not grant

leave.

Mr Kyprianou: Since you are preventing me from continuing my

cross-examination on significant points of the case, then my role

here does not serve any purpose.”

Court: We consider your persistence...

Mr Kyprianou: And I am sorry that when I was cross-examining,

the members of the court were talking to each other, passing

„ravasakia‟ among themselves, which is not compatible with allowing

me to continue the cross-examination with the required vigour, if it

is under the secret scrutiny of the court.

Court: We consider that what has just been said by Mr Kyprianou,

and in particular the manner in which he addresses the court,

constitutes a contempt of court and Mr Kyprianou has two choices:

either to maintain what he said and to give reasons why no

sentence should be imposed on him, or to decide whether he should

retract. We give him this opportunity exceptionally. Section 44 (1)

(a) of the Courts of Justice Law applies to its full extent.

Mr Kyprianou: You can try me.

Court: Would you like to say anything?

Mr Kyprianou: I saw with my own eyes the small pieces of paper

going from one judge to another when I was cross-examining, in a

way not very flattering to the defence. How can I find the stamina to

defend a man who is accused of murder?

Court (Mr Photiou): It so happens that the piece of paper to which

Mr Kyprianou refers is still in the hands of brother Judge Mr

Economou and Mr Kyprianou may inspect it.

Court (Ms Michaelidou): The exchange of written views between

the members of the bench as to the manner in which Mr Kyprianou

is conducting the case does not give him any rights, and I consider

Mr Kyprianou‟s behaviour utterly unacceptable.

Court (Mr Photiou): We shall have a break in order to consider the

matter. The defendant (in the main trial) should in the meantime

remain in custody.

...

Court: We considered the matter during the adjournment and

continue to believe that what Mr Kyprianou said, the content, the

manner and the tone of his voice, constitute a contempt of court as

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 7

provided for in section 44 (1) (a) of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60

... that is, showing disrespect to the court by way of words and

conduct. We already asked Mr Kyprianou before the break if he had

anything to add before we pass sentence on him. If he has

something to add, let us hear him. Otherwise, the court should

proceed.

Mr Kyprianou: Mr President, certainly during the break, I

wondered what the offence was which I had committed. The events

took place in a very tense atmosphere. I am defending a very

serious case; I felt that I was interrupted in my cross-examination

and said what I said. I have been a lawyer for forty years, my

record is unblemished and it is the first time that I face such an

accusation. That is all I have to say.

Court: We shall adjourn for ten minutes and shall then proceed

with sentencing.”

244. After a short break the Assize Court, by a majority, sentenced

Mr Kyprianou to five days‟ imprisonment. The court referred to the

above exchange between Mr Kyprianou and its members and held as

follows:

“...It is not easy, through words, to convey the atmosphere which

Mr Kyprianou created since, quite apart from the unacceptable

content of his statements, the tone of his voice as well as his

demeanour and gestures to the court not only gave an unacceptable

impression of any civilised place, and a courtroom in particular, but

were apparently aimed at creating a climate of intimidation and

terror within the court. We are not exaggerating at all in saying that

Mr Kyprianou was shouting and gesticulating at the court.

It was pointed out to him that his statements and his behaviour

amounted to contempt of court and he was given the opportunity to

speak. And while there was a reasonable expectation that Mr

Kyprianou would calm down and that he would apologise, Mr

Kyprianou, in the same tone and with the same intensity already

referred to, shouted, „You can try me‟.

Later, after a long break, Mr Kyprianou was given a second chance

to address the court, in the hope that he would apologise and

mitigate the damage caused by his behaviour. Unfortunately, at this

stage Mr Kyprianou still showed no signs of regret or, at least, of

apprehension for the unacceptable situation he had created. On the

contrary, he stated that during the break he wondered what his

crime had been, merely attributing his behaviour to the „very tense

atmosphere‟. However, he was solely responsible for the creation of

that atmosphere and, therefore, he cannot use it as an excuse.

Mr Kyprianou did not hesitate to suggest that the exchange of

views between the members of the bench amounted to an exchange

of „ravasakia‟, that is, „love letters‟ (See: „Dictionary of Modern

Greek - Spoudi ravasaki (Slavic ravas), love letter, written love

note‟). And he accused the Court, which was trying to regulate the

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8 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

course of the proceedings, as it had the right and the duty to do, of

restricting him and of doing justice in secret.

We cannot conceive of another occasion of such a manifest and

unacceptable contempt of court by any person, let alone an

advocate.

The judges as persons, whom Mr Kyprianou has deeply insulted,

are the least of our concern. What really concerns us is the authority

and integrity of justice. If the court‟s reaction is not immediate and

drastic, we feel that justice will have suffered a disastrous blow. An

inadequate reaction on the part of the lawful and civilised order, as

expressed by the courts, would mean accepting that the authority of

the courts be demeaned.

It is with great sadness that we conclude that the only adequate

response, in the circumstances, is the imposition of a sentence of a

deterrent nature, which can only be imprisonment.

We are well aware of the repercussions of this decision since the

person concerned is an advocate of long standing, but it is Mr

Kyprianou himself who, through his conduct, brought matters to this

end.

In the light of the above we impose a sentence of imprisonment of

five days”.

245. Mr Kyprianou served his prison sentence immediately. He was

in fact released before completing the full term in accordance with

section 9 of the Prison Law (Law no. 62(I)/1996).

246. The applicant continued to be represented by Mr Kyprianou for

the rest of his trial.

247. On 21 February 2001 the defence requested the judges to

withdraw from the case in view of the events that had occurred so that

the case could be tried by another bench. Mr Kyprianou requested that

the court be addressed by another lawyer in this respect, given the fact

that he had been directly concerned by the court‟s decision on

contempt. The defence was concerned that the court would not be

impartial. This request was granted.

248. On 2 March 2001, by an interim decision, the Assize Court

dismissed the request for its withdrawal. Having examined the relevant

case-law on the issue it found that no ground had been established for

its withdrawal. In this connection it noted that:

“no reasonable person who had actual knowledge of the

circumstances of the case from genuine sources – as opposed to

plain rumours or the manner in which the matter had been

presented in the media – would justifiably form the impression that

there was a real likelihood of prejudice by the court against the

defendant simply because of its conclusion that his lawyer‟s

behaviour, at some stage of the proceedings, had been in contempt

of court”.

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 9

249. Given that its decision on contempt had been a decision

reached within the context of its exercise of its judicial functions and, as

such, there was no issue of personal feelings of the judges or any

prejudice on the part of the court, there was no reason why the court

should abandon the examination of the case before the completion of

the trial.

250. The proceedings therefore continued before the same bench.

251. On 10 May 2001 the Assize Court found the applicant guilty of

manslaughter and robbery. The court dismissed the applicant‟s

allegations that his confession had been fabricated by the police and

taken under suspicious circumstances. It found that there had been

clear, independent and persuasive evidence demonstrating the genuine

nature of his confession to the police. Furthermore, it noted that apart

from the free and voluntary confession, the conclusion about the

applicant‟s guilt was supported by other strong and independent

evidence and facts. In particular, the court relied on the applicant‟s

further statement of 9 May 2000 (see paragraph 11 above), placing the

applicant at the time and place of the crime and confirming that he used

force against the victim, a statement of a friend of the applicant to

whom the applicant had stated that he had been involved in a serious

fight with the victim, and various testimonies confirming that the

applicant had been seen in a pub drinking and talking to the victim,

leaving the pub right after the victim and heading in the same direction

as the victim. Moreover, further testimonies confirmed that the

applicant was seen in the early hours of the following morning drinking

in another pub dressed in clothes covered in mud. The medical evidence

concerning the victim‟s death had confirmed that the cause of death had

been multiple and violent blows, a finding which was consistent with the

applicant‟s two statements as well as that of his co-accused. The

confession of his co-accused could not be treated as evidence against

the applicant.

252. On 24 May 2001 the Assize Court sentenced the applicant to

two concurrent sentences of imprisonment for fourteen and six years for

manslaughter and robbery respectively.

C. Appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court

253. On 29 May 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the

Supreme Court against his conviction and sentence.

254. In challenging his conviction he repeated his arguments

concerning the involuntary nature of his confession, the circumstances

in which it had been taken and the violation of his right to the assistance

of a lawyer. In particular, it was emphasised that the Director of Police

had not advised the applicant himself that he should consult a lawyer

and had not warned the applicant that he was under no obligation to

state anything about the case. Moreover, the applicant maintained that

his conviction had been the direct consequence of the hostility which

had been openly expressed by the Assize Court towards his lawyer, who

had also been tried, convicted by the same court for contempt and

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10 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

imprisoned. As a result, the applicant‟s confidence in the impartiality of

the court and his lawyer had been shaken.

255. The prosecution also lodged an appeal challenging the sentence

imposed as “manifestly insufficient” in the circumstances.

256. On 3 July 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals.

257. As to what had occurred at the pre-trial stages of the

proceedings the Supreme Court noted that the applicant had gone to

the police station accompanied by his father and both had been

informed about the crime, the suspicion that the applicant had been

involved in it and that they could be assisted by a lawyer if they so

wished. The applicant had stated that he was innocent; he had then

been arrested and taken for questioning in a different room. When his

son had been taken for questioning the applicant‟s father had been

warned about the seriousness of the case, that they could consult a

lawyer and that he could be present during the questioning. However,

he had preferred to wait outside. A few minutes later the applicant‟s

father and the Police Director had been informed that the applicant had

confessed his guilt. The court observed that the fact that the applicant

had confessed did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that something

improper had occurred.

258. As to the applicant‟s confession, the court noted that it had

constituted the subject of a separate hearing within the trial and that

the Assize Court had concluded that it had been the product of the free

will of the applicant and found it admissible as evidence. The court

observed that the Assize Court, following settled principles of Cypriot

jurisprudence, had re-examined the content of the statement in the light

of the entirety of the evidence in the main trial. Its judgment was

elaborate and the evidential material was discussed with meticulousness

together with the arguments of the parties. A simple reading of the

minutes confirmed the correctness of the Assize Court‟s judgment. As

for the applicant‟s credibility, the Supreme Court noted that:

“as a general comment, ... the appellant appeared, as it is shown

by the evidence, to have had a selective memory. He remembered

all the details which did not incriminate him while he had complete

lack of memory in respect of all the elements which linked him to

the crime. This attitude is evident from his evidence both in the

main trial and in the trial within a trial concerning the voluntariness

of the contested statement. And in both proceedings he tried to

negate the statements he had made in his earlier written

confession.”

259. Moreover, there was sufficient, powerful and independent

evidence putting the applicant at the time and place of the crime. Such

evidence taken together with the applicant‟s admission contained in a

second statement, the admissibility of which was not contested as

having been submitted on an involuntary basis, rendered the applicant‟s

guilt proven beyond any reasonable doubt.

260. The Supreme Court also dismissed the applicant‟s argument

concerning the Assize Court‟s alleged lack of impartiality in view of his

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 11

lawyer‟s conviction for contempt of court. In particular it stated the

following:

“Following his conviction by the Assize Court (for contempt of

court) Mr Kyprianou requested to withdraw from the proceedings

and to stop acting as counsel for the appellant....The appellant‟s

argument that, in view of what had happened before the Assize

Court, this ceased to be an impartial court and the trial was

rendered unfair, is incorrect. A simple reading of the voluminous

transcript of the proceedings demonstrates the smooth conduct of

the trial, in which all the evidence was presented before the court,

which had to evaluate it and decide the extent to which the

prosecution had managed to prove the charges against the

appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. We have indicated above

that the evidence against the appellant was conclusive. His advocate

had put to the Assize Court everything that could be submitted in

his defence in a trial; a task which was, admittedly, rather difficult.

The Assize Court‟s decision not to allow the advocate to withdraw in

the middle of the trial or to withdraw itself from the case, which

would have led to a retrial, did not render the trial unfair, while the

court itself had, in our opinion, preserved its impartiality throughout

the proceedings.”

261. Finally, as regards the sentence imposed by the Assize Court,

the Supreme Court found that there had been evident leniency in

sentencing, making the length of the prison sentence imposed almost

manifestly insufficient. Nevertheless, it decided not to interfere with the

Assize Court‟s decision in this respect.

262. Concerning the Mr Kyprianou‟s request to stop acting as

counsel for the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 35 above), the

Government clarified that it was made before the contempt proceedings.

This was supported by the applicant and the relevant transcript of the

proceedings.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

A Rights of the accused

263. Article 11 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus

provides as follows:

“Every person arrested shall be informed at the time of his arrest

in a language which he understands of the reasons for his arrest and

shall be allowed to have the services of a lawyer of his own

choosing.”

264. Article 12 (4) and (5) of the Constitution provides, in so far as

relevant, as follows:

(4) “Every person charged with an offence shall be presumed

innocent until proved guilty according to law.

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12 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

(5) Every person charged with an offence has the following

minimum rights:

(a) to be informed promptly and in a language which he

understands and in detail of the nature and grounds of the charge

preferred against him;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his

defence; ...”

B. Right to a fair trial

265. Article 30 (2) and (3) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:

(2) “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of

any criminal charge against him, every person is entitled to a fair

and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent,

impartial and competent court established by law.

...

(3) Every person has the right:

(a) to be informed of the reasons why he is required to appear

before the court;

(b) to present his case before the court and to have sufficient

time necessary for its preparation....”.

C. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966

(“ICCPR”)

266. The ICCPR provides in Article 14(4), which broadly corresponds

to Article 6 of the European Convention, that:

“In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as

will take account of their age, and the desirability of promoting their

rehabilitation.”

D. Treatment of a suspect

1. Domestic law

267. Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 provides as

follows:

“Without prejudice to the generality of section 3 of this Law and

without prejudice to the operation of section 5 of this Law the rules

for the time being approved by Her Majesty‟s Judges of the Queen‟s

Bench Division in England relating to the taking of statements by

police officers (known as „The Judges‟ Rules‟) shall apply to the

taking of statements in the Colony as they apply to the taking of

statements in England”.

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 13

268. Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 provides, in

so far as relevant, as follows:

“...Any [arrested] person while in custody shall be given

reasonable facilities for obtaining legal advice, for taking steps to

obtain bail and otherwise for making arrangements for his defence

or release.”

269. Rule II of the Judges‟ Rules provides as follows:

“As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford

reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an

offence, he shall caution that person or cause him to be cautioned

before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating to

that offence.

The caution shall be in the following terms:

„You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but

what you say may be put into writing and given in evidence.‟ ”

2. Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of

Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

(Ref: CPT/inf/E (2002) 1_Rev.2006)

270. The CPT standards on police detention were set out in its 2nd

General Report [CPT/Inf (92) 3] as follows:

36. The CPT attaches particular importance to three rights for

persons detained by the police: the right of the person concerned to

have the fact of his detention notified to a third party of his choice

(family member, friend, consulate), the right of access to a lawyer,

and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor of his

choice (in addition to any medical examination carried out by a

doctor called by the police authorities). They are, in the CPT‟s

opinion, three fundamental safeguards against the ill-treatment of

detained persons which should apply as from the very outset of

deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be described under

the legal system concerned (apprehension, arrest, etc).

37. Persons taken into police custody should be expressly

informed without delay of all their rights, including those referred to

in paragraph 36. Further, any possibilities offered to the authorities

to delay the exercise of one or other of the latter rights in order to

protect the interests of justice should be clearly defined and their

application strictly limited in time. As regards more particularly the

rights of access to a lawyer and to request a medical examination by

a doctor other than one called by the police, systems whereby,

exceptionally, lawyers and doctors can be chosen from pre-

established lists drawn up in agreement with the relevant

professional organisations should remove any need to delay the

exercise of these rights.

38. Access to a lawyer for persons in police custody should include

the right to contact and to be visited by the lawyer (in both cases

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14 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

under conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality of their

discussions) as well as, in principle, the right for the person

concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation.

271. The CPT standards on juveniles deprived of their liberty were

set out in the CPT‟s 9th General Report [CPT/Inf (99) 12] as follows:

“In this context, the CPT has stressed that it is during the period

immediately following deprivation of liberty that the risk of torture

and ill-treatment is at its greatest. It follows that it is essential that

all persons deprived of their liberty (including juveniles) enjoy, as

from the moment when they are first obliged to remain with the

police, the right to notify a relative or another third party of the fact

of their detention, the right of access to a lawyer and the right of

access to a doctor.”

E. Treatment of an accused’s confession under the national

law

272. In Vouniotis v. The Republic (1975) 2 C.L.R. 34 the Supreme

Court held that the court should verify the truthfulness of a confession

by independent evidence. In this case the following extracts from R v

Sykes 8 Cr. App. Rev. were cited with approval:

“A man may be convicted on his own confession alone; there is no

law against it... the first question [to be asked] when ... examining

the confession of a man, is, is there anything outside it to show it

was true? Is it corroborated? Are the statements made in it of fact

so far as we can test them true? ... Is it [the confession] consistent

with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been,

as in this case, proved before us? ...”

273. In the case of Kafkaris v. The Republic (1990) 2 CLR 203, the

following was stated:

“A confession of a crime – so long as it is accepted as voluntary –

can on its own constitute sufficient ground for an accused‟s

conviction. No matter how voluntary a confession is, it is prudent, in

accordance with the case-law... to have, where possible,

corroborating evidence in support of the accuracy of its content.

That would exclude the possibility of error and discourage the

interrogating authorities to seek a confession as an easy alternative

to having a crime properly investigated. The content of a confession

must be judged not only on the basis of the authenticity of the

allegations it contains, but also in conjunction with any other

testimony that tends to support or disprove the accuracy of its

content.”

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 15

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

274. The applicant made a number of complaints concerning the

fairness of the various stages of the criminal proceedings under Article 6

of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. In the determination of … any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable

time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his

defence;

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his

own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so

require;

(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to

obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf

under the same conditions as witnesses against him...”

275. With regard to the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the

applicant complained that he had not been informed of his right to

consult a lawyer prior to being questioned and submitting his statement

and that he had not been provided with an adequate opportunity to find

a lawyer at that stage. This had been particularly detrimental for his

defence given that he was a minor at the time and had not even been

questioned by the police in the presence of his guardian. He further

complained that he had not been adequately warned of his right to

remain silent.

276. The applicant also complained that he had not received a fair

trial by the Assize Court given its acceptance of his confession, the

admission of other evidence attempting to show his “bad character” and

concerning his involvement in other criminal investigations, and the

continual interferences by the court in the conduct of the trial which

ended in a direct conflict with the applicant‟s lawyer. His lawyer‟s

subsequent conviction and imprisonment for contempt of court had

inhibited the lawyer‟s ability to defend the applicant (see, for the

relevant facts, Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, ECHR

2005-...).

277. Finally, the applicant complained that there was no third-

instance appeal jurisdiction in Cyprus to review the lawfulness of the

findings of the Supreme Court on appeal.

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16 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

278. The Government contested the applicant‟s arguments in their

entirety.

A. Admissibility

279. The Court considers that the complaints concerning the pre-trial

stage of the proceedings and the fairness of the trial at first instance

and on appeal raise questions of law which are sufficiently serious that

their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. No

other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.

These complaints must therefore be declared admissible.

280. In connection with the applicant‟s complaint, concerning the

lack of a third level of jurisdiction in Cyprus to which the soundness and

lawfulness of the judgments of the Supreme Court on appeal could be

challenged, the Court considers that it falls to be examined under Article

2 of Protocol No. 7 of the Convention. The Court observes that the

applicant, following his conviction and sentence by the Assize Court,

appealed to the Supreme Court, which dealt with his elaborate grounds

of appeal providing adequate reasoning for its findings. The applicant

therefore had his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal

in conformity with Article 2 of Protocol No. 7. In this connection, the

Court notes that neither this provision nor any other provision of the

Convention or its Protocols guarantees a right to have a case heard by

three judicial instances.

281. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

B. Merits

1. Complaints concerning the pre-trial stage of the proceedings

(a) The Government

282. The Government maintained that the police had drawn the

applicant‟s attention to his right to remain silent on three occasions: at

the time of his arrest, when he was taken for questioning and before his

written statement was taken. In particular, the applicant had been

warned in accordance with the wording of Rule II of the Judges‟ Rules

which apply in Cyprus by virtue of section 8 of the Criminal Procedure

Law.

283. The Government stated that the testimony of the witnesses for

the prosecution concerning the events at the pre-trial stage of the

proceedings had been accepted by the Assize Court both in the trial

within a trial and in the main proceedings. They noted that in the trial

within a trial the prosecution had succeeded in proving beyond all

reasonable doubt that the applicant‟s confession, given shortly after his

arrest, had been voluntary.

284. Although the applicant‟s father, who was acting at the time as

the applicant‟s guardian, had been made fully aware of the seriousness

of the case and had been prompted to appoint a lawyer immediately

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 17

after the applicant was taken for questioning, the father did not appoint

a lawyer and preferred not to be present when the applicant gave his

written statement to the police. Moreover, neither the applicant nor his

father had requested the assistance of a lawyer to which they were

entitled from the initial stages of the investigation in accordance with

domestic law. Had they requested such services, access to a lawyer

would have been granted. There had therefore been no denial of the

applicant‟s rights in this respect and he had benefited from the

assistance of a lawyer from the day following his arrest and throughout

the proceedings.

285. In the light of the entirety of the proceedings, the absence of

legal assistance on the day of the applicant‟s arrest had not deprived

him of a fair hearing. The applicant had had every opportunity under

domestic law to challenge the voluntary nature and admissibility of his

written statement in the subsequent proceedings. He had been

represented by counsel and had the witnesses of the prosecution cross-

examined, whereas the burden of satisfying the court as to the

voluntary character of the confession, to the requisite criminal standard

of proof, had remained with the prosecution.

286. The applicant‟s father, being at the time the applicant‟s

guardian, had by his conduct unequivocally waived the applicant‟s right

to have the assistance of a lawyer at the pre-trial stage of the

proceedings. The Government could not be held accountable in the

present circumstances for the applicant‟s failure to exercise his right in

this respect.

(b) The applicant

287. The applicant maintained that he had not been advised to find a

lawyer before he was taken for questioning, and that his father had only

been advised to do so while the applicant was being questioned. The

applicant, being underage at the time, had been unable to comprehend

the seriousness of the matter and was totally unaware of the fact that

had he asked for a lawyer the police questioning could have been

deferred pending the lawyer‟s arrival. Moreover, his father had been

unable to respond and request a lawyer for his son immediately as

according to the testimonies of the police officers he had been “stunned,

shocked and unable to speak”.

288. Moreover, due respect by the State of the applicant‟s rights

required that he himself be advised of his right to consult a lawyer upon

his arrest. If the police considered him mature enough to be arrested,

taken for questioning alone, and able to make a statement to the police

without the presence of his father or a lawyer, it was their duty to

explain directly to the applicant that he had the right to consult a lawyer

upon his arrest and that he was entitled to legal aid.

(c) The Court’s assessment

289. At the outset the Court observes that, even if the primary

purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal matters are concerned, is to

ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal

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charge”, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial

proceedings. Article 6 – especially paragraph 3 – may be relevant before

a case is sent for trial if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely

to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its

requirements (see Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 131, ECHR

2005-IV, and Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, § 36,

Series A no. 275). The manner in which Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) is to be

applied during the preliminary investigation depends on the special

features of the proceedings involved and on the circumstances of the

case. In order to determine whether the aim of Article 6 – a fair trial –

has been achieved, regard must be had to the entirety of the domestic

proceedings conducted in the case (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38).

290. Moreover, the Court reiterates that the right to silence and the

right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international

standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under

Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused

against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to

the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims

of Article 6 (see John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996,

§ 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, and Funke v. France,

25 February 1993, § 44, Series A no. 256-A). The right not to

incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a

criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without

resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression

in defiance of the will of the accused (see, inter alia, Saunders v. the

United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, § 68, Reports 1996-VI; Heaney

and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720/97, § 40, ECHR 2000-XII; J.B.

v. Switzerland, no. 31827/96, § 64, ECHR 2001-III; and Allan v. the

United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, § 44, ECHR 2002-IX). In this sense the

right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in

Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

291. As regards the applicant‟s complaints which concern the lack of

legal consultation at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, the Court

observes that the concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 requires that

the accused be given the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at

the initial stages of police interrogation. The lack of legal assistance

during an applicant‟s interrogation would constitute a restriction of his

defence rights in the absence of compelling reasons that do not

prejudice the overall fairness of the proceedings.

292. The Court notes that the applicant was 17 years old at the

material time. In its case-law on Article 6 the Court has held that when

criminal charges are brought against a child, it is essential that he be

dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level of

maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are

taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the

proceedings (see T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, 16

December 1999, § 84). The right of an accused minor to effective

participation in his or her criminal trial requires that he be dealt with

with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stages

of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 19

any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce

as far as possible his feelings of intimidation and inhibition (see, mutatis

mutandis, T. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 85) and ensure that

the accused minor has a broad understanding of the nature of the

investigation, of what is at stake for him or her, including the

significance of any penalty which may be imposed as well as of his

rights of defence and, in particular, of his right to remain silent (mutatis

mutandis, S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958/00, § 29, ECHR

2004-IV). It means that he or she, if necessary with the assistance of,

for example, an interpreter, lawyer, social worker or friend, should be

able to understand the general thrust of what is said by the arresting

officer and during his questioning by the police (ibid).

293. The Court reiterates that a waiver of a right guaranteed by the

Convention – in so far as it is permissible – must not run counter to any

important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner

and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to the

waiver‟s importance (Håkansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February

1990, Series A No. 171, § 66, and most recently Sejdovic v. Italy [GC],

no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-...). Moreover, before an accused can

be said to have impliedly, through his conduct, waived an important

right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have

foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (see Talat

Tunç v. Turkey, no. 32432/96, 27 March 2007, § 59, and Jones v. the

United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30900/02, 9 September 2003). The Court

considers that given the vulnerability of an accused minor and the

imbalance of power to which he is subjected by the very nature of

criminal proceedings, a waiver by him or on his behalf of an important

right under Article 6 can only be accepted where it is expressed in an

unequivocal manner after the authorities have taken all reasonable

steps to ensure that he or she is fully aware of his rights of defence and

can appreciate, as far as possible, the consequence of his conduct.

294. Having examined all the material submitted by the parties and,

in particular, the testimonies submitted in the first-instance proceedings

as recorded in the relevant transcript, the Court makes the following

findings as to the sequence of events concerning the applicant‟s

confession. The applicant, who was a minor at the relevant time, visited

the Police Director‟s office together with his father. The Police Director

explained to the father, in the applicant‟s presence, that the police were

investigating a murder and robbery, that there was evidence linking the

applicant with the commission of these crimes and that an arrest

warrant had been issued against him. The arresting officer then entered

the Director‟s office, showed the arrest warrant and arrested the

applicant. During his arrest, the applicant was “cautioned” within the

meaning of the relevant Judges Rules (see paragraph 44 above). He was

therefore told that he was not obliged to say anything and that anything

he did say could be used in subsequent court proceedings. The applicant

was then taken into a separate room for questioning. The applicant‟s

father was concerned that the police might use force against the

applicant and the Director reassured him that no such practices would

be used. He explained that the case was serious and that they should

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seek the assistance of a lawyer. A few minutes later and while the

applicant was already being questioned, they were informed that the

applicant had confessed his guilt. The Director suggested that the

applicant‟s father join the applicant in the interview room so that he

could hear himself what the applicant had admitted. The applicant‟s

father preferred to wait outside. The applicant was cautioned before his

written statement confessing his guilt was taken by a police officer.

295. The Court observes that the Government did not dispute the

fact that the applicant was not offered legal assistance and that the

suggestion to find a lawyer was only put to the applicant‟s father while

the applicant was being interrogated. The Court considers that the

authorities‟ treatment of the applicant ranged from treating him as a

minor and, as such, addressing his father to explain the seriousness of

the case and describe the evidence existing against the applicant, to

approaching him as a person capable of being questioned in the absence

of his guardian, without informing him of his right to consult a lawyer

before proceeding to make any statement. Neither the applicant nor his

father were adequately informed of the applicant‟s rights to legal

representation before the applicant‟s questioning. Moreover, the

applicant‟s father was not invited to accompany the applicant during his

initial questioning nor was any other person who would be in a position

to assist the applicant to understand the proceedings. The applicant

himself was not advised that he could see a lawyer before saying

anything to the police and before he had his written statement taken.

296. In view of the above the Court considers that it was unlikely,

given the applicant‟s age, that he was aware that he was entitled to

legal representation before making any statement to the police.

Moreover given the lack of assistance by a lawyer or his guardian, it was

also unlikely that he could reasonably appreciate the consequences of

his proceeding to be questioned without the assistance of a lawyer in

criminal proceedings concerning the investigation of a murder (see Talat

Tunç, cited above, § 60).

297. The Court takes note of the Government‟s argument that the

authorities had remained willing at all times to allow the applicant to be

assisted by a lawyer if he so requested. It observes that the obstacles to

the effective exercise of the rights of the defence could have been

overcome if the domestic authorities, being conscious of the difficulties

for the applicant, had actively ensured that he understood that he could

request the assignment of a lawyer free of charge if necessary (see

Talat Tunç, cited above, § 61, and Padalov v. Bulgaria, no. 54784/00,

10 August 2006, § 61). The passive approach adopted by the authorities

in the present circumstances was clearly not sufficient to fulfil their

positive obligation to furnish the applicant with the necessary

information enabling him to access legal representation.

298. Accordingly, the Court finds that the lack of provision of

sufficient information on the applicant‟s right to consult a lawyer before

his questioning by the police, especially given the fact that he was a

minor at the time and not assisted by his guardian during the

questioning, constituted a breach of the applicant‟s defence rights. The

Court moreover finds that neither the applicant nor his father acting on

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 21

behalf of the applicant had waived the applicant‟s right to receive legal

representation prior to his interrogation in an explicit and unequivocal

manner.

299. Concerning the applicant‟s complaint as to his right to remain

silent, the Court notes that the Government maintained that the

applicant had been cautioned in accordance with domestic law both at

the time of his arrest and before his written statement had been taken.

The applicant did not dispute this. The Court notes that in accordance

with domestic law the applicant was told that he was not obliged to say

anything unless he wished to do so and that what he said could be put

into writing and given in evidence in subsequent proceedings (see

paragraph 44 above). The Court finds, given the circumstances of the

present case, in which the applicant had been underage and was taken

for questioning without his legal guardian and without being informed of

his right to seek and obtain legal representation before he was

questioned, that it was unlikely that a mere caution in the words

provided for in the domestic law would be enough to enable him to

sufficiently comprehend the nature of his rights.

300. Lastly, the Court considers that although the applicant had the

benefit of adversarial proceedings in which he was represented by the

lawyer of his choice, the nature of the detriment he suffered because of

the breach of due process at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings was

not remedied by the subsequent proceedings, in which his confession

was treated as voluntary and was therefore held to be admissible as

evidence.

301. In this connection the Court notes that despite the fact that the

voluntariness of the applicant‟s statement taken shortly after his arrest

was challenged and formed the subject of a separate trial within the

main trial, and although it was not the sole evidence on which the

applicant‟s conviction was based, it was nevertheless decisive for the

prospects of the applicant‟s defence and constituted a significant

element on which his conviction was based. It is indicative in this

respect that the Supreme Court found that throughout the course of the

first-instance proceedings the applicant had consistently tried to negate

his initial statement, an approach which had a great impact on the

court‟s assessment of his credibility.

302. In the light of the above considerations the Court concludes

that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of legal assistance

to the applicant in the initial stages of police questioning.

2. Complaints concerning the use of the applicant’s confession and

other evidence in the proceedings

(a) The domestic courts’ reliance on the applicant’s

confession

303. The applicant complained about the use made of his confession

in the proceedings before the Assize Court resulting in his conviction

which was upheld on appeal.

304. The Government did not make any submissions on this point.

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22 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

305. The Court notes that it is not its function to deal with errors of

fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so

far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the

Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it

does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such,

which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Jalloh

v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 94, ECHR 2006-..., and Teixeira de

Castro v. Portugal, 9 June 1998, § 34, Reports 1998-IV).

306. It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a

matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence – for example,

evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law – may be

admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The

question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a

whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair.

This involves an examination of the “unlawfulness” in question and the

nature of the violation found (see, inter alia, Khan v. the United

Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-V; P.G. and J.H. v. the United

Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 76, ECHR 2001-IX; and Allan, cited above, §

42). The severity of the sentence that may be imposed upon the

conclusion of the criminal proceedings would increase the level of due

diligence that is required from the domestic authorities in this respect.

307. In determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair,

regard must also be had to whether the rights of the defence have been

respected. It must be examined in particular whether the applicant was

given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and

of opposing its use. In addition, the quality of the evidence must be

taken into consideration, including whether the circumstances in which it

was obtained cast doubts on its reliability or accuracy. While no problem

of fairness necessarily arises where the evidence obtained was

unsupported by other material, it may be noted that where the evidence

is very strong and there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for

supporting evidence is correspondingly weaker (see, inter alia, Khan,

cited above, §§ 35, 37, and Allan, cited above, § 43).

308. As for the use of evidence obtained in breach of the right to

silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court reiterates

that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at

the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 (see

paragraph 65 above).

309. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court repeats its

findings of a violation of the applicant‟s rights of defence at the pre-trial

stage of the proceedings due to the fact that, whilst being a minor, his

questioning had taken place in the absence of his guardian and without

him being sufficiently informed of his right to receive legal

representation or of his right to remain silent. The Court notes that the

applicant‟s confession obtained in the above circumstances constituted a

decisive element of the prosecution‟s case against him that substantially

inhibited the prospects of his defence at trial and which was not

remedied by the subsequent proceedings.

310. The Court notes that in addition to the applicant‟s confession

his conviction was supported by his second statement admitting that he

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 23

had kicked the victim, a testimony reporting the applicant‟s statement

that he had been involved in a serious fight with the victim and various

testimonies confirming that the applicant had been drinking with the

victim on the evening the victim died and that his clothes had been

covered in mud in the early hours of the following morning. There was

also medical evidence confirming that the cause of the victim‟s death

was multiple and violent blows. While it is not the Court‟s role to

examine whether the evidence in the present case was correctly

assessed by the national courts, the Court considers that the conviction

was based to a decisive extent on the applicant‟s confession,

corroborated largely by his second statement. It considers that the

extent to which the second statement made by the applicant was

tainted by the breach of his rights of defence due to the circumstances

in which the confession had been taken was not addressed by the trial

court and remains unclear. Moreover, the Court observes that having

regard to the Assize Court‟s acceptance of the applicant‟s first

statement, it appears that it would have been futile for him to contest

the admissibility of his second statement.

311. In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes

that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because of

the use in trial of the applicant‟s confession obtained in circumstances

which breached his rights to due process and thus irreparably

undermined his rights of defence.

(b) Admission of evidence of “bad character”

312. The applicant also complained that he had not received a fair

trial given the admission in the main trial of evidence attempting to

show his “bad character” and concerning his involvement in other

criminal investigations.

313. The Court considers that the applicant‟s submission was left

undeveloped and unsubstantiated. Hence, it concludes that there has

been no violation of Article 6 § 1 in this respect.

3. Complaints concerning the Assize Court’s treatment of counsel

for the defence

(a) The Government

314. The Government submitted that the applicant‟s trial taken as a

whole had been fair and in conformity with the Convention. They

maintained that the Assize Court had been impartial towards the

applicant throughout the criminal proceedings from both an objective

and a subjective standpoint. The dispute between the applicant‟s

counsel and the court concerning certain behaviour of the counsel had

been an isolated incident that had not had any impact on the objective

examination of the case or on its outcome. Moreover, the applicant‟s

counsel had not applied to withdraw from the case following his

conviction for contempt of court.

315. There was no evidence of bias against the applicant on the part

of the Assize Court. The applicant had not submitted anything before

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24 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

the Court indicating any factor that could objectively raise a legitimate

fear as to the impartiality of the judges in relation to the conduct of the

proceedings and their findings.

316. The Assize Court had delivered a detailed and reasoned

judgment with a thorough evaluation of the evidence put before it

together with the position of the defence. Its interventions in the

proceedings had not exceeded what was permissible in the

circumstances. The Supreme Court had confirmed the findings of the

Assize Court and found that the trial had been fair and the conviction

and the sentence justified.

(b) The applicant

317. The applicant submitted that his case could not be

distinguished from the case that his lawyer had lodged with the Court

and in which a violation of his lawyer‟s rights under Articles 6 §§ 1, 2

and 3 and 10 of the Convention had been found by this Court‟s Grand

Chamber (see Kyprianou v. Cyprus, cited above). He stated that his trial

had been a continuous confrontation between the bench and his lawyer;

a confrontation which had reached its climax with his lawyer‟s trial,

conviction for contempt of court and imprisonment. During the trial the

Assize Court had made continual and clearly inappropriate interferences

in the proceedings. It was indicative that his lawyer had requested

permission to withdraw from the case since he felt unable to defend the

applicant as a result of the court‟s approach towards him; a request

which was refused thus compelling him to continue defending the

applicant against his will. Moreover, the applicant‟s faith in his lawyer

had been seriously undermined as a result of the contempt proceedings.

318. Following the contempt proceedings, his lawyer had felt unable

to repeat the same request to withdraw from the case as the matter had

already been decided upon by the Assize Court. He had nevertheless

requested that the court withdraw from the further examination of the

case in view of the events that had occurred. The request had again

been refused and the trial had resumed in a climate which did not

coincide with the requirements of a democratic society.

(c) The Court’s assessment

319. The Court reiterates at the outset that it is of fundamental

importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in

the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned,

in the accused (see Kyprianou v. Cyprus, cited above, § 118, and

Padovani v. Italy, 26 February 1993, § 27, Series A no. 257-B).

320. The central question raised under this head of the applicant‟s

complaint is whether the nature of the Assize Court‟s interferences with

the defence counsel‟s exercise of his duties, combined with the

deficiencies found by the Grand Chamber of this Court as to the trial

judges‟ treatment of the applicant‟s lawyer, were such as to cast doubt

on the fairness of the trial.

321. The Court notes that the applicant‟s lawyer and the judges of

the Assize Court engaged in various disagreements over the course of

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 25

the applicant‟s trial, and that the applicant‟s lawyer had felt the need to

request leave to withdraw from the proceedings due to the court‟s

interferences with his conduct of the applicant‟s defence. His request

was refused and he continued to represent the applicant.

322. The Court further notes that upon the resumption of the main

trial following the contempt proceedings Mr Kyprianou felt that it was

necessary for another lawyer to represent the applicant and request the

court itself to withdraw from the further examination of the case. The

request was refused as the Assize Court considered that no reasonable

person could conclude that the applicant could have been prejudiced in

any way by the contempt proceedings.

323. While the Court does not doubt that the judges of the Assize

Court were determined to exercise their functions in an impartial

manner, it reiterates that in its judgment in the Kyprianou case (cited

above, § 133) it concluded that the judges‟ personal conduct had

breached the subjective test of impartiality. In particular, the Court

concluded from the manner in which the contempt proceedings were

conducted, together with the decision and sentencing of Mr Kyprianou,

that the court had failed to sufficiently detach itself from the facts of the

case as the judges had been personally insulted by Mr Kyprianou‟s

comments. The Court considers that the personal conduct of the judges

in the case undermined the applicant‟s confidence that his trial would be

conducted in a fair manner. Although the contempt proceedings were

separate from the applicant‟s main trial, the fact that the judges were

offended by the applicant‟s lawyer when he complained about the

manner in which his cross-examination was received by the bench

undermined the conduct of the applicant‟s defence.

324. The Court also reiterates that in its judgment in the Kyprianou

case (cited above, § 179) it found that although the conduct of the

applicant‟s lawyer could be regarded as disrespectful for the judges of

the Assize Court, his comments were aimed at and were limited to the

manner in which the judges were trying the case and, in particular, their

allegedly insufficient attention to his cross-examination of a witness

carried out in the course of defending the applicant. In this respect, the

interference with the freedom of expression of the applicant‟s lawyer in

conducting the applicant‟s defence, had breached Article 10 of the

Convention (ibid., § 183). Moreover, the Court held that the sentence

imposed on the applicant‟s lawyer had been capable of having a “chilling

effect” on the performance of the duties attached to lawyers when

acting as defence counsel.

325. The Court finds that the refusal of Mr Kyprianou‟s request for

leave to withdraw from the proceedings due to the fact that he felt

unable to continue defending the applicant in an effective manner

exceeded, in the present circumstances, the limits of a proportionate

response given the impact on the applicant‟s rights of defence. Further,

in the view of the Court, the Assize Court‟s response to Mr Kyprianou‟s

discourteous criticism of the manner in which they were trying the case,

which was to convict him immediately of contempt of court and impose

a sentence of imprisonment on him, was also disproportionate. It further

considers that the “chilling effect” on Mr Kyprianou‟s performance of his

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26 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

duties as defence counsel was demonstrated by his insistence, upon the

resumption of the proceedings, that another lawyer should address the

court in respect of the request for the continuation of the proceedings

before a different bench.

326. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the Assize

Court‟s handling of the confrontation with the applicant‟s defence

counsel rendered the trial unfair. It follows that there has been a

violation of Article 6 § 1 in this respect.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

327. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the

Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the

High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to

be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party.”

328. The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction.

Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any

sum on that account. It reiterates that when an applicant has been

convicted despite an infringement of his rights as guaranteed by Article

6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position

that he would have been in had the requirements of that provision not

been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would,

in principle, be trial de novo or the reopening of the proceedings, if

requested (see Öcalan v. Turkey, cited above, § 210 in fine).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Declares unanimously the complaint concerning the pre-trial stage of

the proceedings and the fairness of the trial at first instance and on

appeal admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds by 6 votes to 1 that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1

and 3 (c) of the Convention on account of the lack of legal assistance

in the initial stages of police questioning;

3. Holds by 6 votes to 1 that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1

of the Convention due to the use of the applicant‟s confession in his

main trial;

4. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of

the Convention due to the admission of “bad character” evidence in

the applicant‟s main trial;

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 27

5. Holds by 5 votes to 2 that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1

of the Convention due to the Assize Court‟s handling of the

confrontation with the applicant‟s defence counsel;

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 December 2008,

pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis

Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2

of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to

this judgment:

(a) joint concurring opinion of Judges Spielmann and Jebens;

(b) partly dissenting, partly concurring opinion of Judge VajiĤ;

(c) dissenting opinion of Judge Erotocritou.

C.L.R.

S.N.

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28 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT

JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES SPIELMANN AND JEBENS

1. We agree in all respects with the Court‟s conclusions as to the

violations of Article 6 as identified in points 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the

operative part of the judgment.

2. We would, however, have liked the reasoning set out in paragraph

103 of the judgment, on account of its importance, to have been

included in the operative provisions as well, for reasons which have

already been explained to a certain extent in the joint concurring

opinion of Judges Spielmann and Malinverni in Vladimir Romanov v.

Russia (no. 41461/02, judgment of 24 July 2008) as well as the

concurring opinion of Judge Spielmann in Polufakin and Chernyshev v.

Russia (no. 30997/02, judgment of 25 September 2008) and most

importantly in the concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann,

Ziemele and Lazarova Trajovska in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no.

36391/02, ECHR 2008-...), and which are now repeated here.

3. Firstly, since the Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the

Convention, it also has jurisdiction to assess “the form and quantum of

reparation to be made” (See J. Crawford, The International Law

Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and

Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 211). Indeed, the

Court reiterates in paragraph 103 of the judgment that when a person

has been convicted in breach of the procedural safeguards afforded by

Article 6, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he

would have been had the requirements of that Article not been

disregarded (the principle of restitutio in integrum).

4. The principle of restitutio in integrum has its origin in the

judgment of 13 September 1928 of the Permanent Court of

International Justice in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów

((claim for indemnity) (merits) Series A, no. 17, p. 47):

“The essential principle is ... that reparation must, as far as

possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-

establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if

that act had not been committed.”

5. In Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece ((Article 50), 31

October 1995, § 34, Series A no. 330-B) the Court held as follows:

“The Court points out that by Article 53 of the Convention the High

Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the decision of the Court

in any case to which they were parties; furthermore, Article 54

provides that the

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT - JOINT CONCURRING OPINION 29 OF JUDGES SPIELMANN AND JEBENS

judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of

Ministers which shall supervise its execution. It follows that a

judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the

respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and

make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as

far as possible the situation existing before the breach.

The Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle

free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment

in which the Court has found a breach. This discretion as to the

manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice

attaching to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under

the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed

(Article 1). If the nature of the breach allows of restitutio in

integrum, it is for the respondent State to effect it, the Court having

neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so itself. If,

on the other hand, national law does not allow - or allows only

partial - reparation to be made for the consequences of the breach,

Article 50 empowers the Court to afford the injured party such

satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate.”

6. This principle, namely that restitutio in integrum is considered to

be the primary remedy for effecting reparation for breaches of

international law, has been constantly reaffirmed in international case-

law and practice, and is enshrined in Article 35 of the Draft Articles on

State responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in

2001.

7. Article 35 of the Draft Articles reads as follows:

“A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an

obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation

which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and

to the extent that restitution:

(a) is not materially impossible;

(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit

deriving from restitution instead of compensation.”

8. There is no reason not to apply this principle to make reparation

for international wrongful acts in the field of human rights (see Loukis G.

Loucaides, “Reparation for Violations of Human Rights under the

European Convention and Restitutio in integrum”, in [2008] European

Human Rights Law Review, pp. 182-192; see also A. Orakhelashvili,

“The European Convention on Human Rights and International Public

Order”, in (2002-2003) 5 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal

Studies, p. 237 at p. 260).

9. The reason why we wish to stress this point is that it must not be

overlooked that the damages which the Court orders to be paid to

victims of a violation of the Convention are, according to the terms and

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30 PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT - JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES SPIELMANN AND JEBENS

the spirit of Article 41, of a subsidiary nature. This is in line with the

subsidiary character attributed to compensation for damage in

international law. Article 36 of the Draft Articles on State responsibility

provides:

“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is

under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby,

insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. ...”

It is therefore right that, wherever possible, the Court should seek to

restore the status quo ante for the victim.

10. In the present case, the fairness of the criminal proceedings

under examination had been irretrievably prejudiced, notably by the

absence of a lawyer at the time the applicant was questioned by the

police.

11. The applicant‟s statement obtained in such circumstances

constituted “the fruit of the poisonous tree” which, however, was

admitted in the proceedings and which contaminated them as a whole.

This was further aggravated by the confrontation between the

applicant‟s lawyer and the bench.

12. Given that the multiple violations of Article 6 of the Convention

irretrievably affected his defence rights, and as the Court indicated in

paragraph 103 of the judgment, the best means of redressing the

violations found would be the reopening of the proceedings and the

commencement of a new trial at which all the guarantees of a fair trial

would be observed, provided, of course, that the applicant requests this

option.

13. In Cyprus, there is no legislative provision setting out the

procedure for reopening of domestic proceedings which are found to be

unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, unlike the situation in

other Council of Europe Member States1.

1 For example, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Serbia-Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey and the United Kingdom (special review committee). Admittedly, States are not required by the Convention to introduce procedures into their domestic legal systems whereby judgments of their Supreme Courts constituting res judicata may be reviewed. However, they are strongly encouraged to do so, especially in criminal matters. Incidentally, in a judgment of 9 April 2008, the Belgian Court of Cassation, for the first time ordered a retrial on the basis of Articles 442 bis et seq. of the Code d’instruction criminelle (introduced by an Act of 1 April 2007) in respect of the case of Da Luz Domingues Ferreira v. Belgium (no. 50049/99, 24 May 2007) (Cass.b., 9 April

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT - JOINT CONCURRING OPINION 31 OF JUDGES SPIELMANN AND JEBENS

14. That should not, however, be an obstacle to the inclusion by the

Court of appropriate directions in the operative part of the judgment. As

the Court has held in Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, if

national law does not allow – or allows only partial – reparation

to be made, Article 41 empowers the Court to afford the injured

party such satisfaction as appears to it to be appropriate (see

Papamichalopoulos and Others, cited above, § 34; see also Brumărescu

v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342/95, § 20, ECHR 2001-I).

15. We would also like to add that the Court has already included

directions of this nature in the operative provisions of judgments. For

example, in Claes and Others v. Belgium (nos. 46825/99, 47132/99,

47502/99, 49010/99, 49104/99, 49195/99 and 49716/99, 2 June 2005)

it held in point 5 (a) of the operative provisions of its judgment:

“unless it grants a request by [the] applicants for a retrial or for

the proceedings to be reopened, the respondent State is to pay

[sums in respect of non-pecuniary damage and costs and

expenses], within three months from the date on which the

applicant in question indicates that he does not wish to submit such

a request or it appears that he does not intend to do so, or from the

date on which such a request is refused”.

Similarly, in Lungoci v. Romania (no. 62710/00, 26 January 2006)

the Court held in point 3 (a) of the operative provisions of its judgment:

“the respondent State is to ensure that, within six months from

the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with

Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the proceedings are reopened if

the applicant so desires, and at the same time is to pay her EUR

5,000 ... in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may

be chargeable on that amount, to be converted into Romanian lei at

the rate applicable at the date of settlement.”

16. It is common knowledge that, while the reasoning of a judgment

allows the Contracting States to ascertain the grounds on which the

Court reached a finding of a violation, or not, of the Convention, and is

of decisive importance on that account for the interpretation of the

Convention, it is the operative provisions that are binding on the parties

for the purposes of Article 46 § 1 of the Convention.

17. By virtue of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, supervision of the

execution of the Court‟s judgments is the responsibility of the

Committee of Ministers. That does not mean, however, that the Court

should not play any part in the matter and should not take measures

designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers‟ task in discharging

these functions.

2008, P.08.0051.F/1, Journal des Tribunaux, 2008, p. 403, observations by J. Van Meerbeeck).

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18. To that end, it is essential that in its judgments the Court should

not merely give as precise a description as possible of the nature of the

Convention violation found but should also indicate to the State

concerned in the operative provisions, if the circumstances of the case

so require, the measures it considers most appropriate in order to

secure redress for the violation.

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PANOVITS v. CYPRUS JUDGMENT 33

PARTLY DISSENTING, PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE VAJIģ

1. I have not voted with the majority on point 5 of the operative

part of the judgment as I am of the opinion that there has been no

violation of Article 6 §1 of the Convention on account of the Assize

Court‟s handling of the confrontation with the applicant‟s defence

counsel in the present case. In this respect I join the dissenting opinion

of Judge Erotocritou, that is to say, point (3), paragraphs 13-16 of that

opinion.

2. I also share Judge Erotocritou‟s final remarks relating to the

structure of the operative part of the judgment (paragraph 17 of his

dissenting opinion), according to which the proceedings should have

been taken as a whole (although, ultimately, I do not follow his

conclusion as to the merits). There was no need in this case to find

multiple separate violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the

operative part and thus split up the main violation, namely the lack of a

fair trial. In my opinion, the finding in the operative part should answer

the question whether the trial taken as a whole was fair. The different

reasons that led the Court to find such a violation are well explained in

the text of the judgment, and, according to the usual approach, did not

need to be repeated in the operative part.

106

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE EROTOCRITOU

I agree on the facts as outlined in the judgment. However, while I

respect the view of the majority, I cannot agree with the conclusions

drawn.

1. Τhe complaints concerning the pre-trial stage of the proceedings

(a) The lack of legal assistance in the initial stages of the

proceedings

1. The main complaint of the applicant is that he was deprived of his

right to consult a lawyer, contrary to Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention,

and in particular, that he was not informed of his right before making a

written statement. The applicant, when arrested by the police, was

under age (17 years and 8 months), and for this reason he was called to

the police station accompanied by his father and guardian. Article 6

§ 3 (c) of the Convention, although it protects the right to legal

representation, does not specify the manner of exercising it and

everything seems to depend on the circumstances. It must be noted

that under domestic law there was no requirement at the material time

for the authorities to warn persons arrested of their right to be legally

represented. The only requirement under Article 11 §4 of the

Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is that the arrested person “shall

be allowed ” the services of a lawyer. To my mind, the distinction

between denial of the right to have access to legal assistance and failure

to inform of the existence of such right is important and must be borne

in mind when examining a possible violation of the Convention. I do not

dispute that, under the Convention, a right to be informed might exist

under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, as the Convention does not

detail the manner in which the right to be legally represented may be

exercised and domestic law did not at the time have such a

requirement, I would prefer to look at the totality of the proceedings

before I decide on their fairness and whether any limitation of the right,

through failure to inform, could amount to a violation under Art. 6 § 3

(c). As stated by the Court in Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, no. 13972/88, §

37, “The right set out in paragraph 3 (c) of Article 6 (art. 6-3-c) is one

element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal

proceedings...”.

2. The reason I differ from the view of the majority is that, in the

present case, the father and guardian of the applicant was actually told

by the police director that the case was very serious and that it was

advisable for him to find a lawyer to assist his son. The warning was

given 30-40 minutes before the first written confession was made by the

applicant. The father had, in my opinion, ample time to seek the

services of a lawyer or even request that further interrogation be halted

or delayed, until he could consult a lawyer. However, he elected to

remain inactive. There is, in my opinion, no doubt that, on behalf of his

son, the father waived any right that he may have had

107

and it would not be fair to throw the blame for his inactivity on the

investigating authorities. The police authorities, as stated by the

Government and as has not been disputed, were at all times ready and

willing to allow legal assistance, had it been requested. Furthermore,

the father was invited by the authorities to be present during his son‟s

questioning, but again he preferred to stay outside the investigating

room and walk up and down. Therefore, I cannot come to the conclusion

that, in the circumstances, there was a denial of the right to have

access to a lawyer at the initial stages of the proceedings, or that the

whole treatment of the applicant by the police was in any way unfair.

3. I would like to go a stage further. Even if I were to accept that,

due to the failure to inform, some limitation of the applicant‟s right to

legal assistance did occur, its effect must nevertheless be examined in

the context of the whole proceedings and not in isolation. The applicant,

less than 24 hours after his arrest, had the services of a lawyer who

represented him at the remand proceedings the very next day. Within

one week he appointed a second lawyer and, throughout the one and a

half years the trial lasted, he was at all times legally represented and

had the opportunity to test all the evidence adduced. The fact that his

guardian and not the applicant himself was informed of the right to

consult a lawyer cannot make any difference. In any event the issue

was examined by the Assize Court during the trial within a trial and it

was found that the warning to the father was sufficient, and that the

statement the applicant gave was in any event voluntary. These findings

were subsequently scrutinised and upheld by the Supreme Court. In G

v. the United Kingdom, no. 9370/81, 35 DR 75 (1983), where the

accused was similarly questioned in the absence of a lawyer, the

Commission was satisfied that the statement was voluntary by the mere

availability of voir dire proceedings. Identical procedural mechanisms

existed in the present case and I see no valid reason to reach a different

conclusion.

4. I further consider that, after the statement was declared

voluntary and admissible, it would be an inconsequence to hold

otherwise now. The Court would appear to be acting contrary to its

established case-law that, unless the case is exceptional, it does not

interfere with questions of admissibility and assessment of evidence

108

when such issues have been decided by the domestic courts. My non-

exhaustive search of the case-law under Article 6 § 3 (c) has not

revealed a similar case where failure to inform alone led to a violation.

In most cases the denial of the right in question takes the form of a

request by the arrested person to have the services of a lawyer,

followed by a denial on the part of the authorities. For instance, in

Brennan v. the United Kingdom (no. 39846/98, ECHR 2001-X), the

applicant requested a lawyer but access was delayed. The applicant was

then interviewed for 35 hours on 4 consecutive days, during which he

made a confession. Even so, the Court was not persuaded that the

denial of access to legal assistance had infringed the applicant‟s right

under Article 6 § 3 (c). Having in mind the entirety of the proceedings, I

consider any prejudice there may have been in the present case

relatively much less serious than in Brennan and G v. the United

Kingdom (cited above) and I see no reason for reaching a different

conclusion.

(b) The complaints concerning the right to remain silent

5. The second complaint is that the applicant was not informed of his

right to remain silent, contrary to Article 6, when in fact he was properly

informed of his right. It is not disputed that, in the initial stages, the

applicant was cautioned three times as to his right to remain silent. The

first caution was given on arrest in the presence of his father, the

second when he was to be interviewed by the police shortly after arrest

and the third before a written statement was taken from him. I cannot

subscribe to the view that a mere caution in words is not enough to

enable the applicant to comprehend the nature of the right. The

applicant was of sufficient maturity to understand the nature and

implications of the caution. I also doubt whether in ordinary cases, and

in the absence of special factors or some form of incapacity, we should

place a special duty on the investigating authorities to make sure that

an arrested person comprehends the caution given. Irrespective of the

objective difficulties involved, the danger is that we may return to where

we started, i.e. again using verbal or written means in order to ensure

that an accused person comprehends.

6. One other reason why I cannot accept the complaint that the

applicant‟s right to remain silent has been violated is that no such

ground was explicitly included in the application and therefore it should

not have been made an issue before this Court.

(2) Complaints concerning the main trial

The domestic courts’ reliance on the applicant’s

confessions

7. I come now to the alleged violation that concerns the use by the

Assize Court of the applicant‟s two written confessions. My first

comment is that the domestic courts, both the Assize and the Supreme

Court, have already decided on the issue of the admissibility of the

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confessions and I consider that this Court, in line with its established

case-law, should refrain from acting as an appellate court by re-

examining the admissibility of the confessions. This should only be done

where there is an allegation that the final judgment of the domestic

court was either arbitrary or inadequate. No such allegation was made

in the present application and none exists.

8. In view of my dissenting conclusion that the applicant‟s right to be

legally represented was not violated, I cannot find that a violation

occurred as a result of the use of the first confession. Nor do I agree

that the first confession was tainted in any way by what happened at

the pre-trial stage.

9. With regard to the first confession, it must also be noted that, as

the Supreme Court pointed out in its judgment, the conviction was not

based solely on the applicant‟s confession. There was also other

supportive evidence which, although circumstantial, by itself would have

been sufficient to secure a conviction. The Supreme Court states

emphatically that:

“The lawyer of the Appellant suggested that his written confession

was the only evidence against him and that, without it, his

conviction would not have been possible. We are of the opinion that

the suggestion is ill-founded. There was sufficient, strong and

independent evidence which placed the Appellant and his co-

accused at the scene at the time the crime was committed.”

The Supreme Court then proceeds to analyse each piece of evidence,

namely that (a) the appellant and his co-accused were seen drinking

with the victim, (b) they left the bar immediately after the victim, (c)

they were seen later with their clothes covered in mud, which they tried

to clean and (d) the appellant made a voluntary statement (second

confession), which he did not dispute, admitting kicking the victim twice

and trying to minimise the extent of his complicity.

10. Even stronger is my objection to the finding of the majority with

regards to the use of the second written confession. Firstly, it must be

noted that the second confession was given about 15 days after the first

written confession and at a time when the applicant was legally

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represented. Secondly, it was given after the applicant had been

properly informed of his right to remain silent. Thirdly, it was admitted

in evidence without the defence ever raising any objection as to its

admissibility or as to its voluntariness. Fourthly, the applicant, whilst

giving evidence, admitted the statement, which in effect minimised his

role to only kicking the victim twice. Lastly, in his application to this

Court, the applicant does not include any ground relating to the

voluntariness or fairness of this particular written confession but

restricts his complaint to the first confession. Consequently, I consider

that it cannot be in issue in these proceedings.

11. I cannot subscribe to the view that there was any violation of

Article 6 § 1 as a result of the use in the main trial of the applicant‟s

confessions. Although they were important pieces of evidence, the

confessions were neither tainted by anything that happened during the

pre-trial proceedings, nor were they the only evidence against the

applicant. It must also be borne in mind that in the present case there is

no evidence that the police, during the 3-4 minutes that the whole initial

questioning lasted, used force, duress or trickery of any form. In any

event, as I have pointed out, the confessions and the circumstances in

which they were taken were assessed and scrutinised by the domestic

courts and found to be voluntary and admissible. I consider that, under

the circumstances, there is no justification for this Court to evaluate

afresh their voluntariness or admissibility and, in so doing, appearing to

act as an appellate court.

(3) Complaints concerning the Assize Court’s treatment of counsel

for the defence

12. In the judgment of the majority (paragraph 101) it is concluded

that the Assize Court‟s handling of the confrontation with the

applicant´s defence counsel rendered the applicant‟s trial unfair. Two

main factors seem to have been taken into account. Firstly, the incident

that led to the contempt proceedings against the applicant‟s lawyer, and

secondly, the refusal of leave for him to withdraw.

13. As to the first factor, the findings of the majority are that the

judges‟ personal conduct, in view of the findings of the Court in

Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, ECHR 2005-XIII, undermined

the applicant‟s confidence that his trial would be conducted in a fair

manner.

14. With respect, I cannot see how the incident with the applicant‟s

lawyer could have affected the totality of the proceedings. The contempt

proceedings against the lawyer were separate and distinct and in no way

affected the applicant. The findings of the Court in the Kyprianou case

(cited above) with regard to the lack of impartiality on the part of the

Assize Court were confined to Mr Kyprianou and to the contempt

proceedings against him and in no way extended to the rest of the

proceedings or affected the applicant in any way. I consider any

insinuation that, as a result of the incident with Mr. Kyprianou, the

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Assize Court lost its impartiality or fairness towards the applicant to be

totally unfair to the judges of the Assize Court and generally to the

judiciary of Cyprus. I therefore cannot agree that, in respect of the

applicant, there was any violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as a

result of the contempt proceedings that took place against the

applicant‟s Counsel.

15. As to the second factor, it has been argued that the refusal by

the Assize Court of leave for the applicant‟s lawyer to withdraw from the

case had a “chilling effect” on counsel‟s performance and that the Court

exceeded the limits of a proportionate response, given the impact on the

applicant‟s right of defence. With all respect, I cannot agree. The Assize

Court, in refusing leave, based its judgment on established domestic

jurisprudence and took into account both the interests of justice and

those of the defence. With regard to the interests of justice, it must be

noted that the lawyer‟s application to withdraw was made towards the

end of the main trial and after most of the evidence had been admitted.

To have granted leave at that late stage of the proceedings would have

meant that the trial would be delayed until a new lawyer was found and

the voluminous record of the court containing all the evidence was

transcribed for the benefit of the new lawyer. It is likely that this would

have taken a considerable time, thus further delaying the proceedings.

In trying to safeguard the defence interests, the Assize Court considered

that a new lawyer, who would not have had the opportunity to see or

hear the witnesses testify in court, would have been at a serious

disadvantage. I do not detect any fault in the reasoning of the court, nor

do I see any unfairness in the way the court dealt with the lawyer‟s

request. Had the applicant‟s lawyer considered that he could not do his

best for his client, as he was obliged to do at all times and under any

circumstances, he should have advised his client to dismiss him

forthwith, rather than continue with the trial and complain afterwards.

The applicant himself never raised the issue and never indicated that he

wanted to change his lawyer. Under the circumstances, I cannot agree

that the refusal of leave for the lawyer to withdraw had any detrimental

effect on the proceedings as a whole.

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(4) Comments on the operative part of the judgment

16. One final point, as to the operative part of the judgment. Given

the main violation that the majority finds, I do not see any need in this

case to find separate violations. This, I understand, has not been the

practice of the Court, except in cases where grievous violations take

place. The facts of the present case are not such. The finding of

separate violations is, with respect, unnecessary, serves no useful

purpose and tends to eclipse the main violation that the majority of the

court finds.

17. I would therefore conclude that, taking the proceedings as a

whole and not fragmenting them, no violation occurred. The applicant

was legally represented throughout the proceedings before the domestic

courts, was properly and adequately cautioned as to his right to remain

silent, had all the benefits of an adversarial trial, including the voir dire,

and the judgment of the Assize Court was fully reasoned and in any

event was scrutinised by the Supreme Court. In my opinion, the trial of

the applicant as a whole was fair and none of the incidents complained

of had any decisive effect on the outcome of the proceedings. For my

part, I would dismiss the application.

113

DEUXIÈME SECTION

AFFAIRE KARABİL c. TURQUIE

(Requête no 5256/02)

ARRÊT

STRASBOURG

16 juin 2009

DÉFINITIF

16/09/2009

Cet arrêt peut subir des retouches de forme.

En l’affaire Karabil c. Turquie,

La Cour européenne des droits de l‟homme (deuxième section),

siégeant en une chambre composée de :

Françoise Tulkens, présidente,

Ireneu Cabral Barreto,

Danutė JoĦienė,

Dragoljub PopoviĤ,

András Sajó,

Nona Tsotsoria,

114

IĢıl KarakaĢ, juges,

et de Françoise Elens-Passos, greffière adjointe de section,

Après en avoir délibéré en chambre du conseil le 26 mai 2009,

Rend l‟arrêt que voici, adopté à cette date :

PROCÉDURE

329. A l‟origine de l‟affaire se trouve une requête (no 5256/02)

dirigée contre la République de Turquie et dont un ressortissant de cet

Etat, M. Hüseyin Karabil (« le requérant »), a saisi la Cour le 22 juin

2001 en vertu de l‟article 34 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits

de l‟homme et des libertés fondamentales (« la Convention »).

330. Le requérant est représenté par Me T. Aslan, avocate à Izmir.

Le gouvernement turc (« le Gouvernement ») est représenté par son

agent.

331. Le requérant allègue notamment qu‟il y a eu méconnaissance, à

divers égards, de l‟article 6 de la Convention, lors de son procès devant

la cour de sûreté de l‟Etat d‟Izmir. Il invoque également les articles 14

et 34.

332. Le 16 avril 2007, la présidente de la deuxième section a décidé

de communiquer la requête au Gouvernement. Comme le permet

l‟article 29 § 3 de la Convention, elle a en outre été décidé que la

chambre se prononcerait en même temps sur la recevabilité et le fond.

EN FAIT

I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L‟ESPÈCE

333. Le requérant, né en 1971, résidait à Izmir et était membre actif

de la branche jeunesse du HADEP (« le parti démocratique du peuple »).

334. Le 11 mars 1999, vers 16 heures, il fut appréhendé par la

police de la section antiterroriste de la direction de la sûreté d‟Izmir

(« la direction »). Il ressort du procès-verbal d‟arrestation, signé par

l‟intéressé, que celui-ci avait été dénoncé par M.Ç., ġ.E. et K.K. comme

étant la personne responsable du lancement, dans la région égéenne,

des actions de protestation contre l‟arrestation d‟A. Öcalan, leader du

PKK (le parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, une organisation illégale).

335. Vers 16 h 50, le requérant subit un examen médical à l‟hôpital

universitaire Atatürk. Le rapport délivré en conséquence concluait à

l‟absence de trace de coups et blessures sur son corps.

Après l‟examen, le requérant fut placé en garde à vue dans les locaux

de la direction, après avoir signé un formulaire lui rappelant ses droits,

dont celui de garder le silence et de bénéficier d‟un avocat au terme de

sa garde à vue.

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336. Le lendemain, vers 3 heures, une perquisition eut lieu au

domicile du requérant, en sa présence. Rien de délictueux n‟y fut

découvert.

Par la suite, il identifia M.Ç., K.K. et ġ.E. comme étant des militants

sous ses ordres.

337. Le 13 mars suivant, confronté avec le requérant, un certain

S.A. déclara que celui-ci était le meneur des actions de propagande en

cause.

Le même jour, le requérant, qui prétend avoir été interrogé sous la

torture, signa une déposition reconnaissant avoir reçu une formation

idéologique dans les camps du PKK situés en Roumanie avant de

retourner en Turquie pour y projeter des manifestations en faveur d‟A.

Öcalan. Cette déposition, de huit pages, contenait des informations très

détaillées sur ces plans et leurs acteurs.

338. La garde à vue prit fin le 15 mars 1999 et, vers 13 heures, le

requérant fut réexaminé au bureau local de l‟institut médico-légal. Le

médecin ne décela aucune trace de violence.

339. Immédiatement après, le requérant comparut devant le

procureur de la République près la cour de sûreté de l‟Etat d‟Izmir (« le

procureur » – « la CSEI »). Il renia sa déposition, affirmant l‟avoir

inventée pour échapper aux tortures.

Ensuite, le requérant fut traduit devant un juge assesseur de la

CSEI ; il réitéra ses contestations. Le juge ordonna la mise en détention

provisoire du requérant, qui fut alors transféré à la maison d‟arrêt de

type E de Nazilli, dans le district d‟Aydın.

340. Le 16 avril 1999, le procureur mit en accusation le requérant

(nom de code Ahmet) ainsi qu‟une vingtaine d‟autres personnes pour

appartenance et assistance au PKK. Il requit l‟application à leur encontre

des articles 168 et/ou 169 du code pénal et 5 de la loi no 3713 sur la

lutte contre le terrorisme.

341. Le 21 avril 1999, les débats furent ouverts devant la CSEI,

composée de trois juges dont l‟un de la magistrature militaire. Cette

première audience fut réservée à des questions procédurales.

342. Lors de l‟audience suivante du 2 juin 1999, les juges invitèrent

les prévenus à se prononcer sur les éléments versés au dossier. Le

requérant contesta catégoriquement les accusations ainsi que les

preuves produites contre lui, dont les aveux extorqués sous la torture,

qu‟il avait dû signer les yeux bandés. Il répéta cependant ses dires

devant le procureur et le juge assesseur.

De son côté, Me Aslan plaida que les seuls éléments inculpant son

client étaient ses propres aveux et ceux de ses coaccusés, également

obtenus sous la torture. Aussi sollicita-t-elle un nouvel examen médical

de ces derniers.

La CSEI répondit qu‟il n‟y avait pas lieu de renouveler les examens, le

dossier contenant suffisamment de preuves médicales propres à réfuter

les allégations de mauvais traitements.

343. Le 18 juin 1999, l‟article 143 de la Constitution fut réformé de

manière à exclure les magistrats militaires des cours de sûreté de

l‟Etat ; le 22 juin 1999, ces derniers furent remplacés par des juges

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civils (pour l‟exposé de l‟ancienne législation, voir Incal c. Turquie, 9 juin

1998, §§ 26-29, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1998-IV).

344. La première audience avec la participation du juge remplaçant

se tint le 22 juillet 1999, en présence de Me Aslan. Celle-ci, faisant valoir

les conclusions alarmantes d‟un certificat médical que le coaccusé A.Ġ.

avait pu obtenir après sa libération, demanda à la CSEI de revenir sur

sa décision précédente (paragraphe 14 in fine ci-dessus) et de faire

réexaminer son client. Les conseils des autres prévenus firent de même.

Les juges du fond écartèrent cette demande, pour le même motif que

celui retenu par l‟ancien collège.

345. A l‟audience du 16 septembre 1999, Me Aslan cita deux témoins

à décharge, à savoir H.H., résidant en Roumanie, et K. Karabil – le père

du requérant –, qui devait confirmer qu‟Ahmet (paragraphe 12 ci-

dessus) n‟était pas un nom de code mais juste le second prénom de

l‟intéressé.

La CSEI décida d‟assigner K. Karabil et donna à la défense jusqu‟au

2 novembre 1999 pour faire comparaître H.H., estimant qu‟une

commission rogatoire retarderait le procès.

346. A l‟audience du 2 novembre 1999, K. Karabil fut entendu ; il

confirma qu‟Ahmet était bien le second prénom de son fils. Me Aslan

demanda par ailleurs qu‟un délai supplémentaire lui soit accordé pour

faire entendre H.H. et que soient versées au dossier les déclarations de

C.S., qui avait mis son client en cause.

La CSEI accorda le délai sollicité ; quant aux déclarations de C.S., les

juges conclurent qu‟il appartenait à Me Aslan de les produire, si elle les

estimait utiles pour la défense.

347. A l‟audience du 14 décembre 1999, Me Aslan demanda à être

dispensée d‟assurer la comparution de H.H., celui-ci devant, d‟après

elle, être entendu par la voie d‟une commission rogatoire. Les juges du

fond écartèrent cette solution qu‟ils qualifièrent de dilatoire.

348. Le 20 janvier 2000, la CSEI accorda à Me Aslan un délai pour

faire valoir par écrit les arguments justifiant l‟élargissement des

investigations.

Or, à l‟audience suivante du 22 février, Me Aslan déclara ne pas avoir

de demande dans ce sens.

349. Lors de l‟audience du 5 avril 2000, Me Aslan soumit copie des

procès-verbaux concernant les déclarations de C.S. impliquant son

client. Les juges du fond en donnèrent lecture et les versèrent au

dossier.

350. Le 18 mai 2000, la CSEI condamna le requérant à douze ans et

six mois d‟emprisonnement pour appartenance au PKK. D‟après les

attendus du jugement, bien que l‟intéressé alléguât avoir déposé sous la

contrainte, les procès-verbaux de la confrontation avec S.A., les

identifications et déclarations faites par M.Ç., K.K. et ġ.E. ainsi que les

dépositions de E.K. et de M.Y. (paragraphes 6, 8 et 9 ci-dessus)

venaient confirmer les réquisitions du procureur. Aussi les aveux du

requérant avaient-ils bien valeur probante.

351. Le requérant se pourvut en cassation, sollicitant la tenue d‟une

audience publique, laquelle fut fixée au 6 décembre 2000.

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Le 4 décembre 2000, Me Aslan adressa un courrier urgent au greffe

de la Cour de cassation, demandant l‟ajournement de l‟audience pour

motif de santé. A l‟appui, elle fit valoir un certificat d‟arrêt de maladie de

cinq jours à compter du 3 décembre. Toutefois, ce courrier ne parvint au

greffe que le 11 décembre 2000 et l‟audience eut lieu en l‟absence de Me

Aslan. Celle-ci demanda alors la réinscription au rôle de son pourvoi et

la fixation d‟une nouvelle audience. Cette demande fut laissée sans

réponse.

352. Dans l‟intervalle, le procureur général déposa au greffe son avis

de trois pages sur la recevabilité et le bien-fondé du pourvoi. Cet avis ne

fut pas communiqué à la partie requérante.

353. Le 25 janvier 2001, la Cour de cassation confirma la

condamnation du requérant sur la base des éléments du dossier et des

moyens présentés par écrit. Cet arrêt fut prononcé le 31 janvier suivant,

en l‟absence de Me Aslan.

354. Le 1er juin 2005 entra en vigueur le nouveau code pénal

no 5237, prévoyant la réouverture des procédures aux fins de

l‟application des nouvelles dispositions favorables aux condamnés.

Aussi, le requérant fut rejugé par la cour d‟assises d‟Izmir. Le 25

octobre 2005, celle-ci ramena la peine à six ans et trois mois

d‟emprisonnement.

Le pourvoi du requérant fut rejeté le 8 mars 2006.

II. LE DROIT INTERNE PERTINENT

355. Un exposé des dispositions pertinentes du droit turc figure

entre autres dans les arrêts Salduz c. Turquie ([GC], no 36391/02,

§§ 27-31, 27 novembre 2008), Örs et autres c. Turquie (no 46213/99, §

31, 20 juin 2006) et Yayan c. Turquie (no 9043/03, § 27, 27 novembre

2007).

EN DROIT

I. L‟OBJET DU LITIGE

356. Le requérant dénonce, de manière générale, le régime répressif

concernant les infractions relevant des cours de sûreté de l‟Etat et

estime que son procès a manqué d‟équité sur nombre de points, au

regard de l‟article 6 de la Convention qui, en ses parties pertinentes, se

lit ainsi :

« 1. Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue

équitablement, publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable, par un

tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi par la loi, qui décidera, soit

des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractère civil, soit

du bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée contre

elle. (...)

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2. Toute personne accusée d‟une infraction est présumée

innocente jusqu‟à ce que sa culpabilité ait été légalement établie.

3. Tout accusé a droit notamment à :

a) être informé, dans le plus court délai, dans une langue qu‟il

comprend et d‟une manière détaillée, de la nature et de la cause de

l‟accusation portée contre lui ;

b) disposer du temps et des facilités nécessaires à la préparation

de sa défense ;

c) se défendre lui-même ou avoir l‟assistance d‟un défenseur de

son choix et, s‟il n‟a pas les moyens de rémunérer un défenseur,

pouvoir être assisté gratuitement par un avocat d‟office, lorsque les

intérêts de la justice l‟exigent ;

d) interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et obtenir la

convocation et l‟interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les

mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge ;

(...) »

357. En premier lieu, le requérant soutient n‟avoir pas été informé

de l‟objet et de l‟étendue des accusations portées à son encontre, au

mépris de l‟article 6 § 1 a).

358. En outre, il invoque l‟article 6 § 3 b) et c) et dénonce, d‟une

part, l‟absence d‟un avocat lors de l‟instruction préliminaire (premier

volet) et, d‟autre part, la prise en considération par la cour de sûreté de

l‟Etat des preuves illégalement obtenues lors de cette phase de

l‟instruction, dont ses aveux extorqués sous la torture (second volet). A

cet égard, affirmant avoir subi des électrocutions, des jets d‟eau froide

et des écrasements de testicules, le requérant se plaint de la passiveté

des magistrats face à ses doléances et, en particulier, du refus opposé à

sa demande d‟être réexaminé conformément aux critères posés par le

Protocole d‟Istanbul (voir, par exemple, Batı et autres c. Turquie, nos

33097/96 et 57834/00, § 100, CEDH 2004-IV (extraits)).

359. Concernant la phase de première instance, le requérant allègue

avoir été jugé par un tribunal qui ne pouvait passer pour indépendant et

impartial, au sens de l‟article 6 § 1, non seulement en raison de la

participation d‟un magistrat militaire à une partie du procès (premier

volet), mais aussi du fait que la désignation des autres dépendait du

pouvoir exécutif (second volet).

360. L‟intéressé se plaint encore de n‟avoir pas eu la possibilité de

faire entendre ses témoins à décharge, H.H. et K. Karabil, ni d‟interroger

C.S. et les coaccusés dont les dépositions ont été utilisés pour le

condamner, au mépris de l‟article 6 §§ 1 et 3 d).

361. Par ailleurs, sous l‟angle de l‟article 6 § 3 b), le requérant

déplore son maintien en détention dans une prison éloignée du tribunal

de jugement, ce qui aurait entravé son contact avec son avocat et, du

même coup, la préparation adéquate de sa défense.

362. Eu égard à l‟ensemble des doléances ci-dessus, le requérant

allègue aussi une violation de l‟article 6 § 2 de la Convention.

119

363. Toujours dans ce même cadre, il requérant s‟estime par ailleurs

victime d‟une discrimination prohibée par l‟article 14, du fait de

l‟application à son égard des règles régissant les procédures devant les

cours de sûreté de l‟Etat, moins favorables que celles des juridictions de

droit commun.

364. Concernant la phase d‟appel, invoquant l‟article 6 § 3 b), le

requérant estime avoir été privé d‟un recours devant la Cour de

cassation, celle-ci ayant tenu une audience en l‟absence de son avocate,

laquelle aurait été à tort considérée comme ayant renoncé au pourvoi.

365. A cet égard, le requérant dénonce également la non-

communication de l‟avis du procureur général sur le bien-fondé de son

pourvoi.

366. Enfin, le requérant soutient que l‟absence de notification de

l‟arrêt rendu par la Cour de cassation constitue une entrave au droit de

recours individuel que lui reconnaissait l‟article 34 de la Convention, dès

lors que son avocate, si elle n‟avait pas pensé à s‟enquérir de la

situation auprès du greffe de la CSEI, aurait pu introduire sa requête en

dehors du délai de six mois.

II. SUR LA RECEVABILITÉ

367. Le Gouvernement conteste ces allégations, excipant pour

l‟ensemble de la requête du non-épuisement des voies de recours

internes, parce que celles-ci n‟auraient jamais été soulevées devant les

autorités nationales.

368. Ayant attentivement examiné l‟ensemble des éléments en sa

possession, à la lumière de sa jurisprudence pertinente, la Cour n‟estime

pas devoir se prononcer sur l‟exception du Gouvernement – qui, du

reste, n‟est nullement étayée –, car, en tout état de cause, elle ne

relève aucune apparence de violation des droits consacrés par l‟article 6

de la Convention, s‟agissant des griefs exposés aux paragraphes 291,

312, 333, 354, 365 et 386 ci-dessus.

Aussi la Cour les déclare-t-elle irrecevables pour défaut manifeste de

fondement, en application de l‟article 35 §§ 3 et 4 de la Convention.

369. En revanche, elle observe que les doléances exposées ci-avant,

aux paragraphes 30, 32, 34 et 37, ne se heurtent à aucun motif

d‟irrecevabilité. Il convient donc de les accueillir.

1. Voir, paragraphe 12 ci-dessus, et Kamasinski c. Autriche, 19 décembre 1989, § 79, série A no 168, Söylemez c. Turquie, n° 46661/99, §§ 135 et 136, 21 septembre 2006, et Örs et autres c. Turquie (déc.), n° 46213/99, CEDH 2003-XI (extraits). 2. Voir, paragraphes 14 et 16 ci-dessus, ainsi que Ceylan c. Turquie (déc.), n° 68953/01, CEDH 2005-X, et İmrek c. Turquie (déc.), n° 57175/00, 28 janvier 2003. 3. Voir Ceylan, précitée. 4. Voir, par exemple, Çevik c. Turquie (déc.), n° 76978/01, 9 juillet 2002, et Gerger c. Turquie [GC], n° 24919/94, § 69, 8 juillet 1999. 5. Voir, paragraphe 25 ci-dessus, et – entre autres – Fejde c. Suède, 29 octobre 1991, § 31, série A n° 212 C, et K.D.B. c. Pays-Bas, 27 mars 1998, § 39, Recueil 1998 II. 6. Voir, İpek c. Turquie (déc.), n° 39706/98, 7 novembre 2000, et Özdemir c. Turquie (déc.), n° 60688/00, 8 novembre 2005.

120

III. SUR LE FOND

A. Les griefs se rapportant à la procédure de première

instance

370. Quant au grief tiré de l‟absence d‟un avocat pendant la phase

d‟enquête préliminaire (paragraphe 30 ci-dessus – premier volet), le

Gouvernement fait remarquer qu‟en vertu de la loi no 2845 en vigueur à

l‟époque, les accusés avaient droit à l‟assistance d‟un conseil à partir de

leur placement en détention provisoire. A ce sujet, il se réfère à la

décision Yıldız et Sönmez c. Turquie ((déc.), nos 3543/03 et 3557/03,

5 décembre 2006) et estime que, considérée dans son ensemble, la

procédure litigieuse n‟a pas été entachée d‟iniquité.

371. A cet égard, la Cour renvoie aux principes posés par l‟arrêt

Salduz qui fait autorité en la matière (précité, §§ 50-55), étant entendu

que ces principes l‟emportent sur celui antérieurement suivi dans la

décision Yıldız et Sönmez, précitée, qu‟invoque le Gouvernement

(paragraphe 42 ci-dessus), et absorbent ceux dégagés du précédent Örs

et autres, précité, qui portait spécifiquement sur la question de

l‟utilisation de déclarations prétendument extorquées sous la contrainte

pour asseoir une condamnation (précité, §§ 59-61, et Söylemez c.

Turquie, arrêt du 21 septembre 2006, §§ 121-125 – comparer avec

Salduz, précité, § 54).

372. En l‟espèce, nul ne conteste que le requérant n‟a pas bénéficié

de l‟assistance d‟un conseil lors de sa garde à vue – donc pendant ses

interrogatoires (paragraphes 6-10 ci-dessus) – parce que la loi en

vigueur à l‟époque pertinente y faisait obstacle (Salduz, précité, §§ 27,

28). Nul ne conteste non plus que, pour asseoir la culpabilité du

requérant, la CSEI a admis ses aveux comme preuve et a utilisé les

autres éléments disponibles pour confirmer ceux-ci (paragraphe 22 ci-

dessus).

373. Dans ces conditions, force est de conclure à la violation de

l‟article 6 §§ 1 et 3 c) de la Convention, pour les mêmes motifs que

ceux retenus par l‟arrêt Salduz, précité, dans ses paragraphes 56 à 59

et 62 (voir, aussi, Böke et Kandemir c. Turquie, nos 71912/01, 26968/02

et 36397/03, § 71, 10 mars 2009).

374. Ainsi, la Cour estime avoir statué sur la question juridique

principale posée au regard de l‟article 6 § 3 de la Convention, quant au

respect des droits de la défense devant la juridiction de jugement (voir,

parmi beaucoup d‟autres, Kamil Uzun c. Turquie, no 37410/97, § 64, 10

mai 2007).

375. Par conséquent, elle considère qu‟il ne s‟impose plus de statuer

de surcroît sur le bien-fondé des doléances concernant la prétendue

utilisation à charge des preuves recueillies sous la contrainte

(paragraphe 30 ci-dessus – second volet), l‟atteinte alléguée au principe

de l‟égalité des armes (paragraphe 32 ci-dessus) et/ou une

méconnaissance de la présomption d‟innocence (paragraphe 34 ci-

dessus).

121

B. Le grief se rapportant à la procédure de deuxième instance

376. Le Gouvernement explique qu‟à l‟époque pertinente, il était

loisible au requérant de s‟adresser au greffe de la Cour de cassation,

pour prendre connaissance de l‟avis du procureur général versé à son

dossier (paragraphe 37 ci-dessus). Il s‟agissait là d‟une pratique que Me

Aslan ne pouvait ignorer et qui était suivie de façon usuelle avant que

les réformes législatives ultérieures des 2 janvier 2003 et 1er juin 2005

ne remédiassent à ce problème.

377. La Cour rappelle qu‟elle a déjà statué sur une doléance similaire

dans l‟arrêt de principe Göç c. Turquie ([GC], no 36590/97, § 14, CEDH

2002-V). N‟apercevant aucune raison de se départir du raisonnement

suivi dans ce précédent, la Cour conclut à la violation de l‟article 6 § 1

pour les même motifs, du fait de la non-communication de l‟avis du

procureur général à la partie requérante (ibidem, § 55 ; voir également,

Yayan, précité, §§ 46-48 et la jurisprudence qui y est citée).

IV. SUR L‟APPLICATION DE L‟ARTICLE 41 DE LA CONVENTION

378. Aux termes de l‟article 41 de la Convention,

« Si la Cour déclare qu‟il y a eu violation de la Convention ou de

ses Protocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante

ne permet d‟effacer qu‟imparfaitement les conséquences de cette

violation, la Cour accorde à la partie lésée, s‟il y a lieu, une

satisfaction équitable. »

A. Dommage

379. Le requérant réclame 1 500 euros (EUR) au titre du préjudice

matériel subi du fait d‟avoir eu à recourir à l‟assistance d‟un avocat tout

au long de son procès, et 20 000 EUR pour son préjudice moral.

380. D‟après le Gouvernement ces prétentions n‟ont aucune base

sérieuse et réaliste.

381. La Cour n‟aperçoit pas de lien de causalité entre les violations

constatées et le dommage matériel allégué ; aussi rejette-t-elle cette

demande. En revanche, elle considère qu‟il y a lieu d‟octroyer au

requérant 1 500 EUR (à titre comparatif, voir Salduz, précité, § 73) pour

le préjudice moral.

382. Cela étant, la Cour réaffirme que la forme la plus appropriée de

redressement serait, pourvu que le requérant le demande, un nouveau

procès, conforme aux exigences de l‟article 6 § 1 de la Convention (voir

ibidem, § 72, et, mutatis mutandis, Gençel c. Turquie, no 53431/99,

§ 27, 23 octobre 2003 – pour le principe, voir également, Teteriny

c. Russie, no 11931/03, § 56, 30 juin 2005, Jeličić c. Bosnie

Herzégovine, no 41183/02, § 53, CEDH 2006-XII, et Mehmet et Suna

Yiğit c. Turquie, no 52658/99, § 47, 17 juillet 2007), étant entendu

qu‟en l‟espèce, la réouverture du procès du requérant aux fins d‟un

réexamen des faits litigieux à la lumière des nouvelles dispositions du

code pénal no 5237 (paragraphe 26 ci-dessus) ne tire pas à

122

conséquence. En effet, cette procédure, dite « d‟adaptation » (uyarlama

duruşması), ne tendait qu‟à la vérification de l‟existence des conditions

d‟application de la loi plus douce ; elle n‟était donc pas de nature à

réparer toutes les conséquences dont le requérant avait pu pâtir du fait

de la procédure pénale antérieure (Yayan, précité, §§ 69 et 70

ci-dessus) ni, par conséquent, retirer à celui-ci la qualité de « victime »

(Öztürk c. Turquie [GC], no 22479/93, § 73, CEDH 1999-VI).

B. Frais et dépens

383. Le requérant demande également 2 000 EUR au titre des

honoraires de son avocate et 650 EUR pour les divers frais de

communication et de poste. Concernant les honoraires, il soumet un

récapitulatif indiquant 136 heures de travail, dont seize consacrées à la

procédure engagée devant la Cour.

384. Le Gouvernement s‟oppose au remboursement des frais

encourus aux fins de la procédure interne et fait valoir que le restant

des prétentions manque de justificatifs.

385. D‟après la jurisprudence bien établie, l‟allocation de frais et

dépens présuppose que se trouvent établis leur réalité, leur nécessité

et, de plus, le caractère raisonnable de leur taux. En outre, les frais ne

sont recouvrables que dans la mesure où ils se rapportent à la violation

constatée (voir, parmi d‟autres, Beyeler c. Italie (satisfaction équitable)

[GC], no 33202/96, § 27, 28 mai 2002, et Sahin c. Allemagne [GC], no

30943/96, § 105, CEDH 2003-VIII).

Dans ce contexte, compte tenu des documents en sa possession et

des critères susmentionnés, la Cour estime raisonnable la somme de

2 000 EUR tous frais confondus et l‟accorde au requérant.

C. Intérêts moratoires

386. La Cour juge approprié de calquer le taux des intérêts

moratoires sur le taux d‟intérêt de la facilité de prêt marginal de la

Banque centrale européenne majoré de trois points de pourcentage.

PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR, À L‟UNANIMITÉ,

1. Déclare la requête recevable quant aux griefs tirés de l‟article 6 §§ 1

et 3, alinéas b) et/ou c) ou d) ainsi que de l‟article 6 § 2

(paragraphes 30, 32, 34 et 37 ci-dessus), et la rejette pour le

surplus (paragraphes 29, 31, 33, 35, 36 et 38 ci-dessus) ;

2. Dit qu‟il y a eu violation de l‟article 6 §§ 1 et 3 c) de la Convention,

du fait de l‟absence d‟un avocat pendant l‟instruction préliminaire ;

3. Dit qu‟il y a eu violation de l‟article 6 §§ 1 et 3 b) de la Convention,

du fait de la non-communication de l‟avis du procureur général ;

123

4. Dit qu‟il n‟y a pas lieu d‟examiner les griefs tirés de l‟article 6 §§ 2 et

3, alinéas b) et d) (respectivement les paragraphes 34, 30 in fine et

32 ci-dessus) de la Convention ;

5. Dit

a) que l‟Etat défendeur doit verser au requérant, dans les trois mois

à compter du jour où l‟arrêt sera devenu définitif conformément à

l‟article 44 § 2 de la Convention, les sommes suivantes, à convertir

en livres turques au taux applicable à la date du règlement :

(i) 1 500 EUR (mille cinq cents euros), plus tout montant

pouvant être dû à titre d‟impôt, pour dommage moral,

(ii) 2 000 EUR (deux mille euros), plus tout montant pouvant

être dû à titre d‟impôt par le requérant, pour frais et dépens ;

b) qu‟à compter de l‟expiration dudit délai et jusqu‟au versement,

ces montants seront à majorer d‟un intérêt simple à un taux égal à

celui de la facilité de prêt marginal de la Banque centrale européenne

applicable pendant cette période, augmenté de trois points de

pourcentage ;

6. Rejette la demande de satisfaction équitable pour le surplus.

Fait en français, puis communiqué par écrit le 16 juin 2009, en

application de l‟article 77 §§ 2 et 3 du règlement.

Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens

Greffière adjointe Présidente

124

FIRST SECTION

CASE OF ŠEBALJ v. CROATIA

(Application no. 4429/09)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

28 June 2011

FINAL

28/09/2011

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.

It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Šebalj v. Croatia,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a

Chamber composed of:

Anatoly Kovler, President,

Nina VajiĤ,

Peer Lorenzen,

Khanlar Hajiyev,

George Nicolaou,

Julia Laffranque,

Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, judges,

and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 7 June 2011,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

125

PROCEDURE

387. The case originated in an application (no. 4429/09) against the

Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Zoran Šebalj

(“the applicant”), on 25 March 2009.

388. The applicant was represented by Ms L. Horvat and

Mr S. Radobuljac, lawyers practising in Zagreb. The Croatian

Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š.

Stažnik.

389. On 8 June 2010 the President of the First Section decided to

give notice to the Government of the complaints under Article 3, Article

5 §§ 3 and 4, and Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention. It was also

decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the

same time (Article 29 § 1). On 18 January 2011 the President of the

First Section gave notice of further complaints, under Article 5 §§ 1 and

4 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Government were invited

to submit the relevant practice of the Supreme Court on the question of

the lawfulness of the applicant‟s detention after 19 June 2008.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

390. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Zagreb.

391. The documents in the case file reveal the following facts.

A. The three sets of proceedings joined under case file no. Ko-

824/08

1. Criminal proceedings conducted under case file no. Ko-219/06

392. On 21 September 2005 the applicant was arrested in

connection with a suspicion that he had committed several acts of theft.

He was released on 22 September 2005.

393. On 23 January 2006 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s

Office preferred charges against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal

Court on two counts of aggravated theft in the period between 1 and 4

July 2005 and on 11 and 12 September 2005.

394. A hearing scheduled for 6 April 2006 was adjourned at the

applicant‟s request because he wanted to find legal representation.

395. A hearing scheduled for 8 June 2006 was adjourned owing to

the applicant‟s absence. In a submission of the same day the applicant

informed the presiding judge that he was in pre-trial detention in

connection with some other criminal proceedings against him.

126

396. At a hearing scheduled for 2 October 2006 the applicant was

summoned through the Zagreb Prison authorities but he was not

brought to the hearing because he had been released on 26 June 2006.

397. The presiding judge ordered the police to bring the applicant to

a hearing scheduled for 21 November 2006, but this order was not

complied with. On 28 November 2006 the police informed the presiding

judge that the applicant did not live at his registered address.

398. On 1 December 2006 the presiding judge asked the Central

Prison Administration whether the applicant was placed in any penal

institution in Croatia. On 4 January 2007 the Central Prison

Administration answered that that was not the case.

399. On 16 July 2007 the proceedings at issue were joined with the

criminal proceedings nos. Ko-2965/06 and Ko-2403/07 (see below,

§§ 56 and 68).

400. On 4 August 2007 the applicant submitted a letter of authority

for his defence lawyer, J.N.

401. A hearing was held on 12 September 2007 in the presence of

the applicant and his defence lawyer.

402. The applicant had already been placed in detention on 19 June

2007, pursuant to a detention order of 22 May 2007, issued in the

proceedings conducted under the case file no. 2403/07 (see below, §§

62 and 63). On 28 September 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb

Municipal Court extended the applicant‟s detention on the grounds

under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear of absconding) and 1(3) (fear of

reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning was

essentially the same as in the decision extending the applicant‟s

detention of 12 July 2007 (see below, § 67).

403. On 1 October 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing

firstly that the first-instance decision had not specified the period of

detention covered by it and that his detention between 19 August and

28 September 2007 was not covered by any decision, and secondly

challenging the grounds for his detention on the ground that he could

live with the family D. and that he had not committed any criminal

offence in the past year.

404. A hearing was held on 4 October 2007 in the presence of the

applicant and a defence lawyer.

405. On 5 October 2007 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

applicant‟s appeal of 1 October 2007 finding that he had no address to

127

which the courts could send him a summons, since the police had

established that I.D, the owner of the flat at the address indicated by

the applicant stated that the applicant was a friend of his son but had

never lived with them. The appeal court accepted the grounds for

detention put forward by the first-instance court. It made no comments

on the applicant‟s argument that his detention in the period between 19

August and 28 September 2007 had not been covered by any decision.

406. A hearing was held on 30 October 2007 in the presence of the

applicant and a defence lawyer.

407. On 2 November 2007 the applicant lodged a request for his

release submitting a written statement by I.D. that he allowed the

applicant to live in his flat.

408. On 5 November 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb

Municipal Court extended the applicant‟s detention under

Article 102§ 1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, and no longer for fear of absconding. It found that the

applicant had already been convicted four times for theft or aggravated

theft and each time sentenced to a prison term and that two further sets

of criminal proceedings, also concerning charges of theft, were pending

against him. Against that background and in view of the number of

individual thefts concerned in the proceedings at issue, which all showed

the applicant‟s resolve to commit criminal offences of theft, the

Municipal Court concluded that there was a real danger of his

reoffending.

409. On 8 November 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing,

in sum, that the first-instance court had relied on erroneous provisions

when ordering his detention.

410. On 9 November 2007 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court.

411. A hearing was held on 21 November 2007 in the presence of

the applicant and a defence lawyer.

412. On 7 December 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb

Municipal Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 §

1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It found

that the proceedings at issue concerned six different thefts and that two

other sets of criminal proceedings also concerning charges of theft were

pending against him. Furthermore, he had already been convicted of

theft or aggravated theft four times and each time sentenced to a prison

term. Against that background the Municipal Court concluded that the

applicant had shown a high degree of criminal resolve in committing

thefts and that the previous convictions had not prevented him from

continuing with criminal activity of the same type.

413. A hearing was held on 11 December 2007 in the presence of

the applicant and a defence lawyer. The Deputy State Attorney present

at the hearing withdrew charges in respect of three counts of theft. On

the same day a judgment was adopted finding the applicant guilty of

two counts of theft and sentencing him to one year and three months‟

imprisonment. In respect of the remaining charge he was acquitted. The

trial panel also extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 §

1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

128

414. On 17 December 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against

the decision extending his detention, challenging the grounds for his

detention. The appeal was dismissed on 18 December 2007 by a three-

judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal Court.

415. On 20 December 2007 the applicant‟s defence lawyer also

lodged an appeal against the decision extending his detention,

challenging the grounds for his detention. The appeal was dismissed on

20 December 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court.

416. On 1 January 2008 the applicant‟s defence lawyer lodged an

appeal against the first-instance judgment. He argued that the facts of

the case had been wrongly established, that the reasoning of the

judgment was contradictory and that the sentence applied was too

harsh.

417. On 10 January 2008 the applicant also lodged an appeal

against the first-instance judgment, arguing that it had not been proven

that he had committed the thefts in question. On the same day the

Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s Office also lodged an appeal against

the part of the judgment acquitting the applicant.

418. On 4 March 2008 the Zagreb County Court upheld the first

instance judgment as regards the part finding the applicant guilty of one

count of theft and quashed the remaining part of the judgment, both in

the part finding the applicant guilty in respect of the other count of theft

and the part acquitting the applicant of one count of theft. In that part

the case was remitted for retrial. The County Court at the same time

extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) (fear of

reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It endorsed the reasons

previously put forward by the Zagreb Municipal Court.

419. The case was given a new number, Ko-824/08.

420. On 26 March 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court appointed a

defence lawyer for the applicant since his chosen lawyer ceased to

represent him.

421. On 4 April 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court again extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(3)

(fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the

same reasons as previously.

129

422. On 8 April 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing that the

reasons for his detention were insufficient and that the first-instance

court had only repeated its previous arguments.

423. On 15 April 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court.

424. On 22 April 2008 the applicant submitted a request for his

release, arguing that the reasons relied on by the national courts for

extending his detention were insufficient.

425. On 25 April 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court denied the applicant‟s request, reiterating its previous reasons

justifying the applicant‟s detention.

426. A hearing was held on 9 May 2008 in the presence of the

applicant and his defence lawyer.

427. On 15 May 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) (fear

of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same

reasons as previously.

428. On 20 May 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing that

the reasons for his detention were not relevant and sufficient. The

appeal was dismissed on 21 May 2008 by the Zagreb County Court,

which endorsed the reasoning of the first-instance court.

429. On 17 June 2008 the presiding judge sent a letter to the

Zagreb Prison authorities informing them that on 19 June 2008 the

maximum statutory detention in respect of the applicant would expire

and that the applicant was to be released that day. However, the

applicant was not released and stayed in detention on the basis of the

detention order issued in another set of proceedings (see below,

paragraph 72).

430. The written record of a hearing held on 7 July 2008 states that

the applicant was no longer detained in connection with the proceedings

at issue, but was still detained on the basis of a detention order issued

in the criminal proceedings against him pending before the same court

under the case file no. 3257/05.

431. On 9 July 2008 the presiding judge released from his duty the

officially appointed defence lawyer because the applicant was no longer

detained in connection with the proceedings at issue and therefore the

applicant no longer had the right to be represented by an officially

appointed lawyer. However, on the same day the President of the

Zagreb Municipal Court appointed a new defence lawyer for the

applicant.

432. Hearings were held on 19 September, 22 October and 8

December 2008 and 29 January, 27 February and 3 April 2009, in the

presence of the applicant and a defence lawyer. On the last mentioned

date a judgment was given finding the applicant guilty of two counts of

theft and sentencing him to two years and six months‟ imprisonment.

The time he had spent in detention in connection with the proceedings

at issue between 19 June 2007 and 19 June 2008 was to be included in

the sentence.

433. On 11 January 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing

that the facts of the case had been wrongly established and that some

130

evidence had been unlawfully obtained. He complained about his

treatment during the police questioning, maintaining that after the

police search of his flat on 21 September 2005 at 12.45 p.m., the police

had taken a large number of items from his flat and had then taken him

to the Zagreb Police Department where he was placed in a small room

and forced to sit on a chair until the next morning. During all that time

he was once given a sandwich and a fruit juice. On the morning of 22

September 2005 the police forced him to sign some papers. He had not

been present in the office where the police officers made a list of the

items allegedly taken from his flat.

434. On 13 January 2010 the defence lawyer also lodged an appeal

arguing that the facts of the case had been wrongly established.

435. The proceedings are currently pending before the Zagreb

County Court.

2. Criminal proceedings conducted under the case file no. Ko-

2965/06

436. On 9 September 2006 at 1.30 a.m. the applicant was arrested

in connection with a suspicion that he had committed a theft. He was

released on the same day at 1.15 p.m.

437. On 25 September 2006 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s

Office preferred charges against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal

Court on one count of attempted aggravated theft, allegedly committed

on 8 September 2006.

438. A hearing scheduled for 18 May 2007 was adjourned owing to

the applicant‟s absence.

439. On 1 June 2007 the Ministry of Justice informed the Municipal

Court that the applicant had already been convicted four times for

aggravated theft.

440. On 4 June 2007 the presiding judge asked the police to find the

applicant‟s whereabouts. On 26 June 2007 the police informed the judge

that the applicant did not live at his registered address.

441. On 4 July 2007 the police informed the Municipal Court that the

applicant was in detention in Zagreb Prison.

442. On 16 July 2007 the proceedings at issue were joined with

the criminal proceedings nos. Ko-2403/07 and Ko-219/06 (see above,

paragraph 13).

131

3. Criminal proceedings conducted under the case file no. Ko-

2403/07

443. On 16 October 2006 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s

Office asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court to open

an investigation in respect of the applicant in connection with a

suspicion that he had committed eight acts of theft, in the period

between 17 July and 4 September 2006.

444. On 13 November 2006 the investigating judge asked the

Vukovar County Court to hear evidence from the applicant since his

registered address was on the territory under the jurisdiction of that

court.

445. At a hearing held on 1 December 2006 the investigating judge

heard evidence from two witnesses.

446. On 20 December 2006 the investigating judge reiterated his

request of 13 November 2006. On 8 January 2007 the Vukovar County

Court informed the investigating judge that the applicant did not live at

his registered address.

447. On 8 February 2007 the investigating judge ordered the police

to bring the applicant to a hearing scheduled for 26 February 2007 and

indicated an address in Zagreb. On 27 February 2007 the police

informed the investigating judge that the applicant did not live at the

address indicated in his order.

448. On 22 May 2007 the investigating judge ordered the applicant‟s

pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear of absconding) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure for one month. The decision was justified by

the fact that the applicant did not live at his registered address and a

conclusion that he was in hiding.

449. The applicant was arrested on 19 June 2007 and placed in pre-

trial detention in Zagreb Prison.

450. On 20 June 2007 the investigating judge heard evidence from

the applicant in the presence of an officially appointed defence lawyer.

451. On 25 June 2007 the applicant asked the investigating judge to

be represented by his defence lawyer, J.N.

452. On 9 July 2007 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s Office

preferred charges against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court on

three counts of aggravated theft in the period between 30 August and

8 September 2006.

453. On 12 July 2007 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court extended the applicant‟s detention on the grounds provided for

under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear of absconding) and 1(3) (fear of

reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the first

ground the Municipal Court held that during the investigation the

applicant had not been available since he had not been living at his

registered address and the owner of a house at the other address he

had indicated had refused to allow the applicant to live there. As regards

the second ground, the Municipal Court held that the fear of reoffending

was justified by the fact that the applicant had already been convicted

of theft four times, was unemployed, had no assets, and several further

sets of criminal proceedings against him also on charges of theft were

pending.

132

454. On 16 July 2007 the proceedings at issue were joined to the

criminal proceedings in cases nos. Ko-2965/06 and Ko-219/06 (see

paragraph 13 above).

B. The two sets of proceedings joined under case file no. Ko-

3257/05

1. Criminal proceedings conducted under case file no. Ko-3257/05

455. The written record of the applicant‟s questioning by the police

officers in the Fifth Police Station in Zagreb states that on 2 November

2005 he was questioned by the police in connection with a suspicion

that he had committed several thefts. He confessed that in 2005 he had

committed seven thefts in Zagreb. The written record of his interview

states that it started at 12.30 p.m. and ended at 1.40 p.m. It also states

that a lawyer E.ĥ. was called at 12.30 p.m. and was present during the

questioning. The record is signed by police officer H.ģ., typist S.V.F., the

applicant and lawyer E.ĥ.

456. On 23 November 2005 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s

Office preferred charges against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal

Court, on seven counts of theft committed in Zagreb in the period

between 1 May and 6 October 2005.

457. A hearing scheduled for 21 April 2006 was adjourned because

the applicant did not appear and the postal receipt indicated that he was

unknown at his registered address. In their letters of 29 May and

6 October 2006 the Zagreb Police informed the Municipal Court that the

applicant did not live at any of the addresses they had obtained.

458. On 20 November 2006 the President of the Zagreb Municipal

Court appointed lawyer I.V. to represent the applicant. On the same day

a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal Court ordered the

applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear of absconding) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure for one month, from the date when the

decision became final. The decision was justified by the fact that the

applicant did not live at his registered address and a conclusion that he

was in hiding.

459. On 23 November 2006 the Zagreb Municipal Court issued an

arrest warrant in respect of the applicant and sent it to the Zagreb

Police for enforcement.

133

460. On 28 March 2008 lawyer I.V. lodged an appeal against the

decision on detention arguing that he had received the impugned

decision on 25 March 2008, whilst the panel‟s session had taken place in

November 2006. Moreover, a decision appointing him as the applicant‟s

defence lawyer had been served on him on 17 March 2008 although it

had been adopted on 20 November 2006. Thus he had not been

informed of the panel‟s session for a decision on the applicant‟s

detention and had been prevented from attending it.

461. On 13 March 2008 the Zagreb Police informed the Municipal

Court that the arrest warrant was not registered because the applicant

had already been detained in connection with the other criminal

proceedings pending against him before the same court (see below,

paragraphs 62 and 63).

462. On 10 April 2008 the President of the Zagreb Municipal Court

relieved lawyer I.V. of his duty.

463. At a hearing held on 14 April 2008 the applicant requested its

adjournment and that a defence lawyer be officially appointed for him

because he had no means to pay for his legal representation.

464. On 15 April 2008 the President of the Zagreb Municipal Court

appointed lawyer D.M. to represent the applicant.

465. A hearing was held on 20 May 2008 in the presence of the

applicant and his defence lawyer. The applicant denied that he had

committed the thefts with which he was charged and stated that he had

signed his confession to the police under duress. The relevant part of his

statement reads:

“It is not true that I committed the criminal offences I am charged

with. I signed the statement made at the police station under duress

and after physical and mental ill-treatment. I was questioned by two

police inspectors and other police officers were also coming and

going during the questioning. They slapped me in the face, forced

me to stand continually for two hours on my toes, not allowing me

to sit down. I stayed for twenty-four hours at the Police Station in

Bauerova Street and was taken to the ĥrnomerec Police Station only

during the night. The lawyer arrived but only to sign the written

record [of my questioning] and when he arrived I did not consult

him. We went to another room where he asked me to pay 500

Croatian kuna, which I did, and I signed the written record of my

questioning only to be let free.

To a specific question I can say that I did not see a doctor after

being released because I had no visible injuries and such treatment

[by the police] has become normal for me. I did not read the written

record that I signed, and nor did the lawyer.”

466. On 5 June 2008 the applicant asked that all criminal

proceedings pending against him before the Municipal Court be joined.

On 13 June 2008 the proceedings at issue were joined to the criminal

proceedings in case no. Ko-2730/07, since they were at a similar stage,

while the proceedings conducted under no. Ko-824/08 (see below,

paragraph 140) were not joined because the hearing in those

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proceedings had been concluded and the judgment was in the process of

being drafted.

467. Since on 19 June 2008, the statutory maximum period for the

applicant‟s detention in connection with the criminal proceedings

pending against him in the Zagreb Municipal Court under case file no.

Ko-824/08 expired (see below, paragraph 43), the decision ordering the

applicant‟s detention in the proceedings at issue of 20 November 2006

came into force.

468. On 23 June 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against that

decision arguing that the finding that he was of unknown residence was

wrong since he had been in detention for the past twelve months.

Relying on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, he also argued that the

maximum statutory period for his detention had expired and that in

view of the inviolability of the right of liberty of person no further

detention against him could be lawful. By extending his detention

beyond that time-limit the Municipal Court had misapplied the rules of

criminal procedure.

469. On 23 June 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

appeal against the Zagreb Municipal Court‟s decision of 20 November

2006, lodged by lawyer I.V., but did not decide on the applicant‟s

personal appeal of 23 June 2008. It held that the reasons for detention

put forward by the Municipal Court were sufficient but made no findings

as to the lawyer‟s argument that he was prevented from attending the

panel‟s meeting of 20 November 2006.

470. At a hearing on 14 July 2008, the Municipal Court heard

evidence from H.ģ., the police officer who interviewed the applicant on

2 November 2005. The relevant part of his statement reads:

“It is true that on 2 November 2005 I questioned the defendant in

the V Police Station and I remember that all the time during the

questioning a lawyer, called by my colleague K.K. from the list of

lawyers kept by the police, was present. Upon the lawyer‟s arrival

and before the questioning commenced, the lawyer was informed

about the case and was left for some time alone with the defendant

...

To a question from the judge I can say that I do not remember

which lawyer it was. Both the lawyer and the defendant signed the

written record of questioning without making any objections.

135

To a question from the defence lawyer I can say that what I have

just said concerns the case at issue and that I do not remember the

details concerning the victims or other matters.

To a question from the judge I can say that apart from the lawyer,

the defendant and me, a typist was also present and my colleague

K.K. was sometimes passing by but did not attend the interview.”

471. The Municipal Court also heard evidence from typist S.V.F. The

relevant part of her statement reads:

“Today when I see the defendant I can say that I do not

remember him or his questioning because I do it all the time.

To a question from the judge I can say that usually during the

questioning of a suspect I type what a police officer is dictating to

me. ... A suspect tells me his version of events and then a police

officer dictates to me the suspect‟s defence formulated in a

comprehensible manner and I type it. A police officer asks the

suspect questions. When a written record is completed it is given to

a suspect to read and he signs it. The same method is used when a

lawyer is present. Where a written record of questioning shows that

a lawyer was present and a lawyer has signed the record it means

that he was present from the beginning until the end of the

questioning.

To a question from the defence lawyer I can answer that now

when I see the written record of the defendant‟s questioning of 2

November 2005, I cannot explain why there is no mention of the

time when the defence lawyer arrived.

To a question from the judge I can say that all information and the

name of a defence lawyer and the time of his arrival are dictated to

me by a police officer conducting the questioning and who also signs

the record. Lawyers do not always promptly answer our calls and

sometimes we have to wait for them. When I am asked whether we

start with the questioning before that, I can say that we do not.”

472. The applicant objected to the veracity of the witness statement

to the effect that she had not been present at his questioning by the

police.

473. The defence lawyer requested the applicant‟s release but it was

denied and a separate decision was adopted to that effect. The presiding

judge held that the case file showed that the presence of the applicant

in the proceedings could not be ensured because he had neither lived at

his registered address nor at the address indicated as his temporary

residence. The address the applicant indicated at the hearing was not

the one at which he was registered. Against that background, and in

view of the large number of criminal charges against him, the presiding

judge concluded that there was a risk that the applicant would continue

to change his place of residence and again become unavailable.

474. On 16 July 2008 the applicant also requested his release.

136

475. On 17 July 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court denied the request on the same ground as the presiding judge in

her decision of 14 July 2008.

476. On 22 July 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint

against the decisions of 20 November 2006 and 23 June 2008 arguing,

inter alia, that his right to liberty of person was violated as well as his

right to receive an answer to his appeal; that the prescribed procedures

had not been complied with; and that the lower first-instance court had

not conducted the proceedings with the required efficiency.

477. On 24 July 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear

of absconding) and 1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, citing the same reasons as before.

478. On 28 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that

on 19 June 2008 the statutory maximum period for his detention had

expired. He also argued that his detention between 23 and 24 July 2008

was not covered by any decision. He further claimed that two separate

decisions on his detention existed at the same time, since in the

proceedings at issue a decision ordering his detention had been adopted

on 20 November 2006 and in the proceedings no. Ko-2403/07 he was

arrested and placed in pre-trial detention on 19 June 2007 on the basis

of a detention order of 22 May 2007. He considered that situation

unlawful. He further argued that the reasons for extending his detention

were not relevant and that the proceedings were not conducted with the

required efficiency, all in breach of Article 5 of the Convention.

479. On 29 July 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

applicant‟s appeal, finding that the reasons put forward by the Municipal

Court were relevant and sufficient. It made no comments as to the

remaining arguments by the applicant.

480. On 11 August 2008 the applicant sought his release arguing

that the reasons for his detention had ceased to exist and also that the

proceedings had not been conducted with the required efficiency.

481. On 12 August 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court denied the request, reiterating previous reasons as regards the

ground for the applicant‟s detention and making no comments as to the

conduct of the proceedings.

482. On 29 August 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(1) (fear

137

of absconding) and 1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, citing the same reasons as before.

483. On 1 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal

reiterating the same arguments as in his appeal of 28 July 2008.

484. On 2 September 2008 a hearing was held in the presence of

the applicant and without defence counsel. The applicant agreed that

two witnesses had given evidence.

485. On 10 September 2008 lawyer D.M. lodged an appeal against

the decision of 29 August 2008 arguing that the reasons for the

applicant‟s detention had ceased to exist and that no alternative

measures had been considered.

486. On 11 September 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed

both appeals, endorsing the reasons of the first-instance court.

487. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint on

21 September 2008. He challenged the grounds for his detention and

also argued that the statutory maximum period for his detention had

expired and that the first-instance court had not conducted the

proceedings with the required efficiency, contrary to Article 5 of the

Convention.

488. At a hearing on 22 September 2008 the applicant presented his

defence. He firstly stated that he maintained his statement of 20 May

2008 and then gave his defence to the charges preferred in the

proceedings previously conducted under case file no. Ko-2730/07. The

relevant part of his statement reads:

“... on 19 June 2007 I was shopping when I was arrested by the

police and taken to a police station and questioned about the

criminal offences of thefts and burglaries committed in the territory

of the Fifth Police Station. I was questioned the second day after my

arrest and pressure was put on me. I was physically ill-treated by

the police officers who beat me and my confession was thus forced.

On that occasion lawyer S.S. was called but he did not attend my

interview. I do know that he talked to the police officers and signed

the written record of my questioning. I stayed in detention in

connection with the other set of proceedings. I did not say any of

what is stated in the written record of my questioning by the police

officers in the Fifth Police Station.

To a question by the representative of an injured party I can say

that I did not enter any of the premises or take any of the items

listed in the indictment and I am not familiar with Ksaver [an area in

Zagreb].

To a further question by the representative of an injured party I

can say that the police did not find on me any items which were not

mine.”

489. Lawyer E.ĥ. also gave his evidence:

“Owing to the passage of time I do not remember the defendant.

Likewise, I do not remember the time of the questioning on 2

November 2005 on the premises of the Fifth Police Station in

Zagreb. At that time I was often called by the police officers to

138

attend interviews of suspects. Usually I would first talk in private

with a suspect and explain their rights to them and their procedural

position and then the suspects alone would decide whether to give

their defence to the police. When they decided to give their defence

I would be present during the entire questioning. After that the

written record would be read out loud to the suspect and then both

the suspect and I would sign it.

To a question by the defence lawyer that the defendant had said

that he had paid HRK 500 to me, I can say that I do not remember

it but I admit that it could be true.”

490. The applicant then objected to the evidence given by lawyer

E.ĥ. and said that the written record of his questioning of 2 November

2005 had been signed only the next day at the request of a court.

491. At the end of the hearing the defence lawyer asked for the

applicant‟s detention to be discontinued. The request was denied by a

decision issued on the same day. The Municipal Court reiterated its

previous arguments.

492. On 1 October 2008 the Constitutional Court accepted the

applicant‟s constitutional complaint of 21 September 2008 against a

decision by the Zagreb Municipal Court of 29 August 2008 and a

decision by the Zagreb County Court of 11 September 2008, in the part

concerning the ground for his detention under Article 102 § 1(1) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (fear of absconding), and at the same time

upheld both impugned decisions in the part referring to the ground

under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (fear of

reoffending). The Constitutional Court made no comments on the

applicant‟s argument that the statutory maximum period for his

detention had expired and the argument that the conduct of the

proceedings was inefficient.

493. On 10 October 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb

Municipal Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 §

1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (fear of reoffending) and

reiterated its previous arguments as regards that ground.

494. At a hearing held on 13 October 2008 the Municipal Court

heard evidence from lawyer S.S. and police officers R.Ð. and I.K.

495. The relevant part of the statement given by lawyer S.S. reads

as follows:

139

“I remember that I participated in the questioning of the

defendant on the premises of the Fifth Police Station in Zagreb on

20 June 2007 and I do remember that the questioning concerned

some burglaries and I also remember that the defendant has never

paid for my services. I do not remember the details of the

questioning but I do remember that the police offers called me from

the list of lawyers on duty and that at the beginning I refused to

represent the defendant but the police officers convinced me that

the defendant would pay for my services, so then I agreed to

represent him and I came to the police station.

To a question from the presiding judge I can say that before the

questioning I talked with the defendant and informed him of his

rights, that is to say I informed him that his statement given to the

police in my presence could be used at the criminal trial against

him. I do not remember other details. I was present from the

beginning until the end of the questioning.

To a further question whether I signed the written record of the

questioning I can say that I do not remember that but when the

written record is shown to me I can say that my signature is there.

To a question whether the record was read out to the defendant, I

can say that I do not remember such details.

To a further question from the presiding judge I can say that

before the questioning the defendant had given me his mobile

telephone as a guarantee that he would pay for my services.

To a question from the defence lawyer I can say that the

questioning lasted about an hour and that the Fifth Police Station is

in Bauerova Street.

To a question from the defendant I can say that I do not

remember how much time I spent with him. I do remember that

[the questioning] concerned several criminal offences - six, seven or

eight - and the written record contained three pages.”

496. The relevant part of the statement of police officer R.Ð. reads:

“It is true that I was present at the questioning of the defendant

at the Fifth Police Station in Zagreb on 20 June 2007 and that

lawyer S.S. was called and that the lawyer was present at the

previous questioning of the same defendant, as well as lawyer E.ĥ. I

do not remember whether lawyer S.S. was called at the request of

the defendant or from the list of on-duty lawyers. We allowed the

defendant, as we usually do, to consult the lawyer in private before

the questioning. Such consultations usually last about five to ten

minutes in a room where they are left alone.

To a question from the judge I can say that I do not remember

how long exactly lawyer S.S. and the defendant talked in private

before the questioning commenced.

140

During the questioning the defendant gave his defence freely and

he was also asked some questions.

After he had given his defence I dictated the written record and

the record was written in the presence of the defendant and the

lawyer.

At a question by the judge I can say that when completed the

record was read out to the defendant and the lawyer and given to

them to sign it. I remember that the lawyer took a copy of the

record.

To a question from the judge whether there were any problems

between the defendant and the lawyer concerning the paying [of the

lawyer‟s services] I can say that I do not know anything about it

because the defendants usually make arrangements about it alone

with their lawyers.

To a question from the defence lawyer I can say that I do not

remember that the police and the lawyer discussed the payment

since we are not interested in what would be arranged between a

defendant and a lawyer.

To a question from the defence lawyer whether we often call

lawyer S.S., I can say that we call a lawyer who is available at the

time.

To a question from the defendant whether I am sure that I

questioned him I can say that I questioned him at least three times.

...

When the written record ... is now shown to me I can say that it

contains my signature.”

497. The applicant objected to the veracity of the witness statement

saying that police officer R.Ð. had not questioned him.

498. The relevant part of a statement given by police officer I.K.

reads;

“I do not remember whether I was present at the defendant‟s

questioning at the Fifth Police Station on 20 June 2007 together with

police officer R.Ð. I do know the defendant from November 2006

141

when I was a part of the police team which arrested him. I also

participated in the questioning of the defendant at the police station

about twice but I do not remember the questioning at issue.

When the written record of 20 June 2007 ... is now shown to me I

can say that it contains my signature. Sometimes, when there is no

typist on duty it is me who types the written record.

To a question from the judge I can say that I do remember that

lawyer S.S. was called but it is all hazy and I cannot remember any

details.”

499. On 16 October 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against a

decision of 10 October 2008 extending his detention. He challenged the

grounds of his detention, argued that the statutory maximum period for

his detention had expired and also argued that Article 5 of the

Convention had been violated and that the courts had not conducted the

proceedings with the required efficiency.

500. On 21 October 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the

applicant‟s appeal of 22 July 2008 inadmissible on the ground that the

impugned decision was no longer in effect since, in the meantime, a

fresh decision further extending the applicant‟s detention had been

adopted.

501. On 24 October 2008 the defence lawyer lodged an appeal

against the decision of 10 October 2008 extending the applicant‟s

detention. He challenged the grounds for detention put forward by the

Municipal Court.

502. On 24 October 2008 the Zagreb County Court dismissed both

appeals against the decision of 10 October 2008. It endorsed the

Municipal Court‟s reasoning.

503. On 5 November 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional

complaint, reiterating his previous arguments and particularly stressing

that in its previous decision the Constitutional Court had not examined

his complaint about the inefficient conduct of the proceedings under

Article 5 of the Convention.

504. A hearing was held on 12 November 2008 in the presence of

the applicant and his defence lawyer.

505. On 24 November 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb

Municipal Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 §

1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating

its previous arguments.

506. On 26 November 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the

applicant‟s constitutional complaint of 5 November 2008, accepting the

grounds put forward by the lower courts for the applicant‟s detention as

justified. It made no comments on the applicant‟s objection about the

conduct of the proceedings and his argument that the statutory

maximum period of his detention had expired.

507. On 26 November and 8 December 2008, respectively, the

applicant and the defence lawyer each lodged an appeal against the

decision of 24 November 2008, challenging the extension of the

applicant‟s detention.

142

508. On 5 and 10 December 2008 respectively the Zagreb County

Court dismissed the applicant‟s and the lawyer‟s appeals, endorsing the

reasoning of the Zagreb Municipal Court.

509. On 15 December 2008 a hearing was held in the presence of

the applicant and his defence lawyer.

510. On 17 December 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional

complaint against the decisions of 5 December 2008, reiterating the

arguments from his previous constitutional complaints.

511. On 12 January 2009 a hearing was held in the presence of the

applicant and his defence lawyer.

512. On the same day a three-judge panel of the Zagreb Municipal

Court extended the applicant‟s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) (fear

of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating its

previous arguments.

513. On 15 January 2009 both the applicant and his defence counsel

lodged separate appeals against the above decision, challenging the

grounds of the applicant‟s detention and arguing that each new decision

extending his detention repeated the same reasoning.

514. On 20 January 2009 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the

appeals.

515. A hearing scheduled for 29 January 2009 was adjourned owing

to the non-attendance of the witnesses called. On the same day the

proceedings against the applicant in respect of one count of theft were

terminated because on 9 January 2009 the Zagreb Municipal State

Attorney‟s Office had discontinued further prosecution.

516. On 30 January 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional

complaint against the decision of 20 January 2009, challenging the

grounds for his detention and again arguing that the statutory maximum

period for his detention had expired.

517. On 11 February 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the

complaint finding that the applicant‟s detention was justified and made

no comments as to the applicant‟s argument that the statutory

maximum period for his detention had expired.

518. On 12 February 2009 the Fifth Police Station informed the

Zagreb Municipal Court that the applicant had been taken from prison to

that police station on 9 November 2005 between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., by

an order issued by a judge of the Zagreb Municipal Court. They also said

143

that the written record of the applicant‟s questioning was erroneously

dated 2 November 2005 instead of 9 November 2005.

519. At a hearing held on the same day the applicant gave further

evidence. The relevant part of his statement reads as follows:

“... it is not true that I signed the written record of my questioning

by the police on 2 November 2005 as is stated in that record. Some

time in mid November 2005 I was taken from Zagreb Prison on an

order by a judge of the Zagreb Municipal Court to the Fifth Police

Station and they gave me the record to sign. However, I do not

know what I was signing, I just signed what they gave me because

they told me that I had to sign it. Once there I had to wait for

lawyer E.ĥ. When he arrived he gave me his business card, spoke

for some time with the police officers and then we went to sign the

record.

To a question from the judge as to why I did not ask what I was

signing I can say that I had been at the police many times and had

never asked what I was signing and I did not at all ask for a lawyer

to be present. To a question about why I signed a document

granting authority to the lawyer, I can say that I do not know why I

did so. ...”

520. A letter from the Zagreb Prison Governor to the Municipal Court

on 16 February 2009 showed that on 9 November 2005 the applicant

had been taken out of Zagreb Prison to the Fifth Police Station between

9.25 a.m. and 11.35 a.m.

521. On 19 February 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the

applicant‟s constitutional complaint of 17 December 2008 inadmissible

(see above, paragraph 124) on the ground that that the impugned

decision was no longer in effect, since in the meantime a fresh decision

further extending the applicant‟s detention had been adopted.

522. At a hearing on 10 March 2009 the defence lawyer requested

that the written records of the applicant‟s questioning by the police on

9 November 2005 (erroneously dated 2 November 2005) and on

20 June 2007 be removed from the case file since these records were

unlawful evidence. It was not established when lawyer E.ĥ. had arrived

because there is no relevant evidence as to that fact. The record showed

that the questioning lasted from 12.30 p.m. until 1.40 p.m. in

connection with seven counts of different criminal offences. The

questioning on 20 June 2007, concerning twenty-five criminal offences,

supposedly lasted for about an hour, which could not be possible

because the witness S.V.F. had said that the questioning was conducted

in such a way that the applicant first stated his defence and then the

written record was dictated to her by a police officer before further

questions were put to the applicant. Such questioning in respect of

twenty-five different offences could not have been completed within an

hour.

523. The request was denied.

524. On the same day the applicant was found guilty of thirty-one

counts of theft and sentenced to three years and six months‟

144

imprisonment. The conviction was to a significant extent based on the

applicant‟s statements given to the police.

The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:

“As regards the written record of the defendant‟s questioning on 2

November 2005 this court heard evidence from E.ĥ., H.ģ. and

S.[V.]F.

[statements given by these witnesses are then reproduced]

This court accepts the statement of witnesses H.ģ. and S.[V.]F. as

regards the circumstances in which the written record of the

defendant‟s questioning in the Fifth Police Station were drawn up,

because there is no reason not to believe them, since they are State

officials who have a duty to act in accordance with the law and who

know the relevant laws well.

[This court also accepts] the statement by E.ĥ. because his

statement has not been called into question. It is logical in life that

the witnesses [H.]ģ. and S.V.F. do not remember details of the

defendant‟s questioning, owing to the passage of time and the

numerous interviews they conduct daily, as well as witness E.ĥ.,

who also said that he was often present at such interviews and it is

undisputed that the questioning [of the defendant] took place three

years before the time when the witnesses gave their evidence. Their

statements as regards the usual method of the questioning of

suspects are concordant and mutually corroborated, which leads this

court to conclude that there is no reason not to believe them that at

the end of the questioning a written record is read out to the parties

and they sign it or that the record is given to the parties to read it if

they wish to.

... information has been obtained from the Fifth Police Station that

the defendant was questioned on 9 November 2005, as shown by

the evidence that the defendant was [on that day] taken out of

detention, and the mention of 2 November 2005 in the written

record was an error. This however does not indicate that the

defendant‟s objection that the questioning was not conducted in

accordance with the law is well founded because it has not been put

in doubt, and the court finds this objection unfounded and aimed at

avoiding the defendant‟s criminal responsibility.

145

As regards the written record of the defendant‟s questioning on 20

June 2007... this court heard evidence from S.S., R.Ð. and I.K.

[statements given by these witnesses are then reproduced]

This court accepts the statement by witness [S.]S. as true because

it has not been put in doubt. It also accepts the statements of

witnesses R.Ð. and I.K. finding that there is no reason not to believe

them because they are State officials who have a duty to act in

accordance with the law and know the laws well, and it is

understandable that witness [I.]K. could not remember the details

of the defendant‟s questioning owing to the passage of time and the

numerous interviews he conducts daily. Since this evidence was

truthful and logical, this court finds that there is no reason not to

believe them, that is to say their statement that after the written

record is completed it is given to the parties to read and sign.

In view of the above, this court deems unfounded the defendant‟s

defence given at the trial, where he said that he had not read the

written record of his questioning by the Zagreb Police, and that that

record had not been read out to him so that he had not known the

content of the record, as well as that he had signed the record

under duress and only in order to be released. ...

Therefore this court finds the defendant‟s defence given at the trial

unconvincing. It is necessary to stress that in his defence given to

the police the defendant said that he had stolen some items but

denied taking money from wallets, although the latter was

established as fact from the evidence given by the injured parties at

the trial. Had the police officers falsified the written record of his

questioning, as suggested by the defendant, then they would surely

also have mentioned the taking of the money according to the

complaints of the injured parties. Contrary to this, the written record

states that the defendant did not take any money, which clearly

shows that the police officers did not impute anything to the

defendant ...”

525. In addition, his detention was extended until 19 June 2009,

under Article 102 § 1(3) (fear of reoffending) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, with the same reasoning as before.

526. On 16 and 20 March 2009 respectively the applicant and his

defence lawyer lodged their separate appeals against a decision

extending the applicant‟s detention. They challenged the ground for the

applicant‟s detention and argued that the detention between 20

February and 10 March 2009 was not covered by any decision.

527. On 24 March the Zagreb County Court dismissed the appeals,

endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court as to the ground for

the applicant‟s detention. It made no comments on the argument that

the applicant‟s detention between 20 February and 10 March 2009 was

not covered by any decision.

528. On 26 and 27 March 2009 respectively the applicant and his

defence lawyer lodged their separate appeals against the first-instance

judgment of 10 March 2009. They argued that the applicant‟s

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statements given to the police on two occasions, on 2 November 2005

and 20 June 2007, were unlawful evidence because the applicant had

been heard without the presence of a lawyer and the statements were

fabricated by the police. Both times the lawyers had been called by the

police and were not a choice of the applicant.

529. As regards the record of the applicant‟s questioning of

2 November 2005, it remained unclear when exactly the applicant had

been questioned. The police officer who allegedly questioned the

applicant, H.ģ., claimed that the questioning had taken place on 2

November 2005, while a letter by the Fifth Police Station sent to the

Municipal Court stated that the questioning had taken place on 9

November 2005 and that it had been erroneously dated 2 November

2005. However, a letter by the Zagreb Prison Governor sent to the

Municipal Court on 16 February 2009 showed that on 9 November 2005

the applicant had been taken out of Zagreb Prison to the Fifth Police

Station between 9.25 a.m. and 11.35 a.m., which means that, taking

into account the time needed for travel, the questioning lasted for about

five minutes. In that time, however, it was impossible for the applicant

to consult a defence lawyer, to give his defence and for the police to

dictate and type his defence.

530. They further argued that the only way to be sure when a

defence lawyer arrived would be if the police had a record of all defence

lawyers‟ arrivals and departures from the police stations, but this was

not the case and it was thus impossible to establish with certainty when

the defence lawyer called by the police arrived. It was recorded that

lawyer E.ĥ. arrived at 12.30 p.m. and that the questioning ended on

1.30 p.m. on 2 November 2005.

531. As regards the applicant‟s questioning on 20 June 2007, they

argued that lawyer S.S. had stated that the questioning had lasted for

about an hour. However, the charges about which the applicant was

questioned that day contained twenty-five separate counts of theft and

it would have been impossible for the applicant to consult his defence

lawyer, give his defence and for the police to dictate and type the

written record, all in one hour.

532. On 17 April 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional

complaint against decisions by the Municipal Court of 10 March 2009,

extending his detention, and a decision by the Zagreb County Court of

24 March 2009, repeating his previous arguments. On 8 July 2009 the

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Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible because, in the

meantime the applicant‟s conviction of 10 March 2009 had become final

and therefore the decision of 24 March 2009, upholding the decision of

10 March 2009, was no longer in effect.

533. On 2 June 2010 the Zagreb County Court upheld the applicant‟s

conviction. The relevant part of the judgment reads:

“... the impugned judgment contains clear and valid reasons about

all decisive facts, including why the first-instance court accepted the

evidence given by H.ģ., S.S., S.V.F. and I.K. as true. ...The written

records on the defendant‟s questioning by the police, as rightly

concluded by the first-instance court, are lawful evidence because

the defendant was questioned in the presence of his defence

counsel.

...

... the first-instance court correctly and completely established the

facts of the case ..., correctly and diligently assessed all evidence

and correctly accepted the evidence given by all witnesses, ...

including those who testified about the circumstances of the

defendant‟s questioning by the police. All these witnesses testified

only about the [facts] they remembered; some of them said that

owing to a large number of such interviews they could not

remember all details, but they testified how in general such

interviews are conducted.

The first-instance court ... reproduced in detail the evidence given

by persons who testified about the defendant‟s police interview ...

Thus, it heard evidence from lawyers E.ĥ. and S.S. and police

officers H.ģ., S.V.F., R.Ð. and I.K. In the impugned judgment their

evidence is reproduced in detail and then the evidence was diligently

assessed, each separately and in their mutual connection and then

the defence given by the defendant to the police and the other,

given at the trial, were both assessed ... The first-instance court, in

view of all evidence presented, including the information about

taking the defendant from prison owing to a mistake in the date

when the written record had been drawn up, correctly concluded

that ...the defence given by the defendant at the trial, where he said

that he had signed the written record under duress and that he had

not been questioned in the presence of a defence lawyer, was

unconvincing and aimed at avoiding his criminal responsibility and

contrary to all other evidence, which had been rightly assessed by

the first-instance court as truthful. ...”

534. On 2 July 2009 the applicant lodged a request for extraordinary

review of a final judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud

Republike Hrvatske). He reiterated the arguments from his appeal of 26

March 2009.

535. On 7 October 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the

applicant‟s request. The relevant part of the judgment reads:

148

“... the first-instance and second-instance courts, after finding that

the defendant ... had been questioned by the police in the presence

of his defence counsel (as is stated in the impugned written records)

and that the police officers had not obtained his statement under

duress, rightly concluded that these records were not unlawful

evidence ...”.

2. Criminal proceedings conducted under case file no. Ko-2730/07

536. On 19 June 2007 at 9.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested and

taken to the Fifth Zagreb Police Station in connection with a suspicion

that he had committed twenty-five separate thefts. The record of his

questioning drawn up on 20 June 2007 states that the questioning

started at 3 p.m. and that lawyer S.S. had been called at 2 p.m. and

arrived at 3 p.m. The applicant confessed to the charges. There is no

mention of the time when the questioning ended and when the applicant

was released.

537. On 13 July 2007 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney‟s Office

preferred charges against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court on

twenty-five counts of theft allegedly committed in the period between

18 August 2006 and 6 June 2007.

538. A hearing scheduled for 19 February 2008 was adjourned owing

to the applicant‟s absence.

539. On 4 April 2008 the Zagreb Police informed the Municipal Court

that the applicant had no permanent address or place of residence.

540. A hearing scheduled for 16 May 2008 was adjourned because

the applicant stated that he wanted to be legally represented.

541. On 26 May 2008 the President of the Zagreb Municipal Court

appointed lawyer D.V.T. to represent the applicant in the proceedings at

issue.

542. When on 13 June 2008 the proceedings at issue were joined to

the criminal proceedings in case no. Ko-3257/05 (see above, paragraph

80) the presiding judge relieved lawyer D.V.T. of his duties.

3. Conditions of the applicant’s detention

543. The applicant alleged that since 19 June 2007 he had been

placed in Zagreb Prison in a cell measuring 20.25 square metres,

together with six other inmates, with a semi-secluded toilet, without

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ventilation or proper furniture. The window was barred with thick

aluminium netting and let almost no air through. As a result the cell was

constantly bed-smelling and airless, and in the summer unbearably hot.

He was constantly confined in the cell.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Relevant law

544. The relevant articles of the Croatian Constitution (Ustav

Republike Hrvatske) provide as follows:

Article 23

“No one shall be subjected to any form of ill-treatment ...”

Article 25

“All detainees and convicted persons shall be treated in a human

manner and with respect for their dignity.

...”

545. The relevant provisions of the Constitutional Act on the

Constitutional Court (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu, Official Gazette

no. 29/2002) read as follows:

Section 32

“The Constitutional Court shall declare inadmissible any request or

complaints in respect of which it has no jurisdiction; which are

lodged out of time; and in other situations where the conditions for

examining the merits of a case are not met.”

Section 62

“1. Everyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the

Constitutional Court if he or she deems that a decision (pojedinačni

akt) of a State body, a body of local and regional self-government,

or a legal person with public authority, which has decided on his or

her rights and obligations, or on a suspicion or accusation of a

criminal act, has violated his or her human rights or fundamental

freedoms, or his or her right to local and regional self-government

guaranteed by the Constitution (hereinafter „constitutional right‟) ...”

546. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998,

58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002, 63/2002, 62/2003 and

115/2006) read as follows:

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Article 9

“(1) Court decisions shall not be based on evidence obtained in an

unlawful manner (unlawful evidence).

(2) Unlawful evidence is that obtained in a manner which infringes

the defence rights guaranteed ... by international law ...”

Article 101

“(1) Detention may be imposed only if the same purpose cannot

be achieved by another [preventive] measure.

(2) The detention measure shall be lifted and the detainee

released as soon as the grounds for detention cease to exist.

(3) When deciding on detention, in particular its duration, the

court shall take into consideration the proportionality between the

gravity of the offence, the sentence which ... may be expected, and

the need to order and determine the duration of the detention.

(4) The judicial authorities conducting the criminal proceedings

shall proceed with particular urgency when the defendant is being

held in detention and shall review as a matter of course whether the

grounds and legal conditions for detention have ceased to exist, in

which case the custodial measure shall immediately be lifted.”

Article 102

“(1) Where a reasonable suspicion exists that a person has

committed an offence, that person may be placed in detention:

1. where circumstances justify a risk of absconding ...

...

3. special circumstances justify the suspicion that the person

concerned might reoffend

...”

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Article 109

“(1) Until the delivery of the first-instance judgment, detention on

remand may last for a maximum of:

...

- 2. one year for offences carrying a sentence of a statutory

maximum of five years‟ imprisonment;

...

(2) In cases where a judgment has been delivered but has not yet

entered into force, the maximum term of detention on remand may

be extended for one sixth of the term referred to in subparagraphs 1

to 3 of paragraph 1 of this provision until the judgment becomes

final, and for one quarter of the term referred to in subparagraphs 4

and 5 of paragraph 1 of this provision.

(3) Where the first-instance judgment has been quashed on

appeal, following an application by the State Attorney and where

important reasons exist, the Supreme Court may extend the term of

detention referred to in subparagraphs 1 to 3 of paragraph 1 of this

provision for another six months and the term referred to in

subparagraphs 4 and 5 of paragraph 1 of this provision for a further

year.

(4) Following the delivery of a second-instance judgment against

which an appeal lies, detention may last until the judgment becomes

final, for a maximum period of three months.

(5) A defendant placed in detention and sentenced to a prison

term by a final judgment shall remain in detention until he is

committed to prison, but for no longer than the duration of his

prison term.”

Article 367

“...

(2) A grave infringement of the Criminal Code shall be constituted

where a conviction is based on evidence as defined under Article

9(2) of the present Code.

...”

Article 425

“(1) A defendant who has been finally sentenced to a prison term

... may lodge a request for the extraordinary review of a final

judgment on account of infringements of this Act.

(2) A request for the extraordinary review of a final judgment shall

be lodged within a month after the final judgment has been served

on the defendant.

...”

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Article 426

“The Supreme Court shall decide on requests for the extraordinary

review of a final judgment.”

Article 427

“A request for the extraordinary review of a final judgment may be

lodged [in respect of]:

...

2. An infringement of the rules of criminal procedure under ...

Article 367(2) of the present Code ...”

Pursuant to Article 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the

defendant requests an amendment of a final judgment following a

finding by the European Court of Human Rights of a violation of, inter

alia, the right to a fair trial, the rules governing retrial shall apply.

547. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon

Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette 110/1997) read as follows:

THEFT

“Anyone who takes property belonging to another person with the

intention of unlawfully keeping it shall be fined or sentenced to

imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

...”

Article 217 provides that aggravated theft is punished with a term of

imprisonment of between six months and five years.

548. The relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o

obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 35/2005 and 42/2008) read

as follows:

Section 19

“(1) Every legal entity and every natural person has the right to

respect for their personal integrity under the conditions prescribed

by this Act.

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(2) The right to respect for one‟s personal integrity within the

meaning of this Act includes, inter alia, the right to life, physical and

mental health, good reputation and honour, the right to be

respected, and the right to respect for one‟s name and for the

privacy of personal and family life and freedom.

...”

Section 1046

“Damage is ... infringement of the right to respect for one‟s

personal integrity (non-pecuniary damage).”

549. The relevant part of section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act

(Zakon o parniĦnom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 53/91, 91/92,

58/93, 112/99, 88/01 and 117/03) reads as follows:

“A person intending to bring a civil suit against the Republic of

Croatia shall first submit a request for a settlement to the

competent State Attorney‟s Office.

...

Where the request has been refused or no decision has been taken

within three months of its submission, the person concerned may

file an action with the competent court.

...”

550. The relevant provisions of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences

Act (Zakon o izvršavanju kazne zatvora, Official Gazette nos. 128/1999

and 190/2003), under the heading “Judicial Protection Against Acts and

Decisions of the Prison Administration”, read as follows:

Section 17

“(1) An inmate may lodge a request for judicial protection against

any acts or decisions unlawfully refusing him, or limiting, any of the

rights guaranteed by this Act.

(2) Requests for judicial protection shall be decided by the judge

responsible for the execution of sentences.”

551. The relevant provisions of the Courts Act (Zakon o sudovima,

Official Gazette nos. 150/2005; 16/2007; 113/2008; 153/2009) read as

follows:

Section 14

“...

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia is the highest court

in Croatia.

...”

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Section 22

“The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia:

- ensures uniform implementation of laws;

- considers current issues concerning judicial practice;

...”

B. Relevant practice

552. In its decision of 17 March 2009 (nos. U-III/4182/2008 and U-

III/678/2009) in the case of Robert Peša, concerning, inter alia, the

conditions of the pre-trial detention of the applicant in that case in

Zagreb Prison, the Constitutional Court found a violation of Mr Peša‟s

right to humane treatment and to respect for his dignity and also

ordered the Government to adjust the facilities at Zagreb Prison to the

needs of detainees within a reasonable time, not exceeding five years. It

further held that a complaint about the prison conditions to a judge

responsible for the execution of sentences under the Enforcement of

Prison Sentences Act was also to be used by persons in pre-trial

detention. The relevant part of this decision reads:

“20. ... the Constitutional Court established the following binding

legal opinion:

- the courts are obliged to apply the same procedures, concerning

requests for the protection of the rights of convicted prisoners

submitted to the judges responsible for the execution of sentences,

where such requests are lodged by persons placed in pre-trial

detention ...

...

22. For the reasons set out in points ... 17 [of this decision] the

Constitutional Court finds that the general conditions of the

applicant‟s detention amount to degrading treatment and thus

infringe his constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 23 and

Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and also his rights under Article 3

of the Convention.

155

The Constitutional Court has not addressed the possibility of

granting the applicant just satisfaction for the above infringements

of his constitutional and Convention rights because in the Croatian

legal system there exists another, effective legal remedy in that

respect (see the Constitutional Court‟s decision no. U-III-1437/07 of

23 April 2008).”

553. In decision no. U-III-1437/2007 of 23 April 2008, the

Constitutional Court found that the conditions of detention of a prisoner,

P.M., in Lepoglava State Prison amounted to inhuman treatment. It also

addressed the question of P.M.‟s claim for just satisfaction. The relevant

parts of the decision read:

“In particular, the Constitutional Court finds unacceptable the

[lower] courts‟ opinion that in this case a claim for non-pecuniary

damage cannot be awarded under section 200 of the Civil

Obligations Act on the ground that such a compensation claim is

unfounded in law.

...

Section 1046 of the Civil Obligations Act defines non-pecuniary

damage as infringement of the right to respect for one‟s personal

integrity. In other words, every infringement of a person‟s right to

personal integrity amounts to non-pecuniary damage.

Section 19(2) of the Civil Obligations Act defines the right to

personal integrity for the purposes of that Act as: the right to life,

physical and mental health, reputation, honour, respect for one‟s

dignity and name, privacy of personal and family life, freedom and

other aspects.

... it is to be concluded that in this case there has been a violation

of human, constitutional and personal values because the applicant

was in prison conditions which were incompatible with the standards

prescribed by the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act and also with

the legal standards under Article 25 § 1 of the Constitution. For that

reason the courts are obliged to award compensation for the

infringement of the applicant‟s dignity. ...”

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

554. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in

Zagreb Prison where he had been placed since 19 June 2007 had been

inhuman. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as

follows:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

treatment or punishment.”

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Admissibility

1. The parties’ arguments

555. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted

available domestic remedies. They maintained that he had not

complained about the conditions of his detention to a Zagreb County

Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences, to the prison

authorities or to the Central Prison Administration.

556. The applicant argued that he did not need to exhaust domestic

remedies because the Constitutional Court had found that the conditions

in Zagreb Prison were inhuman and that the prison was overcrowded,

and that therefore no remedy would be effective.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

557. The Court reiterates that the machinery for the protection of

fundamental rights established by the Convention is subsidiary to the

national systems safeguarding human rights. The Convention does not

lay down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring

within their internal law the effective implementation of the Convention.

The choice as to the most appropriate means of achieving this is in

principle a matter for the domestic authorities, who are in continuous

contact with the vital forces of their countries and are better placed to

assess the possibilities and resources afforded by their respective

domestic legal systems (see Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden,

6 February 1976, § 50, Series A no. 20; Chapman v. the United

Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 91, ECHR 2001-I; and Sisojeva and

Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654/00, § 90, ECHR 2007-II).

558. In accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court

may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been

exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States

the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged

against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see,

for example, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A

no. 296-A, and Remli v. France, 23 April 1996, § 33, Reports 1996-II).

Thus, the complaint submitted to the Court must first have been made

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to the appropriate national courts, at least in substance, in accordance

with the formal requirements of domestic law and within the prescribed

time-limits. To hold otherwise would not be compatible with the

subsidiary character of the Convention system (see Gavril Yosifov v.

Bulgaria, no. 74012/01, § 42, 6 November 2008). Nevertheless, the

obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant

make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and

accessible in respect of his Convention grievances (see Balogh

v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 30, 20 July 2004, and John Sammut and

Visa Investments Limited v. Malta (dec.), no. 27023/03, 28 June 2005).

(b) Application of these principles in the present case

559. The Court notes that in its decision of 17 March 2009, case nos.

U-III/4182/2008 and U-III/678/2009, the Constitutional Court

established that the remedies under the Execution of Prison Sentences

Act, namely a complaint to a judge responsible for the execution of

sentences, applied equally to convicted prisoners and to persons in

detention on remand.

560. Furthermore, in the same decision the Constitutional Court

itself found a violation of the right of a detained person not to be

exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment as regards the prison

conditions in Zagreb Prison, the same one where the applicant is placed.

Owing to the conditions the Constitutional Court found to be in violation

of Article 3 of the Convention, it ordered the immediate release of the

person concerned, who then had the right to seek compensation from

the State.

561. In its judgment Peša v. Croatia (no. 40523/08, 8 April 2010)

the Court accepted that the findings of the Constitutional Court together

with a possibility of seeking compensation from the State deprived the

applicant in that case of his victim status in connection with his

complaint about the conditions in Zagreb Prison under Article 3 of the

Convention.

562. The Court thus finds that, irrespective of the overcrowding of

Zagreb Prison, individual measures are available under the national law

and that therefore the available remedies have to be exhausted.

563. The Court notes that the applicant failed to submit his

complaint about the prison conditions to a judge responsible for the

execution of sentences or to the prison administration and in the case of

an unfavourable outcome he could have used further available

remedies, including a constitutional complaint in this respect (see Peša

v. Croatia, cited above, §§ 78-80). He therefore, contrary to the

principle of subsidiarity, failed to afford the national authorities the

possibility of remedying the situation he has complained of to the Court.

564. It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35

§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

158

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

565. The applicant complained that on 19 June 2008 the statutory

maximum period for his detention had expired and that his detention

after that date had been unlawfully and arbitrarily extended, contrary to

Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No

one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in

accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a

competent court;

...

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the

purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on

reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is

reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an

offence or fleeing after having done so;

...”

A. Admissibility

566. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. It further

notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore

be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ arguments

567. The applicant argued that the pre-trial detention ordered

against him in both sets of criminal proceedings at issue should be

viewed as a whole and that already on 19 June 2008 the maximum

period of pre-trial detention allowed under national law had expired.

159

568. The Government argued that the detention from 19 June 2007

to 19 June 2008 had been ordered in connection with the criminal

proceedings conducted under case file no. 2403/07 and that the

maximum period of detention expired on 19 June 2008 when the judge

presiding over the trial in these proceedings ordered the applicant‟s

immediate release. However, he had remained in detention on the basis

of a detention order issued in the context of the other set of criminal

proceedings against him, conducted under case file no. 3257/05. In

respect of this detention order the maximum statutory period of

detention had not expired.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

569. The Court first observes that this case falls to be examined

under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, since the purpose of the

detention was to bring him before the competent legal authority on

reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence.

570. The Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention

guarantees the fundamental right to liberty and security. That right is of

primary importance in a “democratic society” within the meaning of the

Convention (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971,

§ 65, Series A no. 12, and Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October

1979, § 37, Series A no. 33). Its key purpose is to prevent arbitrary or

unjustified deprivations of liberty (see McKay v. the United Kingdom

[GC], no. 543/03, § 30, ECHR 2006-... and Ladent v. Poland, no.

11036/03, § 45, ECHR 2008-... (extracts)).

571. All persons are entitled to the protection of that right, that is to

say, not to be deprived or continue to be deprived of their liberty (see

Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, § 40, Series A no. 114),

save in accordance with the conditions specified in paragraph 1 of Article

5. The list of exceptions set out in Article 5 § 1 is an exhaustive one and

only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the

aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily

deprived of his or her liberty (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 42,

Reports 1996-III; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 170, ECHR

2000-IV; and Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 170, ECHR

2004-II).

572. The Court reiterates that the expressions “lawful” and “in

accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 § 1

essentially refer back to national law and enshrine the obligation to

conform to substantive and procedural rules thereof. Although it is in

the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to

interpret and apply domestic law, under Article 5 § 1 failure to comply

with domestic law entails a breach of the Convention and the Court can

and should review whether this law has been complied with (see, among

many other authorities, Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996,

§ 41, Reports 1996-III, and Assanidze v. Georgia, cited above, § 171).

573. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal

basis in domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring

160

it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the

Articles of the Convention (see Stafford, cited above, § 63, and Kafkaris,

cited above, § 116). “Quality of the law” in this sense implies that where

a national law authorises deprivation of liberty it must be sufficiently

accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to avoid

all risk of arbitrariness (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 50,

Reports 1996-III; Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no. 656/06, § 71, 11 October

2007; and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, § 76, 9 July 2009).

The standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention thus requires that all

law be sufficiently precise to allow the person – if need be, with

appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the

circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see

Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, § 54,

Reports 1998-VII, and Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, § 52, ECHR

2000-III).

574. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient:

Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should

be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from

arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Winterwerp, cited

above § 37; Amuur, cited above, § 50; and Witold Litwa v. Poland,

no. 26629/95, § 78, ECHR 2000-III). It is a fundamental principle that

no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and

the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond lack of

conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be

lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to

the Convention (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03,

§ 67, ECHR 2008-... ).

(b) Application of these principles in the present case

575. In the instant case, the Court will first consider whether the

applicant‟s detention was “lawful” and effected “in accordance with a

procedure prescribed by law”, as required by Article 5 § 1 of the

Convention. It notes that the first detention order was issued on

20 November 2006. However, the applicant was not placed in detention

pursuant to that order but remained at large. The order was not served

on the applicant because he was considered to be of an unknown

address. As long as the applicant was at large this detention order could

not come into effect.

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576. The applicant was arrested on 19 June 2007 in connection with

a different set of criminal proceedings pending against him before the

same Municipal Court, also on charges on theft. A second detention

order was issued on the same day and the applicant was placed in pre-

trial detention pursuant to that second detention order, which thus

immediately came into effect.

577. The first detention order, issued on 20 November 2006, was

served on the applicant‟s defence counsel on 17 March 2008. However,

it did not come into effect as long as the detention order of 19 June

2007, although issued later, remained in effect.

578. Despite the fact that only one of these two detention orders

was in effect, a situation was nevertheless created where two different

detention orders were issued in respect of the applicant in parallel

criminal proceedings pending against him before the same court, all on

charges of different counts of theft or aggravated theft.

579. When on 19 June 2008 the statutory maximum period for the

applicant‟s detention under the detention order, issued on 19 June

2007, expired, the judge conducting the criminal proceedings in

connection with which this order had been issued, gave a decision

stating that the maximum statutory period of detention had been

reached and ordered the applicant‟s immediate release. However, the

applicant was not released because the detention order issued on 20

November 2006 then immediately came into effect.

580. Turning to the relevant provisions of the applicable domestic

law, the Court notes that the Code of Criminal Procedure contains no

explicit provision regulating such a situation. While section 109 governs

statutory maximum periods of detention for different offences,

depending on the sentence prescribed, it contains no provisions

concerning the maximum detention period on the basis of detention

orders adopted in parallel criminal proceedings.

581. Furthermore, although the Government were explicitly asked to

provide the Supreme Court‟s practice regarding the situation at issue,

they have not submitted any such material. The Court therefore

concludes that the lack of statutory regulation has not been remedied by

the practice of the Supreme Court.

582. The absence of any statutory regulation of such a situation and

any relevant practice of the Croatian Supreme Court leaves open the

possibility for the applicable legislation on the maximum statutory

periods of detention to be circumvented.

583. The Court considers that to detain a person after the maximum

statutory period for his detention has expired, on the basis of a

detention order issued in parallel criminal proceedings, without such

detention being based on a specific statutory provision or clear judicial

practice, is incompatible with the principle of legal certainty and

arbitrary, and runs counter to the fundamental aspects of the rule of

law.

584. The Court accordingly finds that the applicant‟s detention

between 19 June 2008 and 10 March 2009 was unlawful, in breach of

the provisions of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

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III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

585. The applicant complained about the grounds for his detention

and the inefficient conduct of the proceedings by the national courts. He

relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the relevant part of which

reads:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions

of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a

reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be

conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

A. Admissibility

1. Detention in connection with the criminal proceedings conducted

under nos. 219/06; 2965/06; 2403/07; and 824/08

586. The Court notes that in these proceedings the applicant was

arrested on 19 June 2007 and placed in pre-trial detention. On 11

December 2007 he was found guilty and sentenced to one year and

three months‟ imprisonment.

587. The first-instance judgment was partly quashed on 4 March

2008 and the case was in that part remitted to the first-instance court,

which delivered a fresh judgment on 3 April 2009. However, in the

meantime, on 19 June 2008 the applicant‟s detention in connection with

these proceedings was terminated.

588. The present application was lodged with the Court on 25 March

2009, that is to say more than six months after the applicant‟s pre-trial

detention had ended.

589. It follows that all complaints concerning the applicant‟s

detention in connection with the proceedings at issue have been

introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with

Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

2. Detention in connection with the criminal proceedings conducted

under nos. 2730/07 and 3257/05

590. The Court notes that this part of the application is not

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the

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Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other

grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ arguments

591. The applicant argued that the national courts had repeatedly

relied on the same grounds for ordering and extending his detention

without taking into account new developments and that the conduct of

the proceedings by the national courts was not in accordance with the

requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

592. The Government argued that the reasons put forward by the

national authorities for ordering and extending the applicant‟s detention

had been relevant and sufficient and thoroughly explained.

2. The Court’s assessment

593. The Court notes that the issue to be examined under Article 5 §

3 of the Convention is whether the grounds relied on by the national

authorities in the order for the applicant‟s detention of 20 November

2006, which came into effect on 19 June 2008, and in all subsequent

decisions extending his detention, were relevant and sufficient.

However, the Court notes that it has already found that the applicant‟s

detention after 19 June 2008 was arbitrary and in contravention of

Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. That finding makes it redundant for the

Court to further examine whether the grounds for such detention were

relevant and sufficient.

594. Against that background and in view of the violation found

under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court finds that it is not

necessary to examine further any complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the

Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

595. The applicant further complained that the proceedings

concerning his constitutional complaints against the detention orders

issued against him had not met the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the

Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention

shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his

detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release

ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

A. Admissibility

596. The Court notes that this part of the application is not

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the

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Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other

grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The parties’ arguments

597. The applicant argued that the Constitutional Court had not

examined three of his constitutional complaints on the merits only

because, in the meantime, a fresh decision extending his detention had

been adopted. He further argued that the national courts had never

addressed his complaint that his detention after 19 June 2008 had been

unlawful because the statutory maximum period had expired.

598. The Government maintained that the applicant‟s detention had

been frequently reviewed by the competent courts of their own motion

and that the applicant had also had the possibility under domestic law of

applying for his detention order to be lifted. The applicant had always

been able to lodge an appeal with the Zagreb County Court against each

decision extending his detention and his appeals had been speedily

decided on.

599. The applicant had also lodged several constitutional complaints.

Pursuant to section 32 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional

Court did not examine the merits of constitutional complaints against

decisions which were no longer in effect at the time when it came to

examine the complaints.

600. As regards the complaint that the national courts had not

addressed the applicant‟s arguments concerning the lawfulness of his

detention after 19 June 2008, the Government contended that the

proceedings before the Constitutional Court fell outside the scope of

Article 5 § 4 of the Convention because the Constitutional Court was not

a “court” within the meaning of that provision.

601. Furthermore, the applicant‟s constitutional complaint of 22 July

2008 had been lodged only two days before a fresh decision extending

the applicant‟s detention had been adopted.

2. The Court’s assessment

602. At the outset the Court reiterates that in a number of its

decisions and judgments concerning Croatia it has already examined

165

various issues about the fairness of the proceedings before the

Constitutional Court as well as issues concerning the rights guaranteed

under Article 5 of the Convention (see, for example, Janković v. Croatia

(dec.), no. 43440/98, ECHR 2000-X; Olujić v. Croatia, no. 22330/05, §§

36 and 37, 5 February 2009; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], no.

15766/03, §§ 108- 110, ECHR 2010-...; Peša v. Croatia, no. 40523/08,

§§ 112-126, 8 April 2010; and HaĎi v. Croatia, no. 42998/08, §§ 43-47,

1 July 2010). The Court does not see any reason to deviate from this

case-law in the circumstances of the present case.

(a) Inadmissibility of the applicant’s constitutional

complaints

(i) General principles

603. The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 5 § 4 is to

assure to persons who are arrested and detained the right to judicial

supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby

subjected (see, mutatis mutandis, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v.

Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no. 12, and Ismoilov and Others

v. Russia, no. 2947/06, § 145, 24 April 2008). A remedy must be made

available during a person‟s detention to allow that person to obtain

speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention, capable of

leading, where appropriate, to his or her release. The existence of the

remedy required by Article 5 § 4 must be sufficiently certain, not only in

theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the accessibility and

effectiveness required for the purposes of that provision (see, mutatis

mutandis, Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, no. 9808/02, § 66 in fine, 24 March

2005, and Vachev v. Bulgaria, no. 42987/98, § 71, ECHR 2004-VIII).

The accessibility of a remedy implies, inter alia, that the circumstances

voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford

applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy (see, mutatis

mutandis, Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, §§ 46 and 55, ECHR

2002-I).

(ii) Application of these principles in the present case

604. The Court firstly notes that under the relevant domestic law,

after an indictment has been lodged, detention must be judicially

reviewed every two months. The Court notes that in the present case

the lawfulness of the applicant‟s detention was considered by the Zagreb

County Court and the Constitutional Court on many occasions.

605. However, three of the applicant‟s constitutional complaints were

not examined on the merits. Thus, the constitutional complaint of

22 July 2008 was declared inadmissible on 21 October 2008; the

constitutional complaint of 17 December 2008 was declared inadmissible

on 19 February 2009; and the constitutional complaint of 17 April 2009

was declared inadmissible on 8 July 2009, each time on the ground that

the impugned decision was no longer in effect since, in the meantime, a

fresh decision extending detention had been adopted. The Court

therefore has to address the question of the compliance of the above-

166

mentioned Constitutional Court‟s decisions with the requirements of

Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

606. In this connection the Court reiterates that, according to its

case-law, Article 5 § 4 enshrines, as does Article 6 § 1, the right of

access to a court, which can only be subject to reasonable limitations

that do not impair its very essence (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no.

38822/97, §§ 82-90, ECHR 2003-I, and Bochev, cited above, § 70).

607. Furthermore, Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting

States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of

applications for release from detention. Nevertheless, a State which

institutes such a system must in principle accord detainees the same

guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see Toth v. Austria, 12

December 1991, § 84, Series A no. 224; Rutten v. the Netherlands, no.

32605/96, § 53, 24 July 2001; Lanz v. Austria, no. 24430/94, § 42, 31

January 2002; and Svipsta v. Latvia, no. 66820/01, § 129, ECHR

2006-III). The Court considers that the same applies in a system which

provides for a constitutional complaint against decisions ordering and

extending detention.

608. However, the Croatian system, although allowing for a

constitutional complaint, leaves it to the Constitutional Court to await a

fresh decision on extension of detention and then to declare the

complaint against the previous decision on detention inadmissible. Thus,

although the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against three

above-mentioned decisions of the Zagreb County Court, the

Constitutional Court did not decide on the merits of any of these

complaints but declared them all inadmissible because each time a fresh

decision on the applicant‟s detention had been adopted in the

meantime.

609. In the Court‟s opinion, the Constitutional Court‟s failure to

decide on the applicant‟s constitutional complaints on the merits made it

impossible to ensure the proper and meaningful functioning of the

system for the review of his detention, as provided for by the national

law. By declaring the applicant‟s constitutional complaints inadmissible

simply because a fresh decision extending his detention had been

adopted in the meantime, the Constitutional Court did not satisfy the

requirement “that the circumstances voluntarily created by the

authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of

using the remedy” (see Peša v. Croatia, no. 40523/08, § 126, 8 April

167

2010, and HaĎi v. Croatia, no. 42998/08, § 47, 1 July 2010). Thus, that

court fell short of its obligation under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention to

review the lawfulness of the applicant‟s detention. There has accordingly

been a violation of that provision.

(b) Failure of the appeal court and the Constitutional Court

to respond to the applicant’s arguments

610. The Court reiterates that arrested or detained persons are

entitled to a review bearing upon the procedural and substantive

conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the

Convention, of their deprivation of liberty. This means that the

competent court has to examine “not only compliance with the

procedural requirements set out in [domestic law] but also the

reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest and the legitimacy

of the purpose pursued by the arrest and the ensuing detention” (see

the Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, §

65, Series A no. 145-B, and Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, §

58, ECHR 1999-II).

611. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that in

his appeal of 1 September 2008, and in his constitutional complaint of

21 September 2008, both lodged in respect of the decision by the

Zagreb Municipal Court of 29 August 2008 extending his detention, the

applicant, relying on Article 5 of the Convention, argued that the

statutory maximum period for his detention had expired already on 19

June 2008 and that the conduct of the criminal proceedings against him

by the lower court had fallen short of the requirement of efficiency.

612. He put forward these same arguments in his appeal of

16 October 2008 and his constitutional complaint of 5 November 2008,

both in respect of a decision by the Zagreb Municipal Court of 10

October 2008 extending his detention.

613. He repeated the same arguments also in his appeal of

15 January 2009 and his constitutional complaint of 30 January 2009,

both in respect of a decision by the Municipal Court of 12 January 2009

extending his detention.

614. However, although in each of these instances both the Zagreb

County Court on appeal and the Constitutional Court examined the

applicant‟s appeals and constitutional complaints on the merits, they

never made any comments on the above-stated arguments concerning

the lawfulness of the applicant‟s detention.

615. While Article 5 § 4 of the Convention does not impose an

obligation on a judge examining an appeal against detention to address

every argument contained in the appellant‟s submissions, its guarantees

would be deprived of their substance if the judge, relying on domestic

law and practice, could treat as irrelevant, or disregard, concrete facts

invoked by the detainee and capable of putting in doubt the existence of

the conditions that are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the

Convention, of the deprivation of liberty (see Nikolova, cited above,

§ 61, and Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 37138/06, § 209, 9

November 2010).

168

616. The applicant‟s submissions in the above-mentioned appeals

and constitutional complaints contained arguments connected with his

rights guaranteed under Article 5 of the Convention, namely that the

statutory maximum period for his detention had expired on 19 June

2008 and that the lower courts had failed to conduct the proceedings

with the requisite speediness. These arguments did not appear

implausible or frivolous. By not taking these submissions into account

the appeal court and the Constitutional Court failed to provide judicial

review of the scope and nature required by Article 5 § 4 of the

Convention.

617. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the

Convention also in the above respect.

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) OF THE

CONVENTION

618. The applicant further complained that on two occasions he had

been questioned by the police without the presence of a defence lawyer

and that his trial had been unfair because his conviction had been based

to a decisive degree on the confession he had made to the police. He

relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, the relevant part of

which reads:

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law. ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

minimum rights:

...

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his

own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal

assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so

require;

...”

169

A. Admissibility

1. As regards the applicant’s questioning by the police on 20 June

2007

619. The Court notes that the applicant was arrested on 19 June

2007 at 9.30 p.m. in order to be interviewed by the police in connection

with twenty-five counts of theft. However, the record of his questioning

states that it started on 20 June 2007 at 3 p.m. At a hearing held on 22

September 2008 the applicant also stated that he had been questioned

on the second day after his arrest, without specifying the time of his

questioning. In his later statements and appeals the applicant

repeatedly stated that he had been questioned by the police on 20 June

2007 without the presence of a defence lawyer. In support of his

arguments he claimed that the lawyer S.S. had said that the questioning

lasted about an hour, but in the applicant‟s view this could not have

been sufficient for him to consult with a lawyer and give his defence

orally in respect of twenty-five counts of theft and for the police officer

to dictate and the typist to type the written record of his questioning.

620. However, the applicant never explained what, according to him,

was the exact duration and manner of his questioning.

621. Furthermore, the lawyer S.S. expressly said that he had been

present during the entire questioning on 20 June 2007, which had lasted

for about an hour.

622. In these circumstances the Court finds that the applicant‟s

complaint that on 20 June 2007 he had been questioned by the police

without the presence of defence counsel is insufficiently substantiated.

623. Thus, in the light of all the material in its possession the Court

finds that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance

of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its

Protocols.

624. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must

be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the

Convention.

2. As regards the applicant’s questioning by the police on 9

November 2005

(a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies

(i) The parties’ arguments

625. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to

exhaust domestic remedies because he had not lodged a complaint

against the police officers in question, including a criminal complaint, or

a complaint to the Croatian Bar Association in respect of the lawyers

concerned.

626. The applicant maintained that he had exhausted all domestic

remedies available in the context of the criminal proceedings against

him.

170

(ii) The Court’s assessment

627. The Court points to the general principles as stated in

paragraphs 173 and 174 above.

628. The Court further notes that in respect of all issues pertaining

to the fairness of criminal proceedings the defendants may lodge an

appeal with an appeal court and a request for extraordinary review of a

final judgment. In its judgment in Maresti v. Croatia (no. 55759/07, §§

23-28, 25 June 2009) the Court accepted that such a request was a

remedy to be exhausted, where it was allowed under the relevant

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the same grounds as

those that an applicant is presenting before the Court. The relevant part

of that judgment reads:

“23. The Court firstly observes that the actual name given to the

proceedings in the domestic legal system or the fact that the

national jurisdictions have considered them as an extraordinary

remedy cannot be considered determinant: what is decisive is the

nature and the scope of the proceedings at issue (see San Leonard

Band Club v. Malta, no. 77562/01, § 41, ECHR 2004-IX).

Furthermore, it is the Court‟s well-established practice that the

proceedings following an appeal on points of law or an appeal for

cassation fall within the scope of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

(see, for example, H.E. v. Austria, no. 33505/96, §§ 14 and 18, 11

July 2002, and Cobianchi v. Italy (no. 1), no. 43434/98, §§ 8 and

11, 9 November 2000).

...

25. ... As to the nature of the proceedings following a request for

extraordinary review of a final judgment in a criminal case, the

Court observes that the Croatian Supreme Court may, if it finds the

request well-founded, quash the lower courts‟ judgments and remit

the case, or in certain cases even decide the case itself. The reasons

justifying extraordinary review of a final judgment are expressly

enumerated in Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are

not subject to any discretionary decision of the court. The remedy is

available only to the defendant (not to the prosecution) for strictly

limited errors of law that operate to the defendant‟s detriment and

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is subject to a strict one-month time limit following the service of

the judgment on the defendant.

26. The request for extraordinary review has its equivalent in civil

proceedings in the form of an appeal on points of law to the

Supreme Court (revizija), which is also lodged against a final

judgment. In this connection, the Court notes that it has already

found that Article 6 is applicable to proceedings concerning such an

appeal (see Debelić v. Croatia, no. 2448/03, §§ 21 and 22, 26 May

2005). As to the criminal-law remedy at issue, the Court has in a

previous case (Kovač v. Croatia (no. 503/05, 12 July 2007)) taken

into consideration proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning

a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment by a

defendant in a criminal case.

27. ... The Court notes that the applicant‟s request was made on

one of the prescribed grounds for finding an infringement of the

Criminal Code ...”

629. As regards the present case, the Court notes that the applicant

lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment of the Zagreb

Municipal Court. After his appeal had been dismissed by the Zagreb

County Court, the applicant lodged a request for an extraordinary

review of a final judgment with the Supreme Court.

630. In his request for an extraordinary review, the applicant

complained that his statements given to the police on two occasions

constituted unlawful evidence because he had been questioned without

the presence of a lawyer and that, as such, those statements should not

have been used by the trial court. In this connection the Court notes

that one of the grounds under Article 427 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, together with Article 367(2) and Article 9 of the same Code,

for lodging such a request exists when a conviction has been based on

unlawfully obtained evidence, and that this was exactly the applicant‟s

claim.

631. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the

proceedings following the request for extraordinary review of the final

judgment were decisive for the determination of a criminal charge

against the applicant and so fall within the scope of Article 6 § 1 and

that the applicant has properly exhausted regular domestic remedies

that were available in the context of the criminal proceedings against

him. He, therefore, did not need to exhaust any further remedies.

Accordingly, the Government‟s objection must be dismissed.

632. The Court notes that this part of the application is not

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the

Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other

grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

172

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

633. The applicant argued that he had been questioned by the police

without the assistance of a lawyer and that his confession thus obtained

had been fabricated by the police. Despite the fact that he had

repeatedly complained about that situation before the national courts,

showing that the lawyer E.ĥ. had not been present at his questioning by

the police, as was apparent from the discrepancy between the time

when the police record had been drawn up and the time when he, the

applicant, had been taken from Zagreb Prison to the police interview,

the national courts had nevertheless based his conviction on his alleged

confession.

634. The Government argued that the applicant had had a fair trial

and that the applicant‟s confession before the police had not been the

only evidence proving his guilt, since the trial court had heard evidence

from a number of injured parties and their statements had been

consistent with the applicant‟s confession.

635. The trial court had also heard evidence from the police officers

and the lawyer implicated and had established that the applicant had

been questioned by the police on 2 November 2005 in the presence of

lawyer E.ĥ.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Questioning of the applicant by the police

(i) General principles

636. The relevant principles have been set forth in the Grand

Chamber judgment in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36391/02, 27

November 2008), as follows:

“50. The Court reiterates that, even if the primary purpose of

Article 6, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, is to ensure

a fair trial by a „tribunal‟ competent to determine „any criminal

charge‟, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-

trial proceedings. Thus, Article 6 - especially paragraph 3 – may be

relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of

173

the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to

comply with its provisions (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 36). As the

Court has already held in its previous judgments, the right set out in

paragraph 3 (c) of Article 6 of the Convention is one element,

amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings

contained in paragraph 1 (Imbrioscia, cited above, § 37, and

Brennan, cited above, § 45).

51. The Court further reiterates that although not absolute, the

right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively

defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the

fundamental features of fair trial (Poitrimol v. France, 23 November

1993, § 34, Series A no. 277-A, and Demebukov v. Bulgaria, no.

68020/01, § 50, 28 February 2008). Nevertheless, Article 6 § 3 (c)

does not specify the manner of exercising this right. It thus leaves

to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it

is secured in their judicial systems, the Court‟s task being only to

ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with

the requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be

remembered that the Convention is designed to „guarantee not

rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and

effective‟ and that assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the

effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused

(Imbrioscia, cited above, § 38).

52. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an

accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are

decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal

proceedings. In such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require

that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a

lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However,

this right has so far been considered capable of being subject to

restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, has

therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so,

whether, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not

deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction

is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (see John Murray,

cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above, § 45, and Magee, cited

above, § 44).

53. These principles, outlined in paragraph 52 above, are also in

line with the generally recognised international human rights

standards (see paragraphs 37-42 above) which are at the core of

the concept of a fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to

the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of

the authorities. They also contribute to the prevention of

miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6,

notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting

authorities and the accused.

54. In this respect, the Court underlines the importance of the

investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings,

174

as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the

framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the

trial (Can v. Austria, no. 9300/81, Commission‟s report of 12 July

1984, § 50, Series A no. 96). At the same time, an accused often

finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the

proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that

legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly

complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering

and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can

only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer

whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of

the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed

presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove

their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained

through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of

the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, § 100,

ECHR 2006-..., and Kolu v. Turkey, no. 35811/97, § 51, 2 August

2005). Early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards

to which the Court will have particular regard when examining

whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the

privilege against self-incrimination (see, mutatis mutandis, Jalloh,

cited above, § 101). In this connection, the Court also notes the

recommendations of the CPT (paragraphs 39-40 above), in which

the committee repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to have

access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against

ill-treatment. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be

clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time.

These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious

charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for

the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible

degree by democratic societies.

55. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the

right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently „practical and effective‟ (see

paragraph 51 above) Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to

a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a

suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the

particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling

reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may

175

exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction -

whatever its justification - must not unduly prejudice the rights of

the accused under Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis, Magee, cited

above, § 44). The rights of the defence will in principle be

irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during

police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a

conviction.”

(ii) Application of the above principles in the present case

637. The Court notes that the record of the applicant‟s questioning

bears the date 2 November 2005. However, according to the findings of

the national courts the questioning took place on 9 November 2005 and

the date 2 November 2005 was a clerical error (see above, paragraph

138).

638. The Court further notes that in the written record of the

applicant‟s questioning it is recorded that lawyer E.ĥ. was called by the

police at 12.30 p.m. and that the interview ended on 1.30 p.m. on 2

November 2005, which should presumably read 9 November 2005.

639. However, whichever was the case, whether the lawyer E.ĥ. was

allegedly present between 12.30 p.m. and 1.30 p.m. either on 2 or

9 November 2005, the Court finds that he could not have attended the

applicant‟s questioning by the police for the following reasons.

640. According to the letter of 16 February 2009 from the Zagreb

Prison Governor, the applicant, who was in Zagreb Prison at the time,

was taken out of that prison for questioning in the Fifth Police Station on

9 November 2005 between 9.25 a.m. and 11.25 a.m. (see above,

paragraph 134). This was also accepted by the national courts. Thus it

follows that lawyer E.ĥ. was not present during the applicant‟s

questioning, since he was called by the police at 12.30 p.m., and even

assuming that he arrived immediately at the Fifth Police Station, at that

time the applicant had already been returned to Zagreb Prison.

641. The question now remains whether the applicant waived his

right to legal counsel. In this connection the Court reiterates that

neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a

person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the

entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial (see Kwiatkowska v. Italy

(dec.), no. 52868/99, 30 November 2000). However, if it is to be

effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in

the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended

by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance (see Sejdovic

v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-...; Kolu, cited above, §

53; and Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, § 28, Series A no. 89).

642. In this connection the Court first observes that the applicant in

the present case complained from the initial stages of the proceedings

about the lack of legal assistance during his initial police questioning.

Furthermore, the Government have not claimed that the applicant

waived his right to be legally represented during the police questioning.

The Court therefore concludes that the applicant did not waive his right

to legal assistance during the police interview.

176

643. Against this background the Court finds that there has been a

violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention on account of the

applicant‟s questioning by the police on 9 November 2005 without the

presence of a defence lawyer.

(b) Use of the applicant’s alleged confession to the police

in his criminal trial

644. The applicant further complained that the fact that his

conviction was based on his alleged confession given to the police

without the presence of defence counsel ran counter to the guarantees

of a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

645. The Court reiterates that its duty, according to Article 19 of the

Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements

undertaken by the Contracting States to the Convention. In particular, it

is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed

by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed

rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6

guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on

the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for

regulation under national law (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988,

§§ 45-46, Series A no. 140).

646. It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a

matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example,

evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law - may be

admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The

question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a

whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair.

This involves an examination of the “unlawfulness” in question ... (see

Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-V, and

Lisica v. Croatia, no. 20100/06, § 48, 25 February 2010).

647. In the light of the above principles, the Court must determine

whether the domestic courts‟ admission of statements obtained in the

absence of a lawyer during the applicant‟s questioning by the police

impaired his right to a fair hearing.

648. The Court notes that during the entire criminal proceedings in

question the applicant was unequivocal in his defence submissions that

the content of his alleged confession to the police had been fabricated

by the police. The Government denied these allegations and invoked the

177

national courts‟ findings. The national courts based their conclusion that

the applicant was questioned in a lawyer‟s presence on the fact that a

statement to this effect had been given by State officials who had a duty

to act in accordance with the laws well known to them. However, the

Court cannot endorse such a conclusion in the light of the fact that the

national courts failed to examine the obvious discrepancy between the

alleged time of the presence of lawyer E.ĥ. and the time of the

applicant‟s actual questioning (see above, paragraphs 255 and 256).

649. The applicant had access to a lawyer after being remanded in

custody and during the ensuing criminal proceedings; he thus had the

opportunity to challenge the prosecution‟s arguments. Nevertheless, as

noted above, in convicting the applicant the domestic courts admitted in

evidence statements which the applicant had subsequently retracted

and which had been obtained during police custody in the absence of a

lawyer. They based the applicant‟s conviction to a significant degree on

this evidence. Thus, in the present case, the applicant was undoubtedly

affected by the restrictions on his access to a lawyer. Neither the

assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer, nor the adversarial

nature of the ensuing proceedings, could remedy the defects which had

occurred during the applicant‟s custody (see Salduz, cited above, § 58;

Amutgan v. Turkey, no. 5138/04, § 18, 3 February 2009; and Dayanan

v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, § 33, ECHR 2009-...).

650. In view of the foregoing, even though the applicant had the

opportunity to challenge the evidence against him at the trial and

subsequently on appeal, the admission of dubious evidence into the

case file affected the applicant‟s right to a fair trial to a degree

incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.

651. There has accordingly also been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of

the Convention on account of the admission of evidence given by the

applicant to the police without the presence of defence counsel and the

reliance on that evidence for the applicant‟s conviction.

V. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

652. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 6 § 2 of the

Convention that, by ordering his detention, the national courts had

shown that they had actually considered him guilty of the offences he

had been charged with, and under Article 14 of the Convention that he

was discriminated against on the basis of his social status, alleging that

the measure of detention had been ordered against him because he had

no property.

653. In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as

the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court

considers that this part of the application does not disclose any

appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is

inadmissible under Article 35 § 3(a) as manifestly ill-founded and must

be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

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VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

654. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the

Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the

High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to

be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the

injured party.”

A. Damage

655. The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-

pecuniary damage.

656. The Government considered that claim unfounded and in any

event excessive.

657. The Court considers that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary

damage as a result of the violations found. The damage cannot be

sufficiently compensated for by a finding of a violation. Making its

assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant

EUR 9,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may

be chargeable on this amount.

658. The Court also considers it necessary to point out that a

judgment in which it finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols

imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those

concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to

choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the

general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its

domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court

and make all feasible reparation for the consequences of its violation in

such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before

the breach. In the case of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention,

applicants should, to the fullest extent possible, be put in the position

they would have been in had the requirements of the Convention not

been disregarded (see Yanakiev v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, § 89, 10

August 2006, and Putter v. Bulgaria, no. 38780/02, § 61, 2 December

2010).

179

659. The Court notes that Article 430 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure provides for the possibility of reopening domestic proceedings

if the Court has found a violation of the Convention.

B. Costs and expenses

660. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and

expenses incurred before the Court.

661. The Government considered that claim excessive.

662. According to the Court‟s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the

reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been

shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are

reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the

documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers

it reasonable to award in full the sum claimed for the proceedings before

the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.

C. Default interest

663. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest

should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declares the complaint under Articles 5 §§ 1, 3, and 4, and the

complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention,

admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the

Convention;

3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the complaint under

Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;

4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the

Convention, both in respect of the Constitutional Court‟s decisions

declaring the applicant‟s constitutional complaints about his

detention inadmissible and in respect of the failure of the appeal

court and the Constitutional Court to address the applicant‟s

arguments that the statutory maximum period for his detention had

expired and that the conduct of the proceedings by the lower courts

was inefficient;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of

the Convention on account both of the applicant‟s questioning by the

police on 2 or 9 November 2005 without the presence of a defence

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lawyer and of the use of his confession thus obtained in his criminal

trial;

6. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from

the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with

Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be

converted into Croatian kunas at the rate applicable at the date of

settlement:

(i) EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros), plus any tax that may be

chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be

chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until

settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at

a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central

Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant‟s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 June 2011, pursuant to

Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Søren Nielsen Anatoly Kovler

Registrar President

181

CINQUIÈME SECTION

AFFAIRE BRUSCO c. FRANCE

(Requête no 1466/07)

ARRÊT

STRASBOURG

14 octobre 2010

DÉFINITIF

14/01/2011

Cet arrêt est devenu définitif en vertu de l'article 44 § 2 de la

Convention. Il peut subir des retouches de forme.

En l'affaire Brusco c. France,

La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (cinquième section),

siégeant en une chambre composée de :

Peer Lorenzen, président,

Jean-Paul Costa,

Karel Jungwiert,

Rait Maruste,

Mark Villiger,

Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,

Zdravka Kalaydjieva, juges,

et de Claudia Westerdiek, greffière de section,

Après en avoir délibéré en chambre du conseil le 21 septembre 2010,

Rend l'arrêt que voici, adopté à cette date :

182

PROCÉDURE

664. A l'origine de l'affaire se trouve une requête (no 1466/07)

dirigée contre la République française et dont un ressortissant de cet

Etat, M. Claude Brusco (« le requérant »), a saisi la Cour le 27

décembre 2006 en vertu de l'article 34 de la Convention de sauvegarde

des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (« la

Convention »).

665. Le requérant est représenté par Me P. Spinosi, avocat au

Conseil d'Etat et à la Cour de cassation. Le gouvernement français (« le

Gouvernement ») est représenté par son agent, Mme E. Belliard,

directrice des affaires juridiques au ministère des Affaires étrangères.

666. Invoquant l'article 6 §§ 1 et 3 de la Convention, le requérant

estimait que l'obligation de prêter serment pour une personne placée en

garde à vue portait nécessairement atteinte à son droit au silence et son

droit de ne pas participer à sa propre incrimination. Sous l'angle de

l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention, il soutenait que par sa décision du 27

juin 2006, la Cour de cassation ne pouvait, sans porter une atteinte

disproportionnée au droit d'accès à un juge, lui opposer le nouvel article

153 du code de procédure pénale résultant de la réforme du 9 mars

2004, pour le priver du droit de faire juger de la nullité de sa garde à

vue. Le requérant dénonçait également l'insuffisance de motivation de la

décision de la cour d'appel qui, selon lui, s'est contentée d'adopter les

motifs des premiers juges. Enfin, invoquant l'article 5 § 3 de la

Convention, le requérant dénonçait le caractère excessif de la durée de

la détention provisoire.

667. Le 24 mars 2009, le président de la cinquième section a décidé

de communiquer le grief tiré du non-respect du droit de ne pas

participer à sa propre incrimination et de garder le silence au

Gouvernement. Comme le permet l'article 29 § 1 de la Convention, il a

en outre été décidé que la chambre se prononcerait en même temps sur

la recevabilité et le fond.

668. Le 29 septembre 2009, le requérant a demandé à la Cour de

tenir une audience pour que les parties soient entendues sur

déroulement de la garde à vue en France. La Cour a décidé de ne pas

faire droit à cette demande.

EN FAIT

I. LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE

669. Le requérant est né en 1952 et réside à Hyères.

670. Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont été exposés par les parties,

peuvent se résumer comme suit.

671. Le 17 décembre 1998, B.M. fut agressé par deux individus

cagoulés dans le garage souterrain de son immeuble à Paris. Il déposa

plainte contre son épouse et le requérant qui auraient entretenu, selon

lui, une relation intime.

183

672. Le 28 décembre 1998, le requérant fut convoqué par les

services de police pour une audition au sujet de cette plainte.

673. Le 19 avril 1999, un juge d'instruction près le tribunal de

grande instance de Paris délivra une commission rogatoire aux services

de police afin de procéder, notamment, à toutes auditions de nature à

permettre d'identifier les auteurs ou complices de faits de tentative

d'assassinat qui auraient été commis sur la personne de B.M. le 17

décembre 1998.

674. J.P.G., soupçonné d'avoir été impliqué dans l'agression de B.M.,

fut placé en garde à vue le 2 juin 1999 dans le cadre de cette

commission rogatoire. Lors de son interrogatoire, il mit le requérant en

cause.

675. Le 3 juin 1999, le juge d'instruction mit en examen J.P.G. et

E.L., également soupçonné d'avoir participé à l'agression de B.M., du

chef de tentative d'assassinat et délivra, dans le cadre de cette

information judiciaire, une commission rogatoire aux services de police

afin de procéder à toutes les auditions, perquisitions, saisies,

réquisitions et investigations utiles à la manifestation de la vérité.

676. Le 7 juin 1999, les policiers interpellèrent le requérant et le

placèrent en garde à vue à 17 h 50, en exécution de la commission

rogatoire du juge d'instruction.

677. Le 8 juin 1999, à 10 h 30, les officiers de police judiciaire

interrogèrent le requérant, après qu'il eut prêté le serment prévu par

l'article 153 du code de procédure pénale. Lors de sa première

déposition qui se déroula de 10 h 30 à 10 h 50, puis de 11 h 10 à 13 h

50, il déclara notamment ce qui suit :

« (...) 'Je prête serment de dire toute la vérité, rien que la vérité.'

(...)

SUR LES FAITS

'Je suis prêt à vous expliquer ma participation dans cette

malheureuse affaire.' (...)

'Pour moi c'est à notre second entretien qu'il m'a dit qu'il pouvait

faire quelque chose afin d'arranger les affaires qui me tenaient à

cœur. C'est au cours de cette conversation qu'il m'a dit qu'il

connaissait du monde capable de lui faire peur, pour moi cela voulait

dire que les gens allaient lui dire d'arrêter de toucher à la petite et

de laisser tranquille S. (...) J'étais d'accord avec l'idée de lui faire

peur mais aucun moment je n'ai donné l'ordre de corriger [B.M] et

encore moins d'attenter à ses jours. '

QUESTION :

'Concernant les renseignements sur [B.M.] comment les avez-vous

confié et à qui ?'

REPONSE :

'J'ai donné à J.P. le numéro de téléphone de domicile à [B.M.], son

adresse et une photographie (...) J'ai dû lui dire aussi qu'il avait une

RENAULT 11 grise c'est tout. (...) Après lui avoir confié l'argent j'ai

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dû l'appeler une fois ou deux pour savoir où ça en était. (...) Il m'a

contacté le jour des faits pour me dire que tout était 'OK' et qu'il lui

fallait le solde de l'argent. On s'est vu 48 heures après (...) et après

lui avoir remis l'argent (...) je lui ai demandé des détails pour savoir

comment cela s'était passé (...) Il a dit qu'il avait reçu des coups sur

la tête, je lui ai dit qu'il n'avait jamais été question de cela. J'étais

atterré.'

QUESTION :

'Pourquoi avoir payé 100.000 francs s'il s'agissait juste de lui faire

peur sans attenter à son intégrité physique ?'

REPONSE :

'J'ai payé cette somme importante car pour moi il fallait payer des

gens qui allaient lui faire peur (...), et il fallait qu'il fasse attention et

qu'il ait peur. Qu'il nous foute la paix à S. et à sa fille. La dernière

fois que j'ai vu J.P. c'était (...) peut-être deux mois après et je lui ai

dit que je n'étais pas content du tout que tout cela n'était pas prévu.

Car entre temps j'avais appris les conséquences de l'agression. Je

n'ai jamais demandé à J.P. de faire frapper [B.M] de la sorte.' »

678. Le même jour, de 14 h 10 à 14 h 40, le requérant rencontra

son conseil.

679. Sa garde à vue fut ensuite prolongée par le juge d'instruction.

680. A la suite de sa garde à vue, le requérant fut mis en examen du

chef de complicité de tentative d'assassinat, et placé en détention

provisoire le 9 juin 1999.

681. Le requérant saisit la chambre de l'instruction de la cour d'appel

de Paris d'une requête en annulation des procès-verbaux des auditions

de la garde à vue, ainsi que de l'ensemble des actes subséquents.

682. Par un arrêt du 28 juin 2001, la chambre de l'instruction rejeta

sa requête. Elle considéra notamment que les services de police ne

disposaient, le 9 juin 1999, d'aucun élément permettant d'affirmer que

le requérant, mis en cause par la victime comme commanditaire de son

agression, avait réellement voulu les violences finalement exercées. Elle

ajouta également qu'en l'absence d'indices graves et concordants

impliquant sa mise en examen, le requérant, que seules les nécessités

de l'enquête autorisaient à placer en garde à vue et à entendre en

qualité de témoin, était tenu à ce titre de prêter le serment prévu par

l'article 153 du code de procédure pénale. Le requérant se pourvut en

cassation.

683. Par une ordonnance du 8 août 2001, le président de la chambre

criminelle de la Cour de cassation dit n'y avoir lieu à déclarer ce pourvoi

immédiatement recevable.

684. Le 8 décembre 2001, le requérant bénéficia d'une remise en

liberté assortie d'un contrôle judiciaire.

685. Par une ordonnance du juge d'instruction du 1er mars 2002, le

requérant fut renvoyé devant le tribunal correctionnel de Paris pour

avoir, le 17 décembre 1998, au préjudice de B.M., « été complice du

délit de violences volontaires ayant entraîné une incapacité totale de

travail supérieure à huit jours, commises en réunion, avec préméditation

185

et avec usage d'une arme par L.E. et F.G., en donnant des instructions

pour commettre l'infraction, en l'espèce en leur demandant de donner

une correction et de mettre la pression sur un homme dont il fournissait

les éléments d'identification ».

686. Par un jugement du 31 octobre 2002, le tribunal correctionnel

de Paris déclara irrecevables les exceptions de nullité de procédure

soulevées par le requérant, dont celle qui concernait son audition faite

sous serment. Après avoir notamment relevé les aveux partiels du

requérant au cours de l'instruction, le tribunal le déclara coupable des

faits reprochés et le condamna notamment à la peine de cinq ans

d'emprisonnement, dont un an avec sursis. Le requérant interjeta appel

du jugement.

687. A l'audience devant la cour d'appel, le requérant souleva

notamment, par voie de conclusions déposées in limine litis, la nullité de

la procédure en raison de l'illégalité de la prestation de serment ayant

précédé ses déclarations.

688. Par un arrêt du 26 octobre 2004, la cour d'appel de Paris

confirma le jugement en toutes ses dispositions en faisant sienne la

motivation du juge de première instance.

689. Le requérant se pourvut en cassation contre les arrêts des 28

juin 2001 et 26 octobre 2004.

690. Par un arrêt du 27 juin 2006, la Cour de cassation rejeta ses

pourvois. Concernant le pourvoi formé contre le premier arrêt, elle

considéra notamment qu'il résultait des dispositions combinées des

articles 105, 153 et 154 du code de procédure pénale qu'une personne

placée en garde à vue sur commission rogatoire pouvait être entendue

par l'officier de police judiciaire après avoir prêté le serment prévu par

la loi, dès lors qu'il n'existait pas à son encontre des indices graves et

concordants d'avoir participé aux faits dont le juge d'instruction était

saisi. Tout en remarquant que l'article 104 de la loi du 9 mars 2004,

modifiant l'article 153 du code de procédure pénale, avait supprimé

l'obligation pour la personne gardée à vue dans le cadre d'une

commission rogatoire de prêter serment et de déposer, elle releva que

cette disposition n'était pas applicable aux actes régulièrement

accomplis antérieurement à son entrée en vigueur et qu'elle prévoyait

également que le fait d'avoir été entendu sous serment ne constituait

pas une cause de nullité de la procédure. Quant au pourvoi formé contre

le second arrêt et mettant en cause sa motivation, la Cour de cassation

le rejeta.

II. LE DROIT INTERNE PERTINENT

691. Les articles du code de procédure pénale applicables au

moment des faits sont les suivants :

Article 63-1

« Toute personne placée en garde à vue est immédiatement

informée par un officier de police judiciaire, ou, sous le contrôle de

celui-ci, par un agent de police judiciaire, des droits mentionnés aux

186

articles 63-2, 63-3 et 63-4 ainsi que des dispositions relatives à la

durée de la garde à vue prévues par l'article 63.

Mention de cet avis est portée au procès-verbal et émargée par la

personne gardée à vue ; en cas de refus d'émargement, il en est fait

mention.

Les informations mentionnées au premier alinéa doivent être

communiquées à la personne gardée à vue dans une langue qu'elle

comprend. »

Article 63-2

« Toute personne placée en garde à vue peut, à sa demande, faire

prévenir, par téléphone, une personne avec laquelle elle vit

habituellement ou l'un de ses parents en ligne directe, l'un de ses

frères et sœurs ou son employeur de la mesure dont elle est l'objet.

Si l'officier de police judiciaire estime, en raison des nécessités de

l'enquête, ne pas devoir faire droit à cette demande, il en réfère

sans délai au procureur de la République qui décide, s'il y a lieu, d'y

faire droit. »

Article 63-3

« Toute personne placée en garde à vue peut, à sa demande, être

examinée par un médecin désigné par le procureur de la République

ou l'officier de police judiciaire. En cas de prolongation, elle peut

demander à être examinée une seconde fois. (...) »

Article 63-4

« Lorsque vingt heures se sont écoulées depuis le début de la

garde à vue, la personne peut demander à s'entretenir avec un

avocat. Si elle n'est pas en mesure d'en désigner un ou si l'avocat

choisi ne peut être contacté, elle peut demander qu'il lui en soit

commis un d'office par le bâtonnier. (...)

L'avocat désigné peut communiquer avec la personne gardée à

vue dans des conditions qui garantissent la confidentialité de

l'entretien. Il est informé par l'officier de police judiciaire ou, sous le

contrôle de celui-ci, par un agent de police judiciaire de la nature de

l'infraction recherchée.

A l'issue de l'entretien dont la durée ne peut excéder trente

minutes, l'avocat présente, le cas échéant, des observations écrites

qui sont jointes à la procédure. (...) »

Article 103

« Les témoins prêtent serment de dire toute la vérité, rien que la

vérité. Le juge leur demande leurs nom, prénoms, âge, état,

profession, demeure, s'ils sont parents ou alliés des parties et à quel

degré ou s'ils sont à leur service. Il est fait mention de la demande

et de la réponse. »

Article 105

187

« Les personnes à l'encontre desquelles il existe des indices graves

et concordants d'avoir participé aux faits dont le juge d'instruction

est saisi ne peuvent être entendues comme témoins.

Il en est de même des personnes nommément visées par le

réquisitoire du procureur de la République.

Toutefois, lorsque le juge d'instruction estime ne pas devoir

mettre en examen une personne nommément visée par le

réquisitoire du procureur de la République, il peut l'entendre comme

témoin après lui avoir donné connaissance de ce réquisitoire. Cette

personne bénéficie des droits reconnus aux personnes mises en

examen. Avis lui en est donné lors de sa première audition, au cours

de laquelle il est fait application des deuxième à quatrième alinéas

de l'article 116. »

Article 153

« Tout témoin cité pour être entendu au cours de l'exécution d'une

commission rogatoire est tenu de comparaître, de prêter serment et

de déposer.

S'il ne satisfait pas à cette obligation, avis en est donné au

magistrat mandant qui peut le contraindre à comparaître par la

force publique et prendre contre lui les sanctions prévues à l'article

109, alinéas 2 et 3.

Lorsqu'il est fait application des dispositions de l'article 62-1,

l'autorisation est donnée par le juge d'instruction. »

Article 154

« Lorsque l'officier de police judiciaire est amené, pour les

nécessités de l'exécution de la commission rogatoire, à garder une

personne à sa disposition, il en informe dans les meilleurs délais le

juge d'instruction saisi des faits, qui contrôle la mesure de garde à

vue. Il ne peut retenir cette personne plus de vingt-quatre heures.

La personne doit être présentée avant l'expiration du délai de

vingt-quatre heures à ce magistrat ou, si la commission rogatoire

est exécutée dans un autre ressort que celui de son siège, au juge

d'instruction du lieu d'exécution de la mesure. A l'issue de cette

présentation, le juge d'instruction peut accorder l'autorisation écrite

de prolonger la mesure d'un nouveau délai, sans que celui-ci puisse

excéder vingt-quatre heures. Il peut, à titre exceptionnel, accorder

cette autorisation par décision écrite et motivée sans présentation

préalable de la personne. (...)

Les dispositions des articles 63-1, 63-2, 63-3, 63-4, 64 et 65 sont

applicables aux gardes à vue exécutées dans le cadre de la présente

section. Les pouvoirs conférés au procureur de la République par les

articles 63-2 et 63-3 sont alors exercés par le juge d'instruction. Le

deuxième alinéa de l'article 63 est également applicable en matière

de commission rogatoire. »

188

692. La loi du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux

évolutions de la criminalité a modifié l'article 153 du code de procédure

pénale pour y préciser que l'obligation de prêter serment et de déposer

n'est pas applicable aux personnes gardées à vue en application des

dispositions de l'article 154 du même code. Le rapport du Sénat sur le

projet de loi (no 441) indiquait que cette modification tendait à clarifier

l'interprétation qui avait été faite de la Cour de cassation de la

combinaison des articles 105, 153 et 154 du code de procédure pénale

(voir, par exemple, Cass. Crim., 14 mai 2002). Ce dernier article a

également été modifié par la loi du 4 mars 2002 complétant la loi du 15

juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d'innocence

et les droits des victimes. Les articles précités se lisent comme suit :

Article 153 (modifié par les lois des 15 juin 2000 et 9 mars

2004)

« Tout témoin cité pour être entendu au cours de l'exécution d'une

commission rogatoire est tenu de comparaître, de prêter serment et

de déposer. Lorsqu'il n'existe aucune raison plausible de soupçonner

qu'il a commis ou tenté de commettre une infraction, il ne peut être

retenu que le temps strictement nécessaire à son audition.

S'il ne satisfait pas à cette obligation, avis en est donné au

magistrat mandant qui peut le contraindre à comparaître par la

force publique. Le témoin qui ne comparaît pas encourt l'amende

prévue par l'article 434-15-1 du code pénal.

L'obligation de prêter serment et de déposer n'est pas applicable

aux personnes gardées à vue en application des dispositions de

l'article 154. Le fait que les personnes gardées à vue aient été

entendues après avoir prêté serment ne constitue toutefois pas une

cause de nullité de la procédure. »

Article 154 (modifié par la loi du 4 mars 2002)

« Lorsque l'officier de police judiciaire est amené, pour les

nécessités de l'exécution de la commission rogatoire, à garder à sa

disposition une personne à l'encontre de laquelle il existe une ou

plusieurs raisons plausibles de soupçonner qu'elle a commis ou

tenté de commettre une infraction, il en informe dès le début de

cette mesure le juge d'instruction saisi des faits. Ce dernier contrôle

la mesure de garde à vue. L'officier de police judiciaire ne peut

retenir la personne plus de vingt-quatre heures.

La personne doit être présentée avant l'expiration du délai de

vingt-quatre heures à ce magistrat ou, si la commission rogatoire

est exécutée dans un autre ressort que celui de son siège, au juge

d'instruction du lieu d'exécution de la mesure. A l'issue de cette

présentation, le juge d'instruction peut accorder l'autorisation écrite

de prolonger la mesure d'un nouveau délai, sans que celui-ci puisse

excéder vingt-quatre heures. Il peut, à titre exceptionnel, accorder

cette autorisation par décision écrite et motivée sans présentation

préalable de la personne.

189

Pour l'application du présent article, les ressorts des tribunaux de

grande instance de Paris, Nanterre, Bobigny et Créteil constituent

un seul et même ressort.

Les dispositions des articles 63-1, 63-2, 63-3, 63-4, 64 et 65 sont

applicables aux gardes à vue exécutées dans le cadre de la présente

section. Les pouvoirs conférés au procureur de la République par les

articles 63-2 et 63-3 sont alors exercés par le juge d'instruction.

L'information prévue au troisième alinéa de l'article 63-4 précise que

la garde à vue intervient dans le cadre d'une commission

rogatoire. »

693. L'article 434-13 du code pénal réprime le témoignage

mensonger fait sous serment devant un officier de police judiciaire

agissant en exécution d'une commission rogatoire. Cette disposition se

lit comme suit :

Article 434-13

« Le témoignage mensonger fait sous serment devant toute

juridiction ou devant un officier de police judiciaire agissant en

exécution d'une commission rogatoire est puni de cinq ans

d'emprisonnement et de 500 000 F d'amende.

Toutefois, le faux témoin est exempt de peine s'il a rétracté

spontanément son témoignage avant la décision mettant fin à la

procédure rendue par la juridiction d'instruction ou par la juridiction

de jugement. »

EN DROIT

I. SUR LES VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES DE L'ARTICLE 6 DE LA

CONVENTION

694. Le requérant allègue plusieurs violations de l'article 6 de la

Convention, dont les dispositions pertinentes se lisent comme suit :

« Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue

équitablement (...) par un tribunal (...) qui décidera (...) du bien-

fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée contre elle. (...)

2. Toute personne accusée d'une infraction est présumée

innocente jusqu'à ce que sa culpabilité ait été légalement établie.

3. Tout accusé a droit notamment à : (...)

b) disposer du temps et des facilités nécessaires à la préparation

de sa défense ;

c) se défendre lui-même ou avoir l'assistance d'un défenseur de

son choix et, s'il n'a pas les moyens de rémunérer un défenseur,

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pouvoir être assisté gratuitement par un avocat d'office, lorsque les

intérêts de la justice l'exigent ;

d) interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et obtenir la

convocation et l'interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les

mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge ;

e) se faire assister gratuitement d'un interprète, s'il ne comprend

pas ou ne parle pas la langue employée à l'audience. »

A. Le droit de garder le silence et de ne pas contribuer à sa

propre incrimination du requérant

695. Le requérant soutient que l'obligation de prêter serment pour

une personne placée en garde à vue porte nécessairement atteinte à

son droit au silence et son droit de ne pas participer à sa propre

incrimination.

696. Le Gouvernement s'oppose à cette thèse. Il fait valoir, à titre

principal, que l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention n'est pas applicable en

l'espèce et, à titre subsidiaire, qu'il est manifestement mal fondé.

1. Sur la recevabilité

a) Thèse des parties

i) Le Gouvernement

697. Selon le Gouvernement, l'applicabilité de l'article 6 en matière

pénale suppose l'existence d'une « accusation ». Il fait valoir que cette

notion a un caractère « autonome » et que l'accusation se définit

comme la « notification officielle, émanant de l'autorité compétente, du

reproche d'avoir accompli une infraction pénale » et renvoie à l'idée de

« répercussions importantes sur la situation de l'intéressé » (Deweer

c. Belgique, 27 février 1980, § 42, série A no 35, et Serves c. France,

20 octobre 1997, § 42, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1997-VI). Il s'agit

donc soit de l'inculpation, soit d'un réquisitoire nominatif (Bertin-Mourot

c. France, no 36343/97, 2 août 2000). Or, selon le Gouvernement, ce

n'est pas le cas en l'espèce : lors de son interpellation par la police, le

requérant ne s'est vu signifier aucun grief ; il n'était pas nommément

visé par la commission rogatoire du 3 juin 1999 ordonnant aux autorités

de police de prendre toutes les dispositions pour le recueil

d'informations dans cette affaire ; il n'était pas non plus visé dans le

réquisitoire introductif de 1998. A cet égard, le Gouvernement rappelle

que le requérant n'a été placé en garde à vue que pour être entendu

comme témoin et pour les nécessités de l'exécution de la commission

rogatoire. Par conséquent et contrairement aux affirmations du

requérant, il n'existait, au moment de l'audition du 8 juin, aucun indice

grave et concordant. Les seules raisons pour lesquelles le requérant a

été auditionné à cette date étaient qu'il avait été cité par d'autres

témoins au cours de leur déposition conformément à l'article 105 du

code de procédure pénale. En tout état de cause, il est impossible, selon

191

le Gouvernement, de démonter qu'existaient alors des indices graves et

concordants permettant de le mettre en examen.

698. Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement rappelle que si, en vertu de

l'actuel article 154 de ce même code, un individu ne peut être mis en

garde à vue que s'il « existe une ou plusieurs raisons plausibles de

soupçonner qu'elle a commis ou tenté de commettre une infraction », il

n'en était pas de même à l'époque des faits. Selon l'ancienne version de

l'article 154, une personne pouvait être gardée à vue pour les nécessités

de l'exécution de la commission rogatoire, sans que pèse

nécessairement contre elle des indices graves et concordants. Ce qui

était le cas en l'espèce. Dans ces conditions, le requérant ne pouvait

être regardé comme un « accusé » au sens de la jurisprudence de la

Cour. S'il devait en être autrement, cela signifierait que toutes les

personnes, témoins compris, entendues par les services de police

pourraient être considérées comme étant en accusation. Cela serait

disproportionné et rendrait impossible le bon fonctionnement des

services de police. Le Gouvernement ajoute que cette conclusion n'est

pas remise en cause par l'arrêt Serves c. France (précité, § 42) qui juge

qu'une assignation à comparaître comme témoin peut s'analyser en une

« accusation » au sens de l'article 6.

ii) Le requérant

699. Le requérant soutient que, dès la notification de la garde à vue

à son encontre, celui qui en est l'objet peut se prévaloir des garanties de

l'article 6 § 3 de la Convention. Il explique également que la notion de

« personne accusée » est autonome et indépendante des qualifications

du droit interne. En réplique aux observations du Gouvernement, le

requérant fait valoir que sa démonstration procède d'une confusion

entre le témoin, le gardé à vue et le mis en examen. Une telle solution

revient à nier l'existence même de toute mise en cause au cours de

l'enquête, ce qui est erroné : la mise en cause d'une personne et,

partant, la notification officielle d'un grief peut intervenir avant la mise

en examen, soit avant qu'il existe des « indices graves et concordants ».

Le requérant explique qu'à chacun des statuts correspond un degré

d'implication présumé et notifié par les autorités compétentes à

l'intéressé : – le témoin est celui sur lequel ne pèse aucun soupçon

d'avoir commis une infraction. S'il peut être entendu par les services de

police, il ne peut être gardé à vue. C'est d'ailleurs parce qu'aucun

soupçon ne pèse sur lui qu'il prête serment ; – le gardé à vue est celui

sur lequel pèse « une ou plusieurs raisons plausibles de soupçonner »

d'avoir commis une infraction ; – le mis en examen est celui sur lequel

pèse des « indices graves et concordants » d'avoir commis une

infraction. Le requérant ajoute que cette hiérarchie dans le soupçon de

la commission de l'infraction détermine le statut accordé à l'intéressé au

cours de l'enquête et de l'instruction et donc le degré de coercition et

d'atteinte à la liberté auquel il est susceptible d'être soumis. En

revanche, elle ne détermine pas le seuil en deçà duquel l'accusation en

matière pénale au sens de l'article 6 n'existe pas. Selon le requérant, la

notification d'un grief au sens des dispositions conventionnelles n'est

pas subordonnée à l'existence préalable d'« indices graves et

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concordants », thèse que soutient le Gouvernement. Aux termes de

l'article 154 du code de procédure pénale, relatif à l'exécution de la

garde à vue sur commission rogatoire, ne peut être gardé à vue qu'une

personne « à l'encontre de laquelle il existe une ou plusieurs raisons

plausibles de soupçonner qu'elle a commis ou tenté de commettre une

infraction ». Certes, il s'agit là de la nouvelle rédaction de ce texte.

Toutefois, le requérant précise qu'elle a été alignée sur l'article 63 du

même code, qui, à l'époque des faits, définissait déjà la garde à vue

dans les termes qui ont été repris par l'article 154, précisément pour

mettre le droit français en conformité avec le droit européen. Se

référant à l'article 63-1 du même code, le requérant explique que le

gardé à vue, personne à l'encontre de laquelle il existe des raisons

plausibles de soupçonner d'avoir commis une infraction, est ainsi

informé, lors de son placement en garde à vue, de l'infraction sur

laquelle porte l'enquête. Dans ces conditions, il est patent que dès la

notification de la mesure de garde à vue prise à son encontre, celui qui

en est l'objet est un « accusé » au sens de la Convention et peut ainsi

se prévaloir des garanties attachées à son article 6 § 3. La garde à vue

ne concerne en effet que les personnes à l'encontre desquelles il existe

des « raisons plausibles de soupçonner » qu'elles ont commis une

infraction, ce qui exclut que les témoins fassent l'objet d'une telle

mesure. Autrement dit, les personnes gardées à vue ne peuvent être

considérées comme des témoins. Le requérant se réfère à l'arrêt Funke

c. France (25 février 1993, §§ 39-40, série A no 256-A), dans lequel la

Cour a jugé que l'article 6 de la Convention peut s'appliquer lorsqu'une

contrainte a été exercée en vue d'obtenir des dépositions, ce qui est

évidemment le cas d'une mesure de garde à vue, au cours de laquelle

l'intéressé est maintenu dans les locaux de la police sous la contrainte et

n'est absolument pas libre de ses mouvements.

700. Le requérant en conclut que, dès lors qu'il a été placé en garde

à vue, il était un accusé au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention, et ce

d'autant plus que la Cour a jugé qu'une assignation à comparaître

comme témoin peut s'analyser en une accusation au sens de cette

disposition.

b) Appréciation de la Cour

701. La Cour relève que les arguments avancés par le

Gouvernement à l'appui de l'exception d'irrecevabilité sont étroitement

liés à la substance du grief tiré de l'article 6 de la Convention. Dès lors,

il y a lieu de joindre l'exception au fond. Par ailleurs, la Cour constate

que ce grief ne se heurte à aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilité. Il convient

donc de le déclarer recevable.

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2. Sur le fond

a) Thèse des parties

i) Le requérant

702. Le requérant fait valoir qu'aux termes d'une jurisprudence

constante de la Cour (Funke c. France, précité, § 44, John Murray c.

Royaume-Uni, 8 février 1996, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1996-I, §

45 et Serves, précité, § 46), le droit de garder silence et le droit de ne

pas contribuer à sa propre incrimination sont des normes internationales

qui sont au cœur de la notion de procès équitable. Précisément,

l'obligation de prêter serment est manifestement incompatible avec le

droit de ne pas participer à sa propre incrimination. Le requérant expose

que le droit reconnu au gardé à vue n'est pas seulement un droit de

refuser de répondre en bloc aux questions qui lui sont posées mais aussi

celui de mentir, ne serait-ce que par omission, aux services de police ;

le droit au silence est un droit à l'ellipse, à l'oubli volontaire et est

radicalement inconciliable avec l'exigence de ne dire que la vérité et

toute la vérité. Il ajoute que le Gouvernement serait d'autant plus mal

venu à prétendre le contraire qu'il a lui-même formellement reconnu

que la possibilité d'entendre des gardés à vue sous serment était

contraire aux dispositions conventionnelles, ce qui a conduit à la

modification, par une loi du 9 mars 2004, de l'article 153 du code de

procédure pénale qui dispose, désormais, dans son alinéa 3, que

« l'obligation de prêter serment et de déposer n'est pas applicable aux

personnes gardées à vue en application des dispositions de l'article

154 ». Le requérant ajoute qu'il a été entendu sous serment alors qu'il

était placé en garde à vue, c'est-à-dire alors même qu'il existait contre

lui des raisons plausibles de soupçonner qu'il ait commis l'infraction

poursuivie. Enfin, il souligne qu'à aucun stade de la procédure, les

juridictions internes n'ont entendu reconnaître que la garantie de ne pas

s'auto-incriminer avait été méconnue.

ii) Le Gouvernement

703. Le Gouvernement explique que prestation de serment et garde

à vue doivent être considérées comme deux éléments juridiquement

autonomes. Le fait qu'en l'espèce le requérant ait été placé en garde à

vue dans le cadre d'une commission rogatoire ne modifiait pas ses droits

et obligations en tant que témoin. Il convient donc d'examiner la

situation du requérant dans sa seule qualité de témoin. Se référant aux

affaires B.B.C. ((déc.), no 25798/94, 18 janvier 1996) et John Murray

(précité), le Gouvernement rappelle que toute personne peut être

appelée à déposer sur les faits dont elle a été témoin. Il ajoute que la

Cour a déjà eu l'occasion de se pencher sur le dispositif français

applicable aux témoins, notamment dans l'affaire Serves où elle a jugé

que l'obligation de prêter serment ainsi que les sanctions prononcées en

cas de non-respect sont certes considérées comme des « mesures de

coercition » mais elles visent surtout à « garantir la sincérité des

déclarations faites », dans la mesure où la personne répond. Toujours

194

dans cette affaire, la Cour a déjà souligné que même entendu sous

serment, le témoin a la possibilité, au nom de son droit à ne pas

« s'auto-incriminer », de refuser d'apporter une réponse aux questions

qui lui sont posées, c'est-à-dire, de se taire. Il ne s'agit pas « d'obliger

l'intéressé à déposer » (Serves, précité, § 47).

704. Le Gouvernement ajoute que le droit au silence, consacré

depuis longtemps en droit français, vise également à protéger la

personne interrogée contre une coercition abusive de la part des

autorités. En l'espèce, le requérant a été mis en garde à vue et cette

procédure lui a été expliquée au moment de son interpellation.

Conformément aux textes en vigueur à cette époque, il a prêté le

serment des témoins dont les conséquences lui ont également été

expliquées par l'officier de police judiciaire. Selon le Gouvernement, le

requérant a eu alors la possibilité de répondre ou de ne pas répondre

aux questions qui lui ont été posées lors de cette garde à vue. Le fait

qu'il ait choisi de donner aux enquêteurs des éléments quant à son

implication dans l'agression de B.M. ne saurait être regardé comme une

conséquence de cette prestation de serment et donc, attentatoire au

droit de ne pas déposer contre lui-même.

705. Si la Cour devait toutefois juger que la prestation de serment

mise à la charge du témoin était constitutive, en l'espèce, d'une certaine

coercition, le Gouvernement fait valoir, en se référant à la jurisprudence

de la Cour, que cette atteinte a été minime et qu'elle n'a pas touché la

substance même du droit garanti par la Convention. Il expose que la

contrainte dénoncée par le requérant était purement théorique et ne l'a,

en pratique, pas empêché de mentir puisque le requérant a été reconnu

coupable de complicité de violences volontaires qu'il a toujours nié. Le

Gouvernement ajoute que le requérant n'a fait l'objet d'aucune

poursuite du chef de faux témoignage.

706. Le Gouvernement estime qu'en toute hypothèse, le grief

invoqué par le requérant n'a eu aucune incidence sur l'ensemble de la

procédure suivie à son encontre à la lumière de jurisprudence de la

Cour. Il constate, en l'espèce, que les déclarations faites sous serment

n'ont, en aucune manière, porté atteinte au droit au procès équitable du

requérant pour deux raisons principales : d'une part, elles n'ont pas

constitué l'élément déterminant de la conviction des magistrats

correctionnels, d'autre part, elles ne sauraient être analysées comme

des aveux et elles étaient identiques à celles faites sans prestation de

serment.

b) Appréciation de la Cour

707. La Cour rappelle que le droit de ne pas contribuer à sa propre

incrimination et le droit de garder le silence sont des normes

internationales généralement reconnues qui sont au cœur de la notion

de procès équitable. Ils ont notamment pour finalité de protéger

l'accusé contre une coercition abusive de la part des autorités et, ainsi,

d'éviter les erreurs judiciaires et d'atteindre les buts de l'article 6 de la

Convention (voir, notamment, Bykov c. Russie [GC], no 4378/02, § 92,

10 mars 2009, et John Murray, précité, § 45). Le droit de ne pas

s'incriminer soi-même concerne le respect de la détermination d'un

195

accusé à garder le silence et présuppose que, dans une affaire pénale,

l'accusation cherche à fonder son argumentation sans recourir à des

éléments de preuve obtenus par la contrainte ou des pressions, au

mépris de la volonté de l'accusé (voir, notamment, Saunders

c. Royaume-Uni, 17 décembre 1996, §§ 68-69, Recueil 1996-VI, Allan

c. Royaume-Uni, no 48539/99, § 44, CEDH 2002-IX, Jalloh c. Allemagne

[GC], no 54810/00, §§ 94-117, CEDH 2006-IX, et O'Halloran et Francis

c. Royaume-Uni [GC] nos 15809/02 et 25624/02, §§ 53-63, CEDH

2007-VIII).

708. La Cour rappelle également que la personne placée en garde à

vue a le droit d'être assistée d'un avocat dès le début de cette mesure

ainsi que pendant les interrogatoires, et ce a fortiori lorsqu'elle n'a pas

été informée par les autorités de son droit de se taire (voir les principes

dégagés notamment dans les affaires Salduz c. Turquie [GC], no

36391/02, §§ 50-62, 27 novembre 2008, Dayanan c. Turquie, no

7377/03, §§ 30-34, 13 octobre 2009, Boz c. Turquie, no 2039/04, §§

33-36, 9 février 2010, et Adamkiewicz c. Pologne, no 54729/00 §§ 82-

92, 2 mars 2010).

709. En l'espèce, la Cour relève que lorsque le requérant a dû prêter

serment « de dire toute la vérité, rien que la vérité », comme l'exige

l'article 153 du code de procédure pénale, avant de déposer devant

l'officier de police judiciaire, il était placé en garde à vue. Cette mesure

s'inscrivait dans le cadre d'une information judiciaire ouverte par le juge

d'instruction, les services de police ayant interpellé le requérant suite à

une commission rogatoire délivrée le 3 juin 1999 par ce magistrat, qui

les autorisait notamment à procéder à toutes les auditions et

perquisitions utiles à la manifestation de la vérité concernant les faits de

tentative d'assassinat commis sur la personne de B.M. le 17 décembre

1998. Ce placement en garde à vue était règlementé par l'article 154 du

code de procédure pénale et n'était pas subordonné, à l'époque des

faits, à l'existence d' « indices graves et concordants » démontrant la

commission d'une infraction par l'intéressé ou de « raisons plausibles »

de le soupçonner de tels faits. La Cour note également que le requérant

n'était pas nommément visé par la commission rogatoire du 3 juin

1999, ni par le réquisitoire introductif du 30 décembre 1998.

710. La Cour constate cependant que l'interpellation et la garde à

vue du requérant s'inscrivaient dans le cadre d'une information

judiciaire ouverte par le juge d'instruction contre E.L et J.P.G., tous

deux soupçonnés d'avoir été impliqués dans l'agression de B.M. Or,

d'une part, lors de sa garde à vue du 2 juin 1999, J.P.G. avait

expressément mis en cause le requérant comme étant le commanditaire

de l'opération projetée et, d'autre part, la victime avait déposé plainte

contre son épouse et le requérant, et ce dernier avait déjà été entendu

à ce sujet par les services de police le 28 décembre 1998. Dans ces

circonstances, la Cour considère que, dès son interpellation et son

placement en garde à vue, les autorités avaient des raisons plausibles

de soupçonner que le requérant était impliqué dans la commission de

l'infraction qui faisait l'objet de l'enquête ouverte par le juge

d'instruction. L'argument selon lequel le requérant n'a été entendu que

comme témoin est inopérant, comme étant purement formel, dès lors

196

que les autorités judiciaires et policières disposaient d'éléments de

nature à le suspecter d'avoir participé à l'infraction.

711. Par ailleurs, la Cour note que, depuis l'adoption de la loi du 15

juin 2000, lorsqu'il n'existe aucune raison plausible de soupçonner qu'il

a commis ou tenté de commettre une infraction, tout témoin – cité pour

être entendu au cours de l'exécution d'une commission rogatoire – ne

peut être retenu que le temps strictement nécessaire à son audition.

712. Enfin, selon la Cour, l'interpellation et le placement en garde à

vue du requérant pouvaient avoir des répercussions importantes sur sa

situation (voir, parmi d'autres, Deweer, précité, § 46, et Eckle c.

Allemagne, 15 juillet 1982, § 73, série A no 51). D'ailleurs, c'est

précisément à la suite de la garde à vue décidée en raison d'éléments

de l'enquête le désignant comme suspect, qu'il a été mis en examen et

placé en détention provisoire.

713. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour estime que lorsque le requérant

a été placé en garde à vue et a dû prêter serment « de dire toute la

vérité, rien que la vérité », celui-ci faisait l'objet d'une « accusation en

matière pénale » et bénéficiait du droit de ne pas contribuer à sa propre

incrimination et de garder le silence garanti par l'article 6 §§ 1 et 3 de la

Convention.

714. La Cour relève ensuite que, lors de sa première déposition le 8

juin 1999, le requérant a fourni certains éléments de preuve pouvant

démontrer son implication dans l'agression de B.M : il a en effet livré

des détails sur ses conversations avec l'un des individus mis en examen,

J.P.G., sur leur entente « pour faire peur » à B.M. et sur la remise d'une

somme d'argent de 100 000 francs français. La Cour note également

que ces déclarations ont été ensuite utilisées par les juridictions pénales

pour établir les faits et condamner le requérant.

715. La Cour estime que le fait d'avoir dû prêter serment avant de

déposer a constitué pour le requérant – qui faisait déjà depuis la veille

l'objet d'une mesure coercitive, la garde à vue – une forme de pression,

et que le risque de poursuites pénales en cas de témoignage mensonger

a assurément rendu la prestation de serment plus contraignante.

716. Elle note par ailleurs qu'en 2004, le législateur est intervenu

pour revenir sur l'interprétation faite par la Cour de cassation de la

combinaison des articles 105, 153 et 154 du code de procédure pénale

et préciser que l'obligation de prêter serment et de déposer n'est pas

applicable aux personnes gardées à vue sur commission rogatoire d'un

juge d'instruction (paragraphe 29 ci-dessus).

717. La Cour constate également qu'il ne ressort ni du dossier ni des

procès-verbaux des dépositions que le requérant ait été informé au

début de son interrogatoire du droit de se taire, de ne pas répondre aux

questions posées, ou encore de ne répondre qu'aux questions qu'il

souhaitait. Elle relève en outre que le requérant n'a pu être assisté d'un

avocat que vingt heures après le début de la garde à vue, délai prévu à

l'article 63-4 du code de procédure pénale (paragraphe 28 ci-dessus).

L'avocat n'a donc été en mesure ni de l'informer sur son droit à garder

le silence et de ne pas s'auto-incriminer avant son premier

interrogatoire ni de l'assister lors de cette déposition et lors de celles qui

suivirent, comme l'exige l'article 6 de la Convention.

197

718. Il s'ensuit que l'exception soulevée par le Gouvernement doit

être rejetée et qu'il y a eu, en l'espèce, atteinte au droit du requérant de

ne pas contribuer à sa propre incrimination et de garder le silence, tel

que garanti par l'article 6 §§ 1 et 3 de la Convention.

B. Le droit d'accès à un juge du requérant

719. Le requérant soutient également, sous l'angle de l'article 6 de

la Convention, que par sa décision du 27 juin 2006, la Cour de cassation

ne pouvait, sans porter une atteinte disproportionnée au droit d'accès à

un juge, lui opposer le nouvel article 153 du code de procédure pénale

pour le priver du droit de faire juger de la nullité de sa garde à vue. La

Cour estime que cette question se confond en réalité avec le précédent

grief examiné ci-dessus. Il doit donc être déclaré recevable et, eu égard

à ce qu'elle a conclu précédemment (paragraphe 55 ci-dessus), la Cour

n'estime pas nécessaire de l'examiner séparément.

C. La motivation de la décision de la cour d'appel

720. Le requérant dénonce l'insuffisance de motivation de la décision

de la cour d'appel.

721. La Cour rappelle que si l'article 6 § 1 oblige les tribunaux à

motiver leurs décisions, il ne peut toutefois se comprendre comme

exigeant une réponse détaillée à chaque argument (voir, notamment,

Van de Hurk c. Pays-Bas, 19 avril 1994, § 61, série A no 288). Ainsi, en

rejetant un recours, la juridiction d'appel peut, en principe, se borner à

faire siens les motifs de la décision entreprise (García Ruiz c. Espagne

[GC], no 30544/96, § 26, CEDH 1999-I).

722. En l'espèce, la Cour observe que la cour d'appel a fait sienne la

motivation des juges de première instance, après avoir considéré qu'elle

était pertinente et que les juges de première instance avaient fait une

juste appréciation des faits et circonstances particulières de la cause

pour déclarer le requérant coupable des faits reprochés. La Cour

constate en outre que le tribunal a rendu une décision dûment motivée,

que le requérant a bénéficié d'une procédure contradictoire et qu'il a pu,

aux différents stades de celle-ci, présenter les arguments qu'il jugeait

pertinents pour la défense de sa cause. La Cour ne décèle donc aucune

atteinte à l'équité de la procédure garantie par l'article 6 de la

Convention.

723. Il s'ensuit que ce grief est manifestement mal fondé et doit être

rejeté en application de l'article 35 §§ 3 et 4 de la Convention.

II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALLÉGUÉE DE L'ARTICLE 5 § 3 DE LA

CONVENTION

724. Le requérant dénonce le caractère excessif de la durée de la

détention provisoire. Il invoque l'article 5 § 3 de la Convention dont les

parties pertinentes se lisent comme suit :

198

« Toute personne arrêtée ou détenue, dans les conditions prévues

au paragraphe 1 c) du présent article (...) a le droit d'être jugée

dans un délai raisonnable, ou libérée pendant la procédure. La mise

en liberté peut être subordonnée à une garantie assurant la

comparution de l'intéressé à l'audience. »

725. Selon la jurisprudence bien établie de la Cour (B. c. Autriche,

28 mars 1990, § 36, série A no 175, et Wemhoff, précité, § 9), une

personne condamnée en première instance, qu'elle ait ou non été

détenue jusqu'alors, se trouve dans le cas prévu à l'article 5 § 1 a) de la

Convention. En l'espèce, la décision de condamnation du requérant en

première instance est intervenue le 31 octobre 2002. Or, la requête a

été introduite le 27 décembre 2006.

726. Il s'ensuit que ce grief est irrecevable pour non-respect du délai

de six mois et doit être rejeté en application de l'article 35 §§ 1 et 4 de

la Convention.

III. SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ARTICLE 41 DE LA CONVENTION

727. Aux termes de l'article 41 de la Convention,

« Si la Cour déclare qu'il y a eu violation de la Convention ou de

ses Protocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante

ne permet d'effacer qu'imparfaitement les conséquences de cette

violation, la Cour accorde à la partie lésée, s'il y a lieu, une

satisfaction équitable. »

A. Dommage

728. Le requérant demande réparation des dommages matériel et

moral résultant des violations des articles 5 et 6 de la Convention. Il

sollicite le remboursement des salaires non perçus du fait de sa

détention et de son contrôle judiciaire, soit 216 349 euros (« EUR »).

S'agissant du préjudice moral, le requérant demande 50 000 EUR,

invoquant l'arrêt prématuré de sa carrière et les conséquences de sa

détention sur sa famille. A l'appui de sa demande, le requérant produit

un jugement du conseil de prud'hommes de Cergy-Pontoise du 9 juin

2005 et des bulletins de paie du requérant.

729. Le Gouvernement considère que les demandes du requérant

sont sans aucun lien avec la violation alléguée de l'article 6 de la

Convention et, en toute hypothèse, manifestement excessives.

S'agissant du préjudice matériel, il fait valoir que si le requérant

souhaitait obtenir une indemnisation du fait de sa détention et de son

contrôle judiciaire, c'est l'article 5 de la Convention qu'il fallait invoquer

à l'appui de sa demande. En outre, il ne justifie pas du caractère certain

de son préjudice. Le Gouvernement rappelle la jurisprudence de la Cour

selon laquelle elle ne saurait spéculer sur le résultat auquel la procédure

incriminée aurait abouti si celle-ci avait respecté la Convention (Foucher

c. France, 18 mars 1997, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1997-II).

Concernant le préjudice moral, il expose que la somme demandée est

199

dépourvue de tout lien certain et direct avec la violation alléguée de

l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention et est manifestement excessive. Dans

ces conditions, et conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour, si celle-ci

estimait fondé le grief du requérant, le constat de violation constituerait

une satisfaction équitable au sens de l'article 41 de la Convention.

730. La Cour estime que la seule base à retenir pour l'octroi d'une

satisfaction équitable réside dans la violation de l'article 6 §§ 1 et 3 de

la Convention. Elle n'aperçoit pas de lien de causalité entre la violation

constatée et le dommage matériel allégué. Partant, la Cour rejette sa

demande. S'agissant de la demande de réparation du préjudice moral,

la Cour estime que le requérant a subi un tort moral certain qui n'est

pas suffisamment réparé par le constat de la violation. Statuant en

équité comme le veut l'article 41 de la Convention, elle lui accorde la

somme de 5 000 EUR.

B. Frais et dépens

731. Le requérant demande 44 126 EUR au titre des frais et dépens

exposés devant les juridictions internes. A l'appui de sa demande, il

produit un certain nombre de factures d'honoraires d'avocats couvrant

la période de mars 2002 à août 2007 (pour un total d'environ 30 926

EUR), ainsi que deux autres notes d'honoraires d'avocat datant de juillet

et décembre 1999 pour des conseils et analyses (environ 13 200 EUR).

Le requérant sollicite également 15 548 EUR au titre des frais et dépens

exposés devant la Cour. A l'appui de sa demande, il produit deux

factures d'honoraires d'avocat datant de septembre 2006 (3 588 EUR)

et juin 2009 (11 960 EUR).

732. Le Gouvernement s'oppose à ces demandes. Il estime que les

factures sont dépourvues de tout justificatif de paiement effectif des

sommes indiquées et ne permettent donc pas d'établir ledit versement.

Il ajoute que les frais et dépens exposés devant les juridictions internes

ne sauraient être remboursés car ils ne visaient pas à corriger une

éventuelle violation de la Convention mais à assurer la défense pénale

d'un individu accusé de complicité de violences aggravées, ce qui vaut

nonobstant le fait que les avocats du requérant aient pu invoquer

l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention devant les juridictions internes. Le

caractère nécessaire de ces dépenses n'est donc pas établi. Enfin, le

Gouvernement estime que les sommes sollicitées atteignent un montant

excessif et qu'elles devront être ramenés à de plus justes proportions

conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour. Selon lui, une somme de

3 000 EUR serait raisonnable.

733. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, un requérant ne peut obtenir

le remboursement de ses frais et dépens que dans la mesure où se

trouvent établis leur réalité, leur nécessité et le caractère raisonnable de

leur taux (voir, par exemple, Micallef c. Malte [GC], no 17056/06, § 115,

15 octobre 2009, Iatridis c. Grèce [GC], no 31107/96, § 54, CEDH 2000-

XI). En l'espèce, eu égard aux critères précités et compte tenu des

documents en sa possession, la Cour estime raisonnable d'accorder une

somme globale de 7 000 EUR.

200

C. Intérêts moratoires

734. La Cour juge approprié de calquer le taux des intérêts

moratoires sur le taux d'intérêt de la facilité de prêt marginal de la

Banque centrale européenne majoré de trois points de pourcentage.

PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR, À L'UNANIMITÉ,

1. Joint au fond l'exception du Gouvernement tirée de l'inapplicabilité

de l'article 6 de la Convention et la rejette ;

2. Déclare les griefs tirés de l'article 6 de la Convention concernant

l'atteinte alléguée au droit de ne pas s'auto-incriminer et au droit

d'accès au juge recevables ;

3. Dit qu'il y a eu violation de l'article 6 §§ 1 et 3 de la Convention

s'agissant du droit du requérant de ne pas contribuer à sa propre

incrimination et de garder le silence ;

4. Dit qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'examiner séparément le grief tiré de

l'atteinte au droit d'accès au juge ;

5. Déclare le restant des griefs irrecevable ;

6. Dit

a) que l'Etat défendeur doit verser au requérant, dans les trois mois

à compter du jour où l'arrêt sera devenu définitif conformément à

l'article 44 § 2 de la Convention, 5 000 EUR (cinq mille euros) pour

dommage moral et 7 000 EUR (sept mille euros) pour frais et

dépens, plus tout montant pouvant être dû à titre d'impôt par le

requérant ;

b) qu'à compter de l'expiration dudit délai et jusqu'au versement,

ces montants seront à majorer d'un intérêt simple à un taux égal à

celui de la facilité de prêt marginal de la Banque centrale européenne

applicable pendant cette période, augmenté de trois points de

pourcentage ;

7. Rejette la demande de satisfaction équitable pour le surplus.

Fait en français, puis communiqué par écrit le 14 octobre 2010, en

application de l'article 77 §§ 2 et 3 du règlement.

Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen

Greffière Président

201

Section 1.01 ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:4240

Instantie

Gerechtshof 's-Hertogenbosch

Datum uitspraak

11-09-2013

Datum publicatie

13-09-2013

Zaaknummer

20-002610-12

Rechtsgebieden

Strafrecht

Bijzondere kenmerken

Hoger beroep

Inhoudsindicatie

Veroordeling wegens het onder meer ten onrechte reiskosten

declareren voor iedere cliënt die verdachte bezocht in zijn functie

als raadsman, terwijl hij dat bezoek combineerde met het

bezoeken van een andere cliënt.

Vindplaatsen

Rechtspraak.nl

(a) Uitspraak

Afdeling strafrecht

Parketnummer : 20-002610-12

Uitspraak : 11 september 2013

TEGENSPRAAK

Section 1.02 Arrest van de meervoudige kamer voor strafzaken

van het gerechtshof te

Section 1.03 's-Hertogenbosch

gewezen op het hoger beroep, ingesteld tegen het vonnis van de

rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch van 10 juli 2012 in de strafzaak met

parketnummer 01-885057-11 tegen:

Section 1.04 [verdachte],

geboren te [geboorteplaats] op [geboortedatum],

wonende te[woonplaats].

Hoger beroep

Bij vonnis waarvan beroep is de verdachte telkens ter zake van valsheid

in geschrift, meermalen gepleegd, vrijgesproken.

De officier van justitie heeft tegen voormeld vonnis hoger beroep

ingesteld.

Onderzoek van de zaak

Dit arrest is gewezen naar aanleiding van het onderzoek op de

terechtzitting in hoger beroep, alsmede het onderzoek op de

terechtzitting in eerste aanleg.

202

Het hof heeft kennisgenomen van de vordering van de advocaat-

generaal en van hetgeen van de zijde van verdachte naar voren is

gebracht.

De advocaat-generaal heeft gevorderd dat het hof het beroepen vonnis

zal vernietigen en, opnieuw rechtdoende, bewezen zal verklaren

hetgeen aan de verdachte is ten laste gelegd, en verdachte zal

veroordelen tot een geldboete ter hoogte van EUR 1.500,-, subsidiair 30

dagen vervangende hechtenis.

Door de verdachte is vrijspraak bepleit.

Vonnis waarvan beroep

Het beroepen vonnis zal worden vernietigd omdat het hof, anders dan

de eerste rechter, tot een bewezenverklaring komt.

Tenlastelegging

Aan verdachte is ten laste gelegd dat:

1.

hij op meerdere tijdstippen in of omstreeks de periode van 29 juni 2006

tot en met 10 december 2007 in de gemeente Veldhoven en/of

Eindhoven, althans in het arrondissement 's-Hertogenbosch, (telkens)

opzettelijk de/een formulier(en) Verklaring optreden piket, zijnde

dat/die formulier(en) (telkens)(een) geschrift(en) dat/die bestemd

is/zijn om tot bewijs van enig feit te dienen, valselijk heeft opgemaakt,

althans heeft vervalst, hebbende hij, verdachte, toen daar (telkens)

opzettelijk valselijk en in strijd met de waarheid op dat/die formulier(en)

Verklaring optreden piket, betrekking hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 02

november 2006, met betrekking tot cliënt [cliënt 1] en/of[cliënt 2] en/of

betrekking hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 01 december 2007, met

betrekking tot cliënten [cliënt 3] en/of [cliënt 4] en/of [cliënt 5] en/of

[cliënt 6] en/of betrekking hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 29 juni 2006,

met betrekking tot cliënten[cliënt 7] en/of [cliënt 8] en/of[cliënt 9] en/of

[cliënt 10] en/of[cliënt 11], bij het item Reiskosten (telkens) vermeld

dat hij ten behoeve van het piketbezoek 20 kilometer heeft gereisd

tussen Veldhoven en Eindhoven v.v., (telkens) met het oogmerk om

voormeld(e) formulier(en) Verklaring optredenpiket als echt en

onvervalst te gebruiken of door een ander of anderen te doen

gebruiken;

2.

hij op meerdere tijdstippen in of omstreeks de periode van 11 oktober

2009 tot en met 27 oktober 2009 in de gemeente Veldhoven en/of

Eindhoven, althans in het arrondissement 's-Hertogenbosch, (telkens)

opzettelijk de/een formulier(en) Verklaring optreden piket, zijnde

dat/die formulier(en) (telkens)(een) geschrift(en) dat/die bestemd

is/zijn om tot bewijs van enig feit te dienen, valselijk heeft opgemaakt,

althans heeft vervalst, hebbende hij, verdachte, toen daar (telkens)

opzettelijk valselijk en in strijd met de waarheid op dat/die formulier(en)

Verklaring optreden piket, (telkens) betrekking hebbende op

rechtsbijstand op 11 oktober 2009, met betrekking tot cliënten [cliënt

12] en/of [cliënt 13] en/of [cliënt 14]en/of [cliënt 15] en/of [cliënt

16]en/of [cliënt 17]en/of[cliënt 18] en/of[cliënt 19] en/of [cliënt 20]

en/of[cliënt 21] en/of[cliënt 22]bij het item Reiskosten (telkens)

vermeld dat hij ten behoeve van het piketbezoek 20 kilometer heeft

203

gereisd tussen Veldhoven en Eindhoven v.v., (telkens) met het oogmerk

om voormeld(e) formulier(en) Verklaring optreden piket als echt en

onvervalst te gebruiken of door een ander of anderen te doen

gebruiken;

3.

hij op meerdere tijdstippen in of omstreeks de periode van 11 oktober

2009 tot en met 28 oktober 2009 in de gemeente Veldhoven en/of

Eindhoven, althans in het arrondissement 's-Hertogenbosch, (telkens)

opzettelijk de/een formulier(en) Verklaring optreden piket, zijnde

die/dat formulier(en) (telkens) (een) geschrift(en) dat/die bestemd

is/zijn om tot bewijs van enig feit te dienen, valselijk heeft opgemaakt,

althans heeft vervalst, hebbende hij, verdachte, toen daar (telkens)

opzettelijk valselijk en in strijd met de waarheid op een formulier

Verklaring optreden piket vermeld dat hij, verdachte, op 12 oktober

2009 te Eindhoven als raadsman is opgetreden met betrekking tot

[cliënt 23] en/of op een formulier Verklaring optreden piket vermeld dat

hij, verdachte, op 11 oktober 2009 te Eindhoven als raadsman is

opgetreden met betrekking tot[cliënt 24], (telkens) met het oogmerk

om voormeld(e) formulier(en) Verklaring optreden piket als echt en

onvervalst te gebruiken of door een ander of anderen te doen

gebruiken.

Het hof verstaat het onder 1 en 2 ten laste gelegde als volgt. Kennelijk

heeft de tenlastelegger onder 1 en 2 beoogt het verwijt te maken dat

verdachte ten onrechte (telkens) voor iedere cliënt die hij bezocht apart

declareerde, terwijl hij dat bezoek combineerde met het bezoeken van

een andere cliënt.

Bewezenverklaring

Het hof acht wettig en overtuigend bewezen dat verdachte het onder 1,

2 en 3 ten laste gelegde heeft begaan, met dien verstande, dat:

1.

hij op meerdere tijdstippen in de periode van 29 juni 2006 tot en met 10

december 2007 in de gemeente Veldhoven en/of Eindhoven opzettelijk

formulieren Verklaring optreden piket, zijnde die formulieren geschriften

die bestemd zijn om tot bewijs van enig feit te dienen, valselijk heeft

opgemaakt, hebbende hij, verdachte, toen daar telkens opzettelijk

valselijk en in strijd met de waarheid op die formulieren Verklaring

optreden piket, betrekking hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 02 november

2006, met betrekking tot cliënt [cliënt 1] en[cliënt 2] en betrekking

hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 01 december 2007, met betrekking tot

cliënten [cliënt 3] en [cliënt 4] en [cliënt 5] en [cliënt 6] en betrekking

hebbende op rechtsbijstand op 29 juni 2006, met betrekking tot

cliënten[cliënt 7] en [cliënt 8] en[cliënt 9] en [cliënt 10] en[cliënt 11],

bij het item Reiskosten vermeld dat hij ten behoeve van het piketbezoek

20 kilometer heeft gereisd tussen Veldhoven en Eindhoven v.v., telkens

met het oogmerk om voormelde formulieren Verklaring optredenpiket

als echt en onvervalst te gebruiken;

2.

hij op meerdere tijdstippen in de periode van 11 oktober 2009 tot en

met 27 oktober 2009 in de gemeente Veldhoven en/of Eindhoven

opzettelijk de formulieren Verklaring optreden piket, zijnde die

204

formulieren geschriften die bestemd zijn om tot bewijs van enig feit te

dienen, valselijk heeft opgemaakt, hebbende hij, verdachte, toen daar

telkens opzettelijk valselijk en in strijd met de waarheid op die

formulieren Verklaring optreden piket, telkens betrekking hebbende op

rechtsbijstand op 11 oktober 2009, met betrekking tot cliënten [cliënt

12] en [cliënt 13] en [cliënt 14]en [cliënt 15] en [cliënt 16]en [cliënt

17]en[cliënt 18] en[cliënt 19] en [cliënt 20] en[cliënt 21] en[cliënt

22]bij het item Reiskosten vermeld dat hij ten behoeve van het

piketbezoek 20 kilometer heeft gereisd tussen Veldhoven en Eindhoven

v.v., telkens met het oogmerk om voormelde formulieren Verklaring

optreden piket als echt en onvervalst te gebruiken;

3.

hij in de periode van 11 oktober 2009 tot en met 28 oktober 2009 in de

gemeente Veldhoven en/of Eindhoven opzettelijk formulieren Verklaring

optreden piket, zijnde die formulieren geschriften die bestemd zijn om

tot bewijs van enig feit te dienen, valselijk heeft opgemaakt, hebbende

hij, verdachte, toen daar telkens opzettelijk valselijk en in strijd met de

waarheid op een formulier Verklaring optreden piket vermeld dat hij,

verdachte, op 12 oktober 2009 te Eindhoven als raadsman is

opgetreden met betrekking tot [cliënt 23] en op een formulier Verklaring

optreden piket vermeld dat hij, verdachte, op 11 oktober 2009 te

Eindhoven als raadsman is opgetreden met betrekking tot[cliënt 24],

met het oogmerk om voormelde formulieren Verklaring optreden piket

als echt en onvervalst te gebruiken.

Het hof acht niet bewezen hetgeen verdachte meer of anders is ten laste

gelegd dan hierboven is bewezen verklaard, zodat deze daarvan behoort

te worden vrijgesproken.

Door het hof gebruikte bewijsmiddelen

Indien tegen dit verkort arrest beroep in cassatie wordt ingesteld,

worden de door het hof gebruikte bewijsmiddelen die redengevend zijn

voor de bewezenverklaring opgenomen in een aanvulling op het verkort

arrest. Deze aanvulling wordt dan aan het verkort arrest gehecht.

Bijzondere overwegingen omtrent het bewijs

De beslissing dat het bewezen verklaarde door de verdachte is begaan

berust op de feiten en omstandigheden als vervat in de hierboven

bedoelde bewijsmiddelen, in onderlinge samenhang beschouwd.

Elk bewijsmiddel wordt - ook in zijn onderdelen - slechts gebruikt tot

bewijs van dat bewezen verklaarde feit, of die bewezen verklaarde

feiten, waarop het, blijkens zijn inhoud, betrekking heeft.

De verdachte heeft ten verweer bepleit dat hij zal worden vrijgesproken

van het hem ten laste gelegde. Daartoe heeft hij aangevoerd dat hij

geen opzet heeft gehad op het valselijk opmaken van de formulieren

„Verklaring optreden piket‟. Hij zou slechts, ten gevolge van de hectiek,

waarmede hij in de uitoefening van zijn piketwerkzaamheden werd

geconfronteerd, onzorgvuldig en slordig hebben gehandeld. Tevens zou

hij niet volledig op de hoogte zijn geweest van het Besluit vergoedingen

rechtsbijstand.

Het hof overweegt dienaangaande als volgt.

205

Het hof is van oordeel dat in onderhavige zaak geen sprake is van enkel

verontschuldigbare slordigheid of onzorgvuldigheid. Bij dat oordeel heeft

het hof de volgende feiten en omstandigheden in aanmerking genomen.

Aan verdachte is onder 1 en 2 ten laste gelegd dat hij verscheidene

malen reiskosten heeft gedeclareerd voor piketbezoek aan cliënten; de

valsheid ligt hierin besloten dat hij in werkelijkheid niet voor ieder van

die cliënten van Veldhoven naar het politiebureau in Eindhoven is

gereisd omdat hij verscheidene bezoeken combineerde. Verdachte heeft

ter terechtzitting in hoger beroep niet betwist dat hij voor iedere in

verzekering gestelde persoon apart reiskosten heeft gedeclareerd.

Verdachte heeft betoogd dat dit in de hectiek van de situatie is gebeurd.

Hij zou tevens de formulieren routinematig hebben ingevuld.

Uit de onderwerpelijke formulieren „Verklaring optreden piket‟ blijkt dat

verdachte telkens uitdrukkelijk bij het onderdeel reiskosten „Veldhoven-

Eindhoven vv 20 km‟ heeft geschreven. Hij heeft ter terechtzitting in

hoger beroep verklaard zelf de formulieren te hebben ingevuld. Het hof

is dan ook van oordeel dat dit een bewuste handeling moet zijn

geweest. Uit de duur van de periode en de hoeveelheid formulieren

waarop verdachte ten onrechte reiskosten heeft gedeclareerd, trekt het

hof het gevolg dat van een incident en van een slordigheid redelijkerwijs

geen sprake meer kan zijn. Daarbij is niet zonder betekenis dat

verdachte de formulieren pas op een later tijdstip heeft ondertekend en

naar de Raad voor de Rechtspraak gestuurd. Op dat moment speelde de

door de verdachte gestelde hectiek echter niet meer. Verdachte heeft in

de tussenliggende periode voldoende tijd gehad om zich te vergewissen

van de juistheid van de invulling van die formulieren.

Onder 3 is aan verdachte ten laste gelegd dat hij op de formulieren

„Verklaring optreden piket‟ heeft vermeld dat hij als raadsman is

opgetreden voor de personen [cliënt 23] en[cliënt 24]; de valsheid ligt

hierin besloten dat hij dat in werkelijkheid niet heeft gedaan. Verdachte

heeft ten verweer gevoerd dat hij per abuis de naam [cliënt 23] heeft

vermeld op het formulier in plaats van [cliënt 15]. Verdachte heeft

echter tevens een formulier ingevuld en ingeleverd op naam van [cliënt

15]. Voorts zou op 11 oktober 2009 zowel een piketmelding

binnengekomen zijn voor [cliënt 17] als voor[cliënt 24]. Achteraf bleek

alleen [cliënt 17] in verzekering te zijn gesteld. De verdachte zou in de

hectiek van de situatie voor alle vier de genoemde personen een

formulier „Verklaring optreden piket‟ naar de Raad voor de Rechtspraak

hebben gestuurd.

Het verweer van verdachte slaagt niet. Daarbij is tevens ten aanzien

van dit feit niet zonder betekenis dat verdachte de formulieren pas op

een later tijdstip heeft ondertekend en naar de Raad voor de

Rechtspraak gestuurd. Op dat moment speelde de door de verdachte

gestelde hectiek niet meer. Verdachte heeft in de tussenliggende

periode voldoende tijd gehad om zich te vergewissen van de juistheid

van de invulling van die formulieren. Tevens blijkt uit het voorhanden

zijnde dossier dat alle vier de formulieren op een andere datum zijn

ondertekend door verdachte. Te weten op data tussen 13 oktober 2009

en 27 oktober 2009. Het hof is dan ook van oordeel dat dit een bewuste

handeling moet zijn geweest.

206

Met betrekking tot de ten laste gelegde feiten overweegt het hof nog dat

juist van een advocaat mag worden verwacht dat hij bij het opmaken

van deze geschriften grote zorgvuldigheid betracht. De verdachte had

zich ervan moeten vergewissen dat hij de formulieren „Verklaring

optreden piket‟ op de juiste wijze had ingevuld. Voorts is het hof van

oordeel dat het verweer van de verdachte dat hij niet of niet volledig op

de hoogte zou zijn geweest van het Besluit vergoedingen rechtsbijstand

geen doel kan treffen. Van een piketadvocaat mag namelijk verwacht

worden dat hij op de hoogte is van de desbetreffende regelingen.

Ten slotte overweegt het hof, anders dan de rechtbank, dat het feit dat

het steeds om relatief beperkte bedragen ging niet kan bijdragen aan de

conclusie dat slechts sprake is geweest van administratieve fouten en

slordigheden.

Alles overziende komt het hof tot de slotsom dat het niet anders kan

zijn dan dat verdachte de piketformulieren opzettelijk valselijk heeft

opgemaakt met het oogmerk deze als echt en onvervalst te gebruiken.

Het hof verwerpt dan ook het verweer.

Strafbaarheid van het bewezen verklaarde

Het onder 1, 2 en 3 bewezen verklaarde is telkens als misdrijf voorzien

en strafbaar gesteld bij artikel 225, eerste lid, juncto artikel 57, eerste

lid, van het Wetboek van Strafrecht.

Er zijn geen feiten of omstandigheden aannemelijk geworden die de

strafbaarheid van de feiten uitsluiten. Het wordt gekwalificeerd zoals

hierna in de beslissing wordt vermeld.

Strafbaarheid van de verdachte

Er zijn geen feiten of omstandigheden aannemelijk geworden die de

strafbaarheid van verdachte uitsluiten.

De verdachte is daarom strafbaar voor het hiervoor bewezen verklaarde.

Op te leggen straf

Bij de bepaling van de op te leggen straf is gelet op de aard en de ernst

van hetgeen bewezen is verklaard, op de omstandigheden waaronder

het bewezen verklaarde is begaan en op de persoon van de verdachte,

zoals één en ander bij het onderzoek ter terechtzitting naar voren is

gekomen.

Verdachte heeft zich telkens schuldig gemaakt aan valsheid in geschrift.

Het hof neemt de omstandigheid in aanmerking dat door het bewezen

verklaarde het vertrouwen, dat in het maatschappelijke verkeer mag

worden gesteld in de juistheid van de onderhavige geschriften, is

geschonden. Het hof heeft voorts gelet op de bijzondere positie die een

advocaat inneemt binnen het maatschappelijke verkeer en overwogen

dat juist van een advocaat zorgvuldigheid mag worden verwacht bij het

opmaken van geschriften als de onderhavige.

Voor wat de persoon van de verdachte betreft, heeft het hof acht

geslagen op de omstandigheid dat de verdachte blijkens een hem

betreffend uittreksel Justitiële Documentatie, d.d. 17 juli 2013, niet

eerder is veroordeeld.

Gelet op het voorgaande en het verhandelde ter terechtzitting in hoger

beroep is het hof van oordeel dat een geldboete van hierna te

vermelden hoogte passend en geboden is.

207

Bij de vaststelling van de hoogte van de geldboete heeft het hof

rekening gehouden met de financiële draagkracht van de verdachte,

voor zover daarvan ter terechtzitting in hoger beroep is gebleken.

Toepasselijke wettelijke voorschriften

De beslissing is gegrond op de artikelen 23, 24, 24c, 57 en 225 van het

Wetboek van Strafrecht, zoals deze luidden ten tijde van het bewezen

verklaarde.

Section 1.05 BESLISSING

Het hof:

Vernietigt het vonnis waarvan beroep en doet opnieuw recht:

Verklaart wettig en overtuigend bewezen dat de verdachte het onder 1,

2 en 3 ten laste gelegde heeft begaan.

Verklaart niet bewezen hetgeen de verdachte meer of anders is ten laste

gelegd dan hierboven is bewezen verklaard en spreekt hem daarvan

vrij.

Verklaart dat het onder 1, 2 en 3 bewezen verklaarde telkens oplevert:

Valsheid in geschrift, meermalen gepleegd.

Verklaart de verdachte daarvoor strafbaar.

Veroordeelt de verdachte tot een geldboete van EUR 1.500,00 (duizend

vijfhonderd euro), bij gebreke van betaling en verhaal te vervangen

door 25 (vijfentwintig) dagen hechtenis.

Aldus gewezen door:

mr. Y.G.M. Baaijens- van Geloven, voorzitter,

mr. J.J. van der Kaaden en mr. H.D. Bergkotte, raadsheren,

in tegenwoordigheid van mr. drs. M.M. Spooren, griffier,

en op 11 september 2013 ter openbare terechtzitting uitgesproken.

mr. Y.G.M. Baaijens- van Geloven en mr. H.D. Bergkotte zijn buiten

staat dit arrest mede te ondertekenen.

208

ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:7269

Deeplink http://d

Instantie

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Datum uitspraak

01-11-2013

Datum publicatie

05-11-2013

Zaaknummer

13/710024-12

Rechtsgebieden

Strafrecht

Bijzondere kenmerken

Eerste aanleg - meervoudig

Inhoudsindicatie

De rechtbank acht bewezen

dat er sprake is van

medeplegen van opzettelijk

mondeling zich jegens een

persoon uiten, kennelijk om

diens vrijheid om naar

waarheid of geweten ten

overstaan van een rechter of

ambtenaar een verklaring af

te leggen te beïnvloeden,

terwijl hij weet dat die

verklaring zal worden

afgelegd.

De rechtbank verklaart

hiervoor verdachte strafbaar

en veroordeelt verdachte tot

een gevangenisstraf van drie

maanden.

Vindplaatsen

Rechtspraak.nl

Uitspraak

RECHTBANK AMSTERDAM

VERKORT VONNIS

Parketnummer: 13/710024-12

Datum uitspraak: 1 november 2013

209

Verkort vonnis van de rechtbank Amsterdam, meervoudige strafkamer,

in de strafzaak tegen

[verdachte],

geboren te [plaats] op [geboortedag] 1974,

ingeschreven in de gemeentelijke basisadministratie persoonsgegevens

en verblijvende op het adres [GBA adres].

1 Het onderzoek ter terechtzitting

1.1

Dit verkorte vonnis is op tegenspraak gewezen naar aanleiding van het

onderzoek op de terechtzittingen van 26 november 2012 (inhoudelijke

behandeling en requisitoir), 7 februari 2013 (regiezitting) en 17 oktober

2013 (pleidooi) en 18 oktober 2013 (re- en dupliek en laatste woord

verdachte).

1.2

De rechtbank heeft kennisgenomen van de vordering van de officieren

van justitie mrs. J.M. Kees en D.E. Kruimel en van wat verdachte en zijn

raadsvrouw

mr. E.A.M. Mannheims naar voren hebben gebracht.

1.3

De rechtbank heeft ter terechtzitting van 17 oktober 2013

kennisgenomen van een door [persoon 1] ingediende vordering tot

schadevergoeding. Zij heeft hem in deze vordering niet-ontvankelijk

verklaard omdat de vordering is ingediend nadat de officieren van

justitie overeenkomstig artikel 311 van het Wetboek van Strafvordering

het woord hebben gevoerd (artikel 51g, derde lid van het Wetboek van

Strafvordering).

2. Tenlastelegging

Aan verdachte is ten laste gelegd dat hij in of omstreeks de periode

vanaf 17 januari 2012 tot en met 19 januari 2012 te Amsterdam en/of

Arnhem en/of Amersfoort, in elk geval Nederland, tezamen en in

vereniging met een ander of anderen, opzettelijk mondeling en/of door

gebaren en/of bij geschrift en/of afbeelding zich jegens [persoon 1]

en/of een of meerdere andere perso(o)n(en) heeft/hebben geuit,

kennelijk om zijn/hun vrijheid om naar waarheid of geweten ten

overstaan van een rechter een verklaring af te leggen, te beïnvloeden,

terwijl hij en of zijn mededader(s) wist/wisten of ernstige reden

had/hadden te vermoeden dat die verklaring(en) zou(den) worden

afgelegd, immers heeft/hebben hij, verdachte, en/of zijn mededader(s):

-

die [persoon 1] herhaaldelijk

gedicteerd en/of gezegd om

bij gelegenheid van het

210

geplande getuigenverhoor op

19 januari 2012 in een tegen

[persoon 2] aanhangige

strafzaak ten overstaan van de

rechter-commissaris in strijd

met de waarheid te verklaren

dat hij, [persoon 1], [persoon

3] in contact heeft gebracht

met [persoon 4] en/of dat hij,

[persoon 1], [persoon 2] niet

(her)kent en/of dat hij,

[persoon 1], [persoon 3] een

grote idioot en een

pathologisch leugenaar vindt

en/of dat hij, [persoon 1], van

zijn advocaat mr. [persoon 5]

vernomen had dat hij

opgeroepen was voor het

getuigenverhoor en/of die

[persoon 1] een of meerdere

verklaring(en) van [persoon 4]

uit het strafdossier van de

zaak [X] overgelegd en die

[persoon 1] gedwongen die

verklaring(en) te lezen en/of

die [persoon 1] gedeeltes uit

de verklaring(en) van

[persoon 4] voorgehouden

en/of

-

die [persoon 1] op het

advocatenkantoor van mr.

[verdachte] aantekeningen

laten maken van hetgeen hij

bij gelegenheid van het

getuigenverhoor op 19 januari

2012 ten overstaan van de

rechter-commissaris zou

moeten verklaren en/of

-

211

die [persoon 1] op het

advocatenkantoor van mr.

[verdachte] een kopie van het

paspoort van [persoon 4]

overhandigd, zodat die

[persoon 1] die [persoon 4]

zou kunnen herkennen en/of

zijn uiterlijk zou kunnen

omschrijven en/of

-

op het advocatenkantoor van

mr. [verdachte] meerdere

malen met die [persoon 1] een

rollenspel gespeeld, teneinde

te oefenen op welke wijze die

[persoon 1] diende te

verklaren op vragen die hem

gesteld zouden (kunnen)

worden bij het

getuigenverhoor bij de

rechter-commissaris en/of

-

die [persoon 1] een groot

geldbedrag van ongeveer

100.000 euro tot 400.000 euro

in het vooruitzicht gesteld

indien hij tegenover de

rechter-commissaris een valse

verklaring zou afleggen en/of

-

die [persoon 1] bedreigd en

geïntimideerd door zijn/hun

houding en/of gedrag en/of

door op een zeer

intimiderende en agressieve

toon en met intimiderend

taalgebruik tegen die [persoon

1] te spreken en/of te

schreeuwen en/of zijn/hun

212

stem te verheffen en/of hem

uit te schelden en/of met

zijn/hun vuist(en) te heffen

en/of met duim en wijsvinger

te wijzen alsof het een pistool

was.

3 Voorvragen

De dagvaarding is geldig, deze rechtbank is bevoegd tot kennisneming

van het ten laste gelegde feit en de officier van justitie is ontvankelijk.

Er zijn geen redenen voor schorsing van de vervolging.

4 Waardering van het bewijs

4.1

Inleiding

Verdachte wordt ervan beschuldigd dat hij samen met anderen [persoon

1], die als getuige door de rechter-commissaris, belast met de

behandeling van strafzaken in de rechtbank Amsterdam, in een andere

strafzaak, bekend onder de aanduiding [X], zou worden gehoord, heeft

belemmerd in zijn verklaringsvrijheid. Belangrijkste bewijsmiddelen

daarvoor zijn door [persoon 1] afgelegde getuigenverklaringen onder

meer over zijn bezoek in de avond/nacht van 17 op 18 januari 2012 aan

het kantoor van verdachte, die toen de raadsman van medeverdachte

[persoon 2] was in die andere strafzaak.

4.2

Het standpunt van het Openbaar Ministerie

De officieren van justitie hebben overeenkomstig het overgelegde

schriftelijk requisitoir gerekwireerd tot bewezenverklaring van het ten

laste gelegde. Zij hebben geconcludeerd dat op grond van het dossier is

komen vast te staan dat juist is wat [persoon 1] heeft verklaard en dat

de bespreking op het kantoor van verdachte in de nacht van 17 op 18

januari 2012 ertoe diende om [persoon 1] in te prenten wat hij bij de

rechter-commissaris moest gaan verklaren.

4.3

Het standpunt van de verdediging

4.3.1

De raadsvrouw heeft overeenkomstig de door haar overgelegde

pleitnotities vrijspraak bepleit en het volgende kort samengevat

aangevoerd.

4.3.2

Het is juist dat [persoon 1] in de genoemde avond/nacht op verdachtes

kantoor is verschenen, samen met medeverdachten [persoon 2] en

[persoon 8], en dat toen is gesproken over het getuigenverhoor

waarvoor [persoon 1] bij de rechter-commissaris was uitgenodigd. Van

enige beïnvloeding van [persoon 1] is echter geen sprake geweest.

213

[persoon 2] heeft [persoon 1] niet gedicteerd wat hij moest verklaren

zoals omschreven in de tenlastelegging en verdachte heeft evenmin

[persoon 1] iets gedicteerd. Verdachte heeft ook geen drie A4‟tjes met

teksten opgesteld en [persoon 1] gezegd dat hij zo moest verklaren.

Ook [persoon 2] heeft dit niet gedaan. Er zijn [persoon 1] geen

aantekeningen gedicteerd. Er is geen kopie gemaakt die avond, ook niet

van het paspoort van [persoon 4]. Er zijn die avond geen kopieën

verstrekt van de verklaringen van [persoon 4]. Er is geen rollenspel

gespeeld, niet eenmaal, niet meermalen. Verdachte is niets bekend over

het in het vooruitzicht stellen van een geldbedrag. [persoon 2] heeft

[persoon 1] op het advocatenkantoor niet onder druk gezet of bedreigd

in woord of gebaar, althans niet in aanwezigheid van verdachte.

[persoon 2] heeft niet met stemverheffing gesproken en/of

geschreeuwd. Noch heeft hij zijn vuisten geheven of een „pistoolgebaar‟

gemaakt. Althans, niet in aanwezigheid van verdachte en het verheffen

van de stem of schreeuwen zou verdachte gehoord moeten hebben

wanneer hij zich in het keukentje of op het toilet bevond, als dat zou

zijn gebeurd. Verdachte heeft [persoon 1] evenmin onder druk gezet.

De sfeer was gemoedelijk en die gemoedelijkheid sluit de beweerde

bedreigingen/agressie door [persoon 2] jegens [persoon 1] buiten

aanwezigheid van verdachte vrijwel zeker uit, omdat het gewoon niet bij

elkaar past. Er is geen dossier [X] of dossier van [persoon 2]/[X] op

tafel geweest en dus is er ook niet in gebladerd. Er bevond(en) zich

geen kast(en) in de wachtruimte en dus is het dossier daar ook niet uit

gepakt. Noch is het mogelijk dat [persoon 2] ongevraagd dossiers

inkeek. De zonwering is naar beneden gedaan door verdachte voor de

privacy van zijn cliënt en de overige bezoekers. Het gesprek heeft geen

4¾ uur geduurd, maar 1¾ tot 2 uur.

4.3.3

De raadsvrouw heeft het volgende geconcludeerd. [persoon 1] heeft een

karikatuur van verdachte geschetst. Als maar een fractie waar zou zijn

wat [persoon 1] heeft verklaard, was de bespreking binnen no time

beëindigd door verdachte, zo ook de relatie advocaat-cliënt. De

verklaringen van [persoon 1] zijn onbetrouwbaar en kunnen niet dienen

tot het bewijs. Aan het Openbaar Ministerie verwijt de verdediging

„karaktermoord‟ te plegen op verdachte, hoewel er serieuze

aanwijzingen zijn dat de verklaringen van [persoon 1] onbetrouwbaar

zijn buiten de betwisting van die verklaringen door de drie overige

aanwezigen bij de bespreking. De verklaringen van [persoon 1] over de

beweerde gang van zaken tijdens de bespreking op kantoor in de avond

van 17 januari 2012 worden niet ondersteund door andere wettige en

overtuigende bewijsmiddelen. Het Openbaar Ministerie heeft verdachte

zonder gegronde redenen ten onrechte tot aan zijn enkels afgebroken.

Een aantal van de ten laste gelegde feiten heeft zich volgens [persoon

1] voorgedaan buiten aanwezigheid van verdachte en niet blijkt, ook

214

niet uit de verklaringen van [persoon 1], dat verdachte hier wetenschap

van had, zodat al om die reden geen sprake kan zijn van medeplegen.

Dit geldt voor het verstrekken van kopieën van processen-verbaal van

verklaringen van [persoon 4] want volgens [persoon 1] kreeg hij die

tijdens de reis Zeeland/Amersfoort of bij aankomst in Amersfoort of

helemaal niet en het in het vooruitzichtstellen van grote geldbedragen

aan [persoon 1] is eveneens volgens [persoon 1] niet aan de orde

geweest tijdens de bespreking.

4.4

Het oordeel van de rechtbank

4.4.1

De rechtbank stelt op grond van het dossier het volgende vast.

[persoon 1] zou in de strafzaak [X], waarin medeverdachte [persoon 2]

een van de verdachten is en werd bijgestaan door verdachte als diens

raadsman, op verzoek van [persoon 2], op 19 januari 2012 bij de

rechter-commissaris in Amsterdam als getuige worden gehoord.

Op 13 januari 2012 hebben [persoon 2] en [persoon 6], nadat zij zijn

adres hadden achterhaald, [persoon 1] thuis in [plaats] bezocht.

[persoon 1] heeft die dag met zijn advocaat, mr. [persoon 5], gebeld.

Een paar dagen later, op 17 januari 2012, heeft [persoon 1] opnieuw

thuis bezoek van [persoon 2] gekregen. Ditmaal werd [persoon 2]

vergezeld door [persoon 7]. [persoon 1] heeft die dag telefonisch

contact opgenomen met het kabinet van de rechter-commissaris en

opnieuw met mr. [persoon 5]. Hij is die dag met [persoon 2] en

[persoon 7] meegegaan met de auto. Zij hebben hem naar Amersfoort

gebracht en daar heeft [persoon 1] zijn intrek genomen in het Hotel

[naam A].

In de late avond van 17 januari 2012 is [persoon 1] opgehaald door

[persoon 2], ditmaal in het gezelschap van [persoon 8]. Zij zijn

vervolgens gedrieën naar het advocatenkantoor van verdachte gegaan.

Nadat hij [persoon 1], [persoon 2] en [persoon 8] had binnengelaten en

naar een kamer aan de voorzijde van het kantoor had geleid, heeft

verdachte de zonwering voor het raam van die kamer neergelaten.

Vervolgens heeft een bespreking plaatsgevonden over de strafzaak

waarin [persoon 1] als getuige zou worden gehoord. Daarna is [persoon

1] door [persoon 2] en [persoon 8] teruggebracht naar zijn hotel in

Amersfoort.

Op 19 januari 2012 is [persoon 1] opgehaald door [persoon 7] en

[persoon 2] en naar de rechtbank in Amsterdam gebracht waar hij die

dag door de rechter-commissaris als getuige zou worden gehoord.

4.4.2

[persoon 1] heeft verklaard dat hij in deze hiervoor weergegeven

periode is beïnvloed zodat hij niet meer onbelemmerd naar waarheid

zou kunnen verklaren. De verdediging is van mening dat de

215

verklaringen van [persoon 1] onbetrouwbaar zijn en niet als bewijs

zouden mogen worden gebruikt en dat zij bovendien steunbewijs

ontberen.

4.4.3

De rechtbank stelt voorop dat uit het dossier blijkt dat de door [persoon

1] afgelegde verklaringen over de hiervoor onder 4.4.1 vermelde

gebeurtenissen – even afgezien van zijn bewering dat hij is geïnstrueerd

wat hij moest gaan verklaren – na verificatie juist zijn gebleken en door

de verdachten ook als juist worden erkend.

In de tweede plaats is er voor de verklaring van [persoon 1] dat hij een

verklaring moest afleggen die [persoon 2] zou ontlasten, wel degelijk

steunbewijs.

[persoon 6] heeft immers bij de politie verklaringen afgelegd die dit

onderdeel van de verklaringen van [persoon 1] schragen. Weliswaar

heeft [persoon 6] die verklaringen ingetrokken en is de verdediging

daarom van oordeel dat deze niet tot bewijs kunnen dienen, maar de

rechtbank heeft [persoon 6] over zijn voor de intrekking van deze

verklaringen opgegeven redenen ter zitting als getuige gehoord en is op

grond daarvan tot de overtuiging gekomen dat die redenen geen geloof

verdienen. De rechtbank gebruikt die verklaringen dan ook voor het

bewijs.

Daarvoor is temeer reden, nu 1) de verklaringen van [persoon 6] en

[persoon 1] ten aanzien van wat er op 13 januari 2012 bij [persoon 1]

thuis is voorgevallen, worden bevestigd door de verklaring van [persoon

9] (welke verklaring op zich eveneens steun biedt aan de hier bedoelde

verklaringen van [persoon 1]); [persoon 9] heeft verklaard dat hij „heeft

gehoord dat ze het over papieren hadden en wat [persoon 1] moest

zeggen‟ en 2)

uit de tussen [persoon 6] en [persoon 1] op 19 en 23 februari en op 5

maart 2012 gevoerde telefoongesprekken moet worden afgeleid dat

[persoon 6], zoals hij in de later door hem ingetrokken verklaringen

heeft erkend, [persoon 1] moest herinneren aan de afspraak die

[persoon 1] en [persoon 2] hadden gemaakt; [persoon 6] heeft hierover

bij de politie het volgende verklaard: “Ik moest [van [persoon 2]]

zorgen dat [persoon 1] zijn verklaring die hij bij de politie had afgelegd

[zou] intrekken. (…) Ik heb inderdaad met [persoon 1] gesproken over

de telefoon dat hij zich aan de gemaakte afspraken moest houden.” De

rechtbank leidt hieruit af dat [persoon 2] met [persoon 1] een afspraak

had gemaakt wat [persoon 1] tegenover de rechter-commissaris zou

zeggen.

Ten slotte bieden ook de verklaringen van verdachte steun aan de

verklaringen van [persoon 1] dat hij is geïnstrueerd wat hij moest gaan

verklaren bij de rechter-commissaris. Verdachte heeft verklaard dat op

216

zijn kantoor met [persoon 1] over de inhoud van de getuigenverklaring

is gesproken.

De rechtbank acht op grond van het voorgaande bewezen dat verdachte

zich jegens [persoon 1] heeft geuit om diens verklaringsvrijheid te

belemmeren. Er zijn afspraken gemaakt met [persoon 1] over hoe en

wat hij moest verklaren. Het motief van [persoon 2] om [persoon 1] te

laten getuigen was om hem te ontlasten in de tegen hem aanhangige

strafzaak [X].

Onderdeel van deze afspraken was ook dat [persoon 1] kennelijk moest

verdoezelen dat hij voor het verhoor bij de rechter-commissaris door

[persoon 2] was opgehaald. [persoon 1] heeft verklaard dat hem door

verdachte is gezegd dat hij geheid de vraag van de rechter-commissaris

of een van beide officieren van justitie zou krijgen waarom hij, hoewel

hij geen uitnodiging voor het verhoor had ontvangen, toch was

gekomen en welk antwoord hij op die vraag moest geven, namelijk dat

hij van zijn advocaat mevrouw mr. [persoon 5] had vernomen dat hij

voor het verhoor was opgeroepen.

De rechtbank wordt in haar overtuiging gesterkt door de angst van

[persoon 1] voor [persoon 2] die uit het dossier naar voren komt.

[persoon 1] heeft op 26 januari 2012 verklaard dat hij nog steeds bang

is. Ook zijn broer [persoon 10] heeft verklaard dat [persoon 1] bang

was. [persoon 1] heeft verklaard dat hij op verschillende plaatsen

verbleef omdat hij bang was en dat wordt bevestigd door [persoon 6].

Laatstgenoemde heeft verklaard ook zelf bang te zijn. Uit het dossier

volgt dat verdachte ook niet zonder vrees voor [persoon 2] door het

leven ging.

Tot de overtuiging van de rechtbank draagt ten slotte bij dat op het

kantoor van verdachte verschillende briefjes zijn aangetroffen, waarin

instructies van [persoon 2] staan die ertoe strekten andere getuigen te

beïnvloeden.

4.4.4

De rechtbank is van oordeel dat verdachte nauw en bewust heeft

samengewerkt met [persoon 2]. In de nacht van 17 op 18 januari 2012

heeft de meergenoemde bespreking plaatsgevonden op het

advocatenkantoor van verdachte. Hij kende de zaak waarin [persoon 1]

een verklaring moest afleggen en hij zou aanwezig zijn bij het

getuigenverhoor op 19 januari 2012 en had daarom een wezenlijk rol in

het geheel. Verdachte zorgde ervoor dat de zonwering werd neergelaten

toen [persoon 1] zijn kantoor betrad. Op geen enkel ogenblik heeft hij

zich van de gang van zaken in zijn kantoor gedistantieerd. Op 19 januari

2012 hebben verdachte en [persoon 2] voordat [persoon 1] bij de

rechter-commissaris als getuige zou worden gehoord telefonisch contact

gehad en nadat het getuigenverhoor is afgeblazen, hadden zij zelfs 10

minuten telefonisch contact. Op verdachtes kantoor is een aantal

217

instructiebriefjes aangetroffen. Het betreffen briefjes die door [persoon

2] zijn geschreven en die [persoon 2] met verdachte heeft besproken.

4.4.5

Ten aanzien van de ten laste gelegde bedreigingen, intimidatie en het

fysieke geweld waarover [persoon 1] heeft verklaard, is onvoldoende

steun te vinden in het dossier zodat verdachte van dat gedeelte van de

tenlastelegging wordt vrijgesproken.

4.4.6

Op grond van het voorgaande is de rechtbank van oordeel dat het ten

laste gelegde kan worden bewezen zoals in rubriek 5 is uitgewerkt. De

rechtbank grondt haar beslissing dat verdachte het bewezen geachte

heeft begaan op de feiten en omstandigheden die in de bewijsmiddelen

zijn vervat. Zij zal in die gevallen waarin de wet aanvulling van het

vonnis met de bewijsmiddelen vereist, de bewijsmiddelen nader

uitwerken en in een aanvulling opnemen die als bijlage aan dit vonnis

zal worden gehecht.

5 Bewezenverklaring

De rechtbank acht bewezen dat verdachte zich heeft schuldig gemaakt

aan wat hem is ten laste gelegd met dien verstande dat verdachte in de

periode van 17 januari 2012 tot en met 19 januari 2012 te Arnhem,

tezamen en in vereniging met een ander, opzettelijk mondeling zich

jegens [persoon 1] heeft geuit, kennelijk om zijn vrijheid om naar

waarheid of geweten ten overstaan van een rechter een verklaring af te

leggen, te beïnvloeden, terwijl hij en zijn mededader wisten dat die

verklaring zou worden afgelegd, immers hebben hij, verdachte, en zijn

mededader:

-

die [persoon 1] gezegd om bij

gelegenheid van het geplande

getuigenverhoor op 19 januari

2012 in een tegen [persoon 2]

aanhangige strafzaak ten overstaan

van de rechter-commissaris te

verklaren dat hij, [persoon 1],

[persoon 3] in contact heeft

gebracht met [persoon 4] en dat

hij, [persoon 1], [persoon 3] een

grote idioot en een pathologisch

leugenaar vindt en dat hij,

[persoon 1], van zijn advocaat mr.

[persoon 5] vernomen had dat hij

opgeroepen was voor het

getuigenverhoor en

218

-

die [persoon 1] op het

advocatenkantoor van mr.

[verdachte] aantekeningen laten

maken van hetgeen hij bij

gelegenheid van het

getuigenverhoor op 19 januari

2012 ten overstaan van de rechter-

commissaris zou moeten verklaren

en

-

die [persoon 1] een groot

geldbedrag in het vooruitzicht

gesteld indien hij tegenover de

rechter-commissaris een valse

verklaring zou afleggen.

Voor zover in de tenlastelegging taal- en/of schrijffouten staan, zijn

deze verbeterd. Verdachte is hierdoor niet in de verdediging geschaad.

6 De strafbaarheid van het feit

Het bewezen geachte feit is volgens de wet strafbaar. Het bestaan van

een rechtvaardigingsgrond is niet aannemelijk geworden.

7 De strafbaarheid van verdachte

Er is geen omstandigheid aannemelijk geworden die de strafbaarheid

van verdachte uitsluit. Verdachte is dan ook strafbaar.

8 Motivering van de straf

8.1

De eis van de officier van justitie

8.1.1

De officieren van justitie hebben gevorderd dat verdachte voor het door

hen bewezen geachte feit zal worden veroordeeld tot een

voorwaardelijke gevangenisstraf van 3 maanden met een proeftijd van 2

jaren en een taakstraf van 180 uren, met bevel, voor het geval dat

verdachte de werkstraf niet naar behoren verricht, dat vervangende

hechtenis zal worden toegepast van 90 dagen, met aftrek van

voorarrest.

8.1.2

De officieren van justitie hebben hun eis als volgt toegelicht. De

conclusie is dat verdachte niet alleen tot het gaatje voor zijn cliënt heeft

willen gaan, maar ook dat hij gedurende dat proces de lijn tussen

maximale legale inzet en het strafrecht uit het oog heeft verloren, of

erin gezogen is. Een dramatische ontwikkeling voor zowel verdachte,

219

maar niet het minst voor de samenleving. Een advocaat heeft – terecht

– een beschermde positie om de rechtstaat te dienen. Elke verdachte

heeft immers recht op een goede verdediging. Maar op het moment dat

een advocaat deze beschermde positie willens en wetens misbruikt, dan

is dat de bijl aan de wortels

van de rechtsstaat. Bij de strafeis wordt in het nadeel van verdachte

meegenomen de aard en de ernst van dit feit en in het bijzonder het feit

dat hij misbruik heeft gemaakt van zijn bijzonder en beschermde positie

van advocaat. Zoals gezegd tast het de rechtstaat in zijn fundament

aan. In zijn voordeel wordt meegewogen het feit dat verdachte geen

documentatie heeft. Maar het allerbelangrijkste is dat een veroordeling

waarschijnlijke zware tuchtrechtelijke gevolgen zal hebben die een zeer

grote impact op het leven van verdachte zal hebben.

8.2

Het standpunt van de verdediging

De verdediging heeft vrijspraak bepleit en ten aanzien van de strafmaat

geen standpunt ingenomen.

8.3

Het oordeel van de rechtbank

8.3.1

De hierna te noemen strafoplegging is in overeenstemming met de ernst

van het bewezen geachte, de omstandigheden waaronder dit is begaan

en de persoon van verdachte, zoals van een en ander ter terechtzitting

is gebleken.

8.3.2

Het rechtsgoed dat door artikel 285a van het Wetboek van Strafrecht

wordt beschermd, is blijkens de Memorie van Toelichting (Handelingen

II 1991/92, nr. 22 483, item 3, blz. 39), niet zozeer de waarheid van de

verklaring als wel de vrijheid van het onbelemmerd kunnen verklaren

van getuigen en deskundigen. Artikel 285a van het Wetboek van

Strafrecht strekt tot het scheppen van waarborgen om tot

waarheidsvinding in een strafprocedure te komen. Wat betreft het

strafmaximum heeft de wetgever dan ook aansluiting gezocht bij de

sanctie die onder meer is gesteld op uitlokking van meineed en een

strafmaximum van 4 jaren verbonden aan het begaan van dit delict.

Daarmee is tevens de ernst van dit delict tot uitdrukking gebracht (Vgl.

Hof Den Bosch 24 november 2004, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2004:AY7986).

8.3.3

Verdachte, die advocaat is, heeft met een cliënt die hij in een strafzaak

verdedigde, samengespannen om een getuige die bij de rechter-

commissaris zou worden gehoord in die strafzaak te brengen tot het

afleggen van een voor zijn cliënt gunstige verklaring. Zij hebben deze

getuige belemmerd in zijn verklaringsvrijheid door hem te zeggen wat

220

hij moest verklaren. Een en ander heeft plaatsgevonden op het kantoor

van verdachte.

8.3.4

Onoorbare beïnvloeding van een getuige is op zich reeds een ernstige

feit waardoor de rechtsgang kan worden geschaad. In het geval van

verdachte acht de rechtbank het bewezenverklaarde des te ernstiger

omdat hij als advocaat een bijzondere positie in de strafrechtspleging

bekleedt.

8.3.5

De rechtbank houdt er, net zoals de officieren van justitie hebben

gedaan, rekening mee dat deze zaak voor verdachte ook nog de nodige

tuchtrechtelijke repercussies zal kunnen hebben en voorts dat het

initiatief bij verdachtes (toenmalige) cliënt lag en de rechtbank zich niet

aan de indruk kan onttrekken dat verdachte onder druk is gezet.

8.3.6

Alles afwegend is de rechtbank van oordeel dat de gevorderde straf

passend en geboden is.

9 Toepasselijke wettelijke voorschriften

De op te leggen straffen zijn gegrond op de artikelen 14a, 14b, 14c,

22c, 22d, 47 en 285a van het Wetboek van Strafrecht. Deze wettelijke

voorschriften zijn toepasselijk zoals geldend ten tijde van het bewezen

geachte.

10 Beslissing

De rechtbank komt op grond van het voorgaande tot de volgende

beslissing.

Verklaart bewezen dat verdachte het ten laste gelegde heeft begaan

zoals hiervoor in rubriek 5 is vermeld.

Verklaart niet bewezen hetgeen aan verdachte meer of anders is ten

laste gelegd dan hiervoor is bewezen verklaard en spreekt verdachte

daarvan vrij.

Het bewezen verklaarde levert op:

medeplegen van opzettelijk mondeling zich jegens een persoon uiten,

kennelijk om diens vrijheid om naar waarheid of geweten ten overstaan

van een rechter of ambtenaar een verklaring af te leggen te

beïnvloeden, terwijl hij weet dat die verklaring zal worden afgelegd.

Verklaart het bewezene strafbaar.

Verklaart verdachte, [verdachte], daarvoor strafbaar.

Veroordeelt verdachte tot een gevangenisstraf voor de duur van 3

(drie) maanden.

Beveelt dat deze straf niet ten uitvoer gelegd zal worden, tenzij later

anders wordt gelast.

Stelt daarbij een proeftijd van 2 (twee) jaren vast.

221

De tenuitvoerlegging kan worden gelast indien veroordeelde zich voor

het einde van de proeftijd aan een strafbaar feit schuldig maakt.

Veroordeelt verdachte tot een taakstraf bestaande uit het verrichten

van onbetaalde arbeid van 180 (honderdtachtig) uren, met bevel,

voor het geval dat de verdachte de taakstraf niet naar behoren verricht,

dat vervangende hechtenis zal worden toegepast van 3 (drie)

maanden, met bevel dat de tijd die door verdachte vóór de

tenuitvoerlegging van deze uitspraak in verzekering en voorlopige

hechtenis is doorgebracht, bij de uitvoering van deze straf geheel in

mindering zal worden gebracht naar de maatstaf van 2 (twee) uren per

dag.

Heft op het – geschorste – bevel tot voorlopige hechtenis.

Dit vonnis is gewezen door

mr. D.J. Cohen Tervaert, voorzitter,

mrs. J. Knol en G. Voorhorst, rechters,

in tegenwoordigheid van M. Cordia, griffier,

en uitgesproken op de openbare terechtzitting van deze rechtbank van 1

november 2013.

De jongste rechter is buiten staat

dit vonnis mede te ondertekenen.

222

ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:8352

Instantie

Rechtbank Zeeland-West-

Brabant

Datum uitspraak

19-11-2013

Datum publicatie

19-11-2013

Zaaknummer

02-881974-11

Rechtsgebieden

Strafrecht

Bijzondere kenmerken

Eerste aanleg - meervoudig

Inhoudsindicatie

De rechtbank acht bewezen

dat verdachte, advocaat

tijdens een getuigenverhoor

bij de RC, een rechercheur

heeft beledigd. Voor de

bewezenverklaring is met

name van belang de context

waarin de opmerking werd

gemaakt. De rechercheur

werd in november 2009 bij

de rechter-commissaris als

getuige gehoord in een

omvangrijke drugszaak. Bij

dit verhoor, dat zeer stroef

en onplezierig verliep, waren

nog drie andere advocaten

aanwezig. De rechercheur

werd door deze advocaten

zeer kritisch bevraagd en

leek moeite te hebben om de

aan hem gestelde vragen te

beantwoorden. Tijdens dit

verhoor noemde verdachte

de rechercheur in een

verzuchting voor iedereen

hoorbaar “sukkel”.

Het uiten van een dergelijke

belediging in een verhoor is

volgens de rechtbank

223

ongepast. Van een advocaat

mag in zo‟n setting een

zekere mate van

professionaliteit worden

verwacht. De rechtbank legt

echter geen straf op, mede

gezien de lange duur van de

behandeling van deze zaak

en het blanco strafblad van

verdachte.

Vindplaatsen

Rechtspraak.nl

Uitspraak

RECHTBANK ZEELAND-WEST-BRABANT

Strafrecht

Zittingsplaats: Breda

parketnummer: 881974-11

vonnis van de meervoudige kamer d.d. 19 november 2013

in de strafzaak tegen

[verdachte]

geboren op [geboortedatum] te [geboorteplaats]

wonende te [adres]

raadsman mr. De Rooij, advocaat te Helmond

1 Onderzoek van de zaak

De zaak is inhoudelijk behandeld op de zitting van 5 november 2013,

waarbij de officier van justitie, mr. Clarijs, en de verdediging hun

standpunten kenbaar hebben gemaakt.

2 De tenlastelegging

Verdachte staat terecht, terzake dat:

hij op of omstreeks 24 november 2009 te Breda opzettelijk beledigend

een

(politie)ambtenaar, te weten [getuige 1], gedurende en/of ter zake van

de

rechtmatige uitoefening van zijn/haar bediening, in diens

tegenwoordigheid

mondeling heeft toegevoegd de woorden "sukkel", althans woorden van

gelijke

beledigende aard en/of strekking;

3 De voorvragen

3.1

De dagvaarding is geldig.

224

3.2

De rechtbank is bevoegd.

3.3

De ontvankelijkheid van de officier van justitie.

3.3.1

Het standpunt van de verdediging

Met betrekking tot de ontvankelijkheid van de officier van justitie zijn

door de raadsman de volgende verweren gevoerd.

a. De verdediging is van mening dat de “equality of arms” ontbreekt en

daarmee ook het “fair trial” als bedoeld in artikel 6 van het Europees

Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de

fundamentele vrijheden (EVRM). De verdediging heeft daartoe een

uitspraak van het Hof te ‟s-Hertogenbosch (K12/0466) aangehaald,

waarbij de beklagkamer heeft geoordeeld dat niet van enig strafbaar feit

sprake was, waar het ging om de officier van justitie die in zijn (op

schrift gestelde) requisitoir de verdachte een “laffe loser” en “een man

zonder ruggengraat” noemde. De verdediging heeft aangevoerd dat

verdachte, als regelrechte tegenpool van het openbaar ministerie, in het

onderhavige geval, niet anders heeft gehandeld.

b. De verdediging is van mening dat niet bewezen kan worden dat

de getuige [getuige 1] in de rechtmatige uitoefening van zijn bediening

was, op het moment dat hij als getuige werd gehoord. Om die reden

blijft naar de mening van de verdediging van de tenlastelegging slechts

over de eenvoudige belediging ex artikel 266 van het Wetboek van

Strafrecht. De verdediging is van mening dat niet is voldaan aan het

klachtvereiste en dat het openbaar ministerie om die reden niet-

ontvankelijk moet worden verklaard.

3.3.2

Het standpunt van de officier van justitie

Betreffende het niet-ontvankelijkheidsverweer op grond van het fair

trial-beginsel heeft de officier van justitie aangevoerd dat het zeer lastig

is om de zaken die de raadsman heeft genoemd, met elkaar te

vergelijken. De officier van justitie is van mening dat er een duidelijk

verschil is in de rol die een officier van justitie ter terechtzitting heeft en

de rol van de raadsman tijdens het horen van een getuige.

Voor wat betreft het klachtvereiste heeft de officier van justitie

opgemerkt dat, gelet op de aangifte van [getuige 1] en de door hem

ingestelde artikel 12 Sv-procedure, [getuige 1] heel duidelijk kenbaar

heeft gemaakt dat hij de vervolging van verdachte heeft gewild.

3.3.3

Het oordeel van de rechtbank

Betreffende het onder a. gevoerde verweer overweegt de rechtbank het

navolgende.

225

Ter terechtzitting heeft verdachte verklaard dat hij in een verzuchting

het woord “sukkel” heeft uitgesproken en dat hij op dat moment geen

effectbejag had. Nadat [getuige 1] verdachte vroeg wat hij zei, heeft

verdachte geantwoord dat hij “sukkel” had gezegd.

Het door de verdediging aangehaalde voorbeeld van een officier van

justitie die in zijn schriftelijke requisitoir de woorden “laffe loser” en

“een man zonder ruggengraat” opneemt en ter terechtzitting ook

uitspreekt, is naar het oordeel van de rechtbank van een geheel andere

orde. Het gaat dan met name om de context waarbinnen de betreffende

officier van justitie die woorden heeft uitgesproken. Die specifieke

context van dat geval is de rechtbank niet bekend. De rechtbank

constateert slechts dat het Hof van oordeel is geweest dat in dat

specifieke geval het gebruik van die woorden kon worden aanvaard om

zodoende het ten laste gelegde feit in zijn context te plaatsen.

De rechtbank constateert dat de verzuchting van verdachte heeft

plaatsgevonden in de beslotenheid van het kabinet van de rechter-

commissaris. Op dat moment waren daar, naast verdachte, ook

aanwezig de rechter-commissaris en drie andere raadslieden in het

[onderzoek]. [getuige 1] werd op dat moment al geruime tijd gehoord

als getuige in het [onderzoek] en uit het proces-verbaal van de rechter-

commissaris blijkt dat dit verhoor op een onplezierige manier plaatsvond

en dat de betreffende raadslieden bijzonder ontevreden waren over de

manier waarop [getuige 1] antwoord gaf op de aan hem gestelde

vragen. Vragen die met name door verdachte werden gesteld. Dat is de

context waarbinnen verdachte zijn verzuchting heeft gedaan en de

rechtbank is van oordeel dat het onderhavige geval van een totaal

andere orde is dan de door de raadsman aangehaalde casus. De

rechtbank is op grond daarvan dan ook van oordeel dat hier geen

sprake is van een gelijk geval dat ongelijk wordt behandeld. Van

schending van artikel 6 van het EVRM is dan ook geen sprake.

Voordat de rechtbank toekomt aan de beoordeling van het onder b.

gevoerde verweer, is van belang de vraag of een eventuele belediging

aan [getuige 1] werd toegevoegd gedurende en/of ter zake van de

rechtmatige uitoefening van zijn bediening. Indien deze vraag namelijk

bevestigend kan worden beantwoord, behoeft dit niet-

ontvankelijkheidsverweer geen bespreking meer.

Op basis van de processtukken heeft de rechtbank vast kunnen stellen

dat [getuige 1] op 24 november 2009 bij de rechter-commissaris als

ambtenaar van politie werd gehoord en dat hij tijdens dat verhoor alleen

werd bevraagd met betrekking tot zijn handelen als financieel

rechercheur in het strafrechtelijk [onderzoek]. In zijn proces-verbaal

van bevindingen geeft [getuige 1] ook aan dat hij door de rechter-

commissaris werd gehoord met betrekking tot zijn functie en rol in het

[onderzoek], de totstandkoming van het door hem opgemaakte proces-

226

verbaal, de inhoud (de gehanteerde methodiek en berekening) daarvan

en het opgemaakte erratum op dat proces-verbaal.

De rechtbank is reeds op grond van deze vaststelling van oordeel dat de

uitlating van verdachte richting [getuige 1] werd gedaan, ter zake van

de rechtmatige uitoefening van zijn bediening.

Een beoordeling van het verweer met betrekking tot het klachtvereiste

kan derhalve achterwege blijven nu de rechtbank niet toekomt aan de

vraag of er sprake was van eenvoudige belediging als bedoeld in artikel

266 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht.

Op grond van het vorenstaande is de officier van justitie ontvankelijk in

de vervolging.

3.4

Er is geen reden voor schorsing van de vervolging.

4 De beoordeling van het bewijs

4.1

Het standpunt van de officier van justitie

De officier van justitie acht het ten laste gelegde wettig en overtuigend

bewezen en baseert zich daarbij op het proces-verbaal van de officier

van justitie mr. De Brouwer, houdende de aangifte door [getuige 1], het

proces-verbaal van bevindingen van [getuige 1], het proces-verbaal van

de rechter-commissaris mr. Lameijer en het proces-verbaal raadkamer

van het Gerechtshof ‟s-Hertogenbosch van 5 april 2011.

4.2

Het standpunt van de verdediging

Met betrekking tot de bewezenverklaring heeft de verdediging het

navolgende aangevoerd.

a. De verdediging is van

mening dat de rechtbank

niet tot een

bewezenverklaring kan

komen dat [getuige 1] in de

rechtmatige uitoefening van

zijn bediening was, op het

moment dat door verdachte

“sukkel” werd gezegd.

b. Voorts heeft de verdediging

met betrekking tot het

gebruikte woord “sukkel”

aangevoerd:

* dat het door verdachte gebruikte woord “sukkel” in dit geval niet kan

worden gewaardeerd als een strafbare belediging. De verdediging heeft

daarbij gewezen op de wijze waarop verdachte dat woord heeft

227

gebezigd, namelijk als verzuchting, en de context waarin dit moet

worden geplaatst.

* dat verdachte niet het opzet heeft gehad op het beledigen van de heer

[getuige 1].

* dat het woord “sukkel” op zichzelf genomen niet beledigend te achten

is.

* dat, indien het woord “sukkel” op zichzelf genomen een strafbare

belediging inhoudt, door de context waarin dit woord werd gezegd, de

strafbaarheid wordt weggenomen. De verdediging heeft daartoe nog

aangevoerd dat het getuigenverhoor plaatsvond in de beslotenheid van

het kabinet van de rechter-commissaris.

4.3

Het oordeel van de rechtbank

Op 24 november 2009 werd [getuige 1] als getuige gehoord bij de

rechter-commissaris te Breda1. Bij dat verhoor was ook verdachte

aanwezig en de rechter-commissaris heeft in het proces-verbaal als

opmerking opgenomen dat verdachte tijdens een indringende en heftige

discussie tegen de getuige [getuige 1] “sukkel” heeft gezegd. [getuige

1] heeft als inspecteur van politie een proces-verbaal van bevindingen

opgemaakt2 waarin hij aangeeft dat hij door de rechter-commissaris

werd gehoord met betrekking tot zijn functie en rol in het [onderzoek],

de totstandkoming van het door hem opgemaakte proces-verbaal, de

inhoud (de gehanteerde methodiek en berekening) daarvan en het

opgemaakte erratum op dat proces-verbaal. Tijdens dat verhoor zou

verdachte duidelijk hoorbaar voor alle aanwezigen in de

onderzoekskamer “sukkel” tegen hem hebben gezegd. [getuige 1] heeft

aangegeven dat hij zich daardoor beledigd voelde in zijn eer en goede

naam. [getuige 1] heeft op 1 december 2009 bij de officier van justitie

aangifte gedaan van belediging3.

Ter terechtzitting heeft verdachte verklaard4 dat hij tijdens het verhoor

van [getuige 1] bij de rechter-commissaris in een verzuchting het woord

“sukkel” heeft geuit.

Voor wat betreft het onder a. genoemde verweer van de verdediging

verwijst de rechtbank naar hetgeen zij hieromtrent onder 3.3 heeft

overwogen en zij verwerpt dan ook dit verweer.

Met betrekking tot de onder b. genoemde verweren stelt de rechtbank

allereerst vast dat [getuige 1], zo blijkt uit het door hem opgemaakt

proces-verbaal van bevindingen, zich beledigd heeft gevoeld.

De rechtbank is op grond van de verklaring van verdachte en de

getuigen van oordeel dat het woord “sukkel” inderdaad door verdachte

als een verzuchting werd uitgesproken.

228

De rechtbank is voorts met de verdediging van oordeel dat de

intrinsieke betekenis van het woord “sukkel” zeker niet in alle gevallen

een strafbare belediging op zal leveren. Het gaat dan met name om de

eerder besproken context waarin dit woord werd uitgesproken.

Zoals reeds eerder overwogen, heeft verdachte in een verzuchting

“sukkel” gezegd. [getuige 2]5 en [getuige 3]6 hebben beiden verklaard

dat zij verdachte het woord “sukkel” in een verzuchting hebben horen

zeggen en ook de rechter-commissaris heeft in zijn proces-verbaal van

24 november 2009 opgenomen dat tijdens een indringende en heftige

discussie tussen de raadslieden en de rechter-commissaris met de

getuige, verdachte tegen [getuige 1] “sukkel” heeft gezegd. De

rechtbank is van oordeel dat hiermee vast is komen te staan dat

verdachte in de beslotenheid van de verhoorkamer bij de rechter-

commissaris en voor iedereen duidelijk hoorbaar “sukkel” heeft gezegd

tegen de getuige [getuige 1]. Voorts stelt de rechtbank vast dat

[getuige 1] op dat moment door vier raadslieden zeer kritisch werd

bevraagd en zich op dat moment in een bijzonder ongemakkelijke

situatie bevond, met name ook omdat het verhoor, zoals de rechter-

commissaris heeft aangegeven, bijzonder stroef verliep, waardoor er

irritaties ontstonden en [getuige 1] moeite leek te hebben om de aan

hem gestelde vragen te beantwoorden. Dit is naar het oordeel van de

rechtbank de context waarin de opmerking van verdachte moet worden

geplaatst en de rechtbank is op grond daarvan van oordeel dat het voor

iedereen hoorbaar verzuchten van “sukkel” als een strafbare belediging

moet worden aangemerkt.

Rest nog de vraag of verdachte ook het opzet heeft gehad om [getuige

1] te beledigen door hem “sukkel” te noemen. De rechtbank

beantwoordt deze vraag bevestigend. Door in de hiervoor beschreven

situatie “sukkel” te zeggen, terwijl dit voor iedereen hoorbaar was, heeft

verdachte naar het oordeel van de rechtbank bewust de aanmerkelijke

kans aanvaard dat [getuige 1] zich daardoor beledigd zou voelen.

Op grond van het vorenstaande is de rechtbank dan ook van oordeel dat

het ten laste gelegde wettig en overtuigend bewezen kan worden.

4.4

De bewezenverklaring

De rechtbank acht wettig en overtuigend bewezen dat verdachte

hij op of omstreeks 24 november 2009 te Breda opzettelijk beledigend

een

(politie)ambtenaar, te weten [getuige 1], gedurende en/of ter zake van

de

rechtmatige uitoefening van zijn/haar bediening, in diens

tegenwoordigheid

229

mondeling heeft toegevoegd het woord "sukkel" althans woorden van

gelijke

beledigende aard en/of strekking;

De rechtbank acht niet bewezen hetgeen meer of anders is ten laste

gelegd. Verdachte zal daarvan worden vrijgesproken.

5 De strafbaarheid

Er zijn geen feiten of omstandigheden aannemelijk geworden die de

strafbaarheid van het feit uitsluiten. Dit levert het in de beslissing

genoemde strafbare feit op.

Verdachte is strafbaar, omdat niet is gebleken van een omstandigheid

die zijn strafbaarheid uitsluit.

6 De strafoplegging

6.1

De vordering van de officier van justitie

De officier van justitie vordert aan verdachte op te leggen een geldboete

van € 500,=, te vervangen bij niet betaling door 10 dagen hechtenis.

6.2

Het standpunt van de verdediging

De verdediging heeft niets aangevoerd met betrekking tot een aan

verdachte op te leggen straf omdat zij van mening is dat de officier van

justitie niet-ontvankelijk moet worden verklaard dan wel dat verdachte

moet worden vrijgesproken van het ten laste gelegde.

6.3

Het oordeel van de rechtbank

Op 24 november 2009 werd de financieel rechercheur [getuige 1] bij de

rechter-commissaris als getuige gehoord in het [onderzoek]. [getuige 1]

was de laatste rechercheur in een reeks van verbalisanten die in dat

onderzoek werd gehoord en uit alles blijkt dat het verhoor van [getuige

1] bijzonder stroef en onplezierig is verlopen, dat sprake was van

irritaties over en weer en dat dit er uiteindelijk toe heeft geleid dat

verdachte de getuige [getuige 1] heeft beledigd door in een verzuchting

“sukkel” tegen hem te zeggen.

Zonder dat de rechtbank verder nog een oordeel wil geven over de gang

van zaken met betrekking tot het getuigenverhoor en hetgeen verder

aan de orde is geweest in het [onderzoek], is zij van oordeel dat het

uiten van een dergelijke belediging ongepast is en niet thuis hoort in

een dergelijke setting, waar een zekere mate van professionaliteit mag

worden verwacht.

Ten tijde van het bewezen verklaarde feit was sprake van een blanco

strafblad.

230

Gelet op de landelijke oriëntatiepunten voor straftoemeting van het

Landelijk Overleg Vakinhoud Strafrecht) (LOVS), zou een geldboete ter

grootte van € 200,- à € 300,- in de rede liggen.

In het voordeel van verdachte zal de rechtbank rekening houden met de

omstandigheid dat het inmiddels vier jaar heeft geduurd alvorens deze -

in de basis eenvoudige- zaak tot een einde is gekomen en met de

omstandigheden waaronder het bewezenverklaarde is begaan. Aan het

voorgaande doet niet af dat het tijdsverloop ten dele ook aan verdachte

zelf te wijten is geweest.

Alles afwegend, is de rechtbank van oordeel dat zij het niet opportuun

acht dat aan verdachte voor het bewezenverklaarde thans nog een straf

wordt opgelegd. De rechtbank zal daarom verdachte schuldig verklaren

zonder oplegging van straf of maatregel.

7 De benadeelde partij

De benadeelde partij [getuige 1] vordert een bedrag van € 75,= ter

zake van immateriële schade.

De rechtbank is van oordeel dat de gevorderde schade een rechtstreeks

gevolg is van het bewezen verklaarde feit en acht verdachte

aansprakelijk voor die schade.

Het gevorderde is voldoende aannemelijk gemaakt en wordt door de

verdediging niet weersproken, zodat de vordering zal worden

toegewezen.

Met betrekking tot de toegekende vordering benadeelde partij zal de

rechtbank tevens de schadevergoedingsmaatregel opleggen.

8 De wettelijke voorschriften

De beslissing berust op de artikelen 9a, 36f, 63, 266 en 267 van het

Wetboek van Strafrecht, zoals deze artikelen luidden ten tijde van het

bewezenverklaarde.

9 De beslissing

De rechtbank:

Voorvragen

- verklaart de officier van justitie ontvankelijk in de vervolging van

verdachte;

Bewezenverklaring

- verklaart het ten laste gelegde bewezen op de wijze als hierboven

onder 4.4 is omschreven;

- spreekt verdachte vrij van hetgeen meer of anders is ten laste gelegd;

Strafbaarheid

- verklaart dat het bewezenverklaarde het volgende strafbare feit

oplevert:

231

Eenvoudige belediging, terwijl de belediging wordt aangedaan aan een

ambtenaar gedurende of ter zake van de rechtmatige uitoefening van

zijn bediening;

- verklaart verdachte strafbaar;

Strafoplegging

- bepaalt dat geen straf of maatregel wordt opgelegd;

Benadeelde partijen

- veroordeelt verdachte tot betaling aan de benadeelde partij [getuige

1] van € 75,= ter zake van immateriële schade;

- veroordeelt verdachte in de kosten van de benadeelde partij, tot nu

toe gemaakt en ten behoeve van de tenuitvoerlegging nog te maken, tot

op heden begroot op nihil;

- legt aan verdachte de verplichting op aan de Staat, ten behoeve van

het slachtoffer [getuige 1], € 75,= te betalen, bij niet betaling te

vervangen door 1 dag hechtenis, met dien verstande dat toepassing van

de vervangende hechtenis de betalingsverplichting niet opheft;

- bepaalt dat bij voldoening van de schadevergoedingsmaatregel de

betalingsverplichting aan de benadeelde partij vervalt en omgekeerd;

Dit vonnis is gewezen door mr. Joele, voorzitter, mr. Hello en mr.

Schiffers-Hanssen, rechters, in tegenwoordigheid van Nouws, griffier, en

is uitgesproken ter openbare zitting op 19 november 2013.

1 Het proces-verbaal van verhoor getuige door de rechter-commissaris

d.d. 24 november 2009.

2 Het proces-verbaal van bevindingen van [getuige 1] d.d. 4 december

2009.

3 Het proces-verbaal van aangifte door [getuige 1] d.d. 1 december

2009.

4 De verklaring van verdachte, afgelegd op de zitting van 5 november

2013.

5 Het proces-verbaal van verhoor getuige [getuige 2] door de rechter-

commissaris.

6 Het proces-verbaal van verhoor getuige [getuige 3] door de rechter-

commissaris.

232

Section 1.06 ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14150

Instantie

Rechtbank Den Haag

Datum uitspraak

16-10-2013

Datum publicatie

23-10-2013

Zaaknummer

96/044269-13

Rechtsgebieden

Strafrecht

Bijzondere kenmerken

Eerste aanleg - enkelvoudig

Inhoudsindicatie

Betwisting ontvankelijkheid in alcoholzaak (tussenvonnis).

Bestuurder van personenauto gedagvaard, terwijl in het kader

van een bestuursrechtelijke procedure reeds het

alcoholslotprogramma was opgelegd. Beroep op ne bis in idem

omdat de opgelegde maatregel moet worden aangemerkt als een

criminal charge.

De politierechter overweegt dat een ongeldigverklaring van het

rijbewijs gedurende vijf jaar als een criminal charge is aan te

merken, indien die ongeldigverklaring het gevolg is van een

zwaarwegende onmogelijkheid aan het alcoholslotprogramma

deel te nemen. Heropening van het onderzoek voor informatie

omtrent de zwaarwegende omstandigheden.

Vindplaatsen

Rechtspraak.nl

(a) Uitspraak

Rechtbank DEN HAAG

Strafrecht

Politierechter

Parketnummer 96/044269-13

Datum uitspraak: 16 oktober 2013

De politierechter in de rechtbank Den Haag heeft het navolgende

tussenvonnis gewezen in de zaak van de officier van justitie tegen de

verdachte:

Section 1.07 [verdachte],

geboren te [geboorteplaats] op [geboortedag] 1960,

[adres].

Section 1.08 De terechtzitting.

Het onderzoek is gehouden ter terechtzitting van 2 oktober 2013.

De verdachte, bijgestaan door haar raadsman mr P.T. Verweijen,

advocaat te Den Haag, is verschenen en gehoord.

233

De officier van justitie mr I. Doves heeft gevorderd dat verdachte ter

zake van het haar bij dagvaarding ten laste gelegde wordt veroordeeld

tot een geldboete van € 1300,00 subsidiair 26 dagen hechtenis,

waarvan € 700,00 subsidiair 14 dagen hechtenis voorwaardelijk met een

proeftijd van 2 jaren, alsmede tot een ontzegging van de bevoegdheid

motorrijtuigen te besturen voor de duur van 7 maanden, met aftrek van

de tijd dat het rijbewijs reeds ingevorderd is geweest.

Section 1.09 De tenlastelegging.

Aan de verdachte is ten laste gelegd dat:

zij op of omstreeks 22 februari 2013 te 's-Gravenhage als bestuurder

van een voertuig, (personenauto), dit voertuig heeft bestuurd, na

zodanig gebruik van alcoholhoudende drank, dat het alcoholgehalte van

haar adem bij een onderzoek, als bedoeld in artikel 8, tweede lid,

aanhef en onder a van de Wegenverkeerswet 1994, 805 microgram, in

elk geval hoger dan 220 microgram, alcohol per liter uitgeademde lucht

bleek te zijn;

( art 8 lid 2 ahf/ond a Wegenverkeerswet 1994 )

Section 1.10 De ontvankelijkheid van de officier van justitie.

De raadsman heeft aangevoerd dat de officier van justitie niet-

ontvankelijk dient te worden verklaard in de vervolging omdat aan

verdachte reeds het alcoholslotprogramma is opgelegd. Naar de mening

van de verdediging is dit een „punitive charge‟ in de zin van artikel 6 van

het EVRM en zou er sprake zijn van dubbele bestraffing. Daarom zou de

vervolging door de officier van justitie strijd opleveren met het ne bis in

idem beginsel zoals dat is neergelegd in artikel 68 van het Wetboek van

Strafrecht.

Section 1.11 Het standpunt van de officier van justitie

De ovj heeft gesteld wel ontvankelijk te zijn omdat naar vaste

rechtspraak de oplegging van het alcoholslotprogramma niet wordt

aangemerkt als een criminal charge, zodat er geen sprake is van

dubbele bestraffing.

Section 1.12 De beoordeling van de ontvankelijkheid

De politierechter overweegt wat betreft de feitelijke achtergrond van het

verzoek het volgende. Het alcoholslotprogramma is een programma met

een duur van ten minste twee jaar dat kan worden opgelegd aan

bestuurders die in beginsel in aanmerking komen voor een

ongeldigverklaring van het rijbewijs (voor alle categorieën waar het voor

is afgegeven). De strekking van dit programma is dat de bestuurder een

beperkt rijbewijs wordt aangeboden voor categorie B, welk rijbewijs

hem de bevoegdheid verleent uitsluitend het voertuig categorie B te

besturen waarin een specifiek voor zijn persoon bestemd alcoholslot is

ingebouwd. Inbouw in een vrachtwagen of autobus is door de wetgever

niet voorzien. Indien de bestuurder niet van dit aanbod gebruik kan

234

maken of wil maken volgt een ongeldigverklaring van het rijbewijs voor

tenminste vijf jaar. Voor de houder van het vrachtwagenrijbewijs brengt

dit mee dat hij gedurende zijn deelname aan het alcoholslot-programma

wel kan rijden in een personenauto maar niet in een vrachtwagen. De

kosten voor het programma komen voor rekening van de deelnemende

bestuurder en bedragen circa vier- tot vijfduizend euro. Deze kosten

betreffen de inbouw van het alcoholslot, de controles daarop, de

controle van de bestuurder en het volgen van de zogenoemde

motivatiecursus.

Indien de bestuurder niet beschikt over een voertuig categorie B waar

hij het alcoholslot kan laten inbouwen is er geen mogelijkheid om aan

het alcoholslotprogramma deel te nemen. Die mogelijkheid is er ook niet

indien de bestuurder in de onmogelijkheid verkeert de kosten van het

programma voor zijn rekening te nemen. Voor deze bestuurders volgt

derhalve de automatische ongeldigverklaring van het rijbewijs voor ten

minste vijf jaar. Ervaring met het alcoholslotprogramma heeft inmiddels

geleerd dat meer dan de helft van de bestuurders geen gebruik van het

aanbod tot deelname kan of wil maken.

De regelgeving betreffende het alcoholslotprogramma wordt uitgevoerd

door het CBR. Toetsing vindt plaats door de bestuursrechter en in

hoogste instantie de Raad van State. Tot voor kort heeft de

bestuursrechter als vast uitgangspunt genomen dat de oplegging van

het alcoholslotprogramma niet als een criminal charge is aan te merken.

De strafrechter heeft dit gevolgd, wat meebrengt dat een beroep op ne

bis in idem niet slaagt.

De raadsman in zijn uitvoerige toelichting op de gestelde niet

ontvankelijkheid wegens ne bis in idem , heeft gewezen op een tweetal

uitspraken van de bestuursrechter waarin is geoordeeld dat onder de

specifieke omstandigheden van die zaken er wel sprake was van een

criminal charge . Die twee zaken betroffen de situatie waarin een

beroepsvrachtwagen- chauffeur als gevolg van deelname aan het

alcoholslotprogramma gedurende tenminste twee jaar weliswaar in een

personenauto zou mogen rijden maar niet zijn beroep als

vrachtwagenchauffeur zou kunnen uitoefenen omdat het rijbewijs voor

de desbetreffende categorieën gedurende ten minste twee jaar ongeldig

zou zijn. De raadsman leidt hieruit af dat de rechtspraak om is, in die

zin dat in de situatie van een beroepsvrachtwagenchauffeur waar het

alcoholslotprogramma leidt tot de onmogelijkheid het beroep uit te

oefenen gedurende twee jaar, sprake is van een gevolg dat zo

ingrijpend en zwaarwegend is dat gesproken dient te worden van een

criminal charge . In het verlengde daarvan betoogt de raadsman dat in

die situatie dat er sprake is van feitelijke onmogelijkheid aan het

programma deel te nemen, waar een ten minste vijf jaar durende

ongeldigheid van het rijbewijs op volgt, evenzeer, zo al niet nog meer,

sprake is van een criminal charge . Aansluitend heeft hij gesteld dat

verdachte, houdster van een rijbewijs voor categorie B is aangeboden

aan het alcoholslotprogramma deel te nemen. Daarnaast heeft de

raadsman aangevoerd dat verdachte in de onmogelijkheid verkeert om

aan het alcoholslotprogramma deel te nemen, omdat zij niet over de

noodzakelijke financiën beschikt.

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Naar het oordeel van de politierechter is een ongeldigverklaring van het

rijbewijs gedurende vijf jaar als een criminal charge aan te merken

indien die ongeldigverklaring het gevolg is van een zwaar wegende

onmogelijkheid aan het alcoholslotprogramma deel te nemen.

Section 1.13 Heropening en schorsing van het onderzoek ter

terechtzitting

Na de sluiting van het onderzoek is onder de beraadslaging gebleken dat

het onderzoek niet volledig is geweest.

De politierechter acht zich omtrent het door CBR gedane aanbod en de

modaliteiten daarvan niet voldoende ingelicht en acht het noodzakelijk

dat de raadsman alsnog gedocumenteerde inlichtingen verschaft. Voorts

dient een afdoende onderbouwing te worden gegeven aan de gestelde

financiële onmogelijkheid om aan het programma deel te nemen. Ten

slotte wil de politierechter worden geïnformeerd omtrent de feitelijke

keuze die verdachte heeft gemaakt met betrekking tot de voorgestelde

deelname.

Daarom zal het onderzoek worden heropend en geschorst.

De stukken zullen in handen van de officier van justitie worden gesteld.

Section 1.14 Beslissing

De politierechter,

heropent en schorst het onderzoek en beveelt dat het onderzoek zal

worden hervat op een nader te bepalen terechtzitting;

stelt de stukken in handen van de officier van justitie;

beveelt de oproeping van de verdachte tegen het tijdstip van een nader

te bepalen terechtzitting, met verstrekking van een afschrift van die

oproeping aan de raadsman van de verdachte.

Dit tussenvonnis is gewezen door

mr Chr.A.J.F.M. Hensen, politierechter,

in tegenwoordigheid van mr H.A.F. Tromp, griffier,

en uitgesproken ter openbare terechtzitting van de politierechter in deze

rechtbank

van 16 oktober 2013.

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