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Volume 25 Number OneJanuary/March IW9

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; B I I

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives ofthe Institute are:

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Journal of the Australian Naval InstituteISSN 0312 — 5807 Volume 25 Number 1 January/March 1999

CONTENTS

Cover — Arm\ Blackhawk Helicopters providedHMAS Tohnik and 2 RAR with air supportfor Exercise Initial Landing 99

Rack Cover - HMAS Tohnik at anchor preparing tounload vehicles.

Apology1. The author of "People... the last to be

considered" in our last edition was CMDRJackson RNZN, not CORE McCaffrie asannotated.

2. Mr Bi l l Reeve's surname was incorrectly writtenas Reave.

PO BOX 80Campbell ACT 2600

Designed, typeset and printed byNCP

22 Pirie Street, Fyshwick ACT 2609. Phone (02) 6280 7477

4 Editorial

5 Amphibious Operations Doctrine

- Commander A.K. Whittaker - RAN

8 Military Sea Lift - The role ofHMNZS Charles Upham

- Commander Richard Jackson - RNZN

10 Unarmed Prophets: AmphibiousWarfare in Australian MilitaryThought

- Michael Evans - Land Warfare Studies Centre

20 Breaking the Spears: HMASTOBRUK'S Involvment in TruceMonitoring Operations in Bougainville

- Commander A.K. du Toit - RAN

24 A Navy Perspective of the Rise ofAmphibious Capability

27 HMAS Protector and SMS Emden

- Commander Robin Pennock - RAN (Rtd)

30 The Battle of Yalu

- Graham Wilson

37 New Zealand's Defence EquipmentDecisions

- Commander Richard Jackson - RNZN

39 President's Report - 1999 AGM

42 A Force for All Seasons

- Lieutenant Commander John Robinson RAN

49 Amphibious Warfare and the ADF

- Maritime Command

51 Book Review

January/March 1999

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

EditorialAmphibious Warfare

In the current political and social climate of ourregion it would not be beyond the realms ofpossibility that the ADF needs to provide force

overseas. If that particular force required elements ofArmour, Artillery and Aviation to support Infantryelements how would we get it there? If the Navy wastasked today, we have one asset that could provide theservice. Would that be sufficient for even a low-levelcommitment?

Is the Navy adequately preparing for likely scenariosor are they preparing for "blue water" conflicts thatwould have been relevant twenty years ago? Are wepursuing a naval strategy at the expense of a maritimestrategy? Are Navy strategists and planners paying lipservice to a maritime strategy by maintaining a tokensea lift capability? Clearly a much larger force isrequired to deploy (and land) the sort of land forcesAustralia might want to have available to give somemeat to the bones of a maritime strategy. Are forcestructure planners driving strategy by maximising thelevel of the more "glamorous" surface combatantforce at the expense of the amphibious workhorse?

This edition of the journal wi l l give you an insightinto Amphibious Warfare and its part in our maritimestrategy. This aspect of warfare crosses serviceboundaries more directly than any other and as suchst imulates some interesting discussion. There are anumber of articles from both the Navy and Army sidesof the house along with contributions from NewZealand.

The first article in the JANI 's Amphibious Warfareedition is a useful setting piece by Commander AndyWhittaker, the Deputy Director Doctrine at the ADFWarfare Centre. If you have any doubts on whatAmphibious Warfare actually is - this article wi l ll e a v e v o n in no doubt . The ar t ic le sets the 'sheet ofmusic' firmly on the music stand.

Doctor Michael Evans, the research Historian with theLand Warfare Study Centre, presents a historicaldevelopment of amphibious capabili ty in Australia.

Unarmed Prophets 'traces the historical outline of analternate strand of mil i tary thought ' - t ha t ofamphibious capability. This article is followed by oneprepared by Commander W. Johnston that outlines theRAN perspective of the rise of amphibious warfare.The two articles read in parallel present an interestingbalance of opinion that show Army and Navy areworking well together in rejuvenating the ADFamphibious lift capability.

Lieutenant Commander John Robinson. RAN hasprovided an article that encourages the concept of atotal ADF force capability. The common thoughtsbehind both Dr Evans' and LCDR Robinson's articlesestablishes the most up-to-date planning basis notonly in the Navy, but also in the ADF.

Commander Richard Jackson from the New ZealandNavy has provided a k iwi perspective on theamphibious capability of the RNZN. Military SeaLift uses the conversion of HMNZS CHARLESUPHAM to make comment on the NZDF amphibiouspolicy.

Having spoken at length on doctrine and thedeve lopment of an amphibious capab i l i t yCommander du Toil details the involvement ofHMAS TOBRUK in recent operations inBougainville. This is a "been there" article that placesinto perspective the doctrine and development issuesdiscussed in previous articles.

There is also an article on New Zealand equipmentpurchases provided h\ Commander Jackson and anhistorical section.

The Apri l June edit ion is current ly underdevelopment and will deal with the relevance ofsurface ships in the modern battlefield. This theme issure to promote some healthy discussion. Any articleson this topic or any other you would like to see in theJournal would be welcome.

ANDREW BEWICK

January/March 1999


Amphibious Operations Doctrineby Commander A. K. Whittaker, RAN

The term Amphibious Operations evokes inmany people images of troops storming thebeaches of Iwo Jima and Normandy "Saving

Private Ryan" style. However, modern amphibiousoperations are far removed from the practices of thepast and aim to manoeuvre forces in the littoral areafrom a seaward approach, avoiding the enemy'sdefences and the inherent attrition of a direct assault.

The Australian Defence Force has recently reviewedits amphibious operations doctrine to keep pace withinternat ional developments in amphibious warfareand to cater for the introduction of the two newLanding Platforms Amphibious, HMA ShipsMdiioo/'d and Kanimhla.

An overview of the new doctrine follows in th isarticle which summarises the content of the soon to bepublished Australian Defence Force Publication 12 -Amphibious Operations. Of note is the replacementof the term Amphibious Tactical Lodgement (ATL)with the term Amphibious Assault which includes thetwo categories 'assault on a potentially hostile shore'and 'assault on a hostile shore.' The term ATL wasunique to the ADF and the adoption of the termAmphibious Assault brings the ADF into line within te rna t iona l doctrine and enhances the ADF'sinteroperability with its allies.

IntroductionThe mari t ime environment provides commanderswith significant scope to conduct manoeuvre warfarethrough the employment of amphibious operations.Amphibious operations are operations launched fromthe sea by a joint task force against a hostile orpotentially hostile shore with the aim of rapidly anddecisively concentrating combat power w i t h i n thelittoral battlespace. The boundary between sea andland is no longer a barrier as in the past, but rather anarea in which an amphib ious operation can bemounted by assault ing through a coastal focal point inan uninterrupted manoeuvre towards the objective.

Amphibious operations afford a broad range ofoptions to apply mil i tary force and project power insupport of operations ashore. Manoeuvre warfare,u t i l i s i n g amphibious operations, seeks to achieveresults disproportionate to the resources applied bydenigrating an enemy's effectiveness through a seriesof coordinated rapid, violent and unexpected actions.The object is to create a tu rbu len t and fastdeteriorating situation that overwhelms the enemy.Emphasis is placed on speed, mobili ty, deception andsurprise to create confusion, uncertainty and delay inthe enemy response.

Modern amphibious conceptsContemporary defensive capabilities have renderedthe World War II amphibious tactic of stormingheavily defended beaches unlikely to succeed withoutunreasonable cost. Amphibious operations shouldtherefore be focused where adversaries' defences arcweakest, or indeed, non-existent. They should beconducted at a time and place that wi l l enable themaximum build-up and application of combat powerbefore the enemy has time to react.

The amphibious task force has significant inherentadvantages. It has operational mobi l i ty and can poiseat sea. Its flexibility in ship to shore manoeuvre candisguise the intended location of landing and producediversions and deceptions. This creates uncertainty inthe enemy and can lead to the incorrect positioning ofdefensive forces. Amphibious operations would oftenbe supported by. or in conjunction with, airborneoperations which can exacerbate the enemy'suncertainty.

Amphibious operations are executed in breadth anddepth utilising parachute and helicopter-borne troopson the enemy's flank and rear, and seaborne deliveryof land forces by landing craft. An amphibiousoperation is u n l i k e l y to occur in i so la t ion.Comprehensive shaping of the intended theatre isachieved through the application of pre-assault forcesto reduce the risk to own troops and enable them tomove quickly from disembarkation points to theobjective area. Objectives could be many miles fromthe shore.

Amphibious forces have a significantly enhanceda b i l i t y to conduct m i l i t a r y support operations.Seabasing obviates the requirement to establishfacilities ashore prior to conducting activities such asrelief or evacuation operations. Improvements inship-to-objective mobil i ty enables direct m i l i t a r yassistance to be provided to remote areas.

Definitions and CharacteristicsThe fol lowing details the types of amphibiousoperations that may be conducted.

• Amphibious assault on a potentially hostileshore. The amphibious force will aim to land onundefended areas, however, such operations w i l lbe mounted against the contingency tha t theenemy w i l l react before complet ion of theoperation.

January/March


• Amphibious assault on a hostile shore. Theamphibious force wil l aim to attack a weak pointi n (he ene im's defences \ \here the defences coverall potential landing sites. The assault will avoidlanding under fire but exploit mob i l i t y to attackfrom an unexpected direction.

• Amphibious raid. A landing from the sea on ahostile shore involving swift incursion into, or atemporary occupancy of. an objective, followedby a planned withdrawal. Raids are conducted forsuch purposes as:

indicting loss or damage,

securing information,

creating a diversion, and

capturing or evacuating individuals and/ormateriel.

• Amphibious demonstration. This is an operationconducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemyby a show of force wi th the expectation ofdeluding the enemy in to a course of actionunfavourable to him.

• Amphibious withdrawal . This is the withdrawalof forces by sea in naval ships or craft, and/or byair in helicopters, from a hostile or potent ia l lyhostile shore.

Combat opera t ions t h a t i n v o l v e waterbornemovement, such as administrative disembarkation onI r i c n d K l e n i i o r v . walcr t e r m i n a l and log i s t i c s over-the-shore operations, possess certain characteristicsand employ some of the techniques of an amphibiousopera t ion . l l o \ \ e \ e r . In d e f i n i t i o n these are notamphibious operations.

Military Support OperationsAmphibious operations are not limited to periods ofconflict and may be employed across the operationalcontinuum. Amphibious operations may beconducted as part of mi l i ta ry support operations thatcan include:

• defence assistance to the civil community.

• defence force aid to the civil power,

• peace operations,

humani tar ian operations,

• c iv i l enforcement duties, and

• evacuation operations.

Landing Force Constraints &Relative StrengthThe nature of operations ashore will be constrained byt h e l i m i t a t i o n s on the Theatre Commander, thecapability of the Joint Task Force Commander and the

capacity of the Commander Amphibious Task Forceto deliver military force. This limitation will dictatethe size of the landing force and the nature of itsequipment that may in turn l i m i t its firepower,m o b i l i t y and s u s t a i n a h i l i l y .

In order to achieve success, an amphibious forceshould have at least local sea control over enemysurface and submarine forces, local air superiority,and significant advantage of combat power over theenemy forces in the objective area for the duration ofthe operation. However, where there are compel l ingoperational imperatives, an amphibious operationmay be under taken on the basis of an o v e r a l lsuperiority of force in the amphib ious area ofoperations. An amphib ious lask force may notpossess numer ica l s u p e r i o r i t y in l a n d i n g forcesagainst an enemy, but may s t i l l be able to conduct anassault successfully by us ing surface and airsuperiority to neutralise enemy land forces.

In addit ion to maximis ing local superiority of forceswi th in the object ive area, an amphib ious lask forceshould have reasonable assurance of freedom fromeffective interference by enemy surface, subsurface,air or ground forces from outside the objective area.

Sequence of an amphibious operation

Phases

The sequence of amph ib ious operations is wel ldefined and the successive phases bear the t i t l e of thedominant act ivi ty taking place wi th in the periodcovered. The sequence of phases are:

Planning. P l ann ing occurs throughout the ent i reoperation but is dominant in the period prior toembarkation.

Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the periodd u r i n g w h i c h (he forces concentrate w i t h the i requipment and supplies and embark in assignedshipping.

Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period duringwhich the operation is rehearsed for:

• tes t ing the adequacy of plans, the t i m i n g ofdetailed operations, and the combat readiness ofparticipating forces;

• ensuring that all echelons are famil iar with plans;and

• testing communications.

Movement. The movement phase is the perioddur ing which the components of the amphibious taskforce move from the points of embarkation, or from aforward deployed position, to the objective area. Thismove may be via rehearsal, staging and/or rende/vousareas. The movement phase is completed w h e n thecomponents of the amphibious task force a r r i v e intheir assigned positions in the objective area.

Januai-\/March 1999


Pre-assault operations. Pre-assault operations arethose thea t re operations conducted prior to theamphibious assault and include:

• Shaping operations. Shaping operations aredesigned to seize the initiative, gain battlespacedominance in the littoral and create a fundamentaldilemma for the enemy commander as to the likelyplace and time of the landing. Shaping operationsare conducted in support of the overall amphibiousobjective under theatre level direction andcommand. They will commence prior to thearrival of an amphibious force in area and wi l lusually continue in support during, and possiblyfollowing, the amphibious assault . Shapingoperations include deception plans and strikesagainst targets within and outside the amphibiousoperations area to neutralise enemy forces.

• Advance force operations. Advance forceoperations are conducted prior to theestablishment of an amphibious operations areaand are related to subsequent act ivi t ies wi th in it.Advanced force operations may precede theamphibious operation by many days and aregenerally covert in nature. A fundamentalrequirement of this type of operation is that it doesnot compromise the intended place and time oflanding . The types of operations involved inc ludeintel l igence and target acquisition.

• Prc-landing operations. Pre-landing operationsare conducted separate to pre-assault onestablishing an amphibious operations area. Theyare conducted up to two days before the assault byforces organic to the Amphibious Task Force.They are primarily designed to support andminimise risk to the main landing force. They aredesigned to:

min imi se risk to the landing by insertingagencies capable of synchronising movementand firepower;

gather localised tactical intelligence that mayinf luence the execution of the landing plan;

isolate the landing area; and

clear routes and obstacles.

Assault. This phase is the period between the arrivalof the major forces of the amphibious task force in theobjective area and the accomplishment/termination ofthe mission. Development of the area for its postoperational use may be ini t iated during this period.

Termination of an AmphibiousOperationThe terminat ion of an amphibious operation ispredicated on the accomplishment of the mission ofthe amphibious task force. This wil l be in accordancewith the specific condi t ions contained •" '"•""governing instructions.

in the

The landing force is regarded as firmly establishedashore when, in the opinion of the landing forcecommander:

• The force beachhead has been secured.

• Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have beenestablished ashore to ensure the continuouslanding of troops and mate r ia l required forsubsequent operations.

• Command, communications, and supporting armscoordinat ion fac i l i t i es have been establ ishedashore.

• The landing force commander has stated that he isready to assume full responsibility for subsequentoperations.

ConclusionThe ADF's amphibious operations doctrine has beenreviewed to cater for the introduction into service ofthe new LPAs and to enhance the ADF'sinteroperability with its allies. The doctrine addressesAmphibious Assault rather than Amphibious TacticalLodgement, albeit the ADF's a m p h i b i o u s l i f tcapability remains modest by international standards.It would not be expected that the capability be uti l ised'against a hostile shore' unless part of a combinedoperation with our allies, or directed against very l ightopposition. The enhancement of the doctrine toinclude Amphibious Assault reflects the reality thatamphibious landings in all but an administrativecontext are planned against the p o s s i b i l i t y ofopposition. It would he imprudent to do otherwise.

Amphibious operations are the most complex of allmilitary operations and their execution involves theemployment of all three services. The ability to landmen and material by air as well as by sea is essentialto the effective application of force and f lexibi l i ty ofthe operation. Accordingly, organic air assets willplay a vital role in the conduct of any amphibiousoperation.

Amphibious operations demand the highest level ofcommand, control and communications. History hasshown that success in is u n l i k e l y where theseelements are inadequate. The forces involved in anamphibious assault may cover a significant part of theADF. Air power may be used in the air transport andoffensive support roles as well as in pre-assaultoperations. Pre-assault operations may also involvesubmarines in clandestine operations and MCMVs inclearing the approaches to the beaches. The N a v y w i l lalso be employed in the transportation of troops to thelanding area and subsequent Naval Gunfire Support.Accordingly, the planning of an amphibious operationmust be comprehensive and exercise truly jointoperations in order to achieve a successful andeffective culminat ion .

JaniKiry/Miircli

Journal of tin.' Australian Naval Institute

Military Sea LiftThe role of HMNZS Charles Upham

Commander Richard Jackson

The m i l i t a r y sea-lift ship, HMNZS CharlesI'l'ltani. has been accorded a high priority torconversion in New Zealand's recent Defence

spending decisions. But this welcome decision comesat the cost of much controversy and. sadly, at theexpense of the Nava l S ta f f ' s reputat ion.

A mil i tary sea-lift ship had been ident i f ied as re levantto New Zealand as far back as the 1987 DefenceKe\ icv\. In 1991 the need was confirmed, and with the1994 Defence Assessment, the provision of a sea-liftcapabili ty was made a high priority, and - importantly

funds were allocated. Within weeks of Cabinet'sapproval, the RNZN purchased the MercandianQueen II, a Danish roll on/roll off freighter, whichwas in service in northern Europe.

1 'he purchase was made quickly , because extensivestudy had gone into the problem. The RNZN hadlooked a purpose designed ship, essent ia l ly a mini -LPD, but it would have cost some $250 million (backw h e n S300 m i l l i o n could buy a brand new f r iga te) .I hen merchant ships like the Union Rotoiti wereassessed, indeed closely examined. These 18,000 tonRo/Ro ships had sufficient vehicle capacity for all theArmy could desire, and were big enough to carry alarge flight deck, with at least four spots. But theactual ships had some significant maintenance andconversion problems, while the psychological factorof such a large ship being used among our friendlyPacific neighbours weighed heavily on some seniorofficials. So further research lead to the Mercandianclass being studied, and eventually the purchase wasmade.

The Merctimliiiii Queen II was del ivered to NZ inFebruary/March 1995, and already one aspect of theship 's characteristics was made vividly apparent:car rv ing a l ight commercial cargo the ship crossed theI n d i a n Ocean on her way to NZ and encountered ac> c lone. The sh ip rolled heavi ly and quickly,inc luding a roll of over 30 degrees - a fr ighteningi n c i d e n t . This t r a i l is . of course, well known amongRo/Ro operators - they general ly sail f u l l y laden, andwhen loading ensure the top vehicle deck is t i g h t l ypacked. The intent is to reduce the rate of roll byreducing metacentric height - the equivalent ofmoving the bob further up the arm of a metronome, soas to slow the rale of the pendulum swing. In factw h e n (he Bri t i sh RFA Argus was converted from theSTUFT ship 'Contender Bezant', some 800 tonnes ofconcrete was poured on the upper deck to form thefoundation of the High! deck, while serving to slowthe ship's roll to allow helicopter operations.

In October 1995 the ship was formally commissionedinto the RNZN as HMNZS Charles Upham. named forNew Zealand's most famous soldier, the SecondWorld War double VC winner. By then the L/i>lianihad been painted grey, given a limited amount ofspecialist n a v a l communications equipment and theship's company trained in its safety and operatingfeatures. As well, sixteen containers of shingle (some300 tonnes) were loaded on to the upper deck toimprove the roll ing characteristics.

Then during 1996 the ship began a ' l i m i t e d operationsand evaluation' period, intended as a trial opportunityfor the Army. Initially the sea-lift ship took Armyequipment from the South Island to an exercise in theNorth Island, using commercial ports. Later, aftervarious loading trials with a range of Army vehicles,the ship was loaded for an Army exercise in Fiji andTonga. It was during this deployment that she wentthrough very heavy seas, whereupon she also sufferedan engine failure. Being l igh t ly loaded, the ship rolledrapidly and heavily, the worst rol l reaching 37degrees. Not only was this f r ightening for the ship'scompany, but such extreme rolling meant that cargolashings were in danger of fa i l ing .

Coincident with these experiences in Charles Upham.the RNZN was experiencing severe personnelshortages in its technical branches, so it becameconvenient to lay up the new sea-lift ship, pending thefunding and design of the necessary modifications,whi l e also reducing the demand for marine engineers.Thus Charles Upham became known as the f loa t ingcar-park, or the 'Calliope South windbreak' .Subsequently she has been leased for two years to aSpanish shipping company and in late 1998 wasdelivered to Spain for commercial use.

I h a v e remarked previously (see JANI July/Sept 98)on the controversy that was generated about the ship;the ul ter ior motive appeared to be to discredit theNaval Staff. Since then the Auditor General andTreasury have both investigated the purchase andoffered opinions to government. Inevitably the bean-counters' attitude was that the ship was better sold -another example of the short term vision induced byfocussing only on the bottom line.

So, last November, the Minister of Defence issued astrongly worded statement t h a t rebutted theallegations made aga ins t the Nava l Staff andemphasised that Charles Upham is the right ship forNew Zealand's sea-lift needs. Then the December '98Defence review gave a clear priority for the

January/March 1999


conversion of the ship, so that after 2001 the RNZNshould be operating a well equipped mili tary sea liftship.

What then should be the doctrine underpinning theoperations of the new ship'.'

The ship's role is intended to be sea-lift , ie landingmilitary vehicles via her roll on/roll off ramps at afunct ional port. As well, disaster relief, medicalassistance and stores carrying, can all be carried outby the ship. But in view of the formation of theAustralian Amphibious Squadron, it seems to me thatCharles Upham's military role could be betterdeveloped by frequent exercises with the AAS. Thereality is that in disasters or mili tary operations, afunctional port in the right place is a rare experience,hence Charles Upham should be tested in across-the-beach operations. This means that the ship's primeassets w i l l become her flight deck and embarkedhelicopters.

The plan is that the converted ship will have a hangerand flight deck, with the flight deck large enough toland on Chinooks. But in all likelihood it will be RANSea Kings or Australian Army Blackhawks that willbe the most appropriate aircraft to operate fromCharles Upham. Therefore the RNZN will have tomake Upham available for operations with the RAN

and 5th Aviation Regiment, so that her flight deckcrews and cargo handling teams can remain workedup in air operations.

Similarly, the NZ Army wil l have to t h i n k careful lyabout the loads they embark in the ship - rather thanlines of APCs and heavy trucks, the stores embarkedshould all be suitable for helicopter-lift; ie Landroversand 105mm Light guns, for example. I see the shipoperating primarily as a mini-LPH. wi th mostequipment disembarked via helicopter, and thevehicle ramps remaining firmly closed while onoperations.

However, the doctrine has yet to be developed; nodoubt the RNZN and NZ Army will take a closeinterest in the activities of Australia's AmphibiousSquadron. Yet our experience so far wi th the CharlesUpham is discouraging - the RNZN at times seemedfaint-hearted towards the value of the new ship, whi lethe Army apparently did not appreciate the actualpurpose of the military conversion. The upshot is athree year delay in getting the (converted) ship intoservice, and an initial operating concept that seemsinherently l imi t ing . But if the ship does become aregular part of the Australian Amphibious Squadronand the emphasis is placed on her helicoptercapability, then the Charles Upham could become avaluable asset to both the ADF and NZDF.

Soldiers from Alpha and Charlie Company a, 2 RAR board Seating Helicopter to returnonboard HMAS Tohruk after night heach assault. Exercise initial landing 99.

January/March 1999


Unarmed Prophets: Amphibious Warfarein Australian Military Thought

by Michael Evans

Land Warfare Studies Centre.

In March 1977. the defence analyst, B. N. Primroseargued thai one of the intellectual weaknesses inAustralia's perception of strategy was the absence

of a maritime tradition. He wrote, 'as an island tradingpeople. Austral ians lack a real understanding of theu t i l i t y of the sea: They lack significant interest inmari t ime affairs; have little cultural affinity with thesea... and i t is d o u b t f u l i f many leaders or theelectorate behind them have understood how toexploit or control the maritime resources which thenation possesses'.1 A decade later, the then Ministerfor Defence. Kim Bea/ley. made a s imilaro b s e r v a t i o n . In a speech in November I9S7 helamented, 'despite a host of good reasons for thecontrary. Australia is not a maritime nation and itspeople do not sustain much of an interest in Australianmarit ime strategy'.:

More than another ten years on. Austral ian defenceplanners have embraced, in principle, a maritimeconcept of strategy. But they have yet to demonstratean unders tanding that such a strategy represents aj o i n t rather than a n a v a l - a i r approach to mi l i ta ryplanning. Indeed. Australian defence planners havedisplayed a rather tenuous grasp of the work of thedoyen of mar i t ime strategists. Sir Ju l i an Corbett. In1911 Corbett warned against equating marit imestrategy with n a v a l strategy. The paramountconcern. . . of maritime strategy', he wrote, 'is todetermine the mutua l relations of your army and navyin a plan of wa r " . In the formulation of maritimestrategy, there were 'delicate interactions' betweenland and sea forces (one must now, of course, add airforces to Corbett's equation) which required carefulh a n d l i n g by mi l i t a ry planners. '

The weakness of Aust ra l ia ' s mar i t ime strategict r a d i t i o n is w e l l exempl i f i ed by the neglect ofamphibious warfare doctrine. It has been argued thatamph ib ious l l e x i h i l i t y is the most important strategic-asset thai a m a r i t i m e state possesses." Yet since theend of the Second World War, the Australian Armyhas tended to concentrate on continental-styleoperations while the Royal Australian Navy ( R A N )and the RAAF (Royal Austral ian Air Force) havegradually developed an interpretation of maritimestrategy w h i c h is confined m a i n l y to Mahanian-s ty lenotions of naval sea control and the air defence of themaritime approaches. The result of these trends is,that at the end of the twen t i e th century, contemporaryA u s t r a l i a n s t r a t eg ic t h o u g h t i s d iv ided between

contending notions of cont inenta l i sm and navalism."Such an approach (lies in the face of Corbett. whobelieved that only a uni ted mi l i t a ry effort couldconstitute mari t ime strategy. He wrote:

...li\ maritime strateg\ we mean the principleswhich govern a war in which the sea is asubstantial factor. Naval strategy is hm that panof it which determines the movements of the fleetwhen maritime strategy has determined what partthe fleet must pla\ in relation to the action of ihckind forces; for it scarcely needs saving linn isalmost impossible that a war can he ilcciilcil hvnaval action alone...

Similarly, separate cont inenta l land operations wereinadequate in serving the needs of a maritime strategy.As Corbett observed, 'the crude maxims as to primaryobjects which seem to have served well enough incontinental warfare have never worked so clearlywhere the sea enters seriously into a war'."

An Austra l ian mar i t ime strategy, embracing (l ieprinciples of Corbett and employing the resources ofall three services, remains to be formulated. Yet inboth the forward defence era of the 1950s and 1960sand in the Defence of Australia era between 1972 and1997. there were a lways dissenting voices who arguedfor a jo int maritime strategy employing anamphibious capabili ty to maximise seaborne mobility.Since most of the features of amphibious warfare arehighly relevant to the development of a joint maritimestrategy, it is worth examining the writings of the mostsignif icant of these dissenters - most of whom weremiddle-ranking Army and Navy officers wri t ing inprofessional mi l i t a ry journals . The aim of this articleis to try to trace the historical outlines of an alternatestrand of Australian military thought - one which overthe past half century has had little official support -but a strand which, in the changing circumstances ofpost-Cold War international security, has much toteach current ADF planners engaged in addressing theproblems of littoral manoeuvre.

Australian Amphibious Thoughtfrom the South West PacificTheatre to the PentropicExperimentAustral ia has seldom concerned i t se l f w i t h t heacquis i t ion of amphibious capabi l i t i es except in a

III .Ianiiar\/March 1999


national emergency - as was the case during the twoworld wars. In September 1914. a battalion-sizedAustralian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force( A N M H F ) captured Rubuul and Madang and sei/.edGermany's possessions in New Guinea following anamphibious landing at Kabakaul Bay. Naval elementsof the ANMEF were later involved in ship-to-shoremovement of British troops at Gallipoli. They alsosupported Australian troops at Sue/ and El Arishduring the 1917-18 Palestine campaign."

An Austra l ian amphibious capab i l i ty was notmaintained in the inter-war years largely because oflack of resources and reliance on the Royal Navy. Inthe Second World War, when Australia was forced toconfront the Japanese in the northern islandarchipelago from Sumatra to the Solomons, the armedforces were t h r u s t i n to amphibious crisis-management. In 1942. a Combined OperationsTraining Centre was created in Port Stephens and anArmy amphibious school was organised at Toorbul inQueensland. By the beginning of 1944, an AustralianCombined Operations Section was formed to directthe amphibious act ivi t ies in 1944-4? of the 7th and9th Divisions of the 2nd AIF which undertook theBorneo and New Guinea landings at Salamaua, Lac.Buna. Tarakan, Wewak, Labuan, Brunei andBalikpapan.'" In general terms, these operations gaveAustra l ian forces a practical understanding ofamphibious operations at the tactical level as well asproviding some exposure to jo int p l a n n i n g andcommand with Admiral Barbey's United States 7thFleet Amphibious Force." But outside the officialhistories, little scholarly research has been undertakenin to the development of Australian expertise inamphibious operations during the world wars.':

After 1945. although the RAN decided to maintain alanding ship tank (LST) force - designated the 10thLST Floti l la - made up of six vessels, amphibioustraining rapidly declined in importance." In the 1950sand 1960s. Australia entered the forward defence eraof expeditionary warfare in Asia employing singleservice rather than a jo in t approach to operations.RAN amphibious ships became important mainly intransport operations as did the landing craftmechanised (LCMs) of the Army's Water TransportSquadron. But by the t ime of the Korean War in 1950.only two specialist amphibious units were retained inthe Citi/ .en M i l i t a r y Force (CMF) . an Ar t i l l e ryAmphibious Observation Battery and an ArmouredCorps Amphibious Assault Regiment.14 In the event ofamphibious operations in Asia, Austral ia seemedcontent to rely upon the resources of its allies. Duringcounter-insurgency operations in Malaya and Borneo,Australia could count on the Royal Nav\ 's Singapore-based Fleet Amphibious Force composed of Wessexhelicopters and Royal Marine Commandos. Duringthe Vietnam War. Australian forces knew that two USNavy Amphibious Ready Groups with battalion si/.edlanding forces and air support were deployed in theSouth China Sea."

Given this situation, it is perhaps not surprising that inthe late 1950s and throughout much of the 1960s.Australian forces concentrated on operating in ana l l i ed framework. The RAN increasingly turned awayfrom fleet carrier operations towards anti-submarinewarfare; the RAAF began to forge a strongprofessional association with the United States AirForce (USAF) symbolised by the purchase of the F-111 f igh te r bomber strike force in 1963."' InNovember 1959. the Army attempted to increase itscombat power in South-East Asia by modernising itsforce structure through the pentropie organisation - ascheme derived from United States Army pentomicbattle group doctrine.17

None of these measures favoured a m p h i b i o u scapabilities. Indeed, at the t ime of the AustralianArmy's adoption of the pentropie organisation in early1960. an interesting essay on amphibiousrequirements appeared in the Australian ArmyJournal. It was written by Major D. M. Butler of theRoyal Austral ian In fan t ry ( R A R ) and sought toaddress the best way for Australia to organise herregular forces to support her treaty obligations."1

Butler argued for a force based on high readiness forboth independent and allied operations and capable ofboth limited war and internal security duties in South-East Asia for up to 5.000 miles from Australian soil.'"

While favouring deployability by air, Butler thoughtthat Australia lacked suf f i c ien t air transport, goodairfields and accessible staging bases to move itsforces around with any degree of confidence. Hewrote, 'our forces must therefore be transported bysea, and since ports are not likely to be available, theforces must be capable of operating over openbeaches'.2" Butler noted that 'the only other force inthe world with a similar problem to ours is the UnitedStates Marine Corps'.21 This led him to examine theconcept of the US Fleet Marine Force division and thegrowing use of helicopter-borne operations toincrease tactical mobi l i ty and rapid dep loyment .Butler thought that an Australian amphibious forcedesigned along the lines of a Fleet Marine Forceconcept offered a number of advantages. First, itsjoint requirements would guarantee the nat ionali d e n t i f y of an Australian task force; second, a fleetmarine concept provided self-contained forcescapable of independent action so reducing 'the dangerof a burdensome dependence on our allies'; third, anA u s t r a l i a n fleet mar ine force would be f l e x i b l e inmeeting threats ranging from limited war to internalunrest."

Butler advocated a three year plan, costing th i r tymi l l ion pounds, to convert one of the RAN's fixedwing aircraft carriers into a helicopter platform and tophase in new assault shipping.2 ' He suggested creatingan in tegra ted . A u s t r a l i a n amph ib ious task force w i t h aJoint Headquarters commanded by a Rear or Vice-Admiral . This task force would be composed of a

January/March 199V II


helicopter carrier, a brigade group (with an SAScompany attached) and sufficient helicopter l i f t tocarry and maintain a battalion group. Air supportwould be the task of an RAAF fighter wing capable ofoperating off Allied carriers and from forward airbases supported by transport, bomber andreconnaissance aircraft.24 Bu t l e r concluded,' integration of the Services is not necessary, butintegration of their roles is the cornerstone of thewhole effort if there is to be a true force inreadiness'.25

Amphibious Thinking in theDefence of Australia EraAlthough But ler ' s recommendations were ignored byAustral ian defence planners, his essay raised themeswhich were to appear repeatedly in Austral ianamphibious writings over the next three decades. Thiswas especially the case after Australia's withdrawalfrom Vietnam in the early 1970s and its movementtowards the strategic posture of Defence of Australia.

Members of the ships ann\ detachment recoverUNIMOG from LCM8 during exercise intial landing 99

In 1M74. some of Butler's views were echoed byLieutenant Colonel L. D. Johnson, CommandingOfficer of 2/4 RAR and a graduate of the US MarineCorps Command and Staff College at Quantico.:fl

Johnson pointed out t ha t Austral ia requiredamphibious forces for reasons of both continental andarchipalegic geography. While conceding tha tAustralia possessed a weak national amphibioustradition. Johnson argued that the campaign in theSouth West Pacific in the Second World War hadtaught the nation a major lesson: when threatenedfrom the northern island chain from Java to Fiji,Australia would require joint amphibious forces tosuccessful!) defend itself ."

Referring to the shift in Army th ink ing towardscontinental defence in the wake of the end of theVietnam War. Johnson thought that Australia'sdistances were so great ' t ha t even a Caesar orNapoleon would baulk before contemplating the

movement of a large land army over them Vs LikeButler, he believed that the a i r l i f t of suff ic ient forceswas not a practical option. There were problems inprotecting air convoys and \ s i t h the geographicallocation of developed air bases. Australia's bestoffensive air bases were in south-east Australia atAmberley and Williamtown and their infrastructurescould not he duplicated quickly elsewhere in thenorth. As he put it. " the s tar t l ing fact is t h a t theseairfields are located in the wrong places'. ' ' Thedevelopment of 'bare bases' at Tindall and Learmonthwas an initiative that was too dependent on f ini te airresources. In a mil i tary crisis, the RAAF would be toocommitted to gaining air superiority and supportingair bases to have the assets to support groundoperations or undertake large tactical airlifts. '"

In the event of an enemy force sei/ing the northernislands. Aus t ra l i a ' s long distances to the l i t t o r a l by railand air were too restrictive for effective deploymentof ground forces. Johnson observed, 'movement overlong distances by road or rail l imits f l e x i b i l i t y ofdeployment, restricts the axis to narrow routes ofadvance near the littoral and place the ground forcesin jeopardy'." Added dangers from choke pointsdeveloping, as wel l as the demands of ma in t a in ingmil i ta ry forces over long distances and hazardousroutes, would be as destructive to operationalefficiency as enemy action. Johnson wrote, 'a land-based, land-trained army wi l l be unable to deployqu ick ly enough along the inadequate communicationsinside "Fortress Australia" to f i l l all the needs ofdefence of the mainland, and certainly cannot copeadequately with the special techniques required foroperations along the island cha in or the islandterritories'.

Aust ra l ia required a defence force wi th a capab i l i t yfor coping with the country's special geographicalproblems, a force t h a t w a s s t ruc tured aroundamphibious organisation, m o b i l i t y and readiness.Such a seaborne force would have the advantage ofbeing self-contained in combat fire support and coulduse 'on station' sea mobile air and logistic support.'2

Johnson pointed out:

...The greatest advantage /of an Australianamphibious force I is tha! no land base ofanv kindis needed forward... Logistical and servicesupport are provided h\ the 'sea base' concept...Overall, the amphibious force is a self-containedpackage, which can move freely and rapidlv. hy-pass choke points, land assault infantr\ on groundof its own choosing, provide inboard fire support.launch its own intercept and close supportaircraft, and maintain the landing force from thesea base in such a way that the onlv thing put onthe beach will be the track marks of the assaultvehicles... When the operation is terminated, itcan extract easily without being involved in messywithdrawals over large distances bv land...

12 January/March 1999


For both operational and financial reasons. Johnsonconsidered thai Australia should structure anamphibious force around an brigade of 5.390 combatand combat support personnel. This force includedthree infant ry battalions, an ar t i l l e ry regiment anarmoured regiment, an SAS squadron and two RAAFhelicopter squadrons.14 He proposed that a battaliongroup of 1,345 personnel be kept permanently afloat,supported by brigade elements ashore." He arguedthat the RAN's force structure was adequate to projecta battalion group using the aircraft carrier HMASMelbourne, supported by guided missile destroyersand minesweepers.lh

Lieutenant Colonel Johnson estimated the cost of newequipment to be some $282 mil l ion. This sumincluded $4()m for a vertical and/or short take-off andlanding (V/STOL) squadron of Harrier AV8 aircraft;$3.9 million for an armoured amphibious carriersquadron of 30 vehicles; and expenditure on a newamphibious assault ship (LHA) along with acquisitionof a modified through-deck cruiser to carry V/STOLand Sea King helicopters in a carrier support role.'7

Like Butler. Johnson suggested phasing the newequipment in over several defence budgets. AnAustralian amphibious force as the main combatorganisation of the ADF would force the services to'concentrate their particular skills into one field ofendeavour. He concluded, 'if cost effectiveness couldbe measured accurately, then the sum of the i n d i v i d u a lservices pursuing their own courses would not be asgreat as that of a joint amphibious force'.'8

From 1975 u n t i l the emergence of the 1987 WhitePaper, the leading advocate of amphibious warfare inthe ADF was Commander P. J. M. Shevlin. the Navy'sDirector of Joint Warfare between 1969 and 1981..Shevlin published a series of articles in the Nav\Quarterly, the Defence Force Journal, the Journal ofthe Australian Naval Institute and the Pacific DefenceReporter calling for Australia to develop a credibleamphibious capabili ty which he believed was 'anessential element of national power'."'

Shevlin had impressive credentials. He had served inthe Royal Navy between 1943 and 1969 and was aveteran of four amphibious operations in Europe andthe Far East during the Second World War. Heparticipated in five more landings in the Middle Eastspanning a twenty year period from the late 1940s tothe mid-1960s. These landings included operationsduring the Anglo-French Suez campaign, the Britishdefence of Kuwait against Iraq and in the Britishcounter-insurgency campaign in South Arabia.'"

W h i l e Shev l in ' s wr i t ings followed Butler 's andJohnson's line of reasoning, they brought to bear atechnical expert's perspective on Australia'samphibious requirements. It was no accident that, inthe early 1970s, he was project director for the newamphibious heavy l i f t (LSH) ship HMAS Tohruk, the

first purpose built amphibious vessel to be procuredfor the RAN. In the mid-1970s, Tohruk an over-the-heach roll-on-roll off ship, replaced the aircraftcarrier, HMAS Sydney, which had performed ad hocamphibious duties - including an LPA role - duringthe 1960s and early 1970s.4' Shevlin was also a firmsupporter of the RAN's First Australian Landing CraftSquadron of 1974-75 and its successor, the AustralianAmphibious Squadron, which was raised in 1981 andlasted un t i l 1986.4:

Through his writings Shevlin became perhaps theADF's strongest proponent of amphibious warfare.For over a decade, he urged the Army to view the seaas a tactical area of operations by taking advantage ofHMAS Tohruk's capabilities in the lodgement ofcavalry, special forces and the deployment of armourand artillery.4' He was an advocate of the formation ofan amphibious core force based on Tohruk. thelanding craft heavy (LCH) of the Australian LandingCraft Squadron and a special landing group of trainedtroops. To this end, he recommended that every twoyears one of the Army's task forces should benominated to provide a quick reaction AmphibiousLanding Group (ALG) of two infantry companies, asupport company and a beach team.44 This measure,he argued, would diversify Army training beyondcontinental land operations and introduce 'a marineelement' that was as essential to a marit ime defenceforce as mine warfare or surface strike forces.4' But toShevlin's great disappointment . the Armydemonstrated only a 'continuing uncertainty' over thetactical use of the sea and failed to develop a conceptof amphibious operations.4"

Like Butler and Johnson, Shevlin believed that theArmy's role should be essentially that of an offshoreregional force. He pointed to the important use Britainhad made of land forces against strategic targets alongthe coasts of Europe and North Africa during theSecond World War. The early capture of strategicislands, he argued, had been the essential preconditionto later Allied successes in the Mediterranean, Ind ianOcean, South East Asian and South West Pacificcampaigns.47 In his writings. Shevl in drew inparticular, on Britain's parallel experience as amaritime state to stress the importance of jointoperations through what he styled as Australia's 'seawater moat' to the north.48 A joint strategy was notsimply a question of dea l ing wi th a threat tocontinental Australia, but was also a means ofdefending vital Australian interests further afield. Henoted:

...Australia, like (ireat liritain in the two WorldWars, could he brought to her knees h\ an effectivemaritime blockade... The outcome of a Hatile ojthe Indian Ocean could he as decisive to Australiaas was the Rattle of the Atlantic fought betweenthe German U-boat arm and Luftwaffe on the onehand and the allied navies and air forces on the

January/March


other, with the support of Ann\ anil Marine unitsto ensure the capture/retention of every strategicisland covering the convo\ routes...n

Shcvl in clearly d i s l iked the i m p l i c a t i o n s of theemerging doctrine of Defence of Australia during the1970s and 1980s. He never wavered in his view thatthe most serious threat to Australian security lay in thenor the rn is land archipelago stretching from Sumatrato the Solomons.'" The ADF had to possess a capacityto project power in land which went beyond shortduration air strike. 'In the days of advanced VSTOI,aircraft', he observed, 'it would be intolerable forLord Howe Island airstrip to be in enemy hands; a pairof dividers w i l l indicate a number of other islands inAustralia's v ic ini ty which could not be allowed to bedeveloped as an aggressor's advanced bases'/1

Credible n a t i o n a l defence demanded that theAustral ian Defence Force should possess thecapabil i ty to deny to any enemy the islands to thenorth 'by means of reinforcement, recapture, seizureor neutra l i sa t ion ' / An offshore capabil i ty for theArmy and the Navy was 'of greater priority thantra in ing for land battles in Austral ia itself though thesemust, of course, also be in the essential t ra iningprogram, to defeat that which maritime operationsmay have failed to stop'." Referring to the role of theArmy he wrote:

... The Armv 's best contribution to national defencewould he in supporting RAN and RAAF efforts tohold the eneinv as tar hack from Australia's shoresus is practicahle. This < an best he achieved h\being able to reinforce, recapture or seizestrategic islands, or lo strike swiftly at strategictargets, with trained landing forces carried in theRAN's amphibious ships and/or RAAF transportaircraft..."

But like Butler and Johnson. Shevlin was a voice inthe wilderness. Although the Army belatedly agreedto form the Australian Amphibious Squadron in 1981in Brisbane - based on HMAS Tobruk and adjacent tothe 6th Brigade -Army doctrine steadily increased itsemphasis on the Defence of Australia and continentalland operations." In 1982 HMAS Melbourne, theNavy's last carrier was decommissioned, effectivelyending the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm. Shevlin notedruefully, 'the seeming lack of concern in many mindsof both 'dark b lue ' and ' k h a k i ' at the missing(amphibious] national capability, and even worse, theapparent opposition in some quarters to making goodth i s serious nat ional defence deficiency'."

Shevlin's views were shared by only a minority ofADF officers. In the late 1970s and 1980s there waslittle in the way of sustained writing on amphibiouscapabilities. Instead there was a spattering of articlesby Navy and Army officers on the subject. Thesearticles included plans to create a special navali n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n : recommendations to endA u s t r a l i a ' s 'amphibious incapabi l i ty ' by revital ising

the structure of the Australian Amphibious Squadron;and schemes to develop a Forward Operating Base(FOB) concept using small scale amphibious forcesand special watercraft such as hovercraft, landingcraft and rigid raiding craft/"

Such ideas ran counter to the of f ic ia l dr ive towardsthe policy of Defence of Australia in the mid-1980s.In 1986, fol lowing the phasing out of a carriercapability, the Australian Amphibious Squadron wasdisbanded. In both the 1986 Dihb Report and the 1987White Paper, amphibious resources and joint maritimeoperations were largely ignored/" ADF" seabornecontingencies in the South Pacif ic , inc lud ingOperation Morrisdance during the 1987 Fiji crisis andlater Operation Lagoon in Bougainvi l le in 1994. didnot s ign i f ican t ly change the con t inen ta l /nor thernapproaches defence thrust of Australian policy.5"

The Pacific contingencies did, however, demonstratehow the lack of helicopter carrier capability limitedADF offshore flexibility and this contributed to animportant procurement decision. In 1993, the ADF"acquired two American /Wuyw/v-class l a n d i n gplatform helicopter (LPH) ships for conversion in toamphibious transport personnel (LPA) ships withlogistics-over-the-shore and assault landing craft.Once modernised and upgraded by the tu rn of thecentury, these ships are expected to give the ADF thecapabili ty to deploy a battalion group with helicoptersupport. But although the ADF improved its t echn ica lcapability for land force operations from the sea. t h i sdevelopment could not disguise the years ofinst i tut ional and doctrinal neglect, cost-cut t ing andlack of single-service interest. These factors haveresulted in Australian amphibious expertise beingconfined to the ADF Warfare Centre and to a fewindividual Army and Navy officers scatteredthroughout the ADF.'"

Australian Amphibious Writing inthe Post-Cold War EraIn the 1990s. ADF wr i t ings on amphibious operationshad to take account of the great changes inconventional mil i tary technology since the 1970s andthe transformation of international security followingthe end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, tree from nearlyhalf a century of East-West confrontation, the leadingWestern powers began to move away from Mahanianideas of blue-water navies and open-oceanwarfighting towards Corbcttian ideas of mar i t imeforce projection and the concept of operat ionalmanoeuvre f r o m the sea (OMITS). This shiftrepresented a major doctr inal change towards astrategy of joint maritime warfare. Amphibiousoperations were transformed by (he nexus betweenprecision firepower and manoeuvre warfare and bythe integration of over-the-hori/on (OTH) attack andforce projection using helicopters, informationwarfare systems and strike missiles."1

14 Januar\/March 7999


These trends were reflected in the meagre number ofamphibious wri t ings which appeared in Australianpublications by the mid-1990s. In March 1996, MajorR. E. Moyse, a Royal Marine exchange officer andamphibious warfare expert at the ADF WarfareCentre, argued that it was possible that Australia'sextraordinary neglect of amphibious operations -especially with regard to mobi l i ty - was a form of'cognitive dissonance'.'' Moyse believed that ADFstrategists lacked a true understanding of the complexrelat ionship between strategic, operational andtactical mobility. He wrote:

...The defence of Australia is a unique inilitar\prohleni. Nowhere else does an island continenthave to he defended by a Regular Army Infantrystrength of 5 Battalions. Despite the uniqueness ofthe problem the solutions applied h\ the ADFappear to owe more to philosophies which harearisen in Europe, for continental warfare in aninfrastructure-dense environment, than to our owngeographical reality... Sydney to Exmouth Gulf,by sea or road, for example is as far from Exmouthto Madras... or three times the distance of Hitler'sdeepest penetration into the Soviet Union..."'

Moyse felt that Australian commanders were viewingmobility and manoeuvre within a European ratherthan an Australian context. He pointed out that the so-called sea-air gap was in fact a sea-air-land gap whichrequired that the Army think seriously about its role inoffshore operations in the northern archipelago.'1' Henoted that the Army in the Twenty First Century (A21)Review, announced in the 1994 White Paper, waslimited to creating mobile task forces for operationson continental Austral ia and ignored amphibiousmobility. Moyse suggested that modern amphibiousoperations had to be seen in the broader context ofoperational manoeuvre from the sea."'

Like Butler, Johnson and Shevlin before him, Moysewas sceptical of depending on Australia's overlandtransport routes from south to north which he feltoffered l i t t l e scope for dispersal and were vulnerable

Army LCM 8's being recovered to HMAS Tohruk.Exercise intial landing 99

to interdiction from the air. He was also wary ofrelying too heavily on air deployment of land forcesbecause strategic airlift was not the best method formoving vehicles and heavy equipment. The ADFneeded both sea and air mobili ty. 'Amphibious and airmobility ' , he wrote, "are complementary andsynergous with one another. The former providesweight and endurance while the latter provides speedof response"."' But Moyse was convinced thatAustral ia could not implement land force operationalmanoeuvre unless it embraced the range, enduranceand speed associated wi th mar i t ime operations. Thiswas best achieved by 'endowing land force tacticalcombat power with amphibious mobility'." Aseaborne force could cover 600 kilometres in twentyfour hours and was capable of outmanoeuvring a landbased opponent. An amphibious battalion grouppoised off King Sound could, for instance, cover thearea from Barrow Island oilfield to Darwin at afraction of the cost of land based forces.'"

Like Shevlin, Moyse identified lack of strategic-direction as the main handicap to the development ofa credible ADF amphibious capability. Since none ofthe services had a part icular ly v i t a l interest inpromoting amphibious warfare in the resources scrumthere was a 'Catch 22' situation because "lack ofrepresentation has lead [s ic] to lack of strategicdirection, which in turn has in turn perpetuated thelack of representation'/'"

Without a single point of amphibious responsibility todevelop a concept of operations and an amphibiousforce structure there could be no real progress. Whilewelcoming the acquisition of the LPAs, Moysewarned that in the ADF, ' i t is clear that many people'sperceptions of amphibious warfare owe more to 1945than 1995'.' The progress associated with the LPAacquisition had taken place in spite of defence policyrather than because of it. Too many uniformed officersand defence officials st i l l equated amphibious warfarewith visions of costly over the beach assault andseemed unaware of new developments in marit imemanoeuvre using sea delivered airmobile forces. 'Thewhole art of amphibious operational manoeuvre', heremarked, 'is to turn a potential assault into anunopposed landing by using superior mobi l i ty ,supported by deception and stealth whereappropriate'.71 Moyse concluded, 'a Concept ofOperations [for the ADF| must take account ofpossibilities provided by both the concepts andtechnology of the late 1990s, not the 1940s'.72

In October 1996, Lieutenant Commander John P.Robinson, a former Director of Joint Warfare Navybetween 1988 and 1991, also questioned the ADF'sconception of mobility and manoeuvre.71 Robinsondrew on the willingness of the new Howard CoalitionGovernment to embrace the idea that 'Australia'sdefence does not begin at our coast-l ine" and thegrowing Government recognition of 'a need to

January/March 7999 IS


increase the flexibility and deployability of highlycapable Army elements'.74 In this new context,Robinson argued for a f u l l e r appreciation by the A l ) f :

of operational manoeuvre from the sea as acomponent of a new approach to amphibiouswarfare." He pointed to the ADF's problems inmoving fuel during Exercise Diamond Dollar in 1997.problems which were only alleviated by using alanding craft heavy (LCH) in the Cape York area. LikeMoyse. Robinson saw great value in an ADFamphibious force which could use helicopters andmobile troops io rapidly deploy along the seawardHank of an area of operations.71'

Like But ler and Shevlin, Robinson saw the need for ahighly mobile land force composed of "Marines" inall but name'.77 The Army of the future had to be ableto respond to a variety of scenarios i n c l u d i n gdeploying and lodging on to isolated and distantterritories, or securing a forward operating base suchas an airhead. Bui developing a joint amphibiousforce 111(0 w h a t Robinson styled as 'a key ADFDefence capabili ty ' required not only a sea-mobilearmy but also redefining A u s t r a l i a n amphib iousdoctrine 'as a function of Manoeuvre Warfare'."" Herecommended that the ADF examine a new concept ofo | v i a i i o n s based on o p e i a t i o n a l n i anoeu \ re anil createa Joint Project Team to advise Commander AustralianTheatre (COMAST).7"

Lessons from the Writings ofAustralia's Amphibious TheoristsWhat lessons can be drawn from this brief survey of thew r i t i n g s of the Australian amphibious warfare theorists?There are perhaps three that are worth noting. First, thelong and often futile struggle of the amphibious theoriststo achieve off icial recognition, suggests that theyencountered a peculiar Australian strategic culture whichwas largely indifferent to the requirements of jointseaborne operations. Second, the wri t ings of theamphibious theor is t s help us to understand thedichotomy between continental and naval thinking incurrent Australian mili tary thought. Third, the seabornewarfare advocaies assist us to comprehend the dynamicsof the strategy-force mismatch in present defence policy.

The Problem of Strategic Culture

All the amphibious writers examined highlight the lackof cultural affinity with the sea which has contributed toAustralia's rather weak maritime - as opposed to naval -tradition. It is perhaps significant that the most importantof the Australian amphibious theorists were officers witheither backgrounds in the Royal Navy and the RoyalMarines, or exposure to the thinking of the United SlatesMarine Corps. Unlike many ADF officers, they werecomfortable wi th the idea of the sea as an arena for jointmobile operations.

This suggests that, while the reluctance of the ADF toembrace amphibious warfare is underpinned by half a

century of single service differences, resource problemsand often unfavourable strategic guidance, it may be - asB. N. Primrose anil Kim Bea/ley ha\e impl ied - at ixx>t,a problem of Australian strategic culture. Although theconcept of strategic culture is a methodologicallydifficult Held, it has produced a growing literature inrecent years.*" A strategic culture has been tentativelydefined as "the habits of thought and action... ofparticular mili tary establishments' or 'the set of att i tudesand beliefs held wi th in a military establishmentconcerning the political objective of war and the mosteffective strategy and operational method of achievingit'.*1 A strategic culture is a complex accretion of ideasabout war which, despite changing circumstances, tendto reappear in new guises and often demonstrate apersistent affinity with the past."

From the perspective of strategic culture, it is possible tomount a case that the Army's experience of large scaleland warfare in Europe and the Middle Fast created apreference for continental warfare. With respect to theRAAF and the RAN. their operational experience haslargely been gained in a coal i t ion rather than anindependent framework. In short, Australia's strategic-culture is distinguished by the lack of a joint nationalapproach to war. As Commander Shevlin noted in 1980.a lack of a national policy was a feature of Australia'sexperience of amphibious operations in the South WestPacific during the Second World War. For most of thecampaign, Australian vessels and tnxips were underAmerican command and were not permitted to operateas a national force." In a real sense. Australia, for mostof its history since 1945, has possessed a military culturewhich has never properly understood the seaborne landforce requirements of a joint maritime strategy. This isparticularly striking when it comes to the problem ofmobile operations. Further research into Australianstrategic cul ture may yield important insights intoAustralia's curious neglect of the sea in jo in t serviceoperations.

The Dichotomy between Continenta/ism andNavalism in Australian Strategic Thought

The writings of the amphibious advocates helpi l l u m i n a t e the way in which defence policy since the1970s has perpetuated the dichotomy between theArmy's cont inental ethos and the Navy's blue waterpreference. The origins of this division in Australianmilitary thinking between continentalism andnavalism can be traced back to the Federation era ofAlfred Deakin and Andrew Fisher and to defenceplanning in the inter-war period.*'

The writings of Butler. Johnson, Shevlin, Moyse andRobinson impl ic i t ly challenge the cont inenta l -nasa ldichotomy in Austral ian strategic t h i n k i n g . Theycontest what Stewart Woodman and David Homerhave defined as the Army's 'continental warfareethos'.*' If Austral ian amphibious theorists have oneimportant feature in common, it is their compellingbelief in the need for Australia to develop a marine-

Jtiiiuar\/M(in-li


style Army. They have been sceptical of what MajorMoyse identified as the Army's European mindset - amindset which tends to conceive of organisation,mobility and manoeuvre in a land-based continentalstrategic context/ '

Soldiers from Alpha Company, 2 RAR conduct beachassault. Exercise initial landing 99

The amphibious strand of Australian military thoughtalso imp l i c i t l y challenges the Royal AustralianNavy's gradual transformation since the 1970s into adefensive 'sea-air gap' force without aircraft carriers,seaborne land forces or significant capability forinland force projection. In invest igat ing therequirements of an Australian maritime strategy.recent writers such as Commodore W. S. G. Batemanand Commander R. J. Sherwood, have emphasised thepredominant role of naval and air platforms over jointforces and the use of sea control rather than littoraloperations."" This navalist preference is reflected bySherwood's and Bateman's comment in 1992 that,'the predominant role of land forces in the defence ofAustralia's interests is only important if the nation'smaritime strategy has failed'.**

In 1997. an assessment of the future direction ofAustralian maritime strategy reinforced this navalistapproach. It argued against a shift towards a littoralwarfare posture stating that 'Australian naval forcesare intended for sea control in the sea-air gap in thenorthern approaches to the country'.*'1 Yet as theleading American marit ime scholar. John B.Hattendorf has warned, the words 'naval and'maritime' are not synonymous because 'a maritimestrategy involves much more than a navy'."" Amaritime strategy is about the comprehensivedirection of all aspects of national power to achievepolicy goals using the sea."'

The Strategy-Force Mismatch in CurrentAustralian Defence Policy

The work of the amphibious theorists also helps toexpose the presence of a strategy-force mismatch in

Australian defence policy. The policy trends since the1970s that have driven the Army towards continentalland operations and the Navy and Air Force towards aplatform-oriented defence of the northern seaapproaches, represent a divergence rather than aconvergence in strategic thought. This has led to alack of coherence in defence planning.

Since 1987, Australian strategy has conceived of alayered, vertical defence in depth placing the Armybehind rather than alongside the Navy and the AirForce. This is a misconceived approach to defenceplanning. It prevents the emergence of a genuine jointmaritime strategy because it divorces the Army fromany significant role in the sea-air-land gap. The resulthas been a strategy force-mismatch between amainland defence role for Australia's ground forcesand a navalist-aerospace strategy for the RAN and theRAAF in the northern approaches. These opposingand centrifugal trends are most s t r ikingly revealed inthe Government's 1997 publications. Restructuringthe Australian Army (RTA) and Australian StrategicPolicy /997(ASP97)." ;

ConclusionAustralia needs to undergo a fundamental strategicorientation by the early years of the next century. Thisshould reflect the teachings of Corbett and be directedtowards a joint maritime strategy as indicated by theamphibious theorists whose writings have beenanalysed in this essay.

There are some clear indications that change in thisdirection has begun - albeit slowly - as politicalfactors, service interests and scarce resources dictatethe pace of change. The conversion andmodernisation of the LPAs HMAS Manoora amiHMAS Kanimbla is well underway. The developmentof JP 2048, the program for a replacement watercraftfleet, is ongoing. The recent decision to retain HMASTobruk until 2010 gives the ADF a potential force ofthree amphibious ships. The implementation of anAfloat Support Study to identify maritime operationalsupport capabili ty and a review of amphib iousdoctrine by the ADF Warfare Centre are both positivesteps. Finally, the establishment of CommanderAustralian Amphibious Forces (CAAF) in MaritimeHeadquarters in February 1999 with a joint staff.represents a serious attempt to give strategic directionto developing an amphibious capability.'"

For some defence analysts, the ADF's need to shifttowards a maritime expeditionary capability andlittoral warfare, is so obvious, that it cannot heaccomplished quick ly enough. For instance, in l a te1997 the leading international naval expert, EricGrove, observed:

...The [Australian] Army is almost twice the si~eof the Nav\ and still geared primaril\ to the rather

Jiimuir\/Murcli 1999 17

Joiirnul of the Australian Naval Institute

unnecessary role of defending the wilderness ofNorthern Australia. What is required is a root andbranch restructuring of the Army into \\-liat wouldeffectively be a small clone of the US MarineCorps, a well-equipped force capable of rapiddeployment by sea and to a lesser extent by air...The 11997/ Strategic Review demonstrates thatthings are beginning to move in that direction, assheer strategic logic dictates such areorientation... This trend might well also reopenthe case for another capability that the RANreluctantly lost, significantly misses, and mightjust get back - an aircraft carrier..."

In his celebrated manual of political power. TheI'nncc. M a c h i a \ e l l i . reminds us that, 'all armedprophets have conquered and unarmed ones failed'. "5

For much of the Cold War era, the advocates ofamphibious warfare have been Australia's unarmedprophets. Lacking in numbers, resources, centralorganisation and official patronage, they consistentlyfai led to carry the i r arguments in the defence debate.The armed prophets became followers of Paul Dibband Kim Bea/ley and conquered the making ofstrategic policy. Hut their late Cold War design ofDefence of Australia became an intellectual cul de sacunder new and fluid strategic conditions. With thedramatic changes in international security during the1990s, it seems as if the wheel of time and thedirection of events has turned decisively in favour ofthe ideas promoted by Aust ra l ian amphibious thinkersfor nearly ha l f a century. There is an historicopportunity for the advocates of a truly joint maritimestrategy to seize the high ground in the defencedebate, to transform themselves from unarmed intoarmed prophets and to stamp their mark on Australianstrategy in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

NOTES1 U. N. Primrose. 'Insurance, Deterrence, Faith: The Search for

an Integrated Concept of Defence', The Australian Journal ofDefence Studies. March 1977. I. i, p. 36.

2 Kim C. Beazley, "The Development of Australian MaritimeStrategy', in Commonwealth of Australia. Selected SpeechesI9N5-19X9 by the linn Kim C. Hi-az/ev. MP Minister forDefence, Directorate of Departmental Publications, 1989, p.184.

3 Julian S. Corbett. Some Principles of Maritime Slrate<>\;Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1911. p. 14.

4 Ibid., pp. 14-15.5 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Value of Amphibious Flexibility and

Forces, RUSI Journal. November I960, CV, No. 620, p. 492.' i Sec \ l i J i a c l I \ . u i s . / / / < AW< ni ilit \n\trnlian \iin\ in ii

Maritime Concept of Strategy. Land Warfare Studies Centre.Working Paper No. 101, Canberra. 1998. On p. 3conl inenta l ism is defined as 'a strategic emphasis on using landforces for the defence of mainland Australia and navalism as 'astrategic emphasis on using naval forces supported by land-based aircraft'.Corbett. i>/> cit.. p. 13.

8 Ibid., p. 14.9 C. D. Coulthard-Clark. 'Formation of the Australian Armed

Services', in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds), Australia:Two Centuries of War and Peace. Austral ian War Memorial.Canberra, 1988. p. 142.

10 See David Horner. 'The Army's Role in the Mari t ime Defenceof Australia', in David Stevens (ed). In Search of a MaritimeSlralefty: The Maritime Element in Australian Defence

Planning since 1901. Canberra Papers on Strategy and DefenceNo. 119, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Austral ianNational Universirt. Canberra. 1997. pp. 17-42; MichaelEvans, 'Maritime Power and the Australian Army: Lessonsfrom the past. Implications for the Future; in David Stevens(ed). Maritime Power in the 20th Century: The AustralianExperience, Allen and Unwin, Canberra. 1998. pp. 230-48.

11 See David Dexter. The New Guinea Offensives, Australia in theWar of 1939-1945, Series One: Army, Vol VI. Australian WarMemorial, Canberra. 1961; Gavin Long, The Final Offensives,Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One: Army. Vol VII,Austral ian War Memorial. Canberra. 1963.

12 An important collection of essays can he found in LieutenantColonel Glenn Wahlert (ed). Australian Army AmphibiousOperations in the South-West Pacific. 1942-45. Army DoctrineCentre. Headquarters Training Command. Sydney. 1994. Morerecently, the Australian Army has commissioned a new study ofamphibious operations in the South West Pacific during theSecond World War.

13 The LST Flotilla was disbanded in 1951.14 See Evans. 'Maritime Power and the Australian Army: Lessons

from the Past. Implications for the Future', pp. 233-4.15 Ibid.16 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia. Cambridge

University Press, Sydney, 1990. p. 223.17 M. C. J. Welburn, The Development of Australian Arms-

Doctrine, 1945-1964, Canberra Papers on Strategy andDefence No. 108. Australian National University. Canberra.1994. chapter five.

18 Major D. M. Butler. 'An Australian Task Force', AustralianArmv Journal, February I960. No. 129, pp. 5-21.

19 Ibid.20 /bid., p. 1521 Ibid., p. 18.22 Ibid., pp. IS-19.23 Ibid., p. 20.24 Ibid., p. 2 1 .25 Ibid.26 Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Johnson. 'The Need for an A u s t r a l i a n

Amphibious Force', Army Journal, February 1974. No. 297.pp. 3-21.

27 Ibid., pp. 5-6.28 Ibid., p. 9.29 Ibid., p. 10.30 Ibid., p. II.31 Ibid., p. 12.32 Ibid., pp. 12-13.33 Ibid., p. 13.34 Ibid., p. 16.35 Ibid.36 Ibid., pp. 17-18.37 Ibid., p. 19.38 Ibid.. p.2().39 Commander P. J. M. Shevlin, 'New Amphibious Ship for

RAN', Navy Quarterly. Spring 1975, IV, ii, pp. 6-8; 'A NewAmphibious Capability for the Australian Services', DefenceForce Journal, November/December 1976. No. 1, pp. 19-24;'An Operational Concept for the Austra l ian Amphib iousForce', Defence Force Journal, September/October 1978. No.12. pp. 6-11; 'Australian Amphibious Capability -An EssentialElement of National Seapower'. Journal of the AustralianNaval Institute. February 1980. VI. No. I. pp. 35-38; 'BlindSpot in Current Defence Planning'. Pacific Defence Reporter.August 1987, XIV. I I , pp. 17-19.

40 Ibid. Letter from Commander P. J. M. Shevlin AM. RAN(Retd) to the author. 15 September 1998. Hereafter cited asShevlin letter.

41 S h c \ l i n . 'New Amphib ious Sh ip for R A N ' , pp. 5-6.42 Shevlin letter, 15 September 1998; Shevlin. 'A New

Amphibious Capability for the Australian Services', pp. 22-3.I ' S h c \ l m . "A New A m p h i b i o u s C a p a b i l i t y loi Ihc A u s t r a l i a n

Services', pp. 21-24.44 Shevlin. 'An Operational Concept for the A u s t r a l i a n

Amphibious Force', pp. 9 -11 .45 Ibid., p. 10; 'Australian Amphibious Capability -An Essential

Element of National Seapower', p. 20.46 Shevlin, 'An Operational Concept for the Australian

Amphibious Force', p. 6: Shevlin letter. 15 September 1998.



47 Shevlin. 'An Operational Concept for the A u s t r a l i a nAmphibious Force', p. 9.

4X Ibid., p. ft.49 Ihiil.. p. 7.50 Shevlin, 'Aus t ra l ian Amphibious Capability - An Essential

l - . l e m e n t of N a t i o n a l POULT", p . 1 5 .51 //>/</.. pp. 16; 19.

52 Shevlin, 'An Operational Concept for the AustralianAmphibious Force', p. 8.

53 //)/,/.. p. X.54 Ibid.55 Michael Evans, 'Forward from the Past: The Development of

Austral ian Army Doctrine, 1972 to the Present'. Land WarfareStudies Paper forthcoming.

5ft Shevlin, 'Australian Amphibious Capability -An EssentialElement of National Seapower'. p. 1ft.

57 Lieu tenant R. M. Smith, 'The Formation of a RANAmphib ious B a t t a l i o n ' . Defence Force Journal,January/February 1978, No. X. pp. 59-ft; LieutenantCommander A. W. Regan. 'Austral ia 's Amphib iousIncapability?' , Defence Force Journal, January/February 19X4,No. 44, pp. 37-43; Major P. H. Quintan. 'Mobi l i ty and SmallScale Amphibious Operations: The FOB Concept', AustralianDefence Force Journal, March/April 1987, No. 63, pp. 44-7.

58 See Shevlin, 'Blind Spot in Current Defence Planning', p. 17.59 Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept

of Strategy pp. 13-15.60 [bid., pp. 13-17,61 The literature on this subject is large. For developments in the

Uni ted Slates see Marine Corps Combat DevelopmentCommand. FMFRP 14-7, Over-the-Horizon (OTH)Amphibious Operations Operational Concept. Quantico.Virginia. 1991: Department of the Navy. From the Sea:1'reparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, WashingtonDC. Department of the Navy, September 1992; For Britain andthe North At lant ic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries seeRoyal Navy, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine:BR 1806. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1995 andVincent Grimes. Richard Scott and Michael Wells.'Amphib ious Advancement ' . Jane'.', Nav\ International.September 1997. ("11. v i i .

62 Major R. E. Moyse, 'The Future of Amphibious Warfare in theADF - Cognitive Dissonance or "Catch 22?"'. AustralianDefence Force Journal. March/April 1996, No. 117. pp. 25-29.Ibid., p. 25.Ihiil.. p. 28.Ibid.Ihhl.. p. 26.

63646566676869707 17273

74

Ibid.Ibid., p. 28.Ibid., p. 27.Ibid., p. 27.Ibid.Ibid.Lieutenant Commander John P. Robinson. 'Manoeuvre fromthe Sea - The Forgotten Force Mul t ip l i e r ' , Journal of theAustralian Naval Institute, August/October 1996. XXI I . i i i . pp.24-30.Ian McLachlan, AO, MP, Minister for Defence, 'Address to theInternational Strategic Studies Conference". Parliament House.3 Mav 1996.

75 Robinson. 'Manoeuvre from the Sea', p. 24.76 Ibid., p. 24.77 Ibid.78 Ibid., p. 26.79 Ibid., pp. 27-29.80 See Yit/.hak Klein, 'A Theory of Strategic C u l t u r e ' ,

Comparative Strategy, 1991, X, i, pp. 3-23; Thomas Cleary.The Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture ofStrategy. Shamhhala. Boston, 1992; Stephen J. Blank.Lawrence E. Gritner. Karl P. Magyar. Lewis B. Ware andB\num I:. Withers. Conflict. Culture and Histor\: RegionalDimensions. Air University Press, Alabama, 1993; Anita M.Arms, 'Strategic Culture: The American Mind', in Thomas C.Gill (ed). Essays on Strategy IX, National Defense University,Washington DC, 1993, pp. 3-32; Alan Macmillan, 'Strategic-Culture and National Ways in Warfare: The British Case',RUSI Journal. October 1995, CXXXX, v. pp. 33-39.

X ! Yit/.hak Klein, 'A Theory of Strategic Culture', pp. 3-23.82 Ibid., pp. 12 -1383 Shevlin, 'Australian Amphibious Capability - An Essential

Element of National Seapower'. p. 17.84 Michael Evans, 'From Defence to Security: Cont inui ty and

Change in Australian Strategic Planning in the TwentiethCentury", in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds). Serving VitalInterests: Australia's Strategic Planning in Peace and War.University of New South Wales, Australian Defence ForceAcademy. Canberra, 199ft. pp. 116-40.

85 Stewart Woodman and David Homer, 'Land Forces in theDefence of Australia" in David Horner (ed), Reshaping theAustralian Army: Challenges for the 1990s, Canberra Paperson Strategy and Defence No. 77, Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre. Australian National University. 1991, p. 20.

86 Moyse, op cit,, p.26.87 W. S. G. Bateman and R.J. Sherwood. Principles of Australian

Maritime Operations, Strategic and Defence Studies CentreWorking Paper No. 265. Australian National Universi ty ,Canberra, 1992.

XX Ibid., p. 19.89 Lieutenant Commander G. J. Sammul. "An Essay on the

Direction of Australia's Maritime Strategy". Journal <>/ theAustralian Naval Institute, July/September 1997. XXIV, i i i . p.34.

90 John B. Hatendorf. 'What is a Mari t ime Strategy'.1 ', in Stevens.In Search of a Maritime Strategy, p. 18.

91 Ibid.92 For an examinat ion see Evans. The Role of the Australian Army

in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, pp. 25-36.93 Letter to author from Commander James Goldrick RAN. Chief

of Staff to Commodore Flotillas. 15 November 199X;Australian Army. Brief for Deputy Chief of Army. 'Visit toLPA- Forgacs Dockyard. Newcastle'. 18 November 1998.

94 Eric Grove. 'The Royal Aus t ra l i an Navy: A Vehicle forRegional Engagement'. Maritime Studies. November/December1997. No. 97, p. 4.

95 Niccolo Machiavelli . The I'rincc. t ranslated by Luigi Ricci,Mentor. New York. 1952. p. 50.

January/March 1999

// of the Australian Naval Institute

Breaking the Spears: HMAS Tobruk'sInvolvement in Truce Monitoring

Operations in Bougainvilleby Commander A. K. du Toit, RAN

A fter nine years of civil war costing thousandsof l i v e s , t he people of the island ofBougainville in Papua New Guinea laid

down their weapons and symbolically 'broke thespears' at a moving ceremony in Bougainvil le 'scapital, Arawa, on Thursday 30 April 1998. On a hotand overcast day, a crowd of several thousand,including members from the unarmed multi-nationalTruce Monitoring Group drawn from Australia, New/calami. Vanua tu and F i j i , assembled at midday towatch the leaders of the war ravaged provinceformally sign a cease-fire deal, which many considerto be Bougainville's best chance for long-term peace,reconciliation and reconstruction.

The formal signing of the cease-fire agreement,which had only been finalised by the leaders, meetingi n HMAS lohnik. du r ing the early hours of thatmorning, was a particularly poignant culmination toTobruk's recent part icipation in Operation Belisi inB o u g a i n v i l l e , wh ich included three deployments tothe war torn i s land and a record breaking 73c o n t i n u o u s d a v s ,il sea between January and March1998 in support of truce monitoring operationsashore.

The Bougainville Conflict. A u s t r a l i a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Bouga inv i l l e stemmedfrom the crisis which began in 1989 when the PapuaNew Guniea (PNG) Government declared a State ofF.nicrgcncv on (he is land f o l l o w i n g the sabotage ofthe g iant Panguna copper mine by local landownersdemanding a greater share in the mine's profits.Fuelled by a separatist /eal. the situation rapidlydeteriorated into a conflict that engulfed the entireis land w i t h the PNG government subsequentlyplacing an embargo on all support i n c l u d i n g food andmedical aid to the troubled island. The ensuing periodwas marked by armed conflict between the pro-independence Bouga inv i l l e Revolutionary Army( B R A ) led hv rebel leader Francis Ona. the PNGarmy and a pro-PNG resistance mi l i t i a , whichresulted in many deaths (estimates range from 2,000to 20.000) as a result of intermit tent skirmishes andthe consequent breakdow n of health and food supplyinfras t ructure . The conflict has also kept the mineclosed, wrecked the island's infrastructure, sappedthe PNG Defence budget and has been a painful thornin the side of successive PNG governments.

A number of previous i n i t i a t i v e s to secure las t ingpeace on Bougainville, inc luding an attempt in 1994,which also involved Tohritk, proved unsuccessful andended in a stalemate. Frustrations boiled over when,after an 18-month cease-fire collapsed in 1996, thenPNG Prime Minister Sir Ju l ius Chan hired foreignmercenaries to destroy the BRA's j ung le bases.In te rna t iona l outrage scuttled the plan andcontributed to his defeat in the J u n e 1997 PNGgeneral election.

W i t h new Prime M i n i s t e r B i l l Skate in ten t on peace.PNG tried again. BRA leader Sam Kauona andJoseph Kahili. Vice-President of the BougainvilleInterim Government (BIG), the BRA's political wing,defied fiercely pro-independence Ona. who hadlargely been marginalised, by entering into talks withthe PNG government and the locally elected andPNG recognised Bouga inv i l l e TransitionalGovernment (BTG). Under New Zealandsponsorship, the r i v a l parties were invi ted toparticipate in new negotiations at Burnham in New/ealand to end hos t i l i t ies . This resulted in adec la ra t ion "to achieve a l a s t i ng peace" w h i c h wassigned by the leaders of the var ious factions on I SJuly 1997.

The Burnham Declaration led to fur ther ta lks inOctober 1997 which resulted in the Burnham Trucebeing signed; the formation of a combined mul t i -national Truce Monitoring Group (TMG); and anagreement to continue talks aimed at securing las t ingpeace via a permanent cease-fire. The October 1997truce was followed in January 1998 by the NewZealand brokered Lincoln Agreement, w h i c h pavedthe way for the negotiation of a permanent cease-firedeal and guaranteed the phased withdrawal of PNGtroops, the transit ion to a Peace Monitoring Group(PMG). talks on the island's political future and theelection of a Bougainvi l le ReconciliationGovernment (BRG).

The Truce Monitoring CroupThe 200-member unarmed TMG. consisting, mainlyof Australian and New Zealand mil i tary and civi l ianpersonnel, w i t h a few personnel drawn from Vanuatuand F i j i , was established on Bouga inv i l l e inNovember 1997. as part of Operation Hcli\i. tooversee the peace process fol lowing the Burnhamt a l k s . I t w a s t h e largest m u l t i n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y

Jiiniuir\/Mnn-li

Journal of the Australian Nan/I Institute

deployment in the South Pacific since 1945.excluding exercises and disaster-relief operations.Their role was to monitor and report on the factionsobservance of the truce and to facilitate the return ofthe island to normality by providing a base level ofconfidence from which the people could moveforward. Australia committed about 80 soldiersproviding logistical support plus some civi l ians in themonitoring teams. TMG Headquarters wasestablished at Arawa with the Logistic Support Team(LST) established at Loloho, and four 20 memberTruce Monitoring Team (TMT) sites located at Buka.Arawa, Buin and Tonu. Following the arrival of theTMG. local peace groups emerged all over the islandindicating a widespread desire by the population forpeace.

Tobruk's InvolvementTohruk's involvement in Operation Bclisi and thecurrent peace process commenced in mid-November1997 while alongside in Guam on a short new entryofficers' t r a in ing cruise, when notice was receivedtha t the ship was to participate in operations toprovide logistic support to the TMG bound forBougainv i l l e . As a result , the remainder of thetraining cruise was cancelled and the ship proceededdirectly back to Sydney, the eight day passage beingused to good effect to plan for the imminentoperation.

Increasingly, the Australian Defence Force has beeninvolved in peacekeeping and aid to civi l poweroperations where the amphibious and sea transportcapabilities of Tohruk has been invaluable. Tohruk. asthe primary amphibious uni t in the ADF inventory, isan extremely important and valuable asset,particularly in joint operations, and there have beenfew contingencies in recent years where her uniquecapabilities have not been required.

Operational planning continued in Sydney, whilematerial preparations were completed in readiness forthe operation. Tobritk, under the command ofCommander G.A. Robinson, RAN. sailed fromSydney on Saturday 29 November, heavily ladenwith approximately 1200 tonnes of cargo and 70soldiers, mostly medical and engineering personnel,embarked. Much to the relief of the embarked force,the six day passage to Bougainville, which lies to theeast of the Papua New Guinea mainland, wascompleted in good weather with Tohruk arriving offAnewa Bay on the morning of Friday 5 December.After rendezvousing with HMAS Success (CaptainA.W. Fl int . CSC, RAN) later that day. Tohrukproceeded alongside the former ore carrier berth atLoloho and immediately began discharging her vitalcargo which was eagerly awaited ashore.

Tobruk's cargo handl ing capabil i t ies were ful lyuti l ised; the 70 tonne heavy-lift Velle derrick and

both eight tonne Favco cranes assisted with thedischarge of vehicles and stores onto the wharf , whi lethe two embarked LCM 8 landing craft conductedstern door operations to off load v e h i c l e s andequipment stowed in the tank deck. Tohruk's flexiblecargo h a n d l i n g fac i l i t ies and motivated ship'scompany ensured thai the unloading operation wascompleted w i th in ten hours prior to getting underwaythe following morning lor the return passage toSydney, where she arrived on Thursday 1 1 to preparefor her return to Bougainville in early January 1998.

Considerable work was undertaken dur ing the threeweek period in Sydney, including the ins ta l la t ion oftwo reverse osmosis plants to produce fresh wateronboard. Addi t ional communica t ions facilities,including provision of INMARSAT B. were alsofitted. Shortly before Christmas Tohruk was advisedthat her participation in operations off Bougainvil lewere l ike ly to extend well beyond the end of Januaryand that the ship should be stored for ninety dayendurance. Final preparations for the deploymentback to Bougainville were completed by New Year'sEve, with equipment enhancements providing agreatly improved operational endurance.

73 Days At SeaTohruk, departed Fleet Base East on Friday 2 Januaryto commence passage back to Bougainvi l le toprovide logistic and communications support to theTMG ashore on the war-torn island. The passagenorth involved the turnover of command fromCommander Robinson to Commander A.K. du Toil,RAN, at sunset on Saturday 3 while transiting northoff the New South Wales coast. CommanderRobinson was subsequently landed by boat at TweedHeads early the next morning and Tohruk shapedcourse for Bougainville to relieve Success on stationin the Combined Force Area of Operations (CFAO).

Progress through the Coral Sea was hampered byTropical Cyclone Katrina, which with almost everyalteration of course made to avoid it. appeared tochange direction towards Tohruk. After f ina l lypassing some 80 miles to the east of the cyclone.Tobruk passed through the Bougainville Strait andentered the CFAO during the night of Wednesday 7January and rendezvoused with HMAS Successshortly after sunrise the following morning. After athree hour underway replenishment with Success,command team briefings and the transfer of two SeaKing SK50A helicopters and associated personnel,Tohruk assumed responsibility as the Task GroupCommander (CTG 627.9) from Success, whichshaped course for Australia soon afterwards.

Tohruk commenced an intensive operational t ra iningprogramme the following day designed to integratethe embarked 817 Squadron Detachment into the shipand establish standard operating procedures in direct

Jdiiiuirv/Miircli 1999 21


support of TMG operations ashore. The aircrewq u i c k l y f ami l i a r i sed themselves w i t h f l y i n goperat ions from both the forward and after f l i g h tdecks and Tohntk soon settled down to an operationstempo, with the ship proceeding to sea on most daysw i t h i n the CFAO to main ta in a patrol sector to theeast of Kieta in order to avoid any confrontation orperceived breach of the truce moni tor ingarrangements, wi th the ship going to anchor in ArawaBay each night . Because tensions were still veryevident on Bougainville during the truce period, thenumber of service personnel permitted on the islandwas strictly limited. As a result, members of Tobruk'sship's company were unable to proceed ashore for theduration of Tohruk's deployment. One day a week,normally Sunday, was therefore spent at anchor inArawa Bay for Ship's Company rest and recreation.

The Austra l ian cont ingent commander. Colonel S.K.Joske. v i s i t ed Tohnik shortly after arriving to briefthe ship's company on the progress of the fragilepeace on the island and a close re la t ionsh ip was soonestablished w i t h Headquarters Truce MonitoringGroup (HQ TMG) ashore. This close liaison wasm a i n t a i n e d th roughout Tohruk's involvement inBougainville, and Colonel Joske and his relief.Colonel J. B. Wilkinson who arrived during the firstTMG rotation in mid-February, regularly visited theship for consultation and used the facilities on boardto assist with planning future military involvement inthe Bougainville peace process.

Ship 's Company postings and aircrew rotationscommenced early in the deployment using scheduledfortnightly RAAF C-130 fl ights between RAAFRichmond and Aropa airfield. This greatly assisted inre tu rn ing the ship to a more normal posting cycle,fo l lowing the posting free/.e introduced whenTnhruk's par t ic ipa t ion in the Operation was firstordered.

HMA Ships Halik/>a/>an and Brunei brought muchwelcomed changes to the daily routine on twooccasions during the deployment with their resupplyof fresh, fro/en, dry provisions and canteen supplies.In a d d i t i o n . Tohnik r e f u e l l e d from HMNZSEndeavour, before the hi t ter ' s departure for New/.calami at the end of January, and HMNZSMtiiKiwiinui, w h i c h regular ly proceeded to Lae andRabaul for fue l for the TMG. also provided Tohnikwith fuel on two occasions, enabling operationalendurance to be extended. Tohnik on the other hand,provided in theatre log is t ic support to the two ArmyLCM 8s which undertook essential TMG supply runsin Bouga inv i l l e a n waters, conducted logisticresupply runs and medivac flights using her twoembarked Shod helicopters and transferred dieseland a v i a t i o n fuel ashore as required.

I IK- Sh ip ' s Company responded remarkably wel l tothe demands placed upon them and their families as

the peace process ashore gained momentum. Duringthe deployment. Tohruk's en ter ta inment committeeworked tirelessly to provide enter ta inment andactivities for the TMG members ashore and the ship'scompany. With many days akin to 'Groundhog Day',activities to dispel the boredom included Aust ra l iaDay celebrations, steel deck barbeques, big screenmovie n ights , a comedy n i g h t , celebrity headsauction, qui / and tombola n ights , s tern doorswimming and regular screening of "Rat News', theship's onboard t e l e v i s i o n programme.Communication with families was maintained wi ththe f u l l range of communications faci l i t ies a v a i l a b l e .Sport and fitness sessions were a major focus w i t ho v e r 100 PT sessions conducted.

Tohnik remained in the Bougainville CFAO. in directsupport of the TMG. u n t i l Tuesday 10 March beforereturning to Sydney for much needed main tenanceand leave after spending 73 demanding days at seasince departing Fleet Base East (FBE) on 2 January.Tohnik was relieved on station on Tuesday 10 byHMAS Lahuan (Lieutenant R. I). Knights . RAN).The two ships rafted up w h i l e at anchor in Arawa Bayto effect the t ransfer of necessary stores and fuel andcomplete a command learn br ie f ing . Kev personnelfrom the TMG visited the ship during the handover,ensuring tha t Lahuan's command was as f u l l yprepared as possible prior to Tohruk's departure. CTG629.7 responsibilities were transferred during theDogs and Tohnik commenced the f ive day passage toSydney shortly afterwards.

With the assistance of the strong East Aust ra l ianCurrent, Tohnik arrived back in Sydney on theafternoon of Sunday 15. on an unseasonable grey anddamp day and berthed at the Fleet Base inWoolloomooloo Bay. Tohnik was met by Mari t imeCommander Australia. Rear Admiral C.A. Richie.AM. RAN. and hundreds of fr iends and f a m i l ymembers of the Ship's Company. Shortly al terberthing. Admiral Richie briefly addressed the Ships'Company and recognised t h e i r a c h i e v e m e n t inkeeping the ship operational th roughout thedeployment, before presenting Australian ServiceMedals wi th Bougainvi l le clasp. The deployment ofTohnik to Bougainville was a demanding operationfor the ship and her ship's company. However, thechallenges, and at t imes monotony of endur ing 73continuous days at sea were far outweighed by theoperational focus and the desire to see peace breakout on the beautiful, but troubled Island.

Cease Fire AgreementFollowing a brief respite in Sydney, during whichtime essential defects were rectified and some verywelcome leave taken. Tohnik sailed for B o u g a i n v i l l eon Wednesday 15 April for the third successive timein six months. On th i s deployment. Tohnik carriedsome 100 soldiers, three Iroqouis helicopters from



1 7 1 Reconnaissance Squadron, and a number ofvehicles, generators and plant equipment to supportthe transition from the New Zealand led TMG to theAustralian led PMG.

The six day return passage to Bougainville was madein benign conditions, which was greatly appreciatedby the embarked force, who had plenty to do withlessons inc luding health and hygiene, local customsand culture, public relations and Tok I'isin, thelanguage of the Bougainville people. Tohruk enteredthe CFAO on Monday 20 April, and berthed at LolohoWharf in Anewa Bay at 0800 on Tuesday 21 April tocommence discharging cargo. The majority of theembarked force, however, remained on board for theweek, thereby relieving the pressure on the limitedresources and facilities ashore during the majorchange-over of personnel.

In contrast to her previous deployment toBougainville, Tobruk's ship's company participated inmany activities ashore during the period alongside, inparticular a very moving ANZAC Day dawn serviceat the war memorial at Kieta which had recently beenreclaimed from the jungle. The service was a highlightand particularly significant with both Australians andNew Zealanders serving together in theatre.

During this visit, Tohruk was the venue for a series ofmeetings to finalise the cease-fire agreement that wasto be signed on Thursday 30 April. These meetingswere rescheduled on several occasions, due mainly todifficulties in assembling the representatives of thevarious factions. After a number of preparatorymeetings, the leaders' of the warring factions arrivedon board at 1000 on Wednesday 29 April andcommenced a long and at times charged meeting thatfinal ly reached agreement during the early hours ofthe next morning - less that six hours before theformal cease-lire signing ceremony was due to beheld in Arawa. With supporters of the various partiesgathered on the jetty, the Commanding Officer ofTobruk was invited to the closing remarks of themeeting and witnessed the emotional atmosphere asthe leaders agreed to strive for a peaceful conclusionto the crisis tha t has d iv ided t h e i r potent ia l lyprosperous island. As a final gesture, the chairmanpresented Commander Du Toil with spears and a bowami arrows, symbolic and poignant gifts todemonstrate that the people of Bougainville wereturning away from violence as a means of set t l ingtheir differences.

After nearly six months involvement with operationsin Bougainville, Tobruk finally sailed for Sydney atfirst light on Thursday 30 April, shortly after thecompletion of the leaders' talks onboard, her Ship'sCompany buoyed by their involvement in the peaceprocess and their proximity to the focus of activityduring the final days before the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

Lessons LearntTobruk's participation in operations in Bougainvi l leonce again highlighted (he importance of adeployahle and sustainable off-shore ADI-'amphibious l i f t capabil i ty in support of regionalcontingencies and reinforced the continued versa t i l i tyof Tobruk. There were two important lessons flowingfrom Tobruk's involvement in Bougainvi l le from theNavy's point of view. Firstly, it again confirmed tha iihe RAN is well equipped and organised to conductoperalions offshore. The Gulf war and Somaliaexperiences, and now Bougainville, have provedinvaluable and much was learnt. All three operationswere particularly rewarding in that they showed thatthe Navy is capable of conducting operationsoffshore in support of Government direction.Secondly, Tobruk's involvement in Bouga inv i l l eagain reinforced the need for an amphib iouscapability in the ADF. The logistics and sea transportroles, which are part of an amphibious capability,ensure that any Defence dollar spent in this area is agood investment. It also confirms that if we look atlikely Defence scenarios which may con from theADF over the ensuing years, there are few that wouldnot require an amphibious capabi l i ty as part of thesolution.

HMAS Tohruk with 2 KAR emurked returns toTownsville after exercise initial landing W

January/March IW9 23


A Navy Perspective of the Rise ofAmphibious Capability

By Commander Warren Johnston, RAN

IntroductionIn 1971 the first of six Landing Craft (Heavy) (LCH)HMAS Balikpopan was commissioned into RANservice. In 1977 HMAS Jen-is Bay was acquiredfollowed in April 1981 by the Landing Ship (Heavy)(LSH) HMAS Tohruk. These ships have provided themainstay of the ADF's Sea Transport capabilitydur ing the last two decades.

W i t h the demise of the Commander Austral ianAmphibious Squadron and the run down of HMASMun'ton in the mid 198()'s. the emphasis on, and levelof corporate knowledge of. amphibious warfaredeclined across the ADF. Although the RANparticipated in some amphibious warefare exercisesthe pract ical focus was clearly on sea transport.

In the early 1990s changes to regional s t ab i l i ty andgradual revision of strategic policy saw theamphibious requirement and capability picture beginto change. The purchase of two ex USN NewportClass Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) was approved inDecember 1993 w i t h HMAS Manoora (Ex FairfaxCoun ty ) arriving in Australia in September 1994, andHMAS Kaniiuhla (Ex Saginaw) arriving in November1994. The new arrivals boosted overall major shipnumbers w i t h i n the Force Element Group (PEG) fromone to three. A recent decision to retain HMAS Tohruku n t i l 2010. and the approval of a Life of TypeExtensions (LOTE) for five of the LCHs providedfurther certainty and capability within the PEG andaccords w i t h the latest strategic direction.1

By the year 2000 the ADI- wi l l posses a PEG ofs ign i f ican t si/e. equipped wi th purpose bui l t ships.modified to su i t ADF requirements, with thecapability to move relatively large quantities ofequipment and numbers of personnel long distancesover the sea. Organic air and watercraft assets wi l lallow the landing of personnel and discharge of cargowi thou t the requirement for harbour or port facil i t ies.

From a modest and dec l in ing baseline in the late 80sthere has been a considerable increase in amphibiousl i f t capability in the RAN. In addition to capitale x p e n d i t u r e , and despite chronic personnel shortages.the Chief of Navy, with the support of Chief of Army,has approved the creation of a Commander AustralianAmphibious Forces (COMAUSPHIBFOR) at theCaptain RAN level supported by a small Navy andArmy staff. COMAUSPHIBFOR wi l l provide a focalpoint of control and adminis t ra t ion and establish acentre of excellence for the amphibious PEG.

Types of OperationsAn amphibious force is described as "a naval forceand landing force, together with supporting forces thatare trained, organised and equipped for amphib iousoperations.'" Amphibious operations are operationsduring which land forces are landed and supportedfrom the sea. They encompass all aspects of planning,mounting, sea passage, landing and supporting thelanded force u n t i l achievement of the mission, andmay also include extraction of a land force. Thisamphibious role for the ADF" is now defined asamphibious assault and replaces the previous ADF'term of Amphibious Tactical Lodgement (ATL).1

Each LPA will be able to transport in excess of fourhundred troops for prolonged periods and, togetherwith the LSH, w i l l be able to embark and transport abattalion group. Lodgement of the force ashore wouldbe achieved by a combination of helicopters movingpersonnel and light stores and LCH and LCM8moving vehicles and bulk stores. These assets wouldalso provide the follow-on support of the landedforce. The current modernisation wi l l provide theLPAs with a deployable JFHQ facility, enhanced C3,and Level 3 medical and dental facilities for deployedforces.

In peacetime, the amphibious PEG is capable ofparticipating in a range of mil i tary support operationsincluding logistic support to land operations. DefenceAssistance to the Civil Community tasks, search andrescue and general naval and aviation t ra in ing . In adisaster relief role the ships can transport rescuepersonnel and equipment and if necessary embarklarge numbers of c iv i l i ans for short periods. Theextensive medical facili t ies in the LPAs would beparticularly useful in such circumstances.

Some LimitationsThe expanded amphibious PEG will be a welcomeand useful addition to ADF capability. However, thereare already signs that expectations are exceeding therealistic capability, which can be delivered. Unlesspart of a coalition force, any amphibious assaultplanning will need to he tempered by the l i m i t e davailability of sea based fire support, air cover andfollow on resupply of large quantities of sustainmentsupplies. Unless quickly reinforced and resupplied theinitial landing force will be limited in the tasks whichit could realistically be expected to achieve. It must



also be remembered that the ships within the PEG arenot new. The youngest ship (Tobruk) is almost 20years old and the oldest ship (Manoora) approachesher 3()th birthday. Despite modernisation these shipshave inherent design limitations which control theamount of equipment that can be carried and the paceat which landings can occur. Some specific limitationsare discussed in the following paragraphs.

Troops AshoreThe composition of the embarked land force will betailored lor the mission hut will nevertheless berestricted by the physical capacity of the vesselsparticularly if the force is to remain at sea for somelime. A force, which is "crammed in', will quicklylose its fighting edge if it is unable to conduct weapontraining, physical exercise and sleep well. The totalnumber of embarked troops does not necessarilyrepresent the number of combat troops, which can belanded to take objectives. Overall embarked numbersmay include special forces personnel, clearanced iv ing teams, aircrew and aircraft maintainers,medical staff for the level three facility, beach team(s)LCM 8 and other watercraft crews and maintainers.The staff of the deployed headquarters will , ot course,also be included in embarked force numbers.

LCH/LCM 8

The LCH is a very capable vessel able to carry largecargoes (3 main battle tanks) over long distances. Themain l imi ta t ion of these vessels being thei r slow speed(maximum 10 knots), and therefore the time it takes todeploy to an AO. Each LPA and the LSH can carrytwo LCM 8 with each vessel able to transport 200personnel or one tank. The slow speed (8 knots) ofthese craft is a major l imi t ing factor. A joint project isunderway to find more suitable replacementwatercraft.

AircraftThe LSH is cleared to operate most ADF helicoptersbut has no hangar/shelter to offer protection ormaintenance facilities for embarked aircraft. Twoaircraft, one of which could be a Chinook, can beoperated from two f l igh t decks. The LPAs w i l lundergo first of class flight trials in order to determinethe safe limits and numbers of aircraft which can beoperated from each ship. Although the physical space-appears ample to support a large number ofhelicopters, the practicalit ies and safetyconsiderations will limit numbers of aircraft that canbe operated. Night operations and adverse weatherconditions are factors that cannot be iunored.

LCMH crew prepare to come alongside HMAS Tobruk during exercise initial landing 99

January/March 7999 25

r Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

At first glance Sea Kings, with their folding blade,large earn ing capacity anil niarinised engines wouldappear to he the ideal helicopter for amphibiousoperations. However, the Sea King is not configuredfor battlefield operations, crews are not regularlypractised in tactical insertion tasks and numbers arel i m i t e d . The B lackhawk is the Army preferredbattlefield helicopter however: it is not niarinised andmay have considerable d i f f i c u l t y in operating at seafor protracted periods. A joint project is underway toenhance both types of helicopter for amphibiousoperations, bu t a mix of helicopter types wouldcomplicate and increase the cost of s u s t a i n a b i l i t yduring operations.

The FutureA considerable amount of attention is now beingdirected toward amphibious warfare both polit icallyand w i t h i n the ADF. The ability to deploy a largecont ingent of Army both in the direct defence ofA u s t r a l i a and offshore is l i k e l y to remain agovernment priority for some time to come. There isc v e r \ indica t ion that the region w i l l remain unstablew e l l i n to the next century and there will always be ar e q u i r e m e n t lo p r o v i d e emcrgenc) assis tance hoihw i t h i n Austral ia and the region. The ADF in general.and the RAN in particular, have l imi t ed amphibiouswarfare experience and wi l l need to develop thenecessary skil ls and doctrine as a matter of someurgency.

The acquisition of the two LPAs and the generalincrease in amphibious capabi l i ty w i l l provide areasonable capabi l i ty to about 2013. Kxperience andlessons learned in the coming years w i l l i n f o r m thecapability required to replace Tobruk and the LPAs.

To maximise the full capability of the amphibiousPEG wil l require commitment from all the involvedparties. By their very nature, amphibious operationsare joint. The more we practise and develop doctrineand experience in amphibious operations, the betterwe w i l l be at the conduct of jo in t warfare. Theunconventional introduction of he LPAs and thereinvigorating of the LSH and LOTE of the LCHs w i l lrequire resource commitment if the i r f u l l potential isto be exploited.

Until recently CMDR \V. Johnston KAN uw theDirector Amphibious and Afloat Support CapabilityCo-ordinator within the Naval Heaih/iuirleisCiinherni. fie would like to acknowledge those whoprovided input to this article, and in particular LCDRRuss Dowrick RANR.

NOTES

1 Australian Strategic Plan 1997 Page 66.2 A D F P I O I .3 Amphibious Assault includes two subcategories namely.

Amphibious Assault on a potentially hostile shore (what wasATL) or an Amphibious Assault on a hostile shore. ADFP 12Chap 1 Para 9.

26 Jdiiniiiy/Miiirli


HMAS Protector and SMS EMDENby Commander Robin Pennock, RAN(Rtd)

HMAS PROTECTOR, a 960 ion Type Fl cruiserwas hitilt bv Sir William Armstrong, Mitchell &Company at Newcastle upon Tyne, England for theSouth Australian Government and launched in/cS'<S'-/ specifically for duties in the relativeh'shallow waters of Spencers and St Vincent's Gulf.In I WO she became to the only (Australian)Colonial warship to lake part in the BoxerRebellion in China, being specially commissionedinto the RN for the task. Post Federation shebecame one of the main units of the newly formedCommonwealth Naval Force and in those earlydays voyaged to Sydney .so that their NavalBrigade could be I rained at sea. Rearmed manytimes. b\ 1915 her armament had been reducedfrom the original outfit of I .\ <S" and 5 .v 6" gunsplus 4 \ Jpdrs to somewhere approximating her1918 outfit of I x 4" gun. 2 x I2pdr and 4 x 3pdr.'

William Rooke Creswell, (Later Vice Admiral SirWilliam. KCMG KBE) was probably her most wellknown Commanding Officer having heldcommand in 1X91 anil from 1893 to 1900 andagain for a short period in 1900.

Part ol' a German squadron of warshipscommanded hy Admiral von Spec, the cruiserEMDEN departed from her base at Tsingtao,

China on 31 July 1914, four days before the outbreakof World War I. Although her remaining life was to beshort, it was to be successful as a surface raider as shemoved from the north coast of China to the IndianOcean. Some of her victims were the merchant shipsINDUS. LOVAT. KAR1NGA. KILUN, CLANMATHIESON. KING LUD. TYMERIC andGRYFEVALE. Overall, in that four month periodbefore her demise she sank or captured 23 vessels ofa value , in 1914 figures, of £2.000.000.; She is ofcourse best remembered for the attack on the cablestation at Direction Island in the Cocos-KeelingGroup and, on 9 November, her short fight with theAustralian cruiser SYDNEY and subsequently beingdriven ashore on North Keeling Island. The remainderof Von Spec's squadron voyaged by a separate routefor South America and created havoc at the battle ofCoronel before being sunk at the Batt le of theFalkland Islands. But that has all been covered before.

News of the battle between S\dne\ and Emden spreadquickly, and HMS Cadmus a 1,000 ton sloop of theChina Squadron was dispatched from Singapore torecover any guns, torpedoes and the like from thewreck, reports indicating that in company with thecable steamer Patrol she was there between 1S and 27

November. A further task assigned her was to disposeof all the bodies remaining onboard and burying thosewashed up on the beach. The subsequent report byher Commanding Officer on the state of the wreckwas comprehensive but stressed the work of SurgeonG.D.G.Fergusson RN, who with four sailors workedunder very d i f f i c u l t conditions "owing to theappalling stench of decomposing bodies". Withanother party. Lieutenant F.C.Platt RN had searchedthe island "in case of treasure having been landed andburied". Cadmus removed a number of mementoesand these were passed to the Australian Government.

The Auxil iary cruiser Empress of Japan, in wordstaken from Commander Patrick Weir's subsequentreport' "was engaged in looting the wreck" from 2 -7 January 1915. HMAS Pioneer also visited thewreck in January 1915 to recover more specie,including a large number of Mexican dollars. HMSCadmus made a second trip from 29 January until 3February of 1915 taking away all the guns andtorpedoes that she was able to dismount and tranship.Finally there is a report of the steamer Handleycoming from Sydney with a film crew embarked.

In Australia the Naval Board had been giving seriousconsideration to salvaging the wreck using privatecontractors and Messrs Darnel & Co offered topurchase the wreck for £2,000. A further offer wasmade by a Mr Richard Nuttall and his consortium -they wished to recover the wreck and display it atvarious Australian ports." Further offers were receivedincluding ones from Japan and the United States. On27 April the Naval Board recommended to theirMinister that an offer of £4,000 from Messrs Darn ley& Co be accepted.7 Subsequently this offer was nottaken up and mention was made of the 30 year old ex-South Australian cruiser Protector.

A Notice of Tender was placed in several editions ofthe Commonwealth Ga/ette in 1915' aniladvertisements were placed in selected newspapersand by June a total of six tenders had been received,with the Naval Board this time recommending that anoffer of £ 4.700 from Mr Charles Read be accepted."Again nothing seemed to happen and in October theCommonwealth approached the South Aust ra l ianGovernment for an extension of service ofCommander Patrick Weir RANR (Rid) ." 1

Patrick Weir, who amongst his many achievementshad in earlier days constructed the Weir's A/ imuthDiagram, joined the SA Naval Reserve as an AbleSeamen at age 35 although holding a MastersCertificate. Concurrent w i t h his promotion to Warrant

January/March 1999

1rJournal of the Australian Naval Institute

Officer in 1891 he was appointed Master of the steamlifeboat Cilv of Adelaide. Promoted Sub Lieutenant inJanuary 1896 and Lieutenant in May 1900. AppointedSecond Lieutenant of Protector he served in tha tvessel in China, returning in January 1901. He laterbecame o\uier of a towage f i rm, and in 1915 wasHarbour Master at Port Adelaide, aged 60.

Because of his vast experience he had beenapproached by Rear Admiral Creswell to assumecommand of Protector, then temporarilycommissioned as a Fleet Auxi l iary to escort and/ortow a bucket dredger from Sydney to Fremantle fordredging work at the proposed Henderson Naval Basein Cockburn Sound. The tow was successfully carriedout between 16 September to 13 October 1915,Protector hav ing had to steam from Melbourne toS v d n e v to co l lec t her charge. Dn'dgc \umher -•>'.' andcalling at Port Adelaide to embark coal and a numberof naval reservists on her way to the West. TheOfficers and Engineers were a mixture of RAN andMerchant Service, but all the ships company werenaval, the great majori ty being reservists.

On 15 October. Two days after arrival in Fremantle.Commander Weir was further tasked to take Protectori n t o the Indian Ocean as far as the Cocos-KeelingIslands and to report on the condition of the wreck ofthe i.nnlcn and see whether it was suitable forrecovery or salvage. Unbeknown to him a largeamount of towing equipment and two civilian divers,the senior one named Becket had been engaged anddispatched by steamer to Fremantle to join Protector.

On 16 October Commander Weir, in a hand writ tenletter to Admiral Creswell," suggested that perhapsthe Nava l Board should hire a more suitable vessel forthe task, and that coal stocks should be sent to CocosIsland to support whichever steamer was chosen.Creswell decided that the Boards' decision shouldstand and that Protector should be used. Diver Becketa r r ived in Fremantle and for a whi l e things seemed togo wrong.

On 2X October, the District Naval Officer Fremantlesent the f o l l o w i n g telegram to the N a v a l Board:

..."l-'rom Captain Weir, "Protector" to NavalHonnl. liei'ket arrived aiul explained [>/a/i withwhich I do not agree. Want of confidence in men,ship appliances mid arrangement preparation forthe expedition and work, rendering it undesirablefor me retaining command. Prospect hopeless forsuccess of small operation. Respectfully askpermission to resign command "Protector" ifrowing finished. Recommend Anju.s Hislopexperienced shipping matter willing and wouldsuit Becket heller than I would. Regret necessityfor this step hut feel it best for all concerned. "...l:

At I I pin the same day. the Naval Board replied toWeir's telegram amending the original directive and

stating that they now only required a report fromCocos on the state of the Emden, for Weir to salve anyequipment that was removable if salvage not feasible,and in view of the changes whether the objections(Weir) st i l l held as they were reluctant to have achange in command. A subsequent signal from Weirassured the Board that he was now quite agreeable toproceed and t h a t D i v e r Becket had been s h o w n theamended instructions and his attitude was now quitesatisfactory.

In retrospect it would appear thai Becket had no hope-whatsoever in taking charge of this operation. Themain players in the drama. Rear Admiral Creswell -Naval Board. Captain C.J.Clare - Distr ict N a v a lOfficer Fremantle and Commander Weir had allserved together for many years in the South Austral ianNaval Force and in Protector. They all knew tha tvessels capabilit ies, age and condition.

Protector even tua l l y departed Fremantle at 1 1 am on3 November 1915 with 60 tons of coal in bags as deckcargo, plus 2 divers and 4 cases of explosives but nospecialised towing gear. She called at Geraldton on 4November for coal and water, departing the next day,this time with the additional coal and fresh water ascargo. There were 50 tons of coal in bags and 16 tonof fresh water in tanks on the well deck. 10 ton of coalin bags in the mess decks and 8 ton of coal in bags onthe poop. With 172 tons of coal in the hunkers she hada total of 240 tons embarked.

She departed Geraldton at noon on Friday 5thNovember setting out on the 1412 mile journey. Fortwo days, under the influence of a south easterly windall possible sail was set and later as the full effects ofthe trade wind were felt the poop awning was set as asquare sail on the port yardarm. I 'nder theseconditions she was making between 6 & 7 knots andconsuming only 9 tons of coal per day. Could th isperhaps be the last t ime that one of (he RAN warshipshad proceeded under sail? On arrival at Port Refugeon the morning of 14 November calculations weremade that they had consumed 80 tons of coal at therale of 17.6 miles per ton. Further calculations weremade and Weir decided that they would need 150 tonsfor the return voyage giving them 10 tons to expend atCocos. They remained overnight at the main islandand departed for North Keeling Island, about 16 milesaway the next day. Weir h a v i n g decided t h a i toconserve fuel he would remain at or near the wrecksite rather than re turning to Direction Island eachevening as the other vessels had done.

The first sight of the Emden did not enthuse PatrickWeir, and 1 quote from his report:"

...Ay we approached, it became evident that allhope of gelling her off was out of the i/uestion asthe stern half of her hull had coinpletelvdisappeared as far as the slump of the third funnelwhich could just be distinguished... her bows



being (/hunt... cables from the beach... drifteddown before the wind with two leads givingsoundings suddenly changed from no bottom at20. to 7 fathoms about I . . . cables off the wreck.Dodged about as close in as wa.s safe for abouthalf an hour to see if there was an\ possihilitv ofboarding the wreck from a boat, but at uncertainintervals a heavy sea would break over her, nearlyas high a.s the funnel, which would havecompletely swamped any boat al all near her...

Not being able to do much more at the time. Protectorwas moved around to the west side of the Island andanchored in smooth water in 7 fathoms, laying outboth bower anchors as a precaution against inclementweather. Although recovery of some artefacts waspossible, the coal state dictated that she could onlyremain for one week. A boat was lowered and Weir,with some of his officers and crew landed on theisland and walked the one mile to observe the wreckfrom the beach. He again concluded that there wasnothing they could do regarding Enulen. There washowever a great deal of wreckage cast up on the beachincluding great quantities of cork slabs, a steel mastcomplete with fighting top, mess tables, seats, boatmasts and spars etc.

After all the effort and hard work, the death knell toany salvage attempt was sounded in Protector'stelegram of 1? November, which simply stated:

..."At wreck am unable to board, sea breakingright over. Stern half of wreck disappeared salvageof vessel quite impossible, standing h\ for betterweather. Wind South East fresh."...

For the next three days there was more wind and seaso for two of those days the ships company werelanded in watches to allow them to explore the islandand one suspects, to obtain some relief from the hotcondit ions onboard. On the last day the routinereturned to normal and there was a full days gun drill.

Friday 19th brought no change in the weather but theygot underway at about 0630 and steamed around tothe wreck once again on their way to Direction Island.From Weir's report:

..."A high sea was running and frequently makinga clean breach over the wreck. Dropped downstern first, and took several snaps of the wreck...the trough of the sea may be observed, which wasprobablv 150 feet from crest to crest"...

They arrived at Direction Island and signalled theNaval Board with their findings, and as hoped weredirected to return to Fremantle. The weather was stillpoor and because of this factor it was not unti l theSunday that they got underway for the return voyage.They endured four days of hard slogging ateconomical speed into the south east trades, makinggood about 5 knots, but after this the speed increased

to about 6 _ knots. On the eighth day they ran in to afull gale and on the next day it was realised that thedepleted coal stocks would not allow the vessel tomake Fremantle. Course was altered for (ieraklton.arriving at 3pm on 2 December with one ton of coalremaining on board. They took in 43 tons of coal andsteaming at full speed against a strong southerly windreached Fremantle at 1.1.Spin on Saturday 4December 1914. According to Patrick Weir's report,they consumed 1 ton of coal to 9.6 miles on the returnvoyage against the I ton to 17.6 miles on the outwardleg. The outward leg was of course, wind assisted.

Considering the facts, and with the benefit of 20/20hindsight, it would seem somewhat ambitious to havesent Protector on such a mission as was original lyplanned. Her original engine power of 1500horsepower would have been somewhat diminishedby time, she was 31 years old, was manned in themain by unexperienced but enthusiastic reservists andwas not adequately supported in regards to coal andwater. In my view Patrick Weir was quite correct invoicing his objections and circumstances proved himright.

As a footnote, a visitor to North Keeling Islandreported in 1919 that almost all traces of Enulen hasdisappeared.

NOTES1 Nuvy Office minute N18/0402 of 10 July 1918.2 G.L.Macanclie "Genesis of the RAN", pp3 HMS Cadmus report dated 2 December 1414 contained in AA

file MP472/I Hem 16/16/18454 HMAS Protector letter dated 4 December 1915 contained in

AAfi lc MP472/1 Item 16/16/1X455 HMAS Protector letter dated 4 December 19156 Navy Office file 15/23237 Navy Office minu t e 15/2323 of 27 April 19158 Commonwealth Gazettes of 1915 at pp 822, 909, 945, I(K)5 &

10599 Naval Board minu te of 25 June 191510 Prime Ministers letter 15/4006 dated 23 August 19151 1 HMAS Protector letter dated 16 October 191512 DNO Fremantle telegram timed at 1530 on 18 October 191513 HMAS Protector letter of 4 December 101514 Contained in AA file MP472/1 Item 16/16/1845

About the Author

Robin Pennock has been a regular contr ibutor to theJournal of the ANI, especially in its earlier years.

Since his retirement from the RAN he and LieutenantCommander Stephen Jeisman R A N ( R t d ) have spentmuch time researching the history of the ColonialNaval Force and of the RAN in South Australia.

With the recent award of a Grant-in-Aid from theAustralian War Memorial. Robin Pennock iscontinuing his research into the Colonial CruiserProtector and hopes to publish a def ini t ive work in thenot too distant future.



The Battle of Yaluby Graham Wilson

As Japan modernised under the M e i j iRestoration and developed her industrial andmilitary power: it became fairly elear that the

possibi l i ty of conflict wi th China and Russia becamestronger. These two nations were blocking Japan'sattempt to become a modern great power withoverseas possessions and spheres of i n f l u e n c e . Thechal lenge to China came first w i th the breakdown ofcivil order in Korea and Japan's opportunity toin tervene . Korea was a semi-independent vassal stateof the old Chinese Lmpire.

The Bat t le of the Yalu. the key battle of the Sino-Japanese war of 1X94-95. was the first Heel actionsince the Austro-Italian bat t le at Lissa in 1866 and thefirst battle of the modern era. Perhaps it is ironic thatthe Japanese fought the first large battle of oceangoing, steam-propelled, armoured battle fleets jus tover a century ago, and w i t h the death of the giantYnmato at the end of World War II, they fought thelast. The era had lasted fifty years. Fifty years lateragain the last of their type are laid up and unl ikely toever see further service.

The position of the Chinese fleet in 1894 was almostthe reverse of the Japanese one. China hadconcentrated on equipment but the i r t r a in ing wasmuch inferior. Corruption was rife at all levels of theadminis t ra t ion so that a large percentage of theira m m u n i t i o n was defective, the engines corroding andthe crews amateurish. Sometimes shells were filledw i t h sawdust or sand instead of cordite. Ju s t beforethe war w i t h Japan, t he Dowager Hmpressappropriated t w e l v e (or 40?) million dollars (US) ofnaval funds to bu i l d an ornamental pier in the gardensof the summer palace. It was in the shape of a two-decker man-of-war. (The contemporary US warshipsOregon and Brooklyn cost about three mi l l ion each).

The Chinese Navy was divided into four fleets, but inthis case only the Northern Fleet, the one Li Hung-Chang', official administrator in (he Chinesegovernment , had spent so much time equipping, wasinvolved. This was where the strength of the ChineseNavy lay, and the Japanese knew it was the key to thewar.

The Southern Fleet had been destroyed during the warw ith France in 1884. The conflict had more to do wi thFrance's internal polities than with China but it ragedin Indo China for some t ime. Final ly Rear AdmiralCourhet was sent on a puni t ive expedition. He sailedpast the Foochow forts posing as a friend and thenblandly announced to the Chinese commander that itwas war. The Chinese fleet was ancient by all navalstandards and the fight was hopeless.

The most modern unit was a composite cruiser, Yonoi.then six wooden sloops, two A.M.C.s, two gunboats,seven spar-torpedo launches and some junks. Aftertwo days of talks, Courbet ordered the Chinese fleetsunk. His f lagship the Vultn opened fire, followed byhis other major units. Don^uy Tronin. Suffrcn andTonnant. The whole action was over in seven minutes.The only interest it created outside of China was thatYonoi was sunk by an automotive torpedo, one of thefirst successes for the new weapon.

France moved operations to Formosa where theymanaged to seize Keelung after bombarding the forts.The Japanese sent Captain Heihachiro Togo, thefuture victor of Tsushima, down to examine theeffects of the bombardment and he was shown overthe fortress by a young French Army Lieutenant, thefuture defender of Paris. Joffre.

In the northern fleet, Li o f t e n pitted his Huropeanadvisers against each other w h i c h led to considerablefrustration and frequently they resigned at theconstant provocation. He also ignored their advice. AGerman officer recommended Kiachow Bay be madethe fleet base. Li chose the exposed Wei-Hai-Weiinstead and then the vulnerable Port Arthur. Finally hechose a cavalry officer. Ting Juchlang as his Admiral.

A greater loss to Ch ina occurred s u b s e q u e n t l y .Admiral Ting had run his ship aground and was absentfrom the fleet. His chief adviser was Captain W.M.Lang R.N. (Long?) and although Lang was second incommand. Ting generally followed his directions.While Ting was away the next senior Chinese officerhoisted the senior officer pennant. Lang objected, andwhen no apology was received, resigned. Ting wasleft without his major crutch just when he needed itmost.

Ting himself was not a naval o f f i ce r , but a brave manwho knew l i t t l e about n a v a l warfare and the Japaneseknew this.

The Action off AsanIn Korea a quasi-religious group of f a n a t i c a lextremists, the Tong-haks. were making the countryungovernable. Japan took the opportunity tointervene. China sent two thousand men to help theirtr ibutary state and notified Japan at the same time. InJapan. Prime Minister Ito contemplated war. but itwas a great risk, especially with Russia behind thescenes. He asked his mil i tary counci l for advice andthey decided against it. However Admiral Kabayamaand General K a w a k a m i stormed out of t h e mee t ing

.111 January/March 1999


and went straight to I to and told him the councilsupported the war. I t was sometime before Ito foundout the council 's true opinion and by then he wascommitted to conflict.

Japan dispatched an army brigade to Chemulpo ineight ships with the protected cruiser Naniwa underCaptain Togo, as escort. They arrived safely on 25June 1894. On the return voyage Naniwa nervouslypassed the Chinese battleship Ting Yuen and armouredcruiser Ping Yuen. Against these odds, Naniwa's andTogo's careers might have been glorious but brief.

Japanese troops seized the capital Seoul on July 20,and gave an ultimatum to China to leave Korea. OnJuly 23 a Hying squadron of protected cruisers underVice Admiral Tsuboi Ko/.o in the Yoshino withAkilmixliiii and Naniwa sailed from Sascbo withorders to stop the Chinese reinforcing the troops inAsan. This operation failed as the Chinese ships hadarrived before the Flying Squadron was in position.

At this point neither Ting nor his Japanese oppositenumber Vice Admiral Sukenori Ito had acteddecisively. Ting split his force and sent only theelderly protected cruiser, Txi-Yiicn and the sloopKwang Yi as escort for the troops. This was too weakan escort to survive a determined Japanese attack, buttoo valuable to jus t throw away. The Japanesehowever sent only three cruisers to stop them. If Tinghad sent his battleships, the Japanese might well havelost the cruisers and the war before it had reallystarted.

The two forces met off the coast of Asan early in themorning. As no war had been declared they passedeach other quite slowly. An over excited lookoutshouted that he saw a torpedo track. Togo was notabove sending his country to war and opened fire. Itwas 7.52 a.m. and the range 3.000 metres. TheChinese replied even before the Japanese shellsarrived, so quickly that the other Japanese shipsthought the Chinese fired first. Their ships were on aconverging course and in spite of the mist, fog andsmoke, only the large number of duds amongst theJapanese ammunition saved the Chinese ship beinginstantly sunk. The bridge was hit and only the captainsurvived. The steering gear was knocked out so theChinese vessel careered about errat ical ly anddisappeared into the fog. The Kwang Yi appeared andseemed to be about to ram the Yoshino, so that Tsuboihail to take avoiding action. The Kwang Ki toodisappeared into the log.

Tsi Yuen then reappeared Hying a white flag over theJapanese and Chinese ensigns. However her steeringgear was restored and she decided not to surrenderand disappeared back into the fog. Yoshino gave chasebut Tsuboi soon gave up, as he worried about fa l l ingin w i t h the Chinese heavy units. Back at the scene ofthe fight Kwang Yi reappeared abeam of the Naniwaand there was another exchange. Akitsnshiu pursued

her into the fog until the Chinese craft piled up on thebeach.

Naniwa left alone, sighted two more ships. One wasthe sloop Txao Kiting that quickly fled. (Some sourcesclaim that she was captured shortly afterwards) Theother was more dangerous, the 1.300 ton Kuwshing. asteamer of the Indochine S.N. Co. which flew theBritish red duster. Togo signaled J.W., "stop engines!"Then L.P., "anchor!" The Kowshing obeyed and Togoclosed and sent a boarding party to the vessel. f l u -Captain, Thomas Ryder Galsworthy and most of hisofficers were British, the rest apart from the PrussianMajor von Hannekan, were Chinese. Galsworthyprotested that there was no war, but the action earlierthat morning put him on shaky ground. In additionaboard his ship were several thousand Chinese troops,fourteen field guns and a load of ammuni t ion . Togoordered the ship to follow him. but the Chinesemutinied and threatened to shoot the English Officers.Death was preferable to surrender. Togo then gave thesignal M.L.. "quit the ship immediately!"

Togo's problem was that a few thousand Chinesetroops was unlikely to affect the course of the war. hutthe enmity of Great Britain might . If he did the wrongthing it might cost him his life. At 1.10 p.m. he fired atorpedo which missed, but the shells from his mainbattery didn't . Galsworthy and his officers divedoverboard and were rescued, but then the Japanesefired on the Chinese struggling in the water. Twolifeboats were sunk and many soldiers killed. A few,including von Hannekan made it to the shore, wherethey were rescued the following day by the Frenchgunboat. Lion.

In London the jingoists rallied, but wisdom prevailedand Togo was jus t i f ied . Overnight the boy fromKugoshima was an international figure. Japan wipedout the Chinese force in Korea and on March 1 Ilk-Mikado declared war.

Battle of the YaluAfter the action off Asan. Ting prepared his ships forbattle. All unnecessary fittings, boats, and lightarmour shields were removed. But he could not sail asthe bureaucrats in Peking were exercising such tightcontrol that he was virtually forced to stay in Wei-Hai-Wei. Li only wanted to defend Peking although lor awhile Ting did sail up and down wi th in his narrowcage seeking battle. On August 10 Ito sailed past andbombarded the forts but Ting did not move. Final ly hewas allowed to operate west of a l ine betweenShantung anil the mouth of the Yalu.

On September 15 the Chinese fleet coaled at TalienBay and moved out to escort a convoy to the mouth ofthe Yalu. The Japanese had sailed on the I Oth to escorta convoy to Caroline Bay after which they made asweep into the Yellow Sea. In the Yalu. Ting sighted


l of the Australian Naval Institute

smoke and to avoid being caught at anchor, sailedimmediately. It was September 17 and the Japanesehad sighted the huge mushroom of smoke of theChinese fleet. The battle of the Haiyang Yalu wasunderway.

The Japanese fleet advanced in l ine ahead formation,with a flying squadron of four ships in the van and themain body of six units behind. Tsuboi led the flyingsquadron in the fast Yoshino w i t h Takachiho(commanded by a young Captain Kamimuru who wasto become famous in the War against R u s s i a ) .Akitsushiu and Nuniwa. The main body of largerprotected cruisers was led by flagship Mutsushimu,and then the small armoured cruiser Chi\oda.followed by Itsukushiina, Hashidate, Hid and Fuso.Slightly astern of the main body was the smallgunboat Akagi. and the armed merchant ship Sciikvowhich flew the flag of Vice Admiral Kabayama. Chiefof Naval Staff. This personage should not have beenpresent at a l l . and if he had to be present should havebeen aboard one ol the c ru i se rs . The fleet steamed ina northeasterly direction across the line of advance ofthe Chinese squadron at a speed of about fourteenknots. This rate of advance was to break up theJapanese l ine as the Hiei. an e lder ly armouredcorvette, was capable of only ten or eleven knotsunder good conditions, and usually held its place inthe line by cutting corners whenever the fleet turned.It was to do the same today.

The Chinese fleet advanced in line abreast, roughlyspeaking, as there was very little line about it. In themiddle of the line was Admiral Ting's flagship. TingYuen, w i t h the other Chinese battleship Chen Yuencommanded by a Commodore Lin with an Americannaval officer Philo McGiffen as executive officer.Outboard of the two battleships were the oddlydesigned armoured cruisers Lai-Yuen and King-Yuen.Outboard again were the fast protected cruisersChing-Yuen and Chih-Yuen. Further out, on the rightwere the sloops Chao-Yuen and Yang-Wei, whi le onthe left flank was the sloop Kwang Kai and the oldpiolecled c in i se i" and \eleran of Asan. the 'isi-Yitcn.The Chinese fleet speed was about six knots.

Much speculation has arisen as to why Ting adoptedthis particular formation. H.W. Wilson thought it wasa misreading of the tactics of the Battle of Lissa in1886, but such a formation would have required theflanks to have been strengthened at least to the pointof placing the armoured cruisers on the wings.1 Otherss p e c u l a t e ihe h i s t r a i n i n g u n d e r l l i e H n g l i s h h a d t a u g h thim to approach action in line-abreast, but had nottaught him how to exploit it after action was joined.Third it m i g h t ha \ e been a t o t a l l y random formationcaused by the position of the various ships in theharbour when the order came to sail immediately. Orit might have been a cavalry formation!

The Japanese decided to attack the right flank of theChinese fleet which meant they had to sail across the

bows of the advancing Chinese squadron at a range ofless than 6,000 yards. The move designed to cut offthe retreat of the Chinese fleet to Port Arthur was arisk. As the Japanese crossed the Chinese line, thebattleships opened fire. The Ying Yuen's captain. I . i nPu-chlan fired without warning his admiral or WilliamTyler, the British executive officer. The two menstanding on an open bridge were knockedunconscious by the concussion. In panic. Liu forgot tocommand the fleet. The range shortened and Yoshinowas bracketed by Chinese shells. A hit by thebattleship would have put the Yoshino out of actionand thrown the Japanese line into confusion.

For a time fortune favoured the Japanese and no hitswere scored on their ships. At 1.05 p.m. Tsuboi closedto within 3.000 yards of the Chinese right flank andopened fire on the two sloops. Yang-Wei and ClmoYung. The effect of the QF guns was immediate andthe rapid flow of shells devastated the fancy woodenuppor works of the elderly vessels.

Ito's plan was for the advanced flying squadron toturn to starboard and run down beh ind the mainChinese body. However at this moment he wasdistracted by a new enemy coming from the North.Ting had sailed so hurriedly that he left a number ofwarships in the Yalu River and these now entered thebattle. The most powerful unit in this force was thearmoured cruiser Ping Yuen, supported by the sloopKwang Ping and a handful of torpedo boats. Theselater vessels were to play a bigger role on Ito's mindthan they were in battle.

Tsuboi swung away to port leaving the two sloopsabla/e. His squadron was well committed to the t u r nwhen Ito recalled him and ordered the FlyingSquadron to follow the main body which was on thecourse which Ito had originally intended the FlyingSquadron to take, that is running around astern of theChinese line.

However all was not well in the Japanese l ine . / / / < • /could not keep up and wisely allowed Fuso to "playthrough". However the Chinese advance wassufficiently fast to cut off the Hiei, Akagi and Saikyo.Tsuboi was therefore directed to the Chinese front toprotect the isolated vessels. This movement tooksome time to execute and meanwhile the Hiei facedthe choice of retreating of taking a short cut throughthe centre of the Chinese fleet. Natura l ly the Japanesevessel chose the later course and crashed through theChinese line between Ting Yuen and King-Yuen, a gapof less than half a mile. At that distance even thedefective Chinese ammunition could score hits andthe Hiei staggered under an enormous battering. Thesmall Akagi advanced to her assistance and shells andtorpedoes were flying wildly. Eventually wi th hercaptain Sukamoto ki l led, the Akagi turned away andretreated. The cruiser I MI Yuen and two smallervessels pursued her. t i l l a l u c k y shel l started aspectacular if not dangerous fire on the large Chinesevessel and the others went to her aid.



On the Chinese right flank, the two sloops that hadbeen battered by the flying squadron and the mainbody in turn, were still afloat. This showed that thestandard of Japanese gunnery was no better than theChinese, but their QF guns enabled them to fire moreshells. The two sloops proved an attraction to theSaikyo that hastened to give them the coup-de-grace.Chang-Yang collapsed under the fire and Yang-Weiran herself ashore on Talu Island.

The lack of order in the Chinese line gave the Ting-Yiien a clear view of the large merchant ship and a hitfrom the battleship knocked out the steering gear ofthe Japanese vessel. Sawdust was jus t as good ascordite lor that . The Saikyo now careereduncontrollably between the last and second last shipsof the line. The Flying Squadron pressed on to protectthe Akagi, but Saikyo now fell in with the Chineseforce that had been left behind. Saikyo only justmanaged to get her steering gear back into some sortof working order in time to avoid a very determinedtorpedo at tack.

On the left flank of the Chinese line there was activityof a different kind. The captain of the Kwang Kaipanicked, fled and ran his ship aground. Captain FangPaich'ien of the Tsi Yuen temporarily lost his head andfled to Port Arthur wherein the local governor madethe situation permanent.

The Chinese fleet was therefore surrounded as itslowly edged its way to safety. Ito closed the range buthis flagship Matsushima nearly hit the Yoshino withan over. The Chinese flagship Ting-Yuen wassuffering badly, but here Ting's older advisor cameinto his own. The Prussian, von Hannekan may haveknown nothing about naval warfare, but he knew agreat deal about forts, floating or otherwise. Heorganised damage control parties that fought the fires,and maintained teams of sailors to keep supplies ofammunition up to the guns. Aboard the Chen-YuenCommodore Lin lost his nerve and McGiffen tookcommand. He ordered the Chen-Yuen to manoeuvre asif out of control and attract the Japanese. Ito closed infor the k i l l and Chen-Yuen surprised them with 12inlire. He managed to hit Matsushima with a heavyshell, that for once was loaded with explosive. Theshell hit a barbette, dismounted the gun, knocked outthe I2 .6 in gun, exploded the ready use ammunitionand ki l led or wounded eighty of the crew. Only thecourage of two marines prevented a major magazineexplosion. Matsushima was out of the fight. Flyingsand from an eight hundred pound shell flayed aJapanese lookout alive. Ito pulled his damaged shipout of the line, transferred his flag to a TB and movedto the Hashidate. But the fleet had lost momentum.

McGiffen had only one tactic in mind, to keep the twoba t t l e sh ips together. This rather negative actionprobably saved both ships.

Ito had missed the chance to charge the enemy fleetand when night fell his fear of torpedo attacks allowedthe enemy to escape. McGiffen was astounded by thisaction, as his ship was effectively out of ammunitionand possibly could have been sei/.ed by boarders.Morning found the remains of the Chinese fleetbehind the forts of Port Arthur.

There is no doubt that the battle of the Yalu was aJapanese victory. China lost one armoured cruiser,King Yuen, which was holed when she attackedTsuboi's ships without adequate support, a l ightcruiser Chili-Yuen which was overwhelmed when sheattacked Yoshino during the incident with the Saikyo'sdamaged steering gear, and three sloops. Japan hadthe Matsushima, Hiei, Saikyo and Akagi all heavilydamaged, but none of them were sunk and all lived foranother day.

The Rising Sun was now clearly seen over thehori /on. but the sh ipwrights in Port Arthur weremaking certain that the war was far from finished.

The battle of the Yalu was the first major naval bat t leof the modern era. Experts studied it closely. The gunshad worked well, the effectiveness of armoursurprised them, but the failure of the torpedoes wasnoted. The 'ling Yuen had been hit more than twohundred times and set on fire, but had only seventeenkilled and thirty-eight wounded. The Clien Yuensuffered more than one hundred and fifty hits withthirteen killed and twenty-eight wounded. Most of thehits were from small or medium calibre shells. TheJapanese three largest protected cru isers eachmounted only one heavy 12.5in gun. It surprised theexperts even more that the battle had stopped as bothsides effectively ran out of ammunition.

Wei-Hai-WeiIn Korea, after the battle at Ping Yang. Field MarshallYamagata Aritomo advanced to the Yalu River. OnSeptember 19, two days after the sea battle, Naniwaand Akitsushiu found the Kwani; Yi s t i l l aground inTalien Bay and blew her up.

The presence of the Chinese Fleet in Port Arthur madeit essential to take tha t port, consequently theJapanese 2nd Army was shipped from Japan to Hus-Yuan-kon. (Flower Garden Port) eighty-five milesfrom Port Arthur. They landed on October 24, thesame day as the army in Korea forced the Yalu River.

The Chinese defence was not well organised and thatallowed the Japanese to cross a narrow neck of landand fall upon Talien, the third major naval base in theYellow Sea area. The full Japanese fleet (except forNaniwa) crept into the harbour at 6 a.m. on November7 to support a combined attack by the land forces.There was silence; the great forts bu i l t by vonHannekan were empty.

Januarv/March /999


However in Port Arthur, Admiral Ting saw his chanceand sailed to Wei-Hai-Wei on the other side of theYellow Sea reducing the whole Japanese operation onthe Peninsula to a pointless sideshow. Togo was not tomake the same mistake in 1904. McGiffen was notwith them. Chaffing at Li's unreasonable controls heslipped away and boarded the USS Monacacy.1

Relentlessly the army pushed forward and November21 (he fortress of Port A r t h u r fe l l . Now for (he first( I N K - F u i o p c a n Powc i s real ised t h a i J apan h a d armedas a mil i tary power. But the escape of the fleet meantt h a t a new operation hail to he mounted qu i ck lyagainst Wei-Hai-Wei as peace moves were alreadyunderway.

Wei-Hai-Wei was the second most important Chinesenaval base in the Yellow Sea after Port Arthur. In away it was more diff icul t to attack than Port Arthur asthe p o w e r f u l shore ba t te r ies of r i f l ed a r t i l l e r v made adirect attack impossible and there were mines and aboom. It needed another combined operation. Buthere the most important of the batteries were on thehigh Liu Kung Island in the middle of the bay, whichwas di f f icul t to assault from the sea and from the landwas protected by the Chinese battleships. St i l l thecombined operation went ahead.

Inside the bay Ting had his battleship the Ting Yuen,two armoured cruisers, the protected cruisers Chin-Yuen and Tsi Yuen, Kwang Ping and some gunboatsand torpedo boats. The Chen Yuen had run aground asthe fleet entered the harbour, but she was sti l lprotected by forts and was in a good position to useher guns.

The Japanese operation began with a diversionarya t t a c k on Timgchow on January IS and then the maina s s a u l t at Yung Ching Bay on January 20. TheJapanese were now only thirty five miles from Wei-Hai-Wei and although it was mid winter they expectedthe whole operation to be complete in about afortnight.

Ito sent Ting a letter offering him sanctuary in Japanp o i n t i n g out how corruption, pacifism andgovernment by men of letters had destroyed the statehe fough t for. The government was rotten. Ting didnot need Ito to tell him that, but he declined the offer.

January 30 an all dav assau l t on the southeastern tortsled to their capture. Naniwa, Akitsushiu and Katsuragibombarded the forts and caused the large Chao-per-tsui Fort to be evacuated hurriedly when a shell foundits way into the magazine. More seriously from theChinese point of view was the fact that internalh i c k c i i i i i . 1 l ed In the cap tu re o f t h e guns i n t a c t . TheJapanese army now hurried around the coast tocapture the western forts. This time Ting took a handand sent landing parties to spike the guns in the fortswhi le fire from the fleet helped slow up the Japanesemovements.

On the night of January 31 Ito attacked with torpedoboats, but the army had not been informed and thenewly seized forts drove off the attackers. February Isaw the start of a weeklong blizzard under the coverof which Ting's raiding parties completed thedestruction of the western forts. Ito was u n w i l l i n g torisk his valuable ships so he stood out to sea and tiredconstantly at the forts w i t h his h e a v i e s t guns.However the sheer stone cliffs of Liu Kung Islandproved impregnable. The next torpedo boat attackf a i l e d to find the gap in the boom t i l l after dayl ightand the attack was abandoned.

The climax came on the night of February 5. Togo ledlour torpedo boats in to the west channel for adiversionary action. Ten other boats came in f r o m theeastern side. A storm blew up. but no one cancelledthe attack. Three men froze to death at their posts. Thetorpedo boats surfed into the harbour but two of themfinished up on the rocks and were lost. Searchlightswere switched on and every gun in the Chinese fleetopened fire. Three of the boats were put out of action,a fourth had thei r torpedoes frozen in to their lubes, butthe other four fired with great success. Ting Yuen wasstruck in the stern and settled onto the rocks, but herguns were s t i l l in action. Lai-Yuen was hit and t u t tiedover, trapping many of her crew inside. Death won therace with rescue. Ching Yuen was hit and disabled buther guns could sti l l fire. Only Chen Yuen wasuntouched and she was already damaged.

On February 7 the tiny island fort of Yih was f i n a l l yblasted into submission. Later that night the Chinesemade an effort to save their torpedo boats. T w e l v e orthirteen made a rush forChefoo. The Flying Squadronwent in pursuit and only two of the Chinese boatsmanaged to escape. The rest were sunk, run agroundor captured. But the luck was not all one way. Theshore batteries struck out and Matsushiina, Yoshinoand Naniwa were all hit and damaged. Two days laterChing Yuen was hit by a shell from the shore andf ina l ly sank. But by way of retaliation the bat t leshipChen Yuen hit the Itsukushima w i t h a heavy shellwhich proved to be a dud.

The firing ceased on February 1 1 when the smallgunboat Chin Pet steamed out under a flag of truce.Ting offered to surrender if his men were allowed toleave, and they were given two or three days to do it.Ito accepted immediately and again offered Tingasylum. Both knew the grafters in Peking weretreacherous. Af te r making al l t h e necessarypreparations for the surrender Ting went to his cabinand took an overdose of opium. His flag captain andthe commandant of Liu Kung did the same.

The Japanese paid Ting the tr ibute due a gallantsoldier and admiral. The officers filed past, minuteguns firing and flags at half-mast, the body was putaboard the captured Tsi Yuen and sent to Chefoo. InPeking the corrupt officials condemned to death allthose tha t Ito had released.



The ConclusionWith Wei-Hai-Wei f i rmly under control and therebeing li t t le likelihood of a Chinese push to retake it,the Japanese began operations in the PescadoresIslands in preparation for the sei/.ure of Formosa.However before operations real ly got under waypeace was declared.

Japan had arrived as a world power and China hadbeen exposed as the corrupt paper t iger hergovernment was. However not many Europeannations were happy about the new s i tua t ion . Japantook from China . Formosa. Pescadores Islands,Korea, and the Lao Tung peninsula including the areaaround Port Arthur. In addition she kept Wei-Hai-Weiunti l such time as China paid the huge indemnity thatwas imposed. The navy was reinforced by thecommissioning of the ex-Chinese vessels, includingthe b a t t l e s h i p Chen Yuen, (Ting Yuen was too badlydamaged to be worth salvaging) the armoured cruiserPing Yuen and the old protected cruiser Txi Yuen, theKwung Ping and half a do/.en old gunboats.

However Japan quickly found out that though she wasthe major Asian power she was s t i l l small byEuropean standards. Russia, as she felt threatened forher interests and ambitions in Manchuria, Germanyfor no good reason and France, joined together toforce Japan to give back much of her conquests.Korea was left independent. Port Arthur and thesurrounding country was given up, while the Chinesepaid the indemnity almost immediately and so Wei-Hai-Wei was lost as well. Nor did China gain anybenefit from these transactions. Russia of coursewanted rewards for her aid and took Port Arthur andgained permission to b u i l d a ra i lway acrossManchuria to Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Germanywho realised how weak China was. took KiachowBay and gained special rights in Shantung. Francetook Kwangchow in the south. In a lew years Japanwould have the opportunity to redress much of th is

misfortune. Britain too viewed Russia as po ten t i a l l yher most dangerous enemy, a constant threat to India .So Britain took Wei-Hai-Wei to keep an eye on theRussians. It was probably the most useless acquisitionof the whole colonial period, and after the forts werebuilt Captain Percy Scoot persuaded the Admiraltynot to waste resources on ins ta l l ing the guns. Itremained a pleasant summer resort for the ChinaStation during the 20s and was returned to China inthe 30s.

Japan now began to prepare for her next struggle, tobe against Imperial Russia." The Battle of Yalu hasjoined one of the scarcely remembered actions thatlitter naval history. It remains an important step in thedevelopment of the technology of sea warfare and inthe tradition of the P.L.A. Navy.11 It is viewed as thefirst attempt by the Chinese people to resist modern"Imperialism" in an organised way at sea. Theyunderstand the importance of developing a strongtradition and spirit in a naval service.

NOTES1 Known to the Japanese as the Battle of Haiyang. hut the rest of

the world as the Battle of the Yalu.2 The spelling of Chinese names in English has changed over the

years and creates some contusion. Where possible in this text,the spelling used pre 1914 has been adhered to. as the principaltext materials were from that era.

3 H.W. Wilson Iwncliuls in Action London 1X96.4 In later years he became depressed about his wounds and

increasing poor health and took his own life on 1 1 February1897.

5 Interesting sources include: H.W. Wilson Ironclads in ActionLondon 1896; Braasey's Naval Annual 1896 Edition: BruceSwanson: Eighth Voyage of the Dragon Annapolis 1982. (JustBrief); J.S. Rawlinson: China's Struggle for NavalDevelopment 1839-1H95 Harvard UP: Cambridge USA 1967(Appendix C pp. 246-259 lists all the Chinese War vessels inservice during the period studied and explains the difficulties indetermining the particular details of various ships); E. FalkTogo London 1936: John Laudermilk "I Fought at Yalu" NavalHistory Sept/Oct 1994 pp. 22-27 (Contains an excellent briefbibliography)

6 The Chinese made feature film of the battle was shown inAustralia on SBS about 19X0.

January/March

r Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

COMMENCEMENT OF THEBATTLE OF YALU

12:50 pm-17 Sep 1894

CHINESE FLEETIRREGULAR LINE-ABREASTSPEED 6 KNOTS

Ting-Yuen opens fire onYoshino (range 6000yards)

Akagi

Saikyo

/ Yoshino (New Protected Cruiser)

Takachino (Protected Cruiser)

Akitsushiu (New Protected Cruiser)

Naniwa (Protected Cruiser)

X Matsushima (Flagship)

Chiyoda (Small Protected Cruiser)

X Itsukushima (Protected Cruiser- French Design)

Hashidate (Protected Cruiser - French Design)

Hiei (Corvette)

/ Fuso (Old Battleship)

Yang-Wei (Sloop)

Chao-Yung (Sloop)

Ching-Yuen (Fast Protected Cruiser)

Lai-Yuen (Armoured Cruiser)

Chen-Yuen (Battleship)

Ting-Yuen (Battleship - Flagship)

King-Yuen (Armoured Cruiser)

Chich-Yuen (Fast Protected Cruiser)

Kwang-Kai (Sloop)

Tsi-Yuen (Old Protected Cruiser)

Pursuant to Ito's signal Tsuboi just hasaltered course slightly to port (Ships inSuccession) and is increasing speed to14 knots to attack the Chinese rightwing.



New Zealand's DefenceEquipment Decisions

by Commander Richard Jackson, RNZN

In I December 1998. the New Zealand

Government announced it would acquire 28 F-16

fighters for the RNZAF, spend $500 million on the

Army, but not order a third Anzac-class frigate for the

RNZN. These decisions were made as the first step in

implementing the 1997 Defence Assessment, which

had laid out the long term capital plan for the NZDF.

The cost of the new program is within that budgeted

for the Defence assessment.

The full Cabinet decisions were:

• to reaffirm the policy set out in the 1997 White

Paper,

• to make the main priority the re-equipping of the

Army

• to study options for an early refit of the sea-lift

ship Charles Upham

• to replace the A-4K. licet wi th 28 F-16A/Bs

• to not order a th i rd Anzac-class frigate, but to

defer a decision on how to replace HMNZS

Canterbury until 2002.

The F-16 OptionThe opportunity for New Zealand to acquire F-l6s

arose from the Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests. F-l6s

bui l t Tor Pakis tan and embargoed due to US

opposition to that nation's nuclear program, were

made available for sale after the nuclear explosions in

1998.

New Zealand has accepted 28 aircraft to be delivered

in early 2001 under a lease arrangement, with an

option to buy in 2010. I t wi l l cost some $NZ 200

mil l ion to activate the aircraft with an annual leasing

fee of $NZ 12.5 million. According to the Minister of

Defence this represents a saving of $NZ43l mil l ion

compared with purchasing 'new' aircraft; implying

that an outright purchase would have cost nearly $NZ

800 mil l ion . The lease arrangement then reduces the

current capital cost to the Defence budget and so

removes some of the potential political heat.

More importantly for the RNZAF, they will at last geta contemporary fighter, after years of making do withthe Skyhawks. The new aircraft, though bu i l t in1989/90 have flown very few hours despite theirchronological age. Ultimately, much will depend onwhat weapons the RNZAF acquires for the newfighters; armed with, say, the Harpoon, the F-16 couldbecome a creditable maritime strike aircraft, but usingonly the RNZAF's current short-range Maverick, thefighter will be of limited value in the maritime scene.

A Third Frigate?The Service that has lost most in the Defence debateis the RNZN, yet it is the one Service that most needsa long-term commitment to its force structure andequipment. Ironically, the 1997 White Paper explicitlycommitted the Government to a three frigate Navy,but the prospect of ordering a third Anzac frigatebecame a symbol for all those opposed to Defencespending.

In the 1998 Parliament, w i t h many MPsunconstrained by party discipline, the Shipleygovernment's ability to maintain power was toofragile for such an unpopular decision. Thus theoverall political environment in Wellington becamemore and more hostile to the RNZN. By year's endthe Cabinet decision only offered Naval Staff thedistant prospect of revisiting the replacement frigateissue.

The Australian ReactionSince the 1997 Defence White Paper. Canberra hadeased off its pressure on Wellington to modernise theNZDF. However the decision to not order a thirdfrigate took the RAN, and Tenix, by surprise; seniorofficials had thought that a very good offer to NewZealand had been 'sewn up' . In the corridors ofRussell, New Zealand has now been 'written oft" as amari t ime nation; not that they have any doubts aboutthe RNZN itself, rather they cannot see the politicalwill (one of Mahan's original elements of Seapower)ever rebuilding to support an adequate Navy. Whetherthat attitude will colour the promised review of areplacement frigate in 2002 remains to be seen; theNZ government will have to work hard to rebuild itscredibi l i ty if it is to regain the same generousconsideration that went into the 1998 frigate offer.

January/March 1999


In the longer term, it is likely that the RNZN willargue that to replace Canterbury with a ship differentfrom the Anzac class then it will be necessary to buytwo second hand ships of one class. This means thatex-American FFG-7s may well come back into

before I he n e x t decis ion is due in 2002.

I l i m e v c r . the a r r i v a l of F- 16s in New Zealand shouldplease the RAAF. For diss imilar air combatmanoeuvring the F/A-18s w i l l have a worthyopponent, w h i l e the new fighters wi l l give theRNZAF some compatibility with regional air forces.many of wh ich arc already experienced F-16operators.

ConclusionThe New Zealand experience in 1998 shows the perilsof Defence decision making in a complacentdemocracy. Since New Zealand's parliament appearsto have no long-term vision, they have down-playedthe f u t u r e \ a l u c of warships to an island nationentering an uncertain new Century. The politicaldebate in New Zealand focussed exclusively onhardware, blinding the public to the actual uses ofarmed force in the contemporary world. Kofi Annan ' sremarks on the value of diplomacy backed byadequate armed force (made after one of last year'sIraq weapons inspection crises) seem to have beenlost on New Zealand's policy makers.



1President's Report to the Annual GeneralMeeting of the Australian Naval Institute

18 February 1999

Iregret to report that our overall performance,measured against our principal objectives, hasbeen poor. Although we have made improvement

in the overall content of the Journal we missed anedition due to lack of material; were late with the lastedition; and have stil l an unacceptable rate of editorialerrors. We also failed to raise the number ofmembers.

I would like to address each of these areas of poorperformance before moving on to those in which wehave achieved more positive outcomes.

JournalFollowing a suggestion made at the last AGM wemoved to establishing a theme for each issue of theJournal. The theme chosen for the first such issue was"The Knowledge Edge", this being the area identifiedas being of highest strategic priority in ASPC)7.Despite the importance of the subject the responsewas very disappointing and, as you are all aware, wefailed to publish thai issue of the Journal due to a lackof su i t ab le material ( i n c l u d i n g general articlesunrelated to the theme) . I wrote to membersexplaining the situation and the Council extended allmemberships by three months to compensate for thisloss of service.

As a result of this experience we increased our effortsto solicit articles for the following issues. This hasbeen a learning experience and I believe that ourefforts have been better targeted and achieved a betterspread for each subsequent issue. The first evidenceof this was the number of original articles in the lastissue of the Journal on "The Human Element ofCapability".

We have not restricted ourselves to Service sources;for the last issue we sought input from both the RSLand ArFFA. The next issue will he on AmphibiousWarfare and the one after that will be on the future ofthe surface combatant. For the latter issue one I wrote17 le t ters to a wide range of ind iv idua l s andauthorities, including DEPSEC S&I. Mr Hugh White;Mr Ken Harris of ADI; and Mr Andrew Johnson ofTENIX. Feedback thai I have received from the firsttwo indicates that both intend to contribute. I amconfident that issue wil l reach the benchmark standardfor content that I believe we should be aiming for withthe Journal.

We created an editorial sub-committee, which has notbeen used properly to date. However, following the

last issue of the Journal , wh ich contained anunacceptable number of editorial errors we haveinstituted a mandatory regime of putting copy throughthis sub-eommittee. I believe that, combined with ourefforts to get ahead of the game in soliciting articles(we are now working two issues in advance), thisshould produce a marked improvement for futureissues.

The situation will also be assisted by the fact that theEdiior is now out of the Minister's office and into amore normal job at ADFA. This should provide amore stable working environment in which he canplan his work with greater certainty. The Editor hasinvestigated and ini t iated a number of steps to reducethe costs of producing Ihe Journal, which have easedthe pressure on the budget.

MembershipWe considered a membership drive last year basedaround an incentive offer to our existing members torecruit new members. This was to consist of areduction in their subscription for each additionalmember they managed to sign up. Unfortunatelyuncertain financial projections delayed considerationof that i n i t i a t i ve anil it remains on the hooks, to belooked at as soon our modelling is complete.

FriendsI have recently written to our four corporate sponsors,or Friends of the ANI, advising of a new sponsorshippackage which includes the Internel site, which I willaddress shortly, and advertising options for theJournal. We have received a positive response fromMr Steve Youll of LOPAC and encouraging signsfrom the other three.

We are planning a d inner for our current Friends andto target potenlial new ones. We are working on a listof potential contenders to approach and a suitable datein the second quarter of the year. The intention is toinvite some of our currently serving flag officers,including CN. to share the evening and assist inpromoting the Institute and its objectives.

Internet SiteThanks principally to the efforts of M i d s h i p m a nRobin Bowley, who was at ADFA last year, we havedeveloped what I believe to be an excellent homepage for the Institute. It is currently hosted on the

January/March 39


\ )clcncc In t rane t I'm 'deve lopment purposes, hut wi l lshortly he hosted on the Internet. Apart from doing anexcellent job of designing the site MidshipmanBowley has established a practical means of keepingthe site current through the Midshipmen undertakingcomputing courses at ADFA.

The site wi l l i n i t i a l l y be a static one; that is, it will notinclude a b u l l e t i n board or a "chat room". Theserequire close to f u l l t i m e m a n n i n g and imposeobligations wi th respect to improper or defamatoryremarks In addit ion to information on the Ins t i tu tethe site wi l l include the contents pages and Editorialsfrom the latest Journals. As part of the sponsorshippackage we have offered the Friends the ability to linkl iom the A M I s i t e to t h e i r corporate s i tes . We are alsolooking to link our site with that of the Navy and otherkindred organisations, such as the US Naval Institute.

We wi l l f ina l ly have an email post box for the Ins t i tu teand in the fu tu re it should be possible to publ i sh theJournal on the site and provide cheaper subscriptions.However. I t h i n k we need to learn to walk first andprove tha t we can successfully ma in ta in the site aspresently conceived. Our previous Internet site couldnot be sustained because it relied on the commitmentand availability of one person. In some respectse s t a b l i s h i n g the site is the easy part, managing it in adynamic manner over a prolonged period will be thechallenge.

I be l ieve , t h o u g h , tha t th is is a very importanti n i t i a t i v e for (he fu tu re of the I n s t i t u t e . Mosti m p o r t a n t l y i t gets us in to the fastest growinginfo rmat ion medium and provides a future growthpath. It also provides a more modern image of theIns t i t u t e that w i l l hopefully appeal to younger peopleand corporate sponsors.

Support to Staff Courses

We have cont inued to provide support to the RANStaff College (RANSC) through the provision ofmedallions, and to the Senior Sailors' and JuniorOfficers' courses at HMAS Creswell throughcomplimentary memberships and book prizes. Ourrelationship with RANSC will need to be renegotiatedal te r collocation of the Service Staff Colleges.

AdministrationOn the administrat ive side we have validated theConsti tut ion and updated our records with theRegistrar General. We have established an improvedsystem of f i l e s and processes for h a n d l i n gcorrespondence. We have archived a significantamount of early material and the ANI l ibrarycontinues to be maintained in the Defence library atCampbell Park.

Patron

Last year we discovered that we had omitted torequest Sir Willaim Deane to become our Patron whenhe became Governor-General. Discussion in Councilraised questions about the role of the Patron and whatthe position contributes. While the Governor-Generalis the Commander-in-Chief he does not play an activerole in the I n s t i t u t e ' s activities nor offer anymeaningful support. Following an examinat ion of theoptions, and in accordance with the Constitution, theCounci l decided that the Chief of Navy would be amore appropriate choice and I have duly invited himto become our Patron. This decision recognises thevery strong support that the present Chief of Navy hasprovided the Institute and the active role that he hasplayed over the last twelve months. It also providesan appropriate formal role within the Inst i tute for theChief of Navy w i t h o u t compromising ourindependent status.

NZ ChapterAnother major issue considered recently by theCouncil has been arrangements wi th the New /ealandChapter. Over the last couple of years changes in keypersonnel on both sides of the Tasman h a v e led tosome v a r i a t i o n s in practice compared w i t h theoriginally agreed arrangements. In a d d i t i o n toin i t i a t i ng corrective action Council decided tha t it wasappropriate to raise these arrangements as an item fordiscussion this year and see if there was any need, ordesire to revise them. I would like to stress that thisis with a view to in i t ia t ing discussion on both sides ofthe Tasman and not w i t h a v iew to any par t icularchange.

It would seem to me that there is a range ofalternatives, probably lying somewhere between thearrangements applicable to a Chapter here inAustralia, and a semi-autonomous body paying forservices received. While the former might seem anobvious choice it is very restrictive and. in mvopinion, does not recognise the fact that this is asignificant body of our membership who belong to aseparate sovereign Navy. At the other end of thespectrum, semi-autonomous status might he d iv id ingthe Institute too much. For my part I favour anarrangement that acknowledges the sovereign statusof the Royal New Zealand Navy and provides theirmembers with a reasonable degree of autonomy toconduct their affairs.

1 do not intend to pursue the ma t t e r fu r the r in thisreport. My in ten t ion is to i n i t i a t e discussion of theissue, canvassing opinion on both sides of the Tasmanwith a view to considering a proposal at next year'sAGM.

January/March


Challenges RemainSubstantial challenges remain, the principal onesbeing to improve the financial and membership base.We are facing strong competit ion from otherorganisations and publications (in a market that haspossibly reached saturation) and we need to improvethe service provided to our members. Our intention isto target new Friends through the dinner and revisedsponsorship package: and to st imulate membershipthrough the previously mentioned membership drive,an improved Journal, and. in due course, byreactivating the seminar program.

There is no doubt that in the post-DRP environmentour people are carrying a heavier load and that theyhave less time to devote to the running of the Insti tute.1 do not believe that it wil l be viable in the future totry and run the Institute without a dedicated, albeitpart-time, staff member, preferably combining theroles of Editor and Office Manager. I believe that thisis the only way to bring the operation of the Inst i tuteto an appropriately professional level and provide therequired level of service to our members.

The issue of a part-time Office Manager has beendiscussed for a long time. In my opinion the time fordiscussion is long past and we should in i t ia te action assoon as our IInances permit. This will depend heavilyupon attracting additional corporate sponsorship.

I am convinced there is a continuing role for theInstitute. We live in a time of considerable change;change that is affecting almost every part of ourprofessional lives. We need a forum where issues canbe discussed and policy and ideas challenged. TheANI is the only such forum and we need to nurtureand stimulate it.

Change of PresidentI have enjoyed my time as President and while theprimary reason for me stepping aside is a move toMelbourne it may well be time for a change, for newideas and a fresh perspective. I have no doubt that ournew President, Commodore Brian Adams, who ispresently Commandant of ADFA, will provide thosenew ideas and positive leadership to the Inst i tute. Iwish him, and the new Council, well.

I would like to conclude my report by thanking theoffice bearers and Councillors for their effort andassistance during the year. Notwithstanding that wedid not achieve all that we set out to do they put in anexcellent effort.

- Rear Admiral W.A.G. Dovers. RAN



A Force for all Seasonsand all the right reasons

by LCDR John P Robinson, RAN

'...The fleet and the armv acting in concert seemto he the natural bulwark of these Kingdoms.'Thomas More Mol\neux, Conjunct Expeditions(1759)

'...Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategicasset that a sea power possesses.' Captain Sirllasil / ./</(/(•// Hart, Deterrence or Defence (I960)

IntroductionAs the 2()th Century draws to a close, it is timely toreflect upon the involvement of the Aust ra l ianDefence Force in world affairs and consider whatform this involvement might take in the 21st Century.The need to maintain a large standing Army andstrong Navy to primarily support campaigns overseashas been a major r e a l i t y of the 2(>lh Century.Involvement in two World Wars as well as a numberof other regional conflicts since, have borne testamentto the need to maintain such forces, which have in themain, been conventionally structured, and organisedand t r a ined along B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y lines. Whils t themaintenance of such forces were appropriate to meetI ! K - r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e l i m e , i t is \ \ o r i h remember ingtha t such organisations had (heir genesis in the 19thcentury, if not earlier, and reflected the requirementsof that period.

The realisation by a number of our allies that therequirement to use military force in the future haschanged has brought about a fundamental change totheir organisations and modus operandi. The end ofthe Cold War and greater stability in Europe hasrefocussed a t tent ion on 'out of theatre'operations orexpeditionary warfare. In the US and UK, forces t r u c t u r e s and the modus operandi. have beenradically changed to reflect the need to have highlymobile forces available to react to a wide variety ofcontingencies. i nc lud ing peacekeeping andhumanitar ian aid. Indeed the focus has moved fromthe need to conduct warfare in a deliberate andponderous manner, with large formations, to warfareconducted quickly by l igh t ly equipped hut h i g h l ymobile forces of all arms, able to react quickly andeffectively to changing demands.

Whilst the ADF today has contracted in size from itsformer past, it nevertheless continues to reflect thest ructure and organisation of a much larger Force.This is particularly so within Army where there still

remains much hollowness. and whi ls t Army 21 andRestructur ing the Army (RTA) ha \ e gone some wayin attempting to redefine Army's future structure androle, they do not reflect the wider ADF modusoperandi of the future. In a s imi la r manner, the RANsince the end of World War 2 has continued to developand acquire capabi l i t ies that are consis tent withconventional Naval requirements but do notnecessarily reflect the wider requirements of the ADI-'in the 21st Century. In this evolutionary process, theRAAF have also evolved from a fledgling Force inWorld War II to becoming a technologically advancedand multi-skilled Air Force within the Air World. Thecurrent range of roles undertaken by the RAAF isextensive but as we look ahead to the next century itwi l l be vital that the future acquisition of high valueaircraft takes account of all ADF' requirements . Therequirements for both fleet and ground support needto be clearly identified and m u s i ref lec t iherequirements of the ADF modus operandi of the 21stCentury. The development therefore of all ADFcapabilities for land, sea and air need to be soorchestrated that the capabilities are fu l ly integrated tomeet all anticipated ADF requirements.

Towards 2000This paper suggests that the t ime has now come toreassess the way in which the ADF wil l go about itsbusiness in the future and examine what capabilitiesthe Force wil l require. At the dawn of the 21stCentury, Australia is faced with the challenge of co-existing and providing responsible leadership in alarge, diverse and rapidly growing region, t h a t isbecoming increas ingly unstable . A s ign i f i can tdiff icul ty for Australian Defence Planners in recentyears has been trying to ident i fy the threat(s) toAustralia. This continues to be the case and w h i l s tthere continues to be no immediate direct threat toAustralia or its interests, there remains a plethora ofpotential indirect or direct threats that could qu ick lyemerge within or beyond the region. In a region that isgrowing rapidly, the potential sources of conflict aremany and such threats could arise quickly and pose asignificant challenge to our Defence resources. There-is therefore a need to prepare the ADF to undertake awide range of roles and to be able to react quickly tothe emergence of threats and to being able to adapt tochanging requirements.

42 January/March I9W


Strategic PolicyThe p u b l i c a t i o n of Aust ra l ia ' s Strategic Policy(ASP97) in December 1997 determined a moreforward looking defence posture for Australia andprovided a template for the development of the ADFinto the 21st century. In introducing the new strategicpolicy the then Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlanstated,

"Australia's Strategic Policy covers those aspectsof the Government's security policy which relate tothe use of armed force in International affairs. Thejudgements in it reflect the (iovernmentsconviction that to prosper in the ver\ demandingenvironment now emerging in the Asia-Pacificregion, Australia needs a strategic approachwhich takes full account of the new challenges weface. Moreover. Australia needs an approach,which explicitly reflects the full breadth of oursecurity interests. Australia's strategic interests donot begin and end at our shoreline. The interests offuture generations of Australians \\'ill not heserved bv encouraging an isolationist mentality ata time when international inter-dependencies areincreasing. The security of Australia is. andshould always remain, the paramount concern ofour national strategic policy. Maintainingconfidence in our ability to defeat an attack onAustralia is, in a sense, the focus of all our defenceactivities. But obviously, developments in ourregion determine the possibility of Australiacoming under military threat. It would he aserious miscalculation to think we could remainunconcerned behind some illusory 'fortressAustralia ' if the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific were to deteriorate. Our aim must he asecure country in a secure region."

What is the region? The region is defined in ASP 97,as "the countries of East Asia, Southeast Asia, theSouth Pac i f ic , the United States, and, perhapsincreasingly in the future. South Asia." This littoralregion is vast and comprises an enormous diversity ofcultures and nationalities and is spread across severaltime zones and climates. It is the fastest growingregion in the world and is the interface betweenburgeoning industr ial and commercial developmentand old established cultures. Clearly, as the regioncontinues to expand and economies grow there w i l l beincreasing pressure on d iminish ing resources, whichwill increase the risk of friction between competitors,at either the national or local level. Other pressureswi th in the region include the establishment ofdemocracy anil independence in a number ofcountries. According to ASP 97 "The dynamism of theAsia-Pacific region makes our task more complexthan it has been in the past. The pace of economicgrowth in our region presents a combinat ion olopportunities and challenges. Our national approach

to the region must therefore have a number ofelements which allow us both to exploit theopportunities and manage the risks presented to us."

An indication of the rate of growth that has occurredin the region in recent years is reflected in themodernisation of a number of regional mil i tary forcesinto well-equipped and balanced conventional forces,able to "monitor and protect offshore resources andinterests". ( Ibid) The recent purchase of an AircraftCarrier (CHAKRI NARUEBET) by Thailand and thecurrent building of three Amphibious Ships (LPD) bySingapore also represents a significant increase tocapability.

ASP 97 notes that this strong rate of growth in defencespending is expected to continue over the comingdecades which wi l l "increase the capability ofregional defence forces." Whilst both ASP 97 and theprevious DOA strategic policy acknowledged thatthere was no obvious or immediate threat to Australiaor its dependencies, clearly there is considerablepotential for a conflict to arise within the region andat relatively short notice. National sovereignty issues,racial and religious disharmony, increased wealth andthe emergence of democracy are all catalysts forconflict. Indonesia, Malaysia and PNG are but threeof a number of countries wi thin the region where suchcatalysts exist. Further afield. Burma. Cambodia.Korea and the South China Sea are all areas ofpotential concern.

As General Krulac, Commandant USMC noted "Inthe future, the United States is likely to face a numberof very different threats to its security interests.Many of these wi l l be associated with the littorals,those areas where land and sea meet. The great coastalcities, well-populated coasts, and the intersection oftrade routes represent a re la t ively small portion of theworlds surface, yet provide homes to over three-quarters of the worlds population, locations for over80 percent of the worlds political capitals, and nearlyall of the primary marketplaces for in te rna t iona l trade.Because of this, the littorals are also the place wheremost of the world's important conflicts are likely tooccur.

Geographic proximity with the littorals is one of thefew things that conflicts of the future are likely tohave in common. In all other respects - goals,organisations, armaments, and tactics - the warfare ofthe next 20 years wil l be distinguished by its greatvariety. For that reason, it is imperative that the Corpsresist the temptation to prepare for only one type ofconflict." (Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea:Bui ld ing a Marine Corps for the 21st Century by Gen.Charles C Kru l ak )

This message is equally applicable to the ADF. wherethe recent economic downturn in the region hasmerely added to the list of potential destabil is ingfactors. In preparing to respond adequately to any one

January/March

Journal of tin1 Australian Naval Institute

or more of the broad range of potential scenarioswi th in the region, the ADF should now re-assess howit is configured and organised. The greati m p o n d e r a b l e i n t h i s c r i t i c a l sel l a ssessment o fdefence capabili ty are the judgements, based oninte l l igence and other factors that ident i fy the threat orthreats to Australia and its interests. A great diff icultyfor the ADF, in the post Vietnam War era has been toident i fy such threats and develop the necessarycapabilities to counter them. Consequently, the ADFhas continued to generally develop capabilities thatreflect known or Single Service perceptions of what isimportant to the defence of Australia and which attimes have been the source of some acrimony betweenthe Services. The result has been the development ofa wide range of defence capabilities, developedlargely in isolation from each other and which are notsuf f ic ien t ly integrated to meet future ADFrequirements and do not reflect a total force concept.

The Way AheadAs we prepare to move into the 21st Century, it ist imely to consider a better way of doing business andacquire a more holist ic approach to the developmentof defence capab i l i t i e s . A key factor in this process isto acknowledge that w h i l s t Aust ra l ia does notcurrently face an obvious threat, ASP 97 demands thatwe are prepared to deal effectively with any one ormore of a range of potential threats emerging wi th inthe region, or bcvoiul. This requires a high order off l e x i h i l i t v t h r o u g h o u t the ADF" in both theorganisation, the command chain and in the planningprocess in older tha t an appropriate force can beassembled quickly and prepared for deployment tomeet any given s i tua t ion . The second key factorconcerns Australia's unique geo-strategic situationw i t h i n the region and its vast hinterland, with limitedinfrastructure. Equally vast, is the regional l i t toralarea into which the ADF may be required to operate.The tyranny of distance between and within these vastareas requires a high level of mobi l i ty at both thestrategic and tactical level across the ADF.

A cornerstone to this development is that recognitionm u s t now be given to the reality of Australia's geo-strategic situation as an island continent, set in apredominantly maritime environment, and t h a i thefu tu r e development of the ADF be based upon amar i t ime strategy. This w i l l then reflect the s ignif icantchange from the continental Defence posture that hasdominated Aus t ra l i an defence development in the20th Century but is no longer relevant to the 21s tCentury. The adoption of a maritime strategy does notplace Navy in a pre-eminent position over the othertwo services but does recognise the extensivemaritime nature of our surroundings and the need todevelop a total force capability. Stewart Fraser. in hisar t ic le on Li t to ra l Warfare & Joint Mar i t imeOperations noted that :

"Maritime strategy flows directlv from a state'sgeo-strategic environment, anil is formulated atnational and grand strategic levels. At itsbroadest, it ma\ he i/efinetl us the utilisation ofnational maritime - based power - military < / / / < /civil - to meet political anil economic objectives:

Maritime strategy is specifically concerned withthe exercise of maritime power, as opposed tonaval power. The difference is significant.Maritime power is inherently joint in miture. liemanates from forces drawn from all threesen-ices, both land and sea-based, supported bynational and commercial resources, exercisinginfluence over sea, land and air environments. "

The reality of deploying and operating in t h i senvironment , in a flexible and mobile manner needsto he fu l ly examined and all Defence capabilities needto be assessed for t h e i r worth in meeting theserequirements. The adoption of a marit ime strategy asthe cornerstone of Australian Defence Policy and thedevelopment of integrated capabilities will ensure thatthe ADF is able to respond in an appropriate mannerto a wide range of threats. This is analogous to theestablishment of a Fire Brigade, w h i c h is equipped,trained and prepared for a wide varietv of potentialtasks. The nature of the task at the time w i l l determinewhat resources are required, the secret to successb e i n g the a b i l i t y to q u i c k l y judge wha t resources arerequired to deal effectively with the (ask and the speedof response. It wi l l be vital for Australia's standingwith in the region in the future tha t any mi l i t a ryresponse is seen to be effect ive. This does require thepreparation of a Force that is well prepared to actquickly and robustly, like a Fire Brigade to any g i v e nsituation and to have the inherent flexibility to ad ju s tto a changing s i tua t ion .

The establishment of a mari t ime strategy, as thecornerstone of Defence policy considerably enhancesthe ADF's ability to deploy within the region andwould confer upon the ADF, an a b i l i t y to maximisethe land, sea and air space for manoeuvre. When theprinciples of mobility and flexibility are applied, theADF will acquire a significant capabi l i ty to remainresponsive to changing circumstances andrequirements w i t h i n the region, inc lud ing mainlandAustralia and the offshore territories. Dr MichaelFv ans noted tha t :

"//; 1902, the great American naval strategist,Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. wrote thatAustralia should base its sectiritv on itsinternational position rather than its loctdgeographv. Mahan was writing about Australia atthe beginning of a new centurv. in n time ofgrowing strategic change and iliplonnii it-uncertainty. 'Local safety', he obsen-ed. 'is notalwavs found in local precaution. There is amilitary sense, in which it is true that he who loseshis life shall save it. "

January/March 1999


On the edge of the twenty-first century Mahan'sadvice is st i l l relevant. In the late 1990s, theimperatives of a new and unpredictable internationalsecurity system are challenging current Australianconcepts of strategy and defence planning. Nowhereis th is more acute than in the Australian Army where,since the mid-1970s, a concentration on local orcont inenta l defence has been the predominantactivity.' Ian McLachlan's comments in 1997 that of'Australia's strategic interests do not begin and end atour shoreline' are consistent with Mahans words from1902.

The development of a Defence capability based upona maritime strategy demands that the middle groundthat lies between ASP 97 and the proposals containedin Restructuring the Australian Army (RTA) be fu l lyevaluated. ASP 97 reflects a strong reliance on theprotection of the Sea-Air gap with naval and airassets, with Army more or less confined to the defenceof mainland Australia. RTA serves to compound thedichotomy between a navalist strategy and continentaldefence by proposing a force structure that isconfigured primarily for continental defence. Both

Soldiers from Alpha C'onipanv, 2 RAR LCM8 forhead] assault. Exercise initial landing 99

ASP 97 and RTA therefore continue to perpetuatecontinental defence, which is at odds politically withour stated involvement wi thin the region andstrategically constrains the ADF by separating thoseforces assigned to continental defence from thoseconcerned with the defence of the sea-air gap. Themiddle ground approach would acknowledge that thesupposed Sea-Air gap, is in reality a Sea-Air-Landgap and that it is extensive. Under a developedmaritime strategy. Army would play a full and vitalpart in th is region as part of a joint force but wouldneed to attain high levels of responsiveness and beequipped accordingly. The ADF as a relatively smallforce must be able to maximise its resources andbecome highly mobile in order to be effective againstmany potential threats, throughout the region. Theapproach must be thoroughly joint, with all elementsof the ADF able to combine together, as and whenrequired. As Dr Evans noted "This combination of

navalism and continenlalism, it is suggested, mayultimately forfeit the advantages of employing a landforce in maritime operations, namely strategicmobility, concentration, surprise and flexibility."Speed of response, an abil i ty to respond to changingcircumstances, the provis ion of h i g h l y mobilestrategic and tactical transport assets, strong all armsfirepower and sound communications would be thekey ingredients. High levels of mobility at both thestrategic and tactical level would however be the keyfactors to the effectiveness of such a Force. Suchforces would be as capable of operating within theregion as operating on mainland Austral ia and woulddeploy by sea or air or a combination of both.

To acquire such a capability the ADF would need tocritically examine its force structure and levels ofreadiness. The development of such a Force wouldrequire that its key 'modus operand!" be establishedupon the concepts of Manoeuvre Warfare, conductedby lightly equipped, highly mobile forces able to besupported over long distances. These forces would beboth airborne and amphibious capable, and wouldhave the necessary integral mobility, firepower andlogistic support necessary to sustain them. Equally,the development of such a Force would require that allfuture ADF capability development be predicatedupon the war fighting requirements of this Force, aspart of a Total Force requirement.

In simple terms this might translate for Army into thereplacement of the current inventory of heavy armourwith light armour, replacing or reducing mediumartillery batteries with light artillery and increasingArmy rotary aviation ( u t i l i t y and a t t a c k ) whi l s treducing the holdings of heavy transport. The latterwould enable much of the mobility to be attained byhelicopter through the conduct of airmobileoperations from both land and sea.

The role of the RAAF as part of a 'total force' wouldnot only require a review of current capability but alsoa considerable increase in the ability to support Navaland Army uni ts in the Maritime environment. Thismight require the acquis i t ion of addi t ional oralternative combat aircraft capable of providing airdefence to naval uni t s throughout the region as well asclose air support (CAIRS) to troops on the ground.The latter might comprise SVTOL type aircraft orattack helicopters.

For Navy, the need to take account of Capabilitydevelopment in a broader ADF sense might translateinto enhancing the capability to transport and supportamphibious forces as well as providing enhancedafloat C3I for the Joint Force and fire support. Thiswould be particularly applicable in the conduct ofOperational Manoeuvre from (he Sea (OMFTS)Operations, where the Force might well be deployedfor a protracted period in the region or beyond. Theinherent abi l i ty of this Force is that it has the mobi l i ty



and flexibility to undertake a wide variety of taskssimultaneously. As Hewish, Janssen and Scott, in theirarticle Power Projection gets Amphibious Boostnoted:

"Amphibious forces have man\ advantages: thevcan he positioned over the horizon from a dangerspot: they can he held concentrated, ready forrapid reaction: '(Poise)'and they can hedispersed, ready to reassemble rapidly whenrequired. Amphibious forces also enjoy greaterflexibility as. at sea. they are not constrained bythe problems of sovereignty, which beset land andair forces."

The concept of Manoeuvre Warfare is not new but hasbeen firmly embraced in recent years by a number of\\estern nations as offering the best capability torespond to a wide range of potential tasks. StewartFraser (Ba i l r igg Memorandum 32) stated t h a t"manoeuvre warfare is generally associated \ \ i t himages of land and combat, such as massed armourand Blit/krieg tactics. However, it is a joint warfareconcept equa l ly applicable and perhaps more so insome respects - to maritime forces. In this context,manoeuvre warfare has two elements: manoeuvre atsea; and manoeuvre from the sea. Manoeuvre at seacentres on naval operations, and is chiefly concernedwith establishing sea control over critical SLOCs. andprecursor operations in the li t toral area, to meet therequirements of the overall joint campaign on land,while manoeuvre from the sea applies the techniquesol m a n o e u v r e ua r fa re to power project ion. TheUSMC concept, as defined in Operational Maneuverfrom the Sea. outlines the idea of the littoral andadjacent SLOCs as a manoeuvre space:

"\Vlnir distinguishes /OMI-'TSJ from all other.species of operational maneuver is the extensiveuse of the sea as a means of gaining advantage, anavenue for friend/v movement that issimultaneously a harrier to the enemy and ameans i>/ avoiding disailvantagcims engagements.I his aspect of [OMFTSj mav make use of, but isnot limited to. such techniques as sea-basedlogistics, sea-based fire support and the use of thesea as a medium for tactical and operationalmovement."

This capabili ty confers upon Commanders enormousflexibi l i ty whereby they are able to apply thenecessary level and mix of force to any particulartask /miss ion . In the Fire Brigade analogy, theCommander, in con junc t ion wi th his principaladvisers is therefore able to make an appreciation ofthe situation, determine the requirements and assignthe necessary resources to achieve the task. Oncecompleted the Force is a v a i l a b l e for new tasking.either by relocating within the AO or be withdrawn toits base afloat. The fact that the force is able to range

over considerable distances v \ h i l s t at sea fu r the rincreases the mobi l i ty and flexibility of the force inbeing able to respond adequately to a wide range oftasks .

Force structureWhilst the ADF clearly does not have the same forcelevels and resources as the USMC'. it is suggested thatthe ADF. with some realignment and enhancement toits force structure and resources could achieve asignificant capabil i ty in the conduct of manoeuvrewarfare under a maritime strategy.

In terms of force structure, the ADF might look at theUK Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) as a modelfor developing a highly mobile and flexible responseforce. The JRDF was formed in August 1996 andwhilst essentially a national force is able to operate aspart of a mul t i national force in the conduct of bothcombat and non-combat functions.

The force is based upon 3 Commando Brigade. RoyalMarines and 5 Airborne Brigade. Both Brigades areessentially light Infantry formations "both in themodern sense of composition and equipment scaleand in their t ra ining for t rad i t iona l l i gh t I n f a n t r ydu t ies such as ra iding. Fach is an independentformation v \ i t h integral artil lerv. engineering, andlogistics support, though the emphasis is somewhatdifferent. For JRDF purposes, a reinforced brigade isseen as the maximum feasible deployment.

5 Airborne may be used where reaction t i m e iscritical, perhaps measured in hours rather than days,and sustainability is not the foremost issue. On theground, wi thout external support, the AirborneBrigade lacks the t ac t i ca l mob i l i t y of i ts RMcounterpart (for example, it has no permanentlytasked support helicopters and r e l a t i v e l y leuvehicles). Conceivably, 5 Airborne might be requiredto seize an airfield as part of a mar i t ime operation;equally, the composition of an airborne battalionenables it to be used as amphib ious groupreinforcements (2 and 3 Parachute Battalions weresuccessfully attached to 3 Commando Brigade duringthe Falklands conflict).

46 Janiuirv/March IW9


3 Commando has a wider variety of assets, providingit wi th a greater degree of combat u t i l i t y - especiallytactical mobi l i ty and firepower - than its Airborneequivalent: cold weather and mountain warfare sk i l l shave, however, been retained in the post - Cold Warperiod. Supporting forces include BV-206 all-terrainvehicles, a Rapier SAM battery, 24 RN Sea Kingassau l t helicopters permanently assigned to theBrigade, an independent landing craft squadron andanother of small Rigid Raiding Craft, and a squadronof Ga/elle scout and Lynx anti-tank helicopters. Theformation has integral Special Forces elements, theSpecial Boat Squadron, and the Mountain and Arctic-Warfare Cadre.

For mar i t ime purposes, both JRDF core uni ts can bereinforced with armoured or armoured reconnaissanceelements, probably in no more than squadron strength(around 12 Challenger tanks or Scimitarreconnaissance vehicles, respectively) on account ofthe sizeable support tail required by such units. In amedium-to-large-scale conflict, deployment of theJRDF may only be a precursor to a divisional-sizedbuild-up. "As Dr Michael Evans noted in his paper""This is a concept of maritime strategy in whichdoctrinal refinements and new technology seem togive amphibious and airmobile operations greaterstrategic potential than ever before in the history ofarms."

Decision TimeThe ADF. at the end of the 2()th Century appears tohave arrived at a critical point in its development withsome fundamental choices to be made as to how to dobusiness in the 21st Century. The reality of Australia'sgeo-strategic situation in a region that is bothmaritime and littoral by nature dictates the adoption ofa strategy that reflects the demands of t h i senvironment. This requires the development of amaritime strategy that caters for the broad range ofcontingencies that could arise in the Sea-Air-Landgap. Neither ASP 97 nor RTA cater for this dimensionof Warfare, as the focus remains on the Defence of theSea-Air gap by Navy and Air Force and on theDefence of Continental Australia by Army. As DrMichael Evans noted in the concluding remarks to hispaper. "Given geography. Australia's concept ofstrategy must be a marit ime one, but it must be aconcept in which land forces play a more preciselydefined role Between the contending imperativesof ASP 97 and the 1997 TRA plan there is a strategy-force mismatch. Because Australia 's current maritimeconcept of strategy is not f u l l y integrated, it isquestionable whether such a synergy between militarymeans and political ends can be achieved. Under ASP97. a naval interpretation of maritime strategy withoutavailable land forces courts possible disaster, underthe 1997 RTA, a continental strategy based largely onland forces courts probable irrelevance."

Whilst the ADF remains small in size, compared to anumber of larger allies, there is enormous potential tomaximise the effects of a re la t ive ly small defenceforce by adopting the concepts of manoeuvre warfare,whereby forces are concentrated at key points to applyleverage. The effectiveness of manoeuvre warfarecalls for high levels of mobility and flexibility, as wellas high levels of training and readiness. Again quotingfrom Dr Michael Evans, "the ADF needs to put primeintellectual effort into broadening the parameters ofthe current maritime concept of strategy. The Armyneeds to examine the use of land forces incontemporary conflict, it needs to emphasise itsmanoeuvre potential across the full spectrum of l ikelyoperations, and it needs to define carefully its forcestructure priorities to transform itself into an agile.concept-driven force."

The ADF is fortunate that many of the componentparts required to develop a h igh ly mobile andresponsive force already exist within the ADF forcestructure. 3 Brigade as the Operational DeploymentForce already provides the nucleus for thedevelopment of a h igh ly mobile force. The LAV andBushranger development programmes will conferincreased mobility to the force.

Artillery. Engineer. Armour. Signals and Logisticsupport units are already well embedded into theArmy orbat. In addition helicopter support is availablethrough 5 Aviation Regiment, and the RAN andRAAF. A modest level of strategic and tactical air andsea mobility is available with the C130 Fleet and thenewly redesigned LPA's HMAS Kaiiinihla andHMAS Manoora in conjunction w i t h HMAS Tithrnk.

The effectiveness of these forces however dependsupon the adoption of a clear warfighting capabil i tybased very much on the integration of the capabilitiesto the common purpose of being able to provide ahighly mobile and responsive force, able to operate inthe mar i t ime environment. This may require somereorganisation to the current force structure and thereplacement of heavy equipment with lighter, moremobile and air/sea transportable equipment. This maywell require the replacement of heavy armour andmedium artillery with lighter equivalents as well as anincrease to the helicopter force and avai lablehelicopter platforms, at sea. The provision of airdefence for those naval and army units operating as ajoint force in the maritime environment wi l l be ofparamount importance. The subsequent developmentof future capabilit ies across the ADF' must cont inue toreflect the underlying requirement to develop a h igh lymobile and responsive force that is able to operateeffectively throughout the region. It is possible thatsome significant savings in cost and manpower maybe ach ieved through the ra t ional i sa t ion of thedevelopmental process, thus offset t ing some costsrelating to restructuring changes. As Dr MichaelEvans noted:

Januarv/March 7999 47


"In tlie twenty-first century, the army must movetowards a more agile force structure based on themultifunctional needs of a 'three theatre' rule. Itmust develop (i warfighting capacity to nuntmdeterrence. compellance anil reassurancemissions across Australia's potential continental,offshore ainl international theatres. "

Conclusion

The ADF at the end of the 2()th Century is faced withsonic s igni f ican t decisions concerning its structureand modus operandi into the 21st Century. The worldlias changed, and wh i l s t a number of countries havedramatically realigned their defence forces to reflectthese changes, the ADF has yet to change from itslong established structures. The coalitionGovernment's stated increased involvement within aregion, that is both predominantly maritime, growingin importance but also becoming increasinglyunstable, demands tha t recognition be given toAustralia 's geo-strategic si tuat ion and tha t thecornerstone of Australian defence policy in the 21stCentury be established upon a maritime strategy.

To be effective, the ADF must not only adopt amari t ime strategy tha t reflects Aus t ra l ia ' s geo-strategic si tuat ion in a predominantly mari t imeenv i ronmen t hut changes its structure and modusoperandi to under take manoeuvre warfare . Whi l s t theADF has a broad range of existing capabilities, theseneed to be reviewed, so that hollowness wi th in thestructure is removed and the ADF acquires a lighter,compact and more mobile capability so that it canadapt and react q u i c k l y to changing s i tua t ions .particularly wi th in the region. Force elements must becapable of coming together as part of a joint force tomeet any given task. The Development of such acapability, demands that single service developmentsidled the requirements of the total force. In addi t ion.

emphasis should be placed on high levels of t rainingand cross-training with other Force Elements toensure tha t a high level of f a m i l i a r i t y andinteroperability is achieved across the ADF.

The ability of this force to be effective throughout theregion into the 21st Century demands that the ADF reevaluate its modus operandi and adopt the concepts ofmanoeuvre warfare. The development of future singleservice capabilities must reflect the needs of the totalforce r e q u i r e m e n t , so tha t the ADF' can indeedbecome A Force for all seasons.

Editors Footnote: Since this article was receivedfor publication, a new Army document entitledThe F u n d a m e n t a l s of Land Warfare waspublished. This document calls for theestablishment of Expeditionary i'orces able tooperate in the Asia Pacific region and serves tounderscore the emphasis now bein^ \>iven to thiscapability.

BIBLIOGRAPHYFraser. S.. (1995) Littoral Warfare & Joint Maritime Operations.

UK Approaches and Capabilities. Bailrigg Memorandum 32,CDISS Lancaster University. Lancaster.

Evans. M., (1998) The role of the Army in a Maritime concept ofStrategy, Working Paper (No 101) LWSC. Canberra.

(ob cil.) Navalism is defined here as 'a strategic emphasis on usingnaval forces supported by land-bused a i r c ra f t ' andcontinentalism as 'a strategic emphasis on using land forces forthe defence of mainland Australia'.

Hewish, M.. Janssen, J,, Scott. R.. (March 1997) Janes'International Defense Review. Coulsdon. Surrey, UK.

Op. Cit.

Fraser. S.. Bailrigg Memorandum 32 quoting OperationalManeuver from the Sea, Headquarters Marine Corps(Washington D.C.)

Fraser, S., Bailrigg Memorandum 32.

Dr Michael Evans LWSC Working Paper No 101 'The Role of theArmy in a Maritime Concept of Strategy.

ibid.

ibid.

Ibid.

I / \I.\S Kalikpapan prepares to come alongside HMAS Tohnik. Initial landing 99

48 Janiiarv/March 1999


Amphibious Warfare and the ADFby Maritime Command Staff

The RANs history of involvement in amphibiouswarfare is a long and crowded one. It is notoften remembered that the largest single

operation which the RAN has conducted was theassault on Leyte Gulf in October 1944. The Australianships present included cruisers, destroyers, landingships and surveying vessels. All of those units werealready very experienced in amphibious work as aresult of the South West Pacific campaigns of 1943 and1944 and they made an important contribution to theAllied campaign. They were to go on to undertakefurther operations in Lingayen Gulf and in Borneo in1945. Ironically, half a world away from the SouthWest Pacific, there were RANVR personnel markingthe way for the Normandy invasion in midgetsubmarines and RAN, RANR and RANVR personnelscattered throughout a mul t i tude of other ships in thevast invasion fleet.

These operations collectively demonstrated veryclearly one of the most important aspects ofamphibious warfare, and one that is not always fullyunderstood. Amphibious warfare is not only complexand demanding because of its inherently joint natureanil the need to integrate with both land and air forcesin the littoral environment. It is a challenge just asmuch because it involves every aspect of navalcapabi l i ty and every area of naval warfare.Amphibious operations cannot even be contemplatedunless control of the sea - however confined in timeand space to the needs of the particular operation - canbe secured and this control must encompass above, onand below the sea. It requires all forms of navalcombatants and all arms of the service, from anti-submarine to mine countermeasures and anti-surfaceoperations. Furthermore, it is inherently knowledgebased. Successful amphibious operations require avery high degree of understanding of the littoral andthis requires not only access to the most sophisticatedpossible data bases - built up by years of steadypeacetime activity but precursor surveyreconnaissances. They thus represent one of theact ivi t ies of the hydrography branch whichdemonstrates most clearly the fundamentaldependence of the combat capabilities upon it. WorldWar II saw all arms of the RAN working together inthis way to put the Army safely ashore in hostileenvironments time and time again. It is a record thatwe cannot only be very proud of, but from which westill have much to learn.

The nature of our strategic environment since 1945 hasmeant relat ively l i t t le emphasis on amphibious warfareas such by either the RAN or the Australian Army and

sometimes even insufficient attention to sea transportand logistics over the shore. Although the RANacquired tank landing ships in 1946. their operationallife was short and their employment very limitedbefore they were disposed of. The sea transport rolewas largely assumed by the Army's Water TransportSquadron, w h i c h acquired medium landing ships(LSM) from the United States Navy in the lale 1950sand then the small freighter John Moncish. These shipswere soon heavily occupied with logistic support forthe Australian Army in Vietnam.

The RAN returned to the sea transport role in 1963with the recommissioning of the old carrier HMASSydney as a training ship and fast troop transport. Thelatter role was to become her primary task for the nextdecade as she ferried troops to and from Vietnam,earning the nickname of the "Vung Tau Ferry".Progressively fitted wi th LCVPs ami n igh t deckcranes and with extensive accommodation and someretained flight facilities, Sydney was a very capableship indeed, despite her age. Ironically, it was onlyafter the end of Vietnam commitment and just beforeSvtlnev was paid off, largely as an economic measure,that the first substantial exercises in tactical vertical l i f tfrom the carrier, using RAAF helicopters, weretrialled.

The disposal of Sydney was recognised as a majorreduction in capability and a project slowly evolvedfor the acquisition of a multi-purpose amphibioustransport. At the same time, after long negotiations, theRAN took responsibility from the Army for theoperation of the larger water transport units, notablythose which possessed sleeping accommodation. Inpractice, this meant that the new Heavy Landing Craft(LCH). buil t to replace the LSMs, were commissionedinto the Navy, while the much smaller Landing CraftMechanised (LCM) were retained by the Army. TheRANs new responsibilities were recognised by thecreation of the First Austral ian Landing CraftSquadron, based at HMAS Morcton in Brisbane.

The design selected for the new major unit was adevelopment of the British Sir Bedivere class landingship. Laid down in 1979 and completed in 1981. theHeavy Landing Ship (LSH) Tohnik representedsomething of a compromise in that she was not 'sized'to carry and deploy a substantial Army formation (suchas a battalion group) but represented the greatestmult iple capability possible on a very limited budget.She could carry and deploy LCM 8s. operatehelicopters, discharge cargo by her own cranes,discharge over the bow onto a beach or a l ighter anddischarge onto smaller landing craft via her stern door.

January/March 1999


Tohruk was to become a vital element in the creationand retention of a core capability within the RAN andthe Australian Army for amphibious operations. Alimited, additional transport capability came in thetraining ship Jen-is Bay, a converted car ferry, whichcould unload over her stern door to lighters andlanding craft.

After Tohruk's commissioning, the Landing CraftSquadron was reconstituted as the Austra l ianAmphibious Squadron and much effort went into thedevelopment of landing techniques and skills. Thecontemporary development of defence strategy,however, was coming to emphasise the defence ofAustralia, particularly within the 'sea air gap' as theprimary determinant of force structure. At a time ofstr ingent restrictions on defence funding , theamphibious and sea transport capabilities came undergreat pressure and in 1986, HMAS Moreton wasclosed, Tohruk moved to Sydney and the majority ofthe LCHs paid off into reserve.

The events of the next few years showed that moreemphasis on sea transport and on the abil i ty to put landforces ashore was needed in the ADF. The 1987 Fijicoup raised the prospect of a services protectedevacuation and made it clear that a renewed emphasiswas needed on amphibious techniques wi th in the ADF.The lesson was reinforced in 1988, when RAN unitswere placed on alert to conduct an evacuation ofAustra l ian nationals from Vanuatu. It was becomingclear, too, that the nature of the Australian environmentitself, with an undeveloped and often impassable northand several isolated offshore territories, required thatwe consider it to be a 'drv archipelago" with theassociated reality that when the Army moves over longdistances and on the large scale, that movement mustbe by sea and air. On the small scale, all but one of theLCHs was progressively returned to service and planswere laid for the development of JERVIS BAY'shelicopter operating capabilities.

The importance of sea transport and amphibiouscapabi l i t ies continued to be demonstrated into the early1990s, not only through the mechanism of majorexercises such as the KANGAROO series, but in theA I ) F \ deployment to Somalia in 1993 and itsoperat ions in B o u g a i n v i l l e in I9 l)4. The challenge forthe ADF was thus to renew and improve its capabilitiesw ithin a limited budget and this came wi th the offer bythe United States Navy of two NEWPORT Class tanklanding ships. Manoora and Kanimhla werecommissioned into the RAN in 1994 and shortlyafterwards arrived in Australia. They immediatelyreplaced the Jen'ix Bay and it was the plan at this stage,when their refits for Australian service were completed,that Tohruk would also go.

The difficulties which were encountered withManoora and Kanimhla over the following few yearsare well known, hut they are being overcome. Within

the modernisation package are a range of al terat ions toimprove their f l ight and hangar capabilities, installcommand and control spaces and a highly capablemedical facility. Both are scheduled to complete theirrefits and modernisation in 1999/2000 and they wil lembark upon an extensive programme of t r ia ls andtraining to prepare them for service.

The requirement for a tactically effective amphibiouscapabil i ty was reinforced b\ the p u b l i c a t i o n ofAustralia's Strategic Policy 1997 which included theDefence of Regional Interests as a capabilitydeterminant in addition to the defence of Austral iaitself. Given the mari t ime environment of the region,mil i tary forces must move by sea and must also beready to deploy into undeveloped areas without thebenefit of sophisticated port facilities or airfields. Anearly result of this shift in strategic direction was thedecision to retain Tohruk in service, thus re ta in ing herunique heavy lift capability as a complement to thetwo LPAs to the point where the tact ical l i f t of abat tal ion group w i l l be a realistic goal for the ADF.

1999 marks a key point in the development andrenewal of the ADF's amphibious warfare capabi l i t ies .Manoora and Kanimhla are expected to start theirtrials at the end of their extensive modernisationprogrammes, Tohruk begins a major and much neededrefit and the Life of Type Extension Programme(LOTE) for the five active LCHs gets under way. Thiscommitment of resources by the RAN is also beingreflected in the Army's increasing focus onamph ib ious capabi l i t ies w i t h i n i t s o w n u n i t s ,p a r i i c u l a r l v . 1 Br igade in l o v v n s v d l c .

The new organ i sa t ion of Commander A u s t r a l i a nAmphibious Forces (CAAF) came into being on 01February 1999. CAAF will manage the AmphibiousForce Element Group on behalf of the MaritimeCommander. In addition to his n a v a l responsibilitiesfor readiness and training, he also has charge of j o i n taspects of amphibious training and readiness and thismeans that he has a key role in coordinating andassessing the joint efforts required to bring the ADF'samphibious forces to the required level of operationalcapability. Many old ski l ls will require to be relearnedand many new ones, particularly relating to helicopteroperations from the l.PAs. w i l l need to be deve loped .

Captain S teve Hooke. who has jus t completed aposting as Chief of Staff to NORC'OM. is the firstCAAF. He is supported by a small joint staff based atGarden I s land . The officers and senior sailors ofCAAF" w i l l play a v i t a l role in br inging the amphibiouscapability of the ADF to the point where it will meetthe strategic requirements of the present day and of theFuture.

January/March 1999


Book ReviewALL MEN BACK - ALL ONE BIGMISTAKE

By LCDR Greg Swinden

An odd title for a very interesting hook. This is thestory of young signalman Bill (Bu/./.er) Bee. whoserved in the cruiser HMAS Perth at the battles of theJava Sea and Sundu Strait and was later a Prisoner ofWar of the Japanese.

Following the sinking of Perth, and the cruiser USSHouston, in the Sundu Strait the story follows theadventures and misadventures of Bi l l Bee and theother Pertli survivors as they are held captive in avariety of Japanese POW Camps. These include campsin Java, Singapore, Thailand, Burma (including theirtime spent on the infamous Thai-Burma Railway) IndoChina and final ly Japan where they were employedunderground in Japanese coal mines.

The title of the hook comes from a habitual saying oftheir Japanese overlords; when a planned moved fromone camp to another fails to eventuate due to somebreakdown in the Japanese communication or logisticschain (a hit like the Australian version of 'packs onpacks off - hurry up and wait ' ) .

The hook ends with Bee returning safely to his familyhome in Western Australia, however, over 100 of hiscomrades did not return - victims of untreated woundsreceived in battle, malnutr i t ion . Japanese brutali ty ork i l l ed when their unmarked prison ships were sunk byAllied submarines or aircraft.

I found the authors style of wri t ing very easy to readand the story captivating, no pun intended, andfinished the 156 page book in a few hours. Althoughthe story of the Australian POW's held by the Japanesehas been told several times before, both collectivelyand on an individual basis, the tales of the hardshipthey endured and their determination to survive nevercease to ama/c me.

Hesperian Press published this hook and they havedone a very good job in doing so. The hook includesover 30 illustrations, mainly photo's of HMAS Perthand members of her crew and a folded map of SouthEast Asia which is a copy of a Red Cross publicationfrom Work! War I I showing the location of JapanesePOW Camps. An appendix lists the Ships Company ofHMAS Perth their f inal fate (ie ki l led in action atSunda Strait , died as a POW, died since the end of thewar. or still living).

I purchased my copy for $19.95 from a smallbookstore in Western Australia (where the publisherand author are located), however it may not he readilyavailable on the east coast. The hook is available fromHesperian Press PO Box 317 Victoria Park WA 6979for S23.50 (which includes $3.50 postage andhandl ing) or direct from the author. Willian Bee of 26David St Mullaloo WA 6027. Payment in both cases isby cheque or money order.


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