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AD387621

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TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

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TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 12 FEB1966. Other requests shall be referred toAssistant Chief of Staff for ForceDevelopment, Department of the Army,Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY28 Feb 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr dtd29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

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to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

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data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and

the fact that the Government may nave formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing

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94CA1 FrCo

iE Heaciartams ,Senior Advisors Alviaor7 For 621TO&: OqiUS.%Mr( 17231M J321# APO 'W Porcca 962413

L Ih a read a" atdiod tbe.reporL eu ittod bV theSeniorW Advisor 7th Division. The facVt conclusions, and recov-ondtions are

in accordance With inforation &athorod by thl r? Co.-s Advior" Saf -

00 durinng and imwediawtelr subsequent to the apisodo.2. 1 concuz with WQ tipdins of the Senior Advisor 7th Infantry

Division a&r reco,,gwmd no disciplinary action bat n ai, n U;5 Advisory

'43, 'This ent .re Incident has been discussed with the 7th, 9th end21 Division Senior Advisores, the C4 11.7 Corp and the Co rdlors of tintoohZWN Divisions. Copies of tho mpoet arc boein furnished each divisionin 17 Corps and the Corps Cv-=rdor. Further reco.mnd that the lessonslearned be n de vaiable to all appropriate coianerss

Fi ,,46 Colonol, Infantz D D C.Senior AdviixerMR f

e :5Ac S Fo' -117G

e - smse aiotmag twaflue * viOi U.e SOui 0*he.

I t or i s .Ot

U 40 Mft cONFDE tsin

INFANRO Y JAL.1HEADQUARTERS

BUWEOT C41 .DAmu Aftor MUt~o oporb COWTVAC3/J332)

MI $onter M~viaox'IV CorpsAdvisor'y TOOMn 96Apo tu Forco3 96W2

M~ Comu6Me ltta2V ftslaots Coeaw d# Vltnam CW

APO US 10,00 9(2h3 Fo k u

,-I COWAL* In ov, l)ionoo iAlth PAN ioV tvjPmbr3tis ropwt le submitt-.4 on tho Viot Cvng atniich ota notor coawvycowi1stio,, of 24a vobiclos carwyt.nU the L it flnttaillonp LU-i Inf,,,*tz'iRolIroent 7th Inantry Divis~ion to Chi Lnna Training Co~tnrs Ch=u DocFrovinao. The anbush ocurrd at aborat 0850 hours, i~ondiys 7 Z'obzuWz19G66# a1zi11jhway 4ii n tho eastorn portimc of CaL .11 4Uit#~t DinuhTon rvincop 7th Divicion Tactical Mroat

to ?UKWL5 "Whis cover lottor is my porsondl rwoo wAn uvaluas.tWo of tho salUn ovonte or tho aribush and surroundina circunatnwoswith a viow toward zb,.rxdnn, %ha~t hapranedl %ihyl ati of grotootkrq~t ~c* to pmoooution or tho jloint W~-)Vd4 offort,, uhnct loso= canbe ).ouvmd ae-oarned cad utat cmn be dono to ruduco to en a1booluteMr&=j~w tho, posoSbility of estailar inoidonto. I havo also soujmt todotomind it d 1cp3.inazy action kpjanst US advisory 1mrsaniol, isappoMM ato

30 W516,S I havo boon Sonior Advisor# 7th Infantry Divlicon vincoA urubt 3,9%,s Cbno day f olleuir tho ormbiwh# I rturt . to tho divis1en

aftar a mWntb' aboorcoo -ar,*oprtj thawros Is bvzod on tba inCrw-cation containod In tho attwhod d~cwnt2al o;,tWnstvo intorv~ouo ofa ,prcpriato US aiu~~ doxmrca5 Ttlow with th13 division ct~iaworand rmociLb of hlz atcXf~j aariral and eround inapecion or th3 uobsito (3 dqrn af tar the -.,.bz'h) wocon:.,,n-lcd by aXro .rlato Lj a(!.13 rs

~~S$.A~ IMp/* ~ ~ 4.CghFENA1

MAC V!J?4A12 Febraary 1966SU- s Cal Be Ambush After Action Report 0(=I 1W3 32

and the 7th Division Deputy f or COerations. Underlyiaz all this, ofO1orses, Is my porronal kno fa and experience as Divisiou SeniorAdvisor since0 Auiust, 330. 1 have pesnalsly Afreotods -organied,.supervised the ollation of this entire after aotion report.

1,o SUPIrflD DOC . . Detailed accounta, factual infwmatlonsadvisors' statemnts, end maps and sketches can be found in thesupporting documonts. They are organized as follous:

T A - ip and Sketheo co N aTab B - Faotual Ambush After Action Reports 14ACV Forut

Tab C - Chronology of Ambush and Related Events

Tab D- Narat4vo Account of Ambush and Related Events

Tab - Advisomt Statements

tab ? 7th DivisionA N and US G-3 o s for 7' FebrLary 1966

Tab 0 a Sumzry of 7th Division - Dinh Tuok Sector CamantdRelationships for Security of Highiy 4s July 196,.February 1966

5. X R A VENSD. Following are the salient events that actuallyhappened, as I can best determe.

a* Miesrroad Knowlodiye of 1/11 flo.. In oarly Jtanum, CO..VAI and his advIsor learnod o schoduled move to training center.Darin seoond week of Januua they learned the movomzt date of 7Febrway. 1ony members of the battalions their families, and personsoutside the battalion wobably had early knailed-e of the date anddestination of the schedulod move.

be Chanoe f41 di ory Team. Composition of tho 1/11advi&soy team WAs ehaed4-6- 6ebrui- Oaptain Roof, after a two dayoverlap, replaced Captain Gillette as Battalion Advisor. SFC Shriverreplaced WoSgt rr, vho had boen wounded and evacuated on 2 February.1st Lt Dratghns who has been with the battalion since October 19($,remained as assistant battalion advi'or. Captain Gillotte va: asnignedas Assistant 0-5 Advisor vith the additional duty of aooopany, thU

th Roonaissance Coaany on operations as an advisor. Captain Roottook over as battalion advisor on 6 February. Captain Root bas beenAssistant 0-5 Advisr n er and has aooompaniod the 7th ReconCompan on sevoral oporations.

lug I mr vtMI tIt9JijAI,1WJ/-

HAMV41IT-SA 12 Febirin7 19M6SU&~?,G&LB MoA~bsh Aftor Action Reoport OUGCV/01S/332)

ee - Division Gerat.2fl On 6 ?bbma7p 7th Division pkannod for7 Fe~m an qp~twa i. o,- !Uih DistriLcts DisXh Tuong Sector to theno~rth of ighwy h. Iba included doioet of, i diVisioa CL' to cAtih district town; omplp~vno am platoon of arood bellcopteral a USAF

wM L').9 and five achadalad zir strikes; and the singlo USA L19 allocated*The division field V? pened at Long 14zh at 070630 Fabruary. Tho firstbattalion croscqd itz LD at 0660 homre The Division Coo his operational

stnoand tho, topuity ;ai1l4 Advi.sr exd hia oprationl staff adyviswr a he A f G2 at Lon& Dinhe

4* Ar~ran~ot for Opvoy. Ca 5 FobruWr 7th 1)ivi_-ion inforrsdDiub ?iaONg r of71/ convoy inwo scheduleod 'naong, 4l~wc on 7Fobriary# d].rocod Sector to vour the routa from~ Vy Tho w3stn'd to !:yThm~ ferry ogcrove tho AX'ekon-,# ad etated that alvision '?CG woul~d provideL-19 for air cower. Ow 6, ?'ebmWu Dinh Taowg Sootor Lrs1pma~d Su-etrtabt * Iowt*at 4oavorl MOTOa 07 robrtiary froa',y Tho to Illy Thum ferryWAx Abetted 4etO1s to- assure S0Iari1t ithin cub-sectr areas befrwoO013Q eading at 18Wsi Oa 6 tabrutry c0 i/u and Advisor requested L19Oavy*g &AMWt4t FO as coauwn cover for convoy* ARWI &W US TOW" person-.rat soQut allocatIOG of twoe "1a' to cover both -7b Division O.'oration,and 1/i convoV cdhadul4 tor 7 eabiryo S1.tho~r ofi V' mid owe WAL-19 or tuo USA L419'a wuld bavo b-jn tcoceptableo* They were successfulIn gatt3.r only owe I-19# a US Army aircraft* Joint~ly the A31M~4J3 7I)Opersonnel dooided thazt dua to tha pm-Iity or the divicsioa ofratonalarea ad the convoy roizte# one L-1.9 aircraft coild visually rccomi~tcrthe convoyr route wan support both the division oporatipn and the convoycovor. 1/U was inst'ueted to be in the south vido f - hn ferry by070930 February.

s. IntolW'eanoop Prior to 7 ?ebmiary there lvas no indication of'1AUSUal, Vist GM CAUIva~s dlong ilichvy 4 that YdZ4 indi~ateoarSbpodin axmb or atak on IXi coavqy.

to 1!0 A m p f afternoon of 6 FebruWr 7th 4vicion Nawod W.1 astyr rv Long Mob myq from My Thi'mn f=rr to Tan MaipWais. Wnormtto was dicoainted that 1/11 woulA probably am to thetrainin conter by air*

go O. Ltio11 n. The V/14 arivoy uich domutaodTeA Hlop tow abo~tO WW Ffjbia3rj consisted of tuo'nty 2.1 ton trucks

ta owr Jeoees 3O amrbar or the battalionp so damodantas thre1A *dviors, ard paroonal and unit euLm wt3rJ 1oaded on the 2 4i vehioloo.Wrer of loadng frmn head to rear was. list# IHoaquarteors 24s PM 3d

O5w&aniioR

MACDVM -A 12 February 1966SUBECT: Cal Be Ambush After Action Report (MAGY11CS/J332)

he 'Cl. Rirjh 14In Ambush Sites Cai Be District. Atabout 070630 February, one 'F pLatoon of 20 men aovd south fr-m 14y Thauhpost to clear the enst sido of Ilighw 4. At about the same time one PFplatoon of 30 men moved north froa Cai Be RJ to clear the east side of Hith-my 1j|, By about 070 at a point roughly midway between the two startpoints, the RF platoon set up a "blocking position" along Highway 4. ThePF platoon, aftr.-xtng. physical contact vith the RF platoon position,returned to a *security position" to the south along Highway 4. Atapprcdmately 0820 both units ware attacked by the Viet Cong. The RFplatoon position. suffered 3 KIA and 5 IIA and withdrow across Highway 4and to the northwest until it was out of contact. It then went into aMofensivewpositioa" to the vest of ghwiay 4. The PF platoon suffered nocasualties and apparently withdrew to CaL Be RJ. Vietnamese reports, uhichI am unable to confirm, state that the RF platoon informed Cai Be Sub-sector headquarters of tb VO attackmd that Sub-sector then directedy- Thuan post nd a P? o post north of the mbsh area to halt tho IAl

convoy and warn it of the ambush. The fact ie'that the 1/11 -s notwarned of the TO attack on the RF and PF platoons nor was Dinh Tuong

Sehor or 7th D-ivsione ot-ueon about 0810 and 030 the USA L-19 aircraftith A V artillery FO made a visual recoanaissance of Highway 4 fr6m

My Tho to Ky Thmn ferry. Wither the pilot nor his observer reportedanytbing auspicious.

L Approaches the Ambush.' As the 1/11 convoy approachedthe amabsh sethe 24 vehUic w raveling at about 60-70 kms/hourand were about 100 raters apart. The battalion advisor estimates theentire column was about 2000-2500 meters long. The Ba CO w, in thetwelfth vehicle, the advisory team in the fourteenths An awinltiontruck was boeteen them. The battalion advisor had his radlo tuned tothe division operational frequency* No aircraft was overhoad. Therevas no indication of danger. The troops were mostly sitting on seatsalong the truck side and facim inward.

x A-

ADVT?-A " 12 Febru 1966SUBECT: C a e Mbush After Action Report (MACVRCS/J 3/32)

- J The hmush. At about 08O5 as th head of the convoy wasabout 300 meters -iort Of Cal. Be UtJ and the advisory jeep was about 1500meters behind the lead vehiloe, tho Viot Cong opened heavy automticweapons fire from both sides of the iaed and some mortar and 5Tmm recoil-less rMe fire. Most of the fie com from weat of, Higway u . The lead14 vehicles with the advisory Jeep at the end speeded up and dashedtowardai Be RJ Ile their occupants fied to both sides of the road.These 14 vehicles closed up fair y tight, stopped at Cal Be RJ, theiroccupants dismounted and deployed to defend themselves against heavy enemyfire they were still receiving frao both sides of the highway bat mostlyfrom a longer range than where the ambush was sprung opposite the advisoryvehicle.

Unknown to either the b CO or the advisor*, the vehicleimmediately behind the a4visor's jeep had stopped on the road near thesite of the initial fire and the rest of the column had closed up behindhim and halted along the road. The halted oolumn stretched about 100poters. hre he Viet Cong from positions in thiak# chest-high grass#rie, and veetation within as close as )5 meters of ti road delivered ahevy volume of automatic weapos fire - the halted vehicles and on theirpasengero who had either become casualties on the vehicles or had re-*rnwd fire, dismounted$ and sought protection beside the road. Sometroops apparently attempted to assault the Viet Cong. The rear part ofthe convV obviously was caught in the main ambush. Viet Cng. fire washeaviest here. The Viet Cong assaulted the soldiers of the 1/11, in-feted heavy casualties on them and captured largo amounts of equipirent.This fight was over in 1$ or 20 minutes at Ihe most, and the Viet Congbegan their withdraval. The largest VC foroe, which wasto the -vest ofthe highways withdraw to the este At about the same tire the ambush wassprung, several 81mm morta' rounds were fired into CaL Be district town,Inflicting light casualties, and several 60mm mortar rounds landed nearelements of the 2/6 armor troop located near Cal Be RJ.

A

EACV--mSA 12 February 1966$UBJ3CT s Cal, Be -Ambush After Action Report (!IACV1CS/J3/32)

k9. Assistance Potentially Available to /ll. Potentiallyavailable for reinforcement or assistance of the 1/11 were the follow-ing forces and weaponst two APO troops, two 103mu artillery tubes,a platoon of armed helicopters, and a flight of F-00's. 2/6 Amortroop was deployed around Cai Be RJ. Its mission was that of a reactionforce along Highway 4. 3/6 Armor troop was in Cal Lay district townabout 9 ken from the ambush. Its normal mission was that of reactionforce for use along Highway 4, but today it had been designated as asecond reserve for the division operation, to be only employed after em-ploy ont of the 1/6 Armor troop in the division operational area.Neither troop had been informed of the 1/11 convoy movement.

When lead lA1 elements arrived at Cai Be RJ# 2/6 was underenem fl, so temporarily without officers and advisors, who were eatingbreakfast in CWl Be; and was oriented toward attacking enaV troops andsuspected 60 m mortar positions almost due west of Cai Be RJ, ratherthan toward assisting the 2/-1 convoy of which 2/6 was virtually inaware.3/6 was =aware of the imbush situation until about 0900 when 00& 6thA:or alerted it for a possible move to the ambush area* The armed hel-ioopte platoon was on the ground at Binh Duo airstrip at Ily Tho, about37'k to the east. The F-100 flight was orbiting with its FAC over thedivision operational area. The USA L-19 with its ARVN artillery PO wasever the western part of the division o erational area. The artilleryplatoon at Cal Be was unawate of the X stuation but within supportingrange, V110 fighters were at Can Tho, 0 kne away,

1t Acions After Ambugh was Trggered.

(1) 4j.The 1/11 fought two separate fights. The partof 1. near Cal Be RJ, which included let Co, some of Headquarters Ca,the Pn CO$ and the advisory team# dismounted and fought to both east andvest of the highway. Its fight partilly overlapped the fight of the 2/6troop, which apparently thought it was fighting its on searate battle,The rear part of 2/31 cauht in the main ambush about 100 meters northof CA Be RJ, was fighting its separate battle for survival* That fightprobably ended by 0903 or 0910A when the VC had accomplished their missionand started to withdraw, About 0920 roughly 10 minttes after P/6 beganattacking northwestward along highway 4# lst Co began advanzing north a-long highway 4 and linked up with the rear element of 11 About 0933.1rom then until about 1700# the 1/11 worked at care and evacuation of

vounded and dead, salvaging equipment# policing the ambush site repairingvehicles, and preparing for return to Long Dinh*

(2) R. 2/6 troop promptly defended ibself when it cameunder attack at about 0850. Its officers and advisors rejoined about 0855.About O910 2/6 began an attack against suspected VO locations northwestof Cai Be RJ* This attack eventually was turned in a more northerly di-rection along the west side of Riehway 4. It thus assisted 1st Co, i/l1in its advance to link up with the rear eleaent of 1/1.o 2/6 continuedattacking the withdrawing VO untillabout 1500 whon it withdrew to Highway4. 2/6 advisor was unaware 1/11 had been ambushed until about 1100,

MAC V--$A 12 February 1966SU BsC, CaLBe Abush After Action Report (AGCV/XCS/J3/32)

(3) 3 . Shorafter 900 3/6 troop was alertdbCO. 6th Armor Squadron to be prepared to move froa Cai Lay to Cai BeBRY when the cO, 6th Armor arrived at 3/6 location, 3/6 moved towardsthe ambush site and at about 1015 attacked suspected VC locations westof Highway 4 and north of the ambush site. It attacked withdrawingVC until about 1500 when 3/6 withdrew to Highway 4.

(4) M.SF FA¢ and -LCO FJI ht. Division OF, which re-ceived first word of the ambush at 0856, immediately diverted USAF FACand his F-100 flight froi division operational area to ambush site, FACarrived over ambush about 0902. His F-100's had sufficient fuel to re-main an stationabout 30 minutes. FAC sized up the situation, felt thathe was able to distinguish friendly from enemy position, requested per-mission for 1/i CO to select air "argcts, requested permission to putin air strikes, had permission denied about 0925j, and diverted to divisionoperational area his F-IO0's and a flight of FNs which arrived about0922. The FAC was extremely frustrated and bitter that his air reservehad not boon used at the ambush site, • FAD put in air strikes to west ofHighway 4 froa about .1000-1300,

(5) A lea end USA IW9, USA L-19 aircraft with MNartllery 70 arrived over ambush site about 0859. This aircraft was pri-mary radio relay between 1/11 USAF FAC aircraft and the Command and Con-trol Helicopter carrying Division Comander and Deputy Senior Advisor.He also adjusted artillery fire. About 0918 two artillery tubes at CaiBe bekan firing to east of Highway 4, At 1000 hours 4 artillery tubeswhich had been moved from the division operational area arrived at Cai Layand began firing on suspected VC withdrawal routes east of Highway 4.

(6) Armed Melfopters. Ordered at 0901 to depart Binh Dueairstrip near My Tho and go to ambush site, amed platoon arrived at am-bush site about 0928 and commenced to operate west of Highway 4 againstt argets requested by 1/1 and the two armor troops and against targets ofopportunity* Assisted with evacuating casualties. Returned to divisionoperational area at l230.

Se?(7) NA VNAF FAG arrived over ambush site about 0920 andstarted putting in V-AF air strikes west of Highway 4 en withdrawal routesabout 094 ,

(0) 20. 1/11 and Advisr. Upon arrival Cai Be RJ Ba 00diwaoumted; reported his situation to division as he knew it; organisedhis defense; attempted unsuocessfully to contact his rear eleent; soughtto get the 26 troop to attack north along Highway 4j requested artilleryand air support; sent his let Company north to link up with the rearelement of i/111 after 2/6 began its attack to the northwest on the westaide of the highways met the division commander and DaA when they landednear him snout 0940; went to main anbush area and only then reolized howheavily the VC had attack his rear element; and then supervised evacuationspolicin&, reiair, and move back to Long Dinh. OTI

NACY4-1T-SA 12 February 1966SUBJECT: Cal. Be Ambush After Actioa Report (MACV/RS/J3/32)

1/I. Advisor reported to division OP the A/i situationas he knew it# first reportinrg at 0856. Ee requested : artillery andarmed helicopter support; provided targets to USA L-19, lhich acted asradio relay for him; assisted the battalion commander with his dutiesduri zg te fight.* advance to the main mbush site, evacuations andactivities prep Ae for move back to Long Dinh,

. / (9) Uth Rcgim-ntal Commander and Advisor. CO 11th* Regiment and his Advisor were uly engaged tvi the son operation.

The CO was informed of the ambush as soon as division knew of it, but hecould influence the action in no Wy. Nor could his advisor*

... (10) Division Comnder and Deputy Senior Advisor. At0856 at Is Bisd OP at L-ong- DinhiDvision Co wa Informed o e ambush.He diverted F-lOO's to the ambush area; directed the armed helicopterplatoon to go' the ambush area; ordered CO, 6th Armor to send assistance to

1/il; sent four artillery tubes from the division operational area tosapport the i/11. Then Division CO ith his Deputy for Operations# theDeputy Senior AdvMsor, and 03 Advisor boarded the C&O helicopter and de-parted for $e ambush area. 1.hile oloft and enroute to the ambush siteboth the Diion CO and DSA attempted to get situation report from 1/11and from Division CP in order to determine hov to use the available air,artillery4 and armed helicopter support. The C&C radio console functionedimproperly, and both Vietnamese and &mrican had great communicationsdifficulties from the C&C helicopter. About 025 the Division O0 and DSAship arrived over the ambush site# orbited and attempted to ascertainthe situation, landed about 094O, and proceeded to the main ambush site,While airborne Division CO, not knowing the ground situation and locationof friendly and eney troops# denied USAF FAG permission to use air supportin the $mediate ambush area and directed the artillery to fire cast ofHishwsy 4 and the ared helicoptors to operate wst of Highway 4. Afterlearning more about the situation, he authozized use of air vest of thehighmw along routes of vithdrawal. A VNAF air strike went in about 0945.Upon reaching the location of the main ambush and seeing the situationtherep, Division CO directed that evacuation begin by air ond road.

Deputy Senior Advisor and 0-3 Advisor assisted their counter-parts in the above activitiesj attempted to aaenertatn the situation throughuse of US communications; kept the Division O0 and Deputy for Operationsinformed of the status of US support and of the ground situation as reportedthrough US channels; recommended use of support; and worked closely 4idhtheir counterparts in attempting to remove soma of the thick fog of warfrom hat they knew was a critical situation. They, too# were handicappedW the faulty functioning of the console radios. The pilots Warrior 6,attempted to relay for theme

a.* Pursuit or Viet Gone. Limited pursuit of the Viet Cong wasconducted by the tuo armored troops who attacked perhaps as far as CO-600meters west of Highway 4 and principally by air, artillery, and arwmdhelicopters firepower.

INi

SiUB~'a CAj Be Ambush After Actc oio (iJ;czJ332

Ci.) /11 o~~a Po.sotnul3: of 343 so1'Wii in thie low.-* vu. 74 vere X Us,. 44 4t, £-1TA. Ezip.eL4 11'4-6.* 8 1110-., 7

148,0~~g 1 60= m*otarp 1 61 =~ fortzxj' 1 57 ti~c 16Vt 6 S.,8 B11'e 3t9-79 gCmwado launc~woos 1 30 c@4 rZ# 33 X{-1 r'ifos, 65 czirbine.

f2) Vn-i VO os". 33 K.1. Iofrx~ 1VP4. UUttioequtdpca captured. Two *oaZ'n4a capbr*4~d. I $AI, 1 X33 car)ilosptwo 5.kilo rnineo W~th dtetorati%; v~r found va~t of the Ztbush site*

*(3) &'ttM of ZiaA.Th bDit1-..1 id not So tq trainingcen~ter as, ahotiilo. ii, jik3 nc-,, raztp rant, rea.r~5tp train.. cn4 berAdo Into virtu3.y .a now bat~talion,

hl* 08Umts PM&A.-rW~ Q his intorivUi L-1 Uw~ 'Vv rir 'r takon nearW@o =mbush it So D iviviof 0-2 hau rmzstuctad the pr. bablo zettingup of thio abush in the f alloiang xarlnu. U1 ia V pri~onor o3.d.iod to bea zmeiba' of the 263 %. The cribu~sh pmblW had Ukmr plavw. fo al'bnatizal on4 pa robably diroated opcitca3J twara the 3.1, It 0-m-ndu~o by tho 263 Zn (-) oparatizi4 woutL d II4~hi 4 =. tw:o di strictoo=P=15o3# C4a tee and Col Iay, to ths 0 a*'% os* isha 4, The two dittrict

b@taeov. About K"0 fred, tthe 263 LA (-~) nd1 IXC-4 fra-A th-3 two dhb-trIct OaJ-mie vare invo2.ve' In the auf, .tii zttack anl sup~yaoirCntropiv. The 263 Zn- (-) zmowad into Vk4. &;.oh otto fr~i 3 ~~t111&vioy 4, aend.ing 3-4, F'oruary about 15 kIs z.-t ,'-,zt t t1ie x-:buh cite.

and 4 kobrw~v~o4e~vn ~g & Ar. s1 or. or' 7 Febr'uarys theVC amboish tr~oops droppezi their jacks vihl huivy vqui*-ent in the fon.,ard&GaetIb3J &NO., moved forwar4 to ertoblir-h and co.,d~ct the r.busthp utp1.frAl to ratwn to p~ickc up eqij~ant. The diLtrict co.,Xade rnovod fromthe o#,. t t.ho amibush aito cnd *~A".'1wod a blva'±nc, ;*ztioxa eO-t of

Uzihwsy 4. 263 (-.) vithirow to t~e o rthuast and. t.1% ditrit at:nisresto the est.

6o C%"HNUSP-Is j GW . UzID~ :1.4 N;It-%T 1t * hi foUovinjvp~cifia coao1..vions az'o diate. to ;QiWflL deui-V: 1J* in 5 S &buv)Gc4.nts "a wL*r-4z lien ocasidorcki appoprito4. Canorul 1z~n willbe Uitt-: In the fo11oirA parar..phe

1/Ji zove avia.co~1 curly to 3p1un rvxrt, -Ad cxfuta *zn wbush~d~o 6-~!S3. to Wit' th~3 1jUlh zv

bo~rouro 2/113.o xcvi g to a. traSxiing crntar 1br svra. vockscxa~~~oy v.'.D ) "I.in

1.,ival than c rx;~.na~tn i ; lo ~ ' " .iO

-,:' i' JMIACY--SA 12 Februar7 1966.SOBJCT Cal Be Ambush After Aetion eorb (HACvAC/J3/32)

in Dinh Tuong Province than outside the 7th ;TTA This feeling probablycontributed to on unconscious relaxation of gigitence,

o Chanp of the composition of the 2/U advliory team at thisti" wa logical and had little or no adverse effect on the performance ofthe advisory team and the battalion during this incident.

m -Sint..ce Captain Gillette will depart Vietnam at thetime the 3/1 was schaduled to complete its trainingit vas desirable toassign a new advisor having time remaining for post-trainina service idththe battalion, Captdn Roof'i operational experience as advisor t6 the7th Reconnaissance Ccspamy had acquainted him with the type warfare thatprevails bore* Lieutenant Draughn s previous four month's servico wdthIX provided advisor continuity.

d, Command arrangements for security of Highway 4 are faultyand division of responsibility between division and r*ctor uaclear*

. nt. While division was responsible for thel/Il convoymovement, sector was responsible for securing-the route* Unity of con andIs absent and there is no single point of responsibility for coordination/everything affcting either a security mission or a convoy movement or thetwo together,

e. Staff planning and supervision of atiangements for the convoywere faulty.

_ggpt; " The convoy should have included armored vehicles andhad L49 eolu cover, Reaction units along the route were not notified the

onvoy wau comings 6th Armors 2/6, 3/6, Inadequate comprehensive conaunicatoIcs system exists for r.apid reporting and exchage of informaticn of all unitsconcerned with security and convoy movement,

ft Execution of the route security mission was faulty.

C on Although tho RF-PF platoons made contact with theTiethCong in 'ie ambush area, 1/i was not halted and warned*

g. The Viet Cong ambush was masterfully executed.

ar so . With a force of 600-700 Viet Cong covering such a

large area so near Iighwy 4# one iouhd think that at least one civilianwould warn OV forces of the threat,

h" Division units and US advisory personnel need more effecti' e

\LA

__

MW.WT C& Vo mushAftr AtimReort(MAV/'c o bush

xorerapd aslamic to2/Uafter the ambmn~h was trigrereds partic41arlyF-100 &Wu F-4 4.1ights end probably artillery at Cal Be&

;ommiient. Tb ii3c oana ad afar less clear picture

of~~~~ ~ ~ ~ the emn C.iin hnddto?.! rteUAL19pltadAIartllry O*ftdwhle n he 1A"'hll-Oper, he ivisionr beCo~n aso

Ere.. ri In&Ivngthe co.ndor on th-: iround inacritical atuatiog,in 'hi c~s IA .target a$p, roval auitmrity fr aat artiller'y,

jsLgaze=An of five ARI~V battalions in the 4ivision operattioniIn Lng Ah vitualy eimisited the divisionle capability to pursue quicklytb~ wthdavur- VetCongo

_ I

CONFIDENTIAL 1NA&CV424-A 2. Februazy 1966SUWM(~: Cad Be Ambush After Action Report (iMACV/B=S/J3/32)

7. OGIERAL COCLUSIW I have reached the following overall con-clusions concerning the anbush and related matter*

. a. Villes it i iapoasible to eliminate completely all possi-bility of an ambush, the 7th Division and its US advisory deta6cbent shouldhave taken several steps which would have greatly reduced the likelihoodof ambush of the 1/1 convoys These steps ie principally in the realmof more effective coamnd arrangments for security of Highw 4 and ofImproving staff planning and supervision. !uch of this ambush incident wascharacterized by absence of the high standards of military professionalismof which the 7th Division and its Advisory Detachmert are capable*

b. The central Iroblem to be solved is the unsatisfactory commandarrangement and unclear assignment of responsibility relating to securityof Highway 4 in Dinh Tuong Provinces Until unity, of command responsibilityxists for security of Highiay 4, there is little hope for appreciably

increasing security along that route* (See Tab G for several commandarrangements for Highway I that have been tried since July 1965 and foundwanting*.

v;c hile reaction of some potential reinf orements to ambushof and uncertain, no real basis exists for chaaoi. Vietnamesedecision-smakers or their American advisors with grossly wrong decisionsor incompetence. One might disagree with some of the decisions made; butat the same time, he must appreciate the circumstances under which theywer made, the limited and often confusing information available at thetime, and the'reasoning on %hich they were based.

do Current RYNAF and MIA'V anti-ambush doctrine and procedures,

if faithfullV and intelligently adhered to$ are sound and adequate.

so Disciplinary action against any US advisor is inappropriate,

8& REC.MEDATIONSe I recommend thats

a. Units due to attend training centers be scheduled for move-ment at the lateut time possible and moved preferably by air but habitu-ally by a different plan from that first announced.

be This ambush and its inherent lessons be suari sed andwidely distributed among RVHAF and AGCV forces.

a* No disciplinary action be initiated against any US advisor.

CONFIDENTIAL

-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; v",'A". i , . , - !

MAY4T4'USA 12 Februar 19a6Cal BO Ambush Arte Action Report (MY/110/3/32)

9. LESSCM LEARneD. No now lessons word learned. Olds familiarlessons wore ro-leanned and reaffirmed* That is tho tragetr and profes-sional shame of the entire incident.

.10. PLANS TO PEVNf SIKILAR INCIDM S IN THS FUT.HE. To seek toprevent future ambushes and similar enemy attaoks, I intend to work ontwo levels:

* a. I viil work with ry counterpart, 7th Division Commanders tofind more effective solutions to the problems mentioned above$ particu-larly the basic problem of more effective command arrangemonts for secur-Lt of Highay h.

b, I will increase the sensitivity to threat of ambush, awarenessof the need for constant security ard professional competenoe of mmbers 3of the 7th Division Advisory %tachmsnt to prevent or deal with ambusheso

Coo e',, InfantrySenior Advisor

* 4