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Controlling DoD Organization: AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development[Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYOACSFOR D/A ltr dtd 13 Sep 1973; OACSFORD/A ltr dtd 13 Sep 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

AD 343693

DEFENSE DOCUMENTATION CENTERFOR

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATIONCAMERON STATION, ALEXANDRIA. VIRGINIA

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICZ: When govermnt or other drswings, speci-fications or other data are used for any purposeother than in connection vith a definitely relatedgvermnt procurement operationj the U. S.Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor anyobligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Govern-ment my have formuated, furnished, or in any waysupplied the sad drawings, specifications, or otherdata Is not to be regarded by implication or other-wise as in any manner licensing the holder or anyother person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell anypatented invention that my in any wvay be relatedthereto.

NOTICE:

THIS DOCUIN CONTAINS INFORMATION

AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF

THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-

ING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,

U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 and 794. THE

TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF

ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN

UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED

BY LAW.

CONFIDENTIALs 2/0 (

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DOC

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALU. S. AMff CCNCEPT TEAM IN VIETNAMAPO , San Francisco, California

ACTIV-AN 5 April 1963

SUBJECT Monthly Test Report Namber 2 - Eplo m nt of cV-a Aircraft inCounter-insurgency Operations, 1 throuh 31 March 1963 (U).

TO See Annex P.

1. (C) Genrlt.a. Purpose of the test.

(1) To evalate, through field test in an active theater# theperformane and effeotiwness of the tactical CV-20 (Caribou) compazy and itsomponet elements in oontmr-insursoey operations, with Pr~mrY m aison sustained support of the Special Warfare effort# forwmrd amea helicopterrefuelinj, and operational support of AM (ArmF of the .epublic of Vietnam)combat elemants.

(2) To determine modifications in organisations doctrine tactics,

procedures, techniques, and equipment of the compa.

b. Teat concept.

(1) Data responsive to test objectives are derived flom obser&a-tion of combat support operations of the let Aviation COMpuV (let AVCO)* Theompan is assigned to the USASGV (US Anr Support Group, Vietnl); it isunder the operational control of COMUSMACV (C0onaner, US M .tary AssistanceComwnd, Vietnum).

(2) Test data are collected during operational mNissons. Thetest unit is not required to enga4e in activities whose sol0 or PriftrYpurpose is production of test data.

c. Test progres.

(1) Evaluation of the CV-20 capability in a medical evacuationrole has been added as a test objective (see Tab ).

(2) It has been determined that the present Ground Based AirDeliver System (Snatch and Go') fails to met flight safety requirsmeots.Pending resolution of these difficulties by the US Ay Nateriel Comandevaluation of this capability as pert of the test effort will be Suspended(am Tab G).

(3) The test is considered to be 40 per ent complete.

2. (C) Dearintion of ti, test unit.

a . Mission.

The mission of the Caribou compa is to provide air transportto esxpdite tactical operations and logistical support In the combat sone;taks include tactical troop lift, forward area rquppIY, transprtati*n Ofommiders and staffs, and msdical evacuation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALACTIV-AMSU&ETt )bnthly Test Report Namber 2 - Eaplopsnt of CV%3 Aircraft in

Counter-Insurgency Operationas, 1 through 31 Narch 1963 (U).

b. Deploysmt of lt AVCO.

USNACV opera-Allocation Aircraft Mlsions re- tional control

2 to I Corps Da Son Corps TOC J3, USACV

2 to II Corps 1 at Corp avia- J3, USNACYP2*iku tion advisor

1 at MW Tras- J3, USNACYNa Traz portation

Section

2 to lnCorps ang Tau Corps avia- J3, USACTtion advisor

2 to IV Corps Yan Tau Corps flight J3, USMtCToperationssection

4 to SL MS (*) VWg Tau Combat Cargo J1, USNACTGroup, 2d AirDivision

() Operations of the S US (South East Asia Airlift System).

c. Staistical 4r1iaa.

Southeast Asia

Passengers 892 9334 54055

Cargo (tons) 612 669 4759

Sorties 1195 1790 3285 ()

Flight hours:

Service 932 1036 8337

Training 40 23 225

Total 972 1059 8562

Aircraft avaiL- 10.9 of 16 11.6 of 16ability (69%) (72.5%)

(*) Figures available only for Februar and March.

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

qw

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AMSUNECT: Monthly Test Report Number 2 - Employment of CV-2B Aircraft in

Counte r-Insurgency Operations, 1 through 31 March 1963 (U).

d. Operational summary by Corps and SEAAS.uit

CCorps Risr xx III IV totl -9,Q

Passengers:

Number 927 1255 2600 3068 858 1168 308 9334

Tons (*) 83.4 132.8 234.7 276.1 707.2 105.1 27.7 8I,0

Cargo (tons) 99.7 96.7 159.4 112.7 460.5 188.3 12.2 669

Sorties 170 259 438 542 09 317 64 1790

Weight persortie (tons) 1.08 .81 .90 .7 - .9 - -

Ton-ilesper sortie 127 57.7 102.7 42.8 - 92.7 - -

(*) Based on passenger vei7-ht of 180 pounds

3. (C) Content and ,ozuat of rewrt.

a. Content.

Monthly Test Report Namber 1 gives background information onthe lot AVCO and on ccrisnd relationships in the RVI which will not be repeatedhere. Monthly reports are intended to indicate progress and to provide foran orderly collection of data to be included in the final test report. AUmutbly reports should be consulted for full background of test activitiesto date.

b. Format.

Tabs A through X cover the 13 test objectives. Tabs X through0 give background information and data in support of certain findings.Distribution of the report is shown at Tab P.

4. (U) References.

a. DA letter, AOA-P(K) 381 (31 Oct 62) DCSOPS, subject: "Azn'Troop Test Program in Vietnam (U)',6 November 1962, as amended.

b. ACTIV letter, subject, "Tet Plan for the Tactical TransportFIAT AC-i (Caribou) Company,* 2 ibvember 1962.

c. CINCPAC mesage, M 0706062 Jan 63, subject: "Test Plan forthe Tactical Transport N/Ut CV-2B (Caribou)*.

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTI V-AMSUBJWT: Nionthly Test 11mport Nomber 2 - Empopoent of CY-U Aircraft in

Counter-Inostawn Opratioas, 1 through 31 Ymarh 1963 (U).

d. USADC mssage, 8DW4O 8-238 M 3155Z Xarch 1963, subject:"CV-2B Xsdical Evacution*.

Rstoan nxt pap Mao

CONFIDENTIAL

"h "CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AHSUDJECT: Monthly Test aport Number 2 - Employment of CV-2M Aircraft in

Counter-InsurgenCy Operations, 1 through 31 March 1963 (U).

LIST OF INCWSURES

1. (Tab A) ANNEX A - Objective 1 (Support of the Special Warfare effort).

2. (Tab B) ANNEX R - Objective 2 (Short Field operations).

3. (Tab C) ANNEX C - Objective 3 (Detached platoon operations).

4. (Tab D) A?'NEX D - Objective 4 (Control of airspace).

5. (Tab 3) ANNEXZ - Objective 5 (Command relationships).

6. (Tab F) A1?1ZX F - Objective 6 (Navigational equipment).

7. (Tab G) ALVEX G - Objective 7 (Cargo delivery by "Snatch-wdGo").

S. (Tab H) AMNEX H - Objective 8 (Support of airborne operations).

9. (Tab I) ANNEX I - Objective 9 (Helicopter refueling).

10. (Tab J) ANNEX J - Objective 10 (Weather-avoidance radar).

11. (Tab K) ANNFX K - Objective 11 (Airborne command pot).

12. (Tab L) AN?,EX L - Objective 12 (Logistical support requirements).

13. (Tab M) ANVEX M - Objective 23 (Medical evacuation).

14. (Tab N) AINEX N - letters from U. S. Senior Advisors, II & III Corps.

15. (Tab O) AVEX 0 - Ground fire damge to aircraft.

16. (Tab P) ANEX P - Distribution.

-I -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALACTIY-AI(Monthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

AMIK A - Objective 1 (Support of the Special Warfare effort)

1. (C) Obociv.

To determine the capability of the CV-= Caribou Company to air dropand support Special Warfare Terms requiring flights during daylight and dark-nae.

2. (C) Disuin.

a. Miseion request channels for CV-0 support of Special Forcesremain as outlined In the First Monthly Caribou report. I Corp. Special Formeteas continue to receive all their CV-0 support from the direct support Cari-boss eleimant at Da~mng, whaile 11 11, and IT Corps team are supportbed. by Cari-bou commtted to SROA (Southeast Asia Airlift System). In accordance withUSNACT policy, air transport Is provided through the S&WM to Special Forelogistical operations center (LOC) for the daily transport of 20 tows at cargoto units located In the 11, 111, and IT Corpe areas. CY-M aircraft operatingIn support of the MWAA nornally transport loads destined for the =§Ur air-stripe serving Special Forces field units. Because at the long distance Invol-ved for the majority of SNlAS missions, the aircraft must be operated at ornear a avima fuel load, this dictates a reduced payload. Several sortieay he Included In a single mission when cargo Is manifested for mren than a

destination; In the majority of cases, the aircraft Is empty for the returntrips to Saigon. While the C-0 is capable of long haul missions, its use forthis purpoe fails to esploit the short-haul, direct-support, tatcdl operationscapability for which the aircraft was designed. TAB A-1 illustrates the decreaseIn payload with Incea sed distaoce.

b. The Special Forces L40C requirement for air transport of cargo issatisfied as long as the EMAS moves a prgamd 20 tons par der. Unts In VthCorps areas, where requirommnto for suplies are based onnmoridiate need otcritical ite rather than on total toinge moved in one da, are net providedtimely ser vic. The II Corps Deputy Senior Advisor has impreesA dissatis-fiction with support provided by the SIAS because of the aeessive Uag timsoaJwasly experienced In responsto nI corpst and Special Fores'1 rwo s

(Sec Tab 13-1). Norml user request channels are fromt SF field dotehntothrough the B teem to Special Forces LOC which relays them to the iSLU. Thedelays Imposed by these channels, exacerbated by the poor radio earinotionswith the field detacmets, have resulted In em average of 7-20 doys, delaybetween the mission request and its aooqalielment.

a. Because of commtento to MWi end AMD approximtely fifty parcent of the total requests for C-a support are turned domes by the nI CorpAviation Officer (See Tab 13-1). 11 Corp. AW Aviation records dm that approim-innately five per cent at the total SF terags In n Corp Is tmansoesed bydirect support CV-S. To transport critical item on shor netles e.g., wmaos,arition, and deadliaed vehicle parts the Special Forces Teen at PUaik nroally requests assistance through the U Corps Aviation Officer for Atop' Aviationresources in direct support of Corps.

d. The Senior Advisor to II Corps, has requested two additional directsupport C-a's to rectify the shortage of Caribous to meet his requiremnt*.(Tab X-2).

a. Direct C-a support of Special Forces Teams ontimes to be mostdisornable In I Corps. 29.1% of total C-a tonnage transported In I Corp asfor Special Forces. 67.60 at this was air dropped. Tonnage transported thismonth sohms a deareace of 64% over last monuth. This decrease resulted from em

TAB A TAB A

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALACTIV-AM

Monthly Test Report Number 2 -- Caribou

ANNEX A - Objective 1 (continued)

exchange of SF B teams in DaNang in the middle of March; the new team initiallyrequired only a ml aount of cargo by CV-2B. (Se. Tab A-2)

f. Much of the Special Forces air-transportod cargo is bulky and light.This includes building materials (thatch and baboo matting)p clothing, blankets,sand bags, and rations (Tab A-3). This type of cargo acounted for apprOXmtely80 of Special Forces sorties flown by CV-3 In I Corps. CV-3 transport underthe SFA Airlift System has included a quantity of like materials. Data on thespecific percentage is not available. Dimensions of certain types of this cargo(e.g., construction materials and large baskets for live rations) preclude useof smaller Arm aircraft norally are economically suited for low tmpages.

g. The let AVCO conducted a Special Forces paradrop mission an 5 Marchin which five members of Special Forces Team and 200 pouds of cargo were droppedan Ha Cam drop sons (near D&Kang) as a demonstration for ARYK troops (Tab A-4).The same team were air dropped by CV-3 aircraft at night over a lighted eospot "T" at Hca Com. The capability of the Caribon to drop personnel has not beenexploited in any tactical operations in the RVN.

3. (C) Wfm

a. The short field and load carrying capabilities of the CV-2B air-craft could be better exploited if used on short rather then long haul resupplymissions.

b. II Corps Special Forces units have requested CV-2 support becausethe SEA Airlift System reaction time is not sufficiently responsive to theirneeds.

c. II Corps has requested two additional CV-B aircraft to supportCorps Area Logistical Comnd (CALC) and Special Forces requirements in its

d. The CV-29 Caribou configuration is suitable for transportingbulky lightweight SF cargo such as construction materials which utilise no-ly all the cubic capacity of the cabin. These cargos, which are typical of SFlogistical requirements in the RUN, indicate that cargo weight alone is nota valid criterior by which to determine efficient aircraft utilisation.

Pap 2 Pap 2TAD A TAB A

S"1 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTry-AKMonthly Test Report Number 2 -- Caribou

(Normal cruise - 2000 rpa, 32.50 manifold pressure, 5000 feet altitude)

9'70 (Max diet full fuel)

9OQ-

700.-------------

PAOW" Pa~m

Aeft : 20,200 ls Neximm prose wt: 28,500 - 21,W04Crew (4 Z 200b). 600 Available for acft fuel &Aam'd *rev seats(2): 254 per lead - 6,696

4Self-sealing fueltanks: 280oil: & 7Q

21,SD4 Me

qNote: Addition of self sealing fuel tanks redues CV-2B fuel capacity by 660 Ibe(110 gala) and endurance by appr me hour.

NM0E: lat Avn Co uses j max pay load (Approx 3000 Ib.) a an economical load.tniw. This fixes the economical operating distance In the 0-710 M.N.area. Radius of action is reduced to the 0-305 N.M. area (RA - )

TAB A-I TAB A-1

CONFENtAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. OV..3 qtpp my, to Speotal r...

(a) By a atheat Asi Airlift System (11, M & IV CoP areas W4)

(1) Passengers - lout8

(2) Cargo (Ton) 188.3

(3) Sorties 317

(b) Direst Sapport to SPeelal FPOrae In I corps On2. (hzolmive of 1SAM)

(M Passagws - 33%

(2) cargo (tans) Airlwasdd 94

AirdropWs 19.6

?ttl 29.0

(3) Sortles - 49

U. Total Speolal VPrees SOPPOrt by CT-aU (ParsgreA A & 3 above)

(1) Pmtss - LNO

(2) cargo (Toe)- 217.3

(3) Sortles -366

TO A-2 TAB A-2

CONFIDENTIAL

C f air drov

-~a A-3

I

-- Jr -w

al Thrc1~,3

~~:-:' ~ I - -" -

0 w CONFIDENTIAL

Vg,=Wr To"t aepot *mmw 2 - Cawiba

3 - Objective 2 (Shut field OPOU'atma)1. (C) Obetie

TO test the sepability of the CV-= Caribou cop to oPerAte frafrtiois sad leaatjame Idth ired 201001 =1S1Srow" SIM1405 Od apOrh5ODA d W und rSI aj tbg weth r O tidfs dW Md Wilt.

2. (0) UMmML.

a. MW a-me esompied by AMV testiel vots Game, senly be sap-plied byr sufase taausportation beosuse of Iasri -- 8,I"se.. As a result, the

M.N ha pissed ~ueis am sirtlold eametruothem mod am Impro of oIr-strips clawe to tatll units. Mhving the past tWo mokA dhe M slate.ditameairstrips hae boom aperatiamulp alU of Wdeh we used by the ]A AWO.

b. Mhe MWC Dmtary direcory of airstrips (Olted In Owibaw APepstUmer 1.) Is undge revision to laslaft IM aifed ka hale reeead3Y bos e00strusted or IMProved Utaa7 MA GIe R unite ond the Civil Aieim Assst="me~acm* - 1alted rtates Opweaams sla to 10amm (c*now). Lbeite later-mmica to ElM! on, Airfelds they use or flor Adak thewe repMoonble. 2heMACV ditosay lists .11 Infawtion, perties to tUy at airf~elds in the

vyU ieept thet WMoh peitalms to aldflsld doluinL4 TAMe Riiooplity sb-pw saol conditimns in the RU mm dssim looag Iantieis ptiuluIrIqiertait. WtmAt do"i ed daa so dsteudains on be noe of 'diet Sir-craft (br tMp sad weight) amn we avala airflelds soa seatisms basslodthst undue aIrfield deterioeatim.

a. Zoeiasm oamoemfiAn the airfields used by lit £10 Is ohms inTab 5-1. INS list omasim asda thes airfields sed a a posam baessThy awe port of the IVOW list ot l2S arfieldsI ishe MU(sited In Anm 3,February Carlbi Ispert0, 2= of v4eh h e used by the Cl-Il.

do CAatrilhssrfilW dmMa ftr 'use at 13 evl Maela.Telatest p*U4ea 1 Jm63i1e itehd - lab 3-2 It wids e a -

ea ofth Aw? uivil airfields und e go XW emel MApu't Ps, to Imelmdospooifie informoiam as airfild doolm load latatiam. Sam WY hos notas ye ifeluds airfiel *Nip lead ma ameit azeftery wi th s vlbade far esoprlsom beome diffrmt atwoeaft (**so* a 1uiptsand tpe air-oraft) Is the 0"d p*hli1" 1W OAM.U on the .41 Atufh" (47). gainthe CA.UUI eriteia, the Cl-U at woe lea (lA. tons) is nd*Ma the do-

sipIletateseof 36 (775) ot the 4141 airfields In the NALSMMPis, SOt vedeee 3.40d0 he Cl6S mnes 4964 Ilatuati teor (Co ethe airfieldS. voic e si e iteriap the 0-M2 at aoe led (1 tons),a*"*s desp ittos for S (2w5 at the airfield.

a. Airstrip aemetuwetias VM62mm In the M wee ieasese In theAnW Testloal Naility Rhplresuite Dowd bhpei (sem 10 3). 8.61 Is thecum Peninsula Mi te Wn damg Dal& (d9sled. s I s th ie so.mat TUb "A) have an valme less than 4 ad sw osiue mpmastl tar oem-.strustim methab 0"tlmed In aM 4100*10 Ininia elWk ste a"for Aw Toemper 21aiag "Prn *%ashle tm I d $401"a aornyWwiet"et emtstiasd time is in emm at 60 v.6. b.4AMte-11"e wo comtrus-tim tim Is tripled for 9-W) tMp faslitles. nloaf14M "5 , am..of the SOesop, a of 0 -sFA Ied I osewod Pusiest Afmmp (0SW diemseeseol problm penler to Nhe cs no ?MamuAM iwtl uh Doi"e

TM a ToRI

CONFIDENTIAL

,T4 CONFIDENTIALMonthly Test Report '4wier 2 - Caribou

AVWN!Z B - Objective 2 (continued)

have a CBR of lest t~an 1, in fact as low as 0.25. These problems precludesfor the mment, economical designs for f eds to aoommdate medium or heavycargo aircraft, and place at a premiu a light transport aircraft sutable forlow capacity runways. I pirical data do onstrate the capability of the CV-ato use the fifteen strip f r which it has mission requiremnts in the Ca Nu-Mekong Delta area without causing notic ble deterioration. The CAAG-USM4theoretical design data lists mazdssm lo dings for eleven of these stripsanl of which are grea er, under dry con itions, than the saximm groe load ofthe CV-2B.

f. Use of unimproved runways and approaches in the RVM involveseripheral airstrip security. Fifteen anding areas are now listed as "hot"ie., CV-2B's have reei ad ground fir near these areas) by the let AVCO.hose include; A LrAu, A., Long, Bato, Can Tho, Cement Plant, Gia mu, Haihan, Hiep Hoa, Hang Buz, lateau G0. Sa gon, Tabat, Tay Ninh, Th Dau Not,

and Trung Lap. During the wa h of Ware , five CV-23' a were hit by small armsground fire at five differ t geoaphical locations - Ga Vuc, Cantho, Tabat,Trung Lap, and at one unkn wn ocation (see Tab 0). Those incidenL remultedin the first injuries to people flyirg in the Caribou. A passenger was fatallywounded near Car Tho on 10 March, and a at VCO crew chief received leg woundsduring take-off from Trung Lap airstrip on 14 March. It is I Corps policy forth transportation movement control of:icer to request VILg fighter escort fora 1 flights into the Corps ' list of "hat' areas. Similar policies have notbeen established in t other orpe, ard CV-2' a generally perform their mis-aions unescorted, Pe-csn &amor prate ion now consi ts of armored vests andgroin protectors (wor y all CT-2B crew fre the beginning of lst AVC0 opera-ims in the VN), idhile there is presently no protective armor installed In

the CV-2Bs , arvor k3ots fcr aircrew protction are being fabricated and will beInstalled in the aircraft in the near future.

3. (C) ?Udms.

a. lat AVCO Caribcue have c aoed operations at sixteen additionalairstrips during th- past two months.

b. The gross we2Nt of the CV-2B is within th design limitation of36 (77%) of the 4? airstrips for which maxdmt loadings are listed by theGAAG-USCK.

c. Imprcvement of certain air-trips, particularly in the Kekn g Deltaand Ca Kau Peninsula area to accommodae medium and heavy transport aircraft(25-35 ton gross load) is imractical under present conditions.

d. The ;AAO-US M provides rumay strength f gures for eleven of thefifteen airstrips used regularly by C-Us in the Cafau4-Wkcng Delta area.All of the elev-r art adequev. for the CV-29 at mama gross lead.

a. F:-vI CV-D'4 S were damaged by ground fire In Narch copared to theprevious mo.thly avwrage of 167.

f. The injury of a crew chief and the death of a paisenger attest tothe increasing a curacy of nourgent's anti-aircraft fire and point up the needfor installing protective aruor in the CV-0.

Page 2 Page 2TAB B TAB B

CONFIDENTIAL

a . CONFIDENTIAL

Neatbr ?est Report imber 2 - Caribou

ANE! B - ObJective 2 (centimaed)

NAVIOATIC UATom* ,_, JJAm-- D S UAC

A1300' X 335' LateriteAn Ke 3674 X 30 Clar& SdAn Lac 4700' X 270' Grass & GravelAn Long 3700' X 310' LateriteAsbau 3350' X 55' PSP & LateriteBe Aeu 2500' X 50' LateriteBa Den 1300' X 155' Sodao Lee (DMO) 2624' X 120' Laterite & Sod

Ban b He t (City) 4590' 1 130 Laterit & ClaYD e thoi t YWe(C) Tee Yes 3937' X 98' AsphaltSato 1420' X 315' lart & LateriteBtie 31,135' I 340' hmeamDiem Re YN() Yes yes 500'X 70' Lateite & SodCa h 1650' X 70' Natrl gadedCeaSe 3773' X 100' natural radedCM4l (Dalat) 3020' 1 9%1 Iboaescan Ybo 3350' X 100' AsphaltCeo iamb 1300' X 43' Gravelcar Go 2560' X 130' Natural adedheo 4e4 25' X 96' Clay & Sodinmt Pl2nt 1600' X 300' Laterite

Coeiw19' I I30' Roled mercLa 1 3500' X 100' Latueite/Sdsmismap 251 X 661 Coaet Ninth

0, X320' I1' Laterite & SodD To 3750'1 X 0' LateriteValst yeaff C) yo Yee 4855' I1 Aspbalta an Yee(C) Yeu You 7672' X 199' Asphalt

DeiS a 3560' X 95' lateritDeng Zel 1700, X 130' nwtDwarng hung yes 3260' X 9e' AsphaltDoe 1100' 1 50' Clow SodOia Too 2700' X 01' Latnitea Tan 100, X 96' Laterite

HIep o" 20001 X 70' GravelQMr Lai. 4500' I 50' Mrevel Mna

Plantationhe ("a Nai) Y"(C) yes 5200'1 " ' AsphaltNe (Citadel) 150' 1 55' Packed Br"Km Doe 4300' x 110' Crashed RookIe Sas 1509' Ig 30, P

leate yes 3,361 I 1351 Lateit. & GrassLad e 460' 180' So Sandaoog Km. 1900' I 100' PS?11 Ties 2300' X 170' latAiteRon ona 1600' I 330' MtLee As Yes 3700' X 65' Oil" lateiteLen g ea 30' X 330' Laterite & Ons

411litanY TOMs - NCivilAm Ter - C

A-1 CONFIDENTIAL To 0.1

CONFIDENTIALACT7V-AN.4onthly Tet Report Miber 2 -. CaribouANXKX B - Objective 2 (cont nued)

MAVIGATitN IUWAY

A,1wT jM - ~ N NA MC

Long Toan 345' X 9' Treated OravelL0ng Xne 3W ' y 9d, AsphaltNoc Hoa 350, X 120, La, ortoNgok Tavak 3180' 120 PMha Trw -P't,) Ye. Yen 6028' 1, 161 A phc I*

n Cot (Gia hia) 4265' X 90' -.lled Laterite"inh-O 1378' X I - rite

Phan Rang 3650' X 90 .P.terlto & SodPhan Tmiet Yes 2300s X 65' Oiled LatritePhouc Ilh 2300' X 15, Naturil gradedPhouc 2D40' X 9 LateritePlateau 0 2800 X 50' Later.).teleiku (isv) Ye.(K) Yea 6000' x 13-, PsPleik (Old) Yes(K, Yoo 5000' X 15 TSPan 350I0' 1 95 L~terite

Qang Tri 1150' I U. tooluIi ohon Ya,(M) Yes 3937' X 9P' P

Bach Ola 3000' X 15C AsphaltSa3igo Yes(C) Ye Yeb 9960' I 150 'oncreteSoo Trang Ye.(K: Yo. 3284' X 98 A,phsal.Song Be (ad Brn) 390' X 15C L&Lerite/Sod3ong Mao 2490' X 87' La, eri,.e/Sodrabat 1550' X 98' .'a-thTan Hiep (Nl Tho) 2000' X i06' ,a.eriteray Riab 1700' X 1' R, -ed BarthIPM Ky 1500' X 94' cdThu au Hot 2952' X 20' -true Trang 2385' 153' Na*'ural gradedThe VI 300' X 147' Nat'ral gradedTrung Lap 1100' X 98' Sod\&- Hoa (North) I " X 65' SId

A Has (South) 3631' X 1311 Aphalt,/GavelViii Long 3300' X 97' Treated Gravel &

en6*:ite

Vi Than 1200' X 1-001 SocVung Tau eos(M) Yes Yes 3900' X 130' PT'PBadop 1650' ; 65' Brth & SodDI iUnh 1640' X 60' Laterite & SodDan Tieg 4700' X 150' Sodisp Khan 1.100' X 1*:u' Later.te

Lao Bao 1100' X 5,' Cravel & LateriteTra Uy 1641' X 501 Mat ual :jrfaeePhu Trach 1500' X Ii; Laterte otQuang Tri isv 2624' X 9"' LateriteTraica 2526' 1 ,0' irtCong Son 1476' '' .,and 4 "odKrung Ko (An Lac) 1800, X 15V(' PSPNocng S;on (Dal Plung) 1600' X 96' 'slayPie Im Iuni 1900' X 16.,' "r&!W, Barth

"iCanh( Dk To Cu Old) 2000'1 X 120' odVan Canh 1462' X 9"' Laterite

Pago 2 Pe 2TAB ;3-1 TAB 3-1

S. CONFDENIAL

* " CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AI1:onthly Test Report ?umnber 2 - Caribou

AMM B - Objective 2 (continued)

Sumary of Runwamy Lengths and Surfaces

thmiber of Percent1. Runway length Airfields & Strips of Total

(a) 100C, to 1500' 16 16.3%

(b) 1501' to 2000' 17 17.3

(c) 2001' to 2500' 7 7.2

(d) 2501' to 3000' 9 9.2

(e) over 3000' 49 50.0

2. Runway surface

(a) Concrete 1 1.0

(b) Asphalt or Ilacadam 12 12.2%

(c) PSP 7 7.1

(d) Laterite (oiled or rolled) 22 22.5

(e) tatural graded andnatural surface e .l

(f) Sod and combination of sodand other material 22 22.5

(g) Clay, gravel, gras, earth,sand, and runways with mixedsurfaces excluding sod typerunways 26 26.6

Page 3 Pare 3TAB B-1 TAB B-I

CONFIDENTIAL

• •CONFIDENTIAL

Nsstb3r Tust Report Nmbu 2 - Caribow

AJhK B - bj.eotive 2 (oantimod)IR OF AI~RPD

oT -1 6AB &I

CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

AUTHORIZED AERODROMESFOR CIVIL USE

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C00"N FI DE NT IA LExtract front Army Tactical Mbility Reaquirements Board Report 20 August 1962

EUTmATES OF B1 ThOOP OOVSTEJOTIOE RM

IN IRAN THAILAND, AND SOUTH VIC=1M (U)

1. (U) P~me This tab sumaries the effects of envirornmental factors

on airfield construction time in Iran, Thailand, and South Vietnam. The impact

on envirornu~sa conditions on construction effort is sham on colored maps of

these areas. Construction tims estimates give the range of Engineer battalion

days required to construct an Aroy airfield in dry and wet seasons.

2. (C) AiQ1 eln The type of airfield used in this evaluation

consisted of 1000 feet of 100-foot-wide rummay, a 180- by 750-foot apron, and

approxdmately 1500 feet of 60-foot-side taxiway. This involves se 369000

square yards of graded esurface. Extension of the runway and connecting taxiway

to 3000 feet would double the Engineer construction time range listed. Exten-

sion of the runway to 4500 feet would approximately triple the construction time

range. This study was based on the premise that by proper site selection at

least one airfield of the type outlined could be built in any area tdithing a 25-

mile-diamter circle in the tine indicated with present Entgineer troops.

3. (C) Desig Airraft end Surfaces. The specific aircraft envisioned

is an Army transport weighing approximately 100,000 pounds and having a 10-ton

load-carrying capacity. The airfield life envisioned is somewhere between 2

weeks and 1 month without requiring major reconstruction. The aircraft would

have lending gear that would permit operation directly on graded sails of CER

10 or better withoutaurfacing. On graded sils inthe CR4tol10range a

present Inventory landing mat surfacing would be required (X-6, X-8, X-9).

Areas requiring landing mat are cross-hatched on the construction-effort, maps.

Soils having a CBR of less than 4 were considered impractical because Egineer

construction equipment would not operate unless the area were first covered

with a blanket of imported granular fill. In mountainous terrain or areas of

heavy forest, the construction night be accomplished but would require mowe

TA B 3-3 TA B -3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

than 2 battalion months. This time requirement was considered to be outside the

scope of the problem.

4. (C) Recuirements for Larner Aircraft. To determine the time require-

ments for producing an airfield capable of supporting C-130 operations, con-

struction time in the following tables should be tripled because the C-130 re-

quires a runway in excess of 4000 feet. Surfacing requirements would be essen-

tially the same, except that the experimental T-11 landing mat would be required

instead of the present inventory mat. Construction time would not be increased.

This points up the desirability of placing the T-11 mat in the supply system as

rapidly as possible. If the T-1 1 mat is not available, some 6 to 15 inches of

imported base course would be necessary under the present inventory mat. This

would so increase construction time as to make construction infeasible in the

cross-hatched areas. It should be mentioned that the time required to place

landing mat is about 1.5 battalion days for areas of the basic size or about

4.5 battalion days for a 4500-foot runway. Thus, landing mat is in reality

more a logistics problem than a construction-time problem. Further, it cannot

be assumed that construction time would be decreased by using more than one

Engineer battalion per airfield because a one-battalion construction force will

saturate an area of the size under consideration. More troops would likely re-

tard progress rather than speed the construction.

5. (C) Color Code. Within the general outline presented above, the con-

struction of the basic 1000-foot airfield in areas shown in green would require

less than I battalion month: (0-10 battalion days, light green, numbered 3;

10-20 battalion days, medium green, numbered 4; 20-30 battalion days, dark

green, numbered 5). The areas shown in brown and nunbered 2 would require more

than 2 battalion months because of rough terrain, heavy vegetation, or a com-

bination of these and other environmental factors. The areas shown in brown

and nunber 1 are those upon which construction equipment would not operate be-

cause of lack of bearing capacity.

Page 2 Page 2TAB-3 TAB-3

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-A.Lonthly Test lloport luriber 2 - Caribou

A1N1' B - Objective 2 (continued)

)~MEKONG

~DELTA

¢CAMAUPENINSULA

LEGENDAREA CUR CONS TIME (UN DAYS)

I (4 IMPRACTICAL2 N/A )60

4-10 0-103 )I0 0-10!1 4-10 I !-204 )10 11-20

4-10 21-30

ACTIV-*lVonthly Test llcport NIumber 2 - Caribou

A11,B -Objective 2 (continued)

LEGENDAREA CUR CONS TIME (&N DAYS)

1 (4 IMPRACTICAL2 N/A )GO.4 4-10 0-103 )10 0-10

__ _ 1I -204 )0IO 11-20

04-10 21-30

*' CONFIDENTIAL

PIAN OF TEST

"Employment of Chemical Grouting Agentsfor Stabilization of Sub-Marginal Soils"

1. References:

a. Ltrs, American Cynamid Company to Mr. Phillip Franklin, OSD/ARPA,dtd 2 Nov and 29 Nov 1962.

b. Miscellaneous paper (draft), WE$, "Evaluation of Airstrip at BinhHung, South Vietnam"

c. Brochure, "AM-9 Technical Data", American Cynamid Company.

2. Pumas

To determine the suitability of chemical grout (American Cynanid Co.S-3403) as a soil stabilization agent for sub-marginal soils such as thosefound in the lower Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam.

3. Background.

a. The specific area to be investigated is the Ca Mau peninsula region(Vic Binh Hung, Cai Nuoc, Cai Buit, Dam Dai).

b. An evaluation of the soil in a representative section of thisgeneral area (Reference b) determined that, in general, the natural materialis a uniform, greyish-brown soft clay with relatively high organic content.The mechanical characteristics of the soil are such that it is consideredentirely unsuitable for normal airfield construction methods (e.g. CBR-O.25,percent saturation-90, such drying as ocrurs takes place via transpirationfrom natural cover, watertable varies from surface to 15" depending uponwhether wet or dry season, too weak tc support conventional constructionequipment). Normally, a CBR of 3 is considered the absolute lower limitfor even forward liaison airstrips.

4. Conceit.

a. The concept is to employ GVN facilities and personnel, throughchannels available to CDTC, to conduct a preliminary series of laboratorytests to ascertain the effects of chemical grout S-3403 on soils of thisnature, and determine an optimum soil-groat mix of acceptable strength,watersealing and density characteristics.

b. The CDTC Project Officer will monitor the tests, provide liaisonwith = and ARVI personnel, collect and evaluate test data and write thereport. LTCOL Joseph E. Halloran Jr. vll be the officer responsible inthe OSD/ARPA I& Field Unit.

TA B-5 TAB B-5

CONFIDENTIAL

' CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-A

onthly Test Report Nwber 2 - Caribou

ANNEX C - Objective 3 (Detached platoon operations)

1. (C) Ob.ective.

To determine the capability of the CV-2B Caribou Comny to supporttactical operations requiring platoons to operate way from base airfields toinclude security requirements, logistical support, cammioations, maintenaneeand administration.

2. (C) Discussion.

There has been no chane in CV-2B method of employent since thebeginning of 'e a t .st. Present method of employment is disussed in mthlyTest Report :umber 1.

TAB C TAB C

CONFIDENTIAL

* CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-A0

Monthly Test Report Nwmber 2 - Caribou

ANNEX D -- Objective 4 (Control of airspace)

1. (C) Obective.

To determine the most efficient method of controllin %ir spacewhere the CV-2B Caribou Coapany must operate in support of tactical oper-ations, considering allocation of altitude, arrival and departure frombase fields, movemaent over the tactical forces, and landing or airdroppingin the forward areas.

2. (U) Discussion.

No additional significant data were developed durin- this period.

(OED TAB DCONFIDENTIAL

I CONFIDENTIAL

ACTI V-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

AN=NE - Objective 5 (Command relationships)

1. (C) OJETIVI.

To determine the appropriate conmmnd relationships of the CV-2BCaribou coupeny in support of tactical operations.

2. (C) MSCUSSIgh.

a. Comnnd relationships of the let AVCO have not changed sincepublication of Monthly Report Number 1.

b. Two Caribou provide direct support to each Corps. Priority ofsupport by Caribou ccmitted to the SILAS is given to the four Corps.

c. U.S. Senior Corps advisors continue to state requirements foradditional direct support Caribous.

3. (U) FINDinGS.

None

TAB I TAD I

C"OONF IDENT I AL

I ' CONFIDENTIAL

ACTTV-AMonthly Test ReportNumber 2 - Caribou

ANNFM F - Objective 6 (Navigational equipment)

1. (C) Obiective.

To determine the appropriate navigational equipment, both in the air-craft and on the ground, which will provide positive locxstion as needed.

2. (C) Discussion.

Present navigational systems installed in the CV-2B are inadequatefor operational missions in the RVN under marginal weather conditions. Mparlyall missione in suport of counter-insurgency operations in the RVW are todestinations not located on established airways and to airfields without instru-ment anproach facilities (see Tab F-l). Of the 98 airfields used rexularakby CV-2B's, only 15 have navigational aids (low frequency non-directionalbeacons or very high frequency onmi-directional range stations); 11 have approvedinstrument apnroaches; 12 have radio tower communication facilities; and onlyeight have runway lighting. CV-2B pilots must use maps, landmarks, and compassheadings as primary means of navigation for over 90 per cent of the missions."hen weather is marginal, missions are delayed or cancelled because of inadequatenavigational systems. High priority missions are often flown despite weatherconditions. Such operations are extremely hazardous in the mountainous northwhere maps are often inaccurate and weather conditions change rapidly. Success-ful completion of these missions can be attributed mainly to t~e afrelumsfamiliarity with the terrain over which the missions are flown. Sueh auardacan be eliminated and CV-2B weather capability can be increased by an additionalnavigational system which provides accurate location of the aircraft in relation-ship to the terrain. One of the navigational systems already developed such asthe Doppler System, the PFNS (Position Fixing Navigational System), or TAPS mysatisfy the requirements and should be evaluated in the CV-2B.

A limited number of small low-frequency radio beacons (PathfinderBeacons) have been issued to outposts in the mountainous terrain of I Corps.Although their range is limited to a few miles they have been helpful inlocating these outposts during periods of low visibility.

The let AVCO has expressed a desire to have an FM radio homing capa-bility. This would increase the company's marginal weather capability, andassist in locating tactical units during periods of low visibility.

3. (C) Findines.

1. Present navigational systems installed in the CV-2B aircraftare not adequate for thi location, during periods of marginal weather, oftactical drop zones or tirstrips without ground radio aids. A determinationof a'nropriate navigational equipment cannot be made until such systems asDoppler, PFRS and TAPS (DrCCA) are evaluated.

2. Small portable low frequency beacons (Pathfinder Beacons)have been useful in locating outposts during periods of low visibility.

3. Installation of FM homing equipment would provide additionalnavigational assistance in locating tactical units, particularly duringperiods if low visibility.

TAB F TAB F

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-GKMbnthly Test Report Nuxber 2 - Caribou

ANNEX F - Objective 6 (Navigational equipment)

Navigational Aids, Instrument Approaches and Tower Radio Coaaumnicationa withinthe Republk of Vitn.

17hPARALIEL

IHUE M-1 UM(Ny

(1.. (1)

OPI WHOM (1DB)

OAU M THUOT -DB)

NRA TRANG (1-VOR, 2 MDB)

4----(2-1B)"

9 BINH-W

((1-3D)

0B3EN HOA (1E (4B

-' *SAIGON (- ,2-40B)

NO:1 TAU (1-1DB)

DUONG ON(1-40GE - sno0wB

RADIO NAVIGATIONAL AIDMDB - Non Directional Beacon - VCR VHF mi

RANRZ STATIONAPPROVED 3NJ RJNKNT APPROACHTOER RADIO CO04UNICATIONSHAS TWO AIRFIELDS WITH INSTRUINENT APPROACHESAND TOWER COMO.

Tab F-1 Tab F-1CONFIDENTIAL

I . CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AM

Monthly Test Report Number 2 1- Caribou

ANNEX G - Objective 7 (Cargc delivery by "Snatch-and-go")

1. (C) O tive.

To determine the capabil'ty of th. CV-2B Caribou aircraft to daliverloads through use of the "snatch-a d-go" delivery technique to areas whichprohibit landing, to include determination of the proper altitude for contactwith the ground mechanism, lengt of cleared ar a n eded, and charact risticsof minin approach obstacles,

2. (U) Discussion.

a. The final phase of the U.S. Army Material amand's eva uationof the "Snatch-and-Go" was conduct d at Fort Bragg, N.C., 3-9 March 1963.Results of this evaluaticn were submit, ed to U.S. Arzy Material Coond bythe QV Research and Engineering Command in a letter dat d 14 March 1963,subject- "Procurement of Operational Test Quantities of Ground Based AirDelivery Systems," which is quoted in part belw:

"7. Recommendatlons- t is the unanimous recommendation

of the participants-

a. To terminate flight testing of the l1 AmericanModel 24 and the Van Zelm IIA-201 Ground Based Air DeliverySystems due to their failure to meet flight safety require-ments when used with the CV-2 series aircraft --

--- d. To discont-nue the plans for operational tests ofthese systems and comply with he provisions of the messagereferenced in paragraph le. (ee Tab G-l)

e. That the systems .rocirzd for over-eas tests bereturned te the Quartermaster esearch and EngineeringCommand for study in conjunction with task AKL 148, rTouch-and-Go Air Delivery System for 'ar ou Aircraft."

b. Evaiuatior of CV-2B capability will be suspended pending finalaction on QMR&E Command's reccmendations.

3. Findinge,

None.

TAB G TAB G

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

072136Z

FM DA WASDC

TO RUHPA/2INPC

RUHAFS/CINCUSARPAC FT SHAFTU HAWAII

RUAMC/COUSA SEOUL KOREA

RUABFB/CGUSARHAW SCHCRFIELD BKS HAWAII

UNCIAS DA321259 FRCU DCSOFS/AV SFD ACTC(

1. THIS IS A SAFETY OF FLIGHT DIRECTIVE.

2. IN CONECTION WITH ALMOSILE TRAINING EXERCISES WM TROOPS ARE

RPELLED FRQ( HOVRING HLICOFPTES BY M ENS OF ROPE. IT IS MANDATORY THAT

THE CREW CHIN' REMIN IN THE HELICOPTER IN (EDE THAT HE MA! TAKE NEESSARY

ACtItC TO FREE THE ROPE IN THE EVNMT OF ENTANGUWMNT WITH TRES LINES AFTER

DISCHARE OF TROOPS.

3. THE IN-FLIGHT DELIVJY OF 3'PMMT WITH THE AC-I CARIBOU USING

NlO-.SAfDAD ZE ACTION TEC-'I(JES SUCH AS THE GROUND BASE) TOUCH404

SYSTMS BEING PROPOSED BY ALL AMKICAI DNGINING COGIA.Y AND VAN ZIM

ASSOCIATES. INC. IS NOT AUTFOCU M PIDING THE DEVLOPMINT AND PUBLICATION

OF STANDARD PROCEDURES AND TECHQUS.

TOR: 1523313 IhCV 504/16 NOV 62 DTG: 07236Z NOV 62

TAB G-1 TAB G-1

ACTIV-hKMonthly Test Report Emsber, 2 - Caribou

AM=K H - Objective 8 (Siapport, of airborne operations)

1. (C) Obeciu.

To dotuim~as the gapability, oorwdination, logistical, implications#4aniadations, aid maintenance reuidred to support an airborne battalionoperst.ons, to include initial drop or air laradirut, resupply for 3 to 5days, and pic-up uan reieplopmsnt.

2. (U) D~mwm

So significant data wore develoWs during this pwled.

3. (U) no=.

None

TAB H TAB H

CONFIDENTIALMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

AWAX I - Objective 9 (Helicopter refueling)

1. (C) Objective.

To determine the capability of CV-2B Caribou aircraft to furnish arifueling capability for use by helicopters, to include determination ofrazims fuel load, application of internal fuel container and pumping mystem,number of helicopters %hich can be refueled simultaneously, and extension ofhelicopter radius action.

2. (C) Discussio.

a. Helicopter refueling problems during tactical operations.

(1) Inforat ion regarding refueling problems has been furishdby the 57th Transportation Copany (CI-21) which is employed in support of IIIand IV Corps.

(2) In operations away from their bass airfield at Tan Son Nhutin Saigon, C1-21's are sreeties refu led from one o more of six 1200 &alonM49C tank trucks spotted at seloct d Aes through .ut the Delta area. Rach atthe K49C tank trucks is rempplie., by c nercial haul over insecure land routesor waterways. The six tank trucks cannot be assembled in a cman area tosupport large numbers of helizopti rs involved in tactical operations.

(3) lore often during tactical missions helicopters are refueledfrom a fifty-five gallon drum with a 15 galln-per-minute hand pump. Fifty-fivegalln drums of aviation fuel are pre-pouitioned at selected airstrips bycomercial carrier. Drum m y remin at the various airstrips indefinitely andmay or my not be secure fron theft or tampering. Even in secured a'ese storageway be improper and fuel in drum often becaos contasmnated by the time it isrequired for refueling aircraft. Under such conditions quality assurance ofaviation gasoline is difficult to accemplish. Fuel deterioration and contami-nation are comon complaints. The only filtering devices available are e haesskins laid over funnels. Using this systm it takes apprximstely 2D minutesto refuel a CH-21. Sinie only are or two hand pumps are norml2y available,refueling is time-consuming. Iffectiven as of tactical operations suffers bythe long turn-around time entailed in such antiquated methods.

(4) There are a number of smller airstrips, met of which arenot secured, where fuel is not pro-stocked. Although these strips my betactically well located for a given assault mission, they cannot be used as abase for refueling unl,-as fuel can be delivered under relatively secure coan-ditions.

b. Concept of Test.

(1) It is the intent of this test objective to devise a systemwhereby bulk fuel can be flm into a forward airstrip via the CV-B anddispensed into the CH-21 and UH-1 utilising 50 gallon-per-minute pumps. If theequipment is suitable, it will allow use of mmny additional airstrips for refuelingbases. Such a system would expedite refueling and would be loe proe to alerting

onurgents of an Irp nang operation sinee fuel would not have to be carried toan airstrip several day. in advane.

(2) It is anticipated that each CV-2B cm carry two 500 gallonnon-vented collapsibl* tanks mounted internally. Dispensing equipment will include

TAD I TAB I

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-At

Monthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

4NMX I .- Objective 9 (continued)

one 50 gallon-per-minute (gpn) electrically powered pump, two 160-foot sectionsof newly developed discharge hose, and allied home manifolding. The amount offuel to be carried will depend on the actual weight of the dispensing equipment,the weight per pound of the fuel being supplied, the radius of action the CV-2Bis to fly, and the weight of the air crew and personnel to operate the dispensingequipment.

(3) Under this concept C-21's will be refueled directly from the"flying tank truck". As soon as the fuel has been dispensed the Caribou will flyout of the area to return nnly if further fuel is required by the helicopters.

(4) An alternate concept to be tested is that of flying the refuel-ing systems to a tactical airstrip and off loading them for ground dispensing fuelinto helicopters. Under this concept, fuel would be supplied o the ground systemsfrom the CV-2B internal refueling system. Caribou could fly shuttle flights tokeep the ground system replenished. Only one major modification must be made.There must either be an additional portable auxiliary power unit for the electri-cally operated pump or a gasoline powered pmp mst be substituted for the elect-ric pump. Testing of this alternate concept is necessary because:

(a) Some airstrips that could be used for refueling do notprovide sufficient space for parking of more than one Caribou during refuelingoperations.

(b) The refueling eercise may extend over such a period oftime that it would be impossible to keep the CV-2B aircraft down for such an ex-tended time.

(c) The amount of fuel required for the helicopters may beof such large quantity that it will be necesear7 to use the available Caribouin a fuel-shuttling service.

c. No additional POL equipment (e.g., 50 gpm electrically operatedpumps with allied hose attachments) or information r-lative to co-ponent weightshave been received in RVN since submission of the last report. Except for thecollapsible drums, all items of equipment tested thus far were used for this testonly because they were locally available. The status of the equipment to be testedis unknown at this time. Therefore, equipment tests have been made using the fol-lowing substitute items:

(1) Pump assembly, 50 M Barnes Yodel, gasoline powered.

(2) Hose, 50 ft section, l inch, discharge (Three sections coupledtogether to form 150 foot length).

(3) Hose, 25 ft. section, 2 inch, suction (Two sections, one of whichwas cut into 16 ft. and 9 ft. pieces for adaption as a manifold).

d. Tests of POL equipment to support the ass'ned objective arbitra-rily have been placed in four phases to allow for more complete prior planningand better time utilisation. The objectives of each of these tests are to:

(1) Phase 1 - Ground test equipment outside the CV-2B aircraft.

Page 2 Page 2TAB I TAB I

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTI VAXMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

AJIIZ I - Objective 9 (continued)

(a) Test following eqipatt

1.500 gal collapsible tanks

£. 0 gan electricaly Powered PAmP

~.160 feet of discharge hose (per pamp)

(b) Train personnel in use of equipment and in helicopter re-fueling proceduree.

(2) Phase 2 - Ground test equipmunt utiliing the CV-2B. Determines

(a) Best method of loading 500 gal collapsible tanks e0Mb4raircraft.

Q.Palletised/non-pal~stised

~.Poeition within aircraft

(b) DSet method of tieing down (rigging) tanks.

() DBet Method of operating 50 gps yp; is., ineide/outaidecv-aB.

(d) Most efficient placement of Caribou -M1-21 for refuelingoperations.

(o) Train personnael

(3) Phase 3 - Flight taut equipment in a non-tactical situation.

(a) Determine maxium loads of fuel that can be carried in theCV-29.

(b) Train personel

I.. Caribou crews - emergency evacuation procedures

2. Caribou crows - familiarise with characteristics of fly-ing while carrying a liquid load.

1. Further develop concepts and practice all pbasue of heli-cbpter refueling.

(4) Phase 4 - Test concept. MA Proesdre during an actual tac-tical situation.

(a) Evaluate proedures, ake necessary modifications in equip-Wet and/or procedures and reteet, i~f necessary.

(b) Write final report, draw conclusions, and ake reocmendao-tions.

Page 3 Page 3TAB I TAD I

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTIV-ANMonthly Test Report Nuber 2 - Caribou

AN= I - Objctive 9 (continued)

e. As of 31 March 1963 preliminary testing has progressed through thefirst phase, as outlined in paragraph 2d(1) above. Further tests within the firstphase are still necessary. Subsequent paragraphs discuss factual data alreadycollected.

(1) The equipment which has been tested is listed in Tab I-1 andshorm in the diagram attached as Tab 1-2 to this annex. Photographs of theequipment on the ground are included as Tab I-3*

(2) Appradmtely 940 gala of AVOAS can be pumped from tvn non-vented 500 gallon collapsible tanks, using a 50 In pop, in 17 minutes. Thetanks, onnected in series with a single pump source, can be filled or emptiedeither individually or simultaneously. The only flay-controlling device is theelbow coupling mounted on each tank, which may either be closed or opened asdesired. To maintain more even weight-load distribution aboard the aircraft itis more advantageous to discharge from the tanks simultaneously. Although eachtank contains about 495 gallons when filled, design deficiency of the tank pre-cludes pumping out of approximately 25 gallons leaving a not available for die-pensing of 470 gallons.

(3) Initial investigation indicates that the total weight of fuel-hendling equipment is too heavy to allow for the a-x4m fuel earring capabilityof the system (1000 gallons). Using the weight of the present POL system andfuel (plus a 20 minute reserve) sufficient for a 50-mile radius-of-action oper-ation, the CV-2 can only carry 82 gallons of AVGAS payload without exoodingits mixmm allowable gross weigh (Aircraft and PCL system weights are listedin Tab I-1). The weight of the dispensing equipment itself must be reduced beforethe concept becomes fully feasible.

(4) A sequence for loading and discharging the equipment and fuelhas been devised. These procedures are considered the most feasible and arelisted in Tab 1-4.

(5) Dispensing equipment under test has no intergral metering appa-ratus. Butt quantities of fuel cannot be measured. Also, during the helicoptermissions which this equipment is designed to support, aviatiors often want a preciseamount of fuel rather than a full tank.

(6) Another disadvantags of the available equipment is the lackof filtering device within the system. Filter-separation of aircraft fuel is acritical requirement. Final filtering of the fuel is now accomplished when theproduct is transferred from the M131A3 or X49C tank truck into the 500 gal collap-sible tanks. Unless the tanks, mrnifolding, pump and hoseline system are clean,there is a good chance of contamination. A final filtering device should be placedbetween the discharge side of the pump and the receiving helicopter (Ref: par 18c,TN 30-3o).

3. (C) Fi.di n

a. The amount of fuel that can be carried by the CV-S is limited (bythe present weight of dispensing equipmnt) to 824 gallons within a 50-mileradius-of-action flight.

Page 4 Page 4TAB I TAB I

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Nhuber 2 - Caribou

ANNEX I - Objective 9 (continued)

b. The weight of the substitute fuel handling system materially reducesthe pay load of fuel which can be carried in the CV-2B. Unless the overall equip-ment weight can be reduced materially the entire concept of using the Caribou as arefueling vehicle may require reappraisal.

c. Two major deficiencies inherent to the available refueling systemare the lack of a metering device and a fuel filtering system.

Page 5 Page5TAB I CONFIDENTIAL TAB I

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4.TIV-AMItonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANIa I - CbJective 9 (continued)

CV-2B POL SYSTEK FOR HLICOPTU REFUELING

The following equipment has been used in the first test phase. Equipmentis show in the diagram attached as Tab 1-2; photos are attached as Tab 1-3.

1. ITDI FEERAL STOCK NO., QUANITYf WEIGHT

Drum, collapsible, 500 gal. 8110-753-4892 2 ea. 520 lbs.(260 lbs ea.)

Pump assemble, 50 gpn, gasolinepowered and hoses 4320-271-1858 1 ea. 155 lbs.

Hose, auction, 2 inch 4720-555-8325 50 ft. 88 lbs.

Hose, discharge, i inch 4720-303-4984 150 ft. 114 lbs.

Nosle, 3. inch 4930-360-0569 1 ea. 5 lbs.

2. Aircraft weight (includes parachutes and survival gear) 20,200 lbs.Crew (4. 200 lbs.) 800 lbs.Armored crew seats (2 ea) 254 lbs.Self-sealing fuel tanks 280 lbs.

*POL dispensing and allied equipment 882 lba.Aircraft engine oil Q7 lbe.

TOTAL . .. . .. 22,686 lbs.

CV-2 m-i-- allowable gross weight 28,500 rbs.Total weight A/C, crew, FOL equipment etc. 22.686 lbs.Total of A/C fuel and full payload that can be carried. 5,814 lbs.(936 gals)

Aircraft fuel (plus 20 minutes reserve) required for50 mile radius-of-acticc operation (based an 670 lbs. per hourat 150 kncts). 670 lbs. (112 gals)

*A portion of this equipment is made up of substitute items. It is anticipatedthat the system weight will increase when standard items are received and in-stalled.

TAB 1-1 TAB 1-1

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Inolosure 2 to JUN1 I - Objectiv 9Subj: POL Refuel1±ng SquipUnt Sot-up in CV-2 (0ropmed)

COCKPIT

Cabin Di usnins(Insido)Length 20' 98 + 48(rop dow) Width 5' .(608)(floo) 71.54 (wall- _"

wall) $7Heith 750

NOTE: Drawing not to 500 gatoals. Collapeible Tak

(1004

Collapsible r.* 61 s(m ) 21 ft + coile16 ft of . of3 I0. Ihdooo a

suction hon e *- I0ho9 ft t 20 suctian

~ hoso

2 T coupling 2ft at 2"

nmotion hose

gasolinepoed

4111- 150 ft of isdisohare hose

TO 1-2 To I-P

CONFIDENTIAL

~.22

, ~t ""Oft

. .- . .............

Wow

... .....-

%It" J'-

31 1.

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ACTIT-IMKonthly Test Report aber 2 - Oaribou

AN= I - Objective 9 (continued)

Recmended Procedures tr Loadif and Discharging Iquiset and Puel.

1. Loading procedures:

a. Position tanks insie the CV-U and seaw.

b onnect auction hoses to the elbow valves on the two tank.

e. Leave 50 an pump outside aircraft.

d. Connect suction hose to quick-coupling adaptor on the bose lInetie. the 131A3 or M49C tank truck.

e. Poop from tank truck into ollamil tanks semiltaneouSl untildesired mount of fuel has been metered through.

f. Close elbow valves on collapsible teaks

g. Disconnect suction hose ftis tank truck hose and cornet sutionhose to suction port of 50 on PUP.

h. Connect 150 ft section of discharge hose to 50 O PIMp, and reelhose as tight as possible.

i. Load pmp and hose-lines Into aircraft and tie do= prP.

3. Readjust and tighten the collapsible tank tie-dows.

2. Discharging procedures:

a. Place 50 gn posp on ground about 15 feet from end of rip. (Thegasoline driven pip is remved fron the aircraft as a safety preseatieal harn,when it is replaced by' the electrical3y operated pop the electricmp wIdl notbe removed fre the aircraft.)

b. Ground the pup and the aircraft.

c. Pull the 150 ft. hose to the helicopter to be refueled.

d. Bond the hose neosle to the helicoptei and prepare to fuel.

e. Open the elbow-wlves on the collapsible tanks.

t Start the pap and refuel the helicopters.

3. Completion of operation,

a. Shut down panp and close elbow valves.

b. Disconnect bond wire to helicopter and roll up bose.

c Disconnect ground wire from pup and aircraft.

d Plae pamp and hose back In Caribou an4 secure.

e. Readjust tank tie-d"as to secure containers.

To 14 CONFIDENTIAL To 1-4

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ACTII'-h

Monthl Test Report Hiuber 2 - Caribou

ANNEX I - Objective 9 (continued)

4. Removal of eqyipimest f ram CV-28aa Remove equipment tie-dons.

b. R ewe all equipment fram aircraft on to 2j ton trucm or fork-lifttrucko.

c. o _ DLWOUM JMrn = Am un.

d. Drain dispensing equiPnt in & safe area if it is to be storedldisconnect and drain hoses.

Page 2 Page 2TAB I-4 TAB I-&

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AOT!V-AM

onthly Teat Report Number 2 -- Caribou

ANE J - Objective 10 (Weather-avoidance radar)

1. (0) objective.

To determine the capability of the GV-2B Caribou aircraft tooperate under adverse weather conditions utilizing weather radar.

2. (U) Dscusson.

live sets of airborne weather-radar will be available for test-ing in Caribou aircr4ft during the approaching monsoon season. Resultswill be r'port*d as obtaino,.

3. (10 Pidne

None

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ACTIV-A0Monthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX K - Objective 11 (Airborne command post)

1. (C) Objective.

To determine the feasibility of installing and operating an air-borne command post for control of combined operations.

2. (C) Discussion,

a. Two heliborne assault operations were conducted in March. Bothoperations employed a CV-2B aerial command post.

b. The communications system was the same as described in TestReport Number 1 (Aircraft Radios and two AN/PRC-IO's). The system is de-signed to maintain communications between the Command Post and the forcesparticipating in the assault. (see Tab K-l). The present system remainsunsatisfactory. A new system is being readied which will provide a UHF,a VHF, 2 FM radio circuits, an intercom system and six operating positions.The new comunication system will be a portable console arrangement designedfor quick installation and removal.

c. Initial concepts of the airborne command post called for itto operate from an altitude of approximately 8000 feet (MSL) in order tomaintain communications with mission staging areas. On the missions flownin March, low cloud layers in the assault areas made it necessary to operat3the Command Post from an altitude of approximately 1500' above the terrain.Operations at the lower altitudes placed the command post aircraft in themaneuvering area and airspace required by fighter-bomber and troop lift air-craft. Additionally, the command post aircraft ms exposed to insurgentsmall arms fire, friendly artillery, and fire from fighter aircraft pullingup from strafing runs with their weapons still activated.

3. (C) Fidig.

a. The concept of the airborne CP is valid but the full value ofthe system cannot be determined until satisfactory communications are pro-vided.

b. Airborne CP operations may not be feasible during periods oflow cloud cover without sacrificing either safetj and communications withthe staging area or vision of the battlefield.

TAB K TAB KCONFIDENTIAL

* CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AllMorthly Test Ieport Nlumber 2 - Caribou

Proposed Comunications for Airborne Command Post

CommandPost

Obsermtion Troop Lift riljtw-aiber Ground Forces

TA K-i CD T K-ILCONFIDENTIAL

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX L - Objective 32 (Logistic support requirements)

1. (C) Objective.

"To determine the logistic support requirements of the CV-2B CaribouCompany to include air base facilities, supply levels, personnel and equipment,POL personnel and equipment, and other support requirements".

2. (C) Discussion.

a. Personnel.

(1) There will be a turnover of lot AVCO personnel during April,May, and June 1963. Approximately one third of the unit will depart each monthfor the CONUS. Rotation dates of returnees have been staggered to provide con-tinuity of operations during the turnover. (See Tabs L-1 and L-2). Projectedarrival dates of aviators appear to permit a sufficient overlap period withdeparting aviators for orientation and area familiarization. Seven replace-ment enlisted men including the new First Sergeant, arrived in the RVN 27 March1963. Firm arrival dates ranging from 1 April to 30 June 1963 have been re-ceived on ten other enlisted mn. USASGY has been infored that 50 enlistedreplacements (MOB unknown) will arrive on or about 1 May 1963. It cannot bedetbrmned if the exchange of enlisted personnel will allow a desired overlapperiod for training of the new replacements.

(2) The advance party of the 70th Transportation Detachment (DS)consisting of one warrant officer and three enlisted men, arrived in the RMNon 27 March. Personnel of the main body are scheduled to arrivo on 4 April,and the unit's organic equipment is expected to arrive an 14 May. The 70thTransportation Detachment was organized and trained at Ft. fustis, Virginia.Familiarization CV-3 maintenance training was conducted at Ft. Bragg, N.C.with the 61st AVCO.

(3) Adequacy of the number of aviators authorized by the TO isunder study. Factors considered include:

(a) The number of aviators assigned to comand, operations,maintenance and other duties that preclude their performing regularly scheduledflight missions.

(b) Average number of hours flown by the aviators of thetransport platoons.

(c) Fatigue or strain on the air crew caused by frequencyof landings and take-offs requiring iixim. performance of the aircraft andconcentration of the air crew.

(d) The average hours of work performed by aviators in a24-hour period.

(e) The possibility that, depending on aircraft availability

and airfield facilities, around-the-clock operations could be implaented.

b. Aircraft maintenance and supply.

(1) The required ratio of maintenance man-hours to each flying

TAB L TAB L

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX L - Objective 12 (continued)

hour is also under study. Records of the lt AVCO do not include maintenanceman-hours expended; however, reasonable estimates can be obtained from recordedaircraft maintenance performed. Tab L-3 reflects maintenance man-hour cocpu-tations for March. Approximately five months will be required to gather suf-ficient data to compute a reliable maintenance man-hour factor.

(2) Aircraft availability for March in graphically depicted anTab L-4. The average daily availability rate was f1.6 aircraft which is 72.5per cent of the total aircraft authorized. Float aircraft were not consideredin the computations. Tab L-5 illustrates comparative aircraft availability andhours flown during January - March.

(3) Tab L-6 lists the shortage of critical supply item requiredfor aircraft maintenance. Because of these shortages lt AVCO has had to resortto aircraft part cannibalization and field expedients to prevent EDP status andto maintain a reatively high availability rate. As exuples, first, tacho-meters from an aircraft about to undergo a periodic inspection ware removed andinstalled on a different aircraft to permit the second aircraft to return to aflyable status. Second, tadpole seals used on engine fire walls were fabricatedby lst AVCO during the period they were not available in supply channels. Theyare inferior in quality to standard seals, but their use has prevented thegrounding of aircraft.

(4) Maintenance support kits issued at the port of ar ationto let AVCO were inadequate and in some cases, inconsistent with latest aircraftmodifications. The kits contained spare parts based on a CONUS planning factorof 30 flight hours per aircraft per month. lot AVCO's flying hour program inthe RVN combined with its maximua performance operatins from small, unimprovedair strips substantially increased maintenance and aircraft parts replacement.This combination depleted the support kits and parts supply rapidly. There uasalso an insufficient quantity of brake linings and tires. Exhaust system spareparts stocked in the support kits had not been exchanged to conform with anearlier ipodification of this system. Consequently, these parts could not beinstalled in the unit's aircraft.

(5) lst AVCO has completed an "in-house" evaluation to determineif pre-flight inspection could replace the daily end-of-day inspection presentlyrequired by TH 55-1510-206-20. During the evaluation two CV-2B aircraft wereflown 100 hours each. There was no daily inspection (which requires approxi-mately three maintenance man-hours). The air crew conducted its normal pro-flight inspection only. Discrepancies detected during the pro-flight inspectionor during flight were deferred to the intermediate or periodic inspections pro-viding they did not present a hazard to flight safety. Intermediate and periodicinspections were completed at the prescribed time intervals during the evaluation.Results were as follows:

(a) Approximately 102 maintenance manhours were conserved.

(b) Aircraft were available for employment during langerdaylight periods.

(c) Intermediate and periodic inspections of the aircraftdid not reveal abnormal deficiencies or discrepancies.

Page 2 Page 2TAB L TAB L

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX L - Objective 12 (continued)

(6) Half of the Aircraft Repair Kit (Como hardware kit) issuedthe let AVCO is not usable. This kit is a CONEX (Container, express) withshelves and bins installed and contains hardware items, i.e., nuts, bolts,cotter keys, pins, washers, that are comon to all aircraft in the Army inven-tory. Hardware peculiar to the CV-2 aircraft are not included in the author-ized stockage list. Several of the hardware items are overstocked. Presentusage rates do not justify the quantity. A hardware kit specially designedfor performing maintenance on the CV-Z would enhance the maintenance effortand would not require an additional container or added weight. Slow-movingitems should be issued commensurate with the expenditure rate.

c. Equipment.

lst AVCO has never been issued a "truck, oil, 1200 gallon capacitywith pre-heating device and pump" authorized by the TOn. The unit has used,since its arrival in SE Asia, a standard M-490 1200 gallon tank truck with thefilter segregator removed, in lieu of the authorized item. This vehicle hasproven adequate and satisfactory under the conditions encountered in the RVN.

3. (C) Findings.

a. Five months' observation will establish a reliable maintenanceman-hours versus flying hour factor for the CV-M.

b. Cannibalization of aircraft parts and field expedients hasassisted in maintaining the present aircraft availability rate of 72.5%.

a. Maintenance support kits issued to the lot AVCO at the POU wereinadequately stocked and some repair parts were obsolete because aircraftmodifications had been accomplished prior to their issue.

d. Pre-flight inspection in lieu of daily inspection shortens air-craft down time and may save over-all maintenance time.

e. The Aircraft Repair Kit (comon hardware kit) stockage list isinadequate and should be revised to reduce the quantity of clower-moving itmand include only those items of additional hardware peculiar to the CV-M.

Page 3 Page 3TAB L TAB L

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ACTIV-ANMMonthly Teat Report Number Carbo

Appendix 1 to Annex L

TAB TAB

L-1 ONFIENTIL L 1

*~ CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AKMonthly Test Report Number -~Caribou

Appendix 1 to Annex L

Y7-

0 Er

TAB TABL-1 ~ CONFIDENTIAL 1

I CONFIDENTIAL

ACTIV-AMMncthly! Test Report Numrser 2 - air

Appendix 2 to ANE L - Objective 12 (conitnued',

APRIL MA~Y JUNE JULY1009

PROJECTED ROTATION OF DILISTEDPERSONNEL

-- NAINT PERSONNELH.-..- Q PERSCKNZL

?LT PLAT PERWNE

25%

TAB 31.4 wA 12

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ACTIV-AMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX L - Objective 12 (continued)

Maintenance manhours per flying hour.

Maint man- MaintType Maint No. hours eaoh manhoures

Daily inspection 318 1 3 - 954

Intermediate inspection 42 X 5 - 210

Periodic inspection 1 X 350 - 3850

Demand -12

6514

6514 Maint Manhours . 6.1 maint manhours per flying hours.1059 Flying Hours

NOTE: Daily inspections are required after the last flight of the day orprior to the next flight.

Intermediate inspections are required at 25 flight hour intervals.

Periodic inspections are required at 100 flight hour intervals.

Demand maintenance includes all maintenance not done during one of theinspections.

TAB L-3 TAB L-3

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ACTIV-AM

Monthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

Appendix 4 to ANNEX L -- (Aircraft availability)

AIRCRAFT- -",0 o 0 -, -/

w i

' U

0

0' 1

TAB - TAB ICONFIDENTIAL

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

Appendix 5 to ANNEX L

&°

° -in

10

TAB L-5 TAB L-5

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX L - Objective 9 (continued)

Critical aircraft spare parts on requisition.

Nomenclature FM or P/Z DATE RFI D

Lining, brake FSN 1630-602-3888 424 1 Jan 63

Wheel assembly " 1630-474-8231 3 11 Jan 63

1 16 Jan 63

Bearing P/N KSYBs -123 32 28 Jan 63

Oil temp bulb FSN 6685-527-7354 1 4 Feb 63

Pipe assembly " 1560-022-9855 2 20 Feb 63

Seal, tadpole P/ CAP 1814-23 36 26 Feb 63

Pipe assembly FSN 1560-022-9855 28 5 Mar 63

Indicator, tachometer " 6680-712-1424 1 1 Mar 63

2 14 Mar 63

Oil temp bulb " 6685-527-7354 1 16 Mar 63

Indicator, tachometer " 6680-712-1424 2 28 Mar 63

. " "2 29 Mar 63

Transmitter(oil pressure) " 6620-557-5557 2 29 Mar 63

TAB L-6 TA L-6

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ACTI¥,,-A

Xonth3 ?et Report, VUer 2 - Caribou

AlEX K - Objective 13 (Modical Evacuation)

1. (C) Objective.

To evaluate the capability of the CV-2B Caribou Aircraft whenemployed in the Medical Evacuation role, to include requirements tor aid-men, medical equipmant end supplies, and suitability of present interiorconfiguration for this role.

2. (C) Discusion.

a. By TWX 8D4O 8-38 frm O USADC, dated 131855Z this objectivewas approved for inclusion in Field Test, CV-2B Caribou Company.

b. No data were collected subsequent to receipt of approval ofobjective.

c. Results of observotion. In support of this objective will besubmitted in future reports.

TAB N TA X

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ACTIV-AHMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX N -- Letters from U.S. Advisory Personnel

ATTACHIkNTS:

Letter N-I . . . . . Frm Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps, 1 April 1963

Letter N-2 . . . . From Senior Advisor, II Corps, March 1963

Letter N-3 . . . . . From Senior Advisor, III Corps, 8 March 1963

TAB N TAB N

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' " 'CONFIDENTIAL

UNITzD 6TATLS ARNIfMILITARY ASS6ITANCi ADVI uXY GROUP, VI6TNAM

II VN CuRPS DiTACHMI TPleiku, Vietnam

1MAGTN-IIC 1 April 1963

Colonel James Lee.CTIV, APU 143, US Forces

ATTN: Air Mobility Section - Caribou

Dear Jim:

As a result of my listening in the last Army Air Conference in Saigonhere are some observations here at Pleiku.

A direct support element of the 1st Aviation Company (FWLT), composedof two CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft, has beUin under operational control of theII Corps Senior Advisor. The two aircraft were originally stationed at NhaTrang in close proximity to II ChLC and in December 1962 one aircraft wasdeployed to II Corps Headquarters at Pleiku to better the Caribous' responsive-ness to the needs of the Corps.

Though the Caribou crews commenced their support of the Corps during therainy season, they were able to use the Pleiku airstrip conti.uously through-out, in spite of low ceilings and the lack of an approved radio approachfacility for the field. For several weeks during the rainy season operatinglimitations prevented O.AF aircraft from getting into Pleiku, and the Corpsexperienced critical supply shortages (particularly rations). As a result,it was necessary to establish regular aerial resupply runs from Nha Trang toPleiku using the Caribou which could and did use the Pleiku strip in spite oflow ceilings and lack of an approved radio approach facility at the field.

The Caribou has been continuously used due to its ability to utilizem.rginal strips. An average of fifty passengers per day are transportedbetween Air Strips in the Corps Zone many of which cannot be served by USAFAircraft, (i.e. Cung Son, Phu Bon, Tan Can, Bato, Van Can and Plei %troung).The high water table characteristic, of much of the Corps Zone, during thelate summer monsoons and poor sub-grade soils result in unacceptable airstripbearing ratios for use by heavier aircraft such as the C-123. Phu Bon forexample was closed to C-123 aircraft because continuous use was causingexcessive rutting of the base course through the PSP surface. The CV-2Bis also tailored for the typical "feeder" type load which, for reasons ofweight or bulk cannot be carried by smaller aircraft, and the load is notlarge enough Lo kiarrant using a C-123.

One of the most significant contributions of the CV-2B crews in IICorps has been their responsiveness to last minute unforseen missions.This applius in pirticular to transport of critical items to users in thefield to include signal items, weapons, ammunition, and parts for deadlinedequipment. During the Corps reorganization of December 1962, II Corps wassuddenly faced with the need to establish communication with its newlyacquired Quang Ngai Province. A generator and signal equipment were neededimmediatly for a radio relay at Plateau Gi in Kontum province to establishcommunication between II Corps and Quang Ngai Province. Experience for

TAB N-1 TAB N-1

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ViturN-Iic 1 April 1963Colonel James Lee

requests of this sort through Air Force channels has shown an average lag timeof seven to ten days. hith only one day's notice, a Caribou crew transportedthe required equipment to Plateau Gi. A critical shortage of shotguns in aCivil Guard unit during the week of 10 March 1963 restricted the units effec-tiveness. A request through the Air Force airlift system would have delayedthese much needed items for several days. The Corps CV-2B completed the haulon the same day of the request. These are by no means abnormal examples ofthe need the Corps Senior Advisor has for an immediate flexible airlift capa-bility if he is to assist ARVN.

rwo other variables which must be dealt with daily are weather and com-munications. During the Monsoons aircraft must be prepared to transport cargoon two or three hour's notice of a ;reak in the weather to preclude a waste ofdays or weeks for sustained improvement in flying conditions. The Corps SeniorAcvisor's immeaiate access to the Caribou crews gives him this required flexi-bility, not possible under a system which requires loads to be manifested atleast twenty-four hours in advance. In-adequate communications, particularlyat remote Special Forces outposts result in excessive delays in transmittingMission recuests through the Air Force airlift system. Special Forces Teamsare forced to appeal to the more immediately responsive Army channels for as-sistance.

In the past, II Corps advisors on official visits to Saigon have consis-tently experienced aelays in returning to Pleiku. The Air Force require per-sonnel to be manifested twenty-four hours in advance of the desired departuredate. II Corps personnel have actually been aelayed three to four working daysfollowing completion of their business in getting Manifested by the Air Force.These holuovers in Saigon have adversely affected the Advisory Effort withinII Corps, Presently, a Caribou departs Pleiku each Wednesday at 0630 carryingthose people with business in Saigon, departs for Pleiku at 1630 the same day,saving many work days and at the same time complying with the MAAG Memo 55-2in reducing TDY travel.

Though the foregoing has indicated satisfaction with the quality of CV-2Bsupport in II Corps, we are daily faced with the inadequate quantity of thissupport, approximately fifty percent of all mission requests must be turneddown due to lack of aircraft. Many of these requests come from Special ForcesTeams who cannot get adequate support through the Air Force airlift system.Two more Caribous are urgently needea to support the Vietnamese Army ar.dbpecial Warfare effort within the II Corps Tactical Zone.

I strongly feel that this auditicnal CV-2B support must be retainedunder the operational control of the Corps Senior Advisor. Pooling ofCaribou resources at higher level would only result in degrading of thequick xTeponiiveness and flexibility which have made the Caribou supportso singularly effective ir this -orpso

Sincerely,

/Is/ owlanu V. henwanz/t/ RuWL,,ND H,, RaWANZ

Colonel, ArmorDeputy Senior Advisor

Page 2T,,3 N-I TAB N-1

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UNITa) STATI.S ARMYMILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM

II VN CORPS DETACHMENTPleiku, Vietnam

MAGTN-IIC March 1963

SUBJkCT: Request For Additional Aviation Support (U)

TO: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, VietnamSaigon, Vietnam Attn: J-4

1. (C) Request two (2) additional CV-2B Caribou aircraft be placed

in direct support of II Corps to meet aviation support requirements.

2. (C) Justification for this request is as follows:

a. The two (2) CV-2B Caribou aircraft presently allocated to IICorps are available for a total of 160 aircraft hours per month. In orderto maintain courier flights, perform necessary command, liaison, adminis-trative, and logistical functions, support Special Forces and meet require-ments for VIP parties, II Corps has a TJinimw requirement in excess of 292hours per month. On 10 March, this requirement will increase to 327 hoursper month. Each month it is necessary to cancel regularly scheduled flightsin order to fly higher priority missions.

b. Presently, II Corps operates a scheduled courier flight throughout the Corps Zone on 5 days per week. This expends approximately 110 air-craft hours per month. There is an existing requirement to increase this to6 days per week, or a minimum of 132 flight hours per month. Availablecourier flight space for both personnel and cargo is inadequate to meet de-mand.

c. Support of II CALC activities requires 100 aircraft hours permonth. Less then 50 hours per month can be allocated at present. Upon as-sumption of logistical support for the 25th Division at Quang Egal on 10March 1963, the II CALC requirement will increase to an estimated minimumof 135 hours per month.

d. Support of Special Forces activities requires approximately60 hours per month. Only a small portion of this requirement can be met,necessitating delay in Special Forces activities and causing sensitive orpriority cargo to be transported overland. Special Forces has a require-ment for delivery of 80,000 pounds of cargo per month at Meg Buk. Atpresent supplies are being air dropped resulting in an estimated 30% lossdue to damage. With additional CV-2B aircraft, these supplies can be de-livered with the "touch and go" system.

e. There is an ever increasing requirement for transportation inorder to conduct planning and coordination conferences. The tempo of "Clearand Hold" Operations in II CTZ has reached the level where increased govern-mental support activities has generated a corresponding increased aviationsupport requirements. The movement of Medical Teams, equipment, supplies,emergency food and clothing for refugees and equipment for Strategic Hamletsare a few of the areas now requiring aviation support.

TAb N-2 TAB N-2

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tiAGTN-IIC March 1963SUBJECT: Request For Additional Aviation Support

f. It is often necessary to use CH-21C helicopters for movement ofcargo which could be more economically moved by Caribou. Use of helicoptersin this type support reduces the number of aircraft available for airmobileoperations.

3. (C) In view of the facts listed above, it is urgently requested thatfull consideration be given this matter and steps be taken to expedite alloca-tion of two additional CV-2B Caribou in support of II Corps.

/s/Hal D. Mc Cowm/t/HAL D. Mc COWN

Colonel, InfantrySenior Advisor

2Page 2 Page 2Ta/ 11-2 TAB N-2

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U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPIII CORPS

SAIGON, VIETNAM

KAGTN-IIIC-3 8 March 1963

M&ORAL±DUM FOR: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Ccmand,. Vietnam,Saigon

Chief, U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam,Saigon

Chief, U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance AdvisoryGroup) Vietnam, Saigon

SUBJCT: Army Fixed-Wing Aircraft Requirements, III Conpe

1. GEERAL:

a. During recent months there have been a variety of proposalsfrom various sources regarding the employment of Army aircraft. Consequently,it is considered desirable to reappraise from the viewpoint of a Corps SeniorAdvisor certain conclusions and recomendations regarding the asignment andemployment of Army fixed-wing aircraft in support of III Corps and subordinateunit advisory staffs.

b. Different agencies have needs for different types of aircraft.There is a need in South Vietnam for medium and heavy airlift, such a. maybe furnished by the C-123. III Corps has no need for C-123's in directsupport. III Corps does very definitely have a requirement for light airliftaircraft, such as the CV-2B Caribou, in direct support. What is more, IIICorps Advisory Detachment requires these aircraft, and all aircraft, on botha preplanned and an imediate-reeponse basis.

c. A big selling point of Army Aiation has been its iMaediateresponsiveness to the needs of the user, because the aircraft are assignedto him and are controlled by him. This is fundamental in justification ofaviation organic to the Army, and any move to take control frm the user wouldrepresent a stop backward. For example, because the roads in manW areas ofSouth Vietnam are not secure, there is often a requirement to move sallnumbers of troops and supplies by air. If the Corps Advisory Staff wererequired to go to another agency for the aircraft, with all of the telephonecalls, coordination, and Justification attendant upon the aircraft request,the aircraft would not be imediately responsive to the requirmont.

2. Present Stationing Plan of Army Fixed-Winm Aircraft. III Corps.The following fixed-wing aircraft, from the units indicated, are stationedand provide support to III Corps as follows:

AIRCisAFT MISSION STATIONI

1 U-IA 'rom 18th Trans Co DS SA 23d Div BAN ME THUOTU-lA from 18th Trans Co GS III Corps SAI"VCV-2B from lt Avn Co GS III Corps VUNK TAU

3. Fixed-Wing Aircraft Situation. Outlook. and Requiremente.

TAB N-3 TAB N-3

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r,&jTt4-IIIC-3 8 Mar 1963JUJaCT: Ariy Fixud-4,.ing Aircraft Requirements, III Corps

a. CV-2B Caribou.

(1) At present, the two CV-2B Caribou are barely adequate toa the Corps advisory effort with supply and personnel airlift. Utili-

zation varies, fro,.i a very few occasions wt.en they are not used at all, to dayswhen both are used extensively, and two or three more could be effectivelyemployed. These two airplanes cannot adequately support requirements of ourAhVN counterparts, nor is their use so intended at this time.

(2) The Caribou is a multi-purpose aircraft, designed for forwardbattle area tactical nd logistical support, and was not intended solely forrirlift of cargo. This aircraft was designed with a short field landing andtake off capability. Consequently, it is and should remain assigned andemployed by tactical units in a variety of "work horse" type missions. Anyaircraft can rrovide effective communication and coordination, and the CV-2Bitself is admiraoly suited for command and stiff liaison between Corps Head-quarters and subordinate elements. One of the best methods to execute F4ACV,MAAG, arid GViJ policy in Vietnam is through face-to-face contact between higher

and lower headquarters advisors and between ARVW commanuers and their sub-ordinates. In this Con s, CV-2B aircraft have been and are being used forthis purpose when necessary, and the success of such missions is not to bemeasured in ton-miles.

(3) With two additioal CV-2B aircraft, it would be possibleto increase our regularly schedu.ed "milk-run" flights, still reserving oneaircraft for special missions. By so doing, we could serve our field detach-ments better, and also, to a degree, accomnodate our ARVN counterparts itcertain valid inspection and coordination missions. This latter type missionundoubtedly accelerates the accomplishment of US objectives in Vietnam, andin this th.e ARVN coa.manuers ire presently neither provided with their ownorganic aviation nor hith iPLaediately responsive support from VNAF.

b. U-lA Otters.

(1) The U-lA Otters have proven to be possibly the most valuablesingle type of aircraft in this country, filling a critical need for movementof small numbers of person, el or small amounts of supplies into small airfields,when a TO-lB airplane would be too small to ao the job, and larger airplanes(or helicopters) would be unfeasible or uneconomical. The fact that theseaircraft have been employed so well is to the credit to the 18th TransportationCompany.

(2) ,ithin III Corps, Otters are urgently needed on a dailyflyable basis, as follows:

(a) One each in support of Senior Advisors to the 5thand 23d Division and one in support of Senior Advisor to PFUOC BINH TFANHSpecial Zone.

(b) At least one aircraft in support of Hq III Corps.

(3) U-6A Beaver airplanes could be utilized in some cases forthe above roles, and in many cases more economically. However, the cost ofthe higher-payload Otter is not so much greater as to justify replacing itwith the smaller airplane.

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MAGTN-IIIC-3 8 March 1963SUBJECT Army Fixed-Wing Aircraft Requirements, III Corps

c. TG-ID Bird Dogs.

(1) This headquarters has been criticized for using largeaircraft for "L-19 missions". The answer to this is not to cancel the mission,which takes first consideration, but to provide the L-19's. The L-19 (TO-ID),where available in Vietnam has become a valuable and inexpensive vehicle forlight-load missions. In this Corps, it could be used for numerous one-manmissions (such as pay runs), for reconnaissance prior to operations, for commndand control during operations, and for a multitude of administrative flightsbetween higher and lower headquarters. It would be useful to assign one ofthese to each Sector Advisor plus all higher headquarters, which would requireapproximately twenty aircraft. It would be extremely useful to assign twoeach in support of Senior Advisors to the Divisions, PHUOC BINH THANH SpecialZone and Headquarters III Corps.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. The effectiveness of the U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam isclosely allied to the availability of Army aircraft for liaison, coordination,communication, mobility, and forward area administrative and logisticalsupport.

b. The pe son or agency that uses aircraft must have operationalcontrol of those aircraft. So long as Army aircraft cannot be assigned orattached to Corps Advisory Teams, they must at the least be placed in directsupport of the Corps Senior Advisor.

c. A requirement exists within III Corps for a total of four CV-2Baircraft on a flyable daily basis.

d. A requirement exists within III Corps for a total of four flyableU-IA Otter airplanes on a daily basis.

e. A requirement exists within III Corps for a total of eight TO-3Dairplanes, both for their own demonstrated usefulness and to prevent thenecessity for filling their missions with larger aircraft or with helicopters.

6. RECOOMDATIONS:

a. That two additional CV-2B aircraft be assigned in direct supportof Senior Advisor, III Corps. for a total of four such aircraft.

b. That a total of four U-IA Otters on a daily flyable basis beassigned in direct support of Senior Advisor, III Corps.

c. That a total of eight TO-ID Bird Dog airplanes be obtained andassigned in direct support of Senior Advisor, III Corps.

/s/Wilbur Wilson/t/WILAJR WILSON

Colonel, InfantrySenior Advisor

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ACTIV-AMMonthly Test Report Number 2 - Caribou

ANNEX 0 - Ground Fire Damage to Aircraft.

1. During the period 1 March to 31 Farch 1963, five Caribou aircraftwere hit by mall-arms ground fire; two of the five lhad to be grouned forrepair of damage.

2. Location of hits on the five aircraft are shown cn succeedingpages. A summary of hits follows:

Date Geographic Number Days fora. Aircraft numbcr Hit Location of hits repair pages

60-5441 10 Mar Can Tho 1 flone* 2

60-5438 13 Yar Tabat 1 1i 2

61-2394 14 Mar Trung lap 4 10 2 and 3

60-5439 20 Mar Unknown 1 None* 1, and 4

61-2389 22 Mar Gia Vuc 1 Ncnep * 1, 2, 3 and 4

* Repaired during PE. No time lost for repair.

b. Point of bullet entry:

Bottom of aircraft - 5

Right side - 0

Left side - 3

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1

A/C 60-5439 - 9

Left HandA/ C 60-5439

A/C 61-2389Round did notpenetrate cargodoor of A/C

Li.MD: 0 Circled dot indicates hit on aircraft06- indicates path of projectile

ge Pace 1

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COFIENIA

* £ CONFIDENTIAL

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cargo 612318939

22 MarGia Vuc

LECND: 0 Circled dot indicates hit om aircraft0- indicates path of projectile

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LJX;I: G Circled dot inL'v vt ilt an :ircraft0-Indicates path )f projectile

ToB 0 A~

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