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AUSTRALIAN VETERINARY EMERGENCY PLAN

AUSVETPLAN1996

Disease Strategy

Rinderpest

AUSVETPLAN is a series of technical response plans that describe the proposedAustralian approach to an exotic animal disease incursion. The documents provide

guidance based on sound analysis, linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordinationand emergency-management plans.

Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand

This Disease Strategy forms part of:

AUSVETPLAN Edition 2.0, 1996[AUSVETPLAN Edition 1.0, was published in 1991]

This strategy will be reviewed regularly. Suggestions and recommendations foramendments should be forwarded to the AUSVETPLAN Coordinator (see Preface).

Record of amendments to this manual:

There are occasional minor differences in the page breaks between the paper and this electronicversion which we can unfortunately not avoid.

© Commonwealth of Australia and each of its States and Territories 1996ISBN 0 642 24506 1

This work is copyright and apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may bereproduced without the written permission from the publisher, the Department of Primary Industries andEnergy, acting on behalf of the Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and NewZealand (ARMCANZ). Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed tothe AUSVETPLAN Coordinator.

The Commonwealth/States/Territories gives no warranty that the information contained in AUSVETPLAN iscorrect or complete. The Commonwealth shall not be liable for any loss howsoever caused whether due tonegligence or other arising from use or reliance on this code.

Manual 7 of 12

AUSTVETPLAN Rinderpest

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PREFACE

This Disease Strategy for the control and eradication of rinderpest is an integral part ofthe Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan , AUSVETPLAN (Edition 2.0).AUSVETPLAN structures and functions are described in the Summary Document.

This strategy sets out the disease control principles that were approved in February 1991by the then Australian Agricultural Council out-of-session at meeting 135, for use in ananimal health emergency caused by the introduction of rinderpest into Australia. Thestrategy has been upgraded and approved by the Agriculture and Resource ManagementCouncil of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ), out-of-session in January 1996.

Rinderpest is designated as a List A disease by the Office International des Epizooties(OIE). List A diseases are ‘Communicable diseases which have the potential for seriousand rapid spread, irrespective of national borders; which are of serious socioeconomic orpublic health importance and which are of major importance in the international trade ofanimals and animal products’. The principles contained in this document for the diagnosisand management of an outbreak of rinderpest conform with the OIE InternationalAnimal Health Code 1992 (OIE Code; see Appendix 3).

Rinderpest is currently included in the list of diseases for which arrangements exist underthe Commonwealth/States cost-sharing agreement for the eradication of certain exoticanimal diseases. Information on the cost-sharing arrangements can be found in theAUSVETPLAN Summary Document and Valuation and Compensation Manual .

Detailed instruction for the field implementation of the strategies are contained in theAUSVETPLAN Operational Procedures Manuals and Management Manuals. Crossreference to strategies, manuals and other AUSVETPLAN documents are expressed in theform:

Document Name, Section no.For example, Decontamination Manual, Section 3 .

In addition, Exotic Diseases of Animals: A Field Guide for Australian Veterinarians byW.A. Geering, A.J. Forman and M.J. Nunn, Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra, 1995 (Exotic Diseases Field Guide) is a source for some of the informationabout the aetiology, diagnosis and epidemiology of the disease and should be read inconjunction with this strategy.

This strategy will be reviewed regularly. Suggestions and recommendations foramendments should be forwarded to:

The AUSVETPLAN CoordinatorAnimal Diseases/Incidents SectionLivestock and Pastoral DivisionDepartment of Primary Industries and EnergyGPO Box 858Canberra ACT 2601Tel: (06) 272 5540; Fax: (06) 272 3372


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Membership of writing group

Graham Gregory (convenor) Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, TAS

Bill Geering Bureau of Resource Sciences (Cwlth), ACT

Peter Hooper Australian Animal Health Laboratory, VIC

Ian Douglas Department of Primary Industries, QLD

The writing group was responsible for drafting this strategy. However, the text may havebeen amended at various stages of the consultation/approval process and the policiesexpressed in this version do not necessarily represent the views of all members of thewriting group. Contributions may also have been made by other people not listed aboveand the assistance of all involved is gratefully acknowledged.


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CONTENTS

PREFACE....................................................................................................................... iii

Membership of writing group....................................................................................... iv

1 NATURE OF THE DISEASE ................................................................................. 1

1.1 Aetiology................................................................................................... 11.2 Susceptible species.................................................................................... 11.3 Distribution and occurrence in Australia................................................... 21.4 Diagnostic criteria ..................................................................................... 2

1.4.1 Clinical signs ................................................................................. 3Cattle.............................................................................................. 3Sheep and goats ............................................................................. 3Buffalo ........................................................................................... 4Pigs ................................................................................................ 4

1.4.2 Pathology....................................................................................... 4Gross lesions.................................................................................. 4Microscopic lesions (histopathology) ............................................ 4

1.4.3 Laboratory tests ............................................................................. 4Specimens required........................................................................ 4Transport of specimens.................................................................. 4Laboratory diagnosis ..................................................................... 5

1.4.4 Differential diagnosis..................................................................... 51.5 Resistance and immunity .......................................................................... 5

1.5.1 Innate and passive immunity ......................................................... 61.5.2 Active immunity ............................................................................ 61.5.3 Vaccination.................................................................................... 6

1.6 Epidemiology ............................................................................................ 61.6.1 Incubation period........................................................................... 61.6.2 Persistence of virus........................................................................ 7

General properties/environment..................................................... 7Live animals................................................................................... 8Animal products and by-products.................................................. 8Fomites .......................................................................................... 8

1.6.3 Modes of transmission................................................................... 8Live animals................................................................................... 8Artificial breeding.......................................................................... 8Animal products and by-products.................................................. 9Fomites .......................................................................................... 9Windborne spread.......................................................................... 9Vectors........................................................................................... 9

1.6.4 Factors influencing transmission ................................................... 91.7 Manner and risk of introduction................................................................ 9

2 PRINCIPLES OF CONTROL AND ERADICATION ......................................... 10

2.1 Introduction............................................................................................... 102.2 Methods to prevent spread and eliminate pathogens................................. 10


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2.2.1 Quarantine and movement controls ............................................... 10Quarantine of infected premises or areas....................................... 10Movement control.......................................................................... 11Zoning............................................................................................ 11

2.2.2 Tracing........................................................................................... 112.2.3 Surveillance ................................................................................... 112.2.4 Treatment of infected animals ....................................................... 122.2.5 Destruction of animals................................................................... 122.2.6 Treatment of products and by-products......................................... 122.2.7 Disposal ......................................................................................... 122.2.8 Decontamination............................................................................ 132.2.9 Vaccination.................................................................................... 132.2.10 Wild animal control ....................................................................... 132.2.11 Vector control ................................................................................ 132.2.12 Sentinel and restocking measures.................................................. 132.2.13 Public awareness ........................................................................... 14

2.3 Feasibility of control in Australia.............................................................. 14

3 POLICY AND RATIONALE.................................................................................. 15

3.1 Overall policy for rinderpest ..................................................................... 153.2 Strategy for control and eradication .......................................................... 16

3.2.1 Stamping out.................................................................................. 163.2.2 Quarantine and movement controls ............................................... 16

Zoning............................................................................................ 173.2.3 Treatment of infected animals ....................................................... 173.2.4 Treatment of animal products and by-products ............................. 173.2.5 Vaccination.................................................................................... 173.2.6 Tracing and surveillance................................................................ 183.2.7 Decontamination............................................................................ 18

3.3 Social and economic effects...................................................................... 183.4 Criteria for proof of freedom..................................................................... 193.5 Funding and compensation ....................................................................... 193.6 Selected strategy if the disease becomes established ................................ 20

APPENDIX 1 Guidelines for classifying declared areas................................... 21

APPENDIX 2 Recommended quarantine and movement controls ................. 22

APPENDIX 3 OIE International Animal Health Code .................................... 24

APPENDIX 4 Procedures for surveillance and proof of freedom ................... 31

APPENDIX 5 Procedures for vaccination ......................................................... 32

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................... 33

Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 35

REFERENCES............................................................................................................... 36

Video/training resources....................................................................................... 37OIE publications................................................................................................... 37

INDEX ............................................................................................................................ 38


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1 NATURE OF THE DISEASE

Rinderpest (cattle plague) is an acute, usually fatal, viral disease, principally of cattle,which is spread by direct contact. An outbreak of the classical disease is characterised bysudden onset, fever, inflammation and necrosis of the mucous membranes, manifested byerosive stomatitis, gastroenteritis and dehydration. Mortality usually approaches 100%.Dysentery is a common feature of the disease, accompanied by rapid respiration anddischarge from the nose and eyes.

1.1 Aetiology

The rinderpest virus is a member of the genus Morbillivirus of the familyParamyxoviridae. Viruses in the same genus include the causative agents of peste despetits ruminants (PPR), canine distemper, human measles, and the newly identified ‘acuteequine respiratory syndrome’.

There is only one serotype of rinderpest, but there are a number of strains that vary in theirpathogenic potential. Some strains of minimal pathogenicity exist in endemic areas(Taylor 1986).

1.2 Susceptible species

Cattle and buffalo• Cattle and buffalo are highly susceptible and rinderpest is most frequently seen in

these species.

• Bos indicus (zebu) breeds of cattle have more resistance than Bos taurus (European)breeds.

• In endemic areas the spread of the disease is reduced by the presence of more resistantbreeds of cattle and immunity in previously infected animals. In this situation it isusually young animals that are infected.

Sheep and goats• There are many reports of sheep and goats in close contact with infected cattle

becoming infected and developing clinical signs (Narayanaswamy and Ramani 1973,Ramani et al 1974).

• Serious clinical rinderpest among sheep and goats is uncommon and it is more likelythat seroconversion occurs, with subclinical or inapparent infection that is not readilytransmitted back to cattle (El Hag Ali 1973, Wafula and Kariuki 1987, Anderson et al1990a, b).

• Sheep and goats can act as inapparent transmitters (Scott and Provost 1992) and inEast Africa the virus has been known to affect sheep without spreading to goats; andgoats without apparently involving sheep (Plowright 1968). Rinderpest is unlikely tooccur in sheep and goats without simultaneous involvement of bovines.

Camels• Inapparent infection develops in camels but is not transmitted to other animals.


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Deer• The susceptibility to infection of farmed and feral deer species in Australia is

unknown, but it is assumed that they can become infected and transmit the disease.

Pigs• European pigs can be infected but rarely develop serious disease. Feral pigs in

Australia are predominantly of European origin.

• Asian pigs are more susceptible and can transmit the disease back to cattle (Ramani etal 1974).

• Infection is by ingestion or by contact with infected cattle or pigs (Weston 1924,Plowright 1968).

Native animals• No disease developed in two kangaroos and two possums inoculated or drenched with

infected blood (Robertson 1924).

• As rinderpest is restricted to ruminants and pigs in other countries, there is no reason tosuspect that the disease would establish itself in populations of Australian nativeanimals. Disease in wildlife in Africa is not maintained without simultaneous diseasein cattle.

Humans• Rinderpest does not infect humans.

1.3 Distribution and occurrence in Australia

Rinderpest originated around the Caspian Basin many centuries ago, and spread withmarauding armies throughout Europe and Asia causing death and devastation. It wasintroduced into the horn of Africa in 1889 and in the seven years to 1896 a pandemicspread throughout Africa killing 90% of the cloven-hoofed animals in its path. This wasthe most devastating visitation of a disease on an animal population.

Rinderpest was introduced into Australia in 1923 in cattle on a ship also containing Asianpigs. It was, however, quickly eradicated (Weston 1924).

Through successful eradication programs the distribution of rinderpest is now limited, as at1992, to four countries in Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan), and occurs in theNear East and India. Eradication campaigns are active in Africa, the Middle East and theIndian subcontinent, aiming at global eradication by the year 2010.

An outbreak of rinderpest was confirmed in the Landhi Dairy Colony, Karachi, Pakistan,in May 1993, in outbreaks around Lahore in April 1994 and in the northern areas ofPakistan in September 1994. Disease eradication programs are continuing.

1.4 Diagnostic criteria

[See Glossary for terms not defined in the text]

Rinderpest should be suspected when acute fever with diarrhoea is accompanied byerosions of the mouth linings and high mortality. Rapid spread from animal to animal andherd to herd can occur, with animals of all ages becoming sick and dying. Any diseaseoutbreak with these features is highly suggestive of rinderpest.



1.4.1 Clinical signs[For terms not defined in the text see Glossary]

Cattle• Acute cases are characterised by the sudden onset of a rapidly-mounting fever, which

reaches 40o–42oC by the second or third day after onset, and remains high for the next3–5 days.

• Early in the fever individuals may show depression, loss of appetite, congestion of thevisible mucosae, watery discharges from the eyes and nose, drying of the muzzle,constipation, harshness of the hair coat and, in the case of dairy animals, loss of milkproduction. None of these symptoms permits a diagnosis of rinderpest.

• From the second or third day of fever, shallow necrotic erosions appear on the lowerlip and gums and, increasing in extent and severity, become the dominant feature ofthe remainder of the fever. Ultimately these lesions, which are characteristic ofrinderpest, may be found on the underside of the free portion of the tongue, on thefloor of the mouth, on and between the buccal papillae, on the margin between theupper lip and dental pad, and on and between the ridges of the hard palate. Erosionsmay also be noticed on the lining of the front of the nose and on the vulva and vagina.Eye and nasal discharges become profuse and assume a mucopurulent character andthe animal's breath becomes strongly foetid.

• Profuse diarrhoea usually commences two or three days after the onset of mouthlesions. Watery at first, it later contains mucus, blood and fragments of necroticepithelium and results in dehydration, weakness and prostration in animals notsuccumbing in the early stages of the disease. Most animals die 6–12 days after theonset of clinical signs, but some animals recover after a period of diarrhoea lastingsome 4–5 days.

• When the virus is first introduced into a fully susceptible bovine population it is highlyprobable that some or all of the above manifestations of classic rinderpest will be seenand that the mortality rate, which may vary initially between 30% and 100%, willincrease with repeated transmissions. Under these circumstances it is even possiblethat peracute cases will occur.

• Conversely there are some field strains that are only moderately pathogenic and whichappear to retain this characteristic when passaged in susceptible cattle. It is not knownhow such strains would behave if introduced into a large and fully susceptiblepopulation but it should not be assumed that they would automatically give rise to theacute form of the disease. Rather, the fever would be brief and accompanied by thetransient appearance of mouth lesions and a short and light bout of diarrhoea. It wouldbe difficult to make a diagnosis based entirely on clinical appearance.

Sheep and goats• Sheep and goats can be affected and develop clinical signs including fever, loss of

appetite, mucopurulent eye and nasal discharges, laboured breathing, congestion andnecrosis of the mouth lining and diarrhoea. Narayanaswamy and Ramani (1973)reported great variation in the clinical picture of rinderpest in sheep and recent opinionsuggests that the signs in sheep and goats may be caused by PPR.

• In the clinical form a high fever (41–42oC) lasts 3–4 days; pin point discrete orcoalescent erosions emerge on the lining of the mouth and are prominent on the gums



and lips. There is concomitant mucopurulent nasal discharge, conjunctivitis andrespiratory distress. Diarrhoea is also a dominant sign. Lambs suffer more severelythan adults, and total mortalities range from 70–90%. Death generally occurs 3–7 daysafter the onset of fever.

Buffalo• Assumed to be similar to cattle.

Pigs• In European pigs only mild symptoms usually develop with transient fever.

• Asian pigs may develop typical clinical symptoms and suffer high mortality (Ramaniet al 1974).

1.4.2 Pathology

Gross lesionsPostmortem findings include a dehydrated carcase; fluid faeces, containing blood andfaecal staining of the legs; erosions of the mucosa in the mouth, pharynx and oesophagus;congestion, oedema and erosion of the abomasal mucosa; prominent necrotic Peyers'patches; congestion and erosion of the mucosa of the large intestine especially along thelongitudinal folds giving a ‘tiger (or zebra) striping’ appearance.

Microscopic lesions (histopathology)Histopathology findings are characterised by lymphocyte and epithelial necrosis and bythe formation of multinucleated giant cells containing intracytoplasmic and intranuclearinclusions in the germinal centres in lymphatic tissues and in stratified squamous epithelialcells.

1.4.3 Laboratory tests

Animal specimens should initially be sent to the State or Territory diagnostic laboratoryfrom where they will be forwarded to the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL),Geelong for exotic disease testing after obtaining the necessary clearance from the chiefveterinary officer (CVO) of the State or Territory of the disease outbreak and informingthe CVO of Victoria (for transport of the specimens to Geelong).

Specimens requiredRinderpest virus is most easily isolated during the early acute stage of the disease whenclinical signs are still apparent. The specimens that should be collected from the liveanimal include blood (whole EDTA, and clotted), lymph node fluid or biopsy, necroticmaterial from oral lesions and lachrymal fluid. Specimens for virus isolation are besttaken from animals with a high temperature and before diarrhoea has started (eg look forthe early less obvious cases).

At postmortem fresh samples of spleen, lymph nodes and affected sections of alimentarytract mucosa should be collected for virus isolation. Samples of tonsil, tongue, spleen,lymph nodes, and affected parts of the alimentary tract should be collected forhistopathology. Postmortem samples should be collected only from animals slaughteredfor the purpose or very fresh carcases.

Transport of specimensAll unpreserved tissue samples, swab and biopsy material, and whole blood should bechilled and forwarded with water ice or frozen gel packs. If the journey is expected to lastmore than 72 hours the samples should be frozen and forwarded packed in dry ice. For



further information see the Laboratory Preparedness Manual, Section 6 andAppendix 3.

Laboratory diagnosisAAHL tests. Tests currently available at AAHL for the laboratory confirmation ofdiagnosis of rinderpest are shown in Table 1. These tests include virus isolation, serumneutralisation and histopathology. Animal inoculation tests can also be used todemonstrate the host range of the virus. A diagnosis would not be available for more thana week.

Table 1 Diagnostic tests currently available for rinderpest at AAHL

Test Specimenrequired

Test detects Time taken toobtain result

Virus isolation tissue/whole EDTAblood

virus 5–7 days

Serum neutralisation serum antibody 6–7 days

Histopathology tissue samples microscopic changes 2 days

Animal inoculation virus isolate host range 10 days

Electron microscopy tissue samples virus 1 day

Source: Information provided by AAHL, 1995 [refer to AAHL for most up-to-date information].

Other tests. Other tests not currently available in Australia include an immunocaptureenzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) specific for rinderpest antigen, anddifferential immunohistochemical staining that differentiates PPR from rinderpest. Crossvirus serum neutralisation tests or the competitive ELISA using monoclonal antibodieswill distinguish rinderpest from PPR antibodies (Anderson et al 1991), but as both diseasesare unlikely to occur in Australia at the same time either a serum neutralisation test usingrinderpest antigen or the indirect ELISA would be the test of choice.

1.4.4 Differential diagnosis

The following diseases must be considered in the differential diagnosis of rinderpest incattle:

• foot-and-mouth disease• malignant catarrhal fever• bovine virus diarrhoea• infectious bovine rhino-tracheitis

Rinderpest is distinguished by the characteristic non-vesicular lesions not involving thefeet, high morbidity, and mortality approaching 100%. The other diseases rarely involveboth high morbidity and high mortality.

1.5 Resistance and immunity

Susceptible cattle of all ages, sexes and breeds can be infected with rinderpest virus anddevelop serious clinical disease. In countries free of rinderpest, its introduction is dreadedas it is believed that in such susceptible populations the disease would spread rapidly andmortality would be high. This may not always be so, however, because of variations in thepathogenicity of virus strains and differences of susceptibility among breeds of cattle.



1.5.1 Innate and passive immunity

In general, zebu breeds (Bos indicus) of cattle have more resistance than European breeds(Bos taurus). European breeds have been seriously affected in outbreaks that wererelatively mild among native African cattle.

Australia's cattle population has a significant proportion of zebu-type animals, and if thedisease first occurred in such animals, the classic expression of disease may be muted, asBos indicus tends to have some innate resistance to the disease.

As the disease has been widespread in Asia and Africa, all breeds must be considered to besusceptible.

Calves suckling immune cows in the first 12–34 hours after birth acquire passiveimmunity, which is protective for several months.

1.5.2 Active immunity

Antibodies appear around the sixth day of the disease and recovered cattle are solidlyimmune and resistant to re-infection for life.

All rinderpest virus strains are immunologically the same. The most important variationsbetween strains are the host affinity, pathogenicity and transmissibility.

1.5.3 Vaccination

Attenuated (‘live’) vaccines are used in the control of rinderpest. The choice of vaccine touse is complicated by the differing responses that a vaccine produces in different types ofcattle. In general the vaccine virus needs to be more attenuated for use in European cattlethan for zebu breeds.

In calves passive immunity derived from maternal antibodies in the colostrum, willprovide protection against infection for 4–9 months. This means that vaccination of calvesless than 9 months old with rinderpest virus may not be effective in producing immunity.Available vaccines are shown in Table 2.

1.6 Epidemiology

1.6.1 Incubation period

The incubation period in susceptible animals may be as short as 2–3 days (Nawathe andLamorde 1983 and ranges up to 15 days (Scott 1981). A period of 8–15 days may passbefore clinical signs are seen in in-contact animals. This results from the maximumexcretion of virus 3–7 days after signs have developed in the primary case. The maximumincubation period under the OIE Code is 21 days (see Appendix 3).

The strain of the virus, dosage and route of exposure may also influence the course of thedisease so that the interval between the index case and secondary cases may approximatetwo weeks and the rapidity of within-herd spread following introduction is an inconsistentdiagnostic feature. However, most cattle in infected herds become infected within 3–4weeks of initial contact.

Table 2 Attenuated virus vaccines available for control of rinderpest

Vaccine Uses



Cell culture vaccine The "Muguga modification" of the RBOKvirulent strain, propagated in cell-cultures, isnow accepted worldwide as safe for all breedsand species into which it has been inoculated.This vaccine virus is non-contagious andgenetically stable on cattle passage. Theduration of clinical immunity, following a simple,effective vaccination, is at least 11 years andprobably lifelong.

Rabbit-adapted virus(lapinised virus vaccine)

Sufficiently attenuated to avoid severe reactionsin susceptible animals but is too attenuated foruse in zebu-type animals. Vaccination providesabout 2 years protection. It was developed inJapan and is rarely used.

Goat-adapted virus Produces lifelong immunity in zebu cattle and inareas where some natural immunity isanticipated. It is still sufficiently virulent toproduce undesirable reactions in Europeancattle. [It is now held to be an undesirableproduct due to problems with quality control andthe inclusion of extraneous viral pathogens(bluetongue virus, goat retrovirus) cannot beexcluded].

1.6.2 Persistence of virus

General properties/environment• The half life of rinderpest virus in cattle blood, spleen or lymph node at 56oC is 5

minutes.

• The virus may survive in culture for at least 4 months at –20oC, 8 weeks at 4oC, 1 weekat 20–25oC and over 2.6 days at 37oC (Plowright 1968).

• There is rapid inactivation of the virus at temperatures above 70oC (De Boer andBarber 1964) but there is no confirmation that in milk it is destroyed by pasteurisation.

• At 4oC rinderpest virus is most stable at pH 7.2–7.9, with a half life of 3.7 days(Plowright 1968), and is inactivated at pH values less than 5.6 or greater than 9.6(Geering et al 1995).

• The virus is rapidly inactivated at environmental temperatures, by ultraviolet light anddesiccation as follows:– contaminated enclosures devoid of vegetation may be infective for cattle for a

maximum of 48 hours after the removal of infected animals;– contaminated buildings without ventilation or sunlight may only remain infective

for 48–96 hours; and– contaminated pasture may remain infective for only 6–8 hours if unshaded and for

18–24 hours if shaded (Plowright 1968).

Rinderpest virus is sensitive to a wide range of disinfectants due to its large size, lipid-containing envelope and sensitivity to both acid and alkali conditions (see Section 2.2.8).



Live animalsRecovered animals carry the virus for no longer than three weeks and develop solidimmunity and a high antibody titre (Nawathe and Lamorde 1983). There is no knownchronic carrier state.

Pregnant animals may abort 2–12 weeks after recovery, and foetal discharges may containinfectious virus (Plowright 1968). The aborting cows are not viraemic and their seracontain high levels of antibodies (Scott and Provost 1992). Vaginal discharges from cowsthat abort have been found to be infectious up to 12 weeks after abortion (Plowright 1968),but Wafula et al (1989) reported no virus in vaginal discharges later than 24 hours afterabortion (see also Artificial breeding, below).

Sheep, goats, camels and wild African ruminants can all be subclinically infected withrinderpest and may act as inapparent carriers.

Animal products and by-productsRinderpest virus is rapidly inactivated by autolysis and putrefaction so will not survivemore than 24 hours in the carcase of an animal dying from the disease (Plowright 1968,Nawathe and Lamorde 1983).

The pH of muscle falls from about 7.2 at death to between 5.5 and 5.8 about six hourslater. As the rinderpest virus is sensitive to low pH, it is likely to be inactivated in hungmeat However, Ezzat et al (1970) recorded that infected meat kept refrigerated for 7 dayswas still infective to cattle.

Virus is present in milk from 1–2 days before clinical signs develop and exceptionally, hasbeen recorded up to 45 days after clinical recovery (see General properties, above).

FomitesTransmission of the virus over distances by inanimate vectors is unlikely in view of thelow resistance of the virus in the environment.

1.6.3 Modes of transmission

Live animalsInfection spreads to new areas by the movement of infected animals. There is no chroniccarrier state in recovered animals.

Rinderpest is usually transmitted by contact with secretions and excretions from infectedanimals (particularly nasal discharge). Virus is found in expired air, nasal and eyedischarges, saliva, faeces, semen, urine and milk.

The route of entry is the upper or lower respiratory tract, with nasal epithelium being theusual site of the first infection. The first significant virus multiplication probably occurs intonsils and lymph nodes draining the respiratory tract. Viraemia occurs and widespreadviral distribution throughout the body follows.

Cattle can be infected experimentally by any route of inoculation. Infection occurs readilyafter conjunctival or nasal instillation of nasal discharges. The virus cannot pass throughintact skin.

Transmission between herds is principally (but not exclusively) by movement of cattle.

Artificial breedingThe virus is present in all secretions and semen transmission was demonstrated by veryearly work. Very little rinderpest virus is excreted into the reproductive tract of cows.



This level is considered insufficient to adhere to embryos and thus embryo transfer is notconsidered to constitute a risk. Little virus is excreted via the reproductive tract soembryos are unlikely to be a vehicle where approved protocol is observed (Philpott 1993).Additional in vitro and in vivo experimental data is required to substantiate these findings.(See the Artificial Breeding Centres Enterprise Manual. )

Animal products and by-productsIngestion of food contaminated with secretions from infected animals, or ingestion ofinfected meat, is an important form of infection in pigs, and hence of transmission back tocattle.

FomitesRinderpest virus is very unstable and does not persist in the environment (see Section1.6.2). This makes indirect transmission of virus, by clothing or equipment contaminatedwith faeces or other excretions from infected cattle, unlikely.

The virus has been isolated from a number of insects, but they are not consideredimportant factors in transmission.

Windborne spreadAlthough transmission is mainly by aerosol over a short distance (up to 2 metres) wherethe animals are in contact for several hours outdoors or for 15 minutes indoors, spread ofthe virus over several hundred metres is possible at normal wind velocities (Scott andProvost 1992). Airborne spread is most likely to occur at night when the effects ofsunlight and temperature are least (Scott and Provost 1992). High and low humidity aidthe survival of the airborne virus, which is rapidly destroyed when the relative humidity is50–60% (Hyslop 1979, cited by Scott 1985).

Vectors

Insect vectors are not considered to spread rinderpest.

1.6.4 Factors influencing transmission

The virus of rinderpest appears in the blood, excretions and secretions 1–2 days before theappearance of clinical signs. Therefore, infection may be inapparently introduced intostockyards and slaughterhouses, or transported long distances in animals shedding thevirus that have not yet developed clinical signs. Maximum excretion of the virus occurs ondays 3–7 of the fever and ceases when the fever has dissipated. Contact transmission isunlikely in the first 24 hours of the fever or more than 24 hours after the disappearance offever.

Animals other than cattle (ie sheep, goats, camels, wild African ruminants) can all besubclinically infected and may act as inapparent carriers.

1.7 Manner and risk of introduction

The importation of an infected animal is an almost absolute pre-requisite for theintroduction of rinderpest into Australia. As the virus survives poorly outside the host,contaminated clothing or equipment or smuggled meat products are not considered to bepotential sources for the introduction of rinderpest.

The importation of ruminants from endemic countries is not permitted, so the risk ofintroduction by this route is remote.



2 PRINCIPLES OF CONTROL AND ERADICATION

2.1 Introduction

If an outbreak on rinderpest occurs in Australia, the objective will be to eradicate itquickly. Characteristics of the disease that should assist eradication are:

• rapid spread by direct contact so the disease should become apparent soon afterintroduction in a closely-settled area;

• short incubation period;• acute cases are easily diagnosed;• very high mortality;• solid immunity of recovered animals;• serological diagnosis of infected or exposed animals;• disease frequently confined to bovines; and• short survival time of the virus in the environment.

Characteristics that might make rinderpest difficult to eradicate are:

• the possibility of a reservoir of infection in swine and susceptible wildlife ruminants(deer, buffalo, camels); and

• the possibility of undetected disease in areas where stock populations are sparse.

It is unlikely that undetected infection will spread over a large area although this is apossibility in remote areas of Australia.

Eradication will be achieved by the application of strict quarantine procedures on infectedand neighbouring properties and the destruction and disposal of affected and in-contactanimals.

2.2 Methods to prevent spread and eliminate pathogens

2.2.1 Quarantine and movement controls

Rinderpest is usually spread by direct animal contact. The quarantine of affected and in-contact animals to prevent their movement should be effective in preventing the spread ofthe disease (see Appendixes 1 and 2).

Quarantine of infected premises or areasQuarantine of an infected premises (IP) prevents spread of the disease by prohibitingmovement of susceptible stock, products and materials from that place. It is important toapply quarantine measures as early as possible to slow the rate of spread in an area.

As the virus survives for only a few days outside the host in many cases it will besufficient to declare only part of a property as the IP or dangerous contact premises (DCP).In this way not all animals on a property may need to be destroyed. Care must be taken toexamine management practices in deciding which mobs may have been exposed toinfection and to ensure that facilities such as stockyards and shearing facilities are not usedby remaining animals on the property until they can be thoroughly cleaned and disinfectedor ‘spelled’ (kept free from use) for at least one week.



While arrangements for valuation, slaughter and disposal of stock are being made allruminants and pigs should be moved towards the centre of the IP away from its boundariesso as to reduce the risk of contact with animals adjacent to the IP.

Movement controlNo movement of personnel, vehicles and equipment directly contaminated from an IP willbe permitted unless they undergo appropriate cleaning and disinfection. Ruminants orpigs may be sent for immediate slaughter after the disease has been controlled and it hasbeen demonstrated that transmission has ceased on the IP. The declaration of a restrictedarea (RA) around IPs will assist in preventing spread by restricting movements ofpotentially infected materials in the area with direct or indirect contact with the IP. Thedeclaration of a control area (CA) around the RA forms a buffer zone between the RA andthe rest of the industry.

All ruminant and porcine products originating from within the RA must be considered aspotentially contaminated.

Animals for slaughter must go direct to an abattoir in the RA or CA (as appropriate). Theymust not be held in the lairage any longer than the minimum time required for meathygiene purposes (24 hours maximum).

Milk from the RA should be collected at a time when cattle are not in the area around thedairy, as the air vented from the tanker may be contaminated with virus from milk alreadycollected from a property where the disease is incubating. However, the risk of aerosolspread of rinderpest from milk tankers is low and the removal of cattle from the immediatearea only at the time of aerosol production should be sufficient. Milk-fed calves or pigsnormally penned near the dairy should be moved out of the immediate vicinity while theRA is in force. Milk from the RA should go to processing where the heat used will killany potentially present virus.

ZoningOnce the extent of the outbreak has been defined, consideration should be given todeclaring a major part of Australia free from the disease. The free area should be based ongeographic boundaries and should comply with OIE requirements (see Appendix 3) or asdetermined by international clients.

2.2.2 Tracing

Detailed tracing of the movement of animals, animal product and feedstuff to and from theinfected premises or DCP needs to be urgently carried out. As a minimum trace-backprocedures should be implemented to apply to all movements during the period from 21days before the first case seen on that infected premises.

2.2.3 Surveillance

It is important to institute an aggressive surveillance scheme to detect all IPs as soon aspossible. Surveillance will be concentrated upon properties considered to be at riskbecause of recent movement of animals and people from IPs as well as those in closeproximity to IPs. (see Appendix 4 for details). Broad surveillance must be maintained sothat farmers, veterinarians, stock agents, abattoir workers, etc watch for signs of diseaseand promptly report any suspicion of infection.



2.2.4 Treatment of infected animals

There is no effective treatment for rinderpest.

2.2.5 Destruction of animals

As soon as practical after the diagnosis of rinderpest and valuation of stock has been madeall infected and in-contact cattle on the IP will be humanely slaughtered. Animals from aDCP or suspect premises (SP) that are not viraemic — do not show signs and have anormal temperature — may be slaughtered for human consumption, provided they can bemoved safely to an abattoir according to strict guidelines.

A decision to slaughter other mobs of ruminants and pigs on the IP should not be madehastily. The following factors should be considered in determining the risk of infectionbeing present in other herds of cattle, sheep, goats or pigs:

• results of transmission tests undertaken by AAHL;• degree of direct contact that may have occurred with infected animals;• whether pigs have ingested infected material (pigs are usually, but not always infected

by ingestion of infected material);• the likelihood that the disease will die out anyway if the mob is isolated from other

animals;• the likely compensation bill; and• resources available.

As a general rule only the infected mob of cattle should be destroyed, unless evidence ofspread in other animals is obtained clinically or from serological tests. Providedrecommended sanitary measures are taken, the disease will not spread from an isolatedgroup of cattle, sheep, goats or pigs.

It should not be necessary to destroy any buildings or materials as the virus survives foronly a few days (see Section 1.6.2).

2.2.6 Treatment of products and by-products

Milk and milk products that have left the IP during the 4 days before the first case must betraced and suitably heat treated. Although the virus is rapidly inactivated at temperaturesabove 70oC, there is no confirmation that it is destroyed in milk by pasteurisation (seeSection 1.6.2). Heat drying of milk for inclusion in milk powder should inactivate thevirus.

It is unlikely that any virus on wool or fibre would remain infective and spread disease,and salted or frozen meat is unlikely to be important in transmission of disease.

2.2.7 Disposal

Carcases must either be buried, or burned or allowed to decompose if they are protectedfrom scavengers such as feral pigs. Feedstuff and bedding that may have beencontaminated will be buried or burned (see Disposal Procedures Manual, Section 3).

The urgency for burial is not as great as that for a highly infectious disease such as foot-and-mouth disease but care should be taken to ensure proper disposal.



2.2.8 Decontamination

The survival of rinderpest virus in the environment is very limited. After the removal of allinfected animals from the premises the maximum period the virus may survive is 4 days(see Section 1.6.2). In practice the survival time of the virus is likely to be less than this.While a program of property decontamination may seem excessive on epidemiologicalgrounds, it would be justified on the basis of ensuring freedom of infection. As an overallpolicy, decontamination should consist of general cleaning of cowsheds and dairies, andany other building in which infected animals were kept. Faeces and other wastes removedat cleaning should be buried. Specific situations may arise where it would be expedientfor the chief veterinary officer to vary this requirement (see Decontamination Manual).

People who have close contact with infected animals or other material must be adequatelydecontaminated prior to leaving the IP.

The infected premises should remain destocked of ruminants and pigs for 30 days afterinfected stock are slaughtered. Fomites, such as bedding materials, feedstuff, footwear,clothing and stock handling equipment, should be appropriately cleaned and disinfected ordestroyed.

Rinderpest virus has a lipid envelope and is sensitive to high and low pH. These featuresensure a high degree of susceptibility to all disinfectants (see Section 1.6.2). In general,the alkalis (sodium carbonate, sodium hydroxide), the halogens (chlorine) and phenoliccompounds are good for the disinfection of buildings, wooden structures, concretesurfaces, equipment and vehicles. For personal disinfection, citric acid, alcohols andiodophors are suitable. Further information, including dilution rates and trade names areavailable in the Decontamination Manual, Tables 2.10, 3.14 and 4 .

2.2.9 Vaccination

It is unlikely that vaccination would be used for the control of rinderpest in Australia asthe preferred option of quarantine and slaughter should be successful.

Ring vaccination around an outbreak may become necessary if an outbreak was not easilycontrolled by quarantine and slaughter. (See Appendix 5 for details on the use ofvaccine.)

2.2.10 Wild animal control

If rinderpest escapes into the feral buffalo, cattle or deer population, a policy of search andslaughter would be required. If the terrain makes the eradication of feral animals difficultthe formation of a buffer area around the population, either by depopulating the area or byring vaccination, would be required to contain the disease until the feral animals can beeradicated.

2.2.11 Vector control

Insect vectors do not play a role in the transmission of rinderpest. Vermin are unlikely tospread the virus as it is very labile in the environment and would be inactivated before thevermin had travelled any significant distance. Prompt removal of contaminated orpotentially contaminated feedstuff should prevent any small possibility of mechanicalspread by birds.



2.2.12 Sentinel and restocking measures

As the rinderpest virus does not survive for more than 4 days in the environment, the useof specific sentinel animals is not warranted. If the premises have been destocked,restocking should be permitted after a nominal period, say 30 days. If some susceptibleanimals are allowed to remain on the premises they should be tested for antibodies, andrestocking permitted only if no evidence of infection is detected.

For 2 months after repopulation, a property will remain in quarantine, with stockmovement allowed only for direct slaughter. During this period a sample of animals willbe inspected every 2 weeks for the appearance of clinical signs or positive serology.

New stock introduced to an IP may be subject to compensation in the case of abreakdown, so care must be taken to ensure proper decontamination.

2.2.13Public awareness

A media campaign must emphasise the importance of farmers inspecting susceptibleanimals regularly and of reporting suspicious lesions and unusual deaths promptly. Thepublic must not be panicked into avoiding meat products. For further details see thePublic Relations Manual.

2.3 Feasibility of control in Australia

Rinderpest is considered to be a relatively easy disease to control provided adequatemovement restrictions can be enforced. It has been eradicated from Europe and southernAfrica by slaughter of all infected and in-contact animals, and eradication campaigns incurrent endemic areas are aiming at eradicating rinderpest by vaccination and movementcontrol globally by the year 2010. It is highly likely that it would be quickly eradicatedfrom Australia (see Section 2.1).



3 POLICY AND RATIONALE

3.1 Overall policy for rinderpest

Rinderpest is an OIE List A disease that has the potential for rapid spreadwithin herds, serious production loss and which is of major importance in thetrade in cattle and cattle products.

The policy is to eradicate rinderpest in the shortest possible period, whilelimiting economic impact, using a combination of strategies including:

stamping out, which involves quarantine, slaughter of all infected andexposed susceptible animals on infected premises, and sanitary disposal ofdestroyed animals and contaminated animal products, to reduce thesource of infection;

quarantine and movement controls on animals, animal products and thingsin declared areas to prevent spread of infection;

decontamination of facilities, products and things to eliminate the virus oninfected premises and to prevent spread in declared areas;

tracing and surveillance to determine the source and extent of infection andto provide proof of freedom from the disease;

zoning to define infected and disease-free areas; and

an awareness campaign to facilitate cooperation from industry and thecommunity;

Vaccines for rinderpest are used overseas where rinderpest is endemic tocontrol the disease before eradication is attempted. It is not envisaged thatvaccine would be required in Australia.

The disease will result in the loss of overseas markets for a period and thedestruction of animals and economic loss to producers and subsidiaryindustries during the eradication phase. The disease can spread rapidlythrough a herd resulting in up to 100 per cent mortality.

Rinderpest is included in the Commonwealth/States cost-sharing agreement.



The CVO(s) in the State(s)/Territory(s) in which the outbreak(s) occurs will be responsiblefor implementing disease control measures (in accordance with relevant legislation), andwill make ongoing decisions on follow-up disease control measures in consultation withthe Consultative Committee on Exotic Animal Diseases (CCEAD), the State/Territory andCommonwealth governments, and representatives of the affected industries. The detailedcontrol measures adopted will be determined using the principles of control anderadication (Section 2) and epidemiological information about the outbreak. For furtherinformation on the responsibilities of the State/Territory disease control headquarters andlocal disease control centre(s), see the Control Centres Management Manual, Part 1,Sections 3 and 4.

3.2 Strategy for control and eradication

Rinderpest is a disease that in almost all cases will be transmitted by an infected animalalthough other means, such as infected material or windborne spread over several hundredmetres under the right conditions, can cause spread. The best strategy to combat anincursion of rinderpest and to eradicate the disease is the immediate quarantining of IPsand DCPs; imposition of strict movement controls; and slaughter of animals on thequarantined premises to contain and eliminate the main source of virus. The disease willspread rapidly within infected herds but movement between herds will be slowed by tightquarantine and the prevention of movement of animals, people and things. It will benecessary to dispose of infected and contaminated products.

Tracing and surveillance will be required to determine the extent of infection so thatadequate areas can be declared for disease control purposes and to assist in proof offreedom. Decontamination of infected items is an important tool in the elimination ofvirus and the prevention of further spread.

3.2.1 Stamping out

Control measures will be initially directed at the eradication of the disease by stamping outto remove the most dangerous source of the virus and be the best use of availableresources. This will permit the return to international trade within the earliest possibletimeframe.

Stamping out will involve the slaughter of all bovine animals and any in-contact bovineson the declared IPs and significantly exposed animals on DCPs.

It may be possible that the IP or DCP is only a part of the total property, depending on theseparation of animal groups and the management practices in place. Other non-exposedbovines on the property would be placed under quarantine and observed for a period forthe presence of clinical disease. Such decisions, if possible, will prevent the unnecessaryslaughter of a large number of animals.

Sheep, goats and European pigs on DCPs are unlikely to become infected withoutsimultaneous disease in cattle. They should not be slaughtered unless it can be shown thatthey excrete the virus, or that spread is occurring in the mob. The disease is self-limitingin properly quarantined and isolated groups and it is possible to observe and survey theseanimals for a specified time for the presence of disease.



3.2.2 Quarantine and movement controls

Quarantine and movement controls will play a major role in restricting the spread of virusfrom farm to farm and in the prevention of spread between in-contacts and other animalson an IP and DCP. All movements of animals and animal products from IPs and DCPswill be prevented and movements from SPs will be prevented while the premises are underobservation and surveillance. People and things will need to be decontaminated beforeleaving these premises.

Animals will be prohibited from entering the RA and CA as these animals would besubject to slaughter and compensation if they become infected or are in-contact withinfected animals.

The RA area will be of sufficient size to ensure that all IPs, DCPs and as many of the SPsare included and that processing establishments are also within the RA. While wild pigs,deer, buffalo and camels are unlikely to be of major significance in the spread of disease,their proximity must be considered in the declaration of an RA.

The CA will form a buffer of at least 10 km between the infected and free areas andmovement into and out of the area will be controlled. All movement restrictions willremain in force until the disease is under control.

Some animals products may be removed from premises within the RA and CA wheredisease is not present, subject to permit and treatment before release.

For further details on declared areas and movement controls refer to Appendixes 1 and 2.

ZoningThe major part of Australia could be declared a disease-free zone after the extent of initialspread has been defined (see Section 2.2.1). The declaration of a 10 km CA to separateinfected from free areas will comply with OIE guidelines. The establishment of zoningcombined with a stamping-out strategy, with or without vaccination, will enable Australiato be declared free from rinderpest 6 months after the last case. For further details refer toAppendix 3.

3.2.3 Treatment of infected animals

There is no effective treatment for rinderpest.

3.2.4 Treatment of animal products and by-products

Certain products may be removed from premises within the RA or CA subject to permitand treatment. Milk will be permitted to be marketed from selected premises subject toheat treatment for milk powder as pasteurisation may not inactivate the rinderpest virus.

Meat from clinically-free animals in infected areas is not infectious so animals from freepremises within the RA and CA may move direct to slaughter for local consumption. Thecarcases must not be chilled quickly but must be hung to ensure normal pH changes canoccur and decrease to a level that will destroy the rinderpest virus. It may also benecessary to prepare processed meats in a manner that will destroy the virus.

Hides, skins and fibre should be disinfected before removal. Bedding, feed and faecesfrom infected premises must be disinfected and buried. Crops and grains may be removedprovided they are not fed immediately to livestock.



3.2.5 Vaccination

Modification of the stamping-out strategy may be required if the disease becomesestablished in extensive grazing areas or in the feral ruminant or pig populations. Theprincipal modification would be the application of vaccine. The attenuated cell culturevaccine is safe for all species and breeds and provides long-term immunity. It is thevaccine of choice if used for a ring vaccination program to provide a buffer zone ofimmune animals until stock within the restricted area can either be mustered or shot out.Ring vaccination should aim at the effective vaccination of at least 90% of the herd inareas where mustering is a problem. All vaccinated animals must be permanentlyidentified for later commercial slaughter or destruction prior to the declaration of freedom.

3.2.6 Tracing and surveillance

Trace-back of animals, people and things should go back for 21 days before the detectionof the first clinical case. Trace-forward will need to cover the period from 21 days prior tothe first case to the time quarantine was imposed to enable identification of the DCPs andSPs and to determine the extent of the RA.

Surveillance is initially used to assess the extent of infection within the RA, particularly onDCPs and SPs and within the CA. The surveillance strategy will involve inspections ofsuspect stock and in-contacts, examinations of reported illnesses and serological testing,which will include all susceptible species. Surveillance will also be widely used, in theform of serological testing and animal observation, during the period after the disease isunder control and until proof of freedom is obtained.

3.2.7 Decontamination

Decontamination is an important strategy to ensure infected material, people and vehiclesare not removed from an infected premises before adequate disinfection has occurred.While materials of this type do not play an important role in the transmission of disease,they are possible sources of infection.

The decontamination process should also include rodent control.

3.3 Social and economic effects

An uncontrolled outbreak of rinderpest in Africa from 1889 to 1896 killed 90% ofruminants in its path as it spread from the horn of Africa to South Africa. A similar resultcould be expected in an uncontrolled outbreak in Australia.

If the disease can quickly be brought under control there may be negligible disruption tothe community. In a large-scale outbreak, which may take several weeks to control, therewould be severe widespread losses in the cattle industry and possibly in the pig, sheep andgoat industries. The resulting financial losses both at the local level and the loss of exportmarkets would have a serious effect throughout the country. Job losses both on farms andin support industries would occur during a prolonged outbreak.

An outbreak of rinderpest in Australia might reasonably be expected to cause a very highmortality in infected herds. The implementation of a stamping-out policy will not lead tothe loss of many more stock on IPs than the disease itself would cause.



A large outbreak in a dairy area would affect the viability of dairy factories and may resultin short-term shortages.

If rinderpest became endemic, continuing economic loss would occur due to losses inyoung animals and the cost of preventative vaccination. Permanent loss of some marketscould be expected It is, therefore, imperative to act immediately to control, and theneradicate the disease, and to establish Australia's freedom to enable local and exportcommerce to recommence.

Legislation in United States currently prohibits the importation of beef from countries inwhich rinderpest is present, and all meat exports to the United States could therefore cease.It is possible that other countries could also place a ban on imports, at least in the shortterm.

It is of prime importance that interference with normal local trade in animals and animalproducts is restricted to the minimum required to prevent transmission of infection. Thisminimum must also take into consideration any constraints that will apply to a zoningstrategy for international trade purposes. Movement control procedures within the CAshould ensure that, as far as possible, normal local production and distribution of animaland animal products is maintained from ‘free’ properties.

Movement restrictions within the RA and CA will cause some loss of market opportunitiesand associated financial losses to non-affected properties in the area and also to supportindustries such as stock transport.

Meat and milk supplies in the areas near an outbreak may be restricted for a short period.As the international export of meat is likely to be greatly reduced, at least in the short term,meat would only be directed to the domestic market. Prices are likely to fall. If an areasupplying milk to a major population centre is affected, milk shortages and consequenthigher prices could be expected if the outbreak is large in scale. In dairying areas,however, the disease is even more amenable to eradication than in extensive grazing areas,so large-scale outbreaks should not occur.

3.4 Criteria for proof of freedomAccording to OIE guidelines Australia would be considered to be free from rinderpestthree years after the last case, or 6 months after the occurrence of the last case if astamping out policy is practised, whether or not vaccination is also used (see Appendixes 3and 4).

Clinical surveillance should be supported by serological testing of the susceptible animalpopulation in the RA and CA to an appropriate level of confidence to provide sufficientproof that the disease has been eradicated. Details of a suggested surveillance program aregiven in Appendix 4.

If vaccination has to be used, animals would need to be permanently identified andslaughtered commercially when possible. This is necessary as the presence of vaccinalantibodies could mask evidence of transmission or a subsequent outbreak.

As the disease has a short incubation period and does not survive long in the environmentit is unnecessary to impose a sentinel animal restocking program. The farm can be safelyrestocked 30 days after disposal of the last clinical case and the premises quarantined andplaced under surveillance.



3.5 Funding and compensationRinderpest is included in the list of diseases for which arrangements exist under theCommonwealth/States cost-sharing agreement for the eradication of certain exotic animaldiseases. Information on the cost-sharing arrangements can be found in the SummaryDocument, Appendix 3 and the Valuation and Compensation Manual .

The amount of compensation will be minimised by the avoidance of radical decisions toslaughter all ruminants and pigs on the IP and DCP.

3.6 Selected strategy if the disease becomes establishedDue to the high mortality, short incubation period and restriction of spread mainly to directcontact, it is unlikely that an outbreak of rinderpest would not be eliminated. If the size ofan outbreak outstripped the resources available for control, and ring vaccination was notable to contain the disease, then it would have to be considered endemic.

Endemic rinderpest, which is only likely to occur in extensive or remote areas, will becontrolled by vaccination of all cattle in areas where the disease occurred, with anattenuated cell culture vaccine of an appropriate level of attenuation for the breed in whichit is to be used. Initially all stock would be vaccinated, but in subsequent years onlyyoung and introduced stock not previously vaccinated, would require vaccination.Vaccination of the entire susceptible population should result in the field virus dying out,allowing the discontinuation of vaccination after only a couple of years.

Areas in Africa and India where rinderpest is endemic are moving towards eradication bythe use of vaccination. The major limiting factors to the success of eradication in theseareas are civil unrest and the lack of veterinary infrastructure. Australia has neither ofthese problems and has an agreed policy and framework to quickly eradicate the disease.



APPENDIX 1 Guidelines for classifying declared areas

Infected premises (IP)Premises classified as IPs will be any defined area (which may be all or part of a property)in which an exotic disease exists or is believed to exist. An IP is subject to quarantineserved by notice and to eradication or control measures.

Dangerous contact premises (DCP)Premises classified as DCPs will be:

• all neighbouring premises on which cattle have been sharing a common fence-line withinfected animals on an IP since the appearance of clinical signs and where it isnecessary to impose disease control measures;

• all premises to which cattle have moved from an IP within 15 days prior to the firstappearance of symptoms on the IP and where it is necessary to impose disease controlmeasures;

These premises will remain under quarantine and close surveillance until 42 days after thelast contact with the IP, subject to continual satisfactory surveillance and final inspection.

Suspect premises (SP)Premises considered as SPs will be:

• all other premises owned or managed in conjunction with an IP;

• other neighbouring premises containing cattle; and

• all premises where it is considered that disease could possibly have spread to cattlefrom an IP by way of the movement of people, vehicles, equipment or feedstuff duringthe period 15 days prior to the first appearance of lesions.

Subject to satisfactory surveillance, premises will be designated SPs for 30 days only.

Restricted area (RA)

The boundary of the RA should be at least 1 km from the boundary of the IP or DCP, andthere should be at least two stockproof barriers between the two. The RA should alsoinclude an area substantially greater than the home range of any susceptible feral speciesthat may come into contact with the IPs or DCPs. Consideration should be given to anynatural geographic features in setting boundaries of these areas.

Control area (CA)

The boundary of the CA should be at least 10 km from the boundary of the RA, and thereshould be at least two stockproof barriers between the two. The CA must alsosubstantially exceed the home range of any susceptible feral animals that may enter thearea. Initially the CA may be a much larger area pending the determination of the extentof the outbreak.



APPENDIX 2 Recommended quarantine and movementcontrols

Infected and dangerous contactpremises

Suspect premises

Movement out of susceptible animals:Movement of any cattle or buffaloesprohibited, unless permitted for immediateslaughter.

Movement of any cattle or buffaloesprohibited, unless permitted for immediateslaughter.

Movement in of susceptible animals:Prohibited (1). Prohibited (2).

Movement out of milk:Milk from infected and in-contact cattle to bedestroyed. Other milk to be moved by permit.

Milk may be moved under permit (2).

Movement out of other animals:Movement of sheep and goats restricted (3). As for IP/DCP.

Movement in and out of people:Conditions apply (4). Must not visit other animals.

Movement in and out of vehicles andequipment:

Conditions apply (4). Unrestricted.

Movement out of grains and crops:Conditions may apply (5). Unrestricted.

Restricted area Control area

Movement out of susceptible stock:Prohibited (6). Permit required (6).

Movement in of susceptible stock:Prohibited (7). No movement of susceptible stock into the

CA should be permitted (7).

Movement within of susceptible stock:Permit required (7). Permit required (7).

Movement through of susceptible stock:Permit required (8). Permit required (8).

Movement of milk:Milk must be heat treated to destroy virus (9). No restriction.

Movement of other animals, people andequipment:Unrestricted. Unrestricted.

Vehicles:Unrestricted. Unrestricted.

Stock routes, rights of way:Prohibited. May be permitted if absolutely necessary

under strict control.



Risk enterprises:Abattoirs may continue working but may not freeze beef.

Artificial breeding centres may continue operations as long as no clinical disease becomesevident on the premises and as long as approved protocol is observed.

Dairy factories must heat treat milk to denature rinderpest virus.

Sales, shows, etc:No shows involving cattle, pigs, sheep or goats within the RA or CA would be permitted.

Notes:

(1) The property can be restocked 30 days after completion of decontamination if there is noevidence of spread in the remaining animals. Serological testing of animals remaining on theIP prior to restocking may be warranted.

(2) It is expected that quarantine would be lifted after 30 days.

(3) The movement of animal species other than cattle and buffaloes will be prohibited unless theanimals can be rendered safe from mechanically transmitting the virus or are sent forimmediate slaughter.

(4) On leaving the IP all people, vehicles and equipment will undergo appropriate cleaning anddisinfection.

(5) It is unlikely that any restrictions would be placed on crops and grains unless the grain wasfor immediate use as stock food.

(6) No movement of cattle, pigs, sheep or goats out of the RA or CA should be permitted whilethe disease is still spreading. Once it is under control, movement from the CA may beallowed under permit. Animals must be identified in case they later have to be checked forseroconversion. Movement direct for slaughter should be permitted.

(7) If any animals introduced into or moved within the RA or CA subsequently become infectedcompensation must be paid. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that there is little risk.

(8) Vehicles carrying susceptible animals should be allowed to pass through the RA or CA aslong as they are not off-loaded within the area.

(9) Milk from the RA should be collected at a time when cattle are not in the area around thedairy, as the air vented from the tanker may be contaminated with virus from milk alreadycollected from a property where the disease is incubating. Milk from the RA should go toprocessing where the heat used will kill any virus potentially present.



APPENDIX 3 OIE International Animal Health Code forrinderpest

[NB The following text is taken directly from the OIE International Animal HealthCode (1992); Chapter 2.1.4. For definitions, Appendixes, etc see the original text.The OIE Codes are amended every year in May. There have been no amendments tothe code for rinderpest in 1993, 1994 or 1995.]

Preamble: For diagnostic tests and vaccine standards, reference should be made to the Manual (A4) [ See OIE publications under References].

Article 2.1.4.1.

For the purposes of this Code, the incubation period for rinderpest shall be 21 days.

Article 2.1.4.2.

For the purposes of this Code:

Rinderpest: free country

A country may be considered free from rinderpest when it has been shown that rinderpesthas not been present for at least the past three years.

This period shall be six months after the occurrence of the last case for countries in whicha stamping-out policy is practised, with or without vaccination against rinderpest.

Rinderpest: infected zone

A rinderpest infected zone shall be considered as such until at least 21 days have elapsedafter the last case has been reported and following the completion of a stamping-out policyand disinfection procedures, or six months after the clinical recovery or death of the lastaffected animal if a stamping-out policy is not practised.

Rinderpest: free zone

An area may be considered to be a rinderpest free zone if it can be ascertained that thedisease has not been present, for at least the past three years and if the followingrequirements are met:

1) The zone shall be delineated by natural barriers or by fencing. Access to the zoneshall be guarded and its boundaries placed under permanent surveillance in order toprevent any illegal movement of animals.

2) The free zone shall be large enough to provide exclusive supply for an area abattoir.It shall be bounded by a buffer zone of at least ten km width. Animals present in thefree zone at the time of its formation shall be vaccinated and marked with anidentification approved for the zone.

3) Entry of animals into the free zone shall be conditional on:

a) vaccination using a vaccine complying with the OIE standards immediately after entry in the buffer zone;

b) isolation in the buffer zone for at least 2l days under veterinary supervision;

c) marking these animals with the approved mark before release into the free zone.



4) Animals born in the free zone should be routinely vaccinated and marked.

5) If rinderpest occurs in the free zone the following arrangements shall be provided for:

a) movement restrictions will be imposed in the infected zone; animals can only be moved to the abattoir;

b) all export of meat shall be stopped immediately;

c) immediate notification of the outbreak by telex, telegram or fax shall be made to the OIE and any country which has recently imported animals from the zone;

d) the rinderpest outbreak shall be confirmed by virus isolation and the source of the infection thoroughly investigated;

e) movement restrictions may be lifted and export of meat resumed if:

• thirty days have elapsed after the carrying out of a stamping-out policy, or if a stamping-out policy is not practised,

• six months have elapsed after the occurrence of the last case and all animals within the infected zone have been revaccinated.

Article 2.1.4.3.

Veterinary Administrations of rinderpest free countries may prohibit importation or transitthrough their territory, directly or indirectly, from countries considered infected withrinderpest of:

1) domestic and wild ruminants and pigs;

2) semen of ruminants and pigs;

3) embryos/ova of ruminants and pigs;

4) fresh meat of domestic and wild ruminants and pigs;

5) meat products of domestic and wild ruminants and pigs which have not beenprocessed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus;

6) products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for use in animalfeeding or for industrial use which have not been processed to ensure the destructionof rinderpest virus;

7) products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for pharmaceutical usewhich have not been processed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus;

8) pathological material and biological products (from ruminants and pigs) which havenot been processed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus.

Article 2.1.4.4.

When importing from rinderpest free countries, Veterinary Administrations shouldrequire:

for domestic ruminants and pigs

the presentation of an international animal health certificate attesting that the animals:

1) showed no clinical sign of rinderpest on the day of shipment;

2) were kept in a rinderpest free country since birth or for at least the past 21 days.



Article 2.1.4.5.


for wild ruminants and pigs



2) come from a rinderpest free country;

if the country of origin has a common border with a country considered infected withrinderpest:

3) were kept in a quarantine station for the 21 days prior to shipment.

Article 2.1.4.6.

When importing from countries considered infected with rinderpest, VeterinaryAdministrations should require:

for domestic ruminants and pigs



2) were kept since birth, or for the past 21 days, in an establishment where no case of rinderpest was officially reported during that period, and that the establishment of

origin is not situated in a rinderpest infected zone; and/or

3) were kept in a quarantine station for the 21 days prior to shipment;

4) have not been vaccinated against rinderpest; or

5) were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the OIE standards:

a) not less than 15 days and not more than four months prior to shipment in the case of animals for breeding or rearing;

b) not less than 15 days and not more than 12 months prior to shipment in the case of animals for slaughter.

Vaccination may be considered whilst animals are in quarantine before shipment or in transit, if the use of vaccine is prohibited in the exporting country.

Article 2.1.4.7.


for wild ruminants and pigs



2) were kept in a quarantine station for the 21 days prior to shipment;




4) were vaccinated, not less than 15 days and not more than four months prior toshipment, using a vaccine complying with the OIE standards.

Vaccination may be considered whilst animals are in quarantine before shipment or intransit, if the use of vaccine is prohibited in the exporting country.

Article 2.1.4.8.


for semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

the presentation of an international animal health certificate attesting that:

1) the donor animals showed no clinical sign of rinderpest on the day of collection andfor the following 21 days;

2) the animals were kept in a rinderpest free country for not less than 21 days prior tocollection;

3 the semen was collected, processed and stored strictly in accordance with Appendices4.2.1.1., 4.2.1.2. or 4.2.2.1. as relevant.

Article 2.1.4.9.

Countries considered infected with rinderpest, Veterinary Administrations require:

for semen of domestic ruminants and pigs

the presentation of an international animal health certificate attesting that:

1) the donor animals showed no clinical sign of rinderpest on the day of collection andfor the following 21 days;

2) the animals were kept in the exporting country, for the 21 days prior to collection, inan establishment or AI centre where no case of rinderpest was officially reportedduring that period, and that the establishment or AI centre is not situated in arinderpest infected zone;

3) the animals were:

a) not vaccinated against rinderpest; or

b) vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the standards in the Manual;

4) the semen was collected, processed and stored strictly in accordance with Appendices4.2.1.1., 4.2.1.2. or 4.2.2.1. as relevant.

Article 2.1.4.10. (under study)


for embryos/ova of domestic ruminants

the presentation of an international animal health certificate attesting that the:

1) donor females were kept in the same herd in a rinderpest free country for at least the30 days prior to departure to the collection unit;



2) donor females and all other animals in the herd of origin showed no clinical sign ofrinderpest during the 24 hours prior to departure to the collection unit and for thefollowing 30 days;

3) donor females were fertilised with semen meeting the requirements provided in Article2.1.4.8.;

4) collection unit remained free from rinderpest during the 30 days following collection.

Article 2.1.4.11. (under study)


for embryos/ova of domestic ruminants

the presentation of an international animal health certificate attesting that the donorfemales:

1) and all other animals in the herd of origin showed no clinical sign of rinderpest duringthe 24 hours prior to departure to the collection unit and for the following 30 days;

2) were isolated in the establishment of origin for the 30 days prior to departure to thecollection unit and were subjected to the sero-neutralisation test for rinderpest withnegative results;


4) were vaccinated using a vaccine complying with the OIE standards;

5) were fertilised with semen meeting the requirements provided in Article 2.1.4.8. or2.1.4.9.;

6) were transported to the collection unit without passing through a rinderpest infectedzone, and that the collection unit remained free from rinderpest during the 30 daysfollowing collection.

Article 2.1.4.12.


for fresh meat or meat products of domestic ruminants and pigs

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that the entireconsignment comes from animals:

1) which have been kept in the country since birth, or have been imported from arinderpest free country;

2) slaughtered in an abattoir and found to be healthy before and after slaughter.

Article 2.1.4.13.


for meat products of domestic ruminants and pigs

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that the:



1) entire consignment of meat products comes from animals slaughtered in an abattoirand found to be healthy before and after slaughter;

2) meat products have been processed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus;

3) necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the meat withany source of rinderpest virus.

Article 2.1.4.14.


for products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for use in animal feedingor for industrial use

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that these products comefrom animals which have been kept in a rinderpest free country since birth or for at leastthe past 21 days.

Article 2.1.4.15.


for products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for pharmaceutical use

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that these products comefrom animals:1) which have been kept in a rinderpest free country since birth or for at least the past 21

days;2) slaughtered in an abattoir and found to be healthy before and after slaughter.

Article 2.1.4.16


for products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for use in animal feedingor for industrial use

meal and flour from blood, meat defatted bones, hooves. claws and horns

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that these productshave been processed using heat treatment to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus;

hooves, claws, bones and horns, hunting trophies and preparations destined formuseums

the presentation of an international sanitary certificate attesting that these products:

1) were completely dried and had no trace on them of skin, flesh or tendon; and/or

2) have been adequately disinfected;

wool, coarse hair. bristles and other hair


1) come from animals which have not been kept in a rinderpest infected zone; or



2) have been processed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus, in premisescontrolled and approved by the Veterinary Administration of the exporting country;

raw hides and skins


1) come from animals which have not been kept in a rinderpest infected zone; or

2) have been adequately disinfected.

Article 2.1.4.17.


for products of animal origin (from ruminants and pigs) destined for pharmaceutical use


1) have been processed to ensure the destruction of rinderpest virus; or

2) come from animals which have not been kept in a rinderpest infected zone;

3) come from animals slaughtered in an abattoir and found to be healthy before and afterslaughter.



APPENDIX 4 Procedures for surveillance and proof offreedom

Proof of freedomFollowing an outbreak, Australia's freedom from rinderpest will be considered after aperiod of six months in which no disease is detected. Rinderpest can be detected fromphysical examination of susceptible herds but evidence of freedom should be supported byserological testing.

All at risk properties must therefore be kept under close surveillance for six months.Properties considered to be at risk are all of those in the RA as well as any other propertiesthat may have been designated DCPs or SPs by tracing of vehicles, people, equipment,fomites, etc.

Suspect or dangerous contact premisesDaily physical surveillance of cattle for a period of 15 days, thence weekly inspections fora further 2 weeks should be required for an SP or DCP. They should be included in laterserosurveillance.

Infected premisesOn IPs (and DCPs which have been destocked), restocking will be allowed 30 days afterdecontamination is completed. On IPs where some ruminants or pigs remain, serologicalevidence that no spread is occurring after the slaughter of the infected mob will berequired prior to restocking. Surveillance visits of all restocked premises should be madeweekly for 4 weeks, then fortnightly for another month.

Restricted areaOn other properties in the RA, surveillance visits should be made as soon as possible afterdetection of the first IP in the RA and then 1, 2, 3 and 4 weeks later.

At surveillance visits every mob of cattle must be inspected and numbers accounted for.In extensive grazing areas, where the degree of contact between groups of animals in aherd may be low, care must be taken to ensure that all groups of animals are present andhealthy. If feral animals are detected appropriate measures must be taken.

Once the disease is confidently contained, all cattle herds within the RA should beserologically sampled to provide a 95% confidence level that the disease is not present at a10% prevalence. Small groups of animals should be kept under close examination. Thisshould take place about 1 month after the last IP has been restocked and repeated 3months later. Herds giving seropositive results should be further tested for evidence ofinfection.

Control areaAll reports of disease must be investigated and random samples should be carried outabout 1 month after the last IP has been restocked and repeated 3 months later.



APPENDIX 5 Procedures for vaccination

If it becomes necessary to vaccinate against rinderpest, the rinderpest cell culture vaccinewill be used (see Table 2), which is accepted as safe for all breeds and species into whichit has been inoculated. It can be cheaply and readily produced in large quantities, is non-contagious and genetically stable on cattle passage. Small supplies of this vaccineproduced at the AFRC Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK are present in Australia.It has been tested and approved by AAHL.

In Africa annual vaccination never exceeded 90% of cattle and in some countrieseradication was achieved with no more than 75% of cattle seropositive.

Variable and often low rates of seroconversion following vaccination have been reportedfrom Africa. Likely causes are:

• a breakdown in the cold chain;• rapid reduction in effectiveness after reconstitution;• using vaccine beyond its shelf life;• poor quality vaccines; and• interference in calves from colostral antibodies.

Care must be taken in hot arid areas of Australia to ensure vaccine is used properly.

The shelf half-life after reconstitution is very short — about 1 hour. Higher titres areobtained by culturing the virus on Vero cells, and the half life can be extended up to 30days. Heat stable clones are also now being used.

The actual vaccination program will depend upon circumstances. About 500 000 dosesshould be quickly available from the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK.

All vaccinated animals must be permanently identified for later tracing for slaughter orserological testing, depending upon what is required by international market forces.



GLOSSARY

Abomasum Fourth stomach of ruminants; also called the ‘true’ or ‘rennet’stomach or ‘reed’. Leads into the small intestine.

Animal by-products Products of animal origin destined for industrial use, eg rawhides and skins, fur, wool, hair, feathers, hooves, bones,fertiliser.

Animal products Meat products and products of animal origin (eg eggs, milk) forhuman consumption or for use in animal feeding.

AUSVETPLAN A series of documents that describe the Australian response toexotic animal diseases, linking policy, strategies,implementation, coordination and emergency-managementplans.

Bos indicus cattle breeds see Zebu

Bos taurus cattle breeds European breeds of cattle, including friesian, ayrshire, jersey,guernsey.

Consultative Committee onExotic Animal Disease

A committee of State/Territory CVOs, AAHL and CSIRO,chaired by the CVO of Australia (Cwlth DPIE), to consult inemergencies due to the introduction of an exotic disease oflivestock, or serious epizootics of Australian origin.

Control area A declared area in which defined conditions apply to themovement into, out of, and within, of specified animals orthings. Conditions applying in a control area are of lesserintensity than those in a restricted area. The limits of a controlarea and the conditions applying therein may be varied rapidlyaccording to need.

Dangerous contact animal An animal showing no clinical signs of disease but which, byreason of its probable exposure to disease, will be subjected todisease control measures.

Dangerous contact premises Premises containing a dangerous contact animal(s)(see Appendix 1).

Declared area A defined tract of land for the time being subject to diseasecontrol restrictions under exotic disease legislation. Types ofdeclared areas include restricted area; control area; infectedpremises; and dangerous contact premises.

Decontamination Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection.

ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay — a serological testdesigned to detect and measure the presence of antibody orantigen in a sample. The test uses an enzyme reaction with asubstrate to produce a colour change when antigen–antibodybinding occurs.

Fomites Inanimate objects (eg boots, clothing, equipment, vehicles,crates, packagings) that can carry the exotic agent and spreadthe disease through mechanical transmission.



In-contact animals Animals that have had close contact with infected animals suchas non-infected animals in the same mob.

Incubation period The period which elapses between the introduction of thepathogen into the animal and the occurrence of the first clinicalsigns of the disease.

Infected premises see Appendix 1.

Local disease control centre An emergency operations centre responsible for the commandand control of field operations in a defined area.

Movement controls Restrictions placed on movement of animals, people and thingsto prevent the spread of disease.

Mucopurulent Consisting of mucus and pus.

Peyer’s patches Lymphoid tissues in the small intestine of sheep.

Premises A defined area or structure, which may include part or all of afarm, enterprise or other private or public land, building orproperty.

Quarantine Legal restrictions imposed on a place, animal, vehicle or otherthings limiting movement.

Restricted area A declared area in which defined rigorous conditions apply tothe movement into, out of, and within, of specified animals,persons or things (see Appendix 1).

Ring vaccination An area surrounding an outbreak of disease in which animalsare vaccinated to provide a buffer zone of protected animalsbetween the disease zone and the free zone.

Risk enterprise A livestock or livestock-related enterprise with a high potentialfor disease spread, eg an abattoir, milk factory, artificialbreeding centre or livestock market.

Sentinel animals Animals of known health status monitored for the purpose ofdetecting the presence of a specific exotic disease agent.

Serotype A subgroup of a genus of microorganisms identifiable by theantigens carried by the members.

Seroconversion Appearance in the blood serum of antibodies followingvaccination or natural exposure to a disease agent.

Serum neutralisation test A type of serological test designed to detect and measure thepresence of antibody in a sample. The test is based on theability of an antibody to neutralise the biological activity of anantigen.

Stamping out Eradication procedures based on quarantine and slaughter of allinfected animals and animals exposed to infection.

State/Territory disease controlheadquarters

The emergency operations centre that directs the diseasecontrol operations to be undertaken in the State/Territory.

Surveillance A systematic program of inspection and examination of animalsor things to determine the presence or absence of an exoticdisease.



Suspect animals An animal that may have been exposed to an exotic diseasesuch that its quarantine and intensive surveillance is warranted;OR an animal not known to have been exposed to a diseaseagent but showing clinical signs requiring differentialdiagnosis.

Suspect premises Premises containing suspect animals which will be subject toquarantine and intensive surveillance ( see Appendix 1).

Spell Keep unused for a period of time until there is no risk ofdisease agent remaining.

Susceptible animals Cattle and buffalo, sheep and goats, camels, deer and pigs.

Tracing The process of locating animals, persons or things that may beimplicated in the spread of disease, so that appropriate action betaken.

Vaccination see Ring vaccination

Vaccines

– attenuated (‘live’)

– inactivated

A vaccine prepared from infective or ‘live’ microbes that havelost their virulence but have retained their ability to induceprotective immunity.A vaccine prepared from a virus that has been inactivated(‘killed’) by chemical or physical treatment.

Vector A living organism (frequently an arthropod) that transmits aninfectious agent from one host to another. A biological vectoris one in which the infectious agent must develop or multiplybefore becoming infective to a recipient host. A mechanicalvector is one that transmits an infectious agent from one hostto another but is not essential to the life cycle of the agent.

Viraemia The presence of viruses in the blood.

Zebu (cattle) Bovine animals (Bos indicus) with characteristic large humpover the shoulders. Widely domesticated in India, China,eastern African, etc and used for cross breeding in Australia.

Zoning Dividing a country into defined infected and disease-free areas.A high level of movement control between zones will apply.



Abbreviations

AAHL CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory, GeelongAI Artificial inseminationARMCANZ Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New ZealandCA Control areaCCEAD Consultative Committee on Exotic Animal DiseaseCSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research O rganisationCVO Chief veterinary officerDCP Dangerous contact premisesDPIE Department of Primary Industries and Energy (Cwlth)EDTA Ethylenediamine tetra-acetic acid (anticoagulant for whole blood)ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assayIP Infected premisesOIE World Organisation for Animal Health [Office International des Epizooties]PPR Peste des petits ruminantsRA Restricted areaSP Suspect premises



REFERENCES

Anderson, E.C., Hassan A., Barrett, T. and Anderson, J. (1990a). Observations on thepathogenicity for sheep and goats and the transmissibility of the strain of virus isolatedduring the rinderpest outbreak in Sri Lanka in 1987. Veterinary Microbiology , 21:309-318.

Anderson, E.C., Jago, M., Mlengeya, C., Timms, C., Payne, A. and Hirji, K. (1990b). Aserological survey of rinderpest antibody in wildlife and goats in Northern Tanzania.Epidemiology of Infection , 105, 203-214.

Anderson, J., McKay, J.A. and Butcher, R.N. (1991). The use of monoclonal antibodies incompetitive ELISA for the detection of antibodies to rinderpest and peste des petitsruminants viruses. In The Sero-monitoring of Rinderpest throughout Africa, InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

De Boer, C.J. and Barber, T.L. (1964). pH and thermal stability of rinderpest virus. Arch. gesam.Virusfor, 15:98-108.

El Hag, Ali B. (1973). A natural outbreak of rinderpest involving sheep, goats and cattle inSudan. Bull Epizoot Dis Africa , 21:421-428.

Ezzat, M.A.E., Kamel, J., Rofail, B. and Osman, F. (1970). Keeping quality of rinderpest virus inmeat kept in the refrigerator. Egyptian Vet Med Assoc J, 30:997-1011.

Geering, W.A. and Forman, A.J., Nunn, M.J. (1995). Exotic Diseases of Animals: A FieldGuide for Australian Veterinarians, Bureau of Resource Sciences, Department ofPrimary Industries and Energy, Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra.

Narayanaswamy, M. and Ramani, K. (1973). Preliminary studies on rinderpest virus isolated fromoutbreaks in sheep in Mysore State. Indian Veterinary Journal, 50:829-832.

Nawathe and Lamorde 1983 Towards global eradication of rinderpest Revue Scientific etTechnique, Office International des Epizooties, 2: 997-1011

Philpott, M. (1993). The dangers of disease transmission by artificial insemination and embryotransfer. British Veterinary Journal, 149:339-345.

Plowright, W. (1968). Rinderpest virus. In Virology Monographs No 3, Springes-Verlag, Viennaand New York, pp 27-110.

Ramani, K., Charles, Y.S., Srinivas, R.P., Narayanaswamy, M. and Ramachandran, S. (1974).Isolation of rinderpest virus from an outbreak in domestic pigs in Karnataka. IndianVeterinary Journal, 51:36-41.

Robertson, W.A.N. (1924). Rinderpest in Western Australia. Service Publication ( VeterinaryHygiene) No 1, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Australia.

Scott, G.R. (1981). Rinderpest and peste des petits ruminants. In Virus Diseases of Food Animals,Vol 2 (Ed E.P.J. Gibles), Academic Press, pp 401-432.

Scott, G.R. (1985). Rinderpest in the 1980s. Prog Vet Microbial Immun , Vol 1, Karger, Basel. pp145-174.

Scott, G.R. and Provost, A. (1992). Global eradication of rinderpest. Paper prepared for the FAOExpert Consultancy on the Global Eradication of Rinderpest, Rome, November 1992.

Taylor, W.P. (1986). Epidemiology and control of rinderpest. Rev Sci Tech, OIE, 5(2):407-410.

Wafula, J.S. and Kariuki, D.P. (1987). A recent outbreak of rinderpest in East Africa. TropAnimal Production, 19:173-176.



Wafula, J.S., Rossiter, P.B., Wamwayi, H.M. and Scott, G.R. (1989). Preliminary observationson rinderpest in pregnant cattle. Veterinary Record, 124:485-486.

Weston, E.A. (1924) Rinderpest in Australia. American Vet Med Assoc J , 66:337-350.

Video/training resourcesOut of Africa — rinderpest and others (video), AAHL (available from the Animal

Diseases/Incidents Section, DPIE, Canberra; or AAHL)

Erosive Diseases — rinderpest and others (50 slides), available from the AnimalDiseases/Incidents Section, DPIE, Canberra.

[See the Summary Document for a full list of training resources.]

OIE publicationsOIE Code (1992). International Animal Health Code (6th edition), OIE, Paris, France.

OIE Manual (1992). Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines (2nd edition), OIE,Paris, France.



INDEX

AAHL diagnostic tests, 5Abbreviations, 35Aetiology, 1Animal by-products, 8, 9Animal products, 8, 9Australian Animal Health Laboratory, 4Calves, 6CCEAD, 16Chief veterinary officer, 16

States, 4Clinical signs, 3Compensation, 19Control and eradication

principles, 10strategy, 16

Control area, 11, 21Control in Australia

feasibility, 14Cost-sharing agreement, 19Dangerous contact premises, 21Decontamination, 13, 18Destruction of animals, 12Diagnosis

criteria, 2differential, 5

Disposal, 12Epidemiology, 6Established disease

strategy, 20Fomites, 8, 9Funding, 19Histopathology, 4Immunity, 5

active, 6innate, 6passive, 6

Incubation period, 6Infected premises, 10, 21Introduction into Australia, 9Laboratory diagnosis, 5Laboratory tests, 4

specimens required, 4Lesions, 3Modes of transmission, 8Movement control, 11Movement controls, 10, 16, 22Occurrence in Australia, 2OIE Code, 24OIE publications, 37Pathology, 4Persistence of virus, 7

environment, 7general properties, 7live animals, 8

Policyoverall, 15

Policy and eradication, 15Postmortem, 4Proof of freedom, 31

criteria, 19Quarantine, 10, 16, 22Resistance, 5Restocking measures, 13Restricted area, 21Restricted area (RA), 11Sentinel, 13Social and economic effects, 18Specimens, 4

transport, 4Specimens required, 4Stamping out, 16Surveillance, 11, 31Susceptible species, 1Suspect premises, 21Tracing, 11Tracing and surveillance, 18Training resources, 37Transmission, 8, 9

artificial breeding, 8live animals, 8

Treatmentanimal products, 17by-products, 12, 17infected animals, 12, 17products, 12

Vaccination, 6, 13, 17procedures, 32

Vector control, 13Vectors, 9Virus

persistence, 7transmission, 9

Wild animal control, 13Windborne spread, 9World distribution, 2Zoning, 11, 17

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