Austin, Emily a._epicurs and the Politics of Fearing Death_Apeiron, 45, 2_2012_109-129

Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death*

EMILY A. AUSTINDepartment of Philosophy

Wake Forest UniversityWinston-Salem, NC 27109, USA

[email protected]

Abstract

Epicurus often serves as the standard-bearer for the view that we can and should useour rational capacities to eliminate our fear of death. Although Epicurus clearlythought that many varieties of the fear of death arise from errors in reasoning, Iargue that he believed that the fear of violent death is ineliminable and sometimeseven advantageous. Humans have a natural and necessary desire for physical security,and the prospect that this desire might be frustrated causes fear. Thus, the best wayto manage (though not eliminate) ones fear of a violent death is to establish favor-able political circumstances rather than employ arguments against false beliefs.

Keywords: Epicurus, death, security, fear, friendship

I

The general consensus is that Epicurus believed the fear of death to bewholly irrational and eliminable. I intend to argue otherwise. An impor-tant background commitment of the standard interpretation is that Epi-curus was an intellectualist (or cognitivist) about emotions. For the in-tellectualist, a fear simply is a belief or a set of beliefs. Thus, a person whoirrationally fears death suffers from false beliefs, and eliminating her fear isa process of altering those beliefs in response to sound arguments. A ra-

apeiron, vol. 45, pp. 109129Walter de Gruyter 2012 DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2011-0003

* Translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. Epicurus Greek is notoriously dif-ficult (cf. Cicero, DF 1: 1415), so I note important differences between my transla-tions and those of others, especially Inwood and Gerson (1988), Hicks (1931), andLong and Sedley (1987). For the Greek text, I consulted Hicks, Long and Sedley,Marcovich (1999) and Usener (1887). For Cicero, I used Reynolds (1998) and forLucretius, Rouse and Smith (1975).

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tional agent recognizes the strength of the arguments and adjusts her be-liefs accordingly, after which her fear dissipates. The change might not beimmediate, of course, since fully endorsing arguments often requires rigor-ous examination, and one might need to assess a battery of arguments.Nevertheless, one can eliminate ones fear of death by engaging in rationaldiscourse and rehearsing arguments.

In this paper, I argue that the standard interpretation overlooks sub-stantive evidence that Epicurus thought that at least one variety of the fearof death arises from ineliminable desires that are beyond the reach of ra-tional persuasion. Such desires, call them brute, are an essential part ofwhat it is to be a human animal, and the prospect of their frustration causesfear. I focus in particular on the ineliminable desire for physical securityagainst death at the hands of others, and I argue that for Epicurus, mana-ging this fear requires establishing favorable political circumstances. Insofaras the desire is currently satisfied, and one has some confidence that it willbe satisfied in the future, one can then manage ones fear. Without suchcircumstances, ones opportunities to live a pleasant, anxiety-free life rapidlydiminish. Note that I argue for two independent claims. First, I contendthat for Epicurus, at least one fear of death arises from political circum-stances rather than from an error in reasoning. Second, I argue that this fearcan only be managed well, since it cannot be eliminated.

Supporters of the standard interpretation tend to focus on Epicuruscentral argument that death cannot be harmful, since harm is pain, painrequires perception, and death is the absence of perception (Key Doctrines 2,Letter to Menoeceus 1245). With the additional premise that it is irrationalto fear something that is not harmful, Epicurus concludes that it is irrationalto fear death while one is alive. This argument can be challenged. ThomasNagel (1979), for example, has argued that one can be harmed withoutbeing aware of the harms.1 Aristotle seems to have made this point beforeEpicurus time (EN I 10, 1100a1821).2 Regardless of whether Epicuruscentral argument succeeds or fails, it plainly takes the fear of death to rest onfalse beliefs that careful reasoning can correct.

However, another critical response might threaten the standard inter-pretation. Epicurus main argument shows at most that it is irrational tofear being dead, but we also fear death for other reasons.3 In response tothis worry, recent defenders of Epicurus, notably James Warren (2004)

1 For further discussion of postmortem harms, see Pitcher (1984), Rosenbaum (1986,1989), Feldman (1992), Nussbaum (1996), and Warren (2004).

2 Many have thought Aristotle confused on the matter, but Scott (2000) argues other-wise.

3 Williams (1973), Nagel (1979), and Luper-Foy (1987); see esp. McMahon (1976)and (1988).

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and Voula Tsouna (2006), have shown that Epicureans offer more thanone argument and target more than one kind of fear. Warren discussesfour varieties of the fear of death:

(1) the fear of being dead;(2) the fear that one will die, that ones life is going to end;(3) the fear of premature death; and(4) the fear of the process of dying.4

If even one of these fears were not to rest on a false belief that rationalargument can correct, then the standard interpretation would be false.

Warren entertains this possibility, but he argues that the standard in-terpretation is correct about how Epicurus treats every fear of death allfour fears depend solely on false beliefs. Although one might think somefears of death are immune to rational persuasion, or simply part of whatit is to be human, like the feelings of hunger or thirst, Warren respondsthat Epicurus, clearly, disagrees.5

I argue that Epicurus does not disagree. Instead, he recognizes a typeof fear of death that is essentially the same as feelings of hunger and thirst.For Epicurus, the desire for security from violent death at the hands ofothers is a natural and necessary desire that cannot be eliminated.6 Hethus recommends ways to ameliorate, rather than extirpate, the fear arisingfrom a lack of personal security, and I argue that those means are primar-ily political in nature. His best advice for coping with this variety of fearof death is a situation, not an argument. With respect to Warrens taxon-omy of fears, I argue against the possibility of ridding oneself of ones fearof some varieties of unexpected or premature death.

The paper proceeds as follows: I begin by establishing that the desirefor security from the threat of others is a natural and necessary desire. Aswith the human need for sustenance, Epicurus believes one can achievesecurity with relative ease if one arranges both ones desires and circum-stances appropriately, although the desire for security is brute and may

4 Warren, 4; Tsouna, 801.5 Warren, 15.6 Despite Epicurus preoccupation with security against the threat of violence, Warren

discusses only three of the six Key Doctrines concerning security (D 6, 7, 13, 14, 27,and 40), and these the discusses only in footnotes. Epicurus focus on security hasfeatured prominently in secondary literature on other Epicurean matters. Evans(2004, 41617) argues that the desire for individual security may provide sufficientgrounds for self-interested, yet self-sacrificing Epicurean friendship. Meanwhile, Arm-strong (1997) argues that Epicurus conception of justice arises from the individualspursuit of safety. In part, my argument links these concerns about friendship andjustice with the fear of death.

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cause anxiety if left unfulfilled. Next, I discuss the strategies that, accordingto Epicurus, are more likely to satisfy the desire for security, as opposed tothose that are counterproductive to gaining security. Epicurus believes, so Iargue, that ameliorating the fear of violent death inextricably involves liv-ing in a safe and healthy community. Only when the persistent threat ofviolence is removed can an individual truly live a pleasant life, enjoying,among other things, genuine friendship and trust.

Finally, I address two objections. First, someone might contend thatthe brute fear of dying at the hands of others should be characterized as afear of pain, not a fear of death. If so, the standard position that Epicur-eans can fully rid themselves of the fear of death would be salvageable.Second, my position might compromise an ancient conception of the sageas unflappable, or happy on the rack. Even if security is best achieved ina particular political arrangement, the sage should be able to live in a dan-gerous city and remain happy while dying violently. An objector mightcontend that if my interpretation suggests this is not the case, then I haverendered the Epicurean a coward, and philosophical charity should mili-tate against my thesis.

II

Epicurus, I argue, classifies the desire for security among the natural, ne-cessary desires. As such, it resembles the brute and undifferentiated desirefor food and drink. When such a desire remains unsatisfied, pain results,and this pain cannot be reasoned away (D 30). My textual case pro-ceeds in three stages. First, I shall show that the desire for security is anatural one, with some initial attention to what makes a desire natural.Second, I consider in what manner Epicurus distinguishes natural and ne-cessary desires from natural and unnecessary ones. Third, in light of thisstandard, I argue that the desire for security is not only natural, but alsonecessary.

Epicureans are dyed in the wool hedonists.7 They argue that pleasureis the only intrinsic good, and the good life is the life of pleasure. How-ever, although every pleasure is in some sense good, Epicurus argues that

7 For a much more detailed discussion of the calculus of Epicurean hedonism, seePurinton (1993). Another point of interest is the debate between Cooper (1998)and Woolf (2004) about whether Epicurus is a psychological or a normative hedo-nist. According to Woolf, Epicurus believes that every desire is simply a desire forpleasure. Cooper, however, is of the opinion that Epicurus hedonism is prescriptive,that is, one should desire pleasure, but there are times when one does not.

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the best life is one in which one pursues all and only the pleasures thatcontribute to achieving and maintaining ataraxia, a long-term, stable statein which one lacks anxiety, regret, or other troubling forms of mental pain(Ep Men 131). Not every pleasure, then, is choiceworthy (, Ep Men129). As a rule of thumb, an object of desire should be avoided when thepleasure experienced from obtaining it is consistently less than the painaccompanying or following its acquisition (Ep Men 125; DF 1: 36). Apain is to be suffered if it results in more pleasure than one could other-wise achieve. Successfully achieving ataraxia, then, requires that one avoidsome sort of pleasures in most or, quite possibly, in every instance.

With this in mind, Epicurus divides desire into three categories: thenatural and necessary, the natural but unnecessary, and the unnatural andunnecessary (D 29, 30; Ep Men 12728).8 The objects of unnatural andunnecessary desires should be sought rarely, if at all. One should restrictoneself to natural desires, and ataraxia can be fully attained even if onefinds herself able to successfully fulfill only natural and necessary desires.Even if the objects of unnecessary desires are available, they present theirown problems, as they are often difficult to obtain and prove unstable.Obtaining pleasure from unnecessary sources is often perfectly acceptable,but requiring or expecting pleasures of this sort is not.

The Key Doctrines make it abundantly clear that security is a naturalgood ( , D 6; , D 7).The role of security and protection from threat in the pleasurable (i.e.,good) life is introduced in D 6 and weaves its way throughout the text,featuring prominently in D 7, 13, 14 and 39, making its final appearancein D 40, the last of the Key Doctrines.

In D 6, Epicurus claims that any successful strategy that brings secur-ity from other people is a natural good.9

For the sake of being secure from other people, anything from which one could getthis was good according to nature.10

8 In Ep Men 127, and . In D 29, .

9 Epicurus uses a number of security-related terms and phrases. Most commonly, heemploys (cp. Aristotles Rhetoric 1. 5: 1360b15, 29), though he also usesforms of the verb (sometimes as a verbal noun) plus a preposition ( or). Both are to be sought (D 6, 7). In addition, security is oftensecured or procured, and Epicurus verb of choice is , generally with a prefixof or .

10 The idea that anything that brings security is naturally good is relatively (though notessentially) important for my later argument. Inwood and Gersons translation differssignificantly. They translate all of the received text:

[ ], .




If anything from which one obtains security is considered a natural good,then it would make sense that security itself is also a natural good.Thissuspicion is confirmed in the next doctrine. In D 7, Epicurus claims thatsecurity against others is a natural good, and he notes a few popular meth-ods for seeking security, including the pursuit of fame and power.

Some people wanted to become honored and admired, thinking to create securityfrom other people in this way. If the life of such people is secure, they have attainedthe good of nature; if, on the other hand, it is not secure, they do not have thatfor the sake of which they originally sought in accordance with what is appropriateby nature.11

Both the means to security and security itself, then, are linked to what isgood according to nature. D 7 on its own, though, leaves it unclearwhether Epicurus believes that both of the conditionals can be satisfied. Inother words, Epicurus could believe that the first conditional, that fameand power bring one security, is a live option. In this case, some powerfulpeople might very well be secure. However, it may also be the case thatthe antecedent of the first conditional is never satisfied, since the antece-dent of the second conditional is always satisfied. Epicurus could believethat everyone who seeks security by way of power could fail to attain thatfor which they aim the natural good of being secure. Thus, rule, power,and prestige would never be natural goods.

In D 14, Epicurus appears to walk a middle ground. In principle, somesecurity from violence can be found in power and money; however, thegreatest security is found in a collective retreat from the citys politics.12

Usener excludes the bracketed text, since he takes it is a marginal gloss meant to serveas an antecedent for . Hicks, Macovich, and I follow Usener, but Inwood andGerson do not, which results in a very different doctrine. Their translation:

The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake getting confidencefrom (other) men, (at least) from those from whom one is able to provide this.

In short, needs an antecedent. Inwood and Gerson take the antecedent to be , reading as masculine. I read as neuter with an indefinite,understood antecedent, equivalent to a present general protasis. Mitsis (1988: 83,89), Strodach (1963, 197), and OConner (1993, 70) share my translation, if notnecessarily for the same reason. D 6 is not even included in Long and Sedley, per-haps because the text is so vexed.

11 , , , , .

12 The standard translation of in D 7 and in D 14 is security against other men, which strongly suggests thatpeople pursue power in order to protect themselves from the violence of their fellowhumans. Roskam (2007: 3341) supports a competing translation: security comingfrom others. Someone who agrees with Roskam might think that Epicurus is not

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Although security against other people comes into being to some extent throughthe power to repel attacks and material wealth, security comes to be in its purestform through quietude and retreat from the many.13

Evidence outside of the Key Doctrines also suggests that psychological secur-ity is highly unlikely to be compatible with wealth and honor (VS 67, 81).

The final two doctrines tie these themes together. According to D39, the best way to gain security is by way of friendship within a stablepolitical community that is protected against external threat and free ofinternal dissension.

The one who best contrived against a lack of confidence about external threatsmade those he was able kin, while those he was unable, he did not make aliens.Those with whom he was not able to do even this, he avoided and banished so faras it was advantageous to do so.14

Finally, in D 40, Epicurus concludes the doctrines with the idea thatfriendship within a stable political community enables an individual toacquire the appropriate attitudes toward death, as manifested in a ten-dency not to pity those who die.

Those who had the power to provide themselves the most security from theirneighbors also lived with each other most sweetly, and having the most certainassurance, and receiving from one another the fullest fellowship, they did not la-ment the death of one who died before them as if it called for pity.15

particularly concerned about violence, which would tell against my claim that Epi-curus recognized an ineliminable fear of violent death. I need not weigh in on thetranslation matter, however, to block this latter move, for even if security indeedcomes from others, it is nevertheless security against something. Such is clear fromthe first clause of D 14, in which an individual pursues security through/againstother men in order to repel attacks ( ; trans. Inwood and Ger-son, accepted by Roskam). These attacks might not come from humans, but fromanimals (cf. DRN 5.1120, cp. Pl. Prot. 322ac). Even so, protection against animalviolence would still be protection from violent death. More likely, though, the attacksat issue come from humans; otherwise, one must wonder why kingship and materialwealth are useful for repelling animal attacks and why retreating to a small commu-nity on the outskirts of town would be more conducive to such protection. Animalsshy away from cities.

13 , .

14 , , , - .

15 , , -. Long and Sedleys translation of the first clause of 40 suggests that those who




The people who have the greatest security, then, live most pleasantly onaccount of that security; they enjoy the truest friendships and do notgrieve the death of their friends. Presumably, should an individual in thissetting die prematurely, it would not be due to the violence or infightingof her fellows, but due to causes beyond those that can be prevented byhumans. Those unable to gain security run the risk of death at the handsof their neighbors; thus, they are unable to gain friendship and are morelikely to grieve untimely, often violent deaths. For Epicurus, then, a personwho rightly seeks security should join a community in which she is freefrom internal threat and protected against external threat.

Indeed, we have seen that security is a natural good, but is it neces-sary? There are, again, two kinds of natural desire, namely, the necessaryand the unnecessary. If the desire for security from the threat of violenceis among the natural, but unnecessary desires, then one can attain ataraxiawithout fulfilling that desire, and expecting security or zealously pursuingsecurity can in fact undermine ones ability to attain ataraxia. One couldgladly welcome security if it came along, but one need not make greatefforts to arrange ones life in order to achieve physical protection (EpMen 131).

Epicurus offers almost no basis for distinguishing the two types of un-necessary desires (natural and unnatural) since he does not give a solidaccount of how to recognize what is and what is not natural to humans.16He does, however, offer a few criteria for distinguishing the two types ofnatural desires. In D 30, he claims that natural and necessary desires are1) easy to attain and 2) cause pain when they remain ungratified.17 In theLetter to Menoeceus, Epicurus offers three reasons a desire might be neces-sary.

withdraw from the city dispel all fear of their neighbors (their emphasis). However,the text suggests that those who withdraw have the most () security. This doesnot entail, however, that they have complete security or that such security is sufficientto get rid of all fear. Nevertheless, it certainly gets rid of most fear.

16 Unfortunately, perhaps the handiest discussion of this distinction comes from ananonymous scholiast of D 29. The scholiast notes that desires for sufficient suste-nance are natural and necessary, desires for excess or special sustenance are naturaland unnecessary, and those for crowns and honors are unnatural and unnecessary.Note that if the scholiast is correct, then the honors that might lead to security inD 6 and 7 become good by nature, which would make honors no longer unnaturaland unnecessary. Annas (1993: 188200) offers a useful contemporary discussion ofwhat might count as natural. She argues that natural and necessary desires are gene-ric, while natural and unnecessary desires are specific. Her classification shares muchin common with that of the scholiasts.

17 , - , , .

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Some are necessary for happiness, some for the freedom of disturbance of the body,and some for life itself. An unwavering gaze at these things is able to refer everychoice and aversion toward securing health of the body and freedom from distur-bance of the mind, since this is the final end of living blessedly (Ep Men 1278).18

There are a few reasons that security is considered a necessary desire. Con-sider, for instance, Epicurus somewhat puzzling claim that security is asufficiently important natural good that any successful means for attainingit is rendered naturally good instrumentally (KD 6). Epicurus wouldclearly not license gross immorality for the sake of gaining security, sincehe thinks truly immoral agents can never attain psychological security andwould always fear detection (VS 7, DF I: 50). However, he does seem tothink that if political power and fame successfully led to security, thenthey would be naturally good. It would be strange to endorse so heartilyany means for achieving an unnecessary desire. For instance, if politicalpower failed to bring security, but did allow for the possession of a well-stocked cellar of wine, then one might think Epicurus would not considerpolitical power to be instrumentally good by nature. Thus, we have a mod-est bit of evidence that security is a necessary desire.

However, some may question my translation of D 6.19 If one opts totranslate the suspected marginal gloss, then Epicurus merely encouragesone to obtain security against whomever one can, rather than from any-thing that promises success.

We can set D 6 aside, though, and still have good reason to countsecurity as natural and necessary in light of Epicurus discussion of neces-sary desires in the Letter to Menoeceus (1278). He claims that some ob-jects of necessary desires are necessary for staying alive, some for the bodyto be rid of uneasiness, and some for a person to be happy. Taken to-gether, the doctrines concerning security suggest that it qualifies as a neces-sary desire in all three of these respects. One can draw a straightforwardconnection between security and staying alive. Likewise, the desire forsecurity is closely bound up with bodily comfort, since security protectsone from physical abuse, among other indignities. More importantly, Epi-curus seems to believe that security is necessary if a person is to be fullyhappy, since D 14, 27, and 40 suggest that security from external threatis crucially tied to ones ability to live a pleasant life, which is none otherthan to obtain the final human good. If the final human good requires gain-ing security, and the final human good is achieving tranquility, then the

18 , , . , .

19 See note 10.




desire for security is bound tight to the pursuit of ataraxia. As such, thepreservation of the body, the tranquility of the mind, and the attainment ofthe final good depend upon ones ability to gain security. Protection againstviolent death is on par with securing a stable food source.

In D 30, though, Epicurus offers two criteria for necessary desires.They not only cause pain when ungratified, but they are also readily avail-able (D 15, 30; Ep Men 130). There is sufficient reason to conclude thatthe lack of security causes anxiety, but is security readily available?

III

For Epicurus, securing food and drink is not terribly difficult. One might,however, struggle to satisfy ones desire for a steady supply of fine wine ora nightly dinner of fishcakes (Ep Men 132).20 Assume that fishcakes areexpensive and in short supply; for someone with an intense desire for fish-cakes, the likelihood of having no future fishcakes could lead to mentaldistress, and her strong desire might tempt her to act unjustly in order toeat whatever she wants. At the very least, it might lead her to envy thosewith the means to acquire what she herself desires. Meanwhile, those whoare content to dine on water and bread rarely find themselves withoutsuch desire (Ep Men 130). Dietary evidence suggests that water and breadalone is not an optimal health program, but it is often an easy one tomaintain. Those who shape their desires to account for the instability offortune, then, rarely find their natural and necessary desires thwarted. Ifsecurity is the object of a necessary desire, it should be in similarly steadysupply for someone who uses the correct strategy and tailors her desiresappropriately.

As with food, some means for gaining security are more readily athand and cause less anxiety. Although D 7 and D 14 leave open thepossibility that Epicurus might believe power and other material goodshave the potential to bring one sufficient security, other Epicurean textssuggest they do not. To the extent that security is obtained throughpower, it is difficult to attain and maintain, and often causes more inse-curity than it ameliorates. Even those who are naturally quick, powerful,and outrageously lucky are always somewhat insecure.

Consider, for instance, Lucretius discussion of the plight of thepower-seeking in a passage that mirrors D 7 almost exactly. In contrastto those who seek to fulfill only necessary desires, others want to be fa-mous and powerful, so that their fortune might remain on a stable foun-

20 For an account of the luxuries of the well-heeled Greek, see Davidsons Courtesansand Fishcakes (1999).

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dation and that, being wealthy, they might be able to pass a peaceful life.But all in vain (DRN 5: 112023, my emphasis).21 In De Finibus, Tor-quatus says of those who pursue the objects of unnecessary desires on ac-count of their fear of death:

Moreover, they do not remember past good things, and they do not enjoy presentgood things; they only wait for future good things, and since those things are notable to be certain, they are consumed both by anguish and fear. And they are espe-cially tormented when they understand too late that they have been eager formoney or for power or for wealth or for glory in vain. For they do not achieve anyof their desires, for which, inflamed by the hope of acquiring them, they have un-dertaken many great hardships (DF 1: 60).22

Lucretius offers a detailed account of why these strategies are destined tofail.23 The heart of the problem is that all such strategies pursue securityby means of goods that are competitive. The process begins with the sup-position that various external goods bring security against the threat ofothers, that is, the more money at ones disposal for buying off opponentsand soldiers, the more protection one has against opponents (DRN 3: 5975). However, everyone has similar aims. Some of the goods are scarce,and others depend by their very nature on the victory of a single personor a small band of allies. While those lucky enough to be born naturallystrong and clever stand a better chance of success, they might lack oppor-tunities to use their skills, and fortune might give the advantage to theweaker opponent. Worse, competition is not always fair, and it may benecessary to harm others to obtain what one needs for protection. In ser-ious competitions, it may prove necessary to kill in order to either success-fully acquire goods or protect oneself against the violent acquisition ofones existing goods by someone else. One must be ready to kill or prepareoneself to die at the hands of those who are not quite squeamish. Thus, tobe fully confident that one has escaped detection, even if one were some-how to avoid harming others (or if one has already harmed others), simplyhaving external goods makes one a target for the injustice of other compe-

21 At claros homines voluerunt se atque potentes.ut fundamento stabili fortunna maneretet placidam possent opulenti degree vitam-nequiquam

22 Praeterea bona praeterita non meminerunt, praesentibus non fruuntur, futura modoexpectant, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu maximequecruciantur, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu maximequecruciantur, cum sero sentiunt frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperiis aut opibusaut gloriae. nullas enim consequuntur voluptates, quarum potiendi spe inflammati mul-tos labores magnosque susceperant.

23 For these ideas in starkest prose, see Hobbes Leviathan XIII. Alternately, most ofThucydides.




titors (cp. DRN 5: 11201134). Even if one manages to escape detection,Epicureans believe that those who commit injustice nevertheless increasetheir anxiety, since they would constantly be wracked by fear of eventualdetection and reprisal from those they disadvantage (D 35; VS 7; DRN5: 11511160; DF 1: 5051). By far, the worst result is that jockeying forpower compromises ones ability to make friends, since trust is impossible,often even among allies. The competition for and acquisition of competi-tive goods, then, does not ameliorate anxiety. Instead, it undermines plea-sure, increases anxiety, and leaves one very unsafe against the violence ofothers.

The members of an ideal Epicurean community like the Garden avoidthis anxiety and insecurity because they do not compete for goods.24 Con-fidence that ones neighbors will do one no harm is most certain within asocial community characterized by a lack of competition for the objects ofnecessary desires and a general agreement about which pleasures shouldnot be pursued (D 14). Goods that are necessary for all are sufficientlyavailable to all, and those for which people in other communities competeare less desired (if they are desired at all). Given that the community hasfound a more efficient and stable way to make itself secure, the motivationfor pursuing power and money is, therefore, diminished.

However, most people do not happen to chance upon a Garden. Thepaucity of safe refuges, then, explains the standard Epicurean advice toabstain from political involvement in non-ideal circumstances, unless fail-ure to be involved is a greater threat to ones safety than participation (cf.fr. 133 Us.). Staying quiet in an insecure city is often the best available albeit greatly inferior security. In short, the closer ones political situa-tion approximates the Garden, the better ones chances of obtaining physi-cal and mental security. For Epicurus, one can only pursue the most pru-dent course in dealing with natural human frailty. We are insecure

24 There is some debate about how an Epicurean community would be just. Given thatEpicurus thinks that justice is exhausted by a prudential agreement backed by sanc-tions, it is unclear why perfectly just sages would need either a formal agreement tobe just (they simply would be just) or sanctions against violations of laws (theywould never even want to violate laws). Armstrong (1997: 326n5) argues that thesages share a tacit social agreement, but they have no need for positive laws or sanc-tions. According to Mitsis (1988), the sages have just souls rather than externally justagreements. I am more sympathetic with OKeefe (2001), who argues that justiceamong sages concerns the instrumental organization of physical goods for the sake ofthe material security of the community. Thus, while a community of perfect Epicu-reans would never need justice to protect themselves from one another, justice mightdecree how many animals should be killed or raised for the continued security of thecommunity against external threat or starvation. In some sense, this question mightturn on a practical impossibility a community of perfect sages. One might expectthat there will always be some Epicureans in training.

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creatures, and although the Garden is ones best bet, Epicurus offers strate-gies for increasing ones security and ameliorating fear of violence whereverone finds oneself.

IV

Someone might grant that security is crucially important to the Epicureansand that a political arrangement such as that found in the Garden is thebest way to gain security, yet deny that the Epicurean quest for security ismotivated by fear of death or that the sage is dependent upon favorablepolitical circumstances to rid herself of fear. So argues Warren, who, again,thinks that Epicurus believes all fear of death is irrational and eliminablein light of sound philosophical arguments. Warren entertains a commonobjection to those who seek to eradicate the fear of death, namely that thefear of death may be prudentially and evolutionarily beneficial. If the fearof death were sometimes advantageous, then there would be good reasonnot to eliminate it, even if it were possible to do so. If the fear of deathkept an agent, for instance, from walking off cliffs and unnecessarily risk-ing her life and safety, then it would be a mistake to rid herself of a fearthat keeps her alive. Thus, Epicurus could, at best, be justified in encoura-ging us to eradicate some of the many varieties of the fear of death. Per-haps being dead should be nothing to us, but dying violently matters.This, in essence, is what I argue that Epicurus believes.

Although Warren acknowledges that Epicurus needs to provide somemechanism by which his followers can avoid pursuing death or becomingambivalent about when or how their death shall occur, he thinks the me-chanism need not be a fear of death. Instead, the fear of pain fully explainssuch behavior. Epicureans do not walk off cliffs, but it is not because theyfear death, it is because they avoid pain:

It remains open, therefore, for the Epicureans to claim that a good Epicurean willfear pain but not death, and that this fear of pain will suffice to ensure that theEpicurean can function in day-to-day situations without needlessly endangeringhimself.25

Warrens account explains why Epicureans fear and avoid painful deaths they hurt. The Epicurean can say, Its the pain I fear, not that it is endsof necessity in death. In other words, she can drive a wedge between in-tense pain and the death in which it terminates. Despite a slight odor ofsophism, one might accept the wedge.

25 Warren, 12.




However, note that if Warren is right, the Epicurean seems to lack aclear reason to avoid a painless death. Why should she skip town whenshe hears that the local tyrant has a penchant for killing aspiring Epicur-eans painlessly in their sleep? If painless deaths are not bad, then whyshould she carefully label and store the fast-acting, tasty poison, ratherthan leave it in the open and accessible to young children? One mustwonder what protects the Epicurean from happily courting a painlessdeath. If she does not bother to protect herself against such deaths, thenthe objection that the fear of death is good if it helps us avoid deathsworth avoiding reasserts itself.

Warrens Epicurean might respond in one of two ways. She mightsimply contest the intuition that painless deaths are bad, conceding in ef-fect that she has no reason to escape the surreptitious tyrant or take pre-cautions against poisoning a child. On the other hand, if she thinks suchdeaths are worth avoiding, then she must offer some reason to protectherself against them without appealing to pain.

Occupying an argumentative space in which one lacks reason to avoideasily and ethically avoidable deaths should, I think, be a last resort. AnEpicurean, then, should first search out something other than pain to ex-plain her decision to seek her own safety and ensure the safety of others.For instance, she might avoid the tyrant because death at the hands of thetyrant is unpredictable and uncertain. She might claim that mental anxietyarising from uncertainty justifies her escape rather than the prospect ofphysical pain. The standard interpretation clearly prohibits this response,however, since anxiety about uncertain death is a species of the fear ofdeath, and the standard interpretation insists that all fears of death areirrational and eliminable. Fear about when ones death will occur is out-right a fear of death.

A second, more promising response shifts the locus of the harm of apainless death. An Epicurean might not avoid the death for her own sake,but for the sake of the community in which she lives. Her painless deathmight trouble or disadvantage her peers or dependents. One might ima-gine a parent who claims that she does not fear death, although she avoidseven painless deaths because she does not want her children to suffer thefate of orphans.26 Even if one lacks dependents, a painless death leaves one

26 Philodemus seems to have had this worry in mind in On Death. He writes: Nowleaving behind parents or children or a wife or certain others of those close to us, ifthey be in dire straits on account of our death or will even lack necessities, has ofcourse a most natural sting, and this alone, or more than anything else, sitrs up emis-sions of tears in the sensible man (25.225.10; trans. Henry [2009]). Though thepassage is extremely fragmentary, the idea seems to be that the sensible man assuageshis worry by securing valuable friends who can ensure the safety of his children.

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less person to pitch in when it is time to harvest the communitys summercrops.

The idea that homicides and accidental deaths caused by others arewrong because they harm the community has some textual evidence tocommend it. For the Epicureans, shared agreement about what is instru-mental to a communitys advantage exhaustively determines the content ofjustice (KD 33, 368), and it is generally not advantageous for a commu-nitys citizens to die, whether by homicide or negligence. In his On Absti-nence, Porphyry offers Hermarchus account of the Epicurean argumentsconcerning whether we have duties of justice to animals that prohibit ourneedlessly killing and eating them (1. 712). He reasonably thinks weshould discover the nature of justice itself before determining whether itapplies to animals; thus, he recounts the origins of mutual obligationamong human members of the Epicurean community. Such a communitycomprises people congregating for the purposes of security against thethreat of death, although they likewise killed aggressive animals in self-de-fense.

Setting the matter of animals aside, the germane feature of justice inHermarchus account of the Epicurean community concerns the need toestablish laws that punish citizens who kill fellow citizens, whether inten-tionally or accidentally. According to the Epicurean law-givers, a commu-nity has a vested interest in discouraging all deaths at the hands of others,and allowing accidental deaths pass unpunished could embolden a mur-derer savvy enough to fake an accident. At the very least, punishment isnecessary to encourage precautionary measures in dangerous situations.Deaths caused by others, then, are clearly bad for the community, whichmakes it acceptable to prohibit and punish them by law.

Note, however, that this shared political concern also collapses into afear of death. If deaths are collectively condemned as harmful, even if theyonly harm those who remain alive, then it makes sense that they are col-lectively feared. On an individual level, I can fear causing a death becausethat death harms others for whom I care. Likewise, I can fear being mur-dered or negligently killed, since murder unsettles my community. In bothinstances, I fear a particular sort of death and my role in it. Thus,although I need not worry myself about deaths I cannot conscientiouslyprevent, I rightly fear and avoid deaths that are roughly within my powerto control, even if I fear them primarily for the sake of others.

Remember that Warrens Epicurean can drive a possibly non-sophisticwedge between fearing pain and fearing the death that accompanies orfollows it out of necessity. That option is not available here, however,since the death is the source of the harm. When I avoid a speeding bus,my efforts might have nothing to do with avoiding death; knowing it willhurt to be hit by a careening bus, I step out of the way. However, when Iavoid causing or suffering a painless death for the sake of others, my ef-




forts have everything to do with avoiding death. A well-legislated commu-nity inhabited by ethical citizens would be sparse on negligent or inten-tional homicides, so a citizen would have little reason to worry. Outsidean optimal community, however, a person will suffer from anxiety in pro-tecting herself and her relations from painless or negligent deaths; thisperson could become unsettled when such deaths happen to others.

If available justifications for avoiding painless or instantaneous deathscollapse into some variety of the fear of death, then an advocate of thestandard interpretation must retreat to the position that these deaths simplyare not bad for either the person or the community. On one front, at least,the evidence from Porphyry would foreclose this option. The lawmakersthink the community should punish violent and negligent deaths, at least forthe sake of the psychological and physical security of the community.

However, one might think that community anxiety of this sort canonly arise because most people are not sages. One might have the naggingthought that the Epicurean sage should not feel any fear or worry, even ifshe finds herself in an exceptionally precarious position. This objectiongets its teeth from the oft-repeated claim, found especially in Ciceroscharacteristic ridicule of Epicurus, that the Epicurean sage is happy on therack (Tusc. II 7: 1719; DL X 118). The sage is suitably equipped for atortured death, perhaps on behalf of her friends (VS 567), perhaps as thetarget of some bloodthirsty tyrant. If the sage can be happy on the rack,and the rack is the most gruesomely violent death, then why would thesage have reason to fear a garden-variety violent death?

This is a challenging objection, which points to a fundamental tensionwithin Epicureanism. If Epicureanism aims to insulate its adherents fromanxiety and fortune, why should the Epicurean especially the Epicureansage need to isolate herself from violence in the suburbs? On one hand,if Epicureanism requires moving away from the citys dangers to free one-self from fear, then it might seem ill-equipped for courageously facingstandard human existence. If, on the other hand, Epicureanism preparesone to die violently, why should Epicureans need to escape the dangers ofthe city at all?

Tension aside, I need an account of how the sages happy death onthe rack affects my thesis. I certainly do not deny that the Epicurean sagecan manage the pain of death or cope with death when it is unavoidable.That the sage is happy on the rack, though, is not necessarily at odds withher having done everything within the scope of her prudential principles(i.e., not betraying a friend) to avoid ending up in physical agony. Theclaim that the sage best endures death at the hands of others when itoccurs is not at odds with her fearing it before it happens. For example, Imight do everything to avoid losing my house in the mortgage crisis; Imay fear losing my house. This does not, however, entail that I cannotendure my homelessness should it occur.

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But, wait! If one fears that something might happen, when the occur-rence of that thing will not to be bad, then is it not patently irrational tocontinue fearing it? A core premise in the Epicurean argument against thefear of being dead contends that one cannot rationally fear what will notbe bad (Ep Men 125). This is a larger problem than one might think.Remember that for Warren, the reason the Epicurean avoids stepping infront of buses is that she fears pain. If the sage, unlike the rest of us, ismightily equipped to handle excruciating pain with happiness, then ex-plaining her aversion to the rack could be a somewhat difficult task. Thehappy sage would fall into the trap of the reckless Epicurean, so she evenmore than the non-sages must have reason to avoid deaths other thanthe likelihood that they will hurt or be beyond endurance. If her pain isalways conquered by happiness, she might as well walk in front of the bus.

The reason she fears and avoids death, I suggest, again appeals to thepleasures of a secure community of friends. First, the sages ability to behappy on the rack might itself depend upon a long history of enjoyingsecurity in a safe, noncompetitive community. Sufficient evidence showsthat the sage can be happy on the rack, but it is less clear how she managesto remain happy on the rack. Commentators draw on evidence from Epi-curus account of the way his own painful death was enjoyable. Epicurus,it seems, distracted himself from the pain by recalling the wealth of plea-sant experiences he had shared with his close friends. These happy mem-ories overpowered the extreme physical pain of his illness. Diogenes pro-vides a passage from Epicurus Letter to Idomeneus:27

On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. Mycontinual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing couldaugment them; but over and against them all I set gladness of mind at the remem-brance of our past conversations.28

Reflecting on memories of pleasant companionship helped Epicurus diehappily despite excruciating physical pain. However, if building an arsenalof memories of the kind that give one pleasure when facing death requiresretreating from the city to the company of like-minded individuals, andD 14 and D 40 suggests that it does, then the best way to deal with aviolent and painful death is to spend a good bit of time conscientiouslyavoiding it. The sages happiness on the rack would turn upon a history offavorable political conditions.

27 Cicero has this letter addressed to Hermarchus. Perhaps there were even two letters.Cicero, though, perhaps manifesting a bit of his customary lack of charity for Epicu-rus, has Epicurus distract himself from his pain by reflecting on his own discoveries(rationum inventorumque nostrorum).

28 DL X 22, Us. 138, trans., Inwood and Gerson.




Second, if I am right that fearing easily avoidable, even painless deathsis necessary for the safety and well-being of the community, then the sagehas as much reason, if not more, to avoid death for the sake of her friends.Since, in some ways at least, the community depends on her more than onother citizens, she tends to avoid and fear the rack, even if she can easilymanage and enjoy such a death when it is unavoidable. Remember thatthe chief Epicurean text we have about the sages experience on the racksuggests that she willingly dies an excruciating death on behalf of herfriends (VS 567). Nevertheless, she can think that a death that harmsher friends, and that she can ethically prevent, is bad.

As a final note, I have so far addressed the objections to my positionon my opponents terms, justifying the fear of death caused by others onpurely rational grounds. In the early sections of the paper, though, I ar-gued that the desire for security is natural and necessary, and thereforebeyond the reach of rational persuasion. For the Epicurean, the desire tosurvive is a brute component of being a human animal, such that we comeequipped with an all-things-considered preference for not starving to deathor feeling insecure. It is no contradiction for individuals to house thesedesires and fears while also having the ability to cope with starvation noblyor endure a painful death while defending their friends or children. Enjoy-ing life and preferring more of it does not in any way require greedinessfor life, and the Epicureans seem to primarily abjure greediness (Ep Men126).

Thus, even if the sage mysteriously experiences no pain while dying,she has reason to think a painless and easily avoidable death is bad, sinceshe is happy and prefers to continue living a pleasant life with her friends.Otherwise she cannot avoid the deaths worth avoiding, and such refusalseems at odds with the Epicurean endorsement of the life of pleasure,especially the life characterized by the pleasures of friendship. She can con-sistently fear and avoid these deaths simply on the basis of her brute desireto maintain her pleasant life, even if her rational capacities help her copewhen her desire is eventually frustrated by circumstances beyond her con-trol.

There remains one key objection: it seems that my interpretationthreatens the possibility of ataraxia. Fear, like grief, is a negative emotion,so an argument that claims we are all motivated to act in light of an in-eliminable (though generally controllable) fear might appear to undercutthe Epicurean quest for an anxiety-free life. If my thesis requires that Epi-curus jettison a fundamental psychological principle that guides his eudae-monist ethics, interpretive consistency is very much against me.

One live option is to retreat to the idea that Epicureanism is a perfec-tionist ethics, according to which even the best of us can only approximateataraxia, if only because there are some psychological and bodily limita-tions imposed on natural creatures. Perfectionism is not a terribly uncom-

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mon feature of ancient ethical theories, and those who are perfect are of-ten judged divine rather than human.29 Another alternative is to recon-ceive ataraxia in light of evidence that even sages experience characteristi-cally negative emotions. Some texts, for instance, indicate that the sagegrieves the deaths of her friends and shares their suffering. On this front,Epicureans seek to differentiate themselves from the Stoics, whose resis-tance to grief seemed positively inhumane (VS 66, DL X, 120; Plutarch, APleasant Life, 1101ab: Us. 120). If the sage achieves and maintains atarax-ia, yet grieves at the same time, then ataraxia might withstand some othernatural, negative human emotions.

V

I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of deathare irrational and eliminable. At least one fear the fear of violent deathcaused by others is brute and must be managed politically. If I am right,Epicurus beliefs would seem much more reasonable to many people whorecognize that we have a vested interest in controlling the fear of death,but who are skeptical about our ability to eliminate it. Epicurus would nolonger believe that a person can study a set of arguments, believe them,chant them regularly to herself or with friends, and thereby rid herself ofthe many varieties of the fear of death. Others, however, might think mythesis renders Epicurus beliefs about the fear of death much less exciting.If one is primarily interested in Epicurus views on death because his extre-mism makes him a useful foil, then he might no longer be the biggesttarget. Likewise, if one looks to Epicurus to eliminate all varieties of onesown fear of death, then one might need to seek extra assistance.

My view might have one final, unsavory result (to some readers, atleast). If one cannot offer a full account of Epicurus views about deathwithout examining his vested interest in security, it might turn out thatEpicurus recommends we become a variety of the suburbanites, albeitpoor and unassuming suburbanites. In other words, Epicureanisms vexingtension between a quest for security through risk aversion and a way oflife designed to make one immune to fortune remains. Some people moveto the suburbs because they are afraid of the city, and Epicurus would beone of them.

In sum, I argue that Epicurus believes there is a fear of death that doesnot disappear, which we can control with due care and with close atten-

29 Assorted claims that the sage can be immortal like the gods raises some puzzles for,among other things, Epicurean atomism. After all, the soul atoms of humans disperseat death, while the gods are the same eternally. See Warren (2000).




tion to the social environs. Though my thesis might render Epicurus lessof a radical with regards the fear of death than heretofore believed, andthough it may even make him seem a bit less than perfectly brave, I main-tain that it is a good way to make sense of the text. Conceding that someparticular fear of death is not fully eliminable could leave Epicureanism, inWarrens words, fatally wounded.30 I prefer to think it escapes largely un-scathed.31

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30 Warren, 7.31 I am grateful to Eric Brown, Matt Cashen, Emily Crookston, Brad Inwood, Ralph

Kennedy, Bob Lamberton, Mariska Leunissen, Kirk Sanders, Clerk Shaw, Brian War-ren, and an anonymous reader from Apeiron for their invaluable assistance. I wouldalso like to thank the philosophy departments at Boston University, Colgate Univer-sity, University of Memphis, Wake Forest University, and Washington University inSt. Louis for disagreeing with my thesis in such a generous spirit.

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