Marquez vs. Disierto

G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE:Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No.We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before it.

FACTS:The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.

Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their extremely detailed character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.

ISSUE:Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court

HELD:The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.

The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause." Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.

People v. LaraG.R. No. 199877, August 13 2012Motion to QuashRule 117 Section 9. (Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor)

FACTS: Sumulong, SPO1 Cruz and PO3 Calix were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. Sumulong testified that:

(a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.;(b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of theemployees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Manacob, Atie andJoselito Bautista; (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Arturo Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, Wag mong ibigay; (g) heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in Bautistas direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two other companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastians money.

SPO1 Cruz testified that:

(a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning;(e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

PO3 Calix testified that:

(a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven pieces of empty shells and six deformed slugs of a 9 mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.

In his defense, Lara testified that:

(a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you; (g) he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day;(j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, Ituro nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.

The RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi. The prosecutions witness Sumulong positively identified Lara as the person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 oclock in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day.

For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. Considering the proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and the residence of the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same barangay.

The positive identification of the accused which were categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. One of which was that he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest, rendering void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction.

The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability. Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was illegal and therefore, may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his conviction

HELD:

No.

Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.

It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.

Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, accused is estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the Information.

What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest.

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the groundsprovided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure to present a witness who actually saw him commit the crime charged.

Accused takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he shot the victim and took the money. Such posture is unpersuasive. Contrary to his assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim. Sumulong vividly recounted that when Bautista alighted the vehicle with the bag containing money, he ran around the vehicle and towards the rear, Lara, who went at the back of the vehicle as well, followed Bautista and fired a gun at him several times. And that when Sumulong stepped down from the vehicle, he saw Bautista shot. Despite the fact that he did not personally see who fired the firearm, Sumulong presumed that it was Lara who fired the gun because at that time, it was the accused who was holding the gun.

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur:(a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of accused is beyond reasonable doubt.

(a) While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, accused suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag containing the money(b) Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle(c) The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag(d) Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim(e) The victim sustained several gunshot wounds(f) The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells

It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.

However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites:

(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly indicate Laras guilt:

(a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautistas direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds;(g) Bautistas blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were recovered therefrom

Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who wasrunning away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted.

Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.

Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stones throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene.

In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.

Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof. In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Laras claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the distance between his house and the place where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is wellnigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Decision of the CA was AFFIRMED.

RATIO: Rule 117 Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14,2008MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENTSec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when:(1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005.The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14]Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and GPursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.[16]Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[19]which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.