Atlanta v APS Ruling

7/24/2019 Atlanta v APS Ruling

1/29

Fulton

County

Superior

Co

***EFILED***N

Date:

1012612015

4.41:51

Cathelene

Robinson,

Cl

IN

T[{E

S{JPERIOR"

COUB'T

*s

F{]I-T'ON

CS[jI1{T'Y

ATLANTA

JUSICNAX,

CTRCUTT

S'TATS

SF'GEOR.GIA

THE

CITY

OF

ATLANTA,

a

municipal

)

Corporation

and

political

suhdivisiofl

of

the

)

State

af

Georgia,

acting by

and

through its

)

fuIay*r anil City Coun*il,

Petitioner,

V.

AT'LANTA

INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL

SYSTEM,

a

politieal

suirdivision

af

the

State

of

Ceorgia. acting

by and

througl"r

its

duly

elected

Board,

Respondent,

)

FULTON

COUr\TY

SCHOOL

DISTRICT.

)

a

political

subdivisir:n

r:f the State

of

)

Georgia

acting

lry

and

througll

its duly

]

Elected

Board,

)

)

Irtervenor-Respondent.

)

F{NAr- ORDE&

ph{

PilNSIF-lG

zuiOTlO$S

The

above

styled

actjon

com.es

befure

this Court on

ilre fullurviirg

rtotions:

t|)

Atlanta

lndepsendent Schrsol.$uranr

's

fu{otirsnJbr

.ludgnrcnt

on the Pleudings,

{21

Fultan

Cot*tl.y St:hool

District's

Motion to

Dismi.ss

PetitionJbt'Declarutory,ludgment,

and

(3)

Citt;

oJ

-Atlunta's

Motiort

.fbr

Suntmary

Judgrnent.

l{aving

considered

the

entire

record in this

rn&tter

and argument

of

counsel,

the

Court

HEREBY

DENIES

Fetitioner

City of Atlanta's

Motion for

Sutntnary

Judgment,

CRANTS

Respondent

Atlanta

lndependent

Schortl

System's

Motiort

fbr Juclgment r:n

the Pleadings.

and ORANTS

Fulton County

School

District's

fuIotian

to

Disiniss

Petiti*n

for

Declaratory

Judgment,

findirig

as

fr:llows:

CIVIL

ACTIOh]

FILE

N{}.2015CV258510


2/29

STATE]VIENT

OF FACTS

In

this

action

Petitioner City

of,Atlanta

seeks

a declaratcry

judg:nent

purstrant

to

O.C.C.A.

$$

9-4-l e{

seq- that

it

rrray

annex

property rvithin Fulton Ci:unt,v

into

the

City

of

Atlanta's

rnunicipal boundaries

r,yithout sin:ultaneously

expanriing

the bouudaries

of

the Atlanta

lndepenrlent

School

Systern

("APS")

and

that the

City rnay

exercise

its rielegated

authority tcl

selectively

rietennine

r,vhether an annexation

extends

APS' bounclalies.l

The

material

fircts of'this

case are

not disputed.

In

i950. the

Ceneral

Assembly

passed

a

local constitutional

amencimcnt

(tlie

"

1950 LCA")

to

the

Ceorgia

Constitutron

of

I

9''15,

r.vhich

was

subsequentiy

ratifieci by

voters. The

1950

LCr\

provided in

rclevant

paft:

fW]hen

the corpcirate

lirnits

of

the

City of Atlanta

are

extenrlsd

into

Fulton

County,

the territory

embraced

therein

shall

becoms

a

part

of

r/re tnd*pendent

school

sltstunt

o.f

the

City

r{Atlunta and shall

cease

to

bs

a

pa:t of the

schor:l

system

of

the county.

The

school

prr:perly

located

within

*re

area

embraced

in

the

extension

sirall

bccome

the

propefiy

of

tlre

Citi; of ,Atlant*.

Ser

Ca.

L.

iq50.

pp. 458r59

(emphasis

added).

Thus, under thr-

1950

LCA

(

1)

wlLenever the

City

of Atlanta

annexed

ten-itory

in Fultc;n

CoL]ilty,

APS'

boundaries

automatically

and

cotenninr:usly

expandecl to encompass

the nervly

annexecl

tenitory,

and

(2)

a:ry "school

property" located

within

that

area

rvor-rld

hecome

the

property

ot'the

City

of Atlanta"

Id.

In

1960,

ar:.other

local

constitutional amendrtent

was enacted

providing

fbr

the

City

to assume

ileflirin

debt

of the Fulton

County Schocl District

("FCSD")

ii:

retnmr

for schr:ol

properlies

transtbn'ed

by

annexation.

Sec

Ga.

L.

1960,

pp.

l44l-44.

At

the

tirne ths

General

Asseurbly

passed

the {950

LCA,

the

City's

independeirt

scirool

systeffi

tvas

not

a

separate $or?orate

entity

but ralher

tire school

sy'i;tem

serving

the City

fonned

part

of the City of Aflanta's

municipalgovernment.

as authorized

by

the

1945

Constitution.

Scre

Ca. Const.

of

1945,

Art.

VIII,

$VIt,1

I. Hoivever,

in 1973,

the Ceneral

Assembly

separated

thc

City

of

Atlanta"s Fetitior: tbr De

claratory

Judgment.

liil

1,

45

2


3/29

City

of Atlanta

fi"onr the

City's school

system and

education

functions,

creating

two separale

corporate

entities

by enacting

separate

charters

ftrr the City

and

rvhat

was to becoms

APS

tlrruughCa.L,

1973,1t.2188(Cityol'AtiantaCharteroi'1973)anclCa"L"

iq73"p.2167(APS

Clrarter

ot'1973).

respectively.

See

alsa

Ca. Const.

Ai1.

VIIL

r\V, 1lli

I

and 11.

The

1945 Ceor:gia Constitution

rvas

replaced

by

rhe

1976

Constitution,

rvhich

tvas

in

trtrn

rcplaccd bythe

1983

Constitution.

cffectivc

Jul. 1.

t983.Sec

Ga.

Const..

Art.

XI,

$1,

llvI.

Thc

1983

Constitution

prohibited

the

enactment of

{irrther

local

constitutionai

aitendr:rents

("LCA").

Sce Ca.

Const.,

Art.

X,

$

I,

lfl

("Arnendments to

this Constitution

or

a

ne\.v

Co*stitution

nray be

proposeri

by

the

Ceneral Assernbly

or

by

a constitutior:al

conveittion.

as

provided

in this

ar"tic1e.

Only

arnendmeftts,,vhich are

olgeneral

and

unifonn

applicability

throughout

the state

shall

be

proposed,

passed,

or subnritted

to

the

people"). Eristing

LCAs

rvould

rcmain in efl'ect

ftrr a IoLrr

year period-until

July

t.

1987.

See

Ga.

Const,,

Att.

XI,

$l.1llv.

If the

Ceneral

Assernbly did

not expressiy

readopt an

LCA

"withotil

amendment" by tirat

date,

it

would be repealed.

Id.

(Eraphasis

added).

In

1986. the Cenerai

Assembly

passed Fir:use

Bill

1620

("1{B

I620"),

r,vhich

provided iri

relevanl

part:

That

constitntional

atnendment

fthe

1q50

LCAJ

providing

that, upr:n

the

extension

of

t1"re

corporate

lirnits of

the City

61611unta

into

Fultan

Cortnty,

the additional

territory

and school

property

locateci

in the annexed

area

become

a

part

of the

Ctty of

Atl*nta

independent

sclr*al system

(Res.

Act

No"

73;

HR

181-q69j; Ga. L. 1950,

p.'t58)

s&aIJ

not

he

r*pealed

ot

tleleted on July

l, 1987,

as

pad

of the Constitution

of

the

State

of

Ceorgia

bttt

is speciJicatly

continued

in

force

ontl efibct

o*

and aftct'

tlrat dats

as

u

pwt

af the

C*nstitutiln

af

the Stnte

of

6e*rgia-

See

FIB

1620,

Ga.

L.

I986,

pp.

48 12*13

(ernpirasis

added)-

While HB I630

sought

to expressly

readopt

and,

thus.

contiirue

in effect

the

1950

LCA,

in

this actiorr

the

City of

Atlanta

arguos

that

HB

1620 in fact

purported to amend

the

1950

LCA


4/29

and

misrepresenterJ

tire

contents

of the

1950

LCA,

making

the

legislatio*

uncr:ustitutional

and

void.

"lhqs,

t'he

City urges

the

1950

LCA

r,vas

repealed by

operation

of Art.

Xl,

rsl,l[V

because

the Ceneral

Assembly

failed

to

enact

valid

legislation

contiuuing

the

1950

LCA

fbllorving

acloption

and

ratification

of

the 1983

Constitution such

that amtexation

by

the

City within

Fulton

County

does

not automalically

and

coterminously

extcnrl the

boundaries

of

APS.

ln

2015,

thres

coinmuniti*s

in unineorporaled

Fulton County

sutrr:ritted

atrnexalioir

petitions

tc

join

the City

of'Atlanta.2

Fur"ther.

the

City

or,vns

real

prop*rty

located ir:

unincorporated

Fulton County

at

0

Fulton

Industri*l

Bculel,ard,

N.V/.,

(the "Fultou lndurstdal

Parcel") r,vhich

the City

r:f

Atlanta

has

propr:sert to arurex.]

The

City

contenris

that

it is

"uncsrtain

ahout

what

school options

are available

to

unincorpornted

ccmtnunities

lrecartse

of

the

existelce

of the 1950

LCA,

as

well

as

wirat

actions

Atlanta

or othel's

may

take in that

regartl""+

Becausc

of

uncefiainty

rsgarding

lvhether the 1950

LCA

rernains

in

etltct

and its

impact otl the

tbregoing

proposed

annexations,

on

Mar.

18"

2015 the City

of

Atlanta

ljled

the

present

action

agailrst

APS,

seeking

il declarati:ry

judgment

that

"the

195fi

Schcols

LCA

is

no longer

eff.cctive

and

thus

that an

apexation

by

Atlanta

within

Fulton County

wauld

not

auton:latically

extencl

the

r

Petirion

fbr

Deulararory Judgn:enr.

YJi{

4-5,

;15:

Cit-v- of

Atlanta's li4otion

lbr Sunrur*r1,

Judgnlenl,

8.

Exhibit

D*'-N{egan

Mid


5/29

boundaries

of APS."5

Thc City

aiso

requests

that

the

Court

declare

that

either

the Ceneral

Assembly

or the

City

of Atlauta

(through

its

o'delegated

[iegislative]

authority")

may

cletennine

wlll:ther

any annexation by

the City

wilhin Fuiton

County

extentls

the

bounrlaries

of

APS.6

Thereafter

the

Court

grar:ted

FCSD's

trzlotion

to Intenr'ene

as a

Respondent.

The

instanl

motions

fallorved.

POSTLJRE

AND STANDARD

OF'REVIEW

This mattei'

came

before

the Court

tirr

a

status

and schedulitrg

conference

on

May

18,

2015,

al rvliich all

pailies

were in attendanse

through

their

respective

counsel.7

Thereatter.

the

Cogrl

enterecl

a Case Management

Orcler

setling

deadlines

for

the subrnission

of

"dispositive

motir:ns"

ancl responses

and

replies

thereto. Cerlain

deadlines

were

extended

via Consent

OrcJer

i:n Jul.

8,

2015. The

parties

each sLrbmitted

dispositive

motions, although

each

filed

ir

ditTerent

motion

seeking

tinal disposition

of this

case.

Fursuant

to

O.C.G.A.

s\9-11-56.

summary

judgment

is

appropriate

"if

the

pleadings,

depositions.

allswers

to inteffogatories,

and

admissions

cn

flle,

together

ivith the

aflidavits,

if

any,

show

that there is

r"ro

genuine

issue

as to airy

rnaterial

fact

and that

the moving

parly

is

entitled

to

a

jticlgrneni

as

a

matter

of law."

O.C.G.A.

$9-

l I

-56.

See

also

Hqme

Builders Ass'n

of

Savannah,

Inc.

v-

Chatham

Cnty.,

276

Ga. 243-?44

(2003)

("Tti pr-evail at

sumnrarrl

judgnrent

under

fO.C.C.A.l

$

9-l

l-56,

the

moving

party

must

demonstrate

that there

is

no

genuine

issue of'

'

City

olAt)anta"s

lvlr:tion

lbr Summary

Judgment.

3'

"

Petition

for Declarutory

Juclgment.

2 ancl

Prayer

fbr

l(eliel

City of Atlanta's

Motion

lbr

Sun:mary

Judgment,

3.

It

appears

tl-re

Cir,v

of

Atlanta

l:rrst

atternpted

to

rrs,rlle

issues

raised

in

thi*

action

by introdrrcing

Iiouse

Bill

638 in

the

General

r\s*eu'rbly,

a bill

expressly

seeking

to

repeal

the

1950

I-CA"

i-Iorv*ver.

[lB

6]8

did not

pass

dur-igg

the 3015

session.

,*re FCSD's

Motion

to

Disrniss

Petition

fbt

l)eclaratory

Judgrnent, 3

and

Exhibit B'

'Seca{saO.C.G.A,

l?4-2-22A

{Georgiacourtsmaytakejudicial

noticeoi.

iilterultu."all

lawsandresolutionsof

thc

Geaeral

Asserublyandthejoumalsol'eaclrbranchthereofaspublishedbyauthority").Act:ordT

oUp:p]ru

C]reatharn,

24-,t Ca.

l l

7.

I

l8

{19?9)l $J:*rpi:-y.

.I,-.orr'e,

214

C4"

511, 5

18

(

1958}-

t

At

the staru$

c-onlbrqnce, the

parties

indicated

they

dc

not trelieve

discovery

is

necessar-v

in this

nratter'

Ser:

Case il4anagenienr

Order

arrd

Order

Granting

Fultan

County

School

District'*

lvJotio*

to

loterveile,

2.


6/29

matcriid

tact

and

that the

irndisputed

tacts,

r,,iewed

in the

light most

favorable

to the nonmoving

par1y,

warant

judgment

aii

a

msttsr

of law").

A

mation

for

judgment

on the

pl*adings

may

be liled

at any

time

"[a]11er

the

pleadings

are closed

but

withiir

such

tin:e

as not

to

delay

the

trial." O.C.C.A.

$

9-11-12{c).

Sucit

shouid

be

granterl

"where

the

undisputed

facts

th*t

appear

from

the

pleadings

establish

that

the movaut

is

entitlecl

to

ju


7/29

extent they

are

othenvise

adrnissible

and

treat the

pending

motions

as

if

tbr

summary

jurtgrnent.

Sec

itlinnifield

v.

Wells

Fargo

Bank.

N.A.,331

Ca.

App.5l2,5i5

(2015). See ttlso

Citvof

Cordele

v. Turtq+'s,

163

Ca.

App. 327.

329

{

198?)

("lt

is

the


8/29

Sovrreign

immunity

extends

to

the

State's "departments

and

agencies"

and

includes

Responilents,

both

politi*at

subclivisions

of the

Stats"E

See Ga.

Const.,

Art.

[,

$

II.lilX{e)

and

Art. Vlli.

$V,

$.

S*e

alsa Cofl'ee Cnty.

Sch.

Di-st.

v.

Snipes,2l6

Ca. App.

293.29a

(i995);

Birnria

v-

Ben I{i11

Cntlv.

Sch.

Dist.,

320 Ca.

App. 433,

424

{2A13).

Tire

party

seeking to

benefit

fiorn the

waiver

of

sovereign

imrnunity

beers the

buriien

of establishing

sLrcl-r

r.vaiver.

DeKallt

Cnt.v*"

Sch.

Dist.

v"

Gold,

318 Ca.

App.633,

635-36

(2012)l

Bonner

v.

Peterso:r.

30i Ga.

App.

443.

443"

(2009).

Thus, the Court

must

{irst

consider

lvhether

sot

ereign

immunity

bars thjs

action"

Respondents argue that

there

is no

statutory

rvaiver

that

penlits

the

City o1'Atlanta

to

Lrring

this declaratcry

action against

them-

The Ciry

cou*ters

that

sovereign

imntunity

does not

bar

declaratory

relief

for its

constituti+nal1y

based

claims.

[n recent

tlecisions

the Ceorgia

Supreme

Court

has expressly

deciined

to address

whether

dectrarxtory

aclions

brought

against

the

State

are barecl

under

the

d*ctrins

of

savereign

immrurity.

See, e.g.,

SJN Pr*peities.

LLC

v-

Fr-rlton

Cnty.-Bd.

of Asscssors,

196 Ga.

793, 802

{2015)

("We

have

prcviously

left unresolved

the

question of *,hether

sovereign

immunity

generally bars claims

against

the

State

fur

tleclaratory

relief . . . Because this

significalit

legal

issue has

received

little

atiention

in these

proceeclings anrl

because

thesc claims

can

be disposed

of

on

other

grounds

.

. . lYe decline

to

clefinitively

resolve

it here")q

Soulhem

LNC.

Iuc.

v.

MacCinnitie

,29A

fra.

2G4,

205*06

(201

1)

{"Tiris

is

not to

say

that

rleclaratory

actions

ag*inst

the State

at'e

rlecessarily

ban-ed

by

sovcre

igrr

immunity.

We siinply

decline

to adclress

the

question whetiler

a

declaratory

action against

the

State to

determine

one's

rights

with

respect

to the applicability

of

a statutc

is

barred

by

sovereign

immunity").

Nevertheless.

liaving

consitiered

the

facis and circurnstanees

of

the

case sub

iudice

t

City of

Arlarta'$

Stalenxent

ol'Undisputed

fuIalerial Facts.

fl

l-3:

AliS"

and FCSD's

Joinl

Response

to

the

City

of Arlanta's

Sratement

of

Undisputed

lv{aterial

Facts

and

Supp}emeot*1

Statement

*f

Undisputed

Ulaterial

lra{rs

qi$

7-'l


9/29

an


10/29

"mischaracterizecl

a

waiver of

sovereign

immunity

as an

excsption

to

sovereign

itnmunitv"'

Iei. at

597.

Ho;over, in

Ctr. for

a Sustainahle

Coast"

inc" our

high

coufi

also

acknolviedged

that

sovereign

irninunity

may

be

properly

waived

pulsuant

to *ther

Constitutional

pruvi.sions-

Citing

City

of Thomasr.ille

v.

Shank.

263

fra"

624(l)

(1q93),

the Couit

noted

ttrat

it

had

previousiy

recognized

a

"fluisance exc*ption"

to

sovereigrr

immurrity

and

in

so

doing

had

"reaffinn[edl

the

iongstanciing

principie

that a

municipality

is liable

lor

creating

or

maintalting

a

nuisance

tvhich

constitutes

either

a danger

to life

and health

or a taking

of

proper"ty"" Ctr,

for

a Sustainable

Coast.

Inc,,

294

Ca.

at 600

iquoting

Shank,

263 Ca.

at

{:25).

Alth*ugh

described

in

$lrank

as an

"exception"

to

sovereign

immunity,

tl're

Court

reasoned

that

the rationale

behind

pen::itting

suit

under

a nuisance

theory

is

conxtitutinnal/y

based:

Thougtr

rienominated

as

an

ooexception"

in

Shanl;,

tlte rationale

behind

it

is

rooted in

the concept

that

the

govenunent

may

rrot

take

or damage

private

properiy

tbr

public

purposes

withriut

just

and

adequate

corrlpensation,

?61

Ca.

at 624-625.437

S.E.?d

306.

See

Ca.

Const.,

Art.

l,

Scc. III,

Par.

I(a)

(emincnt dornain);

Colurubiu

Cauntv

t'.

Doolittlc,2l0

Ca-

49()( l),

512

S.E.2d

236

(

lq99)

(explaining that the eminerit

d*main

prex,'ision

of

the

Georgia

Cor:rstirution

.,r'aivss

sovereign

irnmunity

in

an

i*verse

condemnation

action,

and therefore,

a

county

nray

be suerl

ttlr

damages

and enjoined

fi:r

creating

or

maintaining

a nuisance);

lluttterfbrel.,*.

DtKalb

dtountv,287

Ga'

App.

366(2),

651

S'E.?d

'771

QA07)

(noting

that

a

coutlty

may be

liable

through

inverse

condeinnatign

when

a nuisance

{iinollnts

to

a

taking

nfpruperty

t-nr

public

purposes

because

sovereign

immunity

is

waived

by

the

State

Constitution's

emirent

dornain

provision)'

Thus,

the

*onuisance

exception"

recognized

in

Shanlr

was nr:t

an exceptiot

at

all,

hut

itt*tuad,

$

propsr

roeognttiort

that

the

Constitution

itse

lf

requires

just

carfipensfltion.f*r

takings

and cuxttttl,

thereJ'*re

,

be

understpod

t*

*fford

irumttnity

in such

cs.s?s.

Ctr.

for

a Sustainable

Coast.Jnc"

,294

Ca. at

600

(emphasis

adderi).

Ser:,

e.g., Coh-rmbia

County

v.

Doolittle,77A

Ga.490

(lqqqi

(explaining

lhat

the eminent

domain

provision

of

the Georgia

l{l


11/29

Canstilutiorr

rvaives

sovereign

imrnunity

in

an

inverse

c


12/29

DeKqlb

Cnty.

Sgh.

Diqt.

v. Gold,318

Ca.

App.

633,63?

(201?).

See,

e.g,

o.c.G-A.

$50-13-10

(provision

under

Georgia's

Adtiinistrative

Prrtcedure

Act')

provitling firr

declaratory

action

to

challenge "[t]he

validity of

any rule,

waiver,

or

vadance . . .

when

it is

alleged

that

ihe

rul*.

wftiver,

or variance

or its

threatened

application

interferes

with

or

impairs

the

legal

rights

of

the

petitioner");

Drury,

263 Ga.

429

OgW)

(declaratory

rrli*f

authorized

to challenge

validity

of

agency

rul15s); Unrlercotler

v,

C$ioniai

Pipeline

Co",

I

l4

Ca. App.

739

(

1q66"}

(declaratory

action

by

property

otvfler

against

State

Rer.e:rue

Commissioner

as

to

acl

valorein

tax

return

l'cquirctlcnts

seekirrg

to

make

annual

*d

valorern

tax

ret$ill

to the

Catnmissioner

r';rther

than the

loctl

tax

ccrnmissioncr

in

each

county

in

which

property ownsr

had

property).

In Golcl,

$tiprn,

the

plaintif fls

(teachers

of

the

DeKalir

Cor.rnty

School

DisffictJ

sued

the

ciistrict

and

otlers

challenging

the

district's

suspension

of

its tax sheltered

annuity

plan lvhicil

plaintiffs

alleged

was

an employee

benefit

plan established

as

an

alternalive

t$

the t*ederal

Social

Secgrity

system.

Cqld.

318 Ga.

App.

at

633. The

piainfifts asserted

claims

fur

declarittory

judg:nent,

money

ha


13/29

to Georgia Supreme

Court

prececient that suggesl

deelaratory

actions

are

an apprupriate

mecharism

tc

rlirectly

challenge

the

constitlti+nality

of

Iegisiation:

Sr..e l{igclon

v.

Li4,'

aJ'Senoia,273

Ca.83,

85(l),

538

S'E'2d

39

(2000)

(tjnding

rhat

"[a]n

action

for

declaratory

judgrlett

is

an

available

rflnedy

to

test

the constitutionality

of

a

statute

in

a case

where

an actual

controversy

exists

with

respect lhsreto"

(pBnctuation

ornitterl)):

tu{cDcmiel

v.

T"lzomas,248

Ga.

632. 633(l),

285

S.tr.?d

156

(1981)

{r'evierving

declaratory-juclgtnent

clairn

t}rat

the

Stats's

systern

of

financing

public education

violated

equnl-

protection

plr:visions

of

the

State

constitution.

noting

that

"ft]uclicial

revielv

of

legislative

enactmeflts

is

central

to our

system

of colstituticnal

government and

deeply

moteci

in

E:ur

trtistory").

ld. at

n. 35.

One

of

the

fbregoing

cases,

McDjrniel

v. Thorna*.

rvas

brcught

by

and r:n

belialf

of

stuelents,

parents,

and

the school

boards

of

various

coutrties

against

the

Statr:

Department

{rf

Education

and

its

superinteldent,

challertging

tlte coustitutionality

of

the State's

system

for

financing

pulrlic education.

MgDgnlel,

348 Ca.

633,

n.

1.

Although

the Georgia

Supreme

Court

r1id

lot

directly

address

soverei-$

immunity

in

that

case,

it

did

address

a

simiiar

"th'eshold

issgs"

raised by

the

defentiants

that "the

question

of

how

public

education

can best

be

funded is

nonjusticiable"

and

is'lnore

suitably

l:andle


14/29

Id.

Cranclr)

137,

176,2

L.Ed.

60

(1.q03))- A

sulrstantial

nurnber

of

courts

h*v*

been

called

upon to

decide

issues

similar

tr:

those

presented in this

case and

have nr:t

fourd

the ditliculties

associated

tlrerewitlr

to be

insurmountable.

See,

e.g.,

Nonhshore

Schaol

Distritt

tYo. 4t7

v. Kit"rnear',

84 Wash.Zd

685,

530 P,?d

178

(1974);

Sko./statt

v.

[{ollitts,l

i0

Ariz.

88. 515 P.2d 590

(1973)'

Indeed,

"f

wle

knorv

of

no

sister

Stato wirich

has

refused

merits

treatmeirt

to

such issues,

and

we

would

regard

our owrl

refusal

to adjudicate

plaintiffs'

claim

of

ccr,stituti6rral

infiingernent

an

abdication

of our

cr:nstitutional duties.

Additinnally,

the

Court

must

note that while

Respon


15/29

claims

arising

from

altercation

betlveen

a

siudent

and

a

visitor

to

ths school);

Ceorgia

Dep't

of

Hulrran-Res.

v.

tqss,

263

Ga. 347

(1993i, overrLrled

on other

trounds

bv Hpdquist

v. Merrill

Lynch*

Pierce. FemretrL

Snnith-[nq.,272

Qa.209

(3000)

(clailns

cf

negligence

against

t]re

D*parhaent

of

i{uman

Resources}.

As

i1


16/29

Here, the

City

asks

the

Coufi,

[nrer

alia.

to

dccli:le

tliat the

I950

LCA

is no longer

vaiid,

because

HB

1620 elid

r:rr:t

readopt

it

without

amendtnent

as

required

by

Arlicie

XI.

Seotion

l,

Paragraph

lV

of the Cer:rgia

Coi:stitutir:n

and because

I-lB

1620

vlolated our

Coi:stitrttiou's

notice

and

ilistinct

description

requirements.ll

Thus,

the

cq::rstitutionality

ot- HB

1

6?0

and

resultanr

validity of

the i 9S0

LCA

are

the center

point

of

this litigation.

ffldeed.

hers

the

Court is

facecl

with

political sufudivisions

of this

State

with

patently ditfering

views

on

n'hether

a

legislative

act

i$

constitutional.

Civen

allot'the

abovs

and

insafar

as

"[1]egislative

acts

in

violation

*f

this

Constitution

or

the Constituti


17/29

fi.

Declaratory

Relief

ApS aclvances

the

argument

that

the

"proposecl"

annr:xations

at

issue

ir: the

case

at bar

are

,'tuture

corrtingencfies]"

too

thr removed

fi'o*r

occurring

to bc

considered

an

"'actual

controversy,,

for

which

a cleciaratory

jurlgment

rvould

be

appropriate

.

14

FCSD

contends

the

City

lras

alr-eatly

acted

pursuant

to its

annexation

rights

uncter

O.C.C.A.

$$

l6-36-1

et seq.

by

fonvarding

its alurexatioil

relluest

firr the

Fulton

Inrlustrial

Parcel

to

Fulton

Ci:unty'

Thus,

FCSD

argues

the City

dr:es

not

risk

taking

"undirected

acliotl"

because

it

iras

alreacty

acterl

to arutex

the

foregoipg

parcel

ancl

there

is no

"future

unceftainty"

as

to

the

course

of conduct

the

City

is

to

fbllo1v

rg

cqmplete

the

anne.tati


18/29

the

f'ace of

uncertainty."rT

Althr:ugh

this case

pre*ssnts

a close

questiorl.

the

Court

finds

thc

matter

ripe

and

proper

tbr declaratory

reliet'"

In reviewing

the

p*rties'

papers

and

the

cass

law

cited

therern

rvith

respect

to deciaratory

actiols,

the Court

has not

tbuntl

them

tr:

btl

particularty

helptirl

insofar

as

ilone

preserrts

facts

persuasively similar

to the

case

at trar.

Rather,

the

clearest

authority

seems

to

come

ftorn

the

Declaratory

Judgrnont

r\ct

itself.

O.C,C.A.

$9-4-1

provides: "The

purpose

ot'tl'Iis

chapter

is to

scttle

and allbrcl

relief

frorn uncedainty

and

insscurity

witli

rsspect

to

rights,

status,

and other

lcgal relations;

and this

chapter

is to be

tiberatly cpnstraed

aild adffiinistered."

(Ernphasis

aci


19/29

desire

to

have

a

judgment

*'stored

au,ay

in a

flle tiorn

rvlrich

it

enukl

be ii{led

if the

occasion

ever

arosetheref$r.,,e,78Ga.r\pp.666,68B(1949}.

lmportantly,

as noterl

i:r

Fart l.

supr"a,

Georgia

coufis

h*vs

held that

"[a]n

action

fbr

declaratory

judgment

is an

available

remecly

to

test

ths

constitutionality

of

a

statute

in

a

cass

where an

actual

controversy

exists

r.vith

rsspect

thereto""

Higdcn

v.

City-qf

Seir


20/29

maintain

diarretrieally

opposed

positiclns

w*ith respect

to

the same.

It appears

qr.rite

ohvious

that

rvI:ere

children

will

go

tii schoal

and

the

tax ramitjcations

upon

the

consumnlafioil

of

the

proposed

annexations

at

issue

here are

of

paramount

concelTl

and

inrpo(ance

to the

City

and

the

impactecl

school systems

as

we[1

fls tCI

the etl"ecteci

students.

families.

and

their

comrrunities.

Accorclingly,

the Courl finds

annexation

is

not a

mere

hypothetical

situatior:,

and

the

City

3f Atlanta

cloes

not seek

a

judiciai

cieclaratir:n

to keep on

fiie

should

it

evcr need

it.

Rather,

at

issue

in this case

ere contested

rights

lvith respect

to

pending

but

yet

unconsumntated

annexations

with t'.tr reaching

rarnifications

for all

parties

as

lvell

as the

residents

of

the impacted

comrnunitir,.s.

'I'hus,

the

Court finds

there

exists

the

"'necessity

lor a

determination

of

the dispute

to

guide

aird

prrrtect the

plaintiff

fi'onr uncerlainty

and

insecurity

r.vith

regard

to the

propriety of

sonre

future act

or conduct.

whiclr is

properl-v

incident

to

[its]

alleged

rights

and

w'hich

if

taken

without

dirqction

might

reasonably

jeopardizc

[its]

intel'qst."

Eak-er

v.

Citv

o{Martgl-tq,21

I Ga.

11A,214

(1999)

(quoting

tuIorg4n

r.,.

C-u-ar.

F,iat.

-Con:B4*ies.

268 Ga.

343, 344

(1997i).

Civen

all

of the

above

rnd

insofar

as

the

Corrt

fii"lds

the'oe.nds

ofjustice

require

that

the declaratian

sltrtuld

be maden"

the

Court {iircls

this

matter ripe

and

proper

ttrr

declaratory

relief.le

HI"

Constitutionalitl.

of Hts 16?0

antl

Ongoing

Yalidiry

of

the 1950

LCrt

The

City of

Atlanta

alleges

HB

l610

purported

io amend

the 1950

LCA

in violation

of

Ca. C6nst.

Article XI,

$1, TIV(a)

(provicling

that

an LCA

would be

repealecl

unless

"specifically

continued

in force

and etfe{rt

witl'rout

amendment")

and

vialated the

Georgie

Constitutiou's

notice

and tlistinct

description

requirements.l0, ae

Ca. Const.

Art.

lIl,

$V,lJIilII.

IV,

ancl

IX.

l'

The

Court

l'in


21/29

Thus,

the

City

seeks

a

rieclarator;r

judgrnent

that

LIE 1630

is

unconstituti{'tnal,

and

t}:tt

the i950

LCA

was. therefore,

repealed

by

operationof

law

on

Jul.

I,

1987

pursuant to

Ga.

Const',

Art'

Xl,

gt,

IJIV(a).2

1

The Ccurt

disagrees.

When

a

legislativc

act

is corrstitutir:nally

challenged,

"all

presumptions

are

in

favor of the

constitutionally

of

an

act

of the

legislature."

Shadrick...v.

Blerlsoe,

186

Ca. 345.

350

(1938)' "The

Ceneral

Assernhly

is

presumerl

to

enact

laws

with full

knowledge

of

the

condition

of

the

larv

and

with

refbrer.rce

tc

il,

ar:cl

the

courts

will

not

presume

that

the

legislature

intended

to

enact

an

uncanstitutional

lalv."

Bd,.of

Pub.

EdFc,,

ibr

City

of Savamrah

v'

Hair,

ZlS

fia.575,

576

(2003)'

As

sunmarized

by

the

ceorgia

supreme

court

in

chase

v.

state.

285

Ga.

693

(200q):

fw]hen

we al's

interpreting

a

st0tute,

we

tnust

prsume

that the

General

Assenbly

hart

iul1

knowlecige

of

the

existing

state

of

ths

iaw an


22/29

also

Ccr.rnrye].l

v.

Atlanta

Tru_st

Co.

,177

fra.303

{1933}

{"Repeals

by implicaiion

are

not

favore


23/29

w*ter Authoriqt

shall

nr:t

be

rspealerl

or

delcted

on

July

1,

1987,

as a

pa$

of the

Constitution

r:f

th*

State

of Ceorgiahut

is

specifically

c


24/29

was

that

the 1950

LCA

"s*a/I

flot

he

repealed

or

dsleted

an

Jttly

l, 1987,

a:r

part

of

tlie

Constitution

of

the

State

of Geo

rgia

but

is

speciJically

continued

in

force

an$

effect

on

and

after

thttt

date

as

$

pnrt of the

{anstituti*n

rf the

St*te

of Georgia;'.See

}lB

1620,

Ca'

L.

1986,

pp.

4813-13

{emphasis

added).

With

both

pieces

of

legislati


25/29

technical

construction

rf

HB

1620

in

a

historieal

vaclrum

rvith

no consideration

t'or thc

cxprcss

intent of

the

legislature

or

the

cofitext

and

era in

wliich

HB

1620

and

the

1950

LCA

tvere

ad.pteri.

Rather

than

harmonizing

all

parts

of

HB

1620,

such

a constluction

woulel

in

fact

vitiate

tle

portions

of

HB

I6?0

expressly

providing

tirat

the i950

LCA "sha11

not

be repealed

or

clrleted

on

July

i, lgg7'but

rather

is

"specifically

continur:d

in

tbrce

and

etTect

on

and

after

lhat date

as

a

part

of

the Constitution

of

the

State

ot'GeErrgia."

This

tlre Court

r,vill

not

do. Haviilg

cr:nsidered

the

record

ancl

applyiug

Georgia's

rules

of

statutory

constructicln,

the Court

finds

I-lB

1620 did

not

unooustitutionally

amend

the

1950

LCA.

The

City

of

Atlanta

ftirther

contentls

that

HB

16?0's

text,litle,

and

public noticc

r'vcrc

misleacling,

and

vir:iatcrJ

the Ceorgia

Constitution

in

that

HB

16?0

failed

to

put

tire

public on

notice

that

under

the

1950

LCA,

in

the

event

of

an annexation

"scho(]l

property''

wouid

becomc

property

of tl-ie

City

of

Atianta,

and under

FIB

1620 "school

property"

lvould

becoine

flre

property

of

APS.

However,

the

Cclrut

disagrees.

Article

III,

Section

v,

Paragraph

tv

of

the

coirstitutior:

provides:

No

law or sectiorl

of

the

Code

shall

be

amendeci

or repealed

by mere

retbrence

to

its titis or

to

the numher

of

the

section

cf

the

Code; but

flre

amendirig

or

repealing

Act

shall

distilctly

describe

the

lalv

or

Corle

section

to

be

atnended

or

repealed

as

rvell

as

the

alteration

to

l:e

made'

Ga. Ccnst.,

Ari.

iII,

$V,

flIV.

Further,

Article

iIi,

Section

V,

Paragriiph

lil of

the

Constitution

provides:

,,No

bill

shall

pass

rvhich

retbrs

to

nrore

than

one

subjcct

matter

or

contains

matter

ditt"erent

fiom

rvhat is

expressed

in

the title

thereof.

"

See

nlso

Forlson

v.

Weeks

,232

Ga.

412.

474

(1g74) (..To prevelt tiaud

an


26/29

fof

Ca.

Const.,

Art"

IIl,

Sec.

V"

Para.

III .

.

.

lvas

not

to

pr*v$nt compreirensive,

irut

surreptitious,

legi

slation").

As

surrmarizeri

by the

Georgia

Supreme

Court

in

Mead

Corp.

v.-Collins,

258

Ca.

339

(

r e88):

since

1798.

the

Georgia

constitution

has

provided

that

"No

bill

sha1l

pass

rr,hich

... contains

n-ratter

dift'er*nt

ftonr

what is

expressed

ifi the

title

thereof"

Ca.

Const'1983,

Art'

lll,

Sec'

V,

Para.

IiI:

Ca'

Const'1976,

Ad.

I11,

Sec'

VII, Para'

lV;

fia'

Const.1945,

Afi. III.

Sec.

VII, Para.

VIII.

The

pur:pose

o'f,this

cor:stitutional

provision

requiring

that the

a$t's

title

tnust

alefi

the

re;r{er

to

the miitters

containerl

in

its

body

is

to

protect

against

surprise

legislatior:r.

But recalling

the

history

of

that

prr:vision

ariiing

fr


27/29

they

rvere legislating

and

rvhereas

tl're

t*xt

of

HB

1620

"is

detinitely

related

to

what

is

expressed

in the

title,las

a

natural

connectiop,

and

relates

to

the

maiu

obje*t

of

legislation^

and

is

not

in

conflict

therer,vith,"

the

Cor"rrt

iinds

neither

the title

nor

text,,vere

misleading

or other-rvise

uncsnstitutional.?2

Article III,

Section

V, Faragraph

IX of

the

Constitution

provides:

*'The

Ceneral

Assernbly

shall

prcvide

by

iaw for

ttre

ac{vertisement

o{'notice

of infention

to itrtroduce

local

hi11s."

flT]his

constitutionally

inandated

notice

provision't'does

flot

ieqrire

more

in rmation

as

to

tire

law

to

be

enacted

than

would

be

required

in

the

captiorr

of

the

bilt itself""

225

Ga.

at

16S,

166

s.E.2d 363. The Constitutiolr

does

not require

specificity in

the

notice, bgt dernands

only

that

it

he

sufficient

to infon:r

the

public

that

"legislation

atlesting

a

particular

subject

wi[l

be

intrr:duce


28/29

CONCLU$ION

Given

all of ths

&bove,

Fetitionerls

Motion

for

Sutnmary

Judgment

is HERHBY

DENIED,

Responilent

Atlanta

Independent

School

Systems"

Motion

for

Judgment

on

the

pleadings

is HEREBY

CRANTED

and

Respondent

Fulton

county

school

Distriat's

Motion

to

Dismiss

Fetition

for

Declaratory

Judgment

i.s

HEREBY

GRANTED.

The

Clerk

of

the

Courf

is

INSTRUCTED

to

mark

this

case

CLOSED.

So

ORDERED

this

rN

p;

daY

of

I

Distribution

list

on

rftefollawf*gpage

]

JOI{N

Judicial

Circuit

?8


29/29

Di$tribltttrn

l.ietl

Hrnmet

J.

Bondurant

David

G.H.

Brackett

Robert

L.,{shq

IlI

BSNDURANT,

MIXSSN

&

ELMORE,

LLF

3900

One

Atlantic

Center

1201

W.

Peachtree

Street,

N.W.

Atlanta,

Georgia

30309

bqndffi*lll@*ml+ju&a$]

brackettftr;bm

ei

a',v. co

tn

a;.hs&bmskeufim

Robert

S.

I-lighsrnith

Jr.

HOLLAND

&

KNIGHT

LLP

1301

W. Feachtree

Street,

N.W,

suirc 3000

Atlanta,

Georgia

30309

rp

b.s*."hi

gh

sm-i

g -QlkJ

a

1y,

c.r:

s

Joseph

D. Youug

JOSEPH

F"

YOUNG

II"C.

1266

W.

Paces

Ferry

Road

suite

167

Atlanta,

Georgia

30327

j

o

r sp-h.Is

utH(#p

easl

t

gr: v

-

qP

rn

Riclrard

H-

$inkfield

Phillip

S,

McKlnney

Timothy

J.

Fitz.rnaurice

ROSERS

&

HATT}IN

LLP

2700

Intemational

Tower,

Peaehtree

Center

?29

Feachtree

$h'set,

l''1.8.

Atlantq

Georgia

30303

rsi.nk

{"EJ

cl

@rh

-}aw.

c*

m

nm

ck

i n n

ey(#;rh-

I

aur-eq:1

r

{itArT

auri

cg.&,f h- I

alv.gg,p

Christine

L

Mast

*tr*H,3

#ffiHtt

,'{ACKS*N

&

Y*uN*,

LLP

303

Peachtr,ee

Street,

N.E"

Suite

4000

Atlanta,

Ceorgia

30308

ana$I@hp-ryI4w{sm

kSt$te1gQhpt

v

I

aw. cou.t

Atlanta v APS Ruling

Documents

Transcript of Atlanta v APS Ruling