Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian ReformG.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

Petitioner:Association of Small Landowners in the PhilippinesRespondent:Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCFACTS:The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.ISSUE:A. Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.B. Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP violates the Constitution.C. Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation.D. Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domainHELD:Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.

No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.

No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ (G.R. NO. L-63419, December 18, 1986)FACTS:This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of contract.

ISSUE:Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.

HELD:Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa was not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only punishes the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing obligations.BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to public interests.BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The debt contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to prison for non-payment of contractual debts.However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a valid exercise of police power.Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following acts:any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.Andany person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a huge problem. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and confidence is the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the Congress, through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation on ex delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the YouthThe issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- Astudent shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student shall not beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.FACTS:Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times.When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his admission to the test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. Theadditional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.ISSUE:Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and equalprotection.HELD:No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.Ratio:While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. Thisis true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge toone's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are notdissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promotethe common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of theConstitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The privaterespondent has failed the NMAT five times.While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it iscertainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressedthat a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation.The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that hasnot excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education forthe full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliantfuture. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farmand engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeedthat the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to thecourse for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are anation of misfits.