POLICE POWER

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION et al v. CITY OF MANILAJANUARY 20, 2009

MMDA v. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISINGDecember 16, 2009

ACEBEDO OPTICAL CO. INC. v. CA329 SCRA 314

EMINENT DOMAIN

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et. Al vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY

OF AGRARIAN REFORMG.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J.

Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power of the State.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police power or of the power of eminent domain.

Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of

whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE vs. COMELECGR No. 119694, May 22, 1995

Facts: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of news paper and magazine publishers. On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, providing for a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city.In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of print media to donate “Comelec Space”?

Held: NO. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too

casually to require prolonged consideration on their part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power - essentially a power of legislation - has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard the the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

FORFORM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PNRDecember 10, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES CANCIOJanuary 30, 2009

LBP v. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZJuly 31, 2008

HON. VICENTE EUSEBIO v. JOVITO M. LUIS et alOctober 13, 2009

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACASANGKIT SANGKAYAugust 24, 2011

ANUNCIATION VDA. DE QUANA et al v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESFebruary 9, 2011

DUE PROCESS

LUMIGUED v. HON. APOLINIO EXEVEA282 SCRA 25

SEC. OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH LANTINOctober 17, 2000

GOVT. OF THE USA v. GUILLERMO PURGANANSeptember 24, 2002

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC. v. COMELECApril 29, 2010

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

TELEBAP v. COMELEC289 SCRA 337

PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS324 SCRA 689

BIRAOGO et al. v. PTCGR No. 192935; December 7, 2010

J. Mendoza

FACTS:

COMELEC v. CONRADO CRUZ et alNovember 20, 2009

JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et alSeptember 18, 2012