Art2

Opposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 81 [2000]

Facts: The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari by Oposa et al (several children and their respective parents), together with the Phil. Ecological Network Inc. (PENI), of the dismissal order of the RTC of the case regarding the petition to order DENR to cancel and cease all their timber license agreements. The original suit was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit alleging that petitioners are all citizens of the Phil and are entitled to the “benefit, use and enjoyment of natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforest”. They represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. DENR Secretary Factoran filed a MD claiming that they had no cause of action* against him and that the issue was a political question*. The RTC sustained Factoran’s claims, ruling that the granting of reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Petitioners thus filed this petition for certiorari in the SC.

Issue/s: w/n timber license agreements are contracts, and thus, falls under the non-impairment clause (of contracts)

Held: No, TLA’s are not contracts.

Petitioners may amend their complaints to implead as defendants the owners or grantees of the TLAs for they are indispensable parties.

[also, there is cause of action for the claim of violation of rights]

Ratio: Citing People vs. Ong Tin, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal granting it and the person to whom it is granted. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it a property or property right. The Forestry Reform Code provides that “when national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, permit, license….”

*It is not a political question. What is involved is the enforcement of a right to a balance and healthful ecology, a policy already formulated and expressed in legislation.

*there is a cause of action adequate enough to show, prima face, the claimed violation of the right. The DENR Secretary granted TLA’s that covered more areas for logging than what is available.

Art6

Osmena V Pendatun (1950)

FACTS:

Congressman Osmena delivered his privilege speech, as recorded in House Resolution No. 59, on which he made serious imputations of bribery (regarding “pardons for sale”) against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. The special committee, after giving Osmena the chance to defend himself submitted its report, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior; the Congressmen found his words defamatory, injurious, and without basis, thereby mandating the Special Committee to suspend him. The House approved on the same day (which was House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.)

Congressman Osmena requested the SC to overrule the sanctions levied against him by Pendatun et al for his alleged "defamatory remarks against the president". He cited parliamentary immunity and irregularity of the procedure against him.

He submitted to the Court a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and preliminary injunction against Rep Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as Special Committee created by House Resolution 59.

ISSUES: Whether it is an infringement of his Parliamentary rights? N

Whether or not Congress has the power to discipline its members? Y

RULING:

Although he may be immune from civil actions (as provided in his Parliamentary rights), he will not be immune to disciplinary actions that may be imposed by the House. It says in the Constitution (Sec 15, Article VI) that those speeches and debates shall not be questioned in any other place other than Congress.

The Court has no right to interfere in internal affairs of the Legislature. It is well within the jurisdiction of the Legislature to impose sanctions on its members which its co-equal branches (including the Judiciary) should respect. The Legislative Body enjoys full discretion in the chastisement of its members to ensure legislative conduct. The enforcement of parliamentary rules is the lookout of the body as well- the Courts may not interfere lest it be construed as meddling of the judicial body in the affairs of the legislature. The case has become moot and academic since the Courts doesn’t have Jurisdiction over legislative matters (case dismissed).

The petition is denied.

Bondoc v PinedaFACTS:

Both Petitioner and Respondents fought for the same position as Congressman. The latter own. Petitioner lodged a protest. Respondent belonged to LDP. The HRET decided in favor of Petitioner. Among those voting in favor of the Petitioner was a congressman representing the LDP. On the eve of the announcement of the decision, he was replaced by the House of Congress.

RULING:

In order to exercise credibility and jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. Such independence will be impossible if Congress may change its members anytime to serve the interests of the parties in power. Expulsion of the Congressman who cast his vote in favor of petitioner is a clear attack on the constitutional solidarity of the HRET as the adjudicator of disputes. Being judges, the members of HRET must be impartial. The removal of the congressman from the HRET violates his right to security of tenure. His membership in the HRET cannot be severed at anytime except for a reason, such as ethical failure. Obviously, his removal was machination to nullify his vote. The removal is void.

Arnault vs. Nazareno (1950)

FACTS:

This case concerns the money (totaling P1.5M) used by the Government to buy 2 estates, namely, the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. A special committee was formed to investigate the said purchases due to an allegation that the government, in fact, did not have to pay for these estates since they have been paid for and bought from the first owners (and not from the second owner here in the case) long ago. Jean Arnault was the attorney-in-fact of the American owner who took charge of the payments made by the government. He was an important witness to the purchases and was asked to explain the unaccounted P440,000 payment made. To whom did the check payable to cash go to? What was the name of the “representative” that the owner sent to get the check? There was no receipt and Arnault refused to disclose the name of the receiver (forgot name, self-incriminating, violates the rights of a citizen to private dealings with other people, etc... this guy gave really stupid answers, read the case if you want).

By virtue of a senate resolution based on the findings of the special committee, Arnault was confined in the New Bilibid prison for contempt precisely because he would was withholding important information regarding the investigation. He filed a petition for habeas corpus / relief from confinement in the SC. His position is that the Senate has no power to punish him since the information he is withholding is immaterial to any intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not

embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. Note that this was the first time that the House of Congress punished a non-member.

ISSUES:

w/n the senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt

HELD: Yes

RATIO:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either houses of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is interned to affect or change. Experience has showed that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete… so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. THE POWER OF INQUIRY COMES WITH THE PROCESS TO ENFORCE IT/POWER TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE FOR THE NECESSITY OF INFORMATION IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS.

The inquiry, to be within the legislative body’s jurisdiction must be material or necessary to the exercise of its powers granted by the Constitution. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry – NOT by its indirect relation to a possible or proposed legislation. However, it is apparent that the Senate has already approved the 3 bills recommended by the special committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation. Though they are yet to be approved by the other house and by the President, there are other measures that can be taken by the Congress that it may deem necessary upon completion of the investigation. Considering this, there is no need to know the name of the person since other measures can be taken.

BUT, the court cannot really determine the immateriality of the question to any proposed or possible legislation since the court has no power to approve or reject legislation.

The petition is denied. The witness has a clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to refusal to testify and is punishable by contempt, assuming that refusal to testify would be so punishable.

Demetria vs. Alba

FACTS:

Sec 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 authorized the President to transfer any funds appropriated for the different offices of the Executive Department. The Petitioners assailed this decree, saying that “Sec 44 or Presidential Decree 1177 is repugnant as it fails to specify the objective and purposes for which the transfer of funds are to be made. It allows the president to override safeguards and procedure… giving him unlimited access to funds”

ISSUE: Is Sec 44 unconstitutional?

RULING:

The 1935 Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing the transfer no appropriation. Sec 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 clearly conflicts with the constitution. How that section was snuck into Decree 1977 reeks of treachery.

The court therefore rules that when legislative or executive acts conflict with the constitution and goes beyond the scope of the act , it is the duty of the judiciary to nullify such orders.

Hence, the petition is granted and Par 1 of Sec 44 of Presidential Decree 1177 is declared null and void.

Tobias vs. Abalos

FACTS:Republic Act No. 7675 is also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Manduluyong into a Highly Urbanized City”. Petitioners Estrella, Bautista & Associates, invoke their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong to assail the constitutionality of the RA on three specific provisions. The ground related to this section is that the RA contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule in Art 6 Sec 26 because aside from declaring Mandaluyong as a Highly Urbanized City, it also created a separate congressional district for the city. (other issues are related to sec 5)

ISSUE: w/n RA 7675 is unconstitutional under s26

HELD: No

RATIO: The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion. The title necessarily included and contemplates the subject treated under the section regarding the creation of a separate district. A liberal construction of the “one-title’one-subject” has been adopted by the SC so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The constitutional requirement should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance if the tile expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane/relevant to that general subject.

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 920 entitled “An Act Appropriating Finds for Public Works”, Purpose of which is to appropriate P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. This law was executed by respondent Zulueta and the petitioner alleges that the funds appropriated mentioned earlier were actually spent on private roads within Antonio Subdivision, a property owned Zulueta, thus unconstitutional and illegal. The respondent contends that 1) the petitioner has no standing since the said law is a donation, a kind of contract, which the petitioner has no interest to, 2) that the law has been passed, thus should be followed and 3) that even if it is for private advancement, it still is incidental to public welfare.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not petitioner has a standing?2) Whether or not Republic Act No. 920 is valid?3) Whether or not the respondent is justified in the “incidental public advancement”?

RULING:

1) Yes. As a taxpayer, from whom the funds to be appropriated came from.2) No. Since the powers of legislature to tax and to appropriate funds are correlative thus public funds should be

used only for public purpose.No. (same as number 2)

Senate vs. Ermita (2005)

FACTS:

The Committee of the Senate, as whole, issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to appear on as resource speakers in a public hearing the following week regarding the overpricing of the North Rail Project. Executive Secretary Ermita sent a letter to the Senate respectfully asking for postponement so that the officials could be given ample time to prepare, but Senate President replied saying that the request cannot be granted since it was received belatedly and that all resource persons, preparations, and arrangements were already made. The day before the said public hearing, the President Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately! The Order’s provisions include:

Section 1 – Appearance by Heads of Departments before the Congress: All heads of the Executive departments shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House or Congress. When state security or public interest so requires, or when the President says so in writing, the appearance shall be conducted only in executive session.

Section 2 – Nature, Scope, and Coverage of Executive Privilege:

Matters covered = all confidential or classified information between the president and the public officers including a) conversations and correspondence, b) military, diplomatic, and other national security matters, b) information prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements, c) close-door cabinet discussions, and e) matters affecting national security and public order.

People covered = senior officials of executive departments, AFP generals and flag officers, PNP chief superintendents and higher officers, and senior national security officials who in the judgment of their superiors are covered by the executive privilege and other officers as may be determined by the President.

Section 3 – Appearance of Other Public Officials Before the Congres: All the people covered in section 2 shall secure prior consent of the President before appearing in adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of officials

On the same day of the E.O.’s release, Ermita sent notices that due to the order, invited officials were not authorized to attend the Congressional hearings since they weren’t able to secure the president’s consent. Even so, the hearing pushed through. Only two AFP officials attended and so were relieved from their military posts and had to face court martial proceedings for defying the order.

This very controversial order spurred several petitions for certiorari and prohibition from party lists, organizations, the IBP, and others – one of which, was of course, the Senate. The petitioner Senate of the Phil alleges that the order directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions.

ISSUE: w/n E.O. 464 was unconstitutional or not based on section 21

HELD: Partly yes.

Section 1 – valid during question hour, not in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Sections 2(b) and 3 – invalid

RATIO: *refers back to Arnault case

On why the Congress has power of inquiry over the matter

The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Art VI, Sec 21. The power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. The issue at hand is related to the expenditure of public funds of which the Congress is the guardian. This case also involves government agencies created by the Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. THE POWER OF INQUIRY COMES WITH THE PROCESS TO ENFORCE IT/POWER TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE FOR THE NECESSITY OF INFORMATION IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. All this is important in the aid of legislation.

[Aside: However, there are times when the inquiry itself might not properly be in the aid of legislation and is thus beyond the Congress’ powers. one possible way to provide for less room for speculation is to indicate in its invitations the possible needed statute which prompted the need for inquiry. A crucial safeguard to the power of inquiry is to adhere to the rights of persons guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.]

On the provisions of E.O. 464

The Executive department might invoke the executive privilege, which is grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers. Even so, not all information can be under the so-called executive privilege that the executive department will preclude the power of inquiry of Congress. In order to directly answer the issue, parts of EO464 should be analyzed individually.

1) Section 1 – Grounded on Art VI Sec 22 providing for question hour. However, Sections 21 and 22, although closely related, do not pertain to the same power of the Congress. The two types of legislative inquiries are differentiated:

The doctrine of separation of powers strengthens the essence of Congress inquiring with the executive branch, especially in the performance of its legislative functions. Thus, Section 1 in its face is valid, though it can only be invoked during inquiries in the question

hour, and not during inquiries for aid of legislation.

2) Section 2 (b) and 3 - The enumeration of public officials that should get prior consent from the President before appearing in Congress, and those officials by determination of their heads are covered by executive privilege, is too broad. It also includes other officials that may be determined by the President. In Section 2b, executive privilege is being misused. It is used in context of persons wherein it should be in context of information. Even so, it could just be implied that the persons concerned hold such information.

It should be noted that in these provisions, there is implied claim of executive privilege whenever an official invokes EO 464. But the claim of executive privilege shouldn’t be taken lightly. There should be assertion of this claim as well as basis. Thus, with regard to Section 3 wherein there is no mention of any basis on why such invocation of executive privilege, it is invalid per se. Furthermore, it should be invalidated due to the unlawful delegation of authority exercised by heads of office, when they determine that a certain information falls under the executive privilege, there is presumption of the President’s authorization and has the effect of prohibiting an official from showing up in Congress. Such silent authorization is contrary to the essence of executive privilege. It is limited to the President to determine if information is under executive privilege. If he delegates such authority, it should still be by his order, and not merely implied.

Senate V. ErmitaISSUE: W/n E.O. 464 was unconstitutional

RULING

In a Nutshell:

On April 20, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress can compel the appearance of public officials in inquiries "in aid of legislation", but that EO 464 is constitutional insofar as it bans executive officials from appearing during the "question hour" (investigations directed merely to congressional oversight over the implementation of laws).

The Court also held that only the President can invoke executive privilege. This is within the scope of his authority and has sound basis in the constitution

Malacañang (through Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura) filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court ruling. The motion was denied with finality for lack of merit on July 14, 2006.

Specifics

The power of inquiry vs. the Executive Privilege

The power of inquiry of Congress is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. An exemption to such Congressional power falls under the forces of executive privilege �, which is also a constitutional concept. Executive privilege, however, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.

Validity Section 1 (with limitation)

Section 1 of E.O. 464 specifically applies to department heads. The required prior consent under Section 1 is based on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

Sec 21- Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Sec 22 – Question Hour- specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in order to elicit information that may be used for information- compulsory attendance- may be facilitated by compulsory process, only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation

- objective is simply to obtain information on how department heads are implementing the statutes in pursuit of the Congress’ oversight function- discretionary attendance; congress may only request appearance

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, xxxxx. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Unconstitutionality of Sections 2 (b) and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which implied claim is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof.

Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives the Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.

Validity of Section 2(a)

Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

Right to Information

The Senate is well in its right to claim that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. So while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Court’s Final Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. This is the Court’s ruling

The lousily worded provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.

Flores v Drilon

FACTS:

The Congress passed R.A. 7227 and in section 13 of such law, gave the right to the President to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, as Chieft Executive of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). However, the petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic Zambales, and officers and member of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines says that the said law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL as it goes against Sec 7, first par., Art. IX-B, which states that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designaton in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. They also claim that it goes against Sec. 16, Article VII which violates the limitation of the power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE: w/n Sec. 13 of R.A. 7227 which states, “Provided, however, That for the first year of its operation from the effectivity of this Act the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective official to other government posts?

RULING:

Yes. Our Constitution clearly has provided for a prohibition on appointing elective official to other public positions. The purpose of such law is to enable the elective official to focus on his duty. But in the said case, the Mayor may exercise the duties outside of his office necessarily or collaterally involved in his current position so the court decided that Mayor Gordon may continue with his exercise of the duties of being Chief Executive Officer which are not contrary to law as de facto officer of SBMA. Also he retains all the per diems or salaries he has received as being in the said seat of SBMA.

Other points: It also violates the power of the President to appoint because the law only provides ONE CHOICE for the President to appoint. This defeats the purpose of the discretionary power of the President to appoint. This gives the impression that the President has no choice but to appoint such person deemed eligible by law.

Differentiation between the prohibitions in Article VI regarding the similar topic as Article VII: The Legislators/ Assemblyman will forfeit his previous seat if he gets appointed as for other incumbent elective official, they must first forfeit their seat before become eligible for appointment thus risking ending up with no public position at all.

Sarmiento v. Mison

FACTS:

Salvador Mison was appointed by the President to Commissioner of Bureau of Customs. The petitioners, as lawyers, taxpayers and professors of constitutional law protests that Salvador Mison was not properly appointed because his

appointment was not confirmed by the commission on appointment thus he should not receive his compensation in the said seat and be removed from it.

ISSUE: W/N Heads of Bureaus are included in the list of appointments enumerated that need the confirmation of the COA?

RULING:

NO. The courts went back to the changes made in the past constitutions and the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

In the 1935 Constitution, Almost all the appointments made by the President had to go through COA for approval. It was quite the opposite in the 1973 as it gave the President nearly absolute power on his appointments with hardly any check from COA. The courts arrived at the conclusion that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended a “middle ground”. So it was established that not all appointments had to go through COA for approval

Now for the specifics; the courts went back to the deliberations of the 1986 constitutional commission and they found out that they deliberately removed heads of bureaus in the list enumerated that needed the check of COA. It was also established that only the first group (first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7) needed the approval of COA.

(Four groups that the President may appoint:

1st, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution

2nd, all other officers of the Governments whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law.

3rd, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint

4th, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone)

“The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them.”

Dadole v. COA

FACTS:

RTC and MTC Judges (Petitioners are among these judges) of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 and later on it was increased to 1,500 enacted through an ordinance by the Sanggunuang Panlungsod (LGU) of the said city. A few years later Department of Budget and Management (DBM, an administrative agency and under the executive) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 which decreased the monthly allowances to only P1,000. The petitioner claims that LBC No.55 is against RA 7160 which authorizes the disbursements of allowances to judges as long as the finances of the city government should allow the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not LBC No.55 is valid?

RULING: NO. The Executive branch (through its administrative bodies) only has supervisory power over the LGUs and not a controlling one (which only applies to all under the executive branch, see p310 of bernas primer.) This means that as long as the LGU is fulfilling its duty well within the limitations provided by the Constitution and the law, it must be left alone. The administrative bodies or the Executive branch may only interfere if the LGU does not perform its duty. In the given case, The respondent tried to show that there was a deficit in the financial records of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) BUT failed to show that the city government lacked the finances to provide for the allowances of RTC and MTC Judges in excess of P1,000. Thus the Courts ruled in favour of the petitioner and that the LBC No. 55 was null and void for exceeding its “supervisory power”.

In line with its supervisory power, DBM is given 90 days to review such matter like the one at case after its issuance. It failed to do so and its right to intervene has already lapsed.

Torres v. Gonzales

FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of estafa and later he was granted a conditional pardon by the President, in which case he will not again violate any of the penal law of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. A few years later, the pardon was cancelled by the President upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole. NBI showed a lengthy list of his crimes but more importantly, showed that the petitioner was convicted of sedition after his conditional pardon. He was rearrested and accordingly serve the balance of his original sentence.

Petitioner now claims that he did not violate this condition nor convicted of any of the crimes earlier mentioned (shown by NBI.) He also claims that he was not heard and was deprived of his rights without due process of the Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly serve the balance of his original sentence?

RULING: YES. It was well established in 3 cases in the past that (1) the grant of pardon and the determination of terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. (2) the determination made by the President can be based on Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code which do not need the necessity of the final judgement of the court or Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which needs the court’s decision and (3) The accused has been already previously tried in his offense for which he was pardoned (no need for another trial of the same offense)

In the given case, (1) it is according to the discretion of the President if the petitioner violated the condition. (2) The President opted for Section 64 of RAC which didn’t need the decision of the courts and (3) there was no violation of substantive rights of the petitioner because he was already previously tried, he will just be serving the remainder of his sentence from which he was pardoned.

Sec. of Justice v. Judge Lantion

Note: There is a private respondent in this case, Mark Jimenez, who happens to be the extraditee. Judge Lantion is the Presiding Judge in the RTC of Manila, who granted the request of Jimenez of his right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. The reason for the extradition was not mentioned in both the case book and the original case.

FACTSThis is a petition for Reconsideration for the lower Court’s decision of granting the request of the extraditee that documents related to the extradition case be made available to him. The case involved the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government, involving transnational crimes.

The lower court, presided by respondent Judge Lantion granted the request of private respondent Jimenez. The petitioner filed for an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the decision failed to recognize important and essential facts that would have altered its decision.

Note that P.D. No. 1069, which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty, provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court.

ISSUE: w/n the President has the power to deny the petitioner of his right to the documents at the evaluation stage of the process of an expedition case (involving a foreign relations matter)

HELD: YES

RATIO:The right of the subject to have access to the evidence in the hands of the executive department is only during the judicial phase and not during the evaluation phase. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation.

Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements. It is traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the country’s foreign relations. The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the President’s most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited.

Also, the Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government, especially transnational crimes.

The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. The court must also respect a co-equal branch of the government, the executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations

Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. (Sept 3, 1992)FACTS:

The dispute at bar involves the applicability of PD 1818 which expressly forbids the court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government. During a regular bidding, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) engaged in irregularities while overseeing the bidding for infrastructure contracts. Awards were made that caused aggrieved parties to contest and the respondent judge to issue a restraining order on the awarding of the contracts.

Petitioners invoke PD 1818 which prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government. The pertinent decree goes:

Sec 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, xxx on projects of the government or any public utility of the government, xxx”

In support, Petitioners interpret from Datiles vs. Sucaldito that the Court observed such prohibition so as tofoster the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Padilla, made it clear, however, that on issues outside of this dimension, and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by PD 1818 (and PD 605 after which PD1818 was patterned) from exercising power over illegal acts.

ISSUE: W/n PD 1818’s prohibition covers cases of judicial scrutiny for irregularities by administrative agencies.

HELD:

The court can exercise jurisdiction in this case of irregular bidding- the prohibition does not extend to anomalous contracts where vested rights are affected. As earlier stated in Datiles and Co. v Sucaldito such prohibition against injunctions allows administrative agencies to smoothly function. but, this does not prevent courts from adjudicating issues of grave abuse of discretion. PD 1818 cannot shield administrative agencies from judicial scrutiny for anomalous actions or excess of discretion. Hence the challenged restraining order of the judge and the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be denied.

“… it is apparent from the instant controversy that the problem did not arise from discretionary acts of the administrative body, nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules of bidding which requires strict observance. The purpose of PD1818 is to secure bidding against favoritism, fraud, collusion…”

Macasiano v NHA

FACTS:

The petitioner, suing as a consultant of DPWH and a taxpayer seeks to have the court declare Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, unconstitutional. The law basically prohibits eviction and demolition of structures given a few exemptions, the purpose of which is to have a more humanitarian approach on the matter.

The petitioner claims that he is not able to carry out the demolitions of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past.

ISSUE: W/N the case is fit for judicial inquiry (review)?

RULING:

The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.

What the petitioner may be looking for is declaratory relief, which is better suited in the jurisdiction of other courts

Chavez v. PCGG (1998)

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as “taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country’s economy,” alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that they are “among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997.” As such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the Court granted their motion to intervene and required the respondents to comment thereon. The September 25, 1998 Comment of the solicitor general on said motion merely reiterated his aforecited arguments against the main petition.ISSUES:

(a) Procedural:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and(2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

(b) Substantive:(1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and(2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The petition is imbued with merit.(a) Procedural

(1) YESPetitioner explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition.

He submits that since ill-gotten wealth “belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury,” any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets. The matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue “of transcendental importance to the public.” He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are “of paramount public interest;” and if they “immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people.” Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.

(2) YESPetitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one that is not

intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus.

(b) Substantive(1) YES

The matter regarding with the ill-gotten wealth has been of public concern and the petitioners has a right.Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the

PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

(2) YES.PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of

all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and the Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption. Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law.

The trial courts has not lost its jurisdiction over the caseAdditional info: Prohibited CompromisesIn general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated -- such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence -- or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.

Fabian vs. Ombudsman Desierto (1998)

FACTS:

Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Nestor V. Agustin, the person acquitted by the assistant ombudsman, was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the office of the Ombudsman.

The company participated in the bidding for government construction project. Nestor allegedly took advantage of his official position, and induced Fabian into an romantic relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, Nestor refused and resisted her attempts by employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.

She filed a complaint seeking sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Sec 19, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Sec 36 of P.D.. 807 (Civil Service Decree), charging him with oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.

Nestor was found guilty of grave misconduct by the graft investigator and ordered his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. This was approved by the ombudsman and assistant ombudsman with modifications, finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After an MR, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who set aside the previous order and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.

Fabian filed this petition for certiorari in the SC. She argues that Sec 27 of RA. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that that administrative disciplinary cases In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the …

An exception under Sec 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman) is an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman, which is final and unappealable. She also argues that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by RA No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court.

ISSUE: w/n this petition for certiorari to the SC from the Ombudsman’s office is constitutional under Art 5 Sec VIII

HELD: No it is not. This case is referred and transferred to the CA.

RATIO:

Along with the resolution of the issues in the case, the court inquired into the constitutionality of the above-mentioned statutes.

The court found that [parts only]:

(1) *** Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes the SC to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide.” This refers only to the courts composing the integrated judicial system (RTC, CA, Circuit courts, etc & not the Ombudsman) . It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. Hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the SC or the CA, a specific provision to that effect must be in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court.

(2) With this in mind, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure does not include appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the rule, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies (Ombudsman) are now required to go to the CA.

(3) It is important to note that Sec 27 of RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art VI. Sec 27 of R.A. No. 6770 and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

People V. GacottFACTS:

Now here’s a simple case. Respondent Judge Gacott was found guilty as sin in an administrative case filed against him. He was reprimanded and ordered to pay a fine in a decision of the Supreme Court. He argued that the case should be decided by the Supreme Court en banc.

The SC reconsiders the judgment passed upon said Judge, with the Second Division of the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the sole issue to be resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his

discretion in granting the motion to quash a contested criminal case. The ponencia wrote the following on the case under consideration wit:

“The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . . blah blah blah

xxx xxx xxx

Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. … blah blah de blah blah

xxx xxx xxx

(Gaah the ratio is so frustrating! The ponente sucks!!!)

Before anything else (so you will understand):

Section 13(8), Article XI of the Consti:

The Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII:

Authorizes the SC to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide [Apparently, this does not include the Office of the Ombudsman]

Subsequent laws that sort of amended provisions in the Consti

Section 27, RA No. 6770:

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law—within 10 days from receipt of written notice of the decision.

Amendment of section 9, BP Blg. 129 by R.A. 7902

All adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals

and those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to the SC

Section 1 Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

An appeal by certiorari "Appeal by Certiorari to the SC from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the RTC or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth.

But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . . blah blah oh blah blah blah

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be reconsidered en banc.

HELD:

Only cases involving dismissal of judges are required by the constitution to be decided en banc. The provision that the supreme court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges is a declaration of the grant of that power to the Supreme Court en banc. It does not mean that all disciplinary cases must be decided en banc. It is only when the penalty is dismissal that the Supreme Court must act en banc. To require the entire Supreme Court to decide all administrative cases will result in undue delay.

Art9

MACALINTAL V COMELEC

FACTS:

RA 9189 “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and creation of Joint Congressional oversight committee with power to review, revise, amend and approve IRR of COMELEC.

RULING:

By Sec 19 of RA, it granted authority to craft rules. Once a law is enacted and approved, legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete.

EIIB V CA

FACTS: The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau or EIIB is tasked with the gathering and evaluating of intelligence reports and information regarding illegal activities affecting the economy. Examples of which are economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, etc. The EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance.

The Civil Service Commission/CSC Chairman, asked the Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the EIIB. The Commissioner of the EIIB refused to comply with the order, replying that the EIIB was exempted from the CSC rules and regulations. The CSC then penalized the Commissioner of the EIIB for indirect contempt. This was brought about by his continued refusal to comply with the CSC’s order to submit information regarding the appointments of the EIIB. The EIIB Commissioner then brought the matter before the CA which ruled in favor of the CSC. The case now lies before the SC.

ISSUE: W/N the Economic Intelligence Investigation Bureau (EIIB) is embraced by the Civil Service?

RULING: Yes the EIIB is under the Civil Service Law. The Constitution is clear, all government agencies, without exception are covered by the civil service. (Refer to Art. IX-B, Sec. 2 par.1) The EIIB is a government agency and is therefore within the ambit of the Civil Service Law.

The laws that the EIIB Commissioner sites in support of his argument that the EIIB is exempted shows that the EIIB is merely exempted from the Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions BUT not from the Civil Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to any other matter.

ASTRAQUILLO et al v. MANGLAPUS

FACTS:

This case consolidates 5 cases dealing with a common issue.

1. Astraquillo appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission to UAE was accused of improper interference. The Sec. of Foreign Affairs recommended termination which was approved by the President.

2. Alunan Galang ( to Kuwait) received a telex message informing him to vacate the post because his appt. has been terminated.

3. Alejandro Melchor (Moscow), the Pres. Terminated his service( described as a political( non career Ambassador) upon recommendation of the Sec of Foreign Affairs and was approved by the Pres.

Issue: w/n the “political/non-career appointments” of the diplomats can be terminated at the pleasure of the Pres. Without just cause or in need of investigation.

HELD: YES.

- Their appointments to the Foreign Service were made on “ bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness ( determined by competitive exams or higly based qualifications). Their tenure therefore is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure.

- Under the Foreign Service act of 1952:

Career Officers: areForeign Service Officers appointed by the Pres upon the recommendation of the secretary and MUST be eligible BY passing competitive examinations to determine fitness and aptitude for work, demonstrates loyalty to the RP and the Constitution. It is from This set of Certifed Officers where the Pres. Can exclusive make such appointments.

Non Career officers: did not qualify and not certified (to the req. mentioned above) their entry is based on “other bases other that merit and fitness by exam”.

- Being non-career officers, their termination is not dependent on proof of some legally recognized cause but rests on the will of the Pres., in the exercise of her discretion. The termination was a political decision she can make, the recommendation of the secretary (as her alter ego in Foreign affairs) cannot be contested as not being a personal decision. Besides, her approval means she was the one in effect who ordered the termination.

- CAYETANO V MONSOD -- FACTS:- Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by the president (confirmed by the CA) as COMELEC

Chairman. Cayetano opposed the nomination because he was not “engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.” Petitioner challenges the validity of the appointment. The confusion lies in the exact definition of “practice of law” or if the requirement covers private practice, work in a negotiating team in the World Bank Group, and his other work experiences.

- -- ISSUE: w/n Monsod was qualified to be the COMELEC Chairman--- RULING:- An interpretation in the light of various modern definitions of the term “practice of law” shows that he has been

engaged in the practice for at least 10 years. Liberal construction of the framers of the Constitution were

interpreted to credit Atty. Monsod’s work experiences as a lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator, and lawyer-legislator. The court cannot question the determination of the COMELEC that he did possess the necessary qualification.

-- “Engaged in the practice of law” means to engage in “any activity, or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.”