Assessment of the terrorist threA t to DenmArk

A s s e s s m e n t o f t h e t e r r o r i s t t h r e At to D e n mA r kmarch 2021

Assessment of the terrorist threAt to DenmArk Page 3 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

PREFACE

the assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark is the overall assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad by the Centre for terror Analysis (CtA)1. it is based on a number of underlying CtA analyses, rang-ing from assessments of the threat against specific individuals, locations and events to broader trend analyses and assessments of phenomena with an im-pact on the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

Compared with previous assessments of the terrorist threat to Denmark, CtA has decided to adjust the term of the lowest level on the scale from “none” to “minimal” so the term corresponds with the definition of the threat level. Addi-tionally, the aim is to be able to reflect a threat potential in areas where there is no identified capability or intent. Due to this precision, the threat levels for Greenland and the faroe islands are assessed as “minimal” rather than “limited” without this reflecting a change in the nature of the threat.

the preparation of the 2021 assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark has been overshadowed by an ongoing pandemic, which affects many parts of so-ciety. the pandemic and its derived consequences also affect the assessment of the current threat picture, which remains uncertain in terms of the pandemic’s impact on future trends.

the assessment describes the terrorist threat from militant islamism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and other threats which may be characterized as terrorism. section 6 focuses on the terrorist threat to Greenland and the faroe islands.

the assessment is based on intelligence processed before 15 march 2021.

sincerely,michael hamannhead of CtA

1. CtA is a fusion centre comprising staff from five Danish authorities (the Danish security and intelligence service, the Danish Defence intelli-gence service, the ministry of foreign Affairs, the emergency management Agency and the national Centre of investigation).

Photo: Astrid maria rasmussen, ritzau scanpix

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARKmilitant islamistsright-wing extremistsLeft-wing extremistsother factorsimpact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to Denmark

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTSimpact of perceived insults on the terrorist threattrends in the global militant islamist threat picturemilitant islamist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmarkfocus areas concerning the threat from militant islamism

the terrorist threat from militant islamists to Danes and Danish interests abroad

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTStrends in relation to the threat and narrativesright-wing extremist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS

OTHER THREATS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRORISMConspiracy theoriesincelsClimate extremistssovereignty movementsPeople suffering from mental disorders

THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDSspecifically on the terrorist threat to Greenlandspecifically on the terrorist threat to the faroe islands

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PREFACE

SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT

45 APPENDIX: MODUS OPERANDI FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN DENMARK

Content

DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT

TERRoRIST THREAT LEvEL

DEFINITIoN

very significant there is a specific threat. there is capability, intent, planning and possibly initiation.

Significant there is a known threat. there is capability, intent and planning.

General there is a general threat. there is capability and/or intent and possibly planning.

Limited there is a potential threat. there is limited capability and/or intent.

Minimal there are no indications of any threat. there is no known capability or intent.

TERM DEFINITIoN

Terrorism CtA defines terrorism pursuant to section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code.

The West north America, Australia, new Zealand and europe, not including russia, Belarus, turkey, moldo-va and the Caucasus.

Traveller A private person who has travelled to a conflict zone to support one of the parties in the conflict without necessarily engaging in combat.

Intent the will to employ a certain capability against a certain target or target group.

Capability Agreement between a person’s accessible means and their ability (training, skills, logistics etc.) to use these in a terrorist attack.

Extremism the will to use violence or commit other illegal acts in order to change existing social conditions.

Radicalization A dynamic process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological ends.

Lone actor A person who commits a solo terrorist attack, while planning, training etc. may involve other people.

Inspired attack the perpetrator is inspired by militant islamism or political extremism and plans the attack on their own.

Supported attack the perpetrator is in direct contact with one or more people who provide guidance or in other ways support the attack plans.

Directed attack An attack is sanctioned by and/or planned under a mandate from the senior leadership of a ter-rorist group.

Possible40-60%

Unlikely<= 15%

Less likely15-40%

Highly likely>= 85%

Likely60-85%

CtA uses the following degrees of probability (written in italics in the text):

Photo: Amager torv, strøget i københvan, rune Johansen, scanpix

Assessment of the terrorist threAt to DenmArk Page 9 Page 8 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

CtA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark re-mains significant. According to Pet’s definitions, this means that there is a known threat. there is capability, intent and planning2.

Pet regularly launches operations to uncover and pre-vent potential terrorist threats to targets in Denmark. since 2019, Pet has made arrests in five separate ter-ror-related cases in collaboration with the relevant po-lice districts. most recently, Pet in co-operation with relevant police districts arrested 13 people in Denmark on february 6 and 8, 2021, and another person was ar-rested by German police. the individuals in question are suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Denmark or another country using firearms and improvised ex-plosive devices.

terrorist attacks may occur with no prior intelligence indications, even when the perpetrators have previous-ly been known to sympathize with militant islamism or political extremism. A source of particular concern in this regard are people who go through a relatively short radicalization process as well people who are ex-cluded or rejected from extremist environments, for example due to unusually extreme views or behaviour.

1.1 Militant Islamistsmilitant islamists remain the primary terrorist threat to Denmark, and CtA assesses this threat to be at the level of significant. According to Pet’s definitions, this means that there is a known threat. there is capability, intent and planning

there are people in Denmark and abroad with militant islamist sympathies who pose a terrorist threat to Den-mark. CtA assesses that the threat emanates from peo-ple sympathizing with and inspired by foreign militant islamist terrorist groups, particularly islamic state (is) and al-Qaida (AQ). this is for instance illustrated by the arrest on April 30, 2020 of a Danish citizen suspected of planning a solo terrorist attack involving one or more firearms and the arrests on february 6, 2021 of two syr-ian citizens in Denmark suspected of planning a terror-

the french satirical magazine Charlie hebdo reprinted the muhammad cartoons on september 2, 2020.

the most likely militant islamist terrorist attack in Den-mark is an attack carried out with easily accessible means, firearms or improvised explosive devices by a small group or a lone actor inspired by militant islamist propaganda. CtA assesses that the threat comes from individuals within Danish militant islamist environ-ments and from other radicalized individuals in Den-mark and abroad. international virtual communities in which propaganda is disseminated and extremist views are exchanged across national borders often play a role in the radicalization process.

the most likely targets of a militant islamist terrorist at-tack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotected civilian targets, such as associated with perceived in-sults to islam. other potential symbolic targets include Jewish targets as well as the police and the armed forc-es – particularly in connection with guarding duties. finally, other public officials and certain members of political parties may be potential targets.

the leaderships of the militant islamist groups is and AQ have been weakened, and the groups’ capability to carry out complex, directed attacks in the West is still reduced. however, their intent remains the same, and both is and AQ call on their supporters to carry out at-tacks against targets in the West.

Currently, nearly half of the 160 adults who have left Denmark for the conflict zone in syria/iraq have either returned to Denmark or taken up residence in another country in or outside europe, while roughly one third are presumed to have died in the conflict zone. the re-maining 32 travellers are presumably still in the conflict zone in syria/iraq or in neighbouring countries.

CtA assesses that the threat to Danish interests abroad generally does not differ from the threat to interests of other Western countries. Danes, like other Western-ers, are at risk of becoming random victims of attacks

1. GENERAL ASSESSMENT oF THE TERRoRIST THREAT To DENMARK

ist attack in Denmark or another country using firearms and improvised explosive devices. Both cases showed indications that the suspects had been inspired by mil-itant islamist propaganda.

in 2020, incidents in Denmark and abroad which were perceived as insults to islam showed that cases of in-sults still have considerable potential as a motivating factor for militant islamists. reactions to cases of in-sults abroad, particularly in france, have added to the increased focus on past and current cases of insults in Denmark. in the past year, both AQ and is have men-tioned Denmark in their publications, while propagan-da from the AQ-affiliated group al-Qaida in the Arabi-

an Peninsula (AQAP) has called for attacks on named Danish “offenders”. An added focus on cases of insults in general may increase the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. Possible reactions may occur in the short term, but can also appear at a much later stage.

there were no militant islamist attacks in Denmark in 2020, but 12 militant islamist attacks were committed in other countries in the West, while eight attacks were foiled. the number of terrorist attacks in the West was significantly lower in 2020 than in the years 2015-2017, although the number of attacks carried out in the West has been on the rise, and particularly in france, since

Photo: københavns Byret, ida Guldbæk, ritzau scanpix

2. the threat to Denmark may be kept at “significant” with no planning in progress, as Denmark has previously been the target of attacks, at-tempted attacks or attack planning.


directed at Western interests or if they are near local terrorist targets, such as crowded places, churches and particular official buildings.

1.2 Right-wing extremistsCtA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from right-wing extremists to be at the level of general. According to Pet’s definitions, this means that there is a general threat. there is capability and/or intent and possibly planning.

A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is most likely to be carried out with easily accessible means or firearms by a lone actor or a small group. CtA assesses that the right-wing extremist threat primarily emanates from individuals and small groups who typ-ically meet, become radicalized and find inspiration in virtual right-wing extremist communities and net-works.

the most likely targets of a right-wing extremist ter-rorist attack in Denmark are muslim targets, immigrant targets, Jewish targets, and people of non-Danish eth-nicity as well as locations where these groups are seen to gather. other potential targets include political op-ponents, especially left-wing extremists and certain politicians with views opposing right-wing extremism. finally, some authorities and LGBtQ+ figures are also potential targets.

in 2020, two successful and seven foiled right-wing ex-tremist terrorist attacks were seen in the West. this is a significant drop compared with 2019, where especially the march 2019 attack in Christchurch, new Zealand, inspired other right-wing extremist attacks. thus, the number of successful attacks in 2019 was 12, while seven attacks were foiled.

1.3 Left-wing extremistsCtA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from left-wing extremists to be at the level of limited. According to Pet’s definitions this means that there is a potential threat. there is limited capability and/or intent.

A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is most likely to be carried out with easily accessible means by a small group of people who are members of or in contact with a Danish left-wing extremist group.

the most likely targets of a left-wing extremist terrorist attack are right-wing extremist activities and representatives of the authorities, mainly the police. other potential targets include indi-viduals perceived to sympathize with right-wing extremism and, to a lesser degree, certain politicians and public figures perceived as political oppo-nents, including artists and debaters.

1.4 Other factorsA number of other factors may affect the terrorist threat to Denmark. for example, certain conspiracy theories and movements may contain violent threat potential, which may evolve into actions that, subject to a legal assess-ment, may be characterized as terror-ism.

in addition, threatening comments on social media and elsewhere may cause people who are mentally unstable or easily influenced, to commit violence that could constitute acts of terrorism. if a perpetrator suffers from a mental disorder, it may be difficult for the authorities to assess whether violent actions committed by that person con-stitute acts of terrorism.

finally, political, ethnic and religious conflicts abroad may spark reactions from individuals or groups in Denmark with links to the affected groups, which may develop into acts that could be characterized as terror-ism. such acts may involve state actors. the concrete

reactions, including violent protests, may for instance target politicians, public officials, random citizens or foreign diplomatic representations in Denmark.

1.5 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to DenmarkCtA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic is not an essential driver of terrorism in Denmark and that the pandemic, and the way it is handled, has not in itself

changed the intent and capability of militant islamists or political extremists to commit terrorist attacks in Denmark. however, it is likely that the covid-19 pan-demic has contributed to strengthening existing an-ti-state narratives among right-wing extremists in Den-mark. CtA assesses that the increased anti-state focus may impact on the target selection of Danish right-wing extremists. CtA further assesses that opposition to the restrictions or vaccination programmes may lead

Photo: Unsplash.com


to threats of violence, civil disobedience, arson, vandal-ism and acts of violence which, subject to a legal as-sessment, could be characterized as terrorism.

Virtual activities often play a role in a radicalization pro-cess, and it is possible that the lockdown imposed dur-ing the covid-19 pandemic in some cases has increased the use of online propaganda.

restrictions on social activity in response to covid-19 reduce the availability of unprotected targets such as large crowds in public places. As a result, perpetrators may adjust their attack plans and target selection.

CtA assesses that covid-19 conspiracy theories may ap-peal to and radicalize individuals with no, or only insig-nificant, prior extremist views or contact with extremist environments. A number of conspiracy theories that have emerged or been expanded in relation to covid-19 are included in an ecosystem of online conspiracy theories that may further radicalize individuals who al-ready resort to violence and in some cases legitimize or encourage acts of violence. this especially regards conspiracy theories furthering distrust in the authori-ties, spreading a simplistic black and white view of the world, referring to politicians and public officials as en-emies and legitimizing acts of violence out of consider-ation for “the people”.

in general, the covid-19 restrictions and vaccination programmes have met resistance from loosely organ-ized groups of covid-19 sceptics and opponents of covid-19 restrictions. this resistance has led to harsh, anti-state rhetoric on social media, including threats to certain politicians and representatives of the authori-ties and health service. Vaccine-related matters may also be used by extremists and conspiracy theorists for misinformation and propaganda purposes. in addition, acts of violence have been seen in connection with protests against the covid-19 restrictions, for example during protest marches in Aalborg and Copenhagen in the winter of 2020/2021. CtA further assesses that op-position to the restrictions or vaccination programmes may lead to threats to violence, civil disobedience,

arson, vandalism and acts of violence which, subject to a legal assessment, could be characterized as terrorism.

the assessment of the threat posed by covid-19 scep-tics and opponents of covid-19 restrictions is charac-terized by a large degree of uncertainty. the threat em-anates to a large degree from individuals and groups that do not have a well-known and long-standing his-tory of engaging in violent protests or other actions aimed at politicians or authorities, and the available data is therefore limited.

CtA assesses that the amount of threatening or hostile statements in virtual forums and at demonstrations which draw major public attention may increase the risk of inspiring some mentally unstable individuals to carry out acts of violence which, subject to a legal as-sessment, could be characterized as terrorism.

it is possible that, in the long term, terrorist groups abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its con-sequent effects and that the general terrorist threat to Western interests in the affected countries and regions therefore will increase.

is an Islamist ideology which legitimizes the use of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological ends.

Militant Islamism


this chapter describes the trends within various key areas that CtA assesses will impact the terrorist threat to Denmark from militant islamists in the coming year. Particular focus is given to the impact of perceived in-sults to islam, the global threat picture, virtual commu-nities, militant islamist environments, connections to criminal gangs, radicalized ex-prisoners, travellers to and returnees from conflict zones, the asylum and mi-gration area as well as people who may travel to Den-mark to commit acts of terrorism. finally, CtA assesses

the most likely militant islamist terrorist attack in Denmark is an attack car-ried out with easily acces-sible means, firearms or im-provised explosive devices by a small group or a lone actor inspired by militant islamist propaganda. At-tacks with easily accessible means can be carried out spontaneously or follow-ing a very short planning phase. CtA assesses that the threat comes from indi-viduals within Danish mili-tant islamist environments and from other radicalized individuals in Denmark and abroad. international vir-tual communities in which propaganda is disseminat-ed and extremist views are exchanged across national borders often play a role in the radicalization process.

CtA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic is not an obvious motive for mil-itant islamists in Denmark, who traditionally focus on perceived insults to islam, perceived oppression of

muslims and Western military intervention in muslim countries. it is possible that individuals in Denmark who sympathize with militant islamism have spent more time on the internet since the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic and the introduction of restrictions on social activity. thus, these individuals may also have been ex-posed to more extremist and pro-violence militant isla-mist propaganda and may have increased their partic-ipation in militant islamist virtual online communities.

the impact of terrorist financing from Denmark and the terrorist threat that militant islamists pose to Danes and Danish interests abroad.

CtA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from mili-tant islamists to be at the level of significant. According to Pet’s definitions, this means that there is a known threat. there is capability, intent and planning.

2.1 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist threatCases of perceived insults to islam (hereafter “cases of insults”), sometimes relating to the debate on freedom of speech, have been a factor in the terrorist threat to Denmark since the cartoon case in 2005. in 2020, inci-dents in Denmark and abroad which were perceived as insults to islam showed that cases of insults still have considerable potential as a motivating factor for mili-tant islamists. response to cases of insults abroad, par-ticularly in france, have added to increased focus on past and current cases of perceived insults in Denmark.

in 2020, the political party stram kurs continued dese-crating the Quran during a number of demonstrations in Denmark and a few demonstrations abroad. the in-ternational media coverage of stram kurs and its lead-er increased after the party burned a Quran in malmö, sweden, on August 28, 2020.

During a stram kurs demonstration near the residen-tial area Gellerupparken in Aarhus on June 5, 2020, a person broke through the police cordon and pulled a knife. there are indications that the person is mental-ly unstable. in february 2021, the city court found the perpetrator and a co-defendant guilty of attempted grievous bodily harm, sentencing one to imprisonment for one year and three months and the other to indefi-nite placement and deportation from Denmark.

on september, 2020, the french satirical magazine Charlie hebdo reprinted its own cartoon of a crying muhammad from a 2006 magazine cover and all 12 Danish muhammad cartoons from 2005. the cartoons were reprinted to mark the start of a trial in france that same day against 14 suspected accomplices in the Jan-uary 2015 terrorist attack on Charlie hebdo.

the reprinting prompted negative reactions in parts of the muslim world, and a number of militant islamist propaganda media focused primarily on vengeance against france. in the weeks following the reprinting, Denmark or Danes were mentioned explicitly four times in the official propaganda of militant islamist groups.

2. THE TERRoRIST THREAT To DENMARK FRoM MILITANT ISLAMISTS

Photo: Liselotte sabroe, ritzau scanpix


Denmark was mainly used as historical reference to the punishment and sanctions that had previously been imposed on countries perceived as offensive to islam.

in the months following the reprinting, militant is-lamists in france carried out three separate terrorist attacks against random people at Charlie hebdo’s for-mer premises (september 25 in Paris), against a french school teacher (october 16 in Paris) and against ran-dom people in a church (october 29 in nice). A total of four people were killed in the attacks, while two were seriously injured. it is highly likely that all three attacks were motivated by the reprinting of the cartoons in the french satirical magazine. CtA notes that militant isla-mists already focused on france before Charlie hebdo reprinted the cartoons.

the reprinting and especially the killing of the french school teacher also sparked a debate in Denmark on the limits of freedom of speech. As in many other countries, the number of inci-dents during this period also caused deep con-cern in Danish society.

the extent of negative reactions to cases of in-sults in the West varies from case to case. some cases never receive any attention, while others – as was the case in france in the autumn of 2020 – lead to considerable negative attention, including planning and execution of militant is-lamist terrorist attacks.

CtA assesses that, since the cartoon case in 2005, Denmark has had a reputation for of-fending islam among militant islamists. When Denmark or Danes are mentioned or singled out in militant islamist propaganda, Denmark’s reputation as a “nation of offenders” may regain momentum.

it is CtA’s overall assessment that considerable militant islamist attention to circumstances and events in Denmark may affect the terrorist threat to individuals in Denmark, Denmark in general and Danish interests abroad. CtA assesses that

the impact on the terrorist threat is highly dependent on the exposure of the individual cases in national and international editorial media, social media and militant islamist propaganda as well as on the response to these cases in militant islamist environments in Denmark and abroad. Possible reactions may occur in the short term, but can also appear at a much later stage.

finally, CtA notes that militant islamist terrorist attacks motivated by cases of perceived insults to islam may also trigger violent counter-reactions from individuals and groups motivated by a right-wing extremist, an-ti-muslim agenda.

2.2 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat picture3

the leaderships of the militant islamist groups is and AQ have been weakened, and their capability to carry out complex, directed attacks in the West has been reduced in recent years. however, the intent of these groups remains the same, and both is and AQ encour-age their supporters to carry out attacks against West-ern targets. this is especially emphasized by the efforts of is to build attack structures outside syria/iraq which can act locally and also strike against targets in the West. in 2020, both is and AQ highlighted perceived in-sults to islam and the covid-19 pandemic in their prop-aganda.

since march 2019, when is lost control of its last terri-tories in syria/iraq, the group has established itself as a local terrorist and rebel group in the two countries. it is likely that is in syria/iraq is mainly focused on attacking local targets.

is regards the West as its enemy and, along with is-af-filiated groups and sympathizers, the group still poses a terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. it is likely that the overall strategy of is remains the same and that the long-term goal is still to create a so-called caliphate. in 2020, is continued to encourage its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their home countries, including in the West.

AQ believes that islam is under attack from the West, militarily, financially, socially and culturally. AQ and AQ-affiliated groups pose a threat, although the group’s capability to direct complex attacks in the West remains limited. A number of leading members of AQ died in 2020, and it is likely that these losses will delay, but not directly prevent, the group’s plans to carry out terrorist attacks against Western targets.

it is likely that the main AQ threat to the West comes from small AQ networks operating independently. the networks are typically connected with the AQ senior leadership or regional sub-groups. the networks aim to attack symbolic targets, and the planning phase often

spans several years. in 2020, AQ continued to encour-age its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their home countries, including in the West.

regional AQ sub-groups play a central role in the group’s organization and global presence. the sub-groups are currently present in large parts of Africa, the middle east and Asia. their primary focus is on their own, local interests, but they often follow instruc-tions from the senior leadership. CtA assesses that is and AQ sympathizers may become inspired by the groups’ propaganda to carry out attacks in Denmark or against Danish targets abroad. the quantity as well as the quality of the official is and AQ propaganda remain highly reduced compared with a few years ago, when especially is had a large-scale propaganda production. however, a large amount of propaganda still exists on-line, including extremely violent is propaganda, which may have an effect in terms of radicalization and target selection and may offer specific guidance in connec-tion with attack planning.

is, AQ and their affiliated groups and sympathizers have mentioned covid-19 in their propaganda a num-ber of times. is has, for instance, focused on how the pandemic is weakening the economies of Western countries and making Western societies more vulner-able to militant islamist attacks. however, the focus on covid-19 was most notable at the beginning of the pandemic and has decreased with the global spread of the virus.

since september 2020, is has started focusing on per-ceived insults to islam in its official propaganda. sever-al times during the autumn and winter of 2020, is, AQ and their affiliated groups and sympathizers called for revenge on perceived insults to islam and the boycott of goods.

3. for further details, see the 2020 intelligence risk Assessment by the Danish Defence intelligence service.

Photo: hizb-ut-tahrir demo, Liselotte Sabroe, ritzau scanpix

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Figure 1: foiled and successful militant islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 20204

Figure 2: People wounded or killed in militant islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020

4. Data on the number of foiled and successful militant islamist terrorist attacks in the West may vary depending on the method used for as-sessing the data and the available information.

Definitions of types of militant Islamist It is CTA’s assessment that militant Islamist targets can be divided into symbolic targets and civilian targets.

Symbolic targetsPublic authority targets: Authorities, including certain ministries, police, military, emergency response services, other public institutions as well as representatives of such authorities. Public authority targets may also include diplomatic representations.

Political representatives: Elected politicians, ministers and other people, events and locations affiliated with political parties and movements.

Targets related to perceived insults: Groups, individuals, locations and events which have been selected on the basis of statements, actions or themes which the perpetrator perceives as offensive to Islam.

Jewish targets: Synagogues, Jewish meeting places and institutions, such as schools, and other targets whose association with Judaism is identifi-able. Jewish targets also include Israeli interests in Denmark, including diplomatic representations, companies and tourists.

Other religious targets: Christian symbolic targets, such as churches and Christian schools, Muslim symbolic targets, such as Shia mosques, and other religions.

Civilian targetsPeople who do not constitute symbolic targets. For example random people gathered in public squares, at events or in other crowded places.

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2.3 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and mo-dus operandi in Denmark

2.3.1 Targetsmilitant islamist target selection does not follow a con-sistent and predictable pattern and may change during the course of the planning phase. target selection may be influenced by militant islamist propaganda, current agendas, personal networks and preferences as well as the capability of the attack planner. furthermore, suc-cessful terrorist attacks in the West may serve as inspi-ration for others – a so-called copycat effect.

the most likely targets of a militant islamist terrorist attack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotect-ed civilian targets, such as public crowded places. the

threat against symbolic targets is primarily aimed at individuals, institutions and events that may be seen as offensive to islam. other potential symbolic targets include Jewish targets as well as the police and mili-tary – particularly in connection with guarding duties. there may also be a threat to other public authorities and certain political representatives5. militant islamists still wish to attack transport infrastructure. in general, other religious targets are rarely selected as militant islamist targets. however, is propaganda has called for attacks on religious targets a number of times. in october 2020, a militant islamist terrorist at-tack targeted visitors to a church in france.

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Figure 3: types of targets of successful militant islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may have multiple targets) Figure 4: Weapons used in successful militan islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)

Jewish people, events and locations continue to play an important role in militant islamist propaganda, and militant islamists regard such targets as legitimate ter-rorist targets. the most recent militant islamist attack on a Jewish target in europe was committed in January 2016 in france.

2.3.2 Modus operandi6

CtA assesses that the most likely militant islamist at-tack form in Denmark to be a terrorist attack with use of easily accessible means, firearms or improvised ex-plosive devices. Attacks with easily accessible means can be carried out spontaneously or following a very short planning phase, whereas attacks with firearms are mainly reserved for people with legal access to weapons or criminal contacts who can help them pro-

cure weapons. in a Danish context, easily accessible means are mainly knives, bludgeons/assault weapons, incendiary devices or vehicles.

the arrests in Denmark on December 11, 2019, April 30, 2020 and february 6, 2021 underline the continued in-terest in carrying out attacks with firearms in Denmark. the suspects were allegedly all planning to carry out a terrorist attack on their own using one or more fire-arms, among other means.

the types of weapons most often used in militant isla-mist attacks in the West since 2014 are bludgeons/as-sault weapons and bladed weapons, which have been used in 50 per cent of the attacks and caused 11 per cent of all deaths in terrorist attacks since 2014.

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5. the target type “political representatives” was previously included under “public authority targets”. the category has now been listed as a separate target type. this allows a more detailed description of the target and does not in itself indicate any changes to the threat.

6. for further elaboration of the capability for terrorism in Denmark, see appendix.

DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

terrorist attacks with improvised explosive devices are regularly emphasized in militant islamist prop-aganda. the most recent attack was carried out in 2019 in Lyon, france. in December 2019 and feb-ruary 2021 respectively, a number of people were arrested by Pet, in cooperation with relevant police districts, and charged with making preparations for manufacturing one or more explosive devices to be used in an act of terrorism.

Attacks using drones or chemical, biological and ra-diological agents are regularly mentioned in militant islamist propaganda, and the risk of such attacks is also occasionally mentioned in open media. it is CtA’s assessment that attacks using such means are less likely.

2.4 Focus areas concerning the threat from militant Islamism

2.4.1 Militant Islamist virtual communities and use of the internetmilitant islamists in Denmark and abroad use var-ious virtual communities for communication with like-minded people, dissemination of propaganda, radicalization, recruitment and exchange of infor-mation about weapons and the like, including bomb and attack manuals, which may serve as mutual in-spiration and contribute to building capability.

the level of security awareness is quite high in Dan-ish militant islamist virtual communities. CtA is aware that militant islamist propaganda produced by is and AQ is still being shared in Danish online networks on social media. on the major social media platforms, this propaganda is often shared in a more subtle form, where logos and other features associ-ated with the terrorist groups have been removed, allowing only those familiar with the groups’ sym-bols and figures of importance to know the source of the propaganda and to understand its true meaning.

it is likely that, over the next year, militant islamists in Denmark and abroad will continue, and increase, their use of virtual communities, as these offer a

quick and relatively easy way to disseminate militant islamist messages and propaganda to a large interna-tional audience.

2.4.2 Militant Islamist environments in Denmarkmany militant islamists move in and out of various en-vironments and group constellations, where extremist material and propaganda is shared and where poten-tially radicalizing activities of a social and religious nature take place. Closed or semi-closed groups may serve particularly well as echo chambers for partici-pants to build up and reaffirm one another in a mili-tant islamist view of the world without being contra-dicted. Aside from religious matters, militant islamists especially focus on Danish cases which they perceive as offensive.

the level of security awareness is quite high in Danish militant islamist groups. statements expressing ap-proval of acts of violence or terrorism or support for groups such as is and AQ are usually made in more closed groups or indirectly by means of inside refer-ences.

the physical militant islamist environments are main-ly found in and around Copenhagen, Aarhus, Aalborg and on funen. they are typically multi-ethnic sunni en-vironments consisting of small groups of men in their twenties, most of them with roots in Arabic-speaking countries.

2.4.3 Connections between militant Islamists and organized criminal environments CtA assesses that persons in Danish gang environments are primarily motivated by money and personal status. however, there are several examples of links between militant islamists and individuals from criminal environ-ments. these links are in most cases the result of geo-graphical and social overlap within the environments that gang members and militant islamist sympathizers move in. there are also examples of people from militant islamist environments carrying out islamic missionary activities (dawa) in criminal environments, just as imams and prominent figures in islamist circles have often been used to negotiate peace between rival gangs.

Photo: storstrøm fængsel, Asger Ladefogde, ritzau scanpix


CtA assesses that there are individuals within Danish gang environments who sympathize with militant is-lamism, including individuals who have been to syria/iraq. CtA assesses that individuals who are influenced by militant islamist propaganda and also linked to crim-inal environments prone to use violence and access to weapons may pose a terrorist threat to Denmark. in addition, ongoing relations between people from the gang environments and militant islamist environments may increase the capability of militant islamists to carry out terrorist attacks in Denmark with firearms and ex-plosives.

2.4.4 Radicalized ex-prisonersCtA assesses that radicalized prison inmates may pose a terrorist threat during their incarceration and upon their release. this threat may come from people con-victed or suspected of terror-related offences and from others prone to use violence who start or continue a radicalization process while remanded in custody or serving a sentence. Prison radicalization also manifests itself as the spread of extremist networks and the exer-tion of ideological influence on others.

CtA is aware of seven perpetrators who have commit-ted terrorist attacks in europe since 2015 while on leave from prison or within the first six months of their re-lease. one of them was the Danish citizen omar Abdel hamid el-hussein, who committed a terrorist attack in Copenhagen in february 2015 approximately three weeks after his release. most recently, a twenty-year-old male with asylum status committed a terrorist attack in Dresden, Germany, on october 4, 2020, less than two weeks after his release. this is one of three at-tacks in 2020 that took place within two weeks of the perpetrator’s release.

CtA regularly receives reports about concern over radi-calization and potential threats among inmates in Dan-ish prisons. CtA assesses that the threat from radicali-zation among inmates in Danish prisons may increase if more travellers to syria/iraq return to Denmark and face prosecution. this applies to both male and female travellers.

CtA is aware of a few cases where individuals convicted of militant islamist terror-related offences have inter-acted during their incarceration and have attempted to influence other inmates.

CtA assesses that radicalized inmates may pose a ter-rorist threat to prison staff. CtA has knowledge of three terrorist attacks motivated by militant islamism that have been committed against prison staff in other eu-ropean countries since 2014. 2.4.5 The threat posed by travellers to and return-ees from the conflict zone in Syria/IraqCtA assesses that individuals from Denmark who have

been to the conflict zone in syria/iraq may pose a threat to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. this applies to both men and women and regardless of whether they are still located in the conflict zone, have returned to Denmark or are located in another country in or out-side europe. the potential threat is not limited to attack planning, but may also take the form of radicalization or propaganda activities, logistical support, terrorist fi-nancing and other terror-related activities.

travellers from countries other than Denmark, includ-ing other european countries, may also pose a terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. the threat posed by travellers from other countries comes

primarily, but not exclusively, from individuals located in countries bordering Denmark.

however, the fact that a person travels to a conflict zone to support a militant islamist agenda does not necessarily mean that this person poses a terrorist threat to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. the ter-rorist threat is determined on the basis of a specific as-sessment of the intent and capability of the individual to attack Danish targets. relevant factors to consider include the person’s continued sympathy for militant islamism and affiliation with militant islamist groups along with weapons training and combat experience. According to CtA’s information, seven per cent of all successful and foiled attacks in the West since 2014 have involved perpetrators who have been to syria/iraq.

CtA assesses that at least 160 people have travelled from Denmark to syria/iraq to join militant islamist groups since the summer of 2012. Currently, almost half of them have returned to Denmark or taken up res-idence in mainly other european countries.

According to Pet’s information, nearly one third of the total number of travellers have died in the conflict zone. 32 adult travellers from Denmark remain in syria/iraq or in neighbouring countries. slightly less than half are women. of the 32 adults who remain in the conflict zone, 11 have only held Danish residence permits, and these have all been revoked. in addition, ten have had their Danish citizenship revoked by an administrative order. the remaining 11 adults are Danish citizens. Ac-cording to Pet’s information, five of these 11 citizens are currently imprisoned or detained, mainly in camps under kurdish control in north-eastern syria, while the remaining six citizens are presumably not detained and located in or near the conflict zone or in neighbouring countries.

According to Pet’s information, no one has succeeded in travelling from Denmark to the conflict zone in syria/iraq to join militant islamist groups since 2016. three adult travellers have been ex-tradited to Denmark

Photo: Unsplash.com


since 2016, two of them in 2020. All three are currently imprisoned. CtA has no knowledge of other travellers having returned to Denmark since 2016. All of the 32 adult travellers from Denmark who remain in the con-flict zone have been there for over four years.

CtA assesses that only a few of those who have left Denmark for syria/iraq and remain in the conflict zone will be able to return to Denmark in the short term without assistance from Danish or foreign authorities. the majority of the adult travellers from Denmark who remain in the conflict zone will face prosecution if they return to Denmark. CtA assesses that the conditions in the camps and prisons in north-eastern syria may add to the radical-ization of the detainees, including detained travellers from Denmark.

in 2020, a growing number of women, especially from european countries, managed to escape from camps in north-eastern syria – some of them accompanied by children. CtA assesses that there may also in the future be women, with or without children, who manage to escape from camps in north-eastern syria, potentially also women with links to Denmark.

there have been several reports of prison riots in the overcrowded kurdish-controlled prisons in north-east-ern syria, where around 2,000 male travellers with af-filiation to is are being detained, and the past year has seen examples of is-affiliated inmates who have man-aged to escape. it is likely that there will also be men who manage to escape from prisons in north-eastern syria during the next year. however, CtA assesses that it will remain more difficult to escape from prisons than from camps.

Children of travellersseveral of the travellers from Denmark have brought their children with them to the conflict zone, while some have had their children during their stay in the conflict zone. According to Pet’s information, approxi-mately 45 children whose parents were Danish citizens at the time of the child’s birth are located in or near the conflict zone. in addition, Pet has information that ap-proximately ten children of former Danish residents are also located in the conflict zone. of the approximately 60 children of travellers from Denmark, at least 25 are located in north-eastern syria, mainly in the al-roj and al-hawl camps. According to Pet’s information, the remaining children are located in north-western syria and turkey, among other places.

CtA assesses that it is unlikely that children of travel-lers from Denmark to the conflict zone currently pose a terrorist threat. this is primarily due to the current young age of the children. it is the general assessment of CtA that older children who travel to Denmark from the conflict zone or from camps may pose a terrorist threat due to indoctrination or other types of influ-ence asserted in the conflict zone. further to this, CtA also assesses that the risk of indoctrination and other types of influence increases the longer the children stay in a radicalized environment such as the camps in north-eastern syria.

the threat from travellers, including children of travel-lers, who come to Denmark, may be affected by how they are received by the Danish authorities, including whether they are offered any support for the purpose of potential de-radicalization and reintegration.

2.4.6 The threat from asylum seekers, refugees, migrants and people on exceptional leave to remainCtA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, accepted refugees and migrants who live or arrive in Denmark may pose a terrorist threat if they have been radicalized. this threat may come from people who have entered the country with the flow of refugees with the intent to commit acts of terrorism in

europe or from people who start or continue a radical-ization process after they arrive in Denmark. howev-er, CtA assesses that only a very small percentage of those arriving in europe and Denmark as refugees and migrants sympathize with militant islamism and may pose a terrorist threat.

it is still possible that militant islamist groups will try to exploit refugee and migrant routes to commit terrorist attacks in europe, including Denmark. CtA is not aware of any terrorist attacks in europe committed by individ-uals sent by a militant islamist terrorist group through the flow of refugees within the last year.

CtA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers and migrants may be particularly susceptible to radicalization and influence from militant islamist agendas. this is particularly younger persons travel-ling alone. high susceptibility may be ascribed to such factors as frustration over one’s situation, a sense of exclusion, the absence of family members and mental instability.

since november 2015, asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, accepted refugees and/or migrants have been involved in several successful and foiled attacks in eu-rope. four of the successful attacks were committed within the past year, with the most recent example on october 29, 2020 in france. the attack was committed by a 21-year-old tunisian citizen, who had applied for asylum in italy less than a month before the attack. in addition, CtA notes that the arrests made in Denmark in february 2021 include individuals with an asylum background.

CtA assesses that foreigners with militant islamist sym-pathies on exceptional leave to remain in Denmark may pose a terrorist threat. it is likely that some terror convicts on exceptional leave to remain will estab-lish new networks or strengthen existing networks of like-minded people with militant islamist sympathies.


2.4.7 Militant Islamists based in other countriesDenmark also faces a terrorist threat from radicalized individuals and small groups based in other countries, mainly those neighbouring Denmark. Attacks planned by individuals in one country against targets in another country may be particularly difficult for the authorities to uncover and prevent.

CtA assesses that people with or without links to Den-mark who have travelled to the conflict zone in syria/iraq and returned to countries other than Denmark may pose a threat, as may radicalized ex-prisoners from other countries. in the coming years, a large number of terrorist convicts will be released in other european countries, and these will be able to travel to Denmark after their release. CtA assesses that the most impor-tant factor for attack planning against targets in Den-mark by persons based in other countries is the ex-posure of current and past Danish cases of perceived insults to islam, and especially when such cases are given major attention in militant islamist propaganda and in militant islamist virtual communities.

CtA has knowledge of five cases within the last ten years – most recently in 2016 – where individuals based in the West have travelled to Denmark to prepare and commit terrorist attacks. in four of these cases, the per-petrators intended to hit targets connected with the Danish cartoon case, while the target of the so-called matchstick case in 2016 remains unknown. these types of cases are more frequent in Denmark than in other european countries, which, according to CtA’s assess-ment, is mainly due to the cartoon case and the fact that Denmark is home to targets that have played a central role in the case.

2.4.8 Financing from Denmark to militant Islamist terrorist groups abroadterrorist financing maintains terrorist groups and pro-mote their activities. funding improves the ability of terrorist groups to carry out operations and to recruit and retain members.

CtA assesses that funding from persons in Denmark to militant islamist terrorist groups mainly goes to groups

in syria, iraq, somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pal-estine.

CtA assesses that the intent of individuals in Denmark to provide funds for militant islamist groups has not di-minished. furthermore, knowledge on how to acquire money by way of financial crime and how to transfer money or other assets to terrorist groups remains wide-spread among certain islamist networks in Denmark. the ramified nature of these networks will most likely increase the degree of terrorist financing in the future.

in 2020, the Danish high Court sentenced in the so-called drone case the three defendants to imprison-ment for eight years, four years and six months, and three years, respectively. in the case of one of the de-fendants, the high Court found that purchasing and facilitating thermal cameras to is constituted accessory to terrorism. the case is not a typical terrorist financing case, but it illustrates the fact that not only money but also procurement, facilitation and transfer of other as-sets may be used by sympathizers to support terrorist groups abroad.

2.5 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Danes and Danish interests abroadCtA generally assesses that it is still the intent of mili-tant islamist groups in a number of countries to attack Westerners and Western targets in non-Western loca-tions.

CtA has no knowledge of successful or attempted terrorist attacks against Danes or Danish interests in non-Western countries in 2020. CtA has knowledge of at least four successful militant islamist terrorist attacks on Western civilians or interests in non-Western coun-tries in 2020.

Westerners and Western targets are generally well pro-tected and therefore hard to reach in countries with a high terrorist threat level. Also, the relatively low num-ber of attacks against Westerners in 2020 may be relat-ed to the reduced global travel activity and thus West-ern presence in non-Western countries as a result of the covid-19 pandemic.

the terrorist threat is aimed at protected targets such as diplomatic representations as well as unprotected targets such as companies, nGos and tourists. Danes, like other Westerners, are at risk of becoming random victims to attacks directed at Western interests. in ad-dition, Danes located abroad risk becoming victims of an attack if they are in near vicinity of local terrorist tar-gets, including crowded places, churches and certain official buildings.

CtA generally assesses that Danish diplomatic rep-resentations and other Danish presence abroad, in-cluding employees of Danish companies, may be per-ceived as symbolic targets providing an opportunity to target Denmark without carrying out an attack in Denmark. Danish diplomatic representations may be-come targets of terrorist attacks if they are perceived as less secure than the representations of other Western countries.

CtA assesses that the general terrorist threat level is most high in countries and regions where AQ and is have branches and networks and are able to train and plan attacks. this is especially the case in syria, iraq and Afghanistan, but also in West and east African coun-tries, where militant islamist groups have attacked the local population and authorities frequently through-out 2020. in 2020, there have also been indications that support for militant islamism in south and southeast Asia continues to rise. CtA assesses that increased sup-port to is in south and southeast Asia could extend the focus of local militant islamist groups in the region to include attacks on Westerners and Western interests.

CtA assesses that the threat of militant islamist kid-napping is most significant in conflict zones and their neighbouring areas. CtA also assesses that Danes are generally no more exposed to kidnapping than other Westerners7.

the cartoon case is not forgotten within militant isla-mist environments, and Denmark’s reputation as a na-tion of offenders can quickly become an issue interna-

tionally, in which case the threat to Danes and Danish interests abroad may increase. in the autumn of 2020, the Quran burnings carried out by the Danish political party stram kurs in sweden and other countries at-tracted some international attention. the international focus on perceived insults to islam rose sharply when Charlie hebdo reprinted its own and Danish muham-mad cartoons in september 2020. the majority of the attention was directed at france. the events in sweden and particularly france also re-sulted in some mention of Denmark in militant islamist propaganda. CtA assesses that the reference to Den-mark in militant islamist propaganda may cause local militant islamist groups to intensify their focus on Den-mark as a legitimate target, which in turn may increase the threat to Danes and Danish interests in certain countries and regions.

CtA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic has had no effect on the intent and capability of militant islamists to commit terrorist attacks against Danish interests abroad. CtA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic most likely has made it more difficult for militant islamist groups to attack Danes and Danish interests abroad.

CtA assesses that, in the long term, some terrorist groups abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its financial and social effects and that the general terrorist threat to Western interests may therefore increase. the covid-19 pandemic may for example lead to a weaken-ing and destabilization of countries in the middle east, Africa and Asia, which may then lead to a less priority to counter-terrorism efforts.

7. information on country-specific risks is provided via the travel advice of the ministry of foreign Affairs of Denmark on www.um.dk.


3. THE TERRoRIST THREAT To DENMARK FRoM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS

is a generic term covering various political views on the extreme right of the political spectrum characterized by combinations of nationalist, authoritarian, anarchist, anti-parliamentary, racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic viewpoints. The ideological foundation of right-wing ex-tremism may derive from Nazism, fascism or national conservatism. Right-wing extremists question or reject democracy and consider the use of violence a legitimate means to achieve political goals.

CtA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from right-wing extremists to be at the level of general. According to Pet’s definitions, this means that there is a general threat. there is capability and/or intent and possibly planning

CtA assesses that the most likely right-wing extremist terrorist attack to be carried out in Denmark is an attack by a lone actor or a small group from within or outside the periphery of a right-wing extremist environment. in addition, CtA assesses that a threat may emanate from vulnerable individuals and others who may find identi-ty, inspiration and a sense of community in right-wing extremist virtual environments. the organized, physical groups and organizations are less likely to pose a direct threat of right-wing extremist terrorism in Denmark. however, CtA notes that non-terrorist actions carried out by Danish right-wing extremist groups may create a sense of insecurity. over the past years, for example, a number of anti-semitic actions have been carried out in Denmark, including a case of gross vandalism and desecration of Jewish graves and symbols committed by right-wing extremists in november 20198.

CtA assesses that the covid-19 lockdown and the con-sequent isolation in some cases may have boosted the consumption of right-wing extremist online propagan-da and possibly strengthened existing conspiracy the-ories and anti-state narratives. CtA assesses that covid-19 in general has had no impact on the threat level in relation to right-wing extremists in Denmark. it is pos-sible that covid-19 will affect the right-wing extremist threat picture within the coming year.

3.1 Trends in relation to the threat and narra-tives

3.1.1 Trends in the global right-wing extremist threat pictureover the past years, a number of Western authorities have assessed that the threat from right-wing ex-tremists has increased. Contributing factors include a

number of major right-wing extremist attacks in 2019, including an attack on two mosques in Christchurch, new Zealand, in march 2019. in 2020, CtA recorded a downward trend in the number of successful and foiled right-wing extremist attacks in the West com-pared to 2019. CtA recorded 12 successful and seven foiled right-wing extremist attacks in the West in 2019, while the equivalent figures for 2020 were two success-ful and seven foiled attacks9. it is likely that the declin-ing number of attacks in the West in 2020 is due to the added focus of the authorities on right-wing extrem-ism, but the general covid-19 lockdown may also have had a moderating effect on the physical right-wing extremist activity level in 2020, including the planning and execution of attacks. CtA assesses that the 2019 attack in Christchurch became a catalyst for a number of subsequent copycat attacks that year. 2020 saw no right-wing extremist attacks which in any comparable way incited right-wing extremists to carry out similar, inspired attacks.

the threat from right-wing extremists in the West is posed by a broad spectrum of organizations, groups and individuals inspired by various political and ide-ological agendas, including conspiracy theories. the ideological platform for right-wing extremism may include nazism, fascism or national conservatism, but various conspiracy theories are increasingly becoming the driving force among right-wing extremists in the West.

While militant islamists are often inspired by interna-tional organizations such as AQ and is, there are no physical right-wing extremist organizations which in any similar way are capable of gathering and inspiring internationally across national and cultural boundaries.

CtA assesses that the primary threat from right-wing extremists is not posed by the established, physical or-ganizations, but rather by lone actors and small groups. According to CtA’s record of right-wing extremist attacks in the West, 12 of the 14 successful attacks in

8. two Danish right-wing extremists were convicted of this offence.9. it should be noted that data on the number of foiled and successful right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West may vary depending on the method used for assessing the data and the available information.

Right-wing extremism


2019 and 2020 were carried out by lone actors. none of the attacks were directed by a terrorist group, and no perpetrators were associated with physical right-wing extremist organizations or groups at the time of the attack.

CtA assesses that, over the next year, the threat from right-wing extremists in the West will mainly be posed by individuals and small groups whose primary venue for gathering, engaging in radicalization and finding inspiration will be virtual communities and networks with a right-wing extremist agenda. in Western coun-tries, there is an increasing trend towards international-ization of right-wing extremist narratives, driven by the sharing and consumption of propaganda and facilitat-ed by transatlantic and european virtual communities. CtA assesses that this growing international exchange of propaganda and extremist views may increase the threat from right-wing extremism in Denmark.

3.1.2 Supranational narrativesAmong right-wing extremists, internationally and in Denmark, supranational narratives are commonly used to support, maintain and sometimes constitute the entire underlying basis for their right-wing extremist ideology and world view. some narratives are mainly structured around right-wing extremist interpretations of verifiable information, for example on immigration and islam, while others are founded on highly ques-tionable or non-verifiable information, thereby taking the form of a conspiracy theory.

one of the most prevailing and essential right-wing extremist narratives is the theory of “the Great re-placement”. According to this narrative, the original population of europe is being replaced by immigrants from non-Western countries, mainly due to perceived lenient asylum and immigration policies, higher birth rate of immigrants and low reproduction rate of the eu-ropean populations. there is also a conspiratorial vari-ant of this narrative, according to which a political and financial elite, comprising immigration-friendly politi-cal parties, the eU, the Un and major companies, are making intentional and targeted efforts to replace the

population by means of urged massive immigration. the Great replacement is both the title and the core message of the manifesto which the perpetrator of the attack in Christchurch published shortly before his at-tack in 2019. CtA assesses that the Great replacement is one of the most predominant narratives among right-wing extremists globally and that it is common among both Danish right-wing radicals and right-wing extremists.

A narrative very similar to the Great replacement is the “White Genocide” conspiracy theory, according to which white populations in the West will diminish and die out as a consequence of immigration, low birth rates as well as violence and murder committed by im-migrants. however, this narrative distinguishes itself by being mostly anti-semitic claiming that a Jewish con-spiracy lies behind and controls developments with an aim of exterminating the white race. this narrative finds its primary supporters among anti-semitic right-wing extremists and is explicitly promoted by, among others, the nordic resistance movement (nrm) in Den-mark.

ZoG, the abbreviation for “Zionist occupied Govern-ment”, is an anti-semitic conspiracy theory like White Genocide, claiming that Jews control Western govern-ments, for example through their alleged ownership and total control of banks and the financial sector.

CtA assesses that right-wing extremist narratives may help to reinforce existing enemy perceptions and lead to the creation of new ones and that they may there-fore have a determining effect in terms of which targets are most at risk of becoming victim of right-wing ex-tremist terrorism. in addition, the narratives may have a both mobilizing and uniting effect within right-wing extremist environments, also in Denmark. furthermore, CtA assesses that right-wing extremist narratives re-main widespread and currently reach a large audience through their distribution in virtual communities and on social media.

3.1.3 Right-wing extremists’ use of virtual communities and the internetDanish right-wing extremists and international right-wing extremist groups use various virtual communities for com-munication with like-mind-ed persons, dissemination of propaganda, capability building, radicalization and recruitment. Although major commercial platforms such as facebook, twitter, Youtube and reddit along with ded-icated right-wing extremist websites and forums are still used for such activities, the added focus on extremist content by providers and au-thorities has made it increas-ingly difficult.

As a result of this attention, many right-wing extremists are shifting to platforms which they consider more se-cure, including imageboards such as 4chan and 8kun, which are favoured by right-wing extremists for their limited moderation and high degree of anonymity. social media with limited moderation are also used, among them the russian Vk, the video service BitChute and the Us twitter clones GAB and Parler, encrypted, internet-based communication platforms have also gained popularity, including telegram, which has be-come highly popular among right-wing extremists, while gaming platforms such as the digital distribution and chat services Discord and steam and the lives-tream service twitch are also used.

it is likely that the use of virtual communities among right-wing extremists internationally and in Denmark will continue and increase, as they ensure a very quick and low-cost sharing of right-wing extremist messag-es and propaganda with a very large audience across borders. the use of virtual communities by right-wing

extremists has gradually been extended to include a number of new platforms. it is highly likely that, es-pecially the young and technology savvy right-wing extremists, will continue to look for and use such new platforms and that this trend will continue, also among right-wing extremists in Denmark.

3.1.4 International contacts of Danish right-wing extremistsCtA assesses that international contacts of Danish right-wing extremists may create and maintain net-works which may lead to added radicalization and mo-bilize followers to engage in right-wing extremist activ-ities. such foreign contacts may influence and expand enemy perceptions and narratives and build capability among Danish right-wing extremists.

CtA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic has reduced cross-border meeting activities among right-wing ex-tremists, but that the international contacts have been maintained and strengthened virtually.

Photo: Patrick hertzog, AfP, ritzau scanpix

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Assessment of the terrorist threAt to DenmArk Page 35 DAnish seCUritY AnD inteLLiGenCe serViCePage 34

Figure 5: : foiled and successful right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020

Figure 6: People wounded or killed in right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020

Muslim targets: Mosques and other Muslim meeting places as well as events on Muslim days of celebration and holidays, Muslim schools, clubs and shops frequented by Muslims.

Immigrant targets: Asylum seekers, asylum centres, accepted refugees, immi-grants and others who may be perceived as immigrants on account of ethnic and cultural markers such as skin colour or language.

Jewish targets: Synagogues, Jewish meeting places and institutions, including schools, and other targets whose association with Judaism is identifiable as well as events on Jewish days of celebration and holidays. Jewish targets also include individuals who are perceived as being Jewish as well as Israeli interests in Den-mark, including diplomatic representations, companies and tourists.

Racist targets: Individuals identified as terrorist targets on the basis of ethnic markers such as skin colour.

Authority targets: Authorities, including certain ministries, police, military, emergency response services, other public institutions as well as representatives of such authorities. Authority targets may also include diplomatic representa-tions.

Political representatives: Elected politicians, ministers and other individuals, events and locations affiliated with certain political parties and movements.

Other perceived political opponents: Individuals, events and locations which are perceived as or represent political opponents and which are not authority targets or political representatives.

LGBTQ+ targets: People who, for example, are openly homosexual, queer, bi-sexual or transgender or who may be perceived as such.

Definitions of right-wing extremist target typesCTA assesses that right-wing extremist targets can be divided into symbolic tar-gets and civilian targets.

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Civilian targetsPeople who do not constitute symbolic targets. For example random people gathered in public squares, at events or in other crowded places.

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Figure 7: types of targets of successful right-wing extremist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may have multiple targets)

3.2 Right-wing extremist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark

3.2.1 Targetsthe most likely targets of a right-wing extremist ter-rorist attack in Denmark are muslim targets, immigrant targets, Jewish targets, persons of non-Danish ethnici-ty and locations where these groups are seen to gather. other possible targets include certain perceived politi-cal opponents. Authorities and LGBtQ+ figures are also among the potential targets.

CtA assesses that the use of anti-state rhetoric has become more widespread among right-wing extrem-ists in 2020. it is likely that the covid-19 pandemic has strengthened existing anti-state narratives among right-wing extremists in Denmark, and it is possible that Danish right-wing extremists have been inspired by American or German right-wing extremists, who often display and share strong anti-state views. Also, CtA as-sesses that the increased anti-state focus may impact on the target selection of Danish right-wing extremists.


Figure 8. : Weapons used in successful right-wing attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)

CtA assesses that conspiratorial ideas are gaining foot-hold in right-wing extremist environments in Denmark. the conspiratorial narratives of right-wing extremists often include anti-semitic messages, which may be due to the fact that the leading and most active right-wing extremists in Denmark hold a national socialist ideology. CtA assesses that conspiratorial narratives among Danish right-wing extremists may reinforce ex-isting enemy perceptions.

3.2.2 Modus operandi10

A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is most likely to be carried out by means of bludgeons/assault weapons or small firearms, especially hunting rifles, shotguns, pistols and homemade firearms. other possible weapons include arson, improvised explo-sive devices and vehicles. CtA further assesses that right-wing extremists can build the capability to use weapons, including firearms and explosives, by shar-ing knowledge in virtual communities and following instructions available online, especially videos on You-tube.


4. THE TERRoRIST THREAT To DENMARK FRoM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS

CtA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from left-wing extremists to be at the level of limited. According to Pet’s definitions this means that there is a potential threat. there is limited capability and/or intent. CtA assesses that Danish left-wing extremists are ready to commit acts of violence and have some, but limited ca-pability to commit acts of terrorism. At the same time their intent to commit politically motivated violence, characterized as terrorism has declined and is currently very low.

the primary aim of Danish left-wing extremists is to expose, counter and combat perceived racism and fas-cism, especially as expressed by right-wing radical and extremist groups. CtA assesses that the most likely tar-gets of a left-wing extremist terrorist attack are right-wing extremist activities and representatives of the au-thorities, mainly the police. however, CtA assesses that the threat to the police highly depends on the given situation and that it primarily exists in relation to clash-es with left-wing extremists during actions, protests or squatting. other potential targets include individuals perceived to sympathize with right-wing extremism and, to a lesser degree, certain politicians and public figures perceived as political opponents, including art-ists and debaters.

CtA assesses that right-wing extremist attacks in Den-mark may inspire a violent backlash from Danish left-wing extremists.

the most likely left-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is an attack carried out by a small group of members or associates of a Danish left-wing extremist group.

A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is most likely to be carried out by means of bludgeons/assault weapons, incendiary devices, such as molotov cocktails, or fireworks, including powerful bangers, chrysanthemum bombs, mortar tubes and rockets.

Arson is another possible weapon in connection with demonstrations and actions. CtA assesses that it is less likely that Danish left-wing extremists will make use of improvised explosive devices and unlikely that they will use firearms11.

there are a number of virtual communities used by Danish left-wing extremists to communicate and share information. By using these virtual communities, they are able to relatively quickly mobilize supporters, for example to engage in left-wing extremist events, in-cluding individuals with an otherwise limited contact to the left-wing extremist environments. Danish left-wing extremist groups collaborate with like-minded international organizations and groups. it is likely that collaboration with international left-wing extremist organizations and groups may increase the capability of Danish left-wing extremists, for example in relation to gaining specific tactical know-how on the execution of violent acts. CtA further assesses that collaboration with international left-wing extremist environments with a significant readiness for violence may increase the level of radicalization and readiness for violence among Danish left-wing extremists. fur-thermore, such collaboration may lead to contact with foreign left-wing extremists who are prone to violence and who may become mobilized to engage in left-wing extremist events in Denmark, which may increase the terrorist threat.


Photo: Unsplash.com


5. oTHER THREATS THAT CoULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRoRISM

this chapter deals with current trends in areas that fall outside the scope of militant islamism and political extremism and which, in CtA’s assessment, may affect the terrorist threat to Denmark. the chapter addresses certain conspiracy theories, incels, climate extremism, sovereignty movements and mental illness, which in different ways may inspire acts which, subject to a legal assessment, could be characterized as terrorism.

furthermore, political, ethnic and religious conflicts abroad may spark reactions from individuals or groups in Denmark affiliated with the various affected groups, which may develop into acts that could be character-ized as terrorism. such acts may involve state actors. the reactions, including violent protests, may target politicians, public officials, random citizens or foreign diplomatic representations in Denmark.

5.1 Conspiracy theoriesConspiracy theories are attempts to explain events and circumstances using unfounded claims of underlying secret conspiracies between powerful actors. those who believe in conspiracy theories will often dispute this term as it has a derogatory tone to it.

CtA assesses that a further spread of certain conspira-cy theories could lead to threats against politicians and public officials.

Conspiracy theories appeal to a rel-atively modest group in Denmark, partly due to the Danish populations’ generally high degree of confidence in the authorities. however, the covid-19 pandemic has sharpened interest in conspiracy theories, in particular those based on the pandemic, such as the au-thorities’ handling of the pandemic and their covid-19 guidelines, or the per-ceived harmful effect of the 5G mobile network.

People known to the Danish author-ities for engaging in activities within the islamist environments, the political extremist environments or the Danish sovereignty movements may also be conspiracy theorists.

Conspiracy theorists primarily meet vir-tually in internet forums, including on facebook, instagram and other social media. some influencers (i.e. individ-uals with many social media follow-ers) take the lead in interpreting and spreading the messages.

the current trend indicates that people are interested in not just one conspira-

cy theory, but often a whole group of overlapping or sometimes outright contradicting conspiracy theo-ries, alternative thoughts and ideologies.

Conspiracy theorists are generally characterized by distrust in politicians, media and science along with a fear of losing fundamental rights of freedom. some conspiracy theories, including QAnon12, have a core message that there is a corrupt and morally flawed po-litical elite that must be fought, which, in CtA’s assess-ment, may strike a chord with individuals who pro-foundly distrust the state and who have or have had disagreements with Danish authorities. in addition, several conspiracy theories have a clear anti-semitic and/or islamophobic element.

in some european countries, including the Uk and the netherlands, 5G opponents inspired by 5G conspiracy theories have seriously vandalized 5G masts, or masts and plants considered to be 5G. the United states has seen a number of cases where individuals inspired by QAnon have acted violently or planned violent ac-tions, for example against authorities, private compa-nies and private individuals who have been impugned in connection with the conspiracy theory.

CtA assesses that further dissemination of certain con-spiracy theories that add to the perception that politi-cians and public officials are traitors and enemies, may increase the number of threats and may sharpen the rhetoric of the threats. the majority of threats have no implications of violence or other physical manifes-tations. however, CtA assesses that, in case of such physical manifestations, conspiracy theories may have impacted the motivation and target selection.

CtA assesses that the potential impact of conspiracy theories on the terrorist threat is primarily related to individuals affiliated with political extremist environ-ments, particularly within the extreme right.

12. QAnon is a conspiracy theory with the core narrative that the former Us President Donald trump is secretly fighting against an international conspiracy, which includes prominent politicians and is controlled by a Jewish elite.

Photo: Anthon Unger, ritzau scanpix


CtA assesses that, if conspiracy theories are further em-bedded in extremist environments, this development may cause additional radicalization of people within these environments. this especially regards conspiracy theories promoting distrust in the authorities, spread-ing a simplistic black and white view of the world, re-ferring to politicians and public officials as enemies and legitimizing acts of violence out of consideration for “the people”. such acts of violence may for example take the form of assault which, subject to a legal assess-ment, could be characterized as terrorism. 5.2 Incelsthe word incel is short for “involuntary celibate”. the term covers individuals, predominantly men, who are frustrated with their inability to engage in romantic or sexual relations with women. they join up with people who feel the same way in subcultures online, using a variety of virtual platforms, including 4chan and 8kun, as well as a number of dedicated websites and social media subgroups. some radicalized incels use the plat-forms to express a strong hatred towards women and men who are thought to have success with women.

many incels are engaged in international virtual com-munities offering a high degree of user anonymity, which makes it extremely difficult to assess the total number of radicalized users.

misogyny in particular has been a motivating factor be-hind several multicasualty attacks committed by incels in the United states and Canada from 2014 to 2020. CtA assesses that, it can be very difficult for authorities to predict whom and where incels are going to attack, as they have a wideranging target selection, including both women and men.

5.3 Climate extremistsClimate extremists are individuals or groups who are willing to use violence in the fight for one or multiple causes with environmental protection or global climate as a key element. Climate extremists are unlike climate activists, who only use non-violent means, including civil disobedience. there are also right-wing extremists

within the sphere of climate extremism, including the so-called eco fascists. it is also possible that there are individuals sympathetic with left-wing extremism who will act violently for example when participating in cli-mate demonstrations.

CtA assesses that there are currently no climate extrem-ist groups in Denmark that are willing to use violence in their fight to protect the climate and the environment.

it is less likely that individuals who are actively engaged in climate activist groups and who are dissatisfied with the non-violent activist line will choose to break away from the groups to engage in climate extremism.

5.4 Sovereignty movementssovereignty movements are movements formed by in-dividuals and loosely affiliated groups of varying sizes, sharing the common fundamental ideology that they do not recognize the legitimacy and authority of the state. sovereignty movement supporters also share the conviction that, by declaring sovereignty, individ-uals can resign from the existing society, setting them-selves free from the obligation to abide by its laws and regulations.

Because of their anti-state ideology, sovereignty move-ments pose a potential threat to the authorities, espe-cially the police. the threat is particularly likely to ma-terialize if supporters of a sovereignty movement were to violently resist police arrest.

the ideology of sovereignty movements may for ex-ample seem appealing to criminals or others who have been in conflict with the authorities, especially the po-lice. such individuals may be more prone to violence and have easier access to weapons, which may increase the threat, especially in connection with police con-frontation.

CtA assesses that, if sovereignty movement ideologies become more rooted among people in Denmark, it may increase the risk of sovereignty movements pos-ing a terrorist threat.

5.5 People suffering from mental disordersif a perpetrator suffers from a mental disorder, it may be difficult for the authorities to assess whether vio-lent actions committed by that person constitute acts of terrorism. in some situations, it may be necessary to give special attention to individuals suffering from mental disorders who show signs of radicalization and who have previously displayed violent or impulsive be-haviour. A mental disorder is not necessarily decisive in respect of a person’s ability and intent to commit acts of terrorism, but only one of several factors to consid-er when assessing the terrorist threat which may be posed by the person in question. it should be noted that mental disorders typically appear in conjunction with other risk factors, including social isolation, mar-ginalization, unemployment and life-altering events. CtA assesses that a person’s mental state, including any mental disorders, may be of great importance to their behaviour and motivation for acting, also in con-nection with terrorism.

CtA’s knowledge indicates that perpetrators with a psychiatric diagnosis or symptoms of a non-diagnosed mental disorder are more likely to commit terrorist at-tacks on their own, rather than in a group.

social media are increasingly used for making threaten-ing comments, for example against public figures, and for disseminating rumours and fake news. While the vast majority of these comments do not lead to actual attack planning, CtA assesses that such commentary may lead people who are mentally unstable or easily influenced to commit acts of ideologically motivated violence that could be characterized as terrorism.


6. THE TERRoRIST THREAT To GREENLAND AND THE FARoE ISLANDS APPENDIX: MoDUS oPERANDI FoR TERRoRIST ATTACKS IN DENMARK

6.1. Specifically on the terrorist threat to Greenlandthe terrorist threat to Greenland is minimal. According to Pet’s definitions this means that there are no indi-cations of any threat. there is no known capability or intent.

CtA assesses that militant islamism is less widespread in Greenland than in Denmark.

however, militant islamist or political extremist prop-aganda may also influence individuals in Greenland to commit acts of violence. socially marginalized or

CTA has adjusted the term of the lowest level on the terrorist threat scale from “none” to “minimal”. Against this adjustment, the terrorist threat to both Greenland and the Faroe Is-lands is assessed to be “minimal” rather than “limited” without this reflecting changes in the nature of the threat.

the choice of modus operandi in a terrorist attack often reflects the capability of the perpetrator. it may also af-fect the number of casualties and the propaganda ef-fect of the attack. Below follows an assessment of the overall capability of potential perpetrators in Denmark. Within the individual categories of potential perpetra-tors, there may be some difference in terms of capabil-ity, focus and preferences, which affects the choice of modus operandi13.

CtA assesses that the choice of modus operandi is af-fected by a number of factors, including the adopted focus in propaganda and on virtual platforms, the abil-ities and access to resources of the individual perpetra-tor, access to the intended target and inspiration from other attacks.

the terrorist threat in the West is increasingly posed by people with no physical links to established groups. this regards both militant islamists and right-wing ex-tremists. in Denmark, the capability of potential perpe-trators may for example be enhanced through the use of virtual networks where resource persons share in-structions and give advice on specific modus operandi.

the capability may also be enhanced through recruit-ment or radicalization of key figures with legitimate ac-cess to facilities, resources or information. such insid-ers may have various functions and access rights which may enable them to aid in carrying out a terrorist at-tack or in other ways cause harm.

Attacks with easily accessible means, firearms and IEDsterrorist attacks with easily accessible means can be carried out spontaneously or following a very short planning phase. Attacks with easily accessible means may cause major harm, as particularly illustrated by vehicle attacks. multiple knife attacks in france during 2020 have also illustrated how such attacks can have a high propaganda effect. Vehicles have been used to

carry out terrorist attacks in the West with the main ob-jective of attacking large crowds.

CtA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark with the capability to carry out a terrorist attack using fire-arms. however, acquisition of such weapons typically requires legal access to weapons or criminal contacts who can help facilitate the acquisition.

CtA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark with the capability to make small improvised explosive de-vices and carry out attacks by means of these. instruc-tions and manuals on how to make various explosives and improvised explosive devices, which could be used by people with no prior training, are available online. however, the effect of such improvised explosive de-vices may vary considerably. A number of barriers exist in relation to producing homemade explosives, including the general restric-tions surrounding the sale of substances such as hy-drogen peroxide. however, despite national and in-ternational efforts, it remains fairly easy to procure ingredients for making simple improvised explosive devices, for example by gathering gunpowder from fireworks or pyrotechnics.

there are some criminal environments in Denmark with contacts that enable procurement of factory-made ex-plosives, especially dynamite. increased availability of such explosives may ease the production of impro-vised explosive devices for potential terrorist use.

CtA assesses that radicalized people who have received weapons training in a conflict zone, such as syria/iraq, or who have knowledge of weapons from the military, shooting clubs, criminal environments or elsewhere will be able to carry out high-impact attacks. this in-cludes serial attacks, where individuals or groups carry out multiple consecutive attacks.

13. such specific circumstances are described in more detail under militant islamism (chapter 2), right-wing extremism (chapter 3) and left-wing extremism (chapter 4).

Photo: faroe islands, Unsplash.com

vulnerable young peo-ple may be particularly susceptible to radicali-zation.

CtA assesses that the easier access to weap-ons and explosives in Greenland, compared to other parts of the Danish realm, might increase the chances of carrying out an attack with great damage.

6.2. Specifically on the terrorist threat to the Faroe Islandsthe terrorist threat to the faroe islands is minimal. According to Pet’s definitions this

means that there are no indications of any threat. there is no known capability or intent.

As in Greenland, militant islamism is less widespread in the faroe islands than in Denmark.

militant islamist or political extremist propaganda may influence individuals in the faroe islands or individuals travelling there to commit acts of violence. this may be triggered by political single issues such as animal wel-fare. socially marginalized or vulnerable young people may be particularly susceptible to radicalization.

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Figure 9: Weapons used in successful militan islamist and right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)

14. in this context, the word “attack” refers to an activity aimed at causing a harmful effect. it does therefore not include any terrorist use of computers for the purpose of funding, propaganda or similar activities.15. see the assessment entitled the Cyber threat to Denmark by the Centre for Cyber security (CfCs). 16. synthetic biology concerns the engineering of new, man-made biological systems.

Attacks with dronesthere is capability in Denmark to use drones for recon-naissance, for simple attacks and for intimidation pur-poses, while the capability to use drones for more com-plex attacks is limited. militant groups have displayed considerable ability to use drones, for example to carry out attacks in and around conflict zones in syria/iraq and Ukraine, but this capability has yet to be seen in the West. According to CtA’s assessment, the challeng-es involved in using drones as an attack weapon in Denmark remain substantial compared to the potential harmful effect of such a weapon.

Attacks with chemical agentsCtA assesses that the capability in Denmark to carry

out chemical attacks using means other than unpro-cessed substances is limited.

Various propaganda publications have occasionally fo-cused on the use of chemical agents. Despite calls for using corrosive liquids and chemical agents to poison food, for example, such means have not yet been used for terrorist attacks in the West, according to CtA’s in-formation.

toxic industrial chemicals and actual warfare agents (primarily mustard gas) have been used by armed groups in conflict zones, but CtA assesses that the abil-ity to transfer this capability to individuals or groups in the West is very low.

Attacks with biological agentsCtA assesses that the capability to weaponize biologi-cal agents, such as anthrax, is very limited in Denmark, the reason being that handling of viruses and bacteria requires very special conditions, including access to laboratory facilities.

CtA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark who would be able to produce some toxins of a quality and quantity suitable for use in a simple biological attack. however, the execution of an attack would also require knowledge of efficient means of distribution or disper-sion of the agent. CtA has no information about attacks with biological agents in the West in 2020.

Attacks with powder lettersthere are only very few examples of terrorist attacks with powder letters in the West, and CtA is aware of no powder letter attacks in the West in 2020.

Attacks with radiological and nuclear agentsCtA assesses that the capability to carry out terrorist at-tacks using radiological agents is very low in Denmark. CtA is aware of no attack planning involving such agents in the West.

CtA assesses that there are no individuals in Denmark with the capability to commit acts of terrorism by means of nuclear agents.

Attacks with cyber-related means14

CtA assesses that there is a limited capability in Den-mark to carry out a terrorist cyberattack that causes physical harm to humans or serious disruption of criti-cal national infrastructure or similar targets15.

Attacks by means of new technologiesCtA follows the technological development closely in order to assess the effect of new technologies on the terrorist threat to Denmark. CtA assesses that, despite their potential, none of the new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, 3D printing and synthetic biol-ogy16, are currently suited or sufficiently available to have any independent effect on the terrorist threat.

PoLITIETS EFTERRETNINGSTJENESTECENTER FoR TERRoRANALYSE

klausdalsbrovej 12860 søborg

45 15 90 07 • [email protected] • www.pet.dk

Assessment of the terrorist threA t to DenmArk

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