Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal

8/12/2019 Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal

1/31

Indian Political Science ssociation

ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR, KERALA AND WEST BENGAL: A DIFFERENTIATED ANDA COMPARATIVE OVERVIEWAuthor(s): IQBAL NARAIN and NILIMA DUTTSource: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July - Sept. 1987), pp. 370-399Published by: Indian Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855316.

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2/31

ASSEMBLY

ELECTIONS

IN

KASHMIR,

KERALA AND

WEST

BENGAL: A

DIFFERENTIATED AND

A

COMPARATIVE

OVERVIEW

IQBAL

NARAIN AND

NILIMA

DUTT

With

the

assembly

elections

in

three

states

-

Jammu

and

Kashmir,

Kerala

and

West

Bengal

approaching

closer

-

Rajiv

Gandhi,

the

Prime Minister of India

and

the

Congress

Party

President,

was

involved

with

such

controversies

f

national charac-

ter that were well-expected to influence the poll verdict. Two of

the

major

controversies

that

he was confronted

with

were

Rajiv-

Zail

rift

and

Rajiv-V.P.

Singh

tension. Removal

of

foreign

secretary,

A.P.

Venkateswaran,

by

an

announcement

at

a

press

conference,

also

served

a

major

blow

to the

credibility

of

the

Prime

Minister.

Congress (I)

was

fully

aware of

the

eroding

image

of

their

leader and decided to

campaign

on the

old

slogan

of

threat

to

national

unity,

rather

than to

project

the

personality

of

ajiv

Gandhi

to win

votes.

Ironically

Rajiv

Gandhi did

not hold a

single

Congress

Working

Committee

meeting

ever

since

he

took

over as

the

Prime

Minister.

This added

to

the

already existing

unfavourable

at-

mosphere

for

Rajiv

and his

party

at

a

time

when

campaigning

for

the

assembly

elections

in three states

was

in

full

swing.

The

elections

under

no

circumstances

could be

postponed

with

the

term

of

West

Bengal

assembly

ending

on

13

June,

and that

of

Kerala

on 23

June.

Similarly,

elections

in

Jammu

and

Kashmir

should be held before 31 March

-

that is before the end of the

financial

year

-

to

enable

the new

assembly

to

complete

essen-

tial

financial

business.

Thus

Rajiv

was forced

to

plunge

in

elec-

The

ndian

ournal

f

Political

cience,

ol.

48,

No.

3,

July

September,

987.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND

WEST

BENGAL

371

tioneering

at

a

time

when

his

party's image

had almost nosedi-

ved. Rajiv took the burden and partyresponsibilitywith exten-

sive

election

tours

in

the three

states.

He had no

option

but

to

use

the little

political

charisma

he

was left with.

It

was

neces-

sary

to save

the face of the

Congress

(I)

in

these three states

for

the

future of

Haryana

polls

as

psychology

of

Haryana

voters

would also

depend,

atleast

to some

extent,

on

the

outcome

of

three

assembly polls.

Rajiv

tried to

give

a

new

look

to

the

party

by dropping

every

second

sitting

MLA

in all

the

three

states.

Altogether,

the elections

definitelyposed

a test for

Rajiv's

popu-

larity

and

credibility

as also for the

popularity

of theCongress (I)

vis-a-vis

ts

performance

as

viewed

by

the

electorate.

JAMMU

AND

KASHMIR

Pre-election

cenario

In

Jammu

and

Kashmir,

Rajiv-Farooq

accord

confused the

electorate

totally.1 Only

about two

years back, Farooq

was

branded

as anti-national

and

a

threat to the

security

of

the

nation.2

The

accord

aroused

militancy

among

Congress

party

members.3 Dissidence in

Congress

(I)

created

difficulties n

evol-

ving intra-party

consensus on the 31

candidates till

the

last

minute.

Ultimately,

out

of 76

assembly

seats,

NC(F)

decided to

contest

for

45

seats and

Congress

(I)

for

31

seats. Seat

adjust-

ments were

mutually agreed

upon

between

Farooq

and

Rajiv

but

the

Congress

(I)

members were

unhappy

over the

way

Farooq

exercised his final say on every candidate, including that of

Congress (I).

While

the

NC(F)

decided

to

field

most of

its old

hands,

the

Congress (I)

dropped

most of

its old

faces.

Further,

as a

result

of

the electoral

alliance,

Congress

(I)

was

contesting

new seats

in

which

it

had fared

poorly

in

1983

elections

-

Kokernag,

Trai,

Kangan,

Noorabad

and

Anantnag

in

the

valley.

This resulted

in

dissension in

Congress (I)

circles.

In

Jammu

region,

the

electorate

strongly

felt

that

because

of its alliance with the NC(F), the Congress would not be able

to

safeguard

the interests

of

the

region.

Also

Sikh

electorate,

even

if

in

minority,

who were

concentrated in

Jammu

division,

was

already anatagonistic

to

any

Congress

moves

especially

after

the

Blue

Star

Operation.

The

two

Sikh

organisations

-

10



4/31

372 THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F

POLITICAL

SCIENCE

the

Khalsa

Panthic

Party

and

the

State

Akali

Dal

-

announced

that theywould support the candidates of Abdullah. Elections

became

all the

more a

tough

going

forthe

Congress (I)

as con-

certed

efforts

were

being

made

by

Hindu

voters

to build

up

an

alliance

between

the

BJP

and the

Janata

party

along

with seat

adjustments

with

the

NC(K)

and

the

Lok

Dal. It

could thus

hardly

hope

to

win

same ratio of

seats in

the

region

which it

had

won

in 1982

when

it

bagged

23 out of

32 seats.

Farooq

however

was

optimistic:

"By

contesting

the

election

as

partners

we

are

determined

to

prove

that not

only

can we

retain

our Kashmir

identitybut be part of the national mainstream as well."3

Whatever

the

shortcomings

nd

differences,

he

alliance

was

viewed

as

a

far-sighted ompromise

and

described as.

"Consensus

Politics."4

It

pledged

to

fight

elections

with

an

appropriate

recognition

of the

prospective strength

of the

two

parties,

as well

as

the

long-term

objective

of

winning

the

loyalty

of

the

Muslim

valley

in

the

national interest.

However,

the

time

did

not

permit

the

alliance

to

reach its

grass

roots,

which

undoubtedly gave

rise

to misunderstanding both at inter-party nd intra-partyevels.

Many

of

the

dissidents

turned

towards the

MUF,

which

compri-

sed

of

fundamentalist

groups

-

the

Jammat-e-Islami,

Ummat-

e-Islami,

and

the

Mahaaz-e-Azadi and

constituted

a

loose

confederation

of

politico-religious

groups.

For

the

first

time,

the

valley

,

faced a threat

from

Muslim

voters.

The

MUF

and its

allies decided

to encash

on

the

Muslim

sentiments,

and

an

open

call was made

to vote for

Islam.

(In

the valley there are 95% Muslim voters) They declared

that

a

vote

for

the alliance would

endanger

Islam.

They

dubbed

the

accord

as centre's

move to colonise

Kashmir.

Abdul

Gani

Lone

of

the

Peoples

Conference had

openly

told

voters

in

Kashmir

that

a vote for the

ruling

alliance will

mean

vote

for

'India's

colonial

attitude in Kashmir.'

Elections

in

Jammu

and

Kashmir were of

national

impor-

tance

because

it

was

the first time when

NC

and

Congress

(I)

had joined hands. The political pundits thoughtthat thevictory

of

the

alliance

of

a national

party

with a

regional

party

would

provide

a

new

model for

harmonising regional

with

national

aspirations,

and

would clear

th

clouds

covering

Kashmir

poli-

tics.

The

victory

would

certainly

vouch for

Kashmir's

willingness



5/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND WEST BENGAL373

to

join

the mainstream of

Indian

political

life.

It

was also

being

seen as a victoryof the secular forces in politics. On the eve of

elections,

it

was evident

that

chances

of

victory ay

heavily

on

the side

of the

alliance. The alliance

expected

to secure

60-62

seats

in

the

state.

Post-election

eflections

Results

from

Jammu

and Kashmir

came as

tranquil

demea-

nour

for

Rajiv

and the

Congress

(I).

The alliance

bagged

63

seats as against 70 in the dissolved house

-

39 seats captured by

NC

and 24

by

Congress (I). According

to

Rajiv,

the

alliance's

victory

made the

border

state

a 'bastion

of India's

unity

and

integrity'

and

would

help

in the

country's

fight gainst

commu-

nalism

in

the

Punjab.5

The

message

of

the

results

was

that

it

were

the

Muslims

who defeated

Muslim

Fundamentalism.6

Congress

(I)

which

had

earlier

contested

elections

as

an

opposition

to

NC

now

fought

and won as its

ally.

Though

the

Congress (I)'s

success

in

retaining nearly

the same

number

of

seats it had in the

previous

Assembly

owes a lot to the alliance

with

Farooq

Abdullah,

the evidence

of

its continued

hold over

the

Jammu

region

is

significant

s

irgives

a clue to the

political

thinking

f the

voters in the Hindi heartland.

BJP's cry

of

alli-

ance

as 'unethical' has been belied.7

What

helped

the

Congress

(I)

restrict its

losses was

the

fragmentation

f

the

opposition.

It

just

lost four

seats

in

Jammu

and Kathua

regions.

It achieved

more than

what it

expected,

and

managed

to win 19 out of 24 seats ithad contested/Although

the

percentage

of

vote

of

Congress (I)

fell,

they

retained

all the

seats

-

in

Bari

Brahmana,

it

fell

from

53%,

to

45%,

in

Basohli

from

53%

to

40%,

in R.S.

Pura

from

50%

to

37%,

in

Jandrah-

Gharota

from

43%

to

34%.

These

areas

had

no resentment

against

the

alliance,

but

against

the

Congress (I).

On

the other

hand,

out of the

total

of

73 seats for which

elections

held,8

MUF won

4,

BJP

2

and

Independents

4.

The*

BJP had no representationin the dissolved assembly.

The fact

that

MUF still

retains its

influence

n

the

valley

and its

impact

is

pronounced

in

South

Kashmir,

where

it

has

made

inroads

into the

strongholds

of

the

NC

(F)

-

Congress

(I)



6/31

374

THE INDIAN

JOURNAL

F POLITICAL

CIENCE

alliance

is

alarming

rnough

for

the

government

to be on

the

defensive and not allow these forces to grow further. The dis-

sensions

in

the

Congress

(I)

and NC

helped

MUF

in

the

valley.

MUF

remains

far

from

vanquished.

The sizable number of votes

it has

captured

in its

strongholds

of

Baramulla,

Anantnag,

and

Pulwana

districts

suggests

that its

potential

by using religion

to

sway

the

electorate

could not

completely

be

neutralised.

In

practically

all the constituencies

MUF nominees were runners

up.

In

1983,

it

had drawn

a blank.

The

Jammat

is

gaining

new

adherents,

particularly

among

the

youth.9

Dr.

Abdullah

who contested from

the citadel

of Ganderbal

was

involved

in

a

four cornered

context.

There

was

no doubt

in

his

retaining

of

the seat

which his father

ate

Sheikh

Abdullah

also

held.

He was

declared elected

by

22,000

votes

but

the

percentage

fell

from

98.8%

of

the valid votes,

to

78.8%,

with

MUF

polling

nearly

18%. Although

Khan

Sahib,

Uri,

Charie

Sharif

lost,

they

lost

by

slim

margins.

Major reversals inflictedon the two rulingparties included

defeat

of

two

NC

ministers,

Abdul Ahad

Vakil

in

Sopore

and

Abdul

Slama

Deva

in

Homshalibug;

and that of senior

Congress

leader

Trilochan

Dutt in

Jammu

contonment,

and PCC

general

secretary

Dharampal

in

Akhnoor.

Significant

achievements

came

for

MUF

from

Sopore

constituency

where

the

Jammat-e-Islami

leader

Syed

Ali

Shah

Gillani

defeated

Vakil.

Sopore

also

happens

to

be

the

hometown

of

PCC

president

Ghulam

Rasool

Kar.

Unfortunatelyforthe alliance, its inevitable poll victoryhas

come

to be

painted

with

widely

held

doubts about

its

"ethical

legitimacy".

Total

absence

of

post-election

euphoria

at

people's

level,

unlike

in

previous

elections,

indicated

a

cynical

mood

towards

the

election

outcome.

A

young

lawyer

pleaded,

"I

don't

even

pray

regularly.

But

I am

supporting

the MUF

because there

is

nothing

else.

If

you

take

my

vote

away,

I lose all

faith in

Indian

democracy."11

In the end it may be said thatwiththevictoryofthe alliance

Kashmir

is

expected

to be

integrated

in

the

main

political

stream

of

the

country.

It

is

a

victory

of secular

forces.

Much,

however,

would

depend

on

how

the

alliance

in

power

actually

works to

translate

its

promises.



7/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALAAND WEST

BENGAL375

KERALA

Pre-election

cenario

As

in

Jammu

and

Kashmir,

it

is

reported

that

the

electorate

in

Kerala was

totally

confussd

-

right

from

the

start.

The

voters

found

it difficult

the

keep

track of the

political

groupings

and

regroupings.

The

picture

became so

grim

at

one

time

that

it

was

not

clear how

many

groups

were

active

members

of

the

ruling

United

Democratic

Front

(UDF).

The

picture

was

far

from

clearer than what prevailed in 1967 when there was a direct

confrontation

between

the two

major

groups

-

one

led

by

the

Congress

and the other

led

by

CPI

(M).

The

political

scenario

with

Hindu

BJP

combination,

recently

born

Communist

Marxist

Party (CMP),

split

in the Kerala

Congress,

two

factions

of

the

National

Democratic

Party

-

all

beating

their

own

drums

-

totally

confused

the

electorate.

After

a successful

completion

of its

term,

Karunakaran

led - United Democratic Front (UDF) faced serious crisis and

would

have

certainly preferred

a

delayed

poll

on

account

of

differences

revailing

amongst

themselves.

First

Kerala

Congress

was

on the

throes

of

a

factional

dispute

between

revenue

minister

P-

J*

Joseph

and

irrigation

minister

K. M.

Mani

-

each

lead-

ing

a

group.

Secondly,

there

was a

boycott

call

by

Muslim

League

on account

of Babri

Masjid.

Thirdly,

there

were

differen-

ces

in the

Congress

(I)

itself. Thre

was

a

Karunakaran

lobby

which

was

strongly opposed by

young

leaders

belonging

to

erst-

while Anthony Congress.

Chief

Minister

Karunakaran's

announcement

of

ob

reserva-

tions

provoked

resentment

and

criticism,

not

only

from its

own

party

members,

but

also

from

allied

parties

and

UDF

faced

a

severe

threat

of a

split.

He had

announced

that

15%

of

govern-

ment

obs

would

be reserved for

those

with an

annual

income

of

less

than

Rs.

6,400

-

irrespective

of

the

community

they

belong t.

The

decision

was

vehemently

opposed

by

the

Muslim Lea-

gue.

It

believed

that

the

scheme

would

undermine

communal

reservations.

The new

scheme

was

not

expected

to

touch

the



8/31

376

THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F

POLITICAL

SCIENCE

already

existing

reservation

quota

of

50%

of

which

Muslims had

been assured 12% when the new proposal was put into effect.

The Social

Republican Party

(SRP)

also

opposed

the

new reser-

vation

policy.

Similarly,

the

National Democratic

Party

(NDP)

criticized

the reservation

policy

and

warned the

UDF of dire

consequences

if NDP

was

ignored

in

allocation of

seats.

The

SRP

claimed to

represent

Ezhava interests.

However,

the NDP

faction

led

by

P.K.

Narayana

Panicker

severed

its connection

with

the UDF.

He

said,

"How

can we trust the

Chief

Minister

again

or believe

that he

will

implement

15%

economic

reserva-

tion after he election. Will not the Muslim League oppose it

again

and

force

the Chief Minister to

react?"12

Although

NDP

was

not

expected

to

win

any

seat,

it

was still feared

to

have the

potential

to

turn

the

tables

against

the

UDF

candidate

in central

Travancore.

Panicker was the chief of

the Nair

Service

Society

and

UDF

could

not

afford to lose

Nair votes

for UDF

victory.

The

CPI

(M)

led Left Democratic Front

(LDF)

called the reser-

vation

policy

a

shrewed

political

move.

In an atmosphere of resentmentagainst the UDF, BJP and

Hindu

Munnani

groups

joined

hands

against

UDF,

and

were

bent

upon

creating

an

atmosphere

of Hindu

revivalism

in

politics

in

the

State.

BJP

decided not to

ally

with

any

of the

two

-

LDF

or

UDF,

and

contest 60

seats

in

alliance

with the Hindu

Front.

This

alliance

was

expected

to cut

into

the

voting

strength

f

both

the frontsbut

more into

that of

UDF. Hindu

Munnani

organisation

(which

appeared

on

the

scene

during

the

1984

parliamentary

elections)

openly

opposed

the

policies

of the

government. It had its roots n all the constituencies and attracted

people

from

among

the

Nairs.

As an

independent

organisation

it

was

not

feared

to

do

any

harm,

but if it

decided to work

against

candidates

from

other

communities

it

was

expected

to have

effect.

Karunakaran,

himself

belonged

to the

Nair

community

and

feared

the

threat from

Hindu Munnani

force.

He could

not

afford

to

lose

any

Nair vote.

After NDP

parted

company

fromUDF, Karunakaran had no choice but to appease the NDP,

for

Panicker

was

expected

to endorse and

garner

Nair

votes.

Hence,

on

reservation

ssue,

he

said. "We stand

by

the

(cabinet)

decision.

It will

be

implemented

by

the

new

government

and

in

consultation

with

all the

concerned,

a

commission will

be

appoin-



9/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS N

KASHMIR,

ERALAAND WEST BENGAL

377

ted

to

work out

the modalities of

implementation."13

In

view

of

this statement,Panicker reversed his decisions following a written

assurance

given

by

the Chief Minister. UDF

was

thus forced

to

make a

compromise.

The

Congress (I),

apart

from

dependence

on caste

and

communal-based

parties,

was also

being

forced

to

make

compro-

mises on vital issues of

national

importance.

A

section of

the

Congress (I),

therefore,

wanted to

scrap

its

alliance

with

commu-

nal

and

caste-based

parties

and

go

it

alone

in

the

elections.

The

strategy of the Congress (I) was to secure the maximum seats,

and not

depend upon

Muslim

League

or

Kerala

Congress.

It

decided

to contest 75

seats.

In

Kerala

the

Muslim

fundamentalists

were

demanding

their

rightful

position

from the

Congress (I.)

Apart

from

Northern

Kerala

where

they

were

predominant,

they

were

scattered in

all

14-0

constituencies. The

communal

force

of

Ezhava

community

could not be

minimised.

In

a

way,

it

determined

the

political

future of the state. A predominant section of it was with the

Leftists,

but

the elite

group,

managing

the

affairs

of

the

commu-

nity

(SNDP

and

its

political

wing SRP)

was

trying

to

get

closer

to

Congress

(I).

SRP

was the

political

arm

of

Ezhava

community,

which

decided to

leave the

UDF

in

protest

against

the

raw

deal

over

seat

allocation

and

demanded

parity

with

the

NDP.

The

Democratic

Labour

Party

(DLP)

also

threatened

to

leave

the

UDF.

Karuakaran

was

banking

on a

clout

wielded

by

Narayana

Dharmaparipalana

Yogam,

SNDP

chief,

and

M.

K.

Raghavan,

who joined the Congress (I) along with thousand of his

followers.

Karunakaran also

had

to

compromise

with

the

League

in

order

to

make

sure that

he

won

League's

support

to

win

elections.

For

this

he

was

severely

criticized

by

his

own

partymen.

But

he

observed

that he had

to

compromise

in

order

to

get

League's

support

to contest from

Guruvayoor

which

was

predominantly

a

Muslim

constituency

and a

sure

seat

of

the

League.

The State

had

a

powerful

christian

community.

The

christian

dominated

Kerala

Congress

was

divided

and

both

fac-

tions

were

up

against

each

other.

Kerala

Congress

demanded

more

seats

than

Congress

(I)

could

give

and,

it,

therefore,

broke



10/31

378 THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F POLITICAL

SCIENCE

its

electoral

understanding

with the alliance.

Candidates

of

Kerala Congress - Joseph faction (Kerala Congress-J) filed

nominations

against

the

UDF and

also

against

Kerala

Congress

-

Mani

group

(Kerala

Congress-M).

They

were

battling

over

the

'Horse',

symbol

of the

party,

and

fighting

ver

24

seats

that were

allotted to

the

party

as one

unit.

While

finalising

the

list of

condidates,

the

Congress

Parlia-

mentary

Board

(CPB)

dropped

Finance minister

Thachadi

Prabhakaran,

Transport

minister

. K.

Velaydhan,

formerminister

Gangadharan and threeotherMLAs. They weredropped because

of their

alleged

corrupt

image.

Karunakaran

hoped

to

return to

power

on two

arguments.

That his

coalition

government

did the

maximum

possible

good

to

the

maximum

number of

people.

That

despite

his

government

being

a

coalition

of different

parties,

he could

complete

a

full

term

when

the

CPI

(M)

could

not

complete

even three

years

when

Congress

was in

opposition.

UDF also

adopted

both

the

Kerala Congress factions,when on the eve of elections the feud

between

the two

came to an

end,

and both

the

factions

patched

up

their

differences.

Both

Joseph

and

Mani

joined

hands

and

appeared

on

a

common

platform,

putting

an end to

the

specula-

tion

that

each would

try

to

sabotage

the

other's

prospects.

This

came

as

a

relief

o

the

UDF but further

onfused

the

electorate.

Karunakaran

on

his

part

was also

trying

to

placate

all

conceivable

communal

interests

even

when

they

were

seemingly

in conflict with each other. He raised the election slogan that

poverty

had

no

religion,

and used it

to

justify

almost

every

step

he took.

The other

pillar

of

Kerala's

political

drama was

the Left

Democratic

front

(LDF)

led

by

CPI

(M).

The

strategy

of

the

CPI

(M)

was

also to

contest the

maximum

number

of

seats,

thereby

ncreasing

its

voting

percentage

to become

the

biggest

party

in

Kerala.

CPI

(M)

thus

decided

to contest

79 seats

(including 9 Independents). The strategyworked out among the

partners

of

the LDF was to

put

on

commonly acceptable

indepen-

dent

candidates

in

constituencies where

the communal

and

caste

based

groups

had

a

sway.

An

agreement

was

also

reached

bet-

ween

all the

constituents

of

the

LDF

that

it would

field

a

few



11/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND

WEST BENGAL

379

new

eminent

personalities

as

Independents,

as was

done

by

GPI

in 1957 when it backed people like JusticeV. R. Krishna Iyer,

Dr. A.

R.

Menon,

and

Prof.

Joseph

Mundassery

who

became

ministers

n the

first

ommunist

government

ed

by

EMS

Nam-

boodiripad.

CPI

(M)

manifesto

called

to

defeat

the

communal and

casteist

forces

and reiterated

that

it

could have no

alliance

with

any

caste

or communal

group.

The

party

blamed

the

ruling

front for all

the

economic reversals

in

the

State.

It

also

pointed

out that the industrial and

agricultural

production

had come

to

a

standstill

under

the

government.

It

also held

the

view

that

the reservation

policy

was

announced

to

divide

the

people

on

communal

lines.

Communist

Party

State

Secretary,

Vasudevan

Nair

observed

that

his

party

was

in favour

of

maintaining

a

status

quo

on the issue

of communal reservation. He

held

the

view

that

reservation

was

an

allrlndia

issue

which had

to

be

discussed

widely.

He also

opined

that

reservation

was

no

solution

to

th

problems

of

unemployment, poverty

and

economic

back-

wardness.14

The

CPI

(M)

led Leftist

Front was

trying

o

fight

the

elec-

tions

in

a bid

to

capture

power.

E.M.S.

amboodiripad

pinned

his

hopes

on

the

infighting

f

the

Congress

and

the

general

senti-

ments

of

the

people

against

communalism and

failures

of

the

Rajiv

government.

He announced

his

decision

to

support

Independent

candidates

who had left

Congress

(I).

LDF

did

not

have to make any compromises with any faction. It was free

from

party

squabbles

and

rebels.

It

did

face

an

impact

of

the

split-away

group

led

by

M.

V.

Raghavan

who

formed

the

CMP.

However,

CPI

(M)

faced

no

threat of

losing

face

from

other

factions of

LDF

-

Revolutionary

Socialist

Pany

(RSP),

the

Janata

Party,

and

Congress

(S).

It

decided to

keep

away

from

the

regional

and communal

parties.

In

1982

assembly

elections

the

Congress (I)

led

front

under

the leadership of Karunakaran) got 48.23% votes, totalling

46,17,493

voters.

The

CPI

(M)

led

front

ecured

47.24%,

total-

ling

45,23,228

voters.

Thus

by

a

margin

of

94,270

votes

the

Congress

(I)

was

able to retain

power.

These

assembly

figures

were

retained

in

1984 Lok

Sabha

poll.

But

in

1984,

according

11



12/31

380

THE INDIAN

JOURNAL

F POLITICAL

SCIENCE

to

some

observers,

elections were

fought

on

the

sympathy

wave

followingMrs. Gandhi's assassination.

Now

the

list

of voters

had

enlarged by

the

induction

of

younger

elements.15 The

image

of

Rajiv

with women

and

youth

was

a

plus

point

to be

duly

considered#

But communalism

of

all

shades had

influenced the

elections in

a

big way.

The

politi-

cal

inclination

of new

voters

was,

however,

not

known.

The

LDF

hoped

that

the

youth

would

reject

the communal

combina-

tion

of the

UDF. The

increasing

problem

of

unemployment

and

UDF's failure to solve them was also expected to influencethe

voters.

The

LF

thought

that new

generation

of

youth

should

change

the

political

scenario.

Namboodiripad

questioned

if the

new

generation

would behave

the same

way

it did

in

1982

and

1984.

Those

days

the

Marxist

Party

and

the

LDF

led

by

it

were

openly having

deals

with

communal

parties.

But

now

LDF

was

facing

the

electorate

with

an

uncompromising

stance

against

communalism and had

snapped

all its relations with

any

sortof

communal

groups

or

parties.

They

were

optimistic

in view

of

the

significant

gains

made

by

the Leftist

Student

Unions

in

the

campus

elections held

recently.

But

there

was another

side

of

the

picture.

The

expulsion

of the dissident

leader,

V.

Raghavan,

from

CPI

(M)

and the formation of CMP

had

an

adverse

effect

on

the

young

Marxists

in

the student

and

youth

wings

of CPI

(M).

Hence,

in

order to check

resentment

of the

youth

and to

arrest

mass

exodus

from he

party,

the CPI

(M) leadership

allotted

a

size-

able number of seats to student and

youth

leaders in the assem-

bly

elections. Youth in

the

Congress (I)

was,

on

the other

hand

disgruntled.

It had

bee#

allegedly

ignored.

The

entire

youth

Congress (I)

office

bearers

resigned

in

protest.

The

mass

resig-

nations were

later

withdrawn

following

a

personal

plea

by

the

Prime

Minister.

Nevertheless,

the Youth

Congress

(I)

was

tak-

ing

time

in

becoming

active

in

electioneering

even

though

some

Youth

Congress

(I)

leaders were

candidates.

Altogether,

the

youth

voters

could

swing

the balance

either side.

Similarly,

women were

expected

to

swing

the

elections

one

way

or

the

other,

as

they

outnumbered

men

in

voter's

list

in 94

of

140

constitutencies.

According

to the

revised

voter's list

of



13/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND

WEST BENGAL

381

1,59,21,209

voters

in

Kerala, 80,90,993

were

women

who

had

an

overall majorityof 2,60,777 votes.

Towards the end of

electioneering

slight

shift n

LDF

stra-

tegy

was

obvious when

CPI

(M)

General

Secretary

E.M.S. Nam-

boodiripad spoke

of

Indianization,

while

UDF

declared to extend

support

to

the

newly

formed

CMP.

LDF was

trying

to

woo

other

sections of

society

including

Hindu Front

to

offset

grip

over

Muslims and

Christians which

accounted for

42%

of

Kerala's

population.

He

said,

"The

Hindu

Front

has

been

formed

to

safeguard Hindu interests and resistMuslism

-

Christian commu-

nlism.

In

this,

electoral

defeat

of the

Congress

(I)

and

forma-

tion of

an

opposition

government

are

decisive

factors.

The

thinking

sections

among

the

Hindu,

arrayed

behind

the

BJP-

Hindu

Front

axis,

will

realise that

the

way

to

achieve

these

ob-

jectives

is

the

victory

of the

LDF".16

Due

to various inbuilt

problems

in

UDF-infighting

and

bic-

kerings,

emergence

of

rebels,

and

absence

of

sympathy

wave

-

it became

inevitable for

the

Congress (I) president,Rajiv

Gan-

dhi,

to

step

into the election arena. His firstvisit met

with

lukewarm

response

from

the

people.

His

speeches

were

centring

around

Punjab

and

Barnala

and

Jyoti

Basu.

He

was

quiet

on

the

performance

of the

Karunakaran

government.

On

the

one

hand,

he

attacked communal

parties

and,

on

the

other,

he

was

alleged

to have

turned

a

blind

eye

to

the

communal

aspects

of

the

parties

which

were

part

and

parcel

of

the

Congress

(I).

During

his second round of

tour

he

refrained

from

addressing

meetings

in

areas where

communal

parties

in

coalition with UDFwere

contesting,

but concentrated

on

areas

where

Congress

(I)

or

Independent

candidates

backed

by

Congress

(I)

were

in

the

fray.

He asked the

people

to

compare

the

rule

of

the

LDF

with

that of

UDF.

Rajiv pointed

out

that

Rs.

2,000

crores

had

been

earmarked

(which

would be

assisted

by

other

programmes)

to

create

more

jobs

and

employment

in

agricultural

and

industrial

sectors.

He

also

strongly

criticised

the

CPI

(M)

and

said

it

was

only

interested

in

strengthening

the

'cadre

raj'.17

Rajiv

vehe-

mently

maintained that

the

Congress (I)

-

led UDF had givenKerala

during

its rule the

stability

required

in

administration

whicK

the

State had not

witnessed

for a

long

time.

According

to

him,

stability helped

maintain

law

and

order

and

also

led

to

successful

implementation

of

many

developmental

programmes.



14/31

382

THE INDIAN

JOURNAL

F

POLITICAL

SCIENCE

During

his third

and

last tour

of the

State,

the

Prime

Minister

said, "For us, administration is a major tool forbuilding the

nation,

for the

uplift

of the

poor.

The

Marxists

on

the

other

see it as

a

tool

only

for

building

up

their

party

cadre".1*

Addressing

a

rally

in

Trivandrum,

he

attacked

Indianization

thesis

of

Namboodiripad

and

said,

"After

nearly

seven

decades

of

political thought

he

(Namboodiripad)

talks

about

Indianiza-

tion

which was

rejected

even

by

RSS

as

impractical".19

Also,

Rajiv

defended

the

concept

of

Navodaya

schools

everywhere

during

electioneering.

Post-election

eflections

In

Kerala,

Congress

(1)

-

led

ruling

United

Democratic

Front

faced

a

severe

blow

from

the CPM-led

Left

Democratic

Front in

a

close

race.

The

LDF came

to

power,

getting

151,265

votes

more

than UDF.

In

1982

the

UDF

had scored

29,272

votes

more than

LDF.

Of

the total

1,263,280

votes

polled

in

Kerala

Assembly,

the UDF

had

a

share

of

5,482,147

votes

and

LDF

6,633,412.

While

the

UDF

fielded

136 candidates

and won

60 seats, LDF contested for 138 seats and won 76. The Congress

(I)

put

up

74 candidates

to

gain

33 seats or

24.51%

of

valid

votes. CPI

(M)

fielded

68 candidates

and won

36

seats

with

a

^percentage

of

22.32.

Although

it

fell

by

a

margin

of

ust

about

2%

of

votes,

it was

enough

for the

overthrow

of

the

government.

With

this

came

an end of

Congress

(I)

control

of

the

only

South-

ern

State

where it

had its

share

in

administration.

E. K.

Nayanar

took

charge

of

the

LDF

government

fifth ommunist

led

in

30

years.

It

is

for

the

first

time

since

1970

that

the

state

has

a

governmentwithout any section of the Muslim League, Kerala

Congress

or

the

Congress^

Given

the

national

scene,

the LDF

strategypaid

its dividents.

It

wooed

the

youngsters

by

giving

them

party

tickets.

Said

Cheriyan

Philip,

one of

the Youth

Congress

(I)

state

secretaries:

"The

LDF,

especially

the

CPI

(M)

had

fielded

almost 30

young

candidates,

some

of

them

straight

out

of

college.

We,

on

the

other

hand,

were

given

only

5

seats,

which

included

two

sitting

youth

congress

MLAs".20

It

also

successfully played

up

the

delicate issue of law and order situation in the state by pointing

out

police

atrocities

on women

in

Thangmani

village.

The LDF

strategy

was

masterminded

and

spearheaded

by

Nambooridipad,

the CPI

(M)

general

secretary.

LDF

appealed



15/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALAAND WEST BENGAL

383

to the

voters

from

a

secular

and non-communal

platform.

The

Congress (I), on the other hand, fell a prey to its own deeds -

lack

of

cooperation

and

disorganization.

As Karunakaran

would

put

it

"I

take

the

responsibility

for

the

defeat of the

UDF.

It

is,

however,

not

because

of

the

poor

performance

of

the

govern-

ment,

but due

to the internecine

quarrels

between the consti-

tuents

of

the

UDF."21

It had to

spend

a

lot of time

trying

o

balance

the

different

ommunal

and

religious segments

Muslim

League,

Kerala

Congress,

the

Socialist

Republican

Party

(SRP)

and

National

Democratic

Party

(NDP)

which stood

for

Muslims,

Christians,the Ezhavas and the Nairs respectively. The UDF

was further

handicapped

by

its

educational

policy

and

its

stand

on

the

reservation

issue.

Rajiv

agreed

that

the

party

was

not

able

to handle

education

system

which

created

serious

problems

-

and

thus

the

majority

community

felt

strongly.22

The

bickerings

amongst

the

UDF

partners

were

responsible

for

its

downfall.

The

split

in

the Kerala

Congress

came

at the

time of seat

allocation.

Inspite

of their

warm

hand

shake

on

the

eve of

elections,

the

split greatly

damaged

their

prospects

of

victory

-

especially

in the

Travancore

region

where

it

wielded

influence

-

and

they

could

capture

only

9

of

the

23

seats

contested^there.

It is

evident

from the

poll

results

that

the

UDF

failed to evoke a

favourable

response

from

the

people

in its

own

strongholds

-

Travancore

and

Cochin.

It won

only

8 seats out

of 38

in

three

districts of

Trivandrum,

Quilon,

and Ernakulam.

It failed to channelise non-left and non-Marxist

vote

in

its

own

favour.

The

image

of the Prime Minister

had

little

impact

on

the voters.23

Nevertheless,

some

reversals

in the

voting

pattern

are

quite

interesting.

UDF

won

in

communist

bastions

of

Kasargod,

Kozhikode,

and

Palghat

in

the north

and

LDF had victories

in

the

UDF

citadels of central and

southern Kerala.

Total

rejection

of

the Nair-based NDP and

Ezhava-based

SRP

and the

Kerala

Congress

indicates

a

severe setback

to forces

of

communal

politics.

The defeat of the Muslim League in Cochin

-

Travancore

belt

clearly

suggests

that the

electorate was

not

willing

to vote

for

theological

issues. The

Indian

Union Muslim

League's

(IUML)

representation

shrunk

from 18

to

15,

that

of

Kerala

Congress

from

16

to

9.

The

emergence

of

Hindu-vote

bank

was

another



16/31

384

THE INDIAN

JOURNAL

F POLITICALSCIENCE

TABLE

-

1

Kerala

Party

Position

4

The

following

is

the

detailed

election board for

Kerala:

Contested

Won Votes

Per-

polled

centage

Congress

(I)

74 33

3,074,922

24.51

IUML 23 15 991,236 7.90

KC

(J)

13 5

450,392

3.59

KC

(M)

10 4

425,378

3.39

NDP

9

1

281,881

2.24

SRP

4 nil

154,450

1.23

UDF-Ind.

3

2

103,888

0.82

Total for UDF 136 60 5,482,147 43.70

CPI

(M)

68

36

2,800,938

22.32

CPI

(M)

Ind.

9

4

373,810

2.98

CPI

(Inc.

1

Ind)

26

17

1,073,382

8.55

Congress

(S)

14

6

511,727

4.07

Janata

12

7

482,212

3.84

RSP 7 5 313,004 2.49

Lok

Dal

2

1

78,339

0.62

Total

for LDF

138 76

5,633,412

44.91

BJP-Hindu

Munnani

122

nil

812,915

6.48

Communist

Marxists

86

1

140,483

1.11

Independents

750

1

474,569

3.78

(Cong-I

rebel)



17/31

ASSEMBLY LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND WEST BENGAL

385

important

feature of these elections.

Hindu

awareness

was

mili-

tant to recognise Namboodiripad as a better Hindu than

Karunakaran.

However,

the

"third-front"

which

comprised

of

the

BJP

and

the

Hindu Munnani

failed to secure

any

seat.

The

group

was

vehemently

decried as

communal

by

the

LDF.

In

the

new

Kerala

ministry

here

are

8

woman

as

opposed

to

five

in the

last

assembly.

In

1982

elections,

15

women

were

fielded

as

oppose

to

34 this time. There are now

48

new

faces

and 61

members from

the

dissolved

house

-

including

9 members

fromthe Karunakaran ministry. In the assembly of 138 seats,

LDF

bagged

76 seats while

UDF could

only

caputure

60 seats.

One seat

each

went

to Communist Marxists

and

Independents

(Congress-I rebels).

LDF's

foremost

task would be

to consolidate

its

position,

review the

working

of

traditional

industries,

maintain

law

and

order in

the

state,

introduce correctives

in educational

institu-

tions and

administration,

and

foremost

of

all,

curb

the

process

of

communalization in the state.

It

may

be worthwhile

to recall

here that in

1982,

LDF

was

voted out

of

power

because

of its lack of control over

the activi-

ties of

the

Centre for

Indian Trade

Unions

(CITU).

Now

that

LDF

is back in

power

again,

it

must

make sure to

organise

CITU.

Further

LDF

should also ensure

that it is

in

officefor

a

full

term

This is

even more

important

in

view of the

Lok

Sabha

elections

in

1989.

WEST

BENGAL

Pre-election

cenario

Like

Kerala,

West

Bengal

also

posed

a

challenge

to

Rajiv,

where

preparations

for elections

for

Assembly

had

already begun

as

early

as

from

28

November,

1986,

when

the

Left

Front issued

its

manifesto,

and

where

354 lakh

voters,

incommunicative

as

never

before,

were

to vote for

294

seats

in the

Assembly

elections.

Rajiv plunged

into

the

electioneering arena with

a

team

of

young

Congressmen

and said

that

he

was

fully

prepared

to

give

the

CPI

(M)

a

tough

fight.

"He

(Jyoti

Basu)

will

say

that he

will

win,

but

I

will

say

I

will

win and that is what

you

call

parlia-

mentary

democracy,"

said

the

Prime

Minister.25

The

Congress

(I)



18/31

386

THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F

POLITICAL

CIENCE

decided

to contest

all

the

294

Assembly

seats

including

three in

the Darjeeling district.

One

certainly

witnessed

a

delay

in

selection

and

finalisation

of

Congress

(I)

candidates.

PCC(I)

and AICG

could

not

arrive

at

a

unanimous

consensus

over choice of

candidates.

There

was

a definite

ir

of

confusion

and

conflict.

Dispute

over

loyalists

and

former

Congressmen

who

opposed

Mrs. Indira

Gandhi fur-

ther

delayed

the

finalisation

of the

list. But

this in

no

way

shook

the

confidence

of

the

Congress

(I)

which

was

agile

in

constituting

the State Pradesh Ejection Committee in Februarry,1987. How-

ever

low-keyed

was

its

movement,

it

was

still

roaring

with

optimism

"We

do

not want

to emulate

the

CPI(M)

which

took

out

procession

on

the

very day

the

polls

were

announced in

November,

1984.

As

a result their

campaign

peaked

before

polling

day

and

we

gained,"

remarked

a

Congress

(I)

General

Secretary.26

The

Congress

Parliamentary

Board

abandoned

its

earlier

criterionof selecting candidates on their winning prospects and

loyalty

to

the

party,

because such

a

criterion

nly

resulted

n

poor

performance

n 1982.

Congress

(I)

decided to

give

chance

to all

Congress

MLA's.

"We

have

decided not to

disturb

the

sitting

MLA's.

All

of

them would

be

nominated,"

said

AICC(I)

obser-

ver,

R.

L.

Bhatia.27

It also

decided

to

nominate

more

young

nen,

particularly

professionals

as

candidates for

the

election

fray.

Representation

of

youth

was ensured.

A

senior

Congress

(I)

leader

said,

"The move

was

apparently

designed

to

pave

way

for a regeneration of the party long dominated by leaders who

belong

to

the

pre-Independence

era".28

This

was

reflected n

the

lists

of

candidates

of

both the

CPI(M)

and

Congress

(I).

Elections

came

as

a

tough fight

in

West

Bengal

both

for

Rajiv

anil

his

party.

The

challenge

emanated

from

the

fact

that

the

CPI

(M)

was

geared

for

elections under

its

experienced

leadership.

Many

of

its leaders

had

been

associated

with

the

communist

movement

since its

beginning

in

India.

They

had

been in the partywhen it was in opposition and lived with the

party

in

its

ups

and downs.

Although

splits

in

Communist

movements,

rise

of Naxalites

and

changes

in

the

socialist

world

outside

India

were

a cause of

concern,

Jyoti

Basu's

personal

charisma

and

popularity

did

help

the CPI

(M) gain

its

vigour.



19/31

ASSEMBLY LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND

WEST

BENGAL387

West

Bengal

had been free from

communal

trouble for the

last decade when people had spent peaceful time as compared to

the

years

1972

and

1977

during

the

Congress

rule.

There

were

no

caste

conflictsnor

there were

reported any

police

atrocities.

"In

my

assessment

our

significant

uccess

lies in

ensuring

democratic

rights

and civil liberties to

the entire

community

and all

political

parties.

These

rights

and liberties

were

ruthlessly

taken

away

by

the

previous

Congress regime.

Our

government

has done

best

to

safeguard

the interest

of the

minorities,

harijans,

scheduled

castes

and

tribes

and the hill

people.

Our

thrust on rural

acti-

vities has yielded results. Our accent on urban development

has also

produced

positive

results,

lthough

in

some

fields we

are

yet

to

go

a

long

way

said

Jyoti

Basu

in

an

interview

to the

Statesman

Calcutta.29

He

also confessed

that

"

the

situa-

tion

in

some

of

the

industrial belts

...

is

unsatisfactory

primarily

because

of

wrong

and

unfavourable

policies

of

the

Centre. The

funding

pattern

of

the

Centre

in

respect

of

industrial

reconstruc-

tion

is

totally

faulty..."30

Rajiv's main aim of electioncampaign was to bringCongress

(I)

back to

power

in

West

Bengal

and

rout

the

leftists.

How-

ever,

he

was

cautious not

to

upset

the

electorate

which

he

believed

to be more

pro-left.

He

said,

"sometimes

I

think

why

do we

fight

t

all."31 He

gave

a

call

to

break

the

Communist

citadel

and

promised

the birth

of Nutan

Bangla

(New

Bengal).

He

said,

"Today

West

Bengal

deserves

our

special

attention

because

in the

last

10

years

it

has

lagged

behind

in

all

spheres.

We

shall

spare

no

effort o

build

a

Nutan

Bangla.

Our

efforts

have begun. My personal effort oo ... We have kept aside Rs.

1000 crores to build

a

Nutan

Bangla

and

take it

along

the

road

of

prosperity.

I

assure

you

all

I

shall

make

every

effort

nd

lay

special emphasis

on

Bengal's

development

so

that

Bengal

forges

ahead

of

all

other

states. You

have

to

strengthen

he

Congress,

you

have

to ensure the

victory

of

our

candidates

and

help

form

Congress

led

government

because

only

then

will

Bengal

be

able

to

move

ahead

at a

faster

pace."32

The

Prime

Minister,

on

his

part,

also

blamed

the

Left

Front for

misappropriation

of

Central

funds.

The

Congress (I)

manifesto

was

full

of

promises

made

with

a

view to transform

West

Bengal

into a

New

Bengal.

It

promised

to create

more

obs,

to

remove

poverty

in

villages,

and

to

im-

12



20/31

388

THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F

POLITICAL CIENCE

prove

the standard

of farmers.

The

Congress (I),

if it formed

a

government,would implement the 20 point programmeof Rajiv

Gandhi and

achieve the

targets

of Seventh

Five

Year Plan.

It

said

that

the land

ceiling

Act

would also

be

reconsidered.

Gha-

ni

Khan

Choudhary

had earlier

declared,

"The centre would never

let

West

Bengal

down.

Mr.

Rajiv

Gandhi means what

he

says.

All

projects

announced and

assistance assured

will

be realised

in

the near

future."33

The

Congress

(I)

launched

its election

campaign

simultane-

ously in the districts and the cities. Rajiv said that the elections

in

West

Bengal

would be a

referendum nd

a

peoples'

verdict

on

10

years

rule

of

the

Left,

its failures

and successes.

He

appealed

to

the

people

to

throw

the

"cadre

raj"

and

replace

it

with

"peoples'

raj".

Addressing

a

meeting,

he

said,

"The

only

pri-

ority

of

the

Left

Front in the

last

10

years

has

been

to

strengthen

the

cadres

which

have

penetrated every

walk

of

life

in

the

state.

If

cadre

raj

continues,

everything

in

West

Bengal

will

be des-

troyed,

all

institutions will

collapse."34

He further

said

that

people had been blaming the Centre forall its backwardness: the

time

had

now come

when

they

should

exercise

their

right judge-

ment

and

bring

Congress (I)

back

to

power.

Congress

(I)

felt

uneasy,

not

only

because

of

the

superior

organisational

capacity

of the

CPI

(M),

its

electioneering

mano-

uevres

and

its

undenied

strength

t the

grassroots

evel,

but

also

because

of

the

upcoming

of

dissident

Congress (I)

members

who

assembled

under

the

banner

of

Rashtriya

Samajbadi

Congress

under the leadership of formerUnion Finance Minister,Pranab

Mukherjee.

The

Central

Parliamentary

Board

(CPB)

of

the

Janata

Party

believed

that

Mukherjee's party

had

come

up

asan

effective

hird

force

n the

politically

polarised

state.

The

Janata

Party

had

declared to

forge

an alliance with

Pranab

Mukherjee's

party.

The

CPI

(M)

appealed

to the

electorate

to recall

any

of

the

tall

promises

made

by

the

Congress

(I)

in the

past

that

were

fulfilled. The grant by the Centre to the State of Rs. 1007

crores

had

already

become

a

serious

subject

of

dispute

between

the

Centre

and West

Bengal.

Centre's

promise

to resume

the

project

on

Budge

Namkhana

railway

line

found

no

place

in

Madhav

Rao

Scindia's

railway

budget.

The

feeling

that

money



21/31

ASSEMBLY

LECTIONS

N

KASHMIR,

ERALA

AND

WEST

BENGAL

389

was

being

offered

to

buy

the

votes,

was

spreading

like

wild

fire.

Thus Prime Minister's remarks received a severe rebuttal from

Jyoti

Basu.

He

said,

"Why

doesn't

the

Congress

first reate a

New

Bihar or

New

Uttar

Pradesh,

places

where it is

in

office.

The

Congress

has

no

right

to

utter such

words."35

He

said that

the

Prime

Minister

was

himself

devoting

so

much time

in

West

Bengal

because

none of

his

party

leaders

commanded

credibility

among

the

people,

which

certainly

underlined

the

weakness

of

the local

leadership.

In

reply

to the Prime

Minister's

statement

that

the

Chief Minister

had become

old and

should

now

retire,

Jyoti

Basu said, "First I will see him out of politics and then

retire.

It

isdangerous

for the

country

to

have

a

Prime

Minister

like Mr. Gandhi

who

simply

does not

know

how

to

speak

the

truth."36

The

issues

that

the

Left

Front

put

before

the

electorate

were

peace

and not communal

and caste

disturbances,

the

indispensa-

bility

of the Left

in view

of

10-year

rule

without

any

sign

of

weaknesses,

need

for

continued

political

stability,

the

desirability

of rejuvenation of state economy, removal ofregional imbalances

and

economic

development.

He talked

of

Left

Front

as

the

champion

of

social

and economic

equality.

Basu

also

took

a

nationalistic

stance.

His

appeal

to the

people

was

in

national

perspective.

"We

want

every

state

to

develop

equally.

But

our

complaint

is

why

should

Bengal

be

discriminated

against?

Why

should

Centre

keep

turning

down the

industrial

projects

we

propose?"37

He

also did

not

refrain

from

commenting

that,

"Prime

Minister

is

taking

recourse to

limitless

untruth

and

end-

less false promises. This is surprising. His mother had taken

years

to

go

that

way

but

the

young

Prime

Minister

had

lost

no

time

to

adopt

such

techniques."38

An

election

booklet

entitled "An

appeal

to

the

people

of

West

Bengal"

issued

by

the State

CPI

(M),

accused

Rajiv

Gandhi

of

shielding

the

anti-national

and

terrorist-activitiesf

the

Gorkha

National

Liberation

Front

(GNLF)

workers,

despite

the

declared

shift

in

the

party's

stand

on the

issue

following

discussions

between Rajiv and JyotiBasu. They expressed the apprehension

that

the

Centre

might

allow

carving

of

separate

Gorkhaland

after

elections.

While

the

CPI

(M)

did

not

want

t

make

Gorkhaland

an election

issue

as the

question

of

preserving

the

country's

unity

and

integrity

was

involved

with

it,

the

party

explained

that

it



22/31

390

THE

INDIAN

JOURNAL

F POLITICAL

SCIENCE

spoke

on Gorkhaland

only

"to

satisfy

the

people

who

want

to

know about the Ghising-Gandhi entente."39

Thus

the electorate was

lft

totally

confused

on the

eve of

elections.

A

commoner,

said,

that

he

was

unhappy

with

the

programme

of

the Left

Front,

but

doubted

if the

Congress

(I)

could come back

to

power.

He

said,

"I

will not waste

my

vote

this time."40

People

did not seem to

have

enough

faith

in

the

Congress (I).

The vote from the minoritiesalso appeared divided. There

were

those

who

supported

the rule

of

the Left

Front

government

and

there

was

a

section of

those

who were

disappointed

with

the

rule

of

the

Left

Front. A sect

of Muslims

criticised

the CPI

(M)

for

opposing

the

Muslim

Divorce

Bill.

"The

Communists

were

trying

to dilute our

identity

by opposing

Rajiv

government's

decision

to

leave

us alone with

our

personal

problems

and

laws,"

said Maulana

Wazir Ahmed.41

Said

another

Maulana,

"Do

not

vote for

a

leader

who

attacked our

law

and

who

does

not believe

in God. A few more years of communism and you will be

punished

even

for

saying your

prayers.

Rajiv

is

bad,

but

he is

God

fearing."42

However

another

sect

of Muslims

preferred

he

Left rule

in

West

Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal

Documents

Transcript of Assembly Elections in Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal