“We Must Work Tirelessly to Instill a Political Culture”

Legalistic Aspirations and Realities in Kyrgyzstan

Asher J. Kohn Dec. 2, 2011

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Part I: Introduction & Background

Kyrgyzstan‟s turn of independence in 1991 was in many ways not a welcome one. The

Soviet Socialist Republic of Khirghizia was the second poorest of all the USSR‟s republics upon

breakup, and a March 1991 referendum saw 88.7% of Kyrgyzstani voters approve a proposal to

remain within the Russian Federation.1 It was no matter; Askar Akayev became the first

president of a new Republic of Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991.2 A new Constitution was

approved in 1993, which would be updated in 1996, 2004 and 2007.3 Even in 2005, as Akayev

was swept out of power by a coalition of fellow politicians, the 1993 Constitution remained.4 It

wasn‟t until the 2010 riots that chased new President Kurmanbek Bakiev out of power that a

wholly new Constitution was formed.5

This new constitution, approved by referendum in July 2010, represents if not a clean

break with the past, then certainly a different tack.6 While keeping old legislation intact, it moves

Kyrgyzstan to a parliamentary system where the Prime Minister, not President, is the head of

government.7 However, this constitution is also a strongly aspirational document, defining

1 Genevieve Gunow, Recurring Themes in the Kyrgyz Revolutions, Vestnik: The Journal of Russian and Asian

Studies (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.sras.org/recurring_themes_in_the_kyrgyz_revolutions. 2 Kyrgyzstan‟s official title is The Kyrgyz Republic. The region was incorporated into the Russian Empire as

Kirgizia, was known as the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR, and announced its 1991

independence as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. It changed its name to the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993. An alternative

transliteration is Khirghizstan, which can still be found on some documents. For the sake of sorely-needed

simplification, this paper will refer to the country as Kyrgyzstan and its citizens as Kyrgyzstanis. 3 An electronic version of the 2007 Constitution can be found in English translation at http://aceproject.org/ero-

en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view via ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 4 U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Kyrgyzstan‟s Constitutional Crisis: Context and Implications for U.S.

Interests” (RS22546; Jan. 5, 2007), by Jim Nichol. Accessed: Dec. 1, 2011. This 2005 event that took Akayev from

power and installed Kurmanbek Bakiyev in his stead is popularly called the Tulip Revolution. 5 OSCE observers back Kyrgyzstan referendum, BBC News (Jun. 28, 2010), available at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10432243. 6 Id. It should be mentioned that the referendum installing the new Constitution took place during ethnic clashes in

the south of the country that saw nearly 1,000 dead and 100,000-400,000 refugees. See, “Where is the Justice?”,

Human Rights Watch (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/92408/section/1. 7 Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jun. 24, 2010), available at

http://kyrgyzstan.carnegieendowment.org/2010/06/kyrgystan%E2%80%99s-new-constitution/.

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Kyrgyzstan as it wishes the country be.8 The newly elected President Almazbek Atambaev is

expected to revert rule of law back to presidentialism and, in effect, authoritarianism.9 The future

that this Constitution reaches out to is still ill-defined.

During the drafting process, Nurlan Sadykov stated that in the new Constitution, “[t]he

prime minister will be accountable to the parliament and the parliament will be accountable to

the electorate, the people.”10 This paper will demonstrate how the aspirational Constitution of

Kyrgyzstan is not quite able to answer Sadykov‟s proposition. The paper begins by looking at the

construction of civil society in order to display the vibrancy of non-governmental life in the

country. Then, this paper will briefly survey the elite class of Kyrgyzstan, demonstrating that the

same actors in power at the fall of the USSR are still in power today through an explicit

combination of cooperative measures and exclusionary tactics. Finally, this paper will look at

governmental accountability in two parts, as posited in Sadykov‟s above quote. First, it will

examine the legal and illegal means through which parliament keeps a check on the head of state.

Second, it will examine the relationship between parliament (called “Jogorku Kenesh” in

Kyrgyz, a term that will be used interchangeably with “Parliament” in this paper) and the

Kyrgyzstani people, showing how repression interplays with binding ties to create something

well short of pure accountability.

Simply put, the legal norms in Kyrgyzstan are not quite level with its Constitution. By

exhibiting the difference between civil society‟s and the elite players‟ methods of self

governance, this paper will demonstrate the carrying conceptions and selective enforcement of

8 An aspirational constitution has a “forward-looking viewpoint” that “defines a nation in terms of its future, its

goals and its dreams.” See, Kim Lane Scheppele, “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for

Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models” 1 INT‟L J. CONST. L. 296, 299 (2003). 9 Quoting Eric McGlinchy in Daisy Sindelar, Hopes for Stability as Kyrgyz Presidential Vote Approaches,

Eurasianet.org (Oct. 29, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64406. 10

David Trilling, New Kyrgyz Constitution Strong on Promises, Vague on Checks and Balances, Eurasianet.org

(May 4, 2010), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/60985; Nurlan Sadykov is the director of the Institute

for Constitutional Policy and one of the framers of the Constitution.

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rule of law. By testing intra-governmental and intra-state accountability, this paper hopes to

show that though the underpinnings of a parliamentary democracy exist, the finished product is

not quite where it purports to be. The Constitution is used throughout the paper to reflect and

diverge from the range of anthropological, sociological, journalistic, and analytical accounts

collated to construct an image of Kyrgyzstani life. By comparing Constitutional articles to the

Kyrgyzstani reality, the gap between the two can be more accurately defined.

Part II: Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan

In October 10, 2010, the one hundred twenty members of the Jogorgu Kenesh met for the

first time as a political body.11 President Roza Otunbayeva spoke to the parliamentarians about

the violence of the spring, national unity, and the role of the interim government.12 She closed

her remarks by encouraging the government present and future to become the country their

constitution promises. “We must work tirelessly to instill a political culture” to match the

constitution, she announced.13

The concern over creation of political culture, while absolutely valid, seems strange at

first blush. This part will demonstrate that arguing, compromising, and making group decisions

is part of Kyrgyzstani culture. Civil society in Kyrgyzstan is strong, quite stronger than in any of

the four other post-Soviet Central Asian states.14 However, the heterogeneity of Kyrgyzstan does

not always work in concert with state concretization, as different groups come to consensuses in

different venues. The rural and urban spheres are quite distinct in Kyrgyzstan and each has their 11

President Otunbayeva‟s Address to the Jogorku Kenesh, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Nov. 10,

2010), available at http://kyrgyzstan.carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/president-otunbayevas-address-to-the-

jogorku-kenesh/. 12

Id. 13

Id. 14

Tiago Ferreira Lopes, Will Kyrgyzstan‟s Tulip Revolution dye or blossom?, Strategic Outlook (October 1, 2011),

available at http://www.strategicoutlook.org/2011/10/will-kyrgyzstan%E2%80%99s-tulip-revolution-dye-or-

blossom/.

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own bustling civil society institutions. The dynamics of civil society in Kyrgyzstan can be seen

in the 2005 and 2010 protests, where revolt came not from the center, but from various segments

of this robust, if inchoate, societal movement.15

A. Rural Civil Society

Rural Kyrgyzstan can be portrayed as a hardscrabble, bleak, landscape hedging closer to

a Cormac McCarthy novel than a complicated home to approximately 3.5 million of

Kyrgyzstan‟s 5.5 million people.16 A 2008 New York Times article, typical of the genre, begins

with “[i]n this remote corner of the former Soviet Union, life has shrunk to the size of the basics:

tomatoes; corn; apricot tress; baby goats.”17 It goes on to describe a shuttered toothbrush factory,

bride kidnapping, a burned thatch roof, and ends with “a round, course loaf of bread.”18 It is true

that pastoral rights are enshrined in the constitution, and a visitor may see ancient rites in the

heavily agricultural and shepherding economy.19 This would ignore the prevalence of cell

phones, technology, and the 21st Century interpretations of Soviet kolkhoz communities.20 Rural

communities have proven resilient, remaining largely self-sufficient without much tampering

15

Noah Tucker, Kyrgyzstan at 20: What Now?, Registan.net (Sep. 28, 2011), available at

http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/09/28/kyrgyzstan-at-20-what-now/. 16

Population statistics from World Population to Exceed 9 Billion by 2050, United Nations (Mar. 11, 2009),

available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf; Sixty-five percent

figure from Local Infrastructure Investments Improve Life in Kyrgyz Villages, The World Bank (Jun. 2007),

available at

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21358516~menuPK:47540

51~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html. 17

Sabrina Tavernise, In a Kyrgyz Garden, Unburied Soviet Memories, New York Times (May 15, 2008), available

at

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/world/asia/15kyrgyz.html?ex=1211515200&en=c93a3e4642d55784&ei=5070

&emc=eta1. 18

Id. 19

“Land may also be in private, municipal, and other forms of ownership except for pastures which may not be in

private property.” See, The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic [Hereinafter: “Const.”] Art. XII, §5; Tengrism, the

“monotheist natural religion whose last traces would be found in shamanism” has a society in Bishkek with 500,000

members. Akayev called it the “national and „natural‟ religion of the Turkic peoples [spanning from East Turkestan

in China to Turkey].” See, Marlene Laruelle, Tengrism: In Search For Central Asia‟s Spiritual Roots, Central Asia –

Caucasus Institute (Mar. 22, 2006), available athttp://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3837. 20

Scott Radnitz, WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY: PREDATORY REGIMES AND ELITE-LED PROTESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

215 (Cornell University Press) (2010), [Hereinafter “WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY”].

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from or movement towards urban space.21

There has not been widespread urbanization in

Kyrgyzstan.22 The heads of family will go to the provincial center for market weekly or monthly

and there are economic ties, but political and legal realities are far different.23

Rural villages outside provincial centers are administered by a kommissar, nominated by

the provincial governor who is in turn nominated by the Jogorku Kenesh.24 The kommissar is

usually a relatively young party member who has ties to that village, but he is also often the only

government presence in town.25

The judiciary is represented by aksakal courts. The word aksakal literally means “white

beard,” and is used as synecdoche to classify the oldest, wisest man in the village.26 In aksakal

courts, two or more parties in disagreement agree to take their case to an elder instead of to a

state court and his decision becomes the law.27

Then-President Akayev created the aksakal courts in 1995 to, according to his speech,

bring back an integral part of Kyrgyz communal life.28 It is just as likely the aksakals were

21

In this paper, “resilience” is defined in the socio-ecological sense as “the capacity of a system to absorb

disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure,

identity, and feedbacks.” See, Brian Walker, C.S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter, and Ann Kinzig, “Resilience,

Adaptability, and Transformability in Social-ecological Systems” ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 9, No. 2, Art. 5

(2004), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/. 22

In 1989, 38.2% of Kyrgyzstanis lived in urban areas. That proportion fell to 35.4% by 1999. See, Martin Schuler,

Migration Patterns of the Population of Kyrgyzstan, Espace Populations Societés §5 (Jan. 2007). 23

“In order to go to Talas [the provincial center] we would have to pay 80 Som [the state currency, equal to approx.

$2] in all and come home with an empty stomach.” Interview by Judith Beyer. See, Judith Beyer, “Imagining the

State in Rural Kyrgyzstan: How Perceptions of the State Create Customary Law in the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts”

MAX-PLANK-GESELLSCHAFT (2007) at 4. Beyer‟s work on aksakal courts is both fascinating and vital to

understanding law in rural Kyrgyzstan. 24

Emil Alymkulov and Murat Kulatov, Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic, Local Governments in Eastern

Europe, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, at 571, available at

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN008037.pdf 25

Beyer, “Imagining the State” at 4. 26

Id. at 2. There can be more than one aksakal in a village and there are instances of women taking on this role. 27

Id. at 8. Aksakal courts administer common law and run parallel to the country‟s civil code. The sources for this

common law are traditional, often pieced together from Tengrist beliefs, Islamic Law, Imperial Russian codes,

Soviet memories, and more than a pinch of whole-cloth inventions. Attempts at codification have not been

successful. See, Judith Beyer, “Revitalization, Invention, and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts:

Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History” 53 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 141, 142 (2006). 28

Beyer, “Imagining the State” p. 8. “Create” is the correct word, as Akayev took a vague, if living, tradition and

codified it in a way that would give state control. The concept of “invented tradition” dovetails with this nicely. See,

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established in law to allay a swell of cases swamping the state courts.29 The introduction of

aksakal courts rapidly led to their domination of the rural legal field.30

Most Kyrgyzstanis do not

have the money or time to travel and have their case heard by the state courts in the provincial

center.31 Local self governance is a right enshrined in the constitution, as local communities are

allowed to “independently resolve the matters of local significance” and they may do this “either

directly or through local self governance bodies.”32 Even though the aksakal putatively ranks

below the mayor, he likely had a large part in the mayor‟s education and upbringing in a society

where deference to age is paramount.33

Low levels of state intrusion go hand-in-hand with this constitutional precept of rural

autonomy. There are government-provided pensions and government-sponsored work, but most

public goods are provided by voluntary labor aid institutions called ashars.34 These loose,

informal bands of men and women will clean streets, repair canals, and the like as well as take

part in the more stereotypical Kyrgyzstani art of gossiping at a chaikhana.35 Leaders of these

ashars, rather than the kommissars are known to step in to help solve inter-communal issues such

as water sharing agreements.36

Benedict Anderson, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM, Verso

(1983). 29

Beyer, “Imagining the State” p. 9. 30

Id. At 8. 31

Id. at 4. 32

Const. Art. 110, §1, 3. 33

Beyer, “Imagining the State” at 15. 34

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 44. Words will be pluralized according to English custom in this paper for

simplicity‟s sake. I do not wish to confuse my audience with Kyrgyz or Russian grammar. 35

Id.; Defining and Measuring Social Capital in Kyrgyzstan, Community Action for Health in Kyrgyzstan at 4,

available at

http://www.cah.kg/reports/Defining%20and%20Measuring%20Social%20Capital%20in%20Kyrgyzstan.pdf.

“Chaikhana” translates literally as “teahouse”. They function as social gathering places, with different segments of

societies informally selecting “their” teahouse, much the same way a bar or coffeeshop functions in the United

States. See generally, Defining and Measuring Social Capital in Kyrgyzstan, supra note 35. 36

Justin Vela, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Is Batken Province Central Asia‟s Next Flashpoint?, Eurasianet (Jun. 7,

2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63640.

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Civil society has made Kyrgyzstani rural communities far more self-sufficient than the

rurality elsewhere in the region, but, as described later,37 this autonomy has made them

susceptible to later co-option by the local leaders who have made their way to Bishkek.38 While

rural Kyrgyzstan is indeed traditional, actors in rural society have been able to use rapidly

changing legal and political tools to coalesce into society and interact with the state.

B. Urban Civil Society

Kyrgyzstan‟s population is 35% urban and its main cities of Osh, Jalalabad, and Bishkek host

internationally-ranked universities, non-governmental organizations, and all of the institutions,

formal or not, of Kyrgyzstan intelligentsia.39 “Business start-ups and artist collectives…are

staring to sprout across Bishkek,” turning the city into “the Berlin of Central Asia,” and there is a

level of entrepreneurialism and a discourse befitting an ethnically and economically

heterogeneous capital.40 In this context, though, the subdivisions, and the leaders of these

subdivisions, form the structure of urban society.

Cities are subdivided into mahallas, from an Arabic word for “neighborhoods.”41 Unlike

the word or the concept as used in the United States (outside of gated communities), Kyrgyzstani

mahallas are walled in and mixed-use.42 Mahallas are run by a person known as the dumashni,

37

See infra, Part V, §B(3) “Descending Ties” at 29. 38

Bishkek is the capital and largest city of Kyrgyzstan. 39

“For a relatively small city, the number of major universities and technical schools in Bishkek gives it the feel

almost of place like Boston, and a number of these universities produce talented graduates whose diplomas are

recognized around the world.” See, Kyrgyzstan at 20, supra note 15. 40

Christopher Schwartz, Bishkek, the Berlin of Central Asia? Part 1 – Namba.kg, Neweurasia.net (Sep. 19, 2011),

available at http://www.neweurasia.net/business-and-economics/bishkek-the-berlin-of-central-asia-part-1-namba-

kg/. 41

Martin Gramatikov, Do Mahalla Committees and Aksakal courts promote access to justice in Central Asia?,

Access to Justice Blog (Mar. 20, 2011), available at http://ma2j.wordpress.com/2011/03/20/do-mahalla-committees-

and-aksakal-courts-promote-access-to-justice-in-central-asia/. 42

Mahallas only have a few gates in or out and contain markets, restaurants, and utilities as well as homes. This

system of regulation and protection had dramatic consequences in Osh when riots turned violent in 2010. See, Noah

Tucker, Osh, Part I: City of Echo Chambers, Registan.net (Jun. 21, 2011),

http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/06/21/osh-part-1-city-of-echo-chambers/.

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komitet raisi, or mahalla raisi.43 Organization and upkeep of the mahalla is his responsibility, but

he must also take the temperature of local politics and attempt to restrain any unwelcome

political activity by going from house to house or chaikhana to chaikhana to talk to individuals

and censure unrestrained speech.44

There have been noted tensions between the mahalla raisis, when civil law has smashed

into community standards.45 “By law, we can‟t kick people out,” said one rais, “but sometimes

we must break the law to maintain traditions.”46 These conflicts are commonplace in a country

with aspirational laws; particularly when international aid organizations criticize a practice.47 It is

far easier for the state government to change the law then to change the practice. This is not to

say that all traditional jurisprudence should be gawked at or criticized, just that international

standards are not always as standard as its promulgators may hope. The friction between

international norms and local practices are to be expected and eventually marginalized, not

ignored.

A man named Zaibiddin has made it his goal to form a more Islamic society in his

mahalla in Osh.48 When asked about his philanthropic works, he simply stated, “I help because

the government does not.”49 In other mahallas and in different cities, politicians running for

elected office believe the best medicine is a bit more base. Radnitz describes an Election Day

43

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 45. Switching between Russian, Kyrgyz, and other languages can happen from

neighborhood to neighborhood and for seemingly arbitrary reasons. The lack of a monolithic language has the

byproduct of confusing the terminology in this paper. 44

Id. 45

Do Mahalla Committees and Aksakal courts promote access to justice in Central Asia?, supra note 41. 46

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 50. 47

“Revitalization, Invention, and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts” at 142. Although it is in the

context of Afghanistan, not Kyrgyzstan, Joshua Foust‟s foreigner perspective on the disconnect between practice

and regulation is apt, “The crime here is not that a law is being passed to normalize a routine practice; it is that this

was a routine practice and we chose not to care about it in the first place.” Joshua Foust, Just How Much do We Not

Get it?, Registan.net (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/04/05/just-how-much-do-

we-not-get-it/. 48

Zaibiddin elected not to give his full name to the anthropologist. This is a common occurrence, as is anonymous

sourcing, in the secondary sources. 49

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 90.

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atmosphere by explaining that, “Vodka was poured liberally, especially for local elders, whose

influence was disproportionately large.”50 Elites who wish to build a power base go through these

dumashnis.51 There is some bombast to these leaders and their claims, as can be seen when

national politics interfere with their localized spheres. The aforementioned Zaibiddin can talk

about how he wants Sharia law in Kyrgyzstan, but it is well understood that “to have answered

[the 2005 unrest]…with a call to jihad would have struck most Kyrgyzstanis as ridiculous.”52

Another Osh dumashni who promised a compatriot that his mahalla would protest and who

personally paid drivers to bring his constituents to the event saw that “[w]hen the protestors

reached the blockade…some unpacked their bags and began to eat lunch.”53

While it is easy and often interesting to note differences between Kyrgyzstan‟s cities,

they operate quite similarly to each other.54 The divide is usually broadly defined as

“North/South” with Bishkek and Osh at the poles.55 Bishkek is a former Imperial Russian fort

and has all the marks of a Russian city, with public transportation, apartment blocks, and a built

environment that specifically excludes religious space.56 Osh, in the Ferghana Valley, is a

melting pot of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tajiks, and many other groups along the spectrum from

one Soviet-created-nationality to another.57 It is a city over three millennia old, and it holds the

last standing Lenin statue as well as a sacred mountain complex where Babur, the first Mughal

50

Id. at 134. 51

Id. 52

Id. at 165. 53

Id. at 117. 54

Local Government in the Kyrgyz Republic at 530. 55

Bruce Pannier, Future Kyrgyz Government Faces Traditional North-South Divide, Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty (Dec. 2, 2011), available at

http://www.rferl.org/content/Future_Kyrgyz_Government_Faces_Traditional_NorthSouth_Divide/2025131.html. 56

Maria Elisabeth Louw, The Religious, the Secular, and the Esoteric in Bishkek, American University of Central

Asia (2007). The first sentence of Dr. Louw‟s article is “Doing anthropological research on religion in Bishkek can

be a bit discouraging.”; “The built environment” is defined as “all the structures people have built when considered

as separate from the natural environment.” See, MacMillan Dictionary, available at

http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/the-built-environment. 57

Osh, The London School in Bishkek, available at http://thelondonschool.org/en/osh-and-south.php.

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emperor, placed a mosque on his way towards conquering the subcontinent.58 The divisions

among and within cities make up the vibrancy of Kyrgyzstan society and the Jogorku Kenesh.59

The particulars may change, but the mechanics of civil society do not - all politics is in

some way local in Kyrgyzstan. Sub-metropolitan level civil society rules the day and takes care

of its own in Kyrgyzstan, and outside forces are seen by local actors as positive or negative

mostly for how they affect them.60 Locals will avail themselves of the money and expertise of

international NGOs, but these NGOs have had little luck in turning their services into political

capital. Many Kyrgyzstanis portray NGOs as only benefitting the intelligentsia and not the

country as a whole.61 For example, the Central Asia Free Market Institute has welcomed Chinese

infrastructure investment from Bishkek, saying “[e]nvironmental protection is something that

only rich countries can afford to be concerned about” while the village Jundu basks in

pollution.62 Continuing on the economic theme, most depositors in a new, Jeddah-run, Islamic

banking system are elderly, non-Muslim Russians who think it is a less risky place to keep their

pensions.63 But if the NGOs are powerless, Russia and the United States are given outsized

abilities, with Russia seen as the protector of the minorities of Kyrgyzstan and the United States

as the all-watching arbiter of the status quo.64 Outside forces, be they NGOs, banks, or foreign

58

This mountain complex, called alternatively Taht-I Suleiman and Sulaiman Too (both meaning “Mountain of

Solomon) is the only UNESCO World Heritage Site in Kyrgyzstan. See, Sulaiman-Too Sacred Mountain, UNESCO,

available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1230. 59

The Religious, the Secular, and the Esoteric in Bishkek, supra note 56. 60

Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, “The Dynamics of Change and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders” 53

JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 1 (2006). 61

Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Refinery Riles Environmentalists, Raises Transparency Concerns,

Eurasianet (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63198. “Country as a whole” should be

seen as not meaning “The Kyrgyz state” but “the individuals within the Kyrgyz state.” 62

Id. 63

Justin Vela, Kyrgyzstan: Islamic Banking Offers Alternative to the „European System‟, Eurasianet (Jun. 14, 2011),

available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63675. 64

United States: “[Central Asians] view the Americans in particular as a pervasive and intrusive octopus, intent

upon breaking into their inner worlds.” See, Christopher Schwartz, “‟If they‟re collecting all of this information,

they‟re surely using it, right?‟ WikiLeaks‟ impact on post-Soviet Central Asia” 5 GLOBAL MEDIA JOURNAL –

AUSTRALIAN EDITION 1, 7 (2011). http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/gmjau/v5_2011_1/schwartz_Essay.html;

11

governments, are welcomed – but warily. Turning services rendered towards a goal while

avoiding accusations of conspiracy has not been easy.

C. Robust Society, Parallel Networks

The Jogorku Kenesh as an “omnibus elite network” has provided the structure for the

reorganization of civil society.65 The Jogorku Kenesh provide the link between state institutions

and civil society writ large, but elites in Kyrgyzstan attempt to control and co-opt civil society by

working with its local actors. While this dances around governmental obligations, it also has

been proven to be a force for plurality, giving rise to a variety of voices not seen in neighboring

states.66

The give-and-take between local actors and national elites has worked as a protection

network warding off avarice or caprice. The elite-driven networks work as an alternative to

predatory officials or capricious policy by allowing personal ties and preventing a single all-

powerful leader.67 This network of elites usually runs parallel to politics, but in Kyrgyzstan it has

overrun politics.68 The politicization of a rich history of independent social groups and non-

governmental collective activity may seem cause for celebration by international observers at

first. But it also runs the risk of attenuating any dissent, turning ages worth of polite

disagreement into violent refusal.

Russia: “The guy Russia supports will be supported by ethnic minorities. They see Russia as a protector,” quoting

Joomart Saparbayev in David Trilling, Kyrgyzstan: Presidential Vote Could Aggravate Regional Rift, Eurasianet

(Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64402; This seems to be the common consensus, but is

strange considering that when Uzbek neighborhoods were being destroyed by marauding gangs, Russia refused to

send in troops or police, calling the 400,000 refugees an “internal problem.” See, Erica Marat, “Kyrgyzstan”

Freedom House Nations in Transit 2011, (2011) at 304, available at

http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Kyrgyzstan.pdf [hereinafter “Marat, „Kyrgyzstan‟”]. 65

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 166. 66

Id. at 202. Every other state in post-Soviet Central Asia has been under authoritarian rule. The only changes in

leadership have been in Turkmenistan, when Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) passed away in 2006 and a

bloody civil war that wracked Tajikistan in the early 1990‟s before Emomalii Rahmon was able to hold power. 67

Id. at 20. 68

Tamerlan Ibraimov, ‟Collusion‟ must be replaced by „agreement‟ between the elites, Institute for Public Policy

(Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ipp.kg/en/news/2150/.

12

Part III: The Elites of Kyrgyzstan and their Concretion of Power

Everyone who has held a position of power in Kyrgyzsan is a relic from the Communist

era.69 Even as two presidents have been sloughed off, the current ruling class has remained intact

twenty years, countless riots, and two revolutions. The ruling class has been able to do this by

both strengthening links among themselves and by exclusionary tactics; essentially keeping their

friends close and their enemies impotent.

A. Strengthening Links

Elites in Kyrgyzstan are not interested in systemic change, no matter what the language

of revolution may hint at.70 The strong links between elite actors, discussed elsewhere in this

paper,71 keep those on the fringes of power inside via a sort of centripetal force.72 And while

there are certainly dangers to speaking out against the current regime, well-orchestrated dissent

has twice now caused a governmental downfall. The greater danger is in dissenting alone, not

dissenting too strongly.

These links are most clearly illustrated by the events leading up to the 2005 revolution.

The first victims of then-President Akayev‟s self-fulfilling paranoia was Omurbek Tekebaev.73

After his arrest, Almazbek Atambaev and others chose to stand up for their ally instead of leave

69

The four heads of state have been Askar Akayev (1991-2005), Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010), Roza

Otunbayeva (2010-2011), and Almaz Atambayev (2011- ). At time of independence, Akayev was elected President

by the Supreme Soviet. Bakiyev was a kommissar in his home province. Otunbayeva was Soviet ambassador to

Malaysia, and Atambayev was the manager of a state automobile manufacturer. Michael Coffey, et al., Who‟s Who

in Kyrgyz Politics, The School of Russian and Asian Studies (May 1, 2010), available at

http://www.sras.org/whos_who_in_kyrgyz_politics, [hereinafter Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics]. 70

Weapons of the Wealthy at 205 71

See infra, Part V, §B(1) “Horizontal Ties” at 29. 72

“Centripetal forces are factors which bind together the people of the state [sic]” Wayne Brew,Political

Geopgraphy, available at http;//faculty.mc3.edu/wbrew/CGEONOTES/CHAPTER12.htm. 73

Tekebaev was then the vice speaker of parliament and ran opposed to Akayev in the 2000 elections. He is now the

leader of the Ata-Meken party. See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69.

13

him to his fate.74 They were also arrested, and when Azimbek Beknazarov joined them in jail,

riots in his hometown of Aksy ratcheted tensions up a notch.75 And it wasn‟t until 2003 that Roza

Otunbayeva and Bayman Erkinbaev tipped the scales away from regime legitimacy.76 At any

point in this escalation, the non-jailed politicians had the opportunity to bid adieu to their

colleagues. As discussed later in this part, there are plenty of politicians who have received this

treatment.77

The fact that the likes of Otunbayeva or Atambaev chose to join with their Soviet-

era colleagues rather than face a government without them is telling.

Concerns over rule of law are nothing new in the region,78 but the difficulty has been in

converting such concerns into political capital. Experimentations in free press have been futile

and usually dangerous in Kyrgyzstan and abroad.79 Meanwhile, expediency has triumphed over

any notion of good governance initiatives. After the 2005 revolution, there was a sharp and

continued rise in the number of politicians and journalists assassinated.80 This hasn‟t changed

even after the 2010 riots.81

Old legislation was adopted into the new constitution.82 This was not

because the transitional government wasn‟t allowed to create new legislation; they issued 61

74

Atambaev is a former captain of industry and prime minister, as well as a leader of both the 2005 and 2010

opposition movements. He was recently voted into Kyrgyzstan‟s Presidency. See supra, note 69; Atambaev Sworn in

as Kyrgyz President, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Dec. 1, 2011), available at

http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan_new_president_inauguration/24407831.html. 75

Beknazarov is a former lawyer and prosecutor. It was his arrest in 2002 that truly started the Tulip Revolution.

See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69. 76

Otunbayeva is a former diplomat and became, in November 2011, the first person to step down from power in

Central Asia. See, Id., supra note 69.; Erkinbaev could have politely been called a “leading businessman” but more

accurately was the heroin channel from Afghanistan into Russia. He was assassinated in 2005. See, Nurshat

Ababakirov, Kyrgyz Parliamentarian Bayaman Erkinbaev Assassinated, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute (May 10,

2005), available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3441. 77

See infra, Part III, §B “Exclusionary Tactics” at 15. 78

See generally, Rico Isaacs, The EU‟s Rule of Law Initiative in Central Asia, Centre for European Policy Studies

(August 2009), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/11483/1/1898.pdf. 79

Eric Freedman, “Journalists at Risk: The Human Impact of Press Contraints” 185 in AFTER THE CZARS AND

COMMISSARS: JOURNALISM IN AUTHORITARIAN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, (Eric Freedman and Richard Shafer,

Eds., Michigan State University Press, 2011). See generally, Joshua Foust, The Murdered Journalists of Central

Asia, Registan.net (last updated: Aug 31, 2008). 80

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 205., Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 309-310. 81

Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 309-310. 82

Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7.

14

decrees, 20 of which changed property regulations.83 For revolutionaries, the Kyrgyzstani

leadership shows a striking propensity to continue old practices.84

The interest in strong links is not a need, but a political choice. Most of the initial power

came from botched privatization efforts; the state selling their stakes into an imperfect market.85

The wealthy were able to connect with Soviet regime officials, internationally respected activists,

and criminal kingpins to form a ruling class of individuals with their discrete strengths and

weaknesses.86 These elite actors, able to act independently from government, have become the

government‟s legitimacy.87 The final blow to a regime is the loss of these actors, who can

collectively remove themselves from a regime and thus destroy its legitimacy through

cooperation.88 As important as legitimacy is, having a corps of criminal muscle trained as

wrestlers turns the final corner.89

“Powerholders are prone to subvert or ignore formal institutions,” Radnitz explains in his

seminal Weapons of the Wealthy.90 In 2005, Bakiev promised to promote a “Georgian Model” of

fighting corruption.91 The new model was introduced after 800 kilograms of gold went missing

from state coffers.92 Fighting corruption, punishing corrupt actors, and forming a more adhesive

rule of law all sounds great on paper, but in Marat‟s very apt words, “eradicating

83

Marat Ukushov, Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, Institute for Public Policy (May 27, 2011), available at

http://ipp.kg/en/news/2030/. 84

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 204. 85

Id. at 2. This should not come as a surprise to anyone who studies the Former Soviet Union. 86

Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69. 87

Recurring Themes in the Kyrgyz Revolutions, supra note 1. 88

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 17. This “destruction through cooperation” is essentially what happened in the lead

up to the 2005 revolution, as discussed at length in WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY. 89

Id. at 154. 90

Id. at 5. 91

Erica Marat, THE TULIP REVOLUTION: KYRGYZSTAN ONE YEAR AFTER (The Jamestown Foundation, 2006) at 40.

The Georgian Model is described as legislation written to promote the turning over of stolen property to avoid

punishment, described by Beknazarov as,“return what was stolen and sleep calmly.”The concept of using Georgia as

a positive model for corruption fighting was a lot less comical in 2005 than it may be construed now. 92

Id. at 41.

15

corruption…will involve slinging mud.”93 Pointing fingers at one‟s elite compatriots allows them

to point theirs back at you, which risks rending the political fabric.

B. Exclusionary Tactics

Where strong ties keep Soviet actors in power, exclusionary tactics keep new entrants

out. Barriers to entry prevent usurpers from coming into the inner circle of Kyrgyzstani politics.

The careful vetting process has only allowed toadies into the political realm, not independently

powerful actors. The current acting Prime Minister, Omurbek Babanov, is 41 and one of the

richest men in Kyrgyzstan.94 He is connected with ex-President Bakiyev‟s son Maxim and has

been mentioned in closer connections to corruption scandals than even your standard-issue post-

Soviet politician.95 He is the exception that proves the rule; considering the active youth culture

in Kyrgyzstani cities, it is interesting to see how few young individuals there are in positions of

political power. The Ministry of Youth Affairs is the source of much skepticism. Timur

Shaikhutdinov, head of the Free Generation Alliance, said that it exists for young Kyrgyzstanis

to run to an “older, more experienced „uncle‟…forgetting about all the things they talked about

and believed in yesterday.”96

As discussed above,97 privatization was not performed in an absolutely free market.98

Land often went to farm directors, not the farmers themselves, and the state held on to many

93

Id. 94

Chris Rickleton, African-Kyrgyz Kickboxer Makes Run for Kyrgyzstan‟s Parliament, Eurasianet (Sep. 28, 2010),

available at

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62034. It should be noted that the eponymous African-Kyrgyz kickboxer is not

Babanov; David Trilling, Take Two: Kyrgyzstan Finally Has New Government, Eurasianet (Dec. 17, 2010),

available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62594. 95

Omurbek Babanov: “I have no spoken to Maxim Bakiev”, Kloop (May 26, 2011), available at

http://kloop.info/2011/05/26/omurbek-babanov-i-have-not-spoken-to-maxim-bakiev/; There is plenty of well-

written research on the endemic corruption in post-Soviet space. A good introductory book is Misha Glenny,

MCMAFIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD (Knopf 2008). 96

Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan‟s Youth: Force for Change or Chips off the Old Block?, Eurasianet (Jun. 25, 2011),

available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63739. 97

See infra, Part III, §A “Strengthening Links” at 12.

16

assets they said were truly privatized.99 Foreign investment, the supposed magic bullet set to

empower the Kyrgyzstani people, was funneled through the few elites who were able to present

themselves as the only local attractive option for these international prospectors.100 This led to

corruption that cut out vast globalized wealth creation in the 1990s;101 Kyrgyzstan‟s GDP shrank

58 percent between 1991 and 2001.102 This avoidance of trickle-down wealth via Foreign Direct

Investment prevented many of the thousands of university graduates from choosing economic

independence, forcing this nascent vanguard into the existing corrupt system.103

These victims of a minor form of oppression are by far the more fortunate ones. More

iconoclastic actors have met much more vicious resistance from the government. In October

2005, Akmatbayev was killed in prison; the assumption among most is that he was killed by

Batukayev.104 Akmatbayev‟s criminal background was considered too much of a liability and a

threat to his fellow politicians.105 The more spectacular story is that of Timur Kamchibekov and

Bayamen Erkinbaev. Kamchibekov was 27 years old in 2005, Erkinbaev; 39.106 Between the two

98

Özhan Çetinkaya and Kurmanbek Joldoshev, “Kırgıztan‟da Özelleştirme Uygulamaları ve Etkileri” TÜRK

DÜNYASI KIRGIZ-TÜRK SOSYAL BILIMLER ENSTITÜSÜ, (May 2006) at3, available at

http://www.akademikbakis.org/pdfs/9/kurman.pdf. 99

Camilla Eriksson, “Changing Land Rights, Changing Land Use: Privatisation Drives Landscape Change in Post-

Soviet Kyrgyzstan”, SWEDISH UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, (Feb. 2006) at 7, available at

http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/kyrgyzstan/documents/Privatisation.Landscape.Chang

e.pdf. 100

Mehmet Dikkaya and Ibrahim Keles, “A case study of foreign direct investment in Kyrgyzstan” 25 CENTRAL

ASIAN SURVEY 149, 151 (Mar. 2006). 101

Id. at 155. 102

Joshua Foust, A Year After Revolution, Kyrgyzstan‟s Minority Worse Off Than Ever, The Atlantic (Oct. 27,

2011), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/a-year-after-revolution-kyrgyzstans-

minority-worse-off-than-ever/247479/. 103

“The number of major universities and technical schools in Bishkek gives it the feel almost of place like Boston,

and a number of these universities produce talented graduates whose diplomas are recognized around the world.

Further, their ability to compete in international exchange programs and the political support for these programs has

won students from tiny Kyrgyzstan places in most of the world‟s best universities.” See, Kyrgyzstan at 20, supra

note 15; Kyrgyzstan‟s Youth, supra note 96. 104

Erica Marat, Assassination of Kyrgyz Lawmaker Reveals Links Between Politics and Crime, The Jamestown

Foundation (Oct. 25, 2005), available at

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31017. 105

Id. 106

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 153.

17

of them they controlled Osh‟s gym-bound wrestling organizations and criminal underground

respectively.107 When the Osh revolts turned violent thanks to the spark of hundreds of angry,

drunk wrestlers, thousands were caught in the crowds.108 This scheming and the ostentatious

threat of violence frightened the likes of Bakiev and Kulov, and Erkinbaev would be assassinated

by the end of 2005.109

Kamchibayev is still alive, but was much more subdued during the 2010

riots.110 The greatest threats have been treated the harshest.

Broader movements, such as the perceived menace of nationalist splintering, have been

treated differently than the more salient threats. This does not mean that they‟ve been treated

with delicacy or deference. Uzbek activists such as Davron Sobirov can see their careers ended

by ambiguous laws against “ethnic incitement” as they try to promote the cause of Uzbek

rights.111 Non-Uzbeks rarely have the political capital to do much about or for the Uzbek

population, even if they have the willingness to take on the more nefarious elements of Kyrgyz

nationalism.112

What‟s more, the Constitution is written to very clearly discriminate against new entrants

to power. Article four, Section four, prohibits the military, law-enforcement, or judicial branches

from joining political parties or otherwise getting involved in politics.113 Similarly, parties may

107

Id. 108

Id. 109

Kyrgyz Parliamentarian Bayaman Erkinbaev Assassinated, supra note76. 110

Id. 111

Id. at 96; Const. Art. IV, §4(5) prohibits “…incitement of social, racial, inter-national, interethnic and religious

hatred.” 112

Foust, A Year After Revolution, supra note 102; “Nefarious elements” as defined as a threat to state integrity.

“The main threat to Kyrgyzstan, ultra-nationalism, can be defined in a number of ways including“that citizenship in

a state should be limited to one ethnic group.” See, Martin Sieff, Kyrgyz Separatism, Islamic extremism threats

overstated, Central Asia Security Newswire (Jan. 27, 2011), available at

http://test.centralasianewswire.com/Security/viewstory.aspx?id=3089. 113

Const. Art. IV, §4(2), prohibiting “membership of those serving in the army, law-enforcement agencies as well as

judges in political parties as well as their statements in support of any political party.”

18

not be formed on a religious or ethnic basis.114 An additional ban on “political parties, public and

religious organizations” who “pursue political goals aimed at forced change of the constitutional

setup, undermining national security, incitement of social, racial, international, interethnic, and

religious hatred” is so broadly written as to incriminate anyone who tries to radically change the

government.115 Except, presumably, the revolutionaries who did precisely this to form the current

government.

Parliamentarians have no immunity, a double-edged sword that is welcomed by the

Venice Commission but also allows unpopular members to be ushered out with a long-dragging

court case.116 Individuals running for office must pay for their campaigns from their own pocket,

and if they do make it to office, are excluded from “economic activities” that have no precise

definition.117 This makes it not only extraordinarily difficult for the non-wealthy to become

politically active, particularly in a government where parties are not aggregate interests of

society but factions of personality, but also makes it a losing try to stay in power. Only the rich

may get in and stay in.118 Radical actors, however broadly “radical” is defined, are left in the cold

or tossed into prison.

114

Const. Art. IV, §4(3), prohibiting “creation of political parties on religious or ethnic basis as well as pursuit of

political goals by religious associations.”; Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Sunni political organization whose goal is to unify all

Muslim states and create a new, global caliphate. They explicitly denounce violence, but are banned as a terrorist

organization in Kyrgyzstan. See generally, Tolkun Sagynova, Hizb ut-Tahrir Emboldened in Kyrgyzstan, Institute

for War and Peace Reporting (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/hizb-ut-tahrir-emboldened-

kyrgyzstan. 115

Const. Art. IV, §4(5). 116

Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7; Aivars Endzins, Nicolae Esanu, Angelika Nussberger, and

Anders Fogelklou, “Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” ¶43, European Commission for

Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), (May 21, 2010). The Venice Commission is formally titled the

European Commission for Democracy Through Law. It is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, advising on

constitutional issues in emerging democracies. 117

Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7. 118

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 71.

19

C. A Cohesive - if Calcified - Ruling Class

Despite optimistic comparisons to new democracies in the Former Soviet Union,119

Kyrgyzstan is not Ukraine or Georgia. There is no Saakashvili here. 120 Two different Soviet-

schooled leaders have been removed from office,121 but the structure that they brought with them

remains in place.122 The cohort of now-aged leaders has generally been able to remain cohesive

and portray their actions as united, even if those actions began quite disjointed. What‟s more,

they have been quite successful in eliminating any alternatives to the current rule, if not always

by violent means then certainly by repression. When combined with personalized politics, a

calcified ruling class may present the greatest obstacle towards medium-term change.

Part IV: Is the Prime Minister accountable to Parliament?

The first two heads of Kyrgyzstani government are currently residing in Belarus and

Moscow, with seemingly no interest in returning to their native land.123 In November of 2011,

Roza Otunbayeva became the first Central Asian head of state to peacefully leave office.124 By

all counts, she will be the only one for a long time; concerns over authoritarianism are not

119

Vladimir Radyuhin, Island of democracy in Central Asia, The Hindu (Nov. 14, 2011), available at

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2627589.ece. 120

Mikheil Saakashvili was 35 years old when he stormed through a parliamentary session in Tblisi, Georgia,

chasing the incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze out. Saakashvili rose to the podium and drank

Shevardnadze‟s still-warm tea. It was the capping moment to the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia which, despite

the peaks and valleys that have occurred since, was a dramatic changing of the Communist-era guard. See generally,

Levan Berdzenishvili, “A Not-So Rosy Revolution: Georgia Seven Years After the Rose Revolution” National

Endowment for Democracy (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ned.org/events/a-not-so-rosy-result-georgia-

seven-years-after-the-rose-revolution (includes link to video of presentation). 121

Referring to Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, ejected from office in 2005 and 2010, respectively. 122

Although a new Constitution was put in place in 2010, the old legislation remains. See supra, note 7.

123 Bakiyev has claimed his legitimacy publicly as recently as April 2010, see, Ousted Kyrgyz leader Bakiyev

„remains president‟, BBC News (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8634292.stm;

Akayev, on the other hand, is a professor and researcher at Moscow State University, see, Askar Akayev: The crisis

will force the post-Soviet countries to unite around Russia, Baku Today (Aug. 18, 2011), available at

http://www.bakutoday.net/askar-akayev-the-crisis-will-force-the-post-soviet-countries-to-unite-around-russia.html 124

Asker Sultanov, „Roses for Roza‟ campaign thanks outgoing Kyrgyz president, Central Asia Online (Nov. 1,

2011), available at http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/11/01/feature-02.

20

unfounded.125 Even if President Atambaev goes quietly and calmly at the end of his 5-year, it is

unlikely that he will spend those five years only as a figurehead.126

Kyrgyzstan is the least authoritarian state in its region and the constitution now enshrines

a pluralistic, parliamentary, system. The Prime Minister is ostensibly more powerful than the

President and is selected by parliament.127 This deference to parliament is what Nurlan Sadykov

was referring to when he spoke of the prime minister‟s accountability to parliament. But again,

there is a substantial gap between what the constitution proclaims and life‟s realities.

There are legal and illegal means of a leader‟s accountability to his political peers. This is

not the same as “good” and “bad” means, but rather the different ways in which the two poles

negotiate power. Legal means, generally elections, divisions of governmental power, and party

politics are the transparent ways in which the government chooses how to run its country. Illegal

means are primarily the protests and demonstrations that are more opaque but generally more

effective in negotiations with the head of state.

A. Legal Means

Although Kyrgyzstan‟s elections have been seen to be generally free and fair, there is

certainly plenty of ground to gain in that direction.128 International observers have found the past

two decades of Kyrgyzstani politics far more civil, meaningful, and fair than the rest of Central

Asia.129 The Jogorku Kenesh has often been described by international observers as a village

125

Ishaan Tharoor, Why Kyrgyzstan‟s Presidential Election Matters, TIME (Nov. 1, 2011), available at

http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/11/01/why-kyrgyzstans-presidential-election-matters/. 126

Farangis Najibullah, Atambaev Wants to Close U.S. Airbase, But Can He?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

(Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/atambaev_wants_to_close_us_airbase_but/24379557.html. 127

Article 86 begins by stating “The faction which has more than one half of deputies‟ mandates, or a coalition of

factions with its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new

convocation shall nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.” See, Const. Art. LXXXIV §1 et al. 128

David Trilling, A Fractured But Hopeful Kyrgyzstan Goes to the Polls, Eurasianet (Oct. 30, 2011), available at

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64412. 129

Island of democracy in Central Asia, supra note 119.

21

gathering where elites can network.130 This concept of a self-regulating and self-defining society

is reflected in the Constitution, where Parliament elects their prime minister.131 The Constitution

now also makes the electoral commission independent, not a body appointed by the President.132

At the beginning of independent Kyrgyzstan, then-President Akayev created a multiple-

party system to “prove his democratic credentials to the international community.”133 In the

beginning, nobody knew quite what to do with the Jogorku Kenesh; the 1995 parliament was

only one-third made up for party members, the rest were independent.134 However, sixteen years

and a constitutional shift towards a parliamentary system have seen a 120-seat Jogorku Kenesh

split between five parties, all currently with 18-28 seats apiece.135 Nowadays, “[the 2011]

constitution isn‟t society,” says Marat Ukushov, a Kyrgyzstani lawyer and creator of the 1993

constitution, but “an ideology of a small group of opposition politicians.”136

Akayev‟s opposition was traditionally the intelligentsia, who organized bring forth the

2005 revolution.137 Bakiev and Otunbayeva may have been the international face, but local elites,

particularly the populist Kulov, were the “aura of authenticity” required for a full putsch.138 Once

this coalescing group was able to gain momentum, protesting fraud became less relevant than

protesting solely to keep face and become part of the burgeoning movement.139

130

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 29. 131

“The faction [of parliament] which has more than one half of deputies‟ mandates, or a coalition of factions with

its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new convocation shall

nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.” See, Const. Art. LXXXIV (§1). 132

The Jogorku Kenesh “shall elect members of the Central Commission on elections and referenda; one third of its

members to be nominated by the President, one third by the Parliamentary majority and one third by the

Parliamentary opposition” See, Const. Art. LXXIV §3(4). 133

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 70. 134

Id. 135

Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 306. 136

Uskohov refers to “opposition politicians.” By this he means the group of individuals who ousted Bakiyev from

power in 2010. See, Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, supra note 83. 137

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 66. 138

Id. at 135. 139

Id. at 137.

22

There is pressure for change, good and bad, on the head of state, but the musical chair

analogy is almost too literal in Kyrgyzstan. As the two revolutions in five years have shown, the

head of state is only first among a rotating schedule of equals, in power until he does something

to get himself kicked out. There is accountability and even de jure possibility of impeachment,140

but once elected, there has historically been little stopping the Prime Minister or President from

acting in his own self interest.

Atambaev has been elected to President from his role as acting Prime Minister, a move

that actually promises him less power than before.141 It remains to be seen how Atambaev will

rule as President; most analysts expect him to take on a Putin-esque role after finding a suitable

Medvedev.142 The United States in particular is curious to see how he wields his power; he has

mentioned a desire to close Manas Air Base, a move that would require parliamentary

blessing.143 Considering that the fuel contract for Manas Air Base is one of the greatest prizes of

the Kyrgyzstani economy, he may run into stiff resistance if he decides to move from platitude to

action.144

It is, as of writing, too soon to do anything but project as to how Atambaev will construe

his power as president and how accountable he feels towards what is currently a broad-based

140

“The Jogorku Kenesh shall bring charges against the President and shall make the decision on

his/her impeachment in accordance with the procedures envisaged in the present Constitution.” See, Const. Art.

LXXIV (§7). 141

Atambaev Wants to Close U.S. Airbase, But Can He?, supra note 126. 142

Joshua Kucera, Why Atambaev Might Be Serious About Closing Manas, Eurasianet (Nov. 10, 2011), available at

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64492. This refers to Russian President Vladimir Putin‟s step away from the

trapping sof power while retaining a position in Russian politics as Dmitri Medvedev is head of state. 143

Joshua Foust, Continuing Not to Read Too Much into Atambayev‟s Manas Airbase Politics, Registan.net (Oct.

11, 2011), available at http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/11/10/continuing-to-not-read-too-much-into-

atambayevs-manas-airbase-politics/. 144

Michael Schwirtz, New Leader Says U.S. Base in Kyrgyzstan Will Be Shut, The New York Times (Nov. 1, 2011),

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-says-united-states-manas-air-base-will-

close.html?_r=1&ref=michaelschwirtz; A Gazprom joint venture has the current deal, worth approximately

$9million monthly. See, Deirdre Tynan, Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Contract Goes to Kyrgyz-Russian Venture,

Eurasianet (Sep. 27, 2011), available at www.eurasianet.org/node/64232.

23

parliament. It is safe to assume that the current constitution is not written in stone – it is not a

finished document. How unfinished it is remains to be seen.

B. Illegal Means

The illegal means of accountability are the revolts for which Kyrgyzstan has reached

international infamy. Weapons of the Wealthy discusses that if an individual parliamentarian; (1)

has a sufficiently proficient network of clients and peers, (2)

is in a crisis that is sufficiently

urgent, and (3)

finds self-protection sufficiently necessary, then he will key a protest.145

Mobilization is triggered by a threat from the state, but is only done if other, more subdued,

means are not available.146 And once mobilization of a concert of parliamentarians has begun, the

costs of involvement decline and benefits (such as heroism, attention, and more importantly, a

post in the new regime) increase.147

Protests, and the threat of protests, have been the illegal and yet common means to affect

change and to hold the head of government accountable for his actions.148 The prime minister

cannot afford to alienate his parliament, not for fear of censure or impeachment, but for the fear

of an airplane in the middle of the night on a one-way trip to Minsk.149

It is easy to make much of the relatively commonplace protests in Kyrgyzstan, and

indeed, before the “Arab Spring” of 2011 there was a tendency by journalists to follow them

breathlessly.150 It stands to demonstrate, though, that the Kyrgyzstani protests often follow the

145

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 38. This argument is at the crux of Radnitz‟s book. 146

Id. at 33. 147

Id. at 137. 148

“John Heathershaw, an international relations expert observing the poll in Kyrgyzstan, said that the protest

culture was a sign of democratic development in the country.” See, Johannes Dell and Venera Kochieva, Will

election ease Kyrgyzstan tensions?, BBC News (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-

pacific-15484302. 149

This is a reference to Bakiev‟s current exile to the capital of Belarus, a country often called Europe‟s last

dictatorship. 150

Will election ease Kyrgyzstan tensions?, supra note 148.

24

form of what has been commonly called “astroturfing” in the United States.151 Wealthy elites

bankrolling a protest is not in and of itself a negative act, but the press and fellow elites must

stand to the fact that the protest need not be a popular movement. Protests allow for half-

measures; using language of protest is one thing, a peaceful demonstration another, and violent

acts; a third. The personalization of Kyrgyzstani politics thus allow adherents to represent an

elite actor while permitting the selfsame actor to refrain from girding themselves in a display of

revolution.

C. Protests and More Polite Demands of Accountability

Parliamentarians and other elites have a variety of ways in which they can call attention

to themselves or give a tug on the president‟s ear. The effectiveness of most of these has yet been

proven. A new constitution offers a parliamentary system that allows for impeachment and

censure of the head of state, but those tools of governmental accountability have not yet been

used. Softer measures have also been ignored; checks on executive power exist on paper but

have been run roughshod in actuality. Even the most seasoned of Kyrgyzstan analysts, local and

international, can only wait with bated breath to see how Atambaev will construe his

responsibility to his parliament.

Protests remain the most viable and most reliable method of holding the head of state

accountable. If at knifepoint, protests give actors bold and powerful enough to use them the

ability to register disappointment in a way the president will feel. Even the threat alone, if

executed correctly, can stymie the prime minister. In the recent presidential election, the second-

and third-place finishers didn‟t petition Atambaev for sinecure or negotiate a parliamentary

151

“What exactly is Astroturf supposed to mean? Typically, that, in the absence of widespread support for a

position, some unseen entity manufactures the appearance of it.” See, Ryan Sager, Keep Off the Astroturf, New York

Times (Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/opinion/19sager.html.

25

coalition.152 The first thing they did was threaten protest.153 Such is political life in current-day

Kyrgyzstan, and such is the only form of accountability they have over their leader.

Part V: Is Parliament Accountable to the People?

When discussing how “parliament will be accountable to the people,” the most important

word in the phrase is “accountable.” Ties between parliament members and their constituencies,

among people outside of parliament, and among members of parliament are important but not

terribly illuminating in isolation. Accountability is the result of politicians feeling pressured to

represent the will of the people they represent.154 It is largely an aspirational goal of the

Kyrgyzstani constitution as of now.155 Instead of accountability, popular politics in Kyrgyzstan is

still tainted by very clear repression. Some compromise between upward pressures emanating

from social groups and cynical populism has been formed, but clientelism relationships and peer

grouping has largely defined Kyrgystan‟s political construct156. While the instant relationships

have been particularly fluid, some broader trends can be ascertained. This section will

demonstrate how far Kyrgyzstan is from governmental accountability and avenues through

which accountability could be pursued.

152

Defeated Kyrgyz presidential candidate vows „fight to the end‟, UNHCR Refworld, (Nov. 7, 2011), available at

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,KGZ,4562d8cf2,4ec50457c,0.html. 153

Id. 154

Passing the baton of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, United Nations Development Programme (Nov. 4, 2011),

available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,KGZ,4562d8cf2,4ec50457c,0.html. 155

President Otunbayeva‟s Address to the Jogorku Kenesh, supra note 11. 156

“The clientele and the elites are trying to perpetuate cliental relationships not only for rational reasons but also

intuitively for the unwillingness to live under other forms of societal organization.” See, Political Elites of the

Commonwealth of Independent States in the Dialogue of Civilizations, Rhodes Forum IX Annual Session (Nov. 30,

2011), available at http://www.rhodesforum.org/9-rhodes-forum-2009/panel-1-dialogue-and-global-politics/21-

political-elites-of-the-commonwealth-of-independent-states-in-the-dialogue-of-civilizations.

26

A. Repression in Kyrgyzstan

Repression in Kyrgyzstan is nowhere near as violent, accepted, and at times bizarre as

elsewhere in Central Asia.157 That said, being subjectively “less bad” does not make a system

“good.” Repression of unsavory ideas and projects has been de rigueur in Kyrgyzstan.158 The

state-sponsored sidelining or minimizing of threats to state stability real or imaginary can be seen

as somewhat cynical. This is, after all, a state with multiple revolutions in its recent history.

These revolutionaries are broad-based, but represent a closed field. Even the vox of revolution

will mutually agree to mute a few voices.

In many instances, the curtailing of institutions‟ independence is the clearest form of

repression. Universities and mosques are controlled, if not monitored, by the state.159 Imams are

appointed by Kyrgyzstani authorities and university courses are often attended by police as well

as students.160 These traditional vectors of dissent and information are generally not trusted, and

neither are the state-run news agencies.161 The most trusted place for information on what‟s

157

Islom Karimov of Uzbekistan has been known to boil political opponents alive as well as fire on civilians and

blame the deaths on al-Qaeda-associated terrorist groups, see, Abulfazal, From Turkish protests to calling upon

Canadians – Stop dictator Karimov!, Neweurasia (Sep. 7, 2011), available at http://www.neweurasia.net/politics-

and-society/from-turkish-protests-to-calling-upon-canadians-stop-dictator-karimov/; Nursultan Nazarbayev has

brought Kazakhstan to the chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe without having a single

contested election, see, Robert Coalson, Six Months into OSCE Chair, Kazakhstan Found Wanting in Kyrgyz Events,

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Jun. 30, 2010), available at

http://www.rferl.org/content/Six_Months_Into_OSCE_Chair_Kazakhstan_Found_Wanting_In_Kyrgyz_Events/208

6883.html; Before his 2006 death, Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan named months after family members and

built a gold statue of himself that would rotate to face the sun, see, Marat Gurt, Turkmen statue turns its last, The

Independent (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkmen-statue-turns-

its-last-1871995.html; The long-dead Mullo Abdullo, a rebel during Tajikistan‟s civil war, has made a strange habit

of making the news every few months in his native country, see, George Camm, Tajikistan: Mullo Abdullo Again?,

Eurasianet (Sep. 16, 2010), available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61950; Anything in Kyrgyzstan pales next

to these examples. 158

Muzaffar Suleymanov, Kyrgyzstan‟s familiar path: Press repression, ousted leaders, Committee to Protect

Journalists (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.cpj.org/blog/2010/04/kyrgyzstan-media-crackdown-bakiyev-

ousted.php. 159

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 165. 160

Id. 161

Kyrgyzstan: Media Harassment Engendering Expanded Self-Censorship, Eurasianet (Mar. 21, 2010), available

at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav032210.shtml.

27

going on throughout Kyrgystan in many smaller villages is the chaikhana that the intercity taxi

drivers frequent!162

The courts and the legal system as a whole are so untrustworthy as to be seen not even as

just another channel for state repression, but the most nefarious arm thereof. “Courts were

known to act on behalf of the powerful,” Scott Radnitz writes of the Akayev years, “but rarely

protected individual rights.”163 This is a reality hardly stuck in the past. The Tulip Revolution

that removed Akayev from power was not a “broad-based uprising of the middle class seeking a

greater role in determining the direction of the country,”164 as was promised by the democracy-

promoting rhetoric of the day, but was rather just a reshuffling of elites.165 The 2010 revolution

was followed by violence best described by Natalia Yefimova-Trilling:166

[Osh is] a scruffy provincial town of 260,000 nestled along a major

drug-exporting route from Afghanistan. In June 2010, Osh had been the

epicenter of interethnic carnage that left more than 400 dead and

thousands homeless.167 For months afterward, the bereaved passed around

photos of scorched, mutilated bodies that had once, possibly, belonged to

people they loved. The city's burly mayor and local security forces were

accused by three Western inquiries of doing too little to prevent the

bloodshed, at a minimum, and possibly abetting it. They denied the

162

Judith Beyer, Kyrgyzstan: referendum in a time of upheaval, openDemocracy (26 Jun. 2010), available at

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/judith-beyer/kyrgyzstan-referendum-in-time-of-upheaval; Since taxi

drivers go from town to town, and particularly to the provincial centers so often, they are the most connected

individuals in rural Kyrgyzstan. Their stories of the country outside the particular village will likely be more

interesting, if not much more accurate, than what state-sponsored media says. 163

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 43. 164

Id. at 163. 165

Id. 166

Natalia Yefimova-Trilling, Twitter vs. the KGB, Foreign Policy Dispatch (Nov. 11, 2011), available at

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/10/kyrgyzstan_twitter_journalism. This article cites, in order, the

three below citations via hyperlink. 167

Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan: Remembering Osh Violence Without Reconciling, Eurasianet (Jun, 10, 2011),

available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63661.

28

charges.168 The trials and investigations that followed the fighting,

according to Human Rights Watch, were marred by "threats, violence, and

serious violations, such as arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment.169

The violence, corruption, and repression represented by the June events and those

preceding them are certainly worthy foci of legal interest in their own right. Their existence

demonstrates a terrific blow to the elected officials‟ accountability to their people. Just in the

second half of 2011, there have been reports of KGB agents harassing and assaulting

journalists,170 Uzbek businesses being taken away from them and turned into Kyrgyz

establishments,171 and court cases of high-profile individuals being closed to the public.172 The

laws, such that they exist, cover selectively.

At the constitutional level, the five year terms for parliamentarians is criticized as being

excessive and for insulating parliamentarians from their constituencies.173 Vote thresholds

currently stand at 5% nationally and .5% in each of the seven provinces, Osh, and Bishkek.174

This means that a party must take at least 5% of the national vote and .5% (that is, one half of

one percent) of the vote in each province of Kyrgyzstan as well as in the cities of Osh and

Bishkek in order to hold a seat in parliament.175 This has been cause for concern among fringe

168

“Where is the Justice?”, supra note 6; “The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan: Asia Report No. 193” INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS Group (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/193-

the-pogroms-in-kyrgyzstan.aspx; “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in

Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010” KYRGYZSTAN INQUIRY COMMISSION (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.k

ic.org/images/stories/kic_report_english_final.pdf. 169

Distorted Justice, Human Rights Watch (Jun. 7, 2011), available at

http://www.hrw.org/en/embargo/node/99472?signature=d1f8ee5e698707afc7ac55dafbe5be0b&suid=6. 170

Twitter vs. the KGB, supra note 166. 171

Justin Vela, Where the Restaurants in Osh Have New Names, Eurasianet (Jul. 12, 2011), available at

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63866. 172

Journalists Barred From Attending Trial of Kyrgyz Official‟s Son, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Dec. 2,

2011), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/press_barred_from_bishkek_mayors_sons_trial/24393100.html. 173

Endzins, Esanu, Nussberger, and Fogelklou, “Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” ¶42. 174

Marat, Kyrgyzstan at 305. 175

Id.

29

parties, outside observers, and Kygyzstanis outside of the core elite.176 What‟s more, the same

legislation at levels below the constitution is in place today as was in place in 2004.177 Any

attempts to replace Kyrgyzstan‟s commonplace repression with true governmental accountability

will be a slow and grassroots-oriented process. And it would have to take advantage of the

already-present allegiances described below.

B. Allegiance Networks

As discussed previously,178 the robust civil society in Kyrgyzstan has allowed for strong

ties to be created among individuals in a class and between social classes. The conversion from

civil society to allegiance networks is one from potentiality to power, where trust is turned into

political action.179 This next section will examine horizontal, ascending, and descending ties to

discover where accountability comes in to play.

1. Horizontal Ties

Horizontal ties are defined as the allegiance that individuals have towards others in their

class or social network. It is best seen in two segments; parliamentarians working together in

governmental acts and poor rural communities sticking together to survive.

Kyrgyzstani politics are largely vertical, meaning one person controls their party wholly.

This is because horizontal ties remain inchoate and politicians have not been able to build up

great trust between each other. Their personal fiefdoms only unite when under great stress, and

not for the simple reason of pushing through new legislation. This is described by Radnitz as a

176

Id. 177

Kyrgyzstan‟s Proposed Constitution, supra note 7. 178

See infra, Part III, “Civil Society” at 3. 179

Vladimir Fedorenko, Nepotism and Weak Institutions in Kyrgyz Politics, The Washington Review of Turkish and

Eurasian Affairs (Jun. 2010), available at http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/nepotism-

kyrgyzpolitics.html.

30

collective action problem, and the new constitution aspires towards the strong rule of law

required to go hand-in-hand this allegiance towards each other.180

In Kyrgyzstan things work peculiarly. The opportunity for violence, whether in its more

theatric or visceral forms, is very real. Assassinations are a threat, as several politicians have

learned.181 As discussed earlier in this paper,182 group mobilization of elites is a counter to this, as

elites can act as brokers to communicate the threat and relieve the threat on one by building a

consensus around him.183

Horizontal ties run for the poorer population of the country as well. “Good relations with

ones‟ neighbors are essential to survive grinding poverty,” Radnitz writes.184 And although

ethnicity, kinship, and religion are often seen by external actors to be the keys to rural society,

simple communal proximity is the most resilient.185 The rest are not much more than just trailing

indicators.186 Where elites succeed is when they can convert this communal resiliency for their

own ends, expanding their networks into villages and relying on the locals to look to each other

and form role models to decide how to approach the elite‟s ends. This is best explained by the

careful process in which elites make descending ties.

2. Descending Ties

Descending relationships describe the ways in which elites built a popular support base

by proffering goods political or physical to the lower classes. The concept as laid out in

Kyrgyzstan is that if one desires to work outside or supplant infrastructural power, then one must

180

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 18. 181

THE TULIP REVOLUTION at 97-99. 182

See infra, Part III, §A “Strengthening Links” at 12. 183

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 197. 184

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 121. 185

Id. at 22-23; “Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability” supra note 21. 186

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 22-23; Trailing indicators are defined in the economical sense, as “indicators

which tend to change only after an economy has already changed, or has begun to follow a particular pattern or

trend.” See, “Lagging Indicators” http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/lagging-indicators.html.

31

have revenue independent of governmental pay.187 It is important for politicians to be seen as a

leader, not just a politician, if they want to built such a support base. In order to be seen as this

sort of leader, they must offer services above and beyond purely governmental expectations.

Turning revenue into a social support base then requires not just exposure, but a

“portfolio of private, public, and symblamatic goods.”188 Seeking a social support base requires

not just fame seeking, but also involves a moral dimension and a necessity to grow a reputation

as a benefactor.189 Wrapping oneself in the display of moral rectitude is then a key to growing

and sustaining this base of support. Elite actors use charity as public exposure, as a way to

remind their home regions that they still stand for them and that they are actively bound to their

constituencies‟ well-being.190

An outward show of morality can be one and the same as an internal cynicism. With the

unreliability of elite-level horizontal ties, descending ties are nothing less than an investment in

security.191 Kyrgyzstan is an unstable country, and the two revolts in six years intimate that more

revolutions could certainly be coming. Elites are simply better off building personal allegiances

than devoting their energies towards state-building. There is an awareness by elites that they

could benefit in the long run by restricting some of their wealth in order to gradually subvert

allegiance to the state.192 These descending ties thus are more than just political capital to be used

in elections, but a daily product of power, property, and prestige.193

187

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 24-25. 188

Id. at 85. 189

Id. at 26-27. 190

Id. 191

Id. at 201. 192

Id. at 77. 193

Id. at 201.

32

3. Ascending Ties

Ascending ties are defined as the interactions that allow people to demonstrate their

allegiance to and expectations for their leader. In Kyrgyzstan, these ties are the very ways in

which accountability is brought into being. People in Kyrgyzstan have a stake in the prosperity

of their elites. 194 Not only because he has “bought them off” in some way through charitable

donations, but also because of the payoffs of a protest.195 A balancing test can be weighed

between the specter of unemployment and hopes of potential; in a country as poor as Kyrgyzstan

such a test would weigh heavily towards patronage.196 The limited provision of public goods by

the state makes citizens susceptible to non-state actors.197 Ashars can only do so much, and

international aid organizations cannot be relied upon on a perennial basis.198 Instead, villagers act

as though that the wealthy have a moral obligation to help them.199 It stems from a social

contract, not a demand for handouts from the rich or even from the government. An

understanding exists that if villagers will demonstrate in the streets, barge into the President‟s

resident, or at the very least vote for a politician in elections, they expect their leaders to be

outwardly moral.200 This morality includes religious and philanthropic donations, speeches on

propriety, and personal munificence.201 When referring to their representative in Jogorku Kenesh,

villagers “mean from [their representative‟s] own money, not in [a] public service capacity.”202

This personal connection results in the clearest form of bottom-up allegiance. After an

elite actor who had invested in a social support base lost out in the 2005 elections, there was

194

Id. at 92. 195

Id. at 127. 196

Id. 197

Id. at 7. 198

Kyrgyzstan will not rely on foreign aid – Otunbayeva, Ria Novosti (Jul. 5, 2010), available at

http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100705/159692046.html. 199

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 87. 200

Id. 201

Id. 202

Id. at 89.

33

tremendous outcry from his hometown.203 This even occurred as recently as November 2011

when, after falling quite clearly and unreservedly to Atambayev in the Presidential Elections,

Kamchybek Tashiev brought out his protestors.204

Popularity via ascending ties is not a pure function of money invested, and certain actors

can gain traction among the lower classes through sheer charisma. Feliks Kulov has never been

the favorite of his peers, as his numerous arrests and the laws tacitly forbidding his ascension to

presidency or premiership show.205 But the population of Kyrgyzstan trusts and respects him far

more than those who stand beside him in power.206 Conversely, the 2005 arrests of people such

as Atambaev et al. may have stirred parliamentarians into hue and cry, but the arrests did not

bring the Kyrgyzstani population into protest.207 The ties between individuals and societal groups

exist, and there is genuine devotion of a constituency towards its leader in some cases. But

converting those ties to a political system and not just the individuals‟ benefit has been a

tremendous sticking point as well as a hurdle to new entries into the political sphere, as discussed

previously.208 With the country divided into personalized factions, someone cannot rise to power

without seriously aggravating a powerful actor by stepping on his toes.

In a country where “legal nihilism has reached all aspects of state and social life,”

civil society is the only regulatory framework existent.209 Protests, no matter who leads them, are

the only form of redress in a country where a compromised court system is a given, and the only

203

Id. at 156. 204

“About 100 supporters of presidential candidates K. Tashiev and A. Madumarov began protest meeting at Osh”

Kabar.kg, (Nov. 2, 2011). http://www.kabar.kg/eng/regions/full/2580. 205

Kulov was arrested in 2000 and 2001. See, Who‟s Who in Kyrgyz Politics, supra note 69; Const. Art. LXII, §1

delimits the demographics of presidential candidates, stating they must be “…no younger than 35 years of age and

not older than 70 years of age, who has a command of the state language and who has been resident in the

republic for no less than 15 years in total…” (Emphasis added). 206

The TULIP REVOLUTION at 93. 207

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 206. 208

See infra, Part III, §B “Exclusionary Tactics” at 15. 209

Kyrgyzstan follows its Constitution?, supra note 83.

34

way to visibly perform mass politics.210 Here it sands to remember that the Constitution was

drafted by the former opposition, who did not want to see their gains lost in new protest.211

Constitutional law prevents individuals from being forced into participation.212 The Constitution

also honors assemblers with “the right to submit notice to state authorities” to ensure peaceful

conduct.213

For the constitution‟s platitudes that “[t]he people of Kyrgyzstan are the bearers of

sovereignty and the sole source of state power in the Kyrgyz Republic,” the political culture is

not quite there yet.214 Article three also ensures the “supremacy of the popular power, represented

and ensured by the Jogorku Kenesh and the President elected nation-wide” but it gives no tools

to implement this supremacy.215 The constitution is extraordinarily aspirational in this regard.

Personal allegiances are currently the status quo, as people have demonstrated devotion to an

individual, but much more tenuously to that individual‟s party or even the party system.

Compared to these allegiances, there has been far less accountability and the ascending ties

demonstrated in this section are still quite weak. The two are hardly synonymous, and the

Constitution acts as though these personal allegiances have been transformed into political

accountability with scant regard to the facts on the ground.

C. Adherence, Accountability, and the Yawning Chasm Between Them

There is no doubt that ties exist in Kyrgyzstan, and the difficult steps moving forward,

theoretically, would be turning these ties into accountability. Descending ties that bind a base to

a particular elite actor are particularly strong. These ties have been the key to widespread action

210

WEAPONS OF THE WEALTHY at 15. 211

Id. 212

There is a guarantee of prohibition “On coercion to participate in a peaceful assembly” See, Const. Art. XX,

§4(8). 213

See, Const. Art. XXXIV, §2. 214

Const. Art. I, §1. 215

Const. Art. III, §1.

35

and the ensuing turmoil of protests in the past decade. Unfortunately, these ties are also deeply

personalized. They have not been converted to party politics in any but the most cosmetic

fashion. To turn these ties to accountability and make party adherents feel capable of demanding

change and not only requesting aid from their leaders will take time and finesse. This change

remains a potential avenue of great growth. The road to party politics is the road to a government

up to international norms. It could also just as easily lead to uproarious failure. It could lead to

the gradual elimination of alternatives, as a single leader rises to authoritarian power.

Part VI: Concluding Remarks:

Bringing Local Norms towards International Standards

Sadykov‟s aspirational statement promising that “[t]he prime minister will be accountable

to the parliament and the parliament will be accountable to the electorate, the people,” shows

how much further there is to go.216 Institutions of governance exist within the strong and robust

civil society, but these are not the institutions preferred by the entrenched elites. The 2011

constitution is the first to even show the potential to fully ensconce these formal and informal

institutions.217 Co-opting contemporary institutions will likely be a much more beneficial

solution than creating parallel political institutions and may also be able to assuage concerns over

governmental corruption and repression.218

The chasm is wide between current-day Kyrgyzstan, with its swaths of society beyond

state governance, and the Constitution which implies popular politics and rule of law. Sadykov

216

New Kyrgyz Constitution Strong on Promises, Vague on Checks and Balances, supra note 10. 217

And that could perhaps be only the inability of proving a negative, that is, there is no way to categorically prove

that civil society is not part of political life 218

John Ishiyama, “Political Party Development and Party „Gravity‟ in Semi-Authoritarian States: The Cases of

Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” 4 TAIWAN JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 33, available at

http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0401/033-054-John%20Ishiyama.pdf.

36

remarks on the accountability required to put parliamentary rule into place, but not the

implementation required to further accountability.

Personalized politics are, at this stage, a given in Kyrgyzstan. Co-option of civil society

institutions would depersonalize politics and bridge the gap by creating legislation which would

bring the Constitution closer to Kyrgyzstani reality. International norms are well and good, but

they also lead to authoritarian tendencies.219 A legal system that adheres closer to reality allows

Kyrgyzstanis purchase into the political system that purportedly represents them and makes

ground-up change more possible, if not more hasty. Regulating civil society and bringing local

actors into a formal political process could give Kyrgyzstan a truly democratic way forward.

219

Desires for stability and reliability have led to ossified leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as much

teeth-gnashing from Washington, DC think-tanks on these issues. See, Joshua Foust, Why the U.S. Should Work with

Uzbekistan, The Atlantic (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/why-the-us-

should-work-with-uzbekistan/246221/; Joshua Foust, The Unicorn Principle and Regional Strategy, Registan.net

(October 25, 2011), http://www.registan.net/index.php/2011/10/25/the-unicorn-principle-and-regional-strategy/.