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Antoine Arnauld

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Antoine ArnauldFirst published Sat Jan 27, 2007; substantive revision Mon Jul 30, 2012

Antoine Arnauld (16121694) was a powerful figure in the intellectuallife of seventeenth-century Europe. He had a long and highlycontroversial career as a theologian, and was an able and influentialphilosopher. His writings were published and widely read over a period ofmore than fifty years and were assembled in 17751782 in forty-two largefolio volumes.

Evaluations of Arnauld's work as a theologian vary. Ian Hacking, forexample, says that Arnauld was perhaps the most brilliant theologian ofhis time (Hacking 1975a, 25). Ronald Knox, on the other hand, says, Itwas the fashion among the Jansenists to represent Antoine Arnauld as agreat theologian; he should be remembered, rather as a greatcontroversialist A theologian by trade, Arnauld was a barrister byinstinct (Knox 1950, 196). It is agreed on all sides, however, thatArnauld was acute and learned in theology as well as in philosophy.

Arnauld was an important participant in the philosophical debates of hiscentury, and carried out famous intellectual exchanges with Descartes,Malebranche, and Leibniz. In addition, the Port-Royal Logic, l'Art depenser, which he co-authored with Pierre Nicole, was a standard text inthe field for two centuries. Less attention has been paid to Arnauld'slifelong efforts to reconcile the doctrine of grce efficace par elle-mmewith freedom of will, though they have many connections with the debateabout determinism and free will that continues to this day.

1. Life and Works2. Arnauld on the Distinction between Philosophy and Theology3. Arnauld's Cartesianism

1

3.1 Philosophical method3.2 Mind-body dualism3.3 The Creation of the Eternal Truths

4. Arnauld and Malebranche4.1 Malebranche's position in the Treatise of Nature and Grace4.2 Two themes in Arnauld's criticism of the Treatise of Natureand Grace4.3 Does God act only by general volitions?

5. Arnauld and Leibniz6. Arnauld's Compatibilism

6.1 The Congregationes de Auxiliis and seventeenth-centurycontroversy about grace6.2 Baez, Jansen, and Arnauld on the nature of efficaciousactual grace of the will6.3 The limits of Arnauld's compatibilism6.4 Arnauld's late position on the nature of free will6.5 The advantages Arnauld claims for his new theory overJansen's theory

BibliographyArnauld's WorksRelated Early Modern WorksSecondary Works CitedOther Recommended Secondary Works

Academic ToolsOther Internet ResourcesRelated Entries

1. Life and WorksAntoine Arnauld was born in Paris on February 6, 1612, the twentieth andlast child of an important French family. He is often referred to in the

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French literature as Le Grand Arnauld. Another famous member of thefamily was his sister, Mre Anglique Arnauld. Installed by her wealthyand powerful father as abbess of the convent of Port-Royal in 1602 at theage of eleven, she later reformed the convent and it became a center ofintense religious life. Several of Arnauld's sisters were nuns at Port-Royal,where his mother joined them after the death of his father in 1621.

The young Antoine attended the Collge de Calvi-Sorbonne, where one ofhis fellow students was his nephew, Isaac Lematre de Sacy. Arnauldwent on to study philosophy at the Collge de Lisieux, and then decidedto follow in his father's steps as a lawyer. However, under the influenceof his mother and her confessor, Jean Duvergier, the abb de Saint-Cyran he changed his mind and began studies in theology in 1633.

About 1640, he joined a small group of solitaires who lived in thecountryside near Port-Royal and were associated with the convent. Theyincluded Pierre Nicole, Claude Launcelot, and Sacy. The solitairesinitiated the petites coles de Port-Royal which continued in variouslocations from the late 1630's until 1660. Their students included thedramatist Jean Racine. Later on, Arnauld cooperated with Sacy in the firstimportant French translation of the Bible.[1] He also co-authored theGrammaire gnrale et raisonne with Lancelot and La Logique ou l'Artde penser (hereinafter Logic), with Nicole. All of these collaborativeprojects had their origins in the petites coles. Blaise Pascal was closelyassociated with the solitaires beginning in 1655.

The year 1641 was an eventful one for Arnauld. He was ordained a prieston September 21. During the year, he completed the Fourth Objectionsto Descartes' Meditations and wrote De la Frquente communion(published in 1643). The first work established his reputation as aphilosopher. The second went through many editions and had an effect onCatholic sacramental practice up to the end of the nineteenth century.

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Jansen's Augustinus was also published in Paris in 1641, having beenpublished posthumously in the Netherlands a year earlier. It was attackedby the official theologian of Paris, Isaac Habert, who preached a series ofsermons against Jansen in the cathedral of Paris during Lent, 1643.Arnauld, who had arrived at an interpretation of Augustine similar to,though not identical with, that of Jansen, undertook, at the request ofSaint-Cyran, to defend Jansen against the accusation of heresy. This hedid in his Premire Apologie pour Jansnius, 1644, and SecondeApologie, 1645. Although Arnauld did not agree with important details ofJansen's view, he continued to defend Jansen against the charge of heresyoff and on for the rest of his life.

In 1653 the famous five propositions attributed to Jansen were declared tobe heretical by Pope Innocent X in the Constitution Cum Occasione.Arnauld and most of the Port-Royal group claimed that the fivepropositions, although heretical on their most likely interpretation, werenot in fact in Jansen's work. The dispute led to Arnauld's expulsion fromthe Sorbonne after a celebrated trial, which lasted from December 1, 1655to January 30, 1656. Pascal came to Arnauld's defense with the ProvincialLetters, published in installments from January 23, 1656 to May, 1657.The dispute lasted until 1669, when the French bishops who supportedArnauld worked out a compromise with Pope Clement IX, and Arnauldenjoyed almost a decade in the good graces of both the court and thePope. During this time, Arnauld wrote voluminously on the Eucharist, buthe also found time to co-author the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic, andto write his Nouveaux lments de gomtrie. However, in the late 1670's,the attacks on Port-Royal by civil and religious authorities resumed, andin 1679 Arnauld fled to the Netherlands, where he remained until hisdeath, in Lige, on August 8, 1694.

The last fifteen years of Arnauld's life, spent in self-imposed exile, wereamong his most fruitful in philosophy. During this period, he carried on

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his debates with Malebranche and Leibniz, and also reexamined hisposition on human free will. Arnauld's published criticism ofMalebranche began in 1683 with On True and False Ideas (hereinafterIdeas). But the central topic of the exchange was Malebranche's use ofoccasionalism to explain how it is that not all human beings are saved.Arnauld's criticism of that position is contained chiefly in the threevolumes of Rflexions philosophiques et thologiques sur le nouveausystme de la nature et de la grce (hereinafter Rflexions), published in1685 and 1686. Arnauld's famous correspondence with Leibniz wasinitiated by Leibniz in 1686, when he sent Arnauld the section headingsof his projected Discourse on Metaphysics.

2. Arnauld on the Distinction between Philosophyand TheologyArnauld considered it important to be clear about the distinction betweenphilosophy and theology. This concern is present in his work from thebeginning, in 1641, to the end of his published writings. Thus, he dividesthe Fourth Objections to Descartes' Meditations into the possiblephilosophical objections regarding the major issues of the nature of ourmind and of God and the problems which a theologian might come upagainst in the work as a whole (Descartes, 2:169). One of Arnauld'scriticisms of Malebranche is that he does not establish many of theprinciples in his system of nature and grace either by the proper methodsof philosophy or of theology. Again, in Rgles du bon sens, written theyear before his death, Arnauld warns, Be very careful about the nature ofthe question in dispute, whether it is philosophical or theological. For if itis theological, it must be decided principally by authority, whereas if it isphilosophical, it must be decided principally by reason.[2]

According to Arnauld, the chief purpose of theology is to defend thetruths revealed by God through Sacred Scripture and the teaching

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tradition of the Church. Part of the ceremony in which he received thedoctorate in theology from the Sorbonne was a vow, made before the altarof the Holy Martyrs, that we will give our life before leaving the truthundefended. In the speech he gave on that occasion, Arnauld emphasizedthe vow, which he said was instituted because the obligation to defendthe truth with force and courage is so indispensable in a theologian thatthose whose courage in this regard could weaken, should be committed toit by the holiness and piety of a solemn public vow (Traduction duDiscours latin prononc par M. Arnauld en recevant le Bonnet deDocteur, OA, 43:12). This intense religious commitment to his role as atheologian continued throughout his life. Combined with his combativepersonality, it helps to explain the passion with which he defendedindividual theologians, especially Saint-Cyran and Jansen, as well as whathe took to be the truths of revelation.

Regarding philosophy, Arnauld, like Descartes, held that its purpose wasto acquire useful knowledge through reason. That reason ought to beemployed only in the pursuit of useful knowledge is emphasized in theopening pages of the Logic. Arnauld and Nicole say that speculativesciences, such as geometry, astronomy, and physics can be used asinstruments for perfecting judgment and reason. This provides a use forsome of the nooks and crannies of those sciences, which wouldotherwise be completely worthless. They go on to say, People are notborn to spend their time measuring lines, examining the relations betweenangles, or contemplating different motions of matter. The mind is toolarge, life too short, time too precious to occupy oneself with such trivialobjects. But they are obligated to be just, fair, and judicious in all theirspeech, their actions, and the business the conduct. Above all they oughtto train and educate themselves for this (Logic, 5). Arnauld did not think,however, that philosophical sciences are useful only as instruments foracquiring virtues. Natural philosophy or physics can be made to serve thegood of human life in many ways. But even metaphysics is useful in that

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it can help the theologian in the task of defending the truth.

An outstanding example of that sort of usefulness, in Arnauld's view, wasDescartes' argument for the distinction of the soul or mind from the body.Arnauld refers to Descartes as a Christian philosopher, echoingDescartes' own use of the phrase in the letter dedicating the Meditationson First Philosophy to the Faculty of Theology of the Sorbonne, whereDescartes says that he carried out the injunction of the Fourth LateranCouncil (151317) that Christian philosophers should try to prove theimmateriality of the soul (Descartes, 2:4).

The authorities most often cited by Arnauld are Augustine and Aquinas intheology, and Augustine, Aquinas, and Descartes in philosophy. Arnauld'sattitude toward these predecessors is complex. From the outset of hispublished work in philosophy, he claimed that Augustinian themes werepresent in Descartes. However, in his late work, beginning with On Trueand False Ideas in 1683, he began to cite Aquinas frequently, as well asAugustine, both in philosophy and theology. Thus, in the 181 folio pagesof Ideas, which Arnauld describes as dealing with a purely philosophicaltopic, he cites Augustine twenty times and Aquinas six times, alwaysclaiming that they agree with Descartes and with his own position.Similarly, in the theological part of Rflexions, Arnauld relies heavily onAquinas's Christology while arguing that Malebranche's theodicy leadshim into heterodox, if not downright heretical, positions (OA 39:777).Again, in his late work on the problem of human free will and grceefficace par elle-mme, Arnauld took over what he says is the Thomisticposition that the will is free when it is a potestas ou facultas ad opposita.And in the controversy with Nicole and others over Nicole's theory of agrce gnrale, Arnauld relied heavily on Aquinas's account of cognition.So frequently did Arnauld rely on Thomistic formulations in his late workthat his friends reproached him for abandoning Augustine in order tofollow Aquinas, thus preferring the disciple to the master (Rgles du bon

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sens, OA, 10:154). This reproach had to do directly with Arnauld'srejection of the Platonism in Augustine and Jansen. But as shownbelow, Arnauld, late in his career, also parted company with Augustineand Jansen on the nature of human free will, and with Jansen's account ofthe nature of actual grace.

Arnauld had a scholarly knowledge of the history of philosophy andtheology, and was certainly aware of the important differences amongAugustine, Aquinas, and Descartes on such issues as the role of senseperception in human knowledge, the relation of the mind to the body, andthe nature of human freedom. But Arnauld wanted to emphasize thecontinuity of Descartes with the Christian past. Arnauld feared thatDescartes' philosophy would be made into a weapon against the Christiantradition. Emphasizing those elements in Descartes' philosophy that are incontinuity with Augustine and Aquinas was part of Arnauld's effort tomake of Cartesianism an ally, rather than an enemy, of the faith.

3. Arnauld's CartesianismUnlike Saint-Cyran, Jansen, and most of the Port-royalists, Arnauld had apositive appreciation of philosophy, and a lively interest in the subject(See Nadler 1989, 18 ff.). His philosophy is typically, and correctly,classified as Cartesian. Indeed, Leibniz said, in 1691, that Arnauld hadbeen in all ways for Descartes for a long time.[3] Arnauldenthusiastically endorsed Descartes' physics and the approach to mind-body dualism to which it gave rise. He also adopted some parts ofDescartes' views on philosophical method.

Arnauld's Descartes, however, is unlike the Descartes who is seen as thefather of the enlightenment and who anticipated many of thepreoccupations of recent analytical philosophy. This talk of Arnauld'sDescartes, is a reference to the philosophy that Arnauld crafted on the

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basis of Descartes' views. Arnauld claims, in effect, to set forth the gist ofDescartes' philosophy, but he did not hesitate to replace parts ofDescartes' philosophy with different though related propositions,especially when doing so made Descartes a more reliable ally in whatArnauld took to be his primary task, to defend the truths of the faith.

3.1 Philosophical method

In the Fourth Part of the Logic, On Method, Arnauld and Nicole presentan account of the distinction between analysis and synthesis that they sayis taken from a manuscript of Descartes lent to them by Clerselier. Whatthey present is a free translation of Rule Thirteen of the Rules for theDirection of the Mind. They then paraphrase the four rules given byDescartes in Part Two of the Discourse on the Method, saying thatalthough the rules are often difficult to follow, yet it is always helpfulto bear them in mind, and to heed them as much as possible whenever wetry to find the truth by means of reason (Logic, 23439). But Arnaulddeveloped the Cartesian position on philosophical method in a distinctiveway. In particular, he reshaped the notion of an idea, of a confused idea,of a clear and distinct idea, and of methodic doubt.

An idea, according to Arnauld, is the same thing as a perception (in thebroad sense of the term characteristic of seventeenth-century philosophy),and every perception has an object distinct from the perception itself.Every idea, i.e., every perception, is, in addition, a consciousness of itself.But this implicit reflexion makes present to the mind a perception thatis, in the first place, of an object distinct from itself. As Arnauld puts it, Iknow myself in knowing other things (Ideas, 6). It is obviously true, hesays, that we can know objects only through the mediation of ourperceptions, i.e., our ideas, of them: But if, by not knowing themimmediately, is meant being able to know them only by representativebeings distinct from perceptions, I hold that in this sense we can know

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material things, as well as God and our soul, not only mediately but alsoimmediately, i.e., that we can know them without there being anyintermediary between our perceptions and the object (Ideas, 31).

Arnauld says that the object of any perception has objective being in theperception. Furthermore, the object has objective being in the perceptionas having properties. If an object exists objectively in a given perceptionas having a given property, then Arnauld says that the perceptionrepresents the object as having that property, that is, makes the objectknown to the mind as having that property.[4] Furthermore, an idea (orperception) can represent its object to the perceiving mind as having thisor that property contingently or necessarily. Arnauld cites the dictum, itis in the idea of each thing that we see its properties, and takes it to referto an explicit reflection upon an idea that represents its object as havingcertain properties necessarily.

Arnauld argues at length that this theory of ideas was also held byDescartes (Ideas, 26ff.). This claim has puzzled philosophers fromThomas Reid to the present. (Reid 1785, 169.) A good example of themore common interpretation of Descartes' theory is provided by IanHacking, who also attributes the theory, as he understands it, to the Port-Royal Logic. Hacking begins with the first sentence of the First Part ofthe Logic: We have no knowledge of what is outside us except by themediation of the ideas within us, and continues, The Cartesian ego hasset the stage. The ego able to contemplate what is within it ponders whatlies outside There are some objects that we can contemplate withoutbeing logically committed to the existence of anything other than the ego.These objects are ideas. Borrowing an example from ElizabethAnscombe's comment on Berkeley, Hacking says that in the Cartesian(and Port-royalist) theory, Ideas [in the mind] are paradigm objects' andcoins [in a man's pocket] are not (Hacking 1975b, 2830). But thesentence that Hacking quotes from the First Part of the Logic does not

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demand the interpretation he gives it. It is consistent with the positionArnauld develops in Ideas (published in the same year as the fifth and lastedition of the Logic), according to which ideas are primarily perceptionsof external objects distinct from the perceiver, objects.like coins in aman's pocket; and only secondarily objects of reflexive perception.Arnauld makes a good case for the claim that this position was also heldby Descartes, but the claim is not universally accepted.

Arnauld's account of clarity and distinctness, obscurity and confusion ofideas can be found in the First Part, Chapter 9, of the Logic. Thediscussion proceeds by way of examples, rather than general definitions,but it can be summarized as follows: The basic properties of ideas areclarity and confusion. Clarity of ideas is the same as vividness, and this isa matter of degree; the opposite of clarity is obscurity. Confusion of ideasresults when a number of ideas are connected by false judgments, andconfusion produces obscurity. Opposite to confusedness of ideas isdistinctness. Arnauld and Nicole apply these distinctions to the idea ofpain: We can say that all ideas are distinct insofar as they are clear, andthat their obscurity derives only from their confusion, just as in pain thesimple sensation which strikes us is clear and also distinct. But what isconfused, namely that the sensation is in the hand, is by no means clear inus (Logic, 48). Again, Arnauld and Nicole speak of the obscure andconfused ideas we have of sensible qualities, the soul adding its falsejudgments to what nature causes us to know (Logic, 4950). The simpleidea of pain, for example, is a clear and distinct idea of a sensory state inthe mind, and the idea of the pain in the hand is a compound andconfused idea of something in the hand that exactly resembles pain. Beingconfused, the idea is also obscure, because what it is in the hand thatexactly resembles pain is by no means clear to us.

These comments on the idea of pain are part of a larger position on ideasof sensation. In a famous passage in the Fourth Objections, Arnauld

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objected to Descartes' statement, If cold is merely the absence of heat,the idea of cold which represents it to me as a positive thing will bematerially false (Descartes, 2:145). As part of his reply, Descartes says,If cold is simply an absence, the idea of cold is not coldness itself as itexists objectively in the intellect, but something else, which I erroneouslymistake for this absence, namely a sensation which in fact has noexistence outside the intellect (Descartes, 2:163). Arnauld developed ageneral account of sensory ideas that builds on this part of Descartes'reply. He sets out his account clearly in Ideas: Sensory ideas, like theidea of pain and the idea of cold, are perceptions of mental states. Takenapart from the judgments in which we falsely identify these mental stateswith states of material things, sensory ideas are clear and distinct. Theybecome confused, and hence obscure, only as a result of the precipitous,false judgments of childhood. Arnauld quotes Descartes' Principles ofPhilosophy, Part I, #68 in support of his account: We know pain, colorand the other sensations clearly and distinctly when we consider themsimply as thoughts, but when we would judge that color, pain, etc., arethings which subsist outside our thought, we do not conceive in any waywhat that color, that pain, etc., is (Quoted by Arnauld in Ideas, 132).

Arnauld's theory of clear and confused ideas implies that ideas, as theyare given to us by nature, and thus by God, are clear and distinct, andtherefore cannot be deceptive, or materially false. Any deceptiveness inour ideas derives from their confusedness and is the result of our misuseof freedom. It is not God who confuses us, but we who confuse ourselves.

Arnauld also gave a distinctive interpretation of Descartes' method ofdoubt. In the Fourth Objections, Arnauld offers, as the first of theproblems which a theologian might come up against in the work as awhole, the following: I am afraid that the author's somewhat free styleof philosophizing, which calls everything into doubt, may cause offenceto some people (Descartes, 2:151). Arnauld recommends that the First

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Meditation be furnished with a brief preface which explains that there isno serious doubt cast on these matters but that the purpose is to isolatetemporarily those matters which leave room for even the slightest andmost exaggerated doubt, and that the clause since I did not know theauthor of my being be replaced by since I was pretending that I did notknow the author of my being.

Arnauld was asking Descartes to make clear that his method did notinvolve real doubt, but only a consideration of what would happen if onewere to doubt. Consider this passage from the Port-Royal Logic: If therewere people able to doubt that they were not sleeping or were not mad, orwho could even believe that the existence of everything external isuncertain at least no one could doubt, as St. Augustine says, that oneexists, that one is thinking, or that they are alive From this clear,certain, and indubitable knowledge one can form a rule for accepting astrue all thoughts found to be as clear as this one appears to be (Logic, p.228).[5] This is as close as Arnauld comes to using methodic doubt, but itdoes not imply that one can really doubt the existence of an externalworld, much less that one ought to do so, even once in one's lifetime.

It is not clear to what extent Descartes would have agreed with thatinterpretation of methodic doubt. He did not adopt the first of Arnauld'stwo suggested revisions. Perhaps he thought that the point was covered inthe Synopsis of the Meditations. But he did adopt Arnauld's secondrecommendation by adding some words in parentheses in the SixthMeditation, thus: The second reason for doubt was that since I did notknow the author of my being (or at least was pretending not to), I sawnothing to rule out the possibility that my natural constitution made meprone to error even in matters which seemed to me most true (Descartes,2:53). On the other hand, Descartes begins the Principles of Philosophywith the remark, It seems that the only way of freeing ourselves fromthese [prejudices of childhood] is to make the effort, once in the course of

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our life, to doubt everything which we find to contain even the smallestsuspicion of error (Descartes, 1:193). Here Descartes advocates an effortto develop a real doubt on a wide scale, the sort of advocacy that hadaroused Arnauld's theological concern in the Fourth Objections.[6]

In sum, Arnauld adopted the Cartesian method that seeks to develop clearand distinct ideas and to limit assent to what is represented by them. Buthe gave his own distinctive interpretation of the key concepts in themethod, and eliminated from it anything that he saw as beingtheologically dangerous.

3.2 Mind-body dualism

If there is one part of Descartes' philosophy that met with Arnauld'senthusiastic approval, it is Descartes' mind-body dualism. Yet even hereArnauld's version of the Cartesian philosophy departed in important waysfrom Descartes' own views. Arnauld's departure did not have to do withthe distinction between mind and body; here he largely contents himselfwith endorsing what Descartes says.[7] It had to do rather with the unionof the mind and body in a human being. Arnauld rejected a claim at thecore of Descartes' position, namely, that the union of a person's mind andbody makes it possible for the mind and the body to exercise real causalaction on one another. Arnauld explicitly says that a person's body cannotact causally on his mind, and had at least some difficulty with the notionthat a person's mind can act causally on his body.

In 1680 Arnauld wrote an extended defense of the the philosophy ofDescartes regarding the essence of body and the union of the soul withthe body, against an attack by Fr. Etienne Le Moine.[8] Throughout thiswork, Arnauld quotes Malebranche as representative of the Cartesianposition, and what he defends under the heading, the philosophy ofDescartes, is actually a modified version of Malebranche.[9] Accordingto the Cartesian philosophy, says Arnauld, All the union (alliance) of the

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mind and the body which is known to us consists in a natural and mutualcorrespondence of thoughts in the soul with traces in the brain and ofemotions in the soul with movements of the [animal] spirits. It is notdenied, he adds, that there may be something unknown to us in theunion God has brought about between our soul and our body; what wedo know, however, suffices to show that the mind is not related to thebody as a pilot to his ship, but rather that the two are united in a greaterand more intimate union by which they form a single whole (Examen,OA, 38:141).

Arnauld next takes up a criticism raised by Le Moine against theCartesian account of sense perception, and this leads to the question,whether it is the bodily movements [in the eye] that cause theperceptions in the soul; or whether they are only the occasion on whichthe soul forms [the perceptions] in itself; or whether God gives [theperceptions] to [the soul] (Examen, OA, 38:146). Arnauld says that it iseasy to eliminate the first alternative: For since the motion of a bodycan at best have no other effect than to move another body (I say at bestbecause it may have not even that), who does not see that it can have noeffect on a spiritual soul? He adds that St. Augustine considered itbeyond doubt that a body can have an effect only on our body, and not onour soul. Arnauld rules out the second of his three alternatives on thegrounds that the soul cannot form sensible perceptions in itself on theoccasion of particular motions in the bodily sensory apparatus because thesoul is not aware of those motions. This leaves Arnauld with the thirdalternative, which he accepts, adding that God voluntarily undertakes tocause in our soul perceptions of sensible qualities whenever thecorresponding motions occur in the sensory organs according to the lawsHe himself has established in nature (Examen, OA, 38:148). Hesummarizes this conclusion by saying that our body does not act on oursoul as a physical cause (cause physique) but only as a moral cause(cause morale) (Examen, OA, 38:150).

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Arnauld had a quite different position regarding the causation of voluntarymovements in the body. He held that, in general, it is possible forimmaterial, thinking beings to act causally on material things, and that, infact, God has on occasion given angels the power to do so. He also heldthat the mind of Adam and of Eve had the power to bring about voluntarymotions in their bodies before the Fall, and that the minds of the blessedin heaven will enjoy that power. He suggests that the voluntary bodilymotions of human being in this life here below are not caused by theperson's volitions. His reason for this negative position is that post-lapsarian human beings do not know how to bring about the movementsof the animal spirits that cause the motions of their muscles and limbs.Thus he says, If one can say [that God has not given our soul a realpower to determine the course of the animal spirits toward the muscles ofthe parts of our body that we want to move], it is not [on the grounds of ageneral occasionalism like Malebranche's] It is only because our souldoes not know what must be done in order to move our arm by means ofthe animal spirits (My italics; Dissertation sur les Miracles de l'ancienneloi, OA, 38:690). Steven Nadler cites this text while arguing that Arnauldwas an occasionalist both about the causation of sensory perceptions bybodies, and about the causation of voluntary movements by the humanmind (Nadler 1995, 138). Nadler recognizes that Arnauld had quitedifferent attitudes toward the two cases, but nevertheless says thatArnauld alone among Cartesians recognized mind-body interaction as aspecific problem in Descartes' metaphysics, and used an occasionalistsolution (Nadler 1995, 144).

Arnauld's treatment of the union of mind and body shows that he was nota docile follower of Descartes, and indeed was prepared to develop thephilosophy of Descartes in ways that Descartes would probably not haveaccepted. It also shows that Arnauld was prepared to modify Descartes'philosophy in a way that increased its similarity to Augustine. It is well

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known that Arnauld pointed out similarities between Augustine andDescartes from the beginning of his published work, in the FourthObjections. In the present case, however, Arnauld changes thephilosophy of Descartes in a way that increases its similarity toAugustine. Arnauld did not mention Aquinas, though he could have doneso, as another authority who held that a material thing cannot produce animmaterial effect. It was only a few years later, in On True and FalseIdeas, that Arnauld began to claim an affinity between the views ofDescartes and those of Aquinas. But in his development of the Cartesianposition on the union of mind and body, one can already see Arnauldattempting to make of Descartes a Christian philosopher standing incontinuity with his great patristic and scholastic predecessors.

3.3 The Creation of the Eternal Truths

There is a continuing discussion of Arnauld's attitude toward the viewwhich Descartes expressed in answer to Mersenne's question by whatkind of causality God established the eternal truths. Descartes replied,by the same kind of causality as he created all things, that is to say, astheir efficient and total cause (Descartes, p. 25).[10] The debate has beengreatly influenced by Jean-Luc Marion's interpretation, in La thologieblanche de Descartes, according to which Descartes' position on thematter is fundamental to his metaphysics. Consequently, to the extent thatArnauld, in his mature writings, adopted Descartes' metaphysics, it hasseemed reasonable to say that Arnauld agreed with Descartes about thecreation of the eternal truths. Various attempts have been made to toexplain why Arnauld never made his posiiton explicit. The discussion iscomplicated by the difficulty of interpreting Descartes' own view.

4. Arnauld and MalebrancheNicolas Malebranche was born in 1638, when Arnauld was twenty-six

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years old. In 1660, Malebranche joined the Oratory, a center for priests inParis that had many connections with Port-Royal. Malebranche andArnauld were on friendly terms in the early 1670s, but late in the decadethey had a falling out over Malebranche's explanation of the fact that notall men are saved, and related matters.[11] In 1680, Malebranchepublished his position, against Arnauld's advice, in the Treatise of Natureand Grace (hereinafter TNG). The ensuing public controversy betweenthe two was a central event in the intellectual life of Europe in the lateseventeenth century.

Arnauld's attack on TNG began in a surprising way, with the publicationof On True and False Ideas in 1683. In it, Arnauld presents his ownposition on the nature of ideas, which was described above, and arguesthat Malebranche's view that we see all things (or at least all bodilythings) in God and by means of God's ideas is not only mistaken, butthoroughly confused and wrong-headed. This work engendered apreliminary debate that lasted for two years. The publication of Rflexionsin 168586 provoked further exchanges between the two in 1687, with alast gasp on Arnauld's part in 1694, the year of his death, and onMalebranche's part ten years later, in 1704.[12]

4.1 Malebranche's position in the Treatise of Nature and Grace

TNG provides a general account of God's reasons for creating a worldwith the evils that the world contains. But Malebranche is mainlyinterested in one particular evil, namely, that not all men are saved. Thatnot all men are saved he took to be a datum of revelation, plainlyexpressed in the Scriptures. But he denied that it follows that God doesnot want all men to be saved. Indeed, he says his motive in writing TNGwas to refute those who concluded that God did not have a sincere willto save all men:

If there were not in this century people determined to hold that

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If God wants to save all men, something must prevent Him from doingwhat He wants to do. In the Troisime Eclaircissement to TNG,Malebranche says that since God is omnipotent, He can bring aboutwhatever He wants to bring about. But because His will is the love Hebears for His own attributes, He cannot, by a practical will,[14] willanything or will in any way that is not wise: The wisdom of God rendersHim impotent in this sense that it does not permit him to will certainthings, or to act in certain ways (OM, 5:180). What prevents God fromcarrying out His will to save all men, Malebranche concludes, must bethat doing so would require ways or manners of willing that are unwise.As he puts it a few pages later, God's wisdom holds His volitions incheck, in the sense that not all of His volitions are practical volitions(OM, 5:184).

Malebranche argues that God's wisdom restrains Him from sanctifyingand saving all men because it directs Him not only to create a world thatis good, but also to create in a way worthy of Him, by ways (par desvoyes) that are simple, general, constant, and uniform (OM, 5:49). Moreprecisely, God's wisdom directs Him to an act of creating that bestcombines goodness or perfection of the created world with simplicity ofways of creating. An analogy may help explain Malebranche's position.Suppose that someone sets out to buy a car and wants to do the bestpossible job of car-buying. Suppose further that the second-best car isavailable at a much better price than the best car. In this case, doing thebest job of car-buying might require buying less than the best car. In asomewhat similar way, Malebranche holds that the best job of creating,

God does not have a sincere will to save all men, it would not benecessary to establish principles suitable for destroying thatunhappy opinion. But the need to combat errors brings to lightprinciples suitable to that end. I protest before God that that wasthe principal motive that made me write.[13]

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the one most worthy of God, involves creating a world less perfect thanHe might have made it, in particular, a world in which not all humanbeings are saved.

Malebranche's notion of the simplicity of God's ways of creating dependson his occasionalism. According to that theory of efficient causality, Godis the only true efficient cause. When creatures appear to be efficientcauses, they are really only occasional causes. That is, the events inwhich the apparent created causes take part are followed by other eventsin accordance with laws of nature, which are God's general volitions. Butthe created causes do not really cause the events that follow. Theseevents, like every created reality, are really caused by God.[15] ForMalebranche, the simplicity of God's ways depends on there being a smallnumber of laws of nature, and on there being few exceptions to the laws.Malebranche maintains that in order to do the job of creating that bestcombines goodness of the world created with simplicity of ways ofcreating, God had to make a world with precisely the natural evils(misshapen animals, human suffering, ugly landscapes, etc.) that that arepresent in the world as it is.

The anomalies in the order of grace are explained in a similar way.Malebranche divides grace, the divine assistance given to human beings,into two kinds, which he calls grace of light (lumire) and grace offeeling (sentiment) (OM, 5:9697; 131). The former is, quite simply,knowledge. Malebranche also calls it the grace of the Creator, becauseit is given, in different forms, both to Adam and Eve and to human beingsafter their Fall. Grace of feeling is the grace of Jesus Christ, and wasmerited for human beings by the life and death of Jesus. Malebranchealso describes it as a pleasure (dlectation) which makes a person loveGod (TNG, OM, 5:135). According to Malebranche, the grace of theCreator is dry, abstract, entirely pure and entirely intelligible and doesnot lead us to love God. The grace of Christ, in contrast, is efficace par

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elle-mme in that it always has its effect, always carries us towardGod (OM, 5:132). Human beings, after the fall of Adam, are unable togrow in holiness, or even to be saved from damnation, without the graceof Christ. But the love of God produced by grace is a sort of instinctivelove, which is not meritorious and is not sufficient for salvation. Whetherthe person who receives the grace of Christ is saved depends on theperson's free consent to the movement toward God that grace produces,which converts the instinctive love of God into a free and rational love.This consent is not produced by grace.

Now Malebranche holds that God could give to each person grace thatwould assure the person's salvation: God is the master of hearts. He cangive to the impious a grace such that it will convert him, since Godknows what degree of grace to give, and when it must be given, in orderthat it bring about the conversion of the sinner (OM, 5:186). Similarly,God knows what sort of grace would ensure that any person is not onlysaved, but also attain the maximum holiness of which he or she iscapable. But many who receive grace do not grow in holiness and are notsaved. For example, many who enter the Church later fall away. On theother hand, many fail to receive the grace that would ensure their holinessor even their salvation. For Malebranche, this is a troubling disorder inthe distribution of grace parallel to the disorder found in nature: Godoften distributes graces, without their having the effect that His goodnessmakes us believe He would make them have. He makes the piety of somepeople increase right up to the end of their life, but sin overcomes them atdeath and throws them into Hell. He makes the rain of grace fall uponhardened hearts as well as on earth that is prepared: people resist it andmake it useless for their salvation. How can that be reconciled withwisdom? (OM, 5:48)

Malebranche's answer is that God's wisdom dictates that He act, in thedistribution of both sorts of grace, according general volitions determined

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by created occasional causes to particular effects. In the case of the graceof the Creator, the general volitions are laws of nature and the occasionalcauses are the diverse movements of our will and the encounter ofsensible objects that act on our mind (TNG, 5:102). For the grace ofJesus Christ, the occasional cause if Jesus Christ, in his human nature,and the general volition is that grace be given to human beings if and onlyif Jesus Christ, in his human nature, asks that it be given. Jesus' requestsfor grace are made in view of the needs of the Church. But Jesus, in hishuman nature, does not always think of the future determination of thewill of those for whom he requests grace. The result is that, oftenenough, people receive grace that does not lead to their holiness andsalvation, or fail to receive the grace that would have done so (TNG, OM,5:83).

4.2 Two themes in Arnauld's criticism of the Treatise of Natureand Grace

Arnauld thought that Malebranche's position was dangerous, and that ifaccepted it would have ruinous consequences for the Catholic faith. Hewas furious, as Denis Moreau has aptly said, and decided to leavenothing standing in a philosophy that clearly frightened him (Moreau1999, 240). Here only the general lines of Arnauld's attack are clarified.First, two pervasive themes in Arnauld's criticism are described: (1) thatMalebranche often did not proceed by the proper method of eitherphilosophy or theology; and (2) that Malebranche speaks of God inanthropomorphic terms, as if He were subject to the limitations of ahuman agent.[16] Then we turn to Arnauld's main criticisms ofMalebranche's position that God acts vis-a-vis creatures by generalvolitions.

1. Throughout Rflexions, beginning with the Avant-Propos to thework, Arnauld challenges Malebranche to make clear whether his claims

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are based on reason or on Scripture and tradition.[17] He had mounted thissort of challenge even earlier, in Ideas: He does not say that he learnedthose grand maxims on which all of that [Treatise of Nature and Grace]turns by the revelation of God: that if God wills to act externally, it isbecause He wills to obtain an honor worthy of Himself; that He acts bythe simplest ways; that He does not act by particular volitions; but bygeneral volitions which are determined by occasional causes (Ideas,174). Nor could all of those maxims be demonstrated, in Malebranche'ssense of the term, for Malebranche says that only necessary truths can bedemonstrated, and yet he admits that God does sometimes act byparticular volitions, namely, when He performs miracles. HenceMalebranche himself would have to admit that the third maxim, at least, isnot demonstrable. In Arnauld's view, Malebranche came to accept suchprinciples because he thought they made God more loveable and hencewere favorable to the cause of religion. Thus he introduces, on the basisof religious considerations, principles that are not found in Scripture andtradition.

Arnauld thought that this unholy introduction of religion into what oughtto be treated as philosophical questions began with Malebranche's theoryof ideas, according to which we see all things in God. Thus, in theConclusion of his Dfense contre la Rponse au livre des vraies et desfausses Ides (OA, hereafter Dfense), Arnauld takes up two or threeobjections that might be raised against Ideas. The second objection isone that had been raised by Nicole: I could have avoided thisphilosophical topic [of the nature of ideas] so as not to interrupt what Ihad begun to write about the Treatise of Nature and Grace. In reply,Arnauld says, What was at the outset a question of philosophy is notsuch for [Malebranche]. For him it is a question of theology, very sublimeand very elevated. He considers it a religious duty to devote his wholemind to its defense. He finds it bad that others should disagree with him,and even says that anyone who is not of his opinion must be either an

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unenlightened philosopher or a man insensitive to his duties. Thus he haschanged the form of the dispute. He has involved religion, and hasbecome so devoted to his novel thoughts as to hold that anyone who doesnot approve of them lacks respect for the wisdom of God Himself(Dfense, OA, 39:666).

In Arnauld's direct attack on TNG, he says again and again thatMalebranche relies on principles that have neither a proper theologicalbasis in Scripture and tradition, nor a proper philosophical basis in reason.Clearly he thought that this criticism applied as well to Malebranche'stheory of ideas. But if Arnauld took seriously the remark at the beginningof the Logic, The reflections we can make on our ideas are perhaps themost important part of logic, since they are the foundation of everythingelse, he may well have thought that Malebranche's theory of ideas wasan important source of the confusion of theology with philosophy thatplagues TNG. That, in turn, would help to explain his decision to beginhis attack on TNG with a treatise on the nature of ideas.[18]

2. Arnauld agreed with Malebranche that God's will is reasonable, but hedisagreed with Malebranche's way of conceiving God'sreasonableness.[19] In both Book I and Book II of Rflexions, he tries toshow that Malebranche conceives of God's reasonableness as if it werethe reasonableness of a human being. In the second chapter of Book I, hereports a series of arguments given by Malebranche early in TNG for theconclusion that God acts in the order of nature only by general volitions.These arguments, says Arnauld, are only comparisons with men, which cannot prove anything with regard to God; or popular thoughts notworthy of a philosopher (OA, 39:188). For example, Malebranchesays that God decides to create that which can be produced and conservedby the simplest laws because he is an excellent workman, and anexcellent workman does not do by complicated ways what he couldcarry out by simpler ones (TNG, OM, 5:28). Arnauld objects that there is

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no similarity between an excellent human workman and God, since allthe ways of executing His plans are equally easy for Him, and Hispower, as the author [Malebranche] recognizes, makes Him so much themaster of all things, and so independent of help from elsewhere, that itsuffices that He will, in order for His volitions to be carried out (OA,39;18990). Hence God's volitions are not based on reasoning about themeans to achieve a desired end.

Book II of Rflexions, which deals with God's way of acting in the orderof grace, opens with a related criticism. Arnauld begins by analyzing aline of thought that Malebranche presents in the TroisimeEclaircissement to TNG (OA, 39:42551). The line of thought beginswith two claims: that God can act only for Himself. If He wills to act, itis because He wills to procure an honor worthy of Himself and thatGod can receive an honor worthy of Himself only from Himself. Yet Iam created, so I must be able to render to God an honor worthy of Him.This I can do, says Malebranche, only by becoming a part of the Church,of which the Incarnate Second Person of the Trinity is the cornerstone.More generally, God's great plan is to build in His own honor a spiritualtemple, of which Jesus Christ is the cornerstone His plan is that thisTemple should be as large and perfect as possible. Malebranche thendraws an important conclusion: God wills that all men enter into thisspiritual building, to enlarge it. God wills that all men be saved Godalso hopes that men will merit outstanding degrees of glory: His will isour sanctification (OM, 5:183). But although God wants the salvationand sanctification of all men, He loves His wisdom infinitely more, andHis wisdom requires that He act in the way that is wisest and most worthyof Himself, that is, in general, constant and uniform way, with the resultthat He does not save all men, although He truly wills that they all besaved (OM, 5:185).

Arnauld has much to say against that line of thought, and he begins be

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attacking its very first step, the claim that God can act externally only inorder to procure an honor worthy of Himself (OA, 39:42840).[20] Heobjects that this is not a proper way to speak about an infinitely perfectbeing. Once again, Malebranche is guilty of anthropomorphism. For hesays, in effect, that [God] could resolve to create me, me and the othercreatures, only for some advantage He wanted to obtain for Himself bycreating us. That is how [Malebranche] lowers [God], by claiming thatHe cannot decide to create anything externally, except to procure anhonor worthy of Himself (OA, 39:429). Arnauld goes on to contrastMalebranche's way of describing God's creation with that of St. Thomas,who say that the reason God creates is that His goodness tends tooverflow and communicate itself to other things.[21]

Arnauld also says that to speak about God as consulting His wisdombefore acting is to speak about God as one would about a human beingwho wills an end and is thereby caused to will the means to that end (OA,39:432). It is to compare God to a man who consults his wisdom abouteverything he wants to do as if he were afraid of not acting well, and hiswill needed to be ruled by something other than itself in order to do onlywhat is good (OA, 39:599600). Is it an expression of rigorousexactitude to say of God that He consults His wisdom, and that is how itcomes about that everything He wills is wise, Arnauld asks, as if theword consult is suitable for an infinitely perfect being when one professesnot to speak in popular language? As if God needed to consult Hiswisdom so that what He wills should be wise? As if His will were not Hiswisdom? As if everything He wills were not essentially wise, by virtue ofthe fact that He wills it? (OA, 39:578). God's will is not a force thatneeds to be tamed. The truth, according to Arnauld, is that it is impossiblethat God should have an actual (sincere) will for something that is not infact wise.

In a related criticism, Arnauld chides Malebranche for allowing very

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little freedom and indifference in God's creative action. Arnauld quotesMalebranche: Assuming that God wills to produce outside of Himself awork worthy of Himself, He is not indifferent in the choice; He ought toproduce the most perfect work possible by relation to the simplicity of theways by which He acts; He owes it to Himself to follow the rules of hiswisdom (Quoted by Arnauld at Rflexions, OA, 39:598, from TNG, OM,5: 110). Malebranche tries to save for God at least freedom andindifference with regard to creating or not creating. But Arnauld suggeststhat this move is ruled out by the way in which he conceives God'saction, for supposedly, on Malebranche's view, God would consult Hiswisdom before deciding whether to create or not, and just as His wisdomadvises Him to create this world rather than a less perfect one, assumingthat the two could be created in an equally simple way, His wisdomwould also advise Him that it is better to create than not to create (OA,39:599600).[22]

4.3 Does God act only by general volitions?

Arnauld devoted much of Rflexions to Malebranche's position that Godacts by general volitions and not by particular volitions. In Book I ofRflexions, his focus is on the order of nature and he tries to show thatMalebranche's claim that God acts only by general volitions is confusedand even self-contradictory. In Book II, his focus is on the order of graceand he attacks Malebranche's claim that God does not distribute grace byparticular volitions.

Arnauld begins his criticism in Book I by claiming that Malebrancheconfuses acting by general volitions and acting according to generallaws. Arnauld grants that God acts according to general laws. But againstthe claim that God acts by general volitions, he provides an argument thatis simple, and, his view, decisive: Whatever [God] does, He does inparticular, and not in general. But since to will and to do, in God, are the

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same thing, given that He creates each soul by a particular action, Hemust also will to create it by a particular will (OA, 39:175).

In some passages, Malebranche's language suggests that God's wisdomdictates that He engage in the act of creating that best combines thegoodness of the world created with the simplicity of the laws according towhich the world is created, and not with simplicity of the volitionwhereby God creates (TNG, OM, 5:147). This suggests that forMalebranche God does will particular created effects, though He willsthat they take place according to certain laws. But Arnauld did not thinkthat this was Malebranche's view. For suppose that God creates the worldaccording to a simple set of laws. Let these laws, as regards bodies, be thelaws of motion. A world created according to such laws might be moreperfect than a world not created according to general laws, or createdaccording to a different set of laws. But that would be of no help toMalebranche. For he does not say that a world regulated by simpler lawsis a more perfect world. Rather he maintains that creating such a world isa simpler act of creation in God Himself. But it is not at all clear howsimplicity of laws according to which the world is created would makeGod's way of creating simpler, especially if God's creative activityincludes the will to create every particular part of the creative world.Malebranche's real position, according to Arnauld, emerges in thosepassages in which he identifies the ways in which the word is createdwith the actions whereby God creates. For example, in the passage, Anexcellent workman ought to proportion his action to his work; he does notaccomplish by highly complex ways (voyes) what He can execute bysimpler ones (TNG, OM, 5:28). To this Arnauld objects that the volitionsby which God creates are particular.

Arnauld next points out that Malebranche does not say, withoutqualification, that God creates by general volitions. Rather, Malebranchesays that God's creative will is the cause of a particular effect; but he

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calls it general, because he holds that God has this will only when He isdetermined to have it by an occasional cause, which must be a creature(OA, 39:176). In other words, according to Malebranche, God causesparticular effects in creation, but the contribution of God's volition, asopposed to the contribution of created occasional causes, is general. Lateron, Arnauld says that, on Malebranche's view, it is really only the freevolitions of creatures that can be said to determine God, in view of Hisgeneral volitions, to produce a particular effect. For, according toMalebranche, God is the cause of every bodily event, including thosewhich, together with the general laws, are supposed to determine anygiven consequent event. (OA, 39:230). But Malebranche is committed, soArnauld argues, to the position that the free volitions of creatures are notcaused by God (OA, 39:24857).[23]

Arnauld goes further and says that Malebranche's position on God'screative will is, in fact, self-contradictory. For Malebranche was not ofthe opinion of those philosophers who believe that God originally createdall things, gave them the qualities necessary for their conservation and thepowers they needed in order to act, and then left them to act withoutfurther involving Himself. On the contrary, Malebranche insists thatGod is the sole cause of everything in the world, up to the smallestmovement of the smallest atom. But he also holds that God acts in theworld only as a universal cause, whose general volitions are determinedby the changes in creatures, as by so many occasional causes.Arnauld tries to show that these two positions are inconsistent with oneanother (OA, 39:23137).

Near the end of Book II of Rflexions, Arnauld takes up Malebranche'sarguments for the claim, God does not act, in the order of grace, byparticular volitions, as summarized by Malebranche in the PremierEclaircissement to TNG (OA, 39:621). Malebranche says that theproposition in question can be proved by reason in two ways; priori &

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posteriori; that is, by our idea of God, and by the effects of grace. Thechief a priori argument involves the claim that to choose occasionalcauses, and to establish general laws for carrying out some work,indicates an infinitely more extensive knowledge than to act by particularvolitions. Arnauld retorts, Is it something to be put up with, that humanbeings should have the temerity to make themselves judges of what isa sign in God of greater intelligence and wisdom? (OA, 39:624).

Arnauld quotes Malebranche's statement, The priori proofs are tooabstract to convince most people of the truth I am proposing. It is more propos to prove it posteriori, and goes on to consider the a posterioriarguments (OA, 39:62543). He is less sarcastic in dealing with thesearguments than with the a priori ones. He says that there are three or fourof them, but they all amount to the same thing: There are graces that areinefficacious, and this would not occur if God gave His graces byparticular volitions. He mentions three such arguments, based on thepremise that graces are given to sinners who are not entirely converted;on the premise that grace often falls upon hearts disposed in such a waythat the grace does not bear fruit; and, finally, on the premise that gracesgiven to sinners sometimes end up making them even more guilty.

Arnauld assumes that these arguments have to do with the true grace ofJesus Christ, as defined by St. Augustine: Inspiratio dilectionis, ut cognitasancto amore faciamus, an inspiration of love given to us so that weshould do the good with holy affection. Such grace is efficacious if itinfallibly has its effect. But the effect in question may be either proximate(prochain) or remote (loign). As in the famous example of Augustine, agrace may be efficacious in that it produces the desire to be chaste, andyet not efficacious in that it fails to produces chastity itself. Similarly,Malebranche's arguments assume that Every grace has the effect forwhich God gives it. But once again, this phrase may refer to the effectfor which God gives the grace by His absolute will, or to the effect that

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grace tends to produce by its nature and which for which God gives thegrace by His antecedent will. Arnauld grants that if God gives efficaciousgraces by particular volitions, then there are none that fail to have theproximate effect, which God intends they have by His absolute will. Butthey may well fail to have remote effects to which they tend by theirnature and which God wills only by His antecedent will. For example, ifan efficacious grace has the effect that a sinner repents, only to lapse backinto sin, then the grace had the proximate effect God intended it to haveby His absolute will, even though it failed to have all the effect to whichit tended by its nature and which God willed by His antecedent will. Inthis way, he disposes of Malebranche's three a posteriori arguments.

Arnauld ends Book II with a consideration of what he takes to beMalebranche's master argument. It is a fourth a posteriori argument. Hequotes from the Troisime Eclaircissement: There is no other way than[by saying that God does not act by particular volitions] to reconcile theproposition in Holy Scripture, God wants to save all men, with thisproposition, Not all men are saved (OA, 39:637). Arnauld rejects thisargument mainly because, like the other three a posteriori ones, it assumesthat God wills, by a true volition, the salvation of all men, and theconversion of sinners (OA, 39:641).

Arnauld agreed with Malebranche that God could have brought it aboutthat all men are saved and did not do so. But he favored an Augustinianview that all men in this context means all sorts of men, that is, menof all races, occupations, etc. He did not entirely reject the Thomisticview that God's will for the salvation of all men is God's antecedentwill rather than His consequent will, that is, God's will other thingsbeing equal rather than God's will all things considered. Arnauld pointsout that Malebranche's position might be thought to be a version of theThomistic one, but adds that according to St. Thomas God's antecedentwill is a wish rather than an absolute volition (une velleit plutt qu'une

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volont absolue) (Rflexions, OA, 39:198, cf. 39:576).[24] Arnauld firmlyrejects any notion that God wills the sanctification and salvation of eachand every person in a strong sense of will such that His will would becarried out unless there were something to prevent it, or, in Malebranche'swords, to hold it in check.[25]

5. Arnauld and LeibnizOn February 11, 1686, while the controversy between Arnauld andMalebranche was at a peak of intensity, Leibniz wrote to Landgrave Ernstvon Hessen-Rheinfels, asking that the Landgrave send Arnauld asummary of a short discourse on questions of grace, the concourse ofGod and creatures, the nature of miracles, the cause of sin and the originof evil, the immortality of the soul, ideas, etc. (The Leibniz-ArnauldCorrespondence, Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz,herausgegeben von K. I. Gerhardt, Vol. 2, hereinafter LA, 11). Theensuing correspondence occurred at a crucial point in the development ofLeibniz's philosophy. The Discourse on Metaphysics, the final version ofthe short discourse, marks the beginning of Leibniz's mature metaphysics,and it shows the influence of the correspondence with Arnauld.

Leibniz had corresponded with Arnauld some fifteen years earlier, inconnection with Leibniz's efforts to reunite the Christian churches. Theseefforts took a new turn in March, 1672, when Leibniz, then just 25 yearsold, left Mainz for Paris on a secret political mission for his patron, BaronJohann Christian von Boineburg, who was in turn minister to JohannPhilipp von Schnborn, the Elector of Mainz. Both men were convertsfrom Lutheranism to Catholicism. Leibniz's diplomatic mission was afailure, but he had other reasons for wanting to visit Paris. He was eagerto enter into the brilliant intellectual life of the French capital, and hestayed there, with a brief sojourn in England, until 1676, making theacquaintance of a number of leading intellectuals. During this time, he

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undertook for the first time the serious study of mathematics. But he alsocontinued to work toward a philosophical position that he hoped wouldhelp reunify the churches.

Before coming to Paris, he had discussed the project of reunifying thechurches with his patron Boineburg, and had corresponded with Arnauld,in 1671, about the Eucharist, proposing an account of the real presencethat he thought would be acceptable to both Lutherans and Catholics. Butit was Leibniz's interest in theodicy, and related problems aboutjustification, that flourished in Paris. There, in 1673, he composedConfessio Philosophi, a dialogue in Latin between a theologian and aphilosopher that is sometimes referred to as his first theodicy. Thirty-seven years later in the Theodicy, Leibniz says, While I was in France, Icommunicated to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had written in Latin on thecause of evil and the justice of God. This was not only before his disputeswith R. P. Malebranche, but even before the book on The Search afterTruth had appeared. The principle that I here maintain, that sin waspermitted because it was involved in the best plan for the universe, wasalready employed there, and M. Arnauld did not seem hostile to it(Theodicy, #211).

Soon after Leibniz's arrival in Paris, both Boineborg and von Schnborndied, and Leibniz turned for support to another important German nobleand convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism, Johann Friedrich vonBraunschweig-Lneberg (Hannover). On 26 March 1673, Leibniz wroteas follows to Johann Friedrich:

The famous Arnauld is a man of the most profound and wide-ranging thought that a true philosopher can have; his aim is notonly to illuminate hearts with the clarity of religion, but, further,to revive the flame of reason, eclipsed by human passions; notonly to convert heretics, but, further, those who are today in the

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There is no record of any response by Arnauld to the ConfessioPhilosophi, but when Leibniz returned to the problems of theodicy, in1686, he once again sought Arnauld's cooperation by sending Arnauld theoutline of the Discourse on Metaphysics that was mentioned above. Theoutline sent to Arnauld was no more than a list of the propositions thatwere to appear as the titles of the thirty-seven sections of the Discourse;the entire correspondence was carried out through the intermediary ofHessen-Rheinfels; and the copies of letters received by the two majorcorrespondents were sometimes defective. These facts, together with theextreme subtlety of the philosophical contents of the letters, have madeinterpretation of the correspondence very difficult.

Proposition 8 in Leibniz's outline is: In order to distinguish the actions ofGod from those of creatures, it is explained wherein consists the notion ofan individual substance (LA,8). The notion of a substance is, for Leibniz,the notion of a thing that acts. To explain the notion of a createdindividual substance, therefore, he has to explain the notion of a createdagent, which requires that he distinguish correctly between the actions ofcreatures and the actions of God. Part of Leibniz's account of the notion

greatest heresythe atheists and libertines; not only to vanquishhis opponents, but, further, to improve those of his persuasion. Histhoughts, then, come to seeking how, so far as it is possible, areform of abuses, frankly wide-spread among dissidents, wouldovercome the cause of the division. In this design, on severalpoints of importance, he has made the first step and, as a prudentman, he goes by degrees. I am distressed that we have lost vonBoineburg just when I have struck up an acquaintance withArnauld; for I had hoped to bring these two minds, so similar intheir honest soundness, on the road to a closer agreement, TheChurch, as well as the Fatherland, has sustained a loss with thisman (Quoted in Sleigh 1990, 1516).

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of an individual substance is given in Proposition 13: The individualnotion of each person includes once and for all everything that will everhappen to him, so that one sees in [that notion] a priori proofs of thetruth of each event, that is, why one [event] has occurred rather thananother (LA, 8). The debate between Arnauld and Leibniz begins here.Proposition 13, Arnauld said in his first letter to Leibniz, implies thatonce God decided to create Adam, everything that has happened sinceand will ever happen to the human race was and is obliged to happen witha more than fatal necessity (LA, 27). For example, given proposition 13,if Adam exists, then necessarily Adam is father of Cain and Abel as sons,grandfather of their children, great-grandfather of their children, etc., andeverything that will ever happen to all of them is already determined.

After a complicated three-way exchange of letters, Arnauld withdrew hiscomplaint in a letter dated September 28, 1686. At the outset, Arnauldassumed that according to Leibniz whatever is contained in the individualnotion of a person is contained there as a necessary property of theperson. But in response to Arnauld, Leibniz says that he does not ask formore of a connection here than that which obtains between an individualsubstance and its external denominations (LA, p. 56). Given thisunderstanding of the way that individual notion of a person containseverything that will ever happen to him, Arnauld was prepared to concedethat Leibniz's position did not involve fatalism (LA, 6364).

Arnauld adds that he continues to have difficulty with Leibniz's accountof the possibility of things and his conception of God as choosing theactual world out of an infinity of possible worlds, a point on whichLeibniz agreed with Malebranche. But Arnauld says he does not want togo into that difficulty. Instead, he asks Leibniz to clarify his hypothesisof concomitance or agreement between substances, and his statementthat if a material thing is not merely an appearance, like a rainbow, or anaccidental aggregation of parts, like a pile of stones, it must have a

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substantial form. Leibniz had mentioned both of these points in hisimmediately preceding letter (LA, 6466, 58). According to thehypothesis of concomitance no created substance ever acts upon any othercreated substance. But every later state of any given created substance iscaused by an earlier state of the same substance, and the histories of theindividuals are coordinated by God so that they fit together into thehistory of the actual world. Leibniz also says that one substance, x, mayexpress another substance, y, more distinctly than y expresses x, and inthat case, one may say that x causes changes to occur in y. He uses thisposition to explain the relation of mind and body. Arnauld asked him toexplain his view further by applying it to the example of a man who feelspain when his arm is wounded, and the example of a man wants to takeoff his hat and raises his arm. Arnauld also raises seven objections toLeibniz's claims about substantial forms (LA, 6667) and defends theCartesian view that extension is the real nature of matter, which he takesto imply that bodies have only varying degrees of improper unity (LA,88).

Leibniz provided the further clarification Arnauld requested in severallong letters, which drew two replies from Arnauld. Arnauld continued tofind Leibniz's position unclear. I have no clear notion, says Arnauld, ofwhat you mean by the word expression, when you say that our soulexpresses more distinctly (all other things being equal) what pertains to itsbody, since it is an expression even of the whole universe in a certainsense (LA, 105). He takes Leibniz's views about substantial forms to be astrange and unsuccessful attempt to ascribe true unity to bodies [inparticular the bodies of animals] which would not otherwise have it (LA,107).

Arnauld's last letter to Leibniz is dated August 28, 1687. Leibniz tried toget Arnauld to continue the discussion, but Arnauld was fully occupiedwith other projects. On August 31, 1687, Arnauld wrote to Hessen-

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Rheinfels, saying, It would be preferable if [Leibniz] gave up, at least fora time, this sort of speculation, and applied himself to the greatestbusiness he can have, the choice of the true religion a decision that is ofsuch importance for his salvation (LA, 110).

Evidently Arnauld had less interest in Leibniz's philosophy thanMalebranche's, and less patience with it. This is not surprising, given thatArnauld considered his work in philosophy subordinate to his work as atheologian. The fact that Malebranche was a Catholic made hisphilosophically motivated departures from the tradition all the moredangerous in Arnauld's eyes. It also gave Arnauld some hope that hecould lever Malebranche out of his position by pointing out its heterodoximplications. Leibniz did not pose a similar danger, nor were theregrounds for a similar hope in his regard, unless, of course, he heededArnauld's advice and converted to Catholicism.

6. Arnauld's CompatibilismThroughout his enormously active life as a philosopher and theologian,Arnauld was above all concerned to defend the doctrine that humanbeings, after the fall of Adam, can perform meritorious actions, but onlyif the actions are the result of a supernatural grce efficace par elle-mme.Arnauld claimed to find this doctrine in the writings of Augustine; hedefended Jansen's version of the doctrine against the charge of heresy,even though Jansen's version was significantly different from thatespoused by Arnauld himself; and he attributed the doctrine to Aquinas.But Arnauld, like Augustine, Aquinas, and Jansen, also held that actionsare meritorious only if they are free. For this reason, Arnauld issometimes said to be a compatibilist. For example, Robert Sleigh says,It is worth noting that Leibniz and Arnauld both ascribed compatibilismto St. Thomas and that both accepted compatibilism as well (Sleigh1990, 29).

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There is, however, a case to be made that the position Arnauld defendedand attributed to St. Thomas is in fact quite different from what isnowadays referred to as compatibilism. The position is connected withArnauld's treatment of free will during the last decade of his life, at thetime when he was wrestling with Malebranche's theory of nature andgrace. At that time, Arnauld adopted the position that the human will isfree when and only when it is a potestas ou facultas ad opposita. Butfirst, it is necessary to provide some background for the notion of grceefficace par elle-mme.

6.1 The Congregationes de Auxiliis and seventeenth-centurycontroversy about grace

The point of departure for the disputes about grace and free will inseventeenth-century Europe was the inconclusive ending of theCongregationes de Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae.[26] These were ad hoccommittees of Cardinals convoked to resolve a dispute between theJesuits and Dominicans about grace, predestination, and free will. Thedispute was concerned with a work by the Jesuit Luis de Molina, whoselengthy title indicates the scope and complexity of the dispute: ConcordiaLiberi Arbitrii cum Gratia Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia,Praedestinatione et Reprobatione ad Nonnullos Primae Partis DiviThomae Articulos (The Agreement of Free will with the Gift of Grace,Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination and Reprobation,according to several articles in the First Part of St. Thomas). The workwas published in 1588 and was immediately attacked by the Dominicanschool of Salamanca, led by Domingo Baez. The Congregationes wereconvoked by Pope Clement VIII with the aim of resolving what hadbecome a widespread struggle between the two orders. His hope wasfrustrated; the meetings began on January 2, 1598 and were terminated onAugust 28, 1607 (the feast day of St. Augustine!) by Pope Paul V, whodeclared that neither side was heretical and that both sides had merit.

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A central question at the meetings of the Congregationes had to do withthe relation of supernatural grace to meritorious, free acts of will. It wasassumed on both sides that a human being cannot perform a meritoriousact of will without supernatural assistance from God, that God sometimesgives this assistance, and that it is sometimes part of God's providentialplan that the recipient freely cooperate and thus perform the act inquestion. Meritorious acts of will include, among others, the decision topray, to seek forgiveness for past sins, and to perform a good action forthe love of God. It was assumed by both Jesuits and Dominicans thatGod's providential plan is infallibly realized. Hence both sides agreed thatsupernatural grace is, in at least some cases, infallibly efficacious(Vansteenberghe 1928, #2140). The issue was whether the supernaturalgrace in question is efficacious by itself, in other words, intrinsicallyefficacious, or whether it is efficacious only by virtue of the independent,divinely foreknown cooperation of the one who receives the grace(Vansteenberghe 1928, #215465). Several sorts of supernatural gracewere distinguished. For our purposes, the most important distinctions are(a) between habitual grace (especially the theological virtues of faith,hope, and charity) and actual grace; (b) between external actual grace(e.g., hearing a good sermon) and internal actual grace (grace consistingin internal, mental acts); and (c) between internal actual grace of theintellect and internal actual grace of the will. The question was whetherthe actual grace of the will that infallibly produces a meritorious act ofwill is efficacious by itself, or whether instead its efficaciousness isexplained in part by God's knowledge that the recipient would cooperatewith the grace.

6.2 Baez, Jansen, and Arnauld on the nature of efficaciousactual grace of the will

Jansen and Arnauld, like Baez, defended the position that actual grace of

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the will is sometimes intrinsically efficacious.[27] But they disagreedabout the nature of such grace. According to Baez, efficacious grace isthe supernatural counterpart of physical premotion. The elusive notionof physical premotion is part of a general account of God's causation ofthe actions of creatures. According to this account, God is a cause of acreature's action by bringing about in the creature a premotion thatresults in the creature's carrying out the action in question. For Baez,then, the actual grace in question is a sort of supernatural beginning ofvolition that is produced in the human being by God and that infalliblyresults in a meritorious act of will. Jansen rejected this notion, arguingthat it is an obscure hypothesis that explains nothing. He held thatefficacious grace is, instead, a feeling of love, which he called adelectatio victrix (victorious pleasure) and which infallibly leads to ameritorious act.

Arnauld accepted neither of those views. In a work published in 1656, heconsiders two positions on the nature of efficacious grace, in so far as it isthe principle of good will: Some say that such grace consists in themercy of God and in an inherent form [in the creature], while others saythat it consists only in the mercy of God, which brings about (operatur)the interior movement of the mind. Arnauld says I am not far from thesecond position, which he attributes to Bradwardine, Estius, Tiphanius,and many other [Thomists] (Dissertatio theologica quadripartita, OA,20:237).

When Arnauld returned to questions about efficacious grace and free willtoward the end of his life, he was more categorical: The true opinion ofSt. Augustine, St. Bernard, and St. Thomas concerning actual grace, isthat of Estius, who posits nothing created by God in the will in betweenthe will of God, which he calls uncreated grace, and the free movement ofthe human will which the uncreated grace produces in the human will.Jansen was surely mistaken, Arnauld adds, when he defined actual

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grace as a non-deliberate victorious pleasure (Letter to du Vaucel, 8May 1693, OA, 3:636).[28] In a short treatise on human freedom writtenalmost a decade earlier, Arnauld illustrates his criticism of Jansen(without mentioning him by name) with an example: Suppose that a manwho is not very generous is approached by a beggar who asks him foralms. He deliberates, proposes to himself the commandment of Christ,and gives alms for the sake of God (De la libert de l'homme, OA,10:620). Hereinafter Libert). Jansen assumes that there is a non-deliberate act of victorious pleasure in between the man's deliberation andhis decision to give alms for the sake of God, and that this non-deliberatepleasure is the actual grace that enables him to act in a meritorious way.Arnauld rejects this position and instead identifies the efficacious gracewith God's merciful will that the man arrive at the deliberate decision togive alms for the sake of God.

Yet Arnauld also assumed that the man's decision, like any meritoriousact of will, was free. Arnauld's basic position on the compatibility of theintrinsic efficacy of grace with the freedom of the volitions produced bythe grace, is that we know from Scripture and Tradition, supported byphilosophical reflection on God's omnipotence (a) that the grace of Christis intrinsically efficacious; and we know from our own experience (b)that our volitions of the relevant kind are free. Hence we know that (a)and (b) are consistent, even though we have great difficulty in seeinghow they fit together (OA, 10:436).

6.3 The limits of Arnauld's compatibilism

Arnauld was, then, a compatibilist of sorts. The compatibilism heespoused, and attributed to St. Thomas, however, was limited, and differsin a number ways from the sort of position philosophers now labelcompatibilism.

1. Arnauld was not a determinist, nor did he attribute determinism to St.

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Thomas. Arnauld cites Aquinas (Summa Theologicae I, 19, 3) as anauthority in favor of his own view that God's will with regard to creaturesare not necessary (OA, 39:598).

2. Arnauld held that freedom of human volitions is incompatible with thedetermination of the choices by laws of nature together with temporallyantecedent events. Thus he responds to Malebranche's statement that thedestruction of Jerusalem by the Romans some seventy years after thedeath of Jesus was a necessary outcome of the laws of nature, bysaying, It is clear that a long series of diverse events, that dependedon an infinity of free movements of the wills of men, could have been,and indeed were, regulated by the providence of Him who has analmighty power to move the hearts of men, and to direct them as Hepleases But it cannot be said that it was a necessary consequence ofthe laws of nature without degrading human beings, making them act likelower animals, and depriving them of their liberty, a position that hasbeen declared anathema by the Council of Trent (OA, 39:301). Herepeats the criticism a few pages later: As I have shown above, to holdthat events that depended on an infinity of free volitions of human beingswere a necessary consequence of laws of nature is to deprive humanbeings of their freedom, after the example of Wycliffe (OA, 39:316).[29]

3. According to the position Arnauld attributes to Aquinas, the sinfulchoices of human beings are not determined by any cause exterior to thesinner. Arnauld agreed with Aquinas that God is the sole exterior cause ofthe volitions of a human being, that is, the only efficient cause ofvolitions outside the human being himself or herself, but God nevercauses a person to sin. Arnauld cites Summa Theologiae, I-IIae, 9, 6, ad 3,in which Aquinas answers the objection that God cannot be the soleexterior cause of sinful choices. Aquinas says, God, as the universalmover, moves the will of man to the universal object of the will, which isthe good. And without this universal movement man cannot will

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anything; but man through reason determines himself to will this or that,whether it be a true or only an apparent good. Nevertheless Godsometimes moves some men especially to will something determinate thatis good (interdum movet Deus specialiter aliquos ad aliquid determinatvolendum quod est bonum), as in those He moves by grace (Vera S.Thomae de gratia sufficiente et efficaci doctrina dilucide explanata, OA,20:63).[30] Arnauld's purpose in citing this text is to show that, accordingto Aquinas, when one sins, one is not moved by grace.[31] But the text,together with the premise that there is no exterior cause of human volitionother than God, implies that sinful choices are not determined by anycause outside the sinner.

6.4 Arnauld's late position on the nature of free will

In several letters toward the end of his life, Arnauld recommends a littleLatin text on human freedom that he wrote at the time he was wrestlingwith Malebranche's theory of nature and grace, saying that it isparticularly helpful in connection with the problem of reconcilingintrinsically efficacious grace with freedom of will.[32] The core ofArnauld's new theory is that the human soul has freedom of will withrespect to a true or apparent good when it has the power to will that goodand the power not to will it. In such cases, the soul determines itself towill or not will the good in question. The human soul is said to have thispower with respect to any particular good it apprehends, as long as theparticular good does not encompass all the good toward which the willtends. Arnauld cites I-IIae, 13, 6 as part of the Thomistic origin of histheory:

Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that whichis possible not to be, is not of necessity. For man can will andnot will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do thisor that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the

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Arnauld follows Aquinas in saying that the will is not free with regard totwo objects, first, happiness, apprehended as the ultimate object ofvolition, and, second, God, seen face to face by the blessed in heaven. Inthese two cases, one wills (or loves) the object with necessity of nature,and hence not freely. In all other cases, the will is free, and when onewills, one does so freely.[33] Arnauld provides a compact formula for thistheory: The best and shortest notion one can have of free will is to saywith St. Thomas that it is potestas ou facultas ad opposita (Letter toBossuet, juillet 1693, OA, 3:662).[34]

6.5 The advantages Arnauld claims for his new theory overJansen's theory

Arnauld claims a number of advantages for his theory of free will overthat of Jansen. In particular, he claims that, whe

ARNAULD, Antoine - KREMER.2012.Stanford

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