Army Combat Lessons ~ Feb 1942

8/9/2019 Army Combat Lessons ~ Feb 1942

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COMBATLESSONS

NUMBER 2

Rank and file In combat:What they're doing

How t h e y . d ~ it

*N Cl A-S Sl"f5l,.:n@gsTPB8 . DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.-The information contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics ofrestricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the UnitedSta tes and to persons of undoubted loyalty an d discretion who are cooperating in Gov-ernment work, but will not be. communicated to. the public or to the press except byauthorized military public relations agencies. (See 3,lso par. 18b, AR 380-5,28 Sep 1942.)


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.'NTR'ODUCTION

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Theparamou:tIt combat lesson learned from every opera-tion is the v i ~ a l importance of leadership. .Our e q u i p ~ e n t , our supply, and, above all, our men, are splendid. Aggres-sive and determined leadership is the priceless factor whichinspires a command and upon which all success in battledepends. It is responsible for success or failure.

Chief of Staff


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CONTENTS'

SECTION ONE-LEADERSHIP Page'Leaders vs. Inertia------------------------------ ....- 1Discipline ------------------------__ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2Trial by F i r e - ~ - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4

SECTION TWO-NORMAL OPERATIONS_Combat in T o w n s - - - . , - - - - - - - - ~ - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - 6

Battalion Attack-Italy.:..'--:...---------.,--,--------.,----.:. 15Fighting in Wooded Terrain-------------- ....------- 18Infantry Notes----:'--------.:.-------.,.----'------------- 19

The Importance of Speed .::.__ 19The Herd InstincL '______________________ 20German Registered Fires________________________ 20Base of Fire .:.. '- ...:____________ 21

.Teamwork .,- ~ . - - - - - - - - - - - - 21- i n Which the Outposts Were Not "Posted"'-_____ 21Field Artillery Notes-----------------------------: 22Artillery vs. Tanks '_ -, .,-- 22:Night Reconnaissance -" . '-------- 23'The Observation Battalion in Action ~ ' _ _ ~ ~ _ 22Use of Artillery ObseI;,vation Planes'-_____________ 23Observers on Their Own__ . _'____________ 24Orientation and Survey .,-____ 24Notes From' Other A r m s - - - - - - - ~ - ' - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - 24Tanks: Keep off the' Sky Line L________________ 24AAA: Absence Makes the Heart Grow Fonder____ 254.2" Chemical MOIitars: Target Practice_________ 25


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SECTION .. TWO--NORMAL: , O P E R A T I O N S ~ C o n . Pag(;lRadio c Communications--'---'-----------'---,--------::. 26Intelligence ~ - - - - - - - - - - . . . : ~ - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28Captured D o c u m e n t s ~ - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28Overdoing the "Buddy" System _'_ _ 28Password and Countersign ... ~ - - - - .29Training N o t e s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 29. Speed Marching__ ,- _ 29Reports and. Messages _'_:... -' _ 30

"Ohange Posts !" - - __ ..._:... :_----- 31Oombat Training for Engineers _ 31Miscellaneous Notes _'_ _'_ _ 31Com bat Zone Miscella ny--;--- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ...----- 32AA Small Arms Fire Discipline _ 32Hygiene: Any Day Is Saturday '-- _ 32 'Dirt Breeds .:. _I n f e c t i o n ~ 32

33andbagging Vehicles ~ A Foxhole in Time Saves Lives _ 34Use of the Oompass-- _'_ _ 34

SECTION THREE--MOUNTAIN OPERATlONSB a t t a l i o n A t t a c k - - ~ - : . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : . . . - 35----- '-- as Seen by the Staff---------------------- 37----- asSeen by the S o l d i e r - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - 41.Field Artillery N o t e s - - : - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : ~ - - - 52

Use. of Artillery Spotting PHmes-_--, - _ 52Get a IIorse _'_ __ :...________________ 52Engineer Operations---------------------------'--- 53

The "Engineer War" in Italy "-_______ 53Paving the Way ..:______________________ 53T a n k s - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - 53


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Prepared from Cpmbat Reports and pub-lished by direction of the Chief of Staff byOperations Division in collaboratioriwithother Divisions of the War DepartmentGe.neralStaff, Army .Ground Forces, ArmyAir Forces, and Army Service Forces. Illus-trated with the assistance of the Presenta-. tion Division, 0 ffice.:of Strategic Services.


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LEADERS V5. INERTIA

Lieutenant Colonel R. E . . O j B r i e n ~ C a v a l r y ~ ObserverWith Fifth A r m y ~ ITALY: "In spite'of the fact that lob-served many interesting things in the practice of tactics andtechnique, still the one lesson that stands out in my mindabove all others isthe onethat is so well known by militarymen that itsstatemerrt here amounts to little more than aplatitude. Imention it, however, becausei t had such a pro-found effect upon me. That lesson is the importance of andn e e ~ for adequate leadership.

"The effect on most men of the impact of battle is tocause them to want to do nothing. A determined effortmust be exerted to accomplish even simple tasks, and menare likely to neglect duties which they know must be per-formed. There is no force other than a driving leadershipto overcome this inertia, this tendency t carelessness, andto infuse a determination to succeed in the minds of theindividual men. W ~ e n this spark of leadership is present

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collective s a n i t a t i o n ~ carryin.g out. orders in'general, assump-.t ionand proper discharge or'responsibility throughout thechain of command, e t ~ . There is an inclination for men aswell as for some officers to 'go native? in the tropics, to letdown mentally on material and spiritual values, so' disciplineis .especially needed here. Needless to say, I consider an

,aggressive offensive spirit always.' goes hand in hand- withgood' d i s c i p l i n e . ' ~

*) Lieutenant Colonel Clifton F. voti K a n n ~ 77th Field Artill e r y ~ ITALY:, "The great stress placed on d i s c i p l i n e ~ n d t h e chain of command is not an overerIl:phasis and never can be.We have found again and again that the higheststandardsofdiscipiine are absolutely necessary in and out of combat.1nno, other way can you be assured that the. individualsoldier will carry out orders without s!lpervision, and incombat this is essential.

h, The Basis of Good Disciplil'1e "One of our problems hasbeen to get junior officers and young NCOs sufficiently hardboiled to exact from their subordinates a meticulous obedi-ence to every order. We must ingrain in all ranks t h realization that orders are not' to be treated as suggestionsbut .as Concrete facts calling for the utmost ,effort until theyhave been carried out. So many, people seem to feel thatorders which are incorivenientor. unpopular are to be dis-regarded. This state o f mind is a disease and must beeliminated. On the other hand suchan elimination presupposes that all COs and Staffs take care that the ordersthey issue are c o n s i s t e n t ~ c o r r e c t ~ and. capable .of beingcarried o u t / ~

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.e. Master Your Job Lieutenant General Walter Krueger:, '


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duties with the maintenance section in the vicinity of theunit ration dump they were attacked by Japs who had sur-rounded them. He grabbed.a BAR and"advanced on a Japmachine gun that was delivering intense, accurate, and ex-tremely effective fire 'into the dump. Private Hertzsch was'able to silence this machine gun and then continued to aidaggressively in the defense of the position until reinforce-ments. arrived." *Be Brave Intelligently! Lieutenant Colonel R. E. O ~ B r i e n ~ C a v a l r y ~ Observer With Fifth A r m y ~ ITALY: ' "A prisonerof war, a German light-machine gunner, asked an inter-

lTogator whether A m ~ r i c a n s t o q k stimulants to make themfoolishly brave. When asked to explain what he meant, hestated that he and an assistant gunner were in positionwith a good field of fire one afternoon when a group ofAmerican soldiers was observed approachit:lg. He firedseveral short bursts and began preparation to displace to therear when he saw the A.merican soldiers rise to full heightand start charging toward his position over a hundred yardsaway. He reloaded his gun and opened fire, killing 11 men.He then withdrew because he was sure the charge was madeto conceal an envelopment, but none was made."Dnit commanders 'found it necessaryto direct their mento make full use of concealment and covered approach.Continued emphasis on the necessity for dispersion and useof cover and concealment is essential."

. \'COMMENT: In the ,interests of efficiency bravery must be supplemented .by brainwork. Dead heroes are of .little further use to theirunits; . aqqressive fiqhtinq men trained to apply the most efficienttechnique to c ~ m b a t problems, willinq to accept any necessary risks.and conscientiously avoidinq unnecessary risks are the backboneof the army.

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COMBAT IN TOWNSAs major campaigns develop in Western Europe) combat

in towns assumes increasing importance. Cities, towns, andvillages control the established .road nets which must beopened for the movement of the guns, heavy equipment,and supplies necessary to support t.he advance of infantry.

Recently the German defense of CASSINO has illustratedthe importance of towns in" tactical operations. CASSINOsits' astride' the road to Rome. Infantry attacks by-passingthe town were limited in effectiveness by our inability tomove, supporting .artillery and supplies forward in sufficient quantity to continue operations to the north. Fur-thermore, heights held by the Gerrriansbeyond CASSINOfurnished observation which made attacks on the towncIifficult. "

Not many towns will so effectively block' the. advance ofa Jarge. force, but the same problem, in varying degrees ofdifficulty, will arise, again and again. Combat in townswill .often be the key not only .to our successful advancebut to' s:uccessful defensive actions.6


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Attack of Towns CaptainW. E . H a r r i s o n ~ Parachute In-; f a n t r y ~ ITALY: "The theory of attack of a small town orvillage is to' work groups around the flanks, cut the'retreat,and move in with patrols. In this hilly country, however,we have found that where there is any high ground behindthe town which dominates both the town and the line ofretreat, the best way is to work the entire force around thetown under cover, seize the high; ground in rear, andfirmly establish ourselves with 60mm mortars on that dominating high ground. We take enough food and ammunition with us to last 24 hours, and the G e r ~ a n s usually pullout during this time. From our position we can preventreinforcement and inflict heavy l o s s ~ s onthemduring theirwithdrawal.

"The road, through the town or village'is always blown,and it can't be used until the Engineers can get to work."

*Lieutenant Colonel'L. G. F r e e m a n ~ Parachute Infantry

Battalion Commander, ITALY: "We learned at ALTAVILLAto avoid the direct attack of towns. It's too costly. Wenow work around to' the rear with a large force and seizethe dominating groun9- in rear. We did this at CALLa,MACCHIA; FaRNELL!, and several other places the names ofwhich I've forgotten. I t worked every time. Get yourself within 60 min-mortar range of the town, on .dominatingterr,ain in r e ~ r of it, and the Germans won't stay' in it."

COMMENT: The fact that. Germans have been known to withdrawwithout a ' fight from towns in rear of which' we hold dominatingterrain does not. necessarily mean that such will invariably be therule. However. thispossibil{ty plus the fact that seizure of suchhigh 'ground will greatly facilitate any subsequent attack on the

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town proper suggests that commanders should give serious consideration to these tactics where the terrain permits. It also should beremembered that if such high g r o u n d i ~ held by, th.e enemy, ourattack of the town proper will invariably be costly and the, townitself untenable.In planning the attack of a town proper the following considerationsshould be borne in mind:

1. R e d ~ c e d observation, and limited .fields, of fire place heavierstress on, close combat.2. ' C o n t ~ o l of attacking troqps will be difficult, and much dependson individual initiative and a g g r e s s i v e n e ~ l j l of small !lnit leaders.3. Where possible, towns should be by-passed, isolated,' andattacked from the flanks or rear.4. The use of tanks in aCtual street, fighting. is limited by thedifficulty of maneuver, the impossibility


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Alert for snipers, our patrols enter an Italian town. Thearchitectural design provides little cover for move-ment without exposure and requires covering firefrom rooftops commanding the street.and shutters, and usually with a courtyard inside. Most ofthe streets are quite narrow with a solid wall of two- tofour-story buildings on both sides, making it impossible fortroops to find cover from snipers without breaking openthe heavy doors, which are frequently secured with largeiron bars. The unevenness of- the rooftops and the inac-cessibility of the houses make it slow and difficult to out-flank hostile groups firing down the streets.

"There is usually one main through street in each townwhich is wide and straight. Accurate German artilleryand mortar fire was in each case registered on these streets.

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Numerous large churches with high domes or steeples pro-vided snipers and enemy observers with excellent. obi,ervation for several hundred yards down principal s t r e ~ , t s andside streets.

"It was f o ~ n d necessary to place s t a ~ i o n a r y ' observers onbuildings for sniper protection as the columri moved downthe streets, since it was impracticable for patrols to parallelthe column along the rooftops. It is advisable, in additionto patrols down side streets, to send patrols promptlyt?investigate' church steeples and tall buildings overlookingthe route of march, as these . were. frequently found to beoccupied by snipers. I t appeared that observers Jrom suchpoints would observe troops entering the town so as to callfor .prearranged fires when, the main. body of the troopsarrived. Such OPs should be destroyed by artillery fire

before troops enter thestreets and should bekept under machine-Cover your advancethrough t ~ w n s ! gun fire to neutralize.snipers until patrolscan complete their investigation. Such-firing, kept up duringthe march into town,would' have the addi-tional advantage ofkeeping civilians offthe st r ee t s, undercover, and out of theway of the troops.Locks should be shotoff and houses brokenopen as troops movein, . for cove!." from

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artillery fire. as well as to allow investig


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OMINES

HASTY DEFENSE OF GIUGLIANO

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outskirts were merely outposted. Platoon combat groupswere organized at the principal street intersections, byoccupying two or three adjacent buiJdings. Machine gunswere located at each of these intersections to fire down thestreets in all directions. In this way solid bands of grazingmachine-gun fire could cover the spaces between combatgroups. Also AT guns and mines were used to block principal entrance roads. Reserve units held interior -inter'sections, prepared to counter.,.attack."COMMENT: The defense of a town must be prepared to _meet themethods of attack which may b e ~ m p l o y e d by the enemy. Sincethi,s must include the. possibility of flanking attacks and e ~ c i r c l e -ment, .it follows that an all-around defense must be the rule.

The following points, not covered in the experiences quoted above,should be borne in mind in planning the defense of a town:

1. Avoid if possible placing principal centers of resistance closeto landmarks or at edge of. town where enemy adjustment of~ r t i l l e r y or mortar fire will be facilitated. Positions either outsideof or within the town should be chosen. '2. Where practicable, form salierlts by organizing outlying buildings .to cover perimeter of town with flanking and enfilade fire.3. In addition to ' a central reserve within the', town, provide., ifpossible for a concealed m o b i l ~ r e s e r v ~ (preferably strong inarmor) to be held outside the town to counter enemy flankingmaneuver.4. Wherever adjacent terrain features d o m ~ n a t e the town theyshould be secured. This' use of high ground may be the keyto successful defense.5. Within the town. the c o n s t r u c t i o ~ of street obstacles or barricades to impede enemy movements. and the organization ,ofqrouplil of buildings into strong points should be carried out asextensively as ,the time available will permit.6. In delaying actions the defensive use of towns will prevent, theattacker from determining the strength of the. lorces opposing him.7:.It is normally not advisable\ to organize a town as an isolatedstrong point except under terrain conditions. which prevent theenemy bypassing i t

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... -J:lo

Plan for the double envelopment attack by the battalion which took Guardia.


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BATTALION ATTACK-.-ITALY

Mission Lieutenant Colonel Earl T a y l o r ~ I n f a n t r y ~ Bat-talion C o m m a n d e r ~ ITALY: "On 11 Octpber my battalionwas ordered to make a night march, pass thtoughthe 2dBattalion (which was then about 3 miles east of the Italiantown of GUA R D I A ~ north of the CALORE RIVER), andseizethe high ground in the vicinity of GUARDIA. We werethen to continue the advance.Contact "As we approached GUARDIA our leading com'pany made contact with the enemy at A. (See sketch.,)I t enveloped with one platoon but was stopped by heavymachine-gun and direct 88-mm. fire from points E,F ,and D, and was unable to advance. I immediately mov.edto the high ground 200 yards north of A where I couldobserve the enemy position. .Plan of Maneuver "The enemy had all of the highground to the front, and I could see it would be impossibleto advance frontally. So I decided to make a double envelopment, sending Company I over the hill to the rightand Company K on a wide envelopment to the left. , Contact was to be maintained visually with Company I and bythe 536 radio 1 with Company K. Actuaily the 536 radiodid not carry the distance CompanyK had to travel andit was necessary to send a 511 set 2 later to maintain -contact, which was absolutely necessary in such a m o v e ~ e n t . Base of. Fire "Five tanks were available for the attack.Realizing that the tanks equId not move down the road toG U A R b I A ~ w h i c h was the only tank approach due to the

1 A SY2-pound "handy-talkie" t r a n ~ m i t t e r - r e c e i v e r . 2 A 20-pound battery-operated, short-range transmitter-receiver.

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streams and high mountains, and because the enemy had 88sandarmored cars ~ F, I decided to emplace the tanks alongwith my eight heavy machine guns and six 81-mm. mortars,as shown on the sketch, asabaseoffire to enable Company Lto advance frontally on D.

Results "The attack was successful. By order, the tanksand other supporting weapons opened fire 5 minutes before

' f ~ 9 : r n p ~ n y L started its advance. Fifteen prisoners were.cap'tured and 25 of the enemy killed. Our casualties wereapproximately 10 killed and 15 wounded.

"The enemy strength as determined from prisoners wastwo rifle companies, each reinforced, one at D and one at E,supported by tanks, armored. cars, and 88s along the roadat F. These prisoners s t ~ t e d that their force was so completely disorganized and demoralized by our volume of fireand the scheme of attack that it was impossible for themto make a counterattack to regain their positions.Planning "It took about 2 hours to make plans for thisattack, which was very carefully studied, plamied, and coordinated. lt effectively utilized the terrain features.Every weapon available to the battalion was used.

"In such an attack, maps must be prearranged with criticalpoints and. phase.lines marked for the enveloping units, ~ that the commander can be informed as to their location atany given time and effect coordination by radio or signalwithout disclosure of the transmitted information to theenemy.

"Once an attack is started the basic plan cannot bechanged. It must succeed.

"Estimating the situation and planning should be empha-sized in training."16


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COMMENT: This. a ~ c o u n t is a good example of "fire and movement"on the battalion level. However. i t should be pointed out that adouble envelopment is a rather ambitious scheme of maneuver fora single battalion and should be used with 'Caution.

No mention is made of ,the constitution of a reserve force. Sucha reserve must be retained under the control of. the commanderto .enable him to c o u n t ~ r u n f o r ~ ! ; e e n enemy r e a c t i ~ n as the attackprogresses. Troops committed to a plan of action can not be con-sidered as available for this purpose.

The division of the battalion into approximately three equal attackforces is open t? criticism-but it worked in this case. A scheme ofmane.uver should include a determination of the direction of' themain effort. and the preponderance of force should be-aV"ailableto support this effort. In the case cited above a reserve mi


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This panoramic view, looking toward Av.ellino, is char-acteristic of the terrain along the Italian battlefront.

FIGHTING IN WOODED TERRAINLieutenant Colonel F. L. Walker, Infantry Battalion

Commander, ITALY: "The area in which my battalionoperated was covered with thick scrub trees and fruitorchards, interspersed with frequent farm houses, manystone walls 6 to 8 feet in height, and numerous sunkenroads. Fields of fire were greatly restricted. Averageobservation was only 50 to 100 yards.

"Enemy delaying groups with machine guns were widelyscattered and impossible to locate until arrival within 100yards or less. I t was found necessary to place heavy18


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saved us from huge losses. Down to the lowest private,the feeling exists that we would still be"" at CANICATTI i fwe had not pushed the enemy off balance and kept" himthat way."

The Herd Instind Major f?obert Wilson, Observer with-th Division, ITALY: "Our troops showed" a decided tendency to bunch up under fire. This was observed on severaloccasions. One prisoner of war, a German forward observerfor an 88-mm. battery, was., interrQgated concerning" .histechnique of adjustment. I t seems he had been told thatAmerican troops congregated when under fire. Whenhes ~ American"troops advancing he "was to call for one ortwo rounds in their" vicinity and to observe the area inwhich they congregated. Fire was then to be shifted tothis area. This prisoner stated ,that he had conductedvery effective fire in this way on s e ~ e r a l occasions in Italy."

*erman Registered Fires Private First Class Dorycz, Infantry, SICILY: "Our battalion advancedbeyendthe mainbody and took a high hill position. There we waited forreinforcements. The e n e m y ~ a s he often does when he isabout to retreat and does not want to haul back his ammunition-threw all of his. available ammunition at thecrest of the hilL The" proper procedure as we learnedlater should have been for us to disperse clown the side ofthe hill part of. the way, which would have preserved ourposition and also would not have presented a 'pin point'for their artillery."Just at dusk on another occasion our battalion stormedand took an area. 'Under cover of darkness we withdrew.During the night the Germans bombed and shelled what20


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they. thought was our' new position. Our observers,. prop-erly placed, noted the enemy gun positions and they wereknocked out the follpwing day."

*Base of Fire Lieutenant Colonel J. M. F i n n ~ InfantryBattalion C o m m a n d e r ~ ATTU: "It was found that so longas the Japs could keep us ducking from aimed fire theirposItion remained secure. But once the Jap was made tokeep. his head down and the American could get to his feetthe. attack was merely a matter of walking up to the p,osi-tion and tossing in grenades. To make .this possible required the coordination of fires. down to and including theriflemen. It is important that commanders and leadersrealize this. Otherwise, troops will remain down whenit is not necessary.Teamwork "We would have a rifleman point out pillboxes using tracer ammunition. Then a 37-mm. gunwould take them under fire with HE. Oftentimes the pillbox crew would attempt to evacuate to a safer place, anda light machine gun would ~ o them down."

*--in Which the/Outposts Were Not "Posted" Lieu-tenant ColonelT. F. B o g a r t ~ I n f a n t r y ~ O b s e r v e r with FifthArmy; ITALY: "One night in the v i ~ i r i i t y ofAVELLINO thebattalion established an outpost line around the high groundtQthenortheast of the city. . Patrols were ordered up severalroads leading out of the city. All company commanderswere informed of the dispositions. The patrols went outbefore the outposts were posted. A few hours later firing

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was heard at the battalion CP, which increased in tempo andkept upmost of the' night. Soon reports were sent in thatGerman patrols were operating out.in front of the outposts.Next morning it became apparent that our own ,patrols hadbeen fired on as they attempted to return through t h outpost line.'J .COMMENT: The constant recurrence of such reports indicates thenecessity for closer coordination of patrol activity with the outpostsystem. Positive steps must be taken to insure that the routes ofreturning patrols, are known to the outposts and that recognitionsignals are arranged.

*IELD ARTILLERY NOTESArtillery vs. T a ~ k s Lieutenant Colonel F. Q. Goodell,Field Artilltry, Observer with VI Corps, ITALY: "Direct'fire of I05-mm. howitzers is credited with stopping theGerman 'armored threat on D+4. One battery knocked outfive tanks with six individual rounds a a range of two tothree hundred yards.The Observation Battalion in Action' "Location of hostile artillery by sound ranging, was highly effective whertweather and terrain were favorable. One battery of thedivision artillery, firing on sound-located t a r g ~ t s , usually.individual 88-mm. guns, is credited with keeping these hostileweapons on the move and m a t e r i ~ l l y aidinR the advance ofthe division:"

*Lieutenant Colonel R. E. O'Brien, Cavalry, Observer withPifth Army, ITALY: "OUf sound ranging was accurate butusually 3 to 5 minutes too slow. One prisoner r ~ p o r t e d thathis battery always prepared three or four positions. After22


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firing from one position a maximum of 5 "ar 6 minutes, hisbattery was moved to another position. Several times hestated that our -artillery fire fell on the old position within3 to 5-minutes aftertney had evacuated;"

*Night Reconnaissance Artillery Operations Report, 3dDivision, SICILY: "On August 15 and 16, in order to place

artillery within effective range of the en--emy who ha,d retreated at dark, artillery battalions weredisplaced -to- forwardpositions which wererec


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Observers on Their Own' Lieutenant Colonel' R. E.O'Brien, Cavalry, Observer with Fifth ArmyjITALY: "Onedivision discovered that the worst thing that could happento the artillery planwas for the observers to becomeseparatedfrom the responsible infantry. commanders. .When thishappened there was always the danger that the observerswould bring fire down on their own troops.Orientation and Survey "Generally field artillery bat-teries were fired in, but survey was always completed. Dec-lination of instruments was difficul.t and unsatisfactory be-cause of the ground metal presen't in the solI of this area.Fire was con?ucted satisfactorily from 1 :.50,000 scale mapswhen observation was available, the vertical control beinglargely approximate from this map."

*NOTES FROM OTHER ARMSTanks: Keep off the Sky Line! Lieutenant Colonel T. F.Bogart, Infantry, Observer\ with Fifth Army, ITALY: "Iwitnessed a lone tank approaching the'sky line cautiously, then .pause momen,:,

tariIr right on top bfKeep off the skyline! the hill as if observingto the. front. At thatinstant a German shellhit him; and the tankand. crew were casual-ties. An old story butfrequently forgotten."

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Antiatrcraft:Absence Makes the Heart Grow' FonderLieutenant Colonel T. F. Bogart, Infantry, Observer withFifth Army, ITALY: "The importance of having antiaircraftunits present, even though their fire is often ineffective, wasimpressed on me on, 5 October 1943, in the vicinity ofMONTESARCHIO. After several weeks of almost completeabsence of German aircraft, four Jerry planes appeared overthis town and dive-bombed it,coming in very low., Theyreceived no .A:A fire. It was surprising, because almost invariably AA units had kept up close tp the front-line units.There were 60 trucks lined up at 50- to 100-yard intervalsalong the main highway. The Jerries spotted these truckson the first dive and strafed this column, and bombed' thetown at leisure for about 40 minutes from very low altitude,until apparently all their ammunition was gone. In allprevious air attacks the Jerries had dropped their bombsand left promptly under heavy antiaircraftfire. It was evident that AA units played their part in keeping enemy planesup in the air and on their way."

*

4.2" Chemical M o r t ~ r s : Target Practice Battle Report,- t h Chemical Battalion, SICILY: "Early on the morning of11 July one platoon of Company B fired on what was evidently an Italianreconmi.issance patrol of 15 men approaching GELA from the north. The fire chased the Italiansf r o m ~ n e draw to another and then to a haystack, where onevolley fell' directly in their ~ i d s t . T h e wickedness of thismortar's HE shell was therewith duly proved:. No furthermovement was observed."

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RADIO COMMUNICATIONSRadio Discipline First Lieutenant C. E. Place, Air Corps,SICILY: HFliers coming into the combat zonehad no con-ceptiqn of radio discipline. New 'pilots used the radioindiscriminately. Men returning from missions used theinterplane radio unnecessarily, which jammed up the bandfor other planes still on a mission."COMMENT: Failure to observe radio discipline is a major problemfor both air and 9'round units. In combat each individual believeshis case a special'onj not bound by established rules. This tendencymust be discouraged by positive action. Radio discipline. is established to. facilitate essential communication during combat and isnot a peacetime plaything to be discarded' when action is ioined.

*Training of AAFRadio Mechanics "Radio contact withthe A-36swas. very poor. The main trouble was that theradio repairmen did not h a ~ e a chance to train on theVHF. (Very High Frequency) sets (which we used) before

.they left the United States, and were getting their experi-ence in combat. In their training the radiomen did notget a chance to use the old style aircraft sets because theywere locked' ,up after the pilots used them. One or twomen were sent to a school to work. ~ those sets, but nOJ).ehad any experience with ,the radio in the actual planes.The result was that radio communication was bad, thoughit slowly improved in combat., "In August 1943, the first week of?peration o v e ~ CAPEBON, radio communications were not used, because theradios did not work. Possibly one or. two' sets in a forma-tion were operating. I n t ~ r p l a n e communication was by26


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visual ,signals, which was extremely difficult in '. largeformations."German Countermeasures Sergeant E. G. Dekett, In-fantry, Communications Clerk, SICILY: "The operatingfrequency of the transmitters was changed twice everymonth in- Sicily, but the Germans often jammed the band.We had no alternate frequency set up in the event onewas thoroughly jammed, because permission was not givento companies to carry the alternate crystal to the frontlines."

*Second Lieutenant ]. L. flare, Field. Artillery" SICILY:" T h e ~ n e m y tried to jam the frequency .of, artillery firedlrecti,ng planes with what sounded like Oriental music,but the frequency-modulated sets had a clear channel andthe messages came through."

*Sergeant E. O. Erkhilla, Infantry, Message Center Chief,SICILY: "The communications officer warned us that thelarger radios intended for communications between thebattalion and the regiment would draw fire. Thereforewe planned to use these sets only in case of emergency onCW 'when the phone was out. When I was hit ,we hadbivouacked for the night and used the radio inasmuch asthe telephbnelines were not yet i n Soon thereafter, theCP was, fired on by heavy artillery. Three of our menin t h GP were killed outright."COMMENT: Officers charged with organization of CPs should insistthat all the longer-ranged radio sets such as the SCB 245 or SCB 193,are located from 500 to 800 ,yards from the main CP are.a. Localtelephone lines and runners can be used for inter HQ communication.

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INTELLIGENCE

Captured Documents Regimental Operations R e p o r t ~ VELLALAVELLA: "On 4 September a patrol froffiA Com-pany, led by Lieutenant King, ambushed- a patrol of 12Japanese in the vicinity of BOKo MISSION. Upon searching the bodies they found a map on the body of a 2d Lieutenant and dispatched it immediately to the regimentalcommand post by a runner. The next day the translationof this map was returned to the 1st Battalion. It showedthe Japanese defensive plan of LAMBu-LAMBU COVE andthe VALAPATA area and proved very effective in eliminating the Japanese from the area."COMMENT: Not only marked maps but also documents of less'apparent i ~ p o r t a n c e m a y furnish the key to enemy. plans whencombined with other information. The necessity for prompt forwarding to higher headquarters of all captured documents must beimpressed onall ranks.

*Overdoing the "Buddy" System Lieutenant Coland R.E. O ~ B r i e n ~ Cavczlry:. Observer with Fifth A r m y ~ ITALY:"It was necessary repeatedly to w ~ r r i the troops ag4inst theincorrect practice of fraternizing with prisoners and givingthem cigarettes, which interfered with their prper inter'rogation. Troops 'also had to be warned not to removepay books from the prisoners, because these books furnisheda check to the interrogation officer on the prisoner's state

..ments in regard to his organization and previous service."COlVIMENT: Successful interrogation often hing-es on the nervousnessand strain under which prisoners labor. when they are brought before the interrogator.. Consequently,. any. action by the troops whichtends to reduce this strain an4 put the prisoners. at their ease interferes with'interrogation.28


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Post the sentries with proper knowledge of the password, and countersign. .

Password and Countersign Lieutenant Colonel T. F.Bogart, Observer with Fifth Army, ITALY: "Many sentries were posted without proper knowledge of the use ofthe password and countersign. For example, the passwordand countersign one night were Red and River. Thesoldier challenged, 'Who's there, Red River?' There wereseveral instances also in which the sentry halted a personat such a distance from him that anyone in the vicinitycould have heard the challenge and the reply."

*RAINING NOTESS p ~ e d Marching Report of Commanding General,- 3dDivision, on- its landing in SICILY: "The importanctj of physical condition cannot be over-ernphasized. Spe,ed-marching proved of great value in developing physical condition,eliminating the unfit, and instilling confidence and pridein the individual. Asa general training objective, all units

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"Change Posts!" Lieutenant Colonel ] .M. F i n n ~ Infantry Battalion C o m m a n d e r ~ ATTu: "We had junior lieu-tenants commanding two of our rifle companies for almosthalf the battle. All officers of company grade should begiven an opportunity to handle the company before enteringcombat." *ombat Training for Engineers Commanding O f f i c e r ~ Engineer R e g i m e n t ~ ATTu: "Engineers should have a goodworking knowledge.of combat tactics, night patrolling, outpost duty, and ,use of terrain' features. This would havesaved many of the casua_lties we suffered and would_ havereduced firing at imaginary enemy movements. Trainingof this sort should not be lost sight of in the stress of trainingfor an amphibious operation."

*iscellaneous Notes Lieutenant Colonel C.-E. Brokaw,O r d n a n c e ~ Observer, ITALY: "I believe that the. followingpoints shoulpbe given more s ~ r e s s during training:

LPenetration deeper into enemy territory by small scout-. ing patrols ..2. More training in night fighting-at least 50 percent.3. . More training in mortar fire and in the establishmentof a base of fire of all mortars and machine guns beforeattacking.4. More stress on camouflage.5. Training troops to avoid defiles and advance along t h sides of ridges.6. . Training snipers. Their training has been .neglectedin maneuvers beca,:se no credit is given for snipers.7.. Use double foxholes of the V. or L shape, since twomen together are more confident than two men separated ..

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Don't miss the chance to' get a bath!

became infected because, of lack of, cleanliness. Thereappeared to be a general disregard' or indifference to clean-liness, even when o p p ~ r t u n i t y e x i s t e d to wash."COMMENT: Fortunately the above is an isolated instance, but itindicates the necessity for constant supervision over the hygieneof troops. , .

*Sandbagging Vehicles Major Robert Wilson, Field Ar-tillery, Observer with -th -Division, ITALY: "All driverskept their eyes constantly peeled for burlap sacks withwhich to sandbag the floors' of their vehicles as protectionagainst mines'. This precaution saved lives, including thatof a regimental commander and his driver, both of whomwere seriously 'but not fatally wounded when .the ~ - t o n truck in which they were riding detonated. a' mine."

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A Foxhole in Time Saves Lives Lieutenant Colonel T.. F.Bogart) Infantry) Observer with Fifth Army) ITALY: "Al-though the average . American soldier will dig a. foxhole or~ l i t t ~ e n c h when the artillery o mortar shells are falling in

Dig Deep!his vicinity,-only a few of those I saw would dig ~ h e m priorto that ~ t i m e . When they did dig them they were usuallyquite -shallow. I t was always very easy to tell ;" Germanfoxhole from the American; the former were always muchdeeper. Many casualties occurred from shellfire which Ibelieve would have been avoided had proper foxholes Qrslit trench been dug."

*Use 01 the Compass Private George Scott) Infantry)SICILY: "Some of the men performing combat intelligenceduties were unable to. read the lensatic compass properly.T h ~ s often made their reports valueless."34


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BATTALION ATTACK

From the island of ATTU a narrow, preCIpItous tongueof land about eight miles long juts southeast and then dueeast to CHIRIKOF POINT, 'eastern extremity of the island.SARANA BAY lies to the north and MAS SACRE BAY to thesouth.--SARANA VALLEY and MASSACRE VALLEY run gen-erally northwest and southe:;tst parallel to the central ridgeof the base of this peninsula, but converge about five milesin {rom the, coast where the central ridge dips to a saddlecalled SARANA-MASSACRE PASS.

For a miserable week the 2d Battalion, -th Infantry,had held. wet, soggy, cold positions qn high ground inupper MASSACRE. VALLEY, southwest of the pass, later renamed CLEVESY PASS, for 2d Lieutenant Samuel W.Clevesy, who died gallantly there.

On the right the saddle led up to POINT ABLE, a conicalmountain of bare rock rising 2,000 feet into the Aleutianmist. On the left was COLD M O U ~ T A I N . ( S e e sketch.)

The -Japanese h,eld the dominating high ground; their35


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SA!tAN/HNlliS/I. (!l.El'ASS LoOK INc> 1fE.

\ ~ ~ Y ; j { l \ ~ \( . ~ O \ O .

, No.9 /f .

Panoramic field sketch ofenemy positions between Cold Mountain and PointAble used as the basis for planning our successful attack.


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Preparatory Fires "The afternoon of 18 May was spentin registering artillery on each of the known enemy positions.Inaddition to the supporting artillery, thebattalion hadattached to it six 37-mm.guns (making a total of 10 in all),two. 75-mm. pack howitzers, and 3 additional .50-calibermachine guns. The battalion organic and attached weapons also registered on enemy positions.Communications "A rather elaborate system of communications was established to enable the battalion commanderto control the fire of supporting weapons in furtherance oft a c t ~ c a l plans.' The artillery radio as well as telephone wasset up at the battalion commander's OP on top of the 'hogback.' A sound power telephone was run from themortarOP to the battalion commander, likewise one from the 75s.A telephone was also run from the OF to the officer in chargeof all 37,;.mrp.. firing. Radio and telephone control was runto all the companies in the battalion.. 'Tactical Plan "The tactical plan in general was as follows: One company of the regiment on our right movedout ~ 2400, 18 May for the top of the ridge dividingMASSACRE. and SARANA VALLEYS and was in position ontop of the ridge ready to attack Point A from the south.eastat 0600, 19 May 1943. A patrol from Company I; underLieutena!1tBrown, was started from the Hoor of the valleyon the night of 18 May to work up to the top of COLDMOUNTAIN with t.he mission of enveloping roint 5 from thenorth. Early the next morning a patrol from Company F,under Lieutenant Smith, was given the mission of movingup the slope of COLD MOUNTAIN and attacking the enemytrenches at Point 4 from the northwest and then workingdown to 1, 2, and .3 in conjunction with the rest of the company, which would attack from the east. It should be borne38


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in mind that the average strength of the rifle company inthe battalion theday of the attack was 50 men.

"

Radio Contact "It, was planned to use radio to contactthe CO of the company attacking Point A and also to contact the patrol under Lieutenant Brown on COLD MOUNTAIN.Radio was also to be used to contact the platoon attackingPoint 4.The Action "About 1000, a report came in that the forceattacking Point- A had-been held up by machine-gun andmortar fire and. was unable to advance. Up until this timeno report had been received from the units attacking Points5 and 4, but shortly thereafter the CO of Company F reported that these units were observed to be 'withdrawing fromCOLD MOVNTAIN.Supporting Fire "The battalion commander at this point.decided to attack the positions straight on. The artillery;laid down a .10-minute concentration on enemy positions onCOLD MOUNTAIN. All other weapons opened fire on positions 6, 7, 8,9, and 10. Smoke was laid in the saddle, andthe wind carried the smoke over enemy positions on COLDMOUNTAIN and greatly a i d ~ d CompanyF in its advance ..Orders' "CompanyF was ordereq to attack the enemypositions on COLDMOUNTAIN under cover of artillery fireand smoke. Company E was ordered to occupy the-saddleand to send one platoon to Point 6. Company G wasordered to take position i:p. reserve just southwest of themouth of the P'1.ss in rear of CompaniesE and F.Subsequent Action "Fire was lifted on Point 6, whichwas taken by the platoon of Company E.Compa:py F succeeded in taking Points ~ 4 1, and 2, but received fire from

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This aerial view along general axis of our advance onAttu (looking northward) shows the type of mountainterrain encountered by the Task Force.

Points 3 and 5. Company E sent one of its platoons toattack Point 3, and Company G was ordered to envelop theleft flank, secure Point 5, and ai


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Aerial view of the Attu combat zone looking south.The enemy was driven into the Chichagof Harborarea and destroyed by our forces advancing fromthe pass between Point Able and Cold Mountain.

In the paragraphs to follow, some of the men who did theactual fighting describe the action as they saw it.

*--AS SEEN BY THE SOLDIERThe Attack on Point 5 Sergeant Charles Roberts, Com-pany I, - t h Infantry: "The idea of the thing was to envelop both flanks first and then push through the centerof the pass. Captain Murphy with Company C of the regiment on our right, strung out practically in single file, wasstumbling along the crest of GILBERT RIDGE (dividingSARANA and MAS SACRE valleys), trying to knock outPointA, a natural rock fortress on the right flank of the pass. Ourplatoon of Company I under Lieutenant William Brownhad the mission- of attacking Point 5 on the top of COLDM O U N T A I ~ on the left flank.

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The Approach " It was dark and bitter cold the night of18 May; when our platoon started out. We knew therewere Japs up there, and we knew they had three heavy ma.:chine guns at the least which, unless we knocked them out,would be blasting hell out of the meri going into the passwhen the main attack jumped off.

"The hill Was steep, slippery, and rocky; there was iceforming on the tundra as we slowly stumbled up the face ofthe mountain toward the Japs at thetop.Contact "We saw the first one at 0430 in the morning.He was.a.sentry, and vye were within 50 yards of him. Hestood up against the skyline and was shaking out a grass mat.Lieutenant Brown motioned us to get up under a little ledgeto our front, then he._ shot the Jap. The shot must haveawakened others, and as we worked up over the ledge a Japmachine gunner began firing at us. We stayed down untilthe first excited bursts had gone over, then we raised up andreturned the fire. Several Japs had holes near the edge ofthe ledge we were under


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where back to our left another machine gun opened up, andwe withdrew down the hill to reorganize.The_Radio Fails, "Lieutenant Brown tried again and againto contact, battalion headquarters or theartillery, with' theradio, but the set, refused to, fU!J-ction. The_ radio manworked with it, and tried again, but failed. The platoonwas reorganized, and we started up again. We got as highas the ledge once more,and had started over the top on to thetable above, when the Jap opened up with m a c h i n ~ gunsagain. We needed artillery and needed it bad. Every timewe stuck our noses up, a hailstorm of bullets cracked acrossthem. The radio man was trying frantically to contactanybody in the valley below us, but the set remained silent.Several men had crawled around to the left and threwgrenades at the Japsnear the edge of the table, but themachine guns remained out of range. Our men were drivenback to the cover of the ledge; seve:ral with wounds. Artil-lery, if we only had flrtillery! We could observe the fire; weknew where the guns were. _I f we could only get some firewe'd walk over the damned mountains. The radio man wasdesperate. He tried the set.again, but i t was silent. 'In arage he threw it down the hill.Our Attack Repulsed "We tried once more to movearc;>und the flank and get to the Jap guns. It had been broaddaylight for some t i ~ e , a n d the big 'attack was 'to push 0I:before long. But as we appeared over the hill where theJaps were, an impossible stream of bullets drove the menback. Again we withdrew down. the hill. 'LieutenantBrown sent messengers down the mountain. Then a fewminutes later we heard the guns in the valley begin' firing.The attack was on. We had failed, and we felt had about it.They had the drop on us."

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The Main Attack Sergeant Walter -Moesch, ConipanyH, -th Infantry: "On 19 May our section of heavy machineguns was attached to Company F for the attack up COLDMOUNTAIN on the left of CLEVESY PASS. It was calledSARANA-MASSACRE PASS, then, but I was with LieutenantClevesywhen he was killed there in the pass, and the passWas named for him. The attack had moved across the flatground in front o f COLD MOUNTAIN without much fire ex

.cept long-range mortar .and some 37-mm.fire. We got tothe first Jap position almost without opposition: . But whenthe attack moved up the hill, h ~ l l began to. break loose.Company F was driven back with lots of casualties, and Company G had .moved through them and a.round to the left;they too were getting all shot up. Then CompanyF o theregiment on our right came through on our right flank, heading right out into the pass itself. They c o m b i n ~ d two oftheir platoons with' the remainder of our Company F andwe started up again."The J ~ p s were holding the pass' on thehigh ground onboth sides and to the front too. T h ones on the rightcould fire into the backs of the attackers on the left andvice versa; it was rough going. Our first section was inposition right below where we hadfirst entered the lowestJ ap position, and the second section was around to theright, into the pass about 150 yards.

"Lieutenant Clevesy got me and we went around to thesecond section to get them sta.rted up the hill. The attackwa.s going _ok;ay, but it was awfully tough; bullets wereflying. all over the hillside. Just uphill from the secondsection was a Jap, 37 mm. We had watched them firefrom that position several days before, and we knew therewere Japs in that trench. The main attack was movingaround to the left as we started up the hill. Finally. thefire got so heavy that the machine gun squaos took cover,44


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in a little draw until we could grenade the trench above usand clean it out. Then they were to come on up. SergeantTom Kovick, Private. First Class William M a r ~ h a l l , and I 'started up with Lieutenant Clevesy. We had crawled onour bellies to within about 25 yards of the trench, when asniper raised up and shot Marshall in the ear. We shotat the snip(', and threw grenades into the trench. Wecrawled up rapidly then, ready. to move in behind ourgrenades and another sniper popped .his head up out of'ahole abve us. Lielitenant Clevesy fired his carbine, justas the J ap fired. The Lieutenant toppled over a littlebank and lay still. He was dead. I was jllst bringing myrifle up as the Jap ducked. .

"Then, from across the valley, the Japs spotted us,andthey gave us hell. Machine guns, rifles, and a 37 mm.began' pounding the area.

"Finally the intense shelling slowed down and we dashedfor the open end of tRe Ja r trench we had. grenaded. Thetrench led around the point of the hill. We crawled downthe trench and found where the J aps were located whenwe stuck our heads up right in the face of a burst ofmachine-gun fire. I

" S ~ m e men from Company F' had come; over to helpus, but we were s.tymied. We couldn't( raise up longenough to fire, and we couldn't get close enough to throwgrenades. Finally we decided to s e e ~ if we could get somemortar fire 'on the position some way. Corporal AlfredHehman started back to check up' on. the' mortar possibili-ties, while we waited .and rested. The Jap position wasslightly below us and about 100 yards further into thepass. They were firing almost. constantly at troops wecould see moving out in the valley and on the opposite sideof the pass. 'We were quiteh!gh up on the side of'COLDM O U N T A I ~ . .

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completely off. Theplatoon h e a r d thecommotion and be-gan to advance up the

~ ; ; ~ r ~ - = - - ~ - ~ ~ - : ; - ; ; : ; ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ; ; - : ; hill. T ~ company'slight machine gunsopened fire on .. thetrench as the platoon'advanced. Several ofthe ' laps jumped out

Make the enemy keep his head and tried to run backdown! but the machine gunscut them down. Then the whole company moved for-ward intothe new Jap position and the fighting waspretty hot for a while. We accounted for about 50 Japsthere in a. few minutes. When I jumped up over the littleknoll to move up with th.e company a J ap sniper up on

. POINT ABLE shot me in the leg. The bullet went into themuscle like a hot needle, up near my crotch. It bled andstung but irwasn't bad enough for me to have to go back.

"In the evening the Japs began to' retreat over the wholeright flank of the pass;everywhere but at the top of POINTABLE. It was sometime after 2000, and the Japs were firingfuriously and falling back.

"One heavy machinE( gun .squad out of Company H hadmade it up the hill with us and was firing into the Japs.Robert Greene, the gunner, started the belts through fullon one side,and they were pulling them out empty on theother side and then shoving a new one in. The gun got sopot that we poured canteens of ice water on the mechanismto cool it off. Lieutenant Tommy Hindman let outa terrificrebel yell and we took,Off to assault the last J ap position onthe pass. As we started Corporal Flynn saw a J ap setting48


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up' a light machine gun. He opened up on it and drovethree crew meIl:lbers away'from the 'gun.

"We made it all right. Company E of the - th Infantrymoved into the center of the pass. My Jeg was getting stiffand the medic wanted to send me back, but there is some-thing about being with the boys up there where thefrefighting their guts out that makes laying i a hospital ahell of a thing. I stayed with them, too, until a grenadeshook me up. Then they sent me back"The'Taking of Point "A" Corporal Anthony S i m o n i c ~ Company C -th Infantry: "POINT ABLE was rough. It isa big pinnacle of rock that crowns a barren hiil at the inlandend of GILBERT RIDGE, 'named after Lieutenant Gilbert ofCompany G,wholost his life ina valianLeffort to move upthe coverless slope of POINT ABLE. At its foot lies CLEVESYPASS. The. day before, troops fought through CLEVESYPASS. The Jalps holding the Point were isolated, but theyfought like cornered weasels against Company C on theridge, against Company G moving up from the SARANA side,against 'Company E on the MASSACRE side; they had beenpounded by artillery' and mortars; but they hung. on.

"Lieutenant Gilbert's platoon, whittled down to a singlesquad, was' working up on the right. Lieutenant StanleyWolczyk went to the left. 'Machine-gun fire grazed thetundra from the big rock 800 yards ahead of us and up theslope. We, moved farther to the left,where a shouldl(f oCt h hill jutted out and shielded us from the machine guns.Then we started to Climb. . We got to within 150 yards ofthe Jap trench before they stopped us. Jap rifles were snapping from the trench, and a machine gun rattled off a burst.

"'They've got a machine gun in there too.' someonesaid. Parker said, 'There's gotta be one. The Japs havealways got a machine gun.'

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"We were lying under somesmall rocks at the edge of abig bank 'ofsnow. Out in the snow were several jaggedboulders, and George Parker began to work his way outacross thesnovV to a big one in the,center. We covered himas he crawled. He 'seemed to take an hour to get out thereabout75 yards, but he said he didn't think he had been gone10 minutes when he came back. He had tried to get close'enough to see how many were in the t r e n c h ~ H e said hefigured there were about a dozen. Lieutenant Wolczyk sentback for a mortar.

"It took a long time to get i t up to where we were hang-ing onto the slippery mountain side, but eventually it a r rived. They overshot the first couple of rounds; then theycut the range down to 125 yards and ,began to drop themright in. They dumped six shells right into the Jap trench.

"Then Lieutenant Wolczyk hollered, 'Drop one more inand we'll assault.', He began to place us. There were eightof us in ali, me to the left, Parker to the right. Victor Raku-son wanted to go to the right and get the Japwho had beenshooting at him as he covered Parker. The mortar crewhollered, 'We'll drop two, just for luck.' LieutenantWolczyk said, 'Check your bayonets.'

"When the second round burst in the trench we jumpedup and started across the'snow. As soon as we got to ourfeet the Japs opened up. The BAR man wa's, doing his bestto cover us, but' they were throwing everything, mortars,.rifles, grenades, machine gun. I'll never understand howwe' got as far as we did. . Ra:kuson got his snIper and oneother; Parker was yelling his head off and had killed two; Igot one I 'm sure of and maybe another; and little JoseBenovidez, who had come up with the mortar 'just for theride,' had gotten two. I glanced to the right and saw Parkerholding his rifle like a pistol and shooting, while he pulledthe pin on a grenade with his teeth, just like the movies.50


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A grenade went off right behind me and a piece of it cut thehandle off my shovel. I remember thinking for just a sec-ond, 'May God curse them, my ~ e . s s kit's beenr-qined.'Somebody hollered, 'Parker, you're taki:qg too much, timewith them.' He replied, 'I am, like hell. I want to be surethey're dead.'

"We got to within 30 yards of the trench, to a row of big;jagged boulders, and ran into a nest o f s n i p e ~ s . , It wasfast, desperate work, and 'it was more trouble than we couldhandle. We fell back. \

"In the dark the following morning at 0300 the Point wasfinally taken, the machine guns were silenced. ' I t had costlives and energy, but ~ h big thorn in our side was out."C O M ~ E N T : These accounts bring out some of the, characteristics ofmountain warfare, in which "success depends more upon properadaptation of available means to the terrain than upon their power.Maneuver. of, small units and the initiative and leadership of subordinate commanders are of the highest importarice in mountain warfare. . The actions of small semi-independent units in seizingor defending heights .. or in fighting to seize or block passes ....become of increasing importance." (FSR, Mountain combat.)

The use of patrols and small units to outflank eneiny strong pointsand reduce them in detail was the keynote of this attack. However,it must be remembered that the situation must perIqit covering fireswhich can pin the enemy in his separate strong points and preventthe successive movement of his reserves to the threatened points.,

Note also the formulation of a definite plan of maneuver,' the pro-vision for preparatory and covering fires, the use of smoke, rind the

,preparation of panoramic. sketches for control and intelligence purposes.

The communication plan, although well considered" failed duringthe attack and resulted in costly delay. Possibly the failure of radiocommunications might have been obviated by testing or by bettermaintenance. Whatever the cause in .. this instance, it serves toemphasize the necessity for careful planning of communications,adequate maintenance, of equipment, and the advisability of establishing alternate means.

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FIELD ARTILLERY NOTESUse of Artillery-Spotting Planes in Mountainous TerrainArtillery Report, -thDivision, SICILY: "In terrain whereairfields are readily available the assignment of at least oneplane to the battalion would be recommended, but whereairfields are hard to find centralized control is the onlysolution to' the problem."

*et a Horse! Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Brokaw, Ord-nance, Observer With Fifth Army, ITALY: "On numerous

occasions an artilleryD o n ~ t miss the chance observer was sent to

to observe fire! the highest point in themountains with twomules to carry, his radioand a two-days' supplyfor himself and the ani-mals. These pointswere inaccessible witha jeep. In many in-stances the Germanswithdrew immediatelyas soon as observed ar-tillery fire was directedagainst their positionsfrom these observationpoints. It was easy tofeed the mules withgrain packed in andwith the abundance ofnatural forage available."


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ENGINEER OPERATIONSThe "Engineer War" in It,aly Lieutenant Colonel F; Q.Goodell, 'Field Artillery, Observ,er with VI Corps, ITALY:"Since 20 September, the current Italian operation has been

,definitely an 'engineer war.' All other arms would be hope-lessly neutralized without" them to build and rebuild roads,bridges, and airfields. The Germans are experts at demoli-tion, and in the mountainous country through which theFifth Army is operating all advance must cease until bridgesare built and roads repaired."Paving The Way Artillery Report, 45th Division, SICILY:"It was the excellent work of the Division engineers thatmade i t possible for the artillery to keep in supporting dis";tance of the infantry regiments. One of our battalions'wasto follow an infantry regiment marching on CALTAVUTURO.This route was over some very steep mountains following anold Roman road, now only a mule trail. A company of engi-neers did excellent work in making a road through the moun-tains for this battalion."

TANKS *Ideal vs. Practicable An officer who has led a battalionof Infantry of' the 1st Division through the TUNISIAN andSICILIAN Campaigris has this to say with regard to the'attachment of armQred linits to infantry in mountainousterrain: "We infantrymen would rather see the tank bat-talions used in mass if ever that should be possible, be-cause we know that the tanks achieve their maximum effectthat way. But also, we want the. tanks with us as muchas possible. The s..olution is' to attach the tanks accordingto the terrain, striving to get .as much mass as possible.

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INFANTRY NOTESFormations Informal Report, XIV Corps, SOLOMONISLANDS: "Wherever terrain p e r ~ i t t e d , norqlal forma-tions prescribed in current field manuals were used. I twas possible to advance small units in skirmish lines, linesof squad columns, etc., through open terrain and opencoconut groves. However, -most of the fighting was donein jungle areas where advance had. to be mage in columnof files, often with units as large as a battalion confined toone trail. Offensive tactics found most successful werethe advance on a broad front with units in column, echelonedto a fhmk, and deployment was held asJong as possible. Difficulties of control in the jungle suggested closeformations. Japanese centers of resistance were b y p ~ s s e d and isolated. Frontal attacks were uniformly successfulwhen assisted-by a flank attack. On many occasIons theflank attack preceded .the frontal attack, coming intoJapanese positions from the rear and completely disruptingtheir defense plans. In almost all cases the maneuver54


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used by units orall sizes from division' to, squad was theenvelopment of one or both flanks. Resistance was bypassed, encircled, ahd reduced later.Automatic Weapons "Long-range supporting fire of automatic weapons could not be used in jungle or 'coconutgroves. Automatic weapons advanced with or closely insupport of assault echelons. Machine ,guns and automaticrifles, were set up to cover river crossings before riflementried to advance. The Browning Automatic Rifle wasfound to be invaluable in the attack because of its mobilityand fire power, and patrols sent out were always reinforcedwith automatic rifle teams. ',Night Operations "There were no night operations ofconsequence' beyond resisting enemy attacks. However, itis believed"that under' certain circumstances, carefully prepared night operations would be successful and valuable.Our cordon defense was highly e f f e c t i v ~ against Japanesenight attacks, so effective that it made suicidal all Japanesea t t e m p ~ s t9 break through oUr lines., One hostile nightattack resulted in the death of 90 Japanese with the loss ofonly 2 of our own men. It is therefore apparent that nightattacks against a well-organized enemy are likely to becostly" although the failure of Japanese 'night operations in"most cases was due to their "faulty preparation, and to, thefact that we were constantly alert against night attack. Inthis, connection, the hand grenade and the bayonet useddefensively 'should be emphasized. Rifle fire at night isobviously ineffective and reveals positions.Security Measures "Security for advancing elementsduring. daylight was maintained by patrols and by flank andadvance guards. Distances were greatly reduced. For in

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stance, advance guards often operated from 50 to lOOyardsin front pf the main body, and connecting files were correspondingly close in order to maintain. contact. In advancethrough the jungle it is almost impossible to provide flankprotection for anyone column.. Advance through the jungleon a wide front required the use of multiple columns with'men in each column moving in single f i l e ~ --- During Halts "During halts and particularly atnight,' security measures in the forward areas a s s u ~ e d the~ s p e c t of a cordon defense covering possible a p p r o ~ c h e s from all directions. Routes of enemy approach were w ~ r e d in and covered by fire. Light barbed-wire entanglementsand trip wires with tin cans attached were considered anecessity. Machine guns sighted on final protective lines.were set up tQ cover the front, protected by riflemen andautomatic riflemen. Artillery and mortar fire was plannedand prepared to fire on a .final protective area in case' ofenemy counterattack.Security at Night "Weapons used for night security wereprincipally the grenade, -the bayonet, and final protectivelines of machine guns. The hand grenade was found to bethe best weapon'to use against night attack. Firing Qf tracerammunition at night' was prohibited to prevent exposing thelocation of weapons to the hostile assault; Smoking at nightin forward areas was prohibited.

"All men and officers used foxholes and .local securitywas obtained by keeping from one-fourth to one-half offront line units on the alert at all t i ~ e s . All-around defensewas secured by, requiring reserve units to conform.Protection of Lines of Communication "Lines of communication in open country were secured by periodic patrol56


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ling and by routine passage of armed troops. Lines ofcommunication through jungle areas were. secured byperiodic patrols where strong .hostile activity was not to heexpected. In those cases where hostile activity was expecte9it was necessary. to establish strong fixed guards in foxholes'

.along the trail. Carriers were invariably furnished witharmed guards in the proportion of about 1 to 10 when'carrying through jungle forward areas. These guards wereusually detailed for this purpose from. regimental reserveunits, such as the antitank company. Additional securitywas provided by patrols which combed the areas on theflanks of the line of communications.

"These security measures were sufficient to. prevent sur-prises during any stage of the combat.Patrol Reports "In general the distance covered by patrols was much less than that expected of them. The diffi-

Be conservative in evaluating reports from patrols!

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cuIties of terrain caused many patrol leaders to feel thatthey had covered two or three times as much ground asthey had actually covered. This must be taken into accountwhen evaluating patrol reports."Outposts and Patrols "The terrain over which the divisionfought made it almost impossible to use outposts as pre-scribed in the manuals; where such outposts were usedthey seldom were more than 50 yards from the main posi-tions of the troops. At night all movement in forwardareas was prohibited in order that Japanese making nightattacks could be readily identified and destroyed. Sentriesat night were posted in pairs and maintained absolutesilence and immobility. In the rear constant patrollingis necessary to protect against snipers and infiltratingpatrols.Our forces advance cautiously into a palm grove onan island of Makin atoll, ever watchful for the Jap

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FIELD ARTI.LLERY NOTESSupporting ~ i r e ' s .Comments by the ~ t Division as Re-ported by XIV CorpsJ SOLOMON ISLANDS: "The use ofsupporting artillery fires was often extremely difficult because' of. lack of accurate maps, lack of observation. injungle terrain, difficulty of ammunition supply due to poorroads and lack of transportation, and lack of communica-tions. In spite oJ these handicaps the division artillerygave very excellent and timely s ~ p p o r t . Liaison and Observation "Both a liaison officer and oneor more forward .observers from the direct support of artil-lery were used with each infantry battalion and were foundto Qe essential to good results; Forward observers werepushed well into the front lines and maintained continuouscontact with both front lines and the liaison officer. Because of the fact that t ~ Japanese used only the jungleand reverse slopes for positions, little enemy, activity wasever picked up by forward observers. Some adjustmentswere made by aerial observation. More w o u ~ d have beendone had planes been available.Control "The artillery was kept under centralized control since the division fmight as one team, not as semiindependent regimental combat teams. However, the nor-mal procedure of always assigning the same light battalionto direct support of a front-line. infantry regiment . wasfollowed. In case only two .regiments were. in line thethird light battalion was placed'in general support.Concentrations "Heavyconcentraitions of two or morebattaliohs were the 'rule rather than the exception. Suchconcentrations 'are almost :r:nandatory to .obtain effective

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results,in the heavy jungle where the artillery, targets wereusually located.Adjustment of Fire "In all, cases of artillery support injungle it was essential to start adjustments w ~ l l ' in front ofinfantry troops' and walk the fires in toward our troopsunder the direction of the forward observers. Initial ad-justments on new terrain were carried' out by using smoke.Limitations' "In many cases where artillery fire was highlidesirable and, would have 'been effective, it was impossible

. to execute fires because of the' difficulty in 'locating ourtroops in the jungle, In one or two cases fires could beexecutyd ,only, by withdrawing 'troops temporarily froinclose proximity to enemy positions. However, this pro-cedure is not recommended for general use against aggres-sive Japanese.Effect of Fire "It, is essential that if full advantage is tobe taken of the effect of artillery fires, troops must advanceinto shelled areas immediately upon lifting fire. Due. tothe effective . f i , ~ l d fortifications used by the Japanese, theactual destructive effect 6f artillery fire in jungle is lessthan that normally to be expected. However, the shockeffect was found to be considerable among those Japanesewho had, been exposed to serious artillery concentrationsprior to, attack.H Q n ~ l i n g Smoke Shell Artillery Operations R e p o r t ~ MUNDA Campaign: "Smoke' shell was placed in the sunfo!, a few hours and .then stored in a vertical position onthe theory tha.t an equal distribution of the filler was thuso b t a i n e d ~ The theory was never proved conclusively, butall smoke fired was accurate, the only corrections appliedbeing for weight of projectile.60


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TANK OPERATIONSTanks=j Can Be Used Digest of Various Reports on Tank'Operations in Jungle Country: "Due .to the Cfloseness ofjungle country and the nature of the terrain, employmentof tanks in the jungle is necessarily different from the usualconcept, but i t has been proved that tanks, both light andmedium, can be used in the jungle. They have been success-fully employed in many instances to knock out enemy re-sistance holding up the advance. In most operations 6f thistype from three to six tanks were employed with eachinfantry battalion. It was found that in dense jungle nomore than three tanks could be successfully controlled atone time, ~ n maneuver was almost' impossible due to closecountry and lack of communications. 'The action was veryslow, the tanks runningfor the most part in first gear andadvancing only f r ~ m 25 to 75 yards at a t i ~ e . Cooperation Necessary "Close cooperation and .coordi-nation with the infantry was essential for success. It wasfound' best to assign a certain number of infantrymen tofurnish close support for each tank and for the remainder ofthe . ~ n f a n t r y to follow the tanks closely in order to exploittheir success. When the infantry came up alongside thetank casualties were high, and when the tanks, as they didin some cases, got ahead of their infantry support they were

.attacked by. Japanese swarming over them, rendering theirguns useless. The best results were obtained when the in-

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fantI)' cqrnmatider. followed> the tank commander closely sothat direct communication could be effected, either by useof thewalkie.:talkieradio or by passing messages through therear pistol port of the t a n k s ~ Application of Fire Power "Supporting artillery andmortar fire were found advantageous for clearing fields offire and disclosing enemy p o s i t i o n ~ for the tanks to attack.In addition, the fire power of the tanks was used advanta-geously for the same purposes, canister being employed todear' fields of fire. 37-mm. HE shell was used most often.However, 37-mm. armor-piercing ammunition was used toknock holes in Japanese bunkers after which high explosive.shell was fired through these holes, exploding on the interiorof the p o s i t i o n ~ Jap Magnetic Mines "On several occasions, when closeinfantry support had not been effected, the Japanese wereable to place magnetic mines or grenades against the sidesof the tanks, causing some damage but no casualties. Itwas found that canvas or neutral materials applied on thetanks rrz,ade the magneticmines slide off.Slow Work "Many of the tanks became incapacitateddue to the fact that the going was so slow. Engines had tobe run for long intervals in low gear which overheated themand caused vapor lock.Routes of Advance "The successful, employment of tankswas found to depend to a large extent on close and detailedreconnaissance of the ground, to include route reconnaissance, reconnaissance through the positions. of friendly'troops, and reconnaissance in the area in which the tankswere to be employed; In some cases i t was found necessaryto u s engineer bulldozers to c ~ e a r adequate trails for the62


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TRANSPORTAflONUse of Vehicles Informal Report, XIV Corps, SOLO-MON ISLANDS: "All types of TBA transportation founduse. . . . The %-ton t r u c ~ is an excellent vehicle and willgo anywhere the 14-ton truck will go, provided the passageway is wide enough, although they are more destructiveto trails than the 14-ton. The 14-ton truck (jeep) wasthe most valuable single type of vehicle in any unit. Without this vehicle operations of the nature executed by troopsof this division would have peen impossible. In .additionto normal use, it carried all types of supplies and equipment and was converted to an emergency ambulance forthe evacuation of c a ~ u a l t i e s . Maintenance "Due to the condition of the roads"usagewas. extremely hard on all typ.es of vehicles, and mainten!'lnce requirements mounted far above. what might beconsidered as normaL. In particular, the excessive wearon brake lining caused by the abrasive action of the deepmud and the saltwater caused an early consumption ofall available brake material and brake fluid.64


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AIR SUPPORTDifficulties' Encountered Informal Report XIV C o r p s ~ SOLOMON ISLANDS : ' . 'The air support of ground troops onGuadalcanal was an improvised affair. Its effectivenesswas in a la,rge measure due to the most cooperative spirit'of the air units. 'Much more could have been done ifair ground-support personnel, and equipment had beenavailable. Use of combat aviation was limited by the nature of the terrain and by the extreme difficulty of d e t e r ~ mining the exact locations of the enemy at sufficient dis-tances from oUT own ground troops' to make its ernploy-ment safe' or effective.Targets "Marking targets or front lines for combat avi-ation in this type of terrain is particularly difficult andin many cases impossible. However, air attack by bombsand strafing were very effectively used in some instanceswhere it was necessary to neutralize. reverse slopes and deepr a ~ i n e s which could not be reached by any ground weapons.ILiaison "The air liaison officer lived at division h ~ a d -quarters and when air support was indicated made personalvisits to the front line units concerned in 'order to 'determineexactly where support was wanted. In all except one airattack the liaison o f f i ~ e r then led the,' formation in the airto avoid placing bombs on our own troops and to insurestriking profitable targets. This method is considered mostsatisfactory where air support is tobe used in jungle areas.Unless areas which. are to be attacked from the air areclearly defined on the map or ground the' flight leader ofaircraft to be employed should be shown his target on theground and, where possible, should identify it from the.air before the attack.

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SUPPLY AND EVACUATIONSupply in the Jungle Informal Repor. tXIV Corps,SOLOMON ISLANDS: "Most of the combat areas were ut-terly. devoid of roads and impassable for motor vehicles.Although motor and jeep trails were pushed behind advanc-ing troops as rapidly as possible, in almos.t every case thelast mile to five miles of the supply advance had to be madeby hand carrying.Water Supply "Constant reconnaissance was made forwater supply along fhe routes of advanGe. Despite this,water was the most critical iteIIl of supply to front-line troopsthroughout the campaign, and had a definite relation to theprogress of any offensive action. It ,was supplied to front-linetroops in 5 ~ g a l i o n cans carried by hand from the neares"tsupply point or water tank, or from the head of the nearest

Always be on the lookout for good water!

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jeep road. It was found that the use of catchments such astarpaulins, drainage from tents, etc., proved of great helpin water supply before 'and even after regular water dumBswere. establi,shed.Necessity: Mother of I n v e n t ~ o n "In s0D;le cases the useof cables with trolleys was the only method of advanCing

Keep supplies moving forward to the frontline!supplies or evacuating the wounded. Supplies on reachingthe most forward units were sometimes thrown by handfrom foxhole to foxhole." .The Supply Line "Supplies were pusHed up from the rear,using the larger trucks to establish dumps as far forwardas possible. Supplies were then transferred to jeeps or %-ton trucks to push as far forward as this transportation couldgo. From this motor head supplies were transported bynatives and soldier carriers to the using trqops. In oneinstance, advantage was taken of the water routes, using

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small powered boatsandhome,made b a r g e ~ to save a longcarry by hand.Ammunition Supply "Ammunition was carried .forwardin jeeps and by hand as with other supplies. Amounts sent.forward were based on expenditures and estimated needsof the troops. .Evac;uation Methods Informal Report, XIV Corps, SOLOMON ISLANDS: "Evacuation of casualties was by hand-carty,litter bearers, cable litter slings across jungle gulleys, imp r ~ v i s e d sleds, or drags down steep inclines, improvised litterracks on ~ - t o n j ~ e p s , small boats on mountain streams oralong t4e coast, and finally by field ambulances tb clearingstations or hospitals.-._ .By Litter . "Evacuation by litter bearers was difficult,tiring, time-consuming, and involved .distances averagingtwo or three miles, and five to six miles in some instances.Many more litter bearers had to' be utilized than underordinary conditions. Litter carry in many cases requiredas high a 16 carriers per patient over almost impassableterrain and can be counted as least efficient. Where evacuation by litter was necessary, bearers worked in relays, 8 oreven 16 men accompanying each litter, relieving one anotherin litter carry and in cutting narrow paths through the densejungle. .-.-B y Jeep "Improvised Jeep ambulances were invaluable and should be pushed forward as far as trails are pos.,.sible to carry patients to the n e a r e ~ t point which can bereached by standard ambulance.-.-.-By Water "Evacuation by water where it can be68


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Basic Logistics in Jungle Combat. Providing a hot mealfor forward elements of the combat forces often involves hand-carrying food hundreds of yards throughswamp and jungle.

used is efficient and far more comfortable for the patientthan any other means.Physical Fitness "The arduous and fatiguing litter car-rying demonstrated the need for physical fitness on the partof medical department personnel, which should correct theimpression that the physically impaired can be utilizedthroughout medical department activities."

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1 m p l ' o v i ~ c : d i o n '. "Usewas .also made of improvised sledsto lower,patients down steep hillsides to the Jeep trails orwaterheadson the MATANIKAU RIVER.

Protection of Evacuation Routes "Armed protection wasneeded, either by detailing accompanying rifle m'en,"6rbyarming medical personnel for personal protection as well asfor proteCtion of patients, and was ?ecessary to maintaina stadyHow of evacuation to the aid stations, to collectingor clearing stations, or to points where v ~ h i c l e transportationwas practjcable.

*Medical Notes Artillery. Operations Report, MUNDACampaign: "Medical supplies were adequate to handle any

,situation. The establishment of a small infirmary in connection with the aid statiqn enabled us to hold many cases in'quarters' that would otherwise have had to be evacuatedand further'strain the facilities of hospitals to the rear. Thepeep ambulance proved its wqrth in removing cas,ualties'from difficult terrain. The regularambula!1ce was invalu.,.able also, not for hauling casualties, but as a mobile aidstation at night .. Heavy cardboard was used over the windows to provide a perfectly blacked-out, warm, dry, well-lit.interior. which' greatly facilitated the provision of first aId,the giving ()fplasma, and other first-aid procedures.

"It was found necessary' to store medical supplies verycarefully' to ,prevent deterioration 'from dampness;. ants, andrats.

"The importance of thorough training in sanitation. andpreventive medicine c,annot be overstressed."70


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WIRE COMMUNICATIONSStringingW.....130 in the Jungle Artillery Operations Re-

' p o r t ~ MUNDA Campaign: "One fast method of elevating/W:'-'130 wire was to slash trees at about shoulder heightand lilY wire in the gash between the trunk and the peeledback bark. This obviated making a tie, which is" the mostconstant cause of wire shorting. W-130 wire, when laidon the ground, shortec;l out or was broken within a fewhours.

W-130 wire was found to/be valuable for laying shortlines to forward observers but went out quickly if it washandled or touched. I t should never be used for lines' ofa permanent nature.Test Stations "Test s

Army Combat Lessons ~ Feb 1942

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Transcript of Army Combat Lessons ~ Feb 1942