Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1983

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1983

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J Maddox

2

J. Go()ds()n

Brigadier General Charles E. TeeterDeputy Commander

U.S. Army Aviation Centerfort Rucker, Alabama

6 Aviation at the Inf ' : ln t l l 'U :scnC)Oi CPT Thomas H.

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and CPT John M.

WO LJ. Simone

Mr. Roland WeldonGrcmos. CPT James A.

38 n ........ I ' l I : l In ' Declon1tanlin,aUI)n, 1LT Dave McKenna and SFCKen" Bud Strickland

40 AviationGoodson

Inside

The mission of the U.S. rmy Aviati on Digest USPS 415-350)information 01 an operational. concerningaccident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. research and de-.1elopm'ent,aviation medicine and other related data,

is an official Army periodical published monthlysupervision Commanding General. U,S, Army Aviatio n Center.

Views expressed herei n are not necessarily those of the Department of the Armynor the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Photos are U, S, Army unless otherwise specified. Use of the masculine pronoun intende d to both genders unlessotherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digestand to the author unless otherwise

Articles, photos. and t ~ m sof on Army are invited. Directcommunication is authorized to Editor. U.S. rmy Avisflon Digest,Fort Rucker. AL 36362. Manuscripts returned

This

310-1-

J. Honorable John O MarsSecretary of the Army

Richard K. TierneyEditor

Adjut ant General He,adQuartersin accordance with Army Regulation

Active units receive under pinpoint distribution systemas outlined AR Compl ete DA Form and send directly to COR. AGPublications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore. MD 21220 For anychange distribution requirements. initiate a revised Form 12-5tallninstrument checkride.

Still another prc) ltabJleof

Console instructors Mr. Charles ye and Mr. Glenn Allen mon torflight progress during aviation training in the XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft.Bragg flight simulation control station at Simmons Army Airfield.

SEPTEMBER 983

Rucker.

Whether wear with aand wreath or with a

minted all the aviators benefitfrom the console instructorsknlnW leClIze and to do newand different with the device.

For a unit commanderand asked Mr.

Leeds if the simulator couldlike the UH-60 Black Hawk.

After some and head-decided it could.

at 120with 90 for the

made some in theaircraft within the c o m p u t { ~ rand achieved a simulated Black

Hawk ride.That commander was excitedabout the hisunit members could receive in thesimulator. Such enthusiasm is

of the command theSimulator Branch receives

from all echelons.motivates the aviators' < ' 1 1 1 I U OntllOeS; and derive maximumbenefit from the successful opleratlOltl.

and Joe werestatement, but

studYling identification pro-cedures. anotherscheduled tomorrow.

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The jungle module showing thejung le terrain board, aircraft mockupand controller st tions underneaththe mockup). INSET: A view of thejungle terrain board from inside theaircraft mockup.


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CW DOZEOFF and CPT Nofly weretalking about tomorrow's airmobile mission during aslow moment at the B Company operations buildingon Gloomy Airfield.

Wel l, laughed Dozeoff, it looks like this missionrequest is just like all the others from that same

infantry battal ion. I'll just swag the times for planningpurposes. They won't care if we're a little offschedule.

Yeah, replied No fly , one good thing aboutinfantry, you can tell them just about anythingconcerning aviation and they'll buy it .

Just then the door to operations opened and anunfamiliar face appeared.

Hello, said an Infantry captain, I 'm CaptainStraight, new S3 air for the Infantry, just out ofthe Infantry Advanced Course at Ft. Benning. I needto talk to someone about tomorrow's airmobile training.

Gosh, captain, replied Dozeoff, a phone callwould've done.

I don't think so, replied Straight, I 've got yourcopies of the OPORD, air movement tables and flightroutes, fire support annex, CEOI extracts, andinstructions for a final time hack, so we probably needto talk face to face. By the way, do we get a liaisonofficer, and who's the airmission commander fortomorrow? I need to talk with him about groundspeed.

Dozeoff and Nofly reeled from the effects of

Straight 's speech.t

finally happened, a no-nonsense,by the FM 90-4, airmobile-oriented S3 air. What a fatefor easy going Bravo. What could be worse?

Also, queried Straight, when will you guys beready for some night vision goggles missions?

Nofly fainted.Of course, this little meeting was over dramatized.

Few, if any, combat support aviation companies reflectour Bravo Company's attitude. Also, not many S3 airofficers can be up and ready to go a whole day beforean airmobile mission. The truth lies in between. Oftenan aviation unit will do much of the planning for an

Captain Thomas M Harrisonand

Captain John M HopkinsHeadquarters U S Army Infantry School

Fort Benning GA

SEPTEMBER 1983

airmobile operation because of its experience and asa training tool for younger aviators. The 101stAirborne Division (Air Assault) permanently assignscombat aviation parties and combat aviation teams tounit level to enhance mission planning and to providepersonnel where needed. See Putting the Air Assault

In The Air Assault Division, A viation Digest May1982.)All infantry units are required to maintain pro

ficiency in airmobile operations, and to do this theymust become proficient in planning airmobileoperations in accordance with Field Manual 90-4 andlocal standing operating procedures. There are nopositions within infantry battalions for aviators orpathfinders such as the 101st uses. What about havingaviators plan large portions of the mission, particularlyair movement and routes? Well, there's no problemwith soliciting advice, but there is a problem withhaving aviators do it all, and that is because we won'tbe able to fight that way. While a combat supportaviation company may support one infantry battaliona day in training, that number may increase to fouror five a day in combat depending on the circumstances. The aviation unit will never be able to planall those missions. At best, it can offer advice, so theburden falls on the infantryman. Ft. Benning'sInfantry School prepares officers and noncommissioned officers to plan and conduct airmobileoperations at all levels. For example, the Infantry

Officer Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses (ANCOC) receive a similar block of instruction on the technical aspects of airmobile operations that prepares students to conduct the operationsat squad and platoon level.

Their instruction includes blocks on marking pickupzones (PZ) and landing zones (LZ), attack helicopters,medevac requests, safety, LZ and PZ capacity andsuitability, hand and arm signals, slingloads, theairmobile reverse planning sequence, and capabilitiesand limitations of aircraft. This provides a strongtechnical and theoretical background for the squad andplatoon aspects of airmobile operations.

In the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, greatemphasis is placed on the planning and conduct ofairmobile operations to include simulating a battalionairmobile operation from the PZ to completion of theground tactical phase. Blocks of instruction includea briefing on the planning and execution of the SonTay Raid (an attempt to rescue POWs) , a briefing andpanel discussion by the 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault), a period on planning airmobile operations

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to include an analysis of how airmobile operations areaffected by the factors of METT T mission, enemy,troops, terrain time) and the reverse planningsequence for airmobile operations.

Emphasis is placed on the use of control measures,developing and designating flight routes, preparationof the air movement table, the technical requirementsfor helicopter LZ and Z organization. Fire supportplanning during airmobile operations is another important block of instruction. Questions posed hereinclude how to best suppress enemy air defense, howto best plan fire support along flight routes, whether

or not to prep an LZ and how to plan fires in-depthin order to ensure adequate coverage.

In addition to mortars and artillery, offensive airsupport, attack helicopters, joint air attack teamsJAA T and naval gunfire are all addressed during this

block. The highlight of the Infantry Officer AdvancedCourse airmobile instruction is the planning andexecution of battalion airmobile operations, to includea real time simulation. Students are organized ~ t obattalion staff planning groups and required to planfour separate airmobile operations; a raid in a desertenvironment, an antiarmor delay in Europe, a recon-

LEFT BELOW: Captain Harrison pointing out n enemy air defense position on the mountain terrain boardRIGHT BELOW: Captain Hopkins instructing a student in airmobile operations BOTTOM: The European terrainboard in the combined arms tactical training simulator


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An airmobile operations order spread across a table

naissance in force in a jungle setting, and a secure-anddefend operation in mountainous terrain.

After planning all four missions each staff willexecute one operation as it planned it in the Ft.Benning Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator(CATTS). The scenarios are constantly upgraded andnow include UH-60A Black Hawks, Division 8 organizations and JAAT play. The free play simulation inthe CA TTS provides immediate feedback to studentson how well they planned and executed their missions.

The Infant ry Pre-Command Course (IPCC), comprised of brigade and battalion command designees,also includes (as an elective) an update on airmobilityfocusing on what commanders can expect of theircaptains and lieutenants when conducting airmobileoperations and what changes have occurred in aviationthat will affect airmobile operations. IPCC students

who request additional training also are given accessto the CA TTS.

In November 1982, Colonel James R. Harding, as2d Brigade commander, 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault) planned and executed the secure-and-defendscenario while in IPCC. Coordination is currentlyunderway to make CA TTS resources available toColonel Harding's battalion staffs for trainingpurposes. These facilities also can be made availableto any other interested parties.

SEPTEMBER 1983

The Infantry School emphasizes that aviation is partof the combined arms team to students n courses fromANCOC to IPCC. The utmost in coordination and cooperation is required to bring about successfulairmobile operations. When coordinating support foran airmobile operation remember that we'll fight theway we trained. Infantry Officer Advanced Coursegraduates are capable of planning and executingairmobile operations in a professional manner. Theywill need your advice and input to do this. Don'tshortchange them by using standardized routes andmovement tables, or underestimating their ability.

You know, Dozeoff, that was a slick operation,laughed Nofly as he called Gloomy Tower for landing.

Yes sir, replied Dozeoff, I 've got to hand it tothat CPT Straight, he's really something. I guess we've

misunderstood this airmobile thing all along.

NOTE: I f elements you support are interested theCA TTS scenarios and training are available for anyunit . Call AUTOVON) 835-184212519 for information or write:

Commander USAISATTN: A TSH-B TM 3Ft. Benning GA 31905

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Major Lawrence E.CasperMajor Casper was acombat aviation battalionS3 and an attackhelicopter companycommander In a li htInfantry division when hewrote this article. He Iscurrently assigned to U SAir Force Air Commandand Staff College MaxwellAir Force Base AL.

t tackHelicoptersn thescort Role

II]HE GROUP of attack aviators were huddled

Tround the carbon-blackened stove in the

briefing tent awaiting the operations order fortheir next mission. They'd been doing a lot

of waiting for a couple of days, and they were anxious to get back in the battle. After all, they came outon this division field training exercise to demonstratewhat attack helicopters can do.

The operations officer poked his head through thetent flaps, stepped in, started taking his gloves off, andin a somewhat disgusted tone proclaimed, Well,another escort mission.

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Bob, a tall, boyish Cobra pilot, responded, Herewe go again. Don't these people know how to employan 'attack' company?

Typical infantry mentality, scoffed Doug, a scoutsection leader.

No, tha t's Vietnam 'thinking,' shouted Denny,a Vietnam vet and Cobra standardization instructorpilot (SIP).

That 's the trouble with a light infantry division,they shouldn't have an attack unit anyway. They'reonly capable of thinking a couple of kilome ters anhour, blasted Bill, a steely eyed scout SIP and ex

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perienced battle captain.The operations officer raised his hand and hisvoice, OK, knock off the 'bull' and settle down. Wehave a mission to accomplish and a lot of people aredepending on us, so pay attention.

How often have you heard a dialogue similar to thistake place? f you are in an attack helicopter company,it is probably more often than you care to.

Well is there any validity in attack helicopters escorting assault aircraft? There is no doubt that during airassault operations good preplanning of artillery firesis hard to replace when you need help fast to suppress

any unexpected bad guys. But what if you havecommunication problems and our artillery doesn't getthe call, or what if the mission places the air assaulttask force out of artillery range? What if low ceilingor poor visibility negates the use of our Air Force?What does the commander do to increase the odds ofa successful mission?

The question of attack helicopters assuming theescort role is highly controversial to say the least. FieldManuals (FM) 17-47, 17-50 and 17-95 do not even ad-

SEPTEMBER 983

dress the issue, yet air assault operations are continuously used in lateral displacement, reinforcement,attacks, raids and other operations beyond the forwardline of own troops.

FM 90-4, Airmobile Operations does list attackhelicopters as supporting elements of an air assault taskforce, and states, Attack helicopters should destroyor suppress enemy infantry, tanks, and air defenseweapons, and OVERWATCH AND PROVIDESECURITY FOR ASSAULT AIRCRAFT. The mission is real, and it's one that many members of theattack community do not like to perform.

In a light infantry division, the attack helicoptercompany offers the largest, most concentrated arrayof antitank fIrepower, more than any other single company or battalion-size unit. Certainly these assets arecritical and should be managed accordingly. In the offense as well as in the defense, the attack company af

fords the division commanders the ability to move agreat deal of firepower rapidly to the decisive pointon the battlefield. They would not want to committhose assets to a lesser operation that would jeopardize that flexibility. But what if a division commanderfelt that moving an infantry unit by helicopters tosecure a key piece of terrain (dam, bridge, built -uparea, etc.) could be that decisive action? Then how canwe in the attack helicopter business aid in increasingthose odds for a successful mission?


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Once it is determined that attack helicopters arenecessary to support the air assault task force, a question that must be answered early on is, "Where do weget the attack assets and in what numbers?" f the aircavalry is tagged, the squadron or troop could be used,if not already committed to one of their many mis

sions. But more than likely the assets will come fromthe attack helicopter company. And if so, will the entire attack company be needed? FM 17-50 states, "At-tack helicopters are nomally employed in mass -preferably in battalion strength, but NOT LESSTHAN COMPANY STRENGTH." The number ofaircraft would depend on the nature of the mission.But as an example, a lift consisting of 4 to 1 assaultaircraft could be escorted by as little as an "attackteam," consisting of 3 scout and 5 attack aircraft. Itis essential that once the assets are identified, theliaison officer (La) be in on the planning as early aspossible. The La, like the other members of the taskforce planners, needs to analyze the METT T (mission, enemy, troops, terrain time) factors to ensureoptimum employment and effective coordination.

The four phases of movement in an air assaultoperation that must be considered when planning forthe effective use of the attack assets are:

Helicopter movement to the pickup zone (PZ). Movement from the PZ to the release point (RP). Movement from the RP to the landing zone (LZ). Movement from the LZ back to the assembly

area, subsequent lifts or another mission.t can be assumed that the PZ is secured, unless themission is an extraction of a unit under fire, and thenthe use of all fire support elements is essential. Depending on the mission and the location of the PZ, FM 90-4states, "During air movement to the PZ, enemy antiaircraft or other fire may be encountered." f thatis a concern, then the attack or cavalry aircraft shouldlink-up with the troop-carrying aircraft at theirassembly area and precede them to the PZ. But in mostcases, the attack aircraft will link-up in the vicinity ofthe PZ. The attack cavalry aircraft should not landon the PZ, and if the aircraft will be in the area foran extended period of time, they should occupyho'ldi'ng areas nearby. .

It is critical during the movement from the PZ tothe RP that the at tack cavalry team precede the troopcarrying aircraft. In this manner, the team will attemptto locate and suppress enemy positions prior to the arrival of the formation. Caution must be exercised toensure "telegraphing" the assault aircraft's route tothe enemy oes ot occur. The positioning of the at-

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tack aircraft on the flanks of the assault airc raft' s formation is of equal importance. The attack aircraftshould be placed in such order that the lead aircraftof the flight is provided cover while still being in a position to quickly respond to the call of any assault aircraft in the flight that is taking fire. During this phase

of movement itis

essential that the maximum use ofpreplanned artillery fires and close air support aremade available (range and weather permitting).

The movement from the RP to the LZ and disembarking of the troops is the most time-sensitive andcritical phase. f the LZ is behind enemy lines or isin an area where enemy troops are suspected, alternate LZs must be selected, and the troop-carrying aircraft should not land at any LZ that has not beenreconnoitered by an attack/cavalry team(s). Again,caution must be exercised to ensure that the reconnaissance is not p r m t u rand does not therebydivulge the loca tion of the intended LZ to the enemy.This can be accomplished by reconnoitering both theprimary and alternate LZs. It ensures the absence ofthe enemy, and if observed, keeps the enemy guessingas to where the landing will occur. The recon shouldbe conducted only minutes before the arrival of theassault aircraft, and once completed the attack cavalryteam should reposition itself to an overwatch positionwhich provides optimum intervisibility with the LZ anduse of the maximum effective range of the aircraft'sweapon systems (see figure 2). From the overwatch

position, the attack cavalry team can provide anassortment of key support functions. FM 90-4 suggeststhe following roles:

Provide suppressive fires to prevent a time gapin LZ preparation by other support elements.

Recommend last minute changes regarding aircraft landing instructions.

Provide area cover and neutralize known enemypositions, or provide security for troop-carrying aircraft while in the LZ area.

Provide command and control between theground commander and the assault aircraft pilots arriving and departing the LZ.

Once the determination has been made that successful landing by the troop-carrying aircraft can beaccomplished, and the approach is initiated, the attack aircraft escorting the flight can opt to relocateto an overwatch position or establish a "race track"flight pattern around the LZ.

During the final phase of movement, the attack/caval ry team will accompany the assault aircraftback to a predesignated point and terminate the mis-

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OverwatchPosition

rn landing zoneback to

sembly area .

::;i:n ~ r : II I llllllllit..

Four phases of air assault movement

sion, or, if there are subsequent troop lifts, repeat theprocedure. f the troops in the LZ require fire support,the attack/cavalry team may continue its support fromthe overwatch battle position while the assault aircraftreturn. Additionally, if the mission is a raid, the attack/ cavalry teams as well as the assault aircraft maylaager in a predesignated area near the LZ or objective.

There are two additional elements which willenhance the mission accomplishment and increase thesurvivability of the aircraft. They are conducting airassault operations in periods of darkness or limitedvisibility and the incorpora tion of a feint or false insertion(s) during the execution of the operation. Bothof these techniques aid in confusing the enemy and willcomplicate his decisionmaking.

When attack helicopters are conducting armedescort, as in any attack helicopter mission, the ordnance configuration will vary, and a word of cautionis in order when selecting the amounts and types tocarry. A unique capability of our current attackhelicopter is that it has a diverse array of weaponsystems. From the quick-reacting 2.75 inch rocket area

SEPTEMBER 1983

Pickup

to

Relea e Point

PrimaryLanding

Zone

[l] release pointto landing zone

fire weapon, to the pinpoint precision of the tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)missile and the instant response of the 2 mm cannon,the Cobra can cover virtually all the bases." Theyshould be configured so the pilot has the flexibility toselect the best weapon to neutralize the threat. Furthermore, if 2.75 inch rocket pods are hung on the outboard articulating pylons, the aircraft is effectively lostas a tank killer for a considerable period of time untilthe TOW missile launchers are replaced andboresighted.

So, at tack helicopters in the escort role? Yes indeedAnd it is really nothing new. But that should not betaken as carte blanche" for anyone planning an airassault operation. Remember, attack helicopters area limited asset which are best used when employedagainst armored and mechanized forces in a combinedarms effort, at the decisive time and place to achievevictory. After all, a light infantry division has only oneattack helicopter company, and even with an 8 percent availability rate, the division commander's

trump card amounts to only 17 aircraft.

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photo by Gary Dill

Mr. George E. HalfordPublic Affairs Office

Vicksburg District U.S. ArmyCorps o Engineers

Vicksburg MS

U R I N G THE recent floodemergency in Mississippi, Louisianaand Arkansas, the VicksburgDistrict of the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers found it necessary to callon other branches of the Army forassistance.

Responding to the emergency bysupplying aircraft and crews werethe U.S. Army Electronic ProvingGround-Aviation Division at Ft.Huachuca, AZ, the 121st ArmyReserve Command (ARCOM), and

Detachment Three of the 327thAviation Group of the U.S. ArmyReserve.

The 153d Attack Recon Squadron of the 186th Attack ReconGroup of the Mississippi NationalGuard stationed at Key Field, Meridian, MS, offered its technical ex-pertise to develop high altitudephotographs of the flooded region.

Ft. Huachuca provided the

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ir Support for

the Corps ofEngineersThe U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground

I I ~ Aviation Division at Ft. Huachuca AZ providedthe Corps o Engineers with an OV1 D Mohawkand crew for flood surveillance. The Mohawkwas used to map the extent o flooding locateseepage under the levees and survey the Districtfor flood damage.

District with the services of anArmy OV-ID Mohawk, which wasflown by Captain James R Young.The 0 V-I was used during the April1983 flood of the Pearl River inSlidell, LA. The Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg had beenusing the craft and offered its services to the District.

When the Pearl went above floodstage again in May, with the Mississippi rising rapidly, the Districtrequested use of the Mohawk againto use the airborne radar for checking the delineation of the floodarea. Delineation indicates wherethe water meets land and helpsmark the boundary of the floodedarea.

The radar was augmented by theuse of the photographic and infrared systems. The crew took highresolution black and white pho

tographs of the areas, then used theradar for comparison.According to Sergeant First Class

David Dorschner, operator of thesurveillance equipment aboard theMohawk, the Corps also used falsecolor infrared photography. He ex-plained that false color photography is multicolored. All naturalfoliage will appear red because ithas cholorophyl, while water and

unnatural things will appear in different shades of gray to black. Thismakes it easy to see the water,especially in areas where there area lot of woods around.

The Corps also took advantage ofthe craft's infrared line scan system.

It 's not a camera. It has detectorsto pick up heat emissions andamplify them, SFC Dorschnersaid.

The system can be set up to readeither heat or cold. During the daythe water is cooler than the surrounding surfaces and at night it wouldbe warmer. Basically, it makes thewater easier to see, SFC Dorschnersaid. The infrared line scan is shotat the same scale as the black andwhite photos for comparison.

The black and white film wasdeveloped by the 153d AttackRecon Squadron. SFC Dorschner

contacted Chief Master SergeantJames Barnhill, who runs thephotolab for the 153d, because heknew they could do the job.

The Mohawk flew directly toMeridian to get the film processedat the end of each mission andwaited to return the processed filmback to Vicksburg.

The high-resolution black andwhite pictures were instrumental in

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STRUCTURALLY SOUND-Helicopters were used during therecent flood emergency to check the status of drainage structureslike the one on the Little Sunflower River in Mississippi. There Isonly a slight difference between the water levels on the land sidebelow) and on the river side above). Such structures re used to

prevent river water from entering backwater areas during a flood

locating breaks in minor leveesalong Ascalmore and PeluciaCreeks in northern Mississippi. Thebreak in the Ascalmore Creek Leveewas not accessible by land.

The Mohawk's infrared line scanwas also used to locate seepageunder the levee.

The aircraft flew nearly 40 hoursfor the District during April andMay, with the May flooding accounting for more than half thattime. The missions included patrolling the entire length of the PearlRiver from Jackson, MS, to theGulf of Mexico, and the leveesalong the Mississippi, and surveyingthe extent of flooding.

Though the Mohawk gave a highaltitude overview of the flooding, acloser, farther reaching study ofground conditions on a day-to-daybasis was also necessary. For this,

the Corps used the helicopters andpersonnel of the 121st ARCOMArmy Flight Activity 156, andDetachment Three of the 327thAviation Company, the Vicksburgreserve unit to which the OH-58AKiowa and UH-IH Huey helicopters were assigned. Departmentof the Army Civilian (DAC)/Captain Joseph D. Smith andDAC/Chief Warrant Officer David

SEPTEMBER 1983

K. Farlow are on permanent fulltime duty flying air support for theArmy Reserve. Other pilots neededto fly this mission for the Corpswere brought from within the 121stARCOM.

The helicopters were used topatrol levees, inspect flood controlstructures and survey flooded areasfor damage assessment. However,most of the flights involved levee inspection, where the advantages ofthe helicopter over ground travel orflight in fixed wing aircraft areevident.

On one levee inspection flight, thehelicopter pilot and Corpsemployees spotted two youths in aboat being swept toward the mainchannel of the Mississipi River byflood waters. By alerting authoritiesto the emergency and reassuring theboaters, the helicopter crew and

passengers were instrumental in accomplishing the rescue.One of the advantages o f

helicopters is the ability to land onlevees and pick up passengers, suchas levee inspectors. An inspectiontrip that would take three men halfa day to complete on the ground canbe conducted by one man in ahelicopter in a couple of hours. Inaddition, the helicopters provide a

wider area of observation than ispossible at ground level.

It is easier to spot sand boils fromthe air because they are not hiddenby vegetation. A sand boil marks aplace where water seeping under alevee erodes levee materials.

The helicopters were also used foraerial photography and to gain access to areas inaccessible from theground.

Not all of the flights must beemergency rela ted or connected tothe immediate flood fight. Becausethe helicopters often give employeesa new perspective of a project, anaerial inspection of projects oftenresults in new ideas or improvedmethods which result in monetarysavings to the U.S. Government. Allof this adds to the cost effectivenessof using the helicopters.

Not having full-time access to the

helicoptersis

a major problem. Togain access to the Reserve helicopters, the District must enterPhase One emergency, which differsfrom area to area according toreadings on the river gauges.

Cooperation with the Corps wasalso beneficial to the pilots andground crews. The biggest thingwe got out of it was being able touse our experience for a purpose,

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STILL HOLDING The Corps used thehelicopters to fly levee inspections along theMississippi River. Here, a mainline levee alongthe old river bed protects cultivated farmland atPoint Pleasant, LA, from serious flooding.

CPT Smith said. I t gave us achance to use our training in a realworld situation.

However, CPT Smith added thatthe ground crew did all of the hardwork. I t requires a 11 percent effort from all the people on theground to maintain the aircraft. I tcouldn't have been done withoutthem; they made the mission successful to this point. He added

that the 121st Headquarters hadbeen very supportive, giving thepilots the go-ahead to do whateverwas necessary. CPT Smith said heenjoyed the smooth working relationship with the Corps, and appreciated the feeling of satisfaction from doing a meaningful job.

District personnel described thepeople of the 121st as true workhorses doing an outstanding job.

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Several times the pilots were required to spend 7 out of 8 hours inthe air. Over a 2-week period, theunit flew more than 130 hours forthe Corps.

This year's flood was not the firsttime aircraft had been used to support the efforts of the Corps in aflood fight. National Guardhelicopters were used to surveydamages in the Monroe, LA, area

during Christmas week 1982.The Flood of 1973 was the firsttime that the Vicksburg Districtused helicopters extensively duringa flood fight, said Sam Hernandez,who coordinated emergency operations. At the time, the Armybrought in helicopters from Ft. Ben-ning, GA.

The Corps also uses aircraft forpurposes other than flood fighting.

LOOKING DOWN Thisphoto, taken from the OV1DMohawk at about 8 000 feet,shows a break In the levee onBlack Creek In HolmesCounty, MS note the arrow).This view also makes it easierto see patterns of old creekbeds in the wooded area.

Such was the case at the dedicationof the Tensas National WildlifeRefuge in northern Louisiana.

Eleven UH-IH Hueys from Ft.Polk, LA, commanded by LTCHarry McCloud, flew dignitariesand newsmen from Monroe to theTensas Refuge in early Novemberfor the dedication ceremony.Among the dignitaries were a U.S.Senator, Congressman, the Gover

norof

Louisiana, both the Divisionand District Engineers fromVicksburg and a representativefrom the Department of Interior.

Whether the situation involvesestimating flood damage, locatingtrouble spots in the levees ortransporting dignitaries to a dedication site, the Vicksburg District hasdiscovered the advantages of airsupport from Army helicopters.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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THE HAZARDS TOAIRCRAFT operationsfrom blowing dust and

sand will never have to beexplained to the pilot who hasbeen caught in brownoutconditions, whether caused bynature or created by his own orother aircraft.

FM 1-202, EnvironmentalFlight, dated 23 February 1983,warns aviators against taking offin sand or dust storms andadvises against flying throughsuch storms when possible. Dustand grit in the air will causeconsiderable damage to internalengine parts, excessive bearingwear and erosion of rotor blades.

When operations are necessary

where sand and dust are aproblem the aircraft should beairborne as quickly as possible.A running-type takeoff isrecommended for fixed-wingaircraft and wheel-equippedhelicopters. A maximumperformance takeoff should bemade in helicopters with skids.Rapid takeoff will help avoidloss of visual reference and

SEPTEMBER 983

damage from dust and sand tothe engine and flight controlsystem.

Procedures for landingemphasize that the best way tominimize blowing sand and dustis to make a running landing orif terrain does not permit arunning landing, an approach totouchdown should be made. Alanding should not be made to ahover. Once committed tolanding, the pilot should land asquickly as possible.

When operation in sand cannotbe avoided and a running landingis not possible, landing should bemade using an approach anglethat is greater than the angleused for normal approaches. The

approach angle should becompatible with available power.f a running landing can be

made, the touchdown roll shouldbe kept to a minimum to preventthe possibility of overloading thelanding gear.

Crews are cautioned to keepall doors and windows on theaircraft closed during landingsand takeoffs to prevent sand

from entering the cockpit andcargo area. Hovering and lowaltitude, low-speed flight modesshould be avoided wheneverpossible.

Although FM 1 202 addressesdesert operations, brownout canoccur anywhere there is loose orsandy soil, little or no vegetation,and periods of low precipitation.Strong winds, heavy use byvehicles, and operation ofaircraft in such areas compoundthe problem. Because some o fthese factors are usually present,the possibility of brownoutduring field training exercises isextremely high. Mission briefingsshould contain a warning aboutthe potential for brownout, but

in spiteof

precautions evenexperienced aviators sometimesdo dumb things and are involvedin accidents that simply nevershould have happened.

One such pilot had beenwarned of possible brownoutconditions during a missionbriefing for a false troopinsertion at a drop zone. He had500 rotary wing flight hours,

7


20/48

more than 400 of which were inthe UH-l H which he was flyingfor the night training missi on .His aircraft was one of fourinvolved in the mission. Flying

the lead helicopter, he lined upwith a dirt road running throughthe drop zone. When he haddescended to approximately 8feet above the ground, therotorwash began picking upsand. The copilot commented tohim about the brownout warningbut the pilot replied that hewasn t concerned about dust andcontinued his approach.

He terminated the approachwith a I-foot hover and theresultant blowing dust causedhim to lose visual reference withthe ground. The aircraft driftedand the right skid hit the ground.

t then yawed left and rolled tothe right about the horizontalaxis of the right skid, causing themain rotor to strike the ground.The Huey came to rest on itsright side.

Pilots sometimes involve theiraircraft in brownout conditions

when an alternative is readilyavailable. An OH-6A pilot madehis first mistake when he selecteda parking area for his aircraftclose to an unimproved trailwhich ground vehicles had beenusing for two days. The trail haddeteriorated to the point that adense cloud of dust wasgenerated when it was subjectedto rotor downwash. He had used

18

this same spot for two daysduring daylight hours withoutexperiencing full brownoutconditions. But on the night ofthe mishap, he failed to initiate a

full performance takeoff and wasmentally unprepared for the totalloss of outside visual referencewhen he encountered blowingdust upon liftoff. He then turnedon his landing light and reflectedglare from the dust furtherreduced visibility. He turned thelanding light off but instead oflanding or making a maximumperformance takeoff, hesustained the hover for about 20seconds. The aircraft drifted intoa tree and crashed on its leftside.

The far-reaching effects ofdust and weather on the successof helicopter operations areapparent in the followingsequence of events.

On 24 April 1980, after 5 Ymonths of planning, eight RH-53helicopters took off from theaircraft carrier Nimitz. Theirmission-rescue of the American

hostages in Iran. A minimum ofsix helicopters would be requiredto complete the operation. In thefirst stage of the highly secretoperation, the helicopters wouldtravel 600 miles at low altitude toa preselected refueling site calledDesert One. Two hours aftertakeoff, helicopter No.6 beganshowing indications of rotorblade failure. The aircraft was

landed and a decision was madeto abandon it.

nd th n th r w r 7. Onehour later, the formationunexpectedly encountered a dustcloud of unknown size anddensity. The helicopters brokeout of the first area of suspendeddust but, within an hour, entereda second, larger and denser area.While attempting to navigatethrough this second area withseverely degraded visibility, asecond helicopter No.5)experienced a failure of severalcritical navigation and flightinstruments. The progressivelydeteriorating flight conditionsmade safe flight extremelyquestionable and the helicopter

pilot decided that it would beunwise to continue. He abortedthe mission, reversed course, andrecovered on the Nimitz.

nd th n th r w r 6. Theremaining six helicopters arrivedat Desert One for their refuelingrendezvous with the C-130s. Theformation had been separated inthe low visibility of the duststorm and they arrived from 50to 85 minutes later than planned.While en route, a third helicopter

No.2) experienced a partialhydraulic failure, but the crewelected to continue to therefueling site believing repairscould be accomplished there.Upon landing, however, the crewand the helicopter unitcommander concluded that thehelicopter could not be repaired.

nd th n th r w r 5. In theplanning stages of the rescuemission, it had been determined

that a minimum of sixoperational helicopters would berequired at the refueling site totransport the rescue teams andbring the hostages safely out.The decision was made, andconcurred in by the President, toabort the rescue operation.

(As the force began preparingto withdraw and return to launchbase one helicopter was being

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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repositioned to permit another totop off its fuel tanks for thereturn flight. The first helicoptercollided with one of the refuelingC-130s and both aircraft wereimmediately engulfed in flames inwhich eight crewmembers died

and five other members of theteam were injured.)The Special Operations Review

Group commissioned by theJoint Chiefs of Staff to conducta broad examination of theIranian hostage rescue missionconsisted of six senior militaryofficers-three retired and threestill on active duty. For thepurposes of this article only oneaspect of the group's findingswill be addressed-helicopter No.5.

Little information wasavailable about weather whichcould be expected along the600-mile route to the desertrefueling site. Becauseoperational security wasabsolutely vital to the rescuemission, no weatherreconnaissance flight over theroute was attempted. Adequateweather information can be

denied to Air Weather Servicemeteorologists in several ways:(1) a closed society (such as Iran)does not release information 2)the weather phenomenon can beso infrequent that it has neverbefore been observed in recordedhistory (e.g., Mount St. Helen'sash) or 3) the area of interestmay be so sparsely populatedthat although the phenomenonoccurs frequently, and perhapspredictably, it is not observed by"civilized" inhabitants andtherefore is not recorded. Thesuspended dust encounteredalong the helicopter route fallsmore appropriately into the thirdcategory.

The helicopter forceunexpectedly encounteredvisibility conditions whichprecluded visual meteorologicalconditions (VMC) flight

SEPTE M BER 983

approximately 3 hours aftertakeoff from the Nimitz andflight integrity was lost. Thehelicopters broke out of the firstarea of suspended dust but soonentered a second one, which wasof even greater density.

The force was maintainingstrict radio silence and helicopterNo.5 was not in visual contactwith the other aircraft. Thecommander of No.5 had notbeen told-nor did he askabout the weather conditions atDesert One. Based on instrumentmalfunctions on his aircraft,exacerbated by the visibilityconditions, he made a decision toabort and return to the carrier.(If he had continued towardDesert One, he would have exitedthe instrument meteorologicalconditions (lMC) inapproximately 25 minutes-andin 55 minutes would have arrivedat his destination.)

When questioned about whathis decision would have been ifhe had known that the restrictedvisibility conditions did notprevail at his destination, thepilot indicated that he would

have continued the flight. Hisfailure to arrive at Desert Oneproved critical in that oneadditional mission-capableaircraft would have permitted theentire mission to continue.

The review group believes thatdirect interface between missionpilots and air weather officerswould have increased thelikelihood of foreknowledge ofthe suspended dust phenomenonand that pilots encountering thesuspended dust would have beenbetter prepared to make adecision when they were caughtin the dust storm.

Chances of an encounter withweather phenomena such asvolcanic ash from the Mount St.Helen eruption are slim, but itcan happen. The unexpectednature of such an incident cancontribute to the danger posed to

aircraft.This was the case when the

captain of a British Airwaysflight found himself pilotin g a290-ton Boeing 747 with 262 liveson board and no power Theaircraft was 120 miles from the

nearest airport at Jakarta,Indonesia, when all four enginessuddenly failed.

The best hope for survival layin a long glide back to Jakartawhile attempting to restart theengines-but a 10-thousand-footmountain range was between theairliner and the airport. The hugeaircraft continued to lose altitudeas efforts to restart the enginesmet with no success. Just shortof having to attempt to ditch inthe sea, the first engine finallyroared back to life, followed bythe other three. Inspectionrevealed that the aircraft hadflown into a cloud of ash from avolcanic eruption and all engineshad been snuffed out.

With luck, your experienceswith brownout from dust (orwhiteout from snow in winter)won't be as earth-shaking asthese last two examples. Good

judgment can keep you out ofsituations like those involving theHuey and the OH-6. Sometimesyou will have to operate in areaswhere dust is a problem but lookfor alternatives and use themwhenever you can. When thereare no viable alternatives, followthe procedures in your operatorsmanual and the field manual.Avoiding brownout is a lot betterthan finding yourself trying tofly blind in a cloud of d u s t ~

References

Browne, Peter We've Lost All FourEngines " Reader s Digest, June 1983.u.s. Department of Defense.Report on Iran-Rescue Mission.Prepared by Special Operations ReviewGroup for Joint Chiefs of Staff. A v -tion Week and Space Technology,September 15, 22 and 29, 1980.

9


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PEARL SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival Lowdovvn

ALSE MOSs

Brenda Sandophotograph byReflect ions Stud io

We have not forgotten the critical need for the careeraviation life support equipment (ALSE) military occupational specialties (MOSs), but we need your support in the form of task and skill analyses to helpdevelop the MACRIT (Manpower Authorization Standards and Criteria) we need to send to Military Personnel Center. We will write the necessary justification, but we need your data. We will coordinate allactions through the ALSE Management SteeringCouncil. This council is a strong, unbiased panel thatgets things done .Credit-Wbere t Is Due

A few years back we frequently heard of the good

things that a very strong ALSE supporter was doing.Yes Dave Klindt formerly of the UASSB, SchwaebischHall, Gennany, certainly did an outstanding job in selling ALSE. We're thankful tha t his replacement(CW4 Charles Chuck Gibson) is also a very strongsupporter of this critical area. Since the inception ofthis ALSE element in the UASSB, Europe, and theconcern for well trained personnel, the combined effort of Dave Klindt and Chuck Gibson has paid offto the tune of some 820 aircrew people who are nowqualified and knowledgeable in ALSE. A majority ofthese people are high ranking warrant officers, as wells 'a number of.commissioned officers. Many enlisted

soldiers have participated, including E8s. So we havea viable program going which truly needs a careermilitary occupational specialty (MaS) or MOSs. LetPEARL hear from you in the field; we will carry theball to Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) toget you those MOSs.Tbe Ladies Are Getting ALSE Trained

Our latest Army lady is SGT McKinney, 348thMedical Detachment (HA), 10730 South Florida

20

Drive, Orlando, FL 32812. SGT McKinney recentlywas graduated from the U.S. Air Force Aviation LifeSupport Equipment School, Chanute AFB, IL. She isa 76P and has been assigned to the 348th MedicalDetachment as the ALSE noncommissioned officer incharge. Welcome aboard, SGT McKinney; we lookforward to great things happening for ALSE in yourunit.DARCOM (ALSE) Project Officer (PO)

Aviation life support system equipment training ison the upswing. The Fifth U.S. Army just completedanother course in which a number of high level personnel, both military and civilian, participated.DARCOM ALSE Training For Staff and Users

The recent session of the DARCOM ALSE training school was concluded and again there were highlevel interest and personnel in attendance, showingthey are concerned and are being trained in this criticalfield. We are planning to establish this training to beconducted as a minimum twice each year. We're alsoformalizing the training and are working closely with

the Fifth Army and other Army elements, the ArmyNational Guard and Reserves to ensure we standardize this training.Special Measurement Form

All requests for Special Measurement Clothing forMen, DD Form 358, submitted to DPSC-M must contain the height and weight of the person being fitted.Requests without this information cannot beprocessed. Continue to use DD Form 1111 for women.In all cases you must indicate the height and weight,whether it is for men or women.Supply Information Letter

The U.S. Army/TSARCOM Supply InformationLetter No. 1-83, April 1983, published by the U.S.Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, 2800 South 20thStreet, Philadelphia, PA 19101, has recently beenpublished. Copies are available by writing to the aboveaddress, ATTN: STSAP -G. Information pertaining tosupport equipment (ALSE) is extracted for yourperusal.

Body Armor Small Arms Protective AircrewmanFront Torso and Front/Back Torso. Assets of the

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


23/48

assembled items in sizes short, NSNs 8470-00-935-3183/3192 and regular, NSNs 8470-00-935-3184/3193 are exhausted. Requisitions received forthese NSNs will be rejected with status code CK.

Assets are currently available for size long only, NSNs8470-00-935-3185/3194. Army activities authorizedsubject body armor should requisition out-of-stocksizes by available components and assemble the item.

SIZE VEST FRONT PLATE BACK PLATEShort 8470 00 999 1473 8470 00 935 3177 8470 00 935 3174

Regular 8470 00 999 1474 8470 00 935 3178 8470 00 935 3175

Chemical Protective Clothing Laces. DPSC is accepting requisitions for footwear laces for use with thechemical protective footwear cover, NSN 8340-01-021-5978. The laces are black nylon, flat, braided, tipped on both ends, 7/32 of an inch wide and 84 incheslong. NSN 8335-01-107-6998, laces footwear, pair$.31.

Socks Extreme Cold Weather. The socks are to beworn with boots, ECW, mukluk and serve as a linerfor maximum insulation effectiveness. CTA 50-900,Note 147 authorizes 1 pair per authorized boots,ECW. The socks re not listed in CT A 50-900 as aseparate item of supply, but as a component of theboots, ECW, mukluk. LIN C08274 applies to both

the socks and boots, ECW. Point of contact is VickieDomenico, AUTOVON 444-2535.Chemical Protective Overgarment. Stocks of sub

ject item for sizes XXXS, NSN 8415-01-070-1880 andXXS, NSN 8415-01-070-1879, are exhausted. Furtherprocurement of these sizes is pending adoption of thenew battledress overgarment. All requisitions routedto DPSC (S9T) for these sizes will be rejected withstatus code CA. Size substitutions should be usedwhere possible.

Mountain Piton Snap Link. There have been severalinstances recently of snap link failure due to improperrapelling technique. Improper technique was used inlacing the rope through the snap link. We in ArmyAviation are using this snap link for rescue purposes,but use two snap links so we should not be faced withthe mountain or helicopter rapelling problem. But dobe sure you use two snap links when wearing theSRU-21/P modified survival rescue vest.

Visor Tracks. The Army Support Activity issued amessage R251530Z May 83 which furnishes pertinentchanges for the visor tracks and earcup retention

SEPTEMBER 983

assemblies for the S P H ~helmet. Due to unsatisfactory performance, visor track, NSN 8 4 1 5 ~ 0 1 0 8 3 8 3 7(interchangeable), will no longer be issued. Visor track,left hand, NSN 8415-00-410-4669 and right hand, NSN

8415-00-410-4668, have been reinstated as the standarditems of issue. DLA assets are available for both leftand right hand track. Interchangeable visor tracks currently in use should be replaced at the next 90-day inspection or at the earliest possible time.

Earcup Retention Assemblies. Item was previouslyavailable in two sizes. The Army adopted a standardsize retention assembly, NONS/ZED NSN8415-01-056-0699, SZ XL, which is being phased out.DLA assets will be issued until exhausted. NSN8415-01-056-0700 SZ Reg. for which DLA assets havebeen exhausted, is being retained as the NSN for thenonsized standard item. Description data is beingrevised. All requisitions currently on backorder forNSN 8415-01-056-0700 will be supplied with the standard nonsized item, when available. Point of contactis Ms Gerry Lyles, AUTOVON 444-2537.ALSE Revisited

While browsing through a technical magazine published in early 1938, PEARL came across an articleon, guess what? Yes, would you believe an article on

Emergency Locator Transmitter. For the benefit ofall concerned, we are quoting from this article:

Enclosed in a fireproof box, the miniature batteryoperated transmitter is designed to be mounted on coilsprings within the tail of a plane. A severe jolt closesa switch that sets the little black box in operat ion for4 days. The set will continue to send out short wavesignals without interruption. This will allow ample timefor search aircraft with direction finding equipmentto locate the crash site. This article appearedNovember 1938. The subject of the ELT has b ~ e naround for a long time, but its need is being recognized.Support for the personnel location system (PLS) israpidly advancing. The letter requirement has beensigned off and actions in this area will be increasing.Now with the PLS we will have something to locatethat downed aircraf tlai rcrew. The PLS will playan important role when we finally see the newAN/PRC-112 survival radio. ~

If you have a question about personal equipment orrescue/survi val gear wri te PEARL DARCOfvf ATTN: DRCPOALSE 4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St. Louis MO 63120 or callAUTOVON 693-3307 or ommercial 314-263-3307.

21


24/48


25/48

JHE TIME HAS come for your aviation unit to

T um in a "seemingly" perfect helicopter to Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD). You've beenscheduled to turn it in and pick up a freshlyoverhauled one in return. You're confused. Why?

So starts another long industrial process at CCADwhich was established in 1961. Completion of a helicopter life cycle under the on condition maintenance(OCM) program keeps the Army utility, attack andobservation helicopter fleet alive, well and flying.

The overhaul and repair business at the depot ishealthier and more successful than ever. CCAD, whichis under the command control of the U.S. Army DepotSystem Command (DESCOM), Chambersburg, PA,is located in the south Texas Gulf Coast region on anaval air station. t took Texas and the naval air station as its home because of their availability and accessibility when the Navy Airplane Rework Facility

was closed in 1960.The depot complex of 13 acres, employing more

than 3,000 civil service employees and 3 military, in1982 processed more than 500 aircraft encompassing14 different types, from Turkey to Korea-Alaska toPanama . Impressive? You bet However, the depotprocess may be confusing to many. t is easier tounderstand if you are fortunate enough to be assignedas a military member. I am one such military member,assigned to the depot as a 67Z maintenance supervisorand formerly was noncommissioned officer in chargeof the Aircraft Delivery Office.

I arrived at CCAD from Germany in 1979 andworked in a branch of the depot that receives aircraft

SEPTEMBER 983

arriving for repair or overhaul and leave the depot oncethey are completed. The job is unique since any ferrycrew coming through CCAD must pass through theoffice. The Aircraft Delivery Office initially receivesthe crews and explains the depot process and oftenconducts tours to point out the maintenance andlogistic process that the helicopter will go through.Crews from almost every state and most aviationorganizations, to include Reserves and NationalGuard, pass through the office. Each crew is amazedto find out what happens to an aircraft during itsoverhaul process.

This process really begins with the commoditymanager for helicopters at the Troop Support andAviation Materiel Readiness Command (TSARCOM)in St. Louis, MO. The manager sends out a team ofcontracted technicians each year to inspect airframeson every helicopter. During the inspection A CE

Aircraft Condition Evaluation), panels and structuresare evaluated and assigned a score. Those aircraftassigned a higher score will be inducted for depotoverhaul and the process of induction begins at thedepot. From there, the aircraft candidate is managedby TSAR COM as to the date when it should be eitherflown, trucked or air shipped to the depot foroverhaul. After coordination among the owning unit,TSARCOM, DESCOM and CCAD, arrangements forturn-in are formulated.

These arrangements are further processed within thedepot 's Production Planning and Control Division, aswell as the Aircraft Delivery Office. This is the pointwhere the depot assumes one of the more personal

nd returns them

3


26/48

roles in the depot system. By this I mean we are in contact with our stateside customers on the phone explaining any unanswered questions before the turn-in process begins. We also discuss the OCM aircraft beingassigned and finally schedule the dates to pick up theaircraft. Many ferry crews have questions about theiraircraf t configura tion modification work ordersradio systems and even the color and year of manufacture. We try to answer all these questions so themembers of the ferry crews are in tune to what takesplace before they arrive.

Once members of ferry crews arrive at the depotthe aircraft they are turning in are inventoried for completeness records are checked for accuracy and personal items are removed. Next the OCM aircraft areissued. The ferry crews are given the logbooks and theyare provided with a DA Form 2404 to inspect the aircraft for any safety of flight items they may find.

When the aircraft are inspected and inventoried andall questions answered the ferry crews are given theignition keys the flight logs and a complete set of

publications before signing for the aircraft. This is a3- to-4-hour process.

Often during this transfer process the crewmembersare amazed to learn that they are receiving an a ircraftthat has more than 8 000 hours or was in Vietnamwith them or was in their last unit in Germany. Overallthey are impressed with the product and give our depota good report card once they get home. It 's often hardto convince crews that the depot does not produce newaircraft. CCAD only overhauls what is in the Armysystem-and that goes back to 1962 vintage aircraftwith some having more than 10 000 hours. Nevertheless the crews generally report that CCAD makesan old aircraft like new once it completes its depotprocess.

This is another ongoing cycle that is repeated 300to 400 times a year; and it's a process the depot isproud to say it supports with pride.

But once members of a ferry crew depart the depotthey normally forget what is about to happen to thehelicopter they left behind. Within 2 days the aircraft

The depot has machine shops for repair o engines such as T53L 13 engines lower right).

24 u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


27/48

is inventoried, shortages are noted, and the aircraftis defueled and preserved. Depending on the programand availability o funds, the aircraft waits in storagefor induction into the maintenance processing cycle.

The first stage o maintenance is for the aircraft tobegin its process o overhaul at the disassembly pointwhere the aircraft is stripped down to wires and pip-ing. Components are removed and routed to the manyspecialized prime shops for overhaul work. The air-frame is cleaned thoroughly so inspectors can performa thorough examination. From here, the airframe isrepaired, as needed, with the aid o jigs and fixtures.The tailboom moves through the same sequence oevents. Finally, after 6 work days, the aircraft ispainted, fueled, weighed and flight tested. Logbooks,loose gear and a complete set o publications are add-ed. The aircraft is now finished and ready for anassignment to almost any part o the world, ready to

meet the demanding challenge o Army Aviation smission. ~

TOP: 540 rotor hub assembly getting a finalinspection. CENTER: A technician inspectingbearing parts. BOTTOM: A bearing technicianchecking bearing specifications.

SEPT EM ER 1983

FACTS AND FICTION ABOUTCORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT

1. CCAD produces ' new helicopters.FALSE: CCAD overhauls, modifies, repairs and/or

repaints helicopters.

2. Helicopters leaving eCAD begin with zero hours on theairframe. J

FALSE: Helicopters that complete overhaul retain the, continued airframe time-some airframes have"apcumulated 10,000 hours.

,3. Military personnel can receive depotlevel, handsontraining at CCAD.

TRUE: Depot assistance,training can be r e c e i v ~ datCCAD for 2 . to 4 . weekpe rfods 'by contacting the DepotSGM at AV 8613771/3772. H ~ n d s o nonly.)

4. CCAD is manned by civilian personnel.TRUE: More than 3,000 civil service employees, as well

as 30 active military people, comprise the depot workforce. The commander is an Army colonel.

5. CCAD overhauls Army air,craft only.FALSE: Besides the Army, CCAD overhauls/repairs the

helicopters for the Navy, M a r i n e ~and some Air Force.

6. CCAD has a Hotline system , or service centers.TRUE: Engine Hotline-(24 hours) AV 8612651/2Supply Hotline-AV 8612066Field Assistance Hotline-AV 8612651/2/3Customer Complaint Coordinator-AV 8612587

7. CCAD sends out maintenance crews to field units whenneeded.

, TRUE: The depot can send maintenance ' teams on siteto perform depot , evel repairs. Teams travel annually tomost parts of Conti,nenta( United States ,and many foreigncountries and have proven to be a valuable asset to CCADas well as to the 'unitavlatiol' commander-

S.CCAD's only mission is to dverhaul or repair aircraft.F FALSE: Besides overhauling aircraft, CCAD has themission of overhauling components such as tail booms,90degree and 42degree g e ~ r :,boxes, C H ~ 7gear boxes,

. turbine engines, bearings; component containers, andmore. These components are controlled by the -NationalInver;ltory Control Point at'St: Louis, MO. '9. CCAD still operates its ship 'called the Corpus Christi

ay f, , : .' ' ,FA LSE: The famous Corpus : Ch(isti Bay was

decO/TlI ry,issioned following , itlrterm of service in the SouthChina Sea off the Vietnam coast. Its memory still lives on,as m ~ n yof the workers on the , iflat top are now civilianemployees in the depot. -

10. T h ~UH60 Black Hawk will someday be overhauled at '

CCAD.TRUE: CCAD will one day ,ove 'rhaul fhe UH60.

Preliminary planning has al'ready begun in the depot, andthe depot i ~ e ~ p ~ n d i n gits facilities to acommodate the~ I a c kH a ~ k " .t> . c ;11. H e l i c o ~ t e r s r e q u i r e dto go 'throl,lgh o v ~ r h a u larescheduled on an annual basis : '

FALSE: Helicopters that are required to be turned in toeCAD for overha -ul are entered based on the ACE score.This score represents a profile of the condition of theairframe. The higher the score, the sooner41:leaircraft entersthe overhaul program . J "

12. When an Army organization is notified to pick up ahelicopter at CCAD, it has in most cases completed

. oVerhaul. ;TRUE: Most aircraft being picked up from eCAD have

been overhauled; however, many aircraft are sent to CCADonly for minor repairs or for transfer i n s p ~ c t i o n ;

\

5


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u s RMY

Directorate of Evaluation Standardization 5 'R PORT TO THE FIELD VI TION

ST ND RDIZ TION

UH Instructor PilotQualification

I STRUcrOR PILOTS IPs) arethe cornerstonesof our flight standardization program. For this reason,the U.S. Army is highly selective in choosing aviatorsto attend resident instructor pilot courses conductedat the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL.

These courses are designed to train, challenge andqualify selected commissioned and warrant officeraviators as unit instructor pilots for the conduct oftransition/standardization training in Army aircraft.Instructor pilot courses require much study before,during and after course attendance.

This article provides information that will assistaviators who contemplate attending the UH-l instructor pilot course 2C-ASI5K/2C-SQIC). The course title is: UH-l Contact Instructor Pilot and it lasts 4weeks see figure, fiscal year 1984 schedule). To qualifyyou must:

Be an Active Army or Reserve Component commissioned officer currently in Specialty Code 15A,15B 15C, 15M, 15S 67J or 71A.

Be an Active Army or Reserve Component war-

FY 1984 Schedule

Class Report Date Finish Date

84-1 25 Oct 83 23 Nov 8384-2 24 Nov 83 06 Jan 8484-3 08 Jan 84 03 Feb 8484-4 05 Feb 84 05 Mar 8484-5 05 Mar 84 02 Apr 8484-6 02 Apr 84 30 Apr 8484-7 30 Apr 84 29 May 8484-8 29 May 84 26 Jun 8484-9 26 Jun 84 25 Jul 8484-10 25 Jul 84 22 Aug 8484-11 22 Aug 84 20 Sep 8484-12 20 Sep 84 19 Oct 84

26

rant officer currently in military occupational specialty100B, C, D or E.

Be assigned to, or on orders to a unit equippedwith UH-l helicopters.

Be current in the UH-l and possess a current flightphysical and rotary wing instrument rating, neither ofwhich will expire during the course.

Meet weight standards of AR 600-9. Meet all requirements of AR 95-1 pertaining to

the award of an IP rating. Accept obligated service of 1 year, for active duty

commissioned and warrant officers. Have a minimum of 500 hours of rotary wing time

of which 250 hours are as pilot/copilot in the UH-lor 250 hours as a rotary wing IP.

A security clearance is not required, but if you areselected to attend, the following records should accompany you: 201 file; Standard Form 88; and DA Forms2, 2-1 and 759.

f you should not meet the requirements listed, youcan request a waiver from:

DirectorDepartment of Flight Training

ATZQ-T-FT-OFt. Rucker, AL 36362AUTOVON: 558-2214/2188Commercial: 205) 255-2214/2188

Course DescriptionThe IP course consists of flight and academic train

ing in day and night visual flight rules VFR); UH-laircrew training manual maneuver tasks to include allbefore flight, basic flight, approach/landing, andemergency tasks; academic instruction and practical application of principles and techniques of flight instruction; academic instruction and practical application ofUH-l aircraft systems and maintenance subjects.

Sufficient depth of knowledge is gained to enablegraduates to teach subjects in both flight and maintenance areas.

Academic subjects taught are designed to providestudent IPs with a working knowledge of instructionfundamentals, flight regulations and rotary wingaerodynamics. Student IPs also receive familiarizationand instruction in aircraft systems which providebackground knowledge in UH-l maintenance subjects.Included are UH-l:

General information

u s ARM Y AVIATION DIGEST


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Power plant and related systems Power train Main and tail rotor system Weight/balance Performance planning Flight controls and hydraulics Electrical system.The flight training portion of the course is based on

28 hours of flight instruction. However, on demonstrated proficiency the student IP may be graduatedwith fewer hours. Flight hours are applied as follows:Day 20.6 Night 3.9 SFTS 1.5 Eva12.0 = 28.0.

Aviators can enhance their performance in thecourse through prior study. They should becomefamiliar with AR 95-1 with particular emphasis in theareas of safety, VFR and IFR flight planning andairspace requirements. They should study theOperator s Manual (dash 10 and know Chapter 5,Limitations, and Chapter 9, Emergency Procedures.

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attentionon an rea of major importance. Write to us at: CommanderU.S. Army Aviation Center ATTN: A TZQ-ES Ft Rucker AL

Personnel Changes at MILPERCENWe have had several changes to our MILPERCEN

Aviation Team: Steve DeVault, Specialty Code 15 majors assignments officer, was promoted to lieutenantcolonel; MAJ Gary Steimle, majors overseasassignments officer, has been replaced by MAJ SteveRaho; MAJ (P) David Hicks, lieutenant colonels'assignments officer, has been replaced by MAJ JoeFucci; and Joe's replacement as professional development officer is MAJ Mitch Johnson. LTC (P) Bob

Wolf replaced LTC Gene Grimsley in Colonels'Division.NOT AM-Flight Pay Delay

Your flight pay could temporarily stop-even if youare in an operational flying duty position. When youreach a gate (and fail it) or when you reach 22 or 25years of Total Federal Officer Service (whichever isapplicable) your entitlement to continuous AviationCareer Incentive Pay ceases. Of course if you are performing operational flying duty you are entitled to

SEPTEM ER 1983

Also, be familiar with weight/balance and performance planning.

Other areas you should study are: TC 1-135: Know the prope r execution of all con

tact maneuver tasks. M 1 203: Develop a working knowledge of ro

tary wing aerodynamics. M 1 301: A light reading of this publication

should be adequate. AIMs: Develop an understanding of airspace

structure and requirements. Instructor Pilot Guide: A thorough reading of

this publication is most beneficial since it s unique toinstructor pilot status.

Once you've studied the aforementioned areas, getwith your unit instructor pilot and allow him or herto assist you with additional flight and academic preparation.

Most important of all ... stay motivated

36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205-255-3504. A fter duty hours call Ft Rucker Hot Line AUTO VON558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message

monthly incentive pay. To preclude any lag betweencessation of continuous incentive pay and commencement of monthly incentive pay, each commissionedaviator should notify the servicing military personneland finance and accounting offices.New Army Experimental Test Pilots

On 10 June four Army officers successfully completed the rigorous II-month Naval Test Pilot Schoolat Patuxent River Naval Air Station, MD. MAJ JamesA. Correia and CW3 (P) Roger P. Rensvold are now

assigned to the Aircraft Development Test Activity,Ft. Rucker, AL. CPT (P) James S. Voss is now a student at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, V A,and CW4 James M. Adkins is now assigned to theArmy Aviation Engineering Flight Activity, EdwardsAFB, CA. Congratulations on a job well done

The next selection board is tentatively scheduled forFebruary 1984. Refer to DA Circular 351-82-5 forgeneral information, prerequisites and applicationprocedures. a .'

27


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ew

ExtensionTraining

MaterialsCatalog

New

TrainingExtensionCourse TEC)

Lessons

28

Army ATeTrainingaterials

Mr. Roland WeldonCourse Development Division

Directorate of Training DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker AL

ATTENTION MOS 71P, 93H AND 93J PERSONNEL AND SUPERVISORSl

design provides a valuable and ready referenceof materials needed to train common tasks,military subjects and military occupationalspecialty (MOS) technical tasks, plus it providesguidance on how-to obtain the materials.Copies of the new catalog may be requisitionedthrough your AG channels.

The extension training materials catalog, DAPamphlet 350-101-3 (February 1983), has beenpublished with a new look. The new version isbright red and titled Air Traffic Control Battalion (CORPS), ARTEP 1-225. Its improved

The new catalog has a listing of TEC lessons. been completed on these, they may already be

in your TEC library.owever, there are 5 additional TEC lessonsnot shown in the listing. These were submittedin a correction to the new catalog and shouldbe included in the next issue. Since work has

The number and title for each of the additional lessons are shown below:

2220116231 F2220116232F

2220116233F

2220116234F

2220116235F

2220116236F

2220116237F

2220116238F

2220116245F

2220116246F

2220116247F

2220116248F2220116251 A2220116254F

2220116257 A

Load and Unload Shelter TSQ 71APosition and Unpack Radar RT Group Trailer

Assemble R a d ~ rRT Group

Install Shelter to Trailer Cable IFF Antenna and PU 678/GInstall Shelter Mounted UHFIVHF Antennas

Install Shelter Mounted FM Antenna Shelter Sunshield and Vestibule

Install Telephone Lines and Miscellaneous Shelter Component and Ground Equipment

Installation Checks TSQ 71A

Install Aircraft Control Central TSQ 70A Part I

Install Aircraft Control Central TSQ 70A Part II

Install Aircraft Control Central TSQ 70A Part III

Install Aircraft Control Central TSQ 70A Part IV

Facil ity Training Part 2Install and Prepare PU 619 M for Operation

Assign Beacon Codes

More TEC lessons are on the way. Twenty-sixare currently under development and should be fielded during 1984. A listingof

theseis

shownbelow:

2220116258F2220116259F

2220116260F2220116261 F

2220116262F

2220116263F2220116264F

Select Site for TSQ 97

Install TSQ 97 Part I

Install TSQ 97 Part II

Operate TSQ 97

Operate ARC 11 4 115 Radio Sets of the TSQ 97

Operate the RT1167/ARC 64 Radio Set and Alimeter of the TSQ 97

Operate TSQ 97 Under Unusual Conditions

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


31/48


32/48

Captain James A HerbergThreat Branch

Directorate of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army A viation Center

Fort Rucker, L

Operational Maneuver Groups

IIJHE N XTWAR may start with little or nowarning. I t may start with a slow escalation o

tensions between the major powers or perhaps becauseo conflicts in Third World countries. But no matterhow it begins, one thing is inviolable: The Soviets will

attack with massive forces forward in an attempt todestroy NATO s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization s) defensive integrity while driving to key objectives deep within NATO s interior and destroying orsecuring key military, political and economic installations before NATO can react with approval for nuclearweapons release. The Soviets plan to accomplish thisthrough the use o the operational maneuver group(OMG).

The OMG is a relatively recent Soviet innovationwhich was introduced around 1976 as an answer toNATO s active defense. I t had its beginnings back inWorld War II when the Soviets began organizing theirarmor and mechanized forces into mobile groups.Mobile groups, which were employed at the operational (army andfront level, were tasked with the mis-sion o punching through the remaining enemy defenses where the Soviet attack had been most successful and striking deep into the enemy s defensiveformations. These deep strikes, which were o corpsand army size, forced the Germans to disrupt theirplanned defenses and reorganize in an attempt to stopthe breakthroughs that occurred. Their front linedefense thus thinned and with their mobile reservescommitted to stopping the Soviet maneuver Imobile

group, the Germans were unable to halt the Soviet advance and were forced to fall back and establish newdefensive lines. 1

The current Soviet OMG is a highly mobile, armorheavy, flexible strike force. Within a typical frontorganization, an OMG gene lly will be an army consisting o two to four divisions and possibly more. I t

1 C,N , Donnelly , The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group, A New Challenge forN TO (International Defense Review, 9 1982), p 1177-1179,

3

is reinforced by airborne and heliborne forces,engineers, aviation, air defense and artillery. At thearmy level, the OMG will likely consist o a reinforceddivision. Artillery reinforcements may be as high asone artillery battalion for each maneuver battalion in

an army level OMG.An OMG at front level consisting o three tank divisions and one or two motorized rifle divisions wouldhave about 1,100 to 1,400 tanks and 1,900 to 2,500armored personnel carriers . Enhanced by massive artillery and aviation reinforcements, the Soviet OMGs,with their organic division aviation and artillery assets,possess the ability to rapidly concentrate fires anywhere along their intended route o advance.

Weapon systems such as the Frog-7, Scud-B andSS-12 Scaleboard, if employed in either a nuclear orchemical role, would allow the Soviet ground forcesto eliminate defending forces before physical contactwas made by their advancing troops. These weaponsystems are available within the front and can be readily employed up to ranges o 900 kilometers. (They arecurrently being replaced by newer, more accurateweapon systems with greater ranges.)

The OMG is normally assigned deep objectiveswhich are generally separate from the first and secondechelon missions. hefront level OMG is committedbefore the first echelon battle is completed and generally before the second echelon is committed. I t may becommitted as early as the second or third day o anoffensive but usually after the enemy tactical depth

(division rear) is reached. hefront first echelon hasthe mission to destroy the enemy defense and attackthrough the immediate operational depth, 5 to 300kilometers behind the forward line o own troops(FLOT). OMG objectives, while generally 1 to 15kilometers deep, could extend further into the enemyoperational depth. Key missions would be the destruction o enemy nuclear weapons and reserves, seizingo key terrain and airfields, and preventing reinforcement and enemy withdrawal. At the same time, aprime purpose o the OMG is to cause NATO forces

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


33/48

to fight in their own rear areas from the start of thewar. This would preclude NATO s use of tacticalnuclear weapons since there would be no definiteseparation of Soviet and NATO forces. Instead, thetwo sides would be intermingled, effectively prevent-ing NATO tactical nuclear weapon use .

The army level OMO, whiie having the same mis-sions as th front OMO, would be committed as earlyas the first day. Both OMOs would probably attackon an independent axis removed from a main attackaxis. Even though they are committed as soon as possi-ble, in cases where resistance is stiff, a second echelonmay be committed before the OMO is, to weaken orbreach NATO defenses, thus ensuring early success forthe OMO. Once through the enemy front line defense,the OMO would move as quickly as possible to itsultimate objective. Along its route of march, an OMOmay have intermediate objectives which it would at-tack but where it would avoid becoming decisivelyengaged.

OMOs would operate with relative autonomy behindNATO s front lines but they would attempt to main-tain air and ground lines of communication with thefront or army which controls them. Since each Sovietdivision carries 3 to 5 days ammunition and 3 com-plete fuel loads, it becomes possible for OMOs to govery deep in NATO rear areas and operate for up toa week with minimal resupply. With the reestablish-ment of army aviation, the Soviet division has theorganic capability to rapidly conduct minimal resupplyand other airmobile missions. Additionally, up to 50to 70 percent of a front s aviation may support theOMOs.2

Identification of OMOs is critical if they are to besuccessfully countered. Of course, the best time todefeat these forces is before they are committed, andearly identification may be possible if the Soviets at-tack in the traditional echelon formation. OMOs aregenerally stronger than second echelon forces and bothfront and army leve l OMOs travel separately behindtheir first echelons and maintain separation as muchas possible from the second echelons. The army OMGis about 5 kilometers behind the first echelon, whilethe front OMO is about 300 kilometers behind thefront first echelon.

Additionally, fronts may put in opera tion multipleOMOs. The OMOs may be constituted from their ownavailable armies or additional forces may be allocatedto a particular front from the theater of military opera-tions. Employment remains the same. However, multi-ple axes of advance possibly converging on a singleobjective are used. One other possibility presentsitself when multiple OMOs are employed. It becomesmuch more likely for at least one OMO, once secure-ly behind NATO front lines, to split into numeroussmall groups and attack many targets, destroying

SEPTEMBER 1983

Soviet OMGs are armorheavy highly mobile strikeforces that are assignedmissions 50 to 300kilometers in enemy rearareas. A key function ofthe OMG is to causeNATO forces to fight deepin their own territory fromthe start of war, precludingNATO s use of tacticalnuclear weapons.

nuclear weapons and command and control facilities

and disrupting rear area movement and resupplyoperations across the entire corps area .When employed as a single entity, keys to the possi-

ble direction of attack for an OMO may lie with theparticular maneuvers of the front air assault brigadeor other airborne forces. In conjunction with the com-mitment of OMOs, air assault/airborne forces arelaunched with specific missions to seize or destroynuclear weapons , storage sites, command and controlcenters, airfields, and critical road crossings andbridges. The seizure of airfields, road crossings andbridges would facilitate the rapid advancement of theOMO to its ultimate objective and permit the Sovietsto rapidly resupply and reinforce the OMO by aerialdelivery means. This could be crucial in the event theOMO is able to drive 300 kilometers deep into theNATO rear area in 3 to 5 days.

A further development in Soviet doctrine may callfor the employment of all Soviet operational forces-front and army level to be employed in a singleechelon while using mUltiple OMOs. Divisions wouldcontinue to be echeloned but armies would not, andNA TO plans to interdict a second operational echelon,with nuclear and conventional fires, would be futile.I t becomes evident that if this maneuver is adopted,

it will be extremely critical for NATO forces to stopthe OMOs as quickly as possible. 3

The destruction of Soviet OMOs with only conven-tional forces means hitting them in two locations onthe battlefield:

behind their lines, and behind our lines.

2 ibid ., p. 1184 .l LTC David M. Glantz, Soviet Operational Formation For Battle ; A Perspective

(Combat Studies Group , CGSC , 1982) , p . 8 .FM 100-2 , The Soviet Army TBP FY 84 ) G e n e ral Reference .

31


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Hangar Talk is a quiz containing questions based onpublications applicable toAnny Aviation. The answers are atthe bottom of the page. I f you did not do well, perhaps youshould get out the publication and look it over.

FM 1 2 3Meteorology for Army Aviators

CW3 Gary R. WeilandDirecto rate of Train ing Developments

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker , AL

1. What does a relative humidity of 50 percentindicate?

a. The air is 50 percent water vapor

b , There is a 50 percent chance of rainc. The air contains 50 percent of the watervapor that it is capable of holding at itstemperature

2. The dew point temperature is that temperature towhich air would have to be cooled for saturationto occur.

a. True b . False

3. To produce other than light intensity precipitation,clouds usually have to be more than eet

thick .a. 2,000b. 4 ,000

4. Frost is frozen dew .a . True

c. 6 ,000d. 8 ,000

b . False

I - ~ i 1t m ~ e 'Zl()q -v1 ele "e '11

q1 -01 ele :v-p ' - > "Z_q ' l -e ' 01

SEPTEMBER 1983

(z)e9 -6 ele "e '66 -9 ele q ' 8

%-9 eled e L

5. The weather in a s frequently violent.a. Ridge c. Troughb. Col

6. The density altitude changes b o u ~ f e e tfor

each 1 degree Celsius variation from the standardtemperature.a . 120 c. 500b . 200

7. In a I the winds have a tendency to flowup mountain slopes on warm days.

a . Valley breezeb. Mountain breezec. Chinook wind

8 . Dust devils are created by the same conditionswhich produce tornadoes.

a . True b. False

9 . Arctic air is colder than polar air.a . True b. False

10. Match the symbols with the type of front theyrepresent.

a . .-b.

c . _d.

.

1. Occluded2 . Cold3. Warm4. Stationary

11. Clear ice is more hazardous than rime ice .a. True b . False

12. The difference between fog and clouds is that thebase of fog is at the surface ; whereas, the baseof a cloud is at least eet above the surface.

a. 50 c. 500b. 100

q8-S ele '12 9PS -S eled :> 'sQ8-v eled "Q 'v

q -v ele "q ' v v ele "e 'z

q-v ele "> ' I SH3MSNV

33


36/48

Tn

with CopilotsCW3 Craig R NixonB Company, 8th Aviation Batta lion Combat)

APO New York

In July 1983 viation igest published an article titled Communicationby Major Craig Geis. Since then the Aviation Center has been designinga program of instruction intended to deal specifically with cockpit communication/teamwork. When this program is completed it is envisionedthat not only students at Ft. Rucker but every aviator in the Army wi ll beable to receive this training. The article which follows is an affirmationto the interest and effort professionals are willing to put forth.

IIIH CONCEPT OF the pilotas the information process-ing center of an aircraft s

fairly well established. In the 1950s,aviation physiologists described theaircraft and its pilot as a closed-loopsystem. The pilot was seen as thenerve center of the aircraft. He or

she takes in information, makesdecisions and sends out controlsignals to cause the aircraft to reactas desired . The copilot can be included in this information loopby the PIC.

Unfortunately, many pilots inArmy Aviation close the loopwithout including the copilots.These pilots only include thecopilots to prepare flight plans and

34

the weight and balance forms. Theresult: valuable crewmembers unsure of their responsibilities. As expected, the copilots then dropout and assume no responsibilityduring the flight other than to halfheartedly do as they are told.

Copilots spend a lot of time just

sitting and only occasionally arethey invited to give the PICs abreak. To effectively use copilotsand include them in the informationloop, PICs ust operate the aircraftusing teamworkTeamwork.

The Random House CollegeDictionary defines teamworkas: cooperative or coordinated effort by a group of persons acting

together for a common cause. fyou add that the team s organizedfor a specific period of time underthe direction of a leader, you havea good explanation of the optimumpilot-copilot relationship. For anyteam to succeed it must have direc

tion. The direction of an aircrewteam comes from the division ofduties that the PIC establishes asteam leader. The assignment ofspecific tasks for the copilot to doat certain times will eliminate muchuncertainty in the team's operation.

Aircrewmembers are constantlyreceiving information from their environment while in flight. All ofthese inputs and the decisions theymake about them form theworkload they must maintain.When each member has a portionof the load, the total that can be carried s increased. This increasedload-bearing division s the key toflying complex aircraft in demanding mission profiles.

The point of overload isestablished by task satura

Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1983

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1983