Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1993

7/28/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1993

1/52


2/52


3/52

Warfighter 6 Major General Dave Robinson

Assignment: Fort Eustis

In the last bimonthly issue ofA viation Digest, I relayed thebranch emphasis of getting the bestand brightest officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers at FortRucker, AL. I'm looking for intuitive and aggressive soldiers withfield savvy to build ou r future aviation force. I want the leaders inaviation to cycle in and ou t (2- 3years) of the Aviation WarfightingCenter and channel their operational acumen and energies into alasting contribution to improve ourwarfighting capabilities. No stacking arms, no homesteading, and nogetting "stuck" at Fort Rucker.

As part of the Aviation team, theU.S. Army Aviation LogisticsSchool (USAALS) at Fort Eustis,V A, is equally important in contributing to the formulation of ourfutu re aviation force. An assignment at USAALS provides numerous important opportunities to contribute to the combined arms team.

The USAALS will experience amajor reorganization in the firstquarter of FY 95. The new orga-u.s.ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993

nization, the U.S. Army AviationMaintenance Training Activity(USAAMTA), will have the charter of producing the best aviationmaintenance and logistics soldiersin the world. The reorganizationresults from an impending Combined Arms Support Commandrestructure initiative driven by congressional mandated resource reductions. The USAAMTA reorganization will result in moving various USAALS activities to FortRucker. This effort will ultimatelygenerate a closer alignment withinthe Aviation Warfighting Team.Subordinate elements of USAAMTAwill include a Reserve Component,Training and Operations, TrainingDevelopment, Evaluation and Standardization element and tw o staffand faculty companies. Additionally, the USAAMT A organizationwill include the Departments ofSystems Training, Aviation TradesTraining, and Attack HelicopterTraining. For simplicity, throughout th e rest of this article,USAAMTA is used in lieu of

USAALS since this designation willbe discontinued next FY.

The USAAMTA mission is totrain, mentor, and graduate thefinest aviation maintenance and logistics soldiers in the world. TheUSAAMTA mission essential tasklist is to develop and conduct aviation logistics training for the TotalArmy (Active and Reserve Component soldiers); support an devaluate aviation logistics trainingin the field; conduct and guidedevelopment of logistics supportconcepts, doctrine, materiel, andorganizations fo r Army Aviation.

Th e USAAMTA provides a keylink in the chain of Army combatsupport systems . Th e school isdevoted to the support of Armyaviation logistics operationsthrough the development of concepts, doctrine, and training fo renlisted soldiers and officers. TheUSAAMT A boasts that to accomplish its mission, it has the largestconcentration of senior aviationnoncommissioned o fficers (NCOs)in the Army.


4/52


5/52


6/52

terials. Specifically, HTIS providesresponses to questions from DOD onsafety, health, transportation, storage,handling, regulatory, disposal, and envirorunental considerations of hazardous materials and wastes. However,services are not restricted to DOD.Other Federal agencies may use HTISif an item in question was formerlyDOD-{)wned or - managed.

HTIS publishes a quarterly bulletinto keep DOD personnel informed ofcurrent teclmical and regulatory developments, as well as education andtraining related to hazardous materialsand waste.

For telephone inquiries call HTIS atDSN 695-5168, commercial 804-279-5 168, or toll-free 1-800-848-HTIS. Aprofessional in chemistry, chemicalengineering, industrial hygiene, or envirolUl1ental science will respond toyour inquiry.

Mr. Leonard S. LambertDirectorate of Technical OperationsDLARichmond, VA

AAAASymposiumThe Army Aviation Association of

America's (AAAA's) Aviation Electronic Combat (AEC) Symposium willbe held 2 through 3 November1993 in Melbourne, FL. The themefor the symposiwn is "AEC-CombatMultiplier for Tomorrow's BattlefieldToday." Grumman Mel boume Systems, a division of Grumman Corporation, will host this year's Symposiumat the Holiday Inn Melbounle Oceanfront.

The AEC Symposium is open to allinterested AAAA members who possess, as a minimum, a SECRET levelclearance.

For further information, contactAAAA, 49 Richmondville Avenue,Westport, CT 06880-2000, phonecommercial 203- 226-8184, or FAX203-222-9863.4

AviationSymposium .From 2 through 4 November 1993,

the U.S. Army Aviation and TroopCommand (A TCOM) and the St. LouisChapter of the American HelicopterSociety (AHS) are hosting an AviationIndustry Day Symposiwn at the HenryVIII Hotel and Conference Center,4690 North Lindbergh Boulevard, St.Louis, MO. The theme of the symposium is "Army Aviation of the 21stCentury" and will feature planninginfonnation for the Aviation Scienceand Technology Program.

For morc information, contact Mr.Ed Branhof at commercial 314-263-30500rFAX314-263-3271.Mr. Thomas L. House

Executive Director, Aviation Research, Development, and Engineering Center

U.S. Anny ATCOMSt. Louis, MO

WritingContestAller a nlatus ot over a year, Ule

Army's Military History Writing Contest is back on track for 1993. Sponsored by the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, Washington, DC, thehistory writing contest is a professionaldevelopment exercise designed to improve young ofiicers' and noncommissioned officers' communicationskills and enhance their knowledge ofthe profession of arms. Winners receive cash awards and Department ofthe Anny certificates of achievement.Rules for the 1993 contest are thefollowing:

Eligibility: Participation is limitedto students attending officer advancedcourses and the Sergeants Major Academy during calendar years 1992 and1993. Eligibility has been extendedback to 1992 because the contestwas no t held last year. Include socialsecurity number, Sergeants Major

Academy or advanced course title,course number, and a forwarding address.

Entries: Submit two copies ofpreviously unpublished manuscripts,maximum length 3,500 words (about14 pages), typed, and double-spaced.ENTRIES THAT EXCEED TH EMAXIMUM ALLOWED LENGTHWILL NOT BE JUDGED. Documentation is required but footnotesand endnotes are not included in length.Submit graphics, illustrations, or photographs as if the article will be published.

Topics: Essays should develop alimited historical theme related to theArmy. Some suggested topic areasare--

I) Analysis of World War II (WWll)or Korean War battles and campaigns.(Note this is the period of the 40thanniversary of the Korean War and the50th anniversary of WWII.)

2) The Black experience during theCivil War, Spanish- American War,WWI or II , Korea, Vietnam, etc.

3) Fighting outnwnbered and winning, e.g., Ardennes, Korea, and Vietnam.

4) Light Infantry, airbome, armor,artillery, or other forces.5) Logistics, leadership, training,unit cohesion, or stress in combat.

6) Desert operations. Deadline: Entries must be post

marked by midnight 31 December 1993to the U.S. Army Center of MilitaryHistory, AITN: DAMH-FI (WritingContest/Mr. Arthur), 1099 14th StreetN.W., Washington, DC 20005-3402.

Judging: Papers will be judged bya panel of military historians, using thefollowing criteria: historial accuracy,originality, style, and relevance to current Army issues. Contest winnersshould be announced by the end ofApril 1994.

Prizes: Ist-$500 and publicationin Army History; 2d-$250; 3d-$100,or as the judges direct.

For additional infoffilation on thecontest, contact Mr. Billy Arthur, U.S.

us. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


7/52

Anny Center of Military History, 109914th Street, N.W., Washington, DC20005-3402; telephone DSN 285-5368; or commercial 202-504-5368.WRASS Course InfoThe Western Region Aviation Survival School (WRASS) Courses (listed

below) emphasize special interest inaviation life support eqwpment (ALSE)training. A responsibility of ALSE officers and technicians graduates is toreturn and teach the hands-on use of

ALSE in an on-the-ground survivalsituation.

Training focuses on escape, evasion, and self-initiated recovery. Attendees leam the safe combat survivalskills of locating water, food, concealedshel ter, and accurate routes of travel.

Mobile training team courses can bescheduled to meet training needs in allstates. Nomlal scheduling should bedone 90 days in advance. An URGENT course can be scheduled uponrequest. College credits are given andmay be applied to the civilian educational requirements outlined in Anny

COURSE DATES* COURSE TITLESurvival Instructor/

13 through 24 Sep 93 (Portland, OR )Cold Climate Survival/

10 through 14 Jan 94 (Ely, MN)Cold Climate Survival/

17 through 21 Jan 94 (Ely, MN)Cold Climate Survival/

07 through 11 Feb 94 (Ely, MN)

regulations and National Guard Bureau (NGB) Regulation 600-100.

Course tuition payment is madeusing Department of Defense FOffi11556, Autl1orization Agreement, Certification of Training and Reimbursement, or NGB FOffi1 64, Applicationfor Training.

Application to tl1e WRASS shouldbe in accordance witl1 DA Field Manual1-508, page 8-8.

Questions on combat survival schooltraining may be directed to tl1e schooldirector of training at commercial 503-636-6254.

CLASS NO.9399

9400

9401

940216 through 18 Feb 94 Over Water/(Portland, OR) 9403

14 through 18 Mar 9421 through 25 Mar 94

11 through 15 Apr 94

18 through 22 Apr 9409 through 11 May 9416 through 18 May 9413 through 17 Jun 9420 through 24 Jun 9411 through 13 Jul9418 through 20 Jul 94

12 through 23 Sep 94u.s. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993

Basic Land/(Portland, OR)Basic Land/(Portland, OR)Combat Aircrew SurvivaIl

(Marana, AZ)Combat Aircrew Survival!

(Marana, AZ)Over Water/(Portland, OR )Over Water/(Portland, OR)Basic Land/(Portand, OR )Basic Land/(Portland, OR )Over Water/(Portland, OR )Over Water/(Portland, OR )

Survival Instructor/(Portland, OR )

94049405

9406

9407940894099410941194129413

9414 *Travel timenot included5


8/52

Ever vigilant, U.S. Army Aviationsoldiers man their equipment and traindiligently in preparation for conflict.Around the world, our Army can befound in places of need .. and there,too, is Anlly Aviation. Perhaps noplace better reminds us of the need forcombined anllS readiness than here inthe Eighth United States Anny (EUSA).Still holding on to the vestiges of com-munism and led by the unpredictableKim II Sung and his son, Kim Jung II,North Korea remains a serious threatto the regional stability of northeastAsia and to world peace.

The EUSA stands ready to win.Every day, the duty performance ofour aviation soldiers, tankers, infantry,artillery, and America's finest supporttroops sends a message to those whowould prey upon their neighbors:"You're gonna lose if you try." ArmyA viation is the decisive edge that wehave over North Korean battlefield capa-bility. The combat power of the EUSAAviation Force and the CombinedAviation Force is awesome. Firepower,mobility, and the flexibility to deal withnearly any situation resides in our avia-tion. Aviation modernization programs,both within the EUSA and the Repub-lic of Korea Anny, will continue toassure this qualitative advantage.

6

I am happy to have this oppor-tunity to share the EUSA Aviationstory in this edition of the AviationDigest. For the many readers whohave never served in the Republic ofKorea, I hope this will help you under-stand some of the professional chal-lenges available in the EUSA. Forthose who have served here, things

have changed so much that you willenjoy catching up. In either case, thearticles come from the aviation troopsthemsel ves-your counterparts. I knowthat you will find the information inter-esting.

Keep up the good work Army Avia-tion. Your service is greatly appreci-ated.

William W. CrouchLieutenant General, U.S. ArmyCommander, Eighth U.S.AnnyChiefof Staff, United Nations CommandCombined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea

u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


9/52

u.s. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993 7u.s. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993 7


10/52

8 u.s. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993


11/52

U.S. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993 9


12/52

Colonel Johnnie L. ShepherdArmy Aviation Operations OfficerCombined/JointlG3, Combined Forces CommandGround ComponentCommand, Combined Forces CommandU.S. Forces Korea, Eighth U.S. Army

I f you have been listening to thenews, you know about the seriousissues in our dealings with the NorthKoreans. As the last vestige of he ColdWar-yes, the one that everyone claimswe won-North Korea has not ac-cepted the reality of the impendingfailure of the communist dogma.

Along the world's most heavilyarmed and fortified border, the demili-tarized zone (DMZ), the potential forconflict presides quietly over dailylife .... For 40 years, "Armistice" hasexisted, with occasional violations re-sulting in moments of grave concern.The tension from this situation is im-posed over some of the most ruggedterrain imaginable and a climate givento extremes.

II I1-501 2-501

ASLT HB MLHB

Republic of Korea

Now you begin to understand theserious need for equipment readiness,soldier conditioning, and a strong ArmyAviation combat maneuver force inthis country. All of these elementsfactor in making an assignment to theRepublic of Korea (ROK) and, espe-cially the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA),a great professional challenge.

Every day, more and more, assign-ment officers are sending aviation sol-diers for their first tour of duty in theROK. This information about EUSAshould assist you in gaining a perspec-tive of the units here and in deciding tomake a tour in Korea a credit in buildingyour aviation career.

Five major subordinate commandsinEUSAhave aviation units. The 17th

17TH AVIATION BRIGADEII II

Aviation Brigade, the theater aviationbrigade, has five subordinate battal-ions (figure I). The brigade is unique inthe U.S. Army because it merges, onorder, with the ROK Army (ROKA)Aviation Command to form the Com-binedAviationForce(CAF). The com-mander of the CAF is a ROKA majorgeneral and the 17th Aviation Brigadecommander is the deputy commanderof the CAF. The CAF provides theGround Component Command (G CC)of the Combined Forces Command(CFC) a responsive and lethal aviationcombat capability. In the coming year,force modernization programs will re-place the two U.S. AH-IF Cobra bat-talions with AH-64A Apache battal-ions. A force to be reckoned with, the

I4-501 5-501 4-58ATKHB ATKHB ATC

Figure 1. 17th Aviation Brigade's Five Subordinate Battalions

10 u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


13/52

CAP can field more than 300 attackand assault helicopters on short notice.

The Combat Aviation Brigade, 2dInfantry Division (Mechanized), appears to be a standard divisional aviation unit (figure 2). Although the divi-

requirements. The 501st MI aviationkeeping the EUSA honed to the cuttingedge of reality.

Lifeor death-that is the businessofthe 377th Medical Evacuation(MEDEV AC) Company (figure 4).

them. The medic administered first aidto one unconscious soldier. Meanwhile the helicopter crew provideddirections by survival radio for the safeescape of the squad and medic to thevalley below and to medical attention

I COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE, 2D INFANTRY DIVISION III I I I1 -2 2-2 5/17ATKHB ASLTHB CAV C/2 AVIM

Figure 2. Structure of CAB's 2d ID Division

sion has no AH--64As today, its C-NiteCobras have proven to be superb nightfighters. Modernization of the 5-17thCavalry will result in the addition of heOH-58D Kiowa Warrior by the end offiscal year 1994.

The 50 1st Military Intelligence (MI)Brigade, attached to the EUSA fromthe U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, is our eyes and ears(figure 3). The 3d MI Battalion aerialexploitation (AE) often has aircraft in

Subordinate to the 52d Medical Bat- needed. Just another workday fortalion, the unit fields 25 UH-60 Black MEDEVAC in Korea.Hawks at four locations and meetsaircraft readiness standards with onlyan aviation unit maintenance (A VUM)level organic maintenance capability."DUSTOFF" can be counted onwhen an emergency c c u r ~ a n y t i m e ,day or night-"you call and they haul."No job is too tough for-them when thehealth of our troops and families is atstake.

The theater aviation intennediatemaintenance (A VIM) is aligned withthe 19th Support Command under the23d Area Support Group. The 3d Battalion, 501st Aviation, is a ReserveComponent unit (figure 5); therefore,the two A VIMs are assigned to the194th Maintenance Battalion. A Company, 3-501 st Aviation, provides maintenance support to all ofEUSA's avia-

501 ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE

Figure 3. Structure of 501 st Military Intelligence Brigade

the air every hour of the day, every dayof the week. Aerial exploitation at itsfinest, the 3d MI keeps the EUSA wellsupplied with information. Also, thePhoenix Platoon, 751st MI Battalion,is always ready to respond to supportu.s_ Army Aviation Digest July/August1993

Recently, one DUSTOFF crewsaved asquadofROK soldiers trappedby a forest fire on the top of a mountain. Landing on the mountain wasimpossible; however, the crew lowered a medic, by winch and cable, to

tion units. B Company, 3-501st Aviation, will be activated in December1993, giving the capability to maintainAH-64As. Also keepers of the theaterspare aircraft account, these maintainersare warfighters through and through.

11


14/52

18THMEDCOM 19THSUPCOM52DMED BN 23DASG

377TH MED EVAL CO (AA)

Figure 4. Two Subordinate Elementsof the 18th Medical Command

,M IA/ . 01 (AVIM)III' eot "'IN (A8LT),-601 MM.J ...77MEO1/W4-IIATCCH-4711MU.ATORAI+-64CMS

Figure 5. Theater AVIM Support Elements

lep IEAQLE ( H ~ 1 1 1AD, ARiM-eOI "'II" ITIIA)I OLA. AIR IASI! fK-1!} IAtt.eol AVN (Qat,,4/S77 MEO

8 1 4 ~ A T eUH-'IUH-eG8IMULATOR

Figure 6. U.S. Army Aviation in Korea

To "wrap up" this introduction toKorea, it is important to recognizeone other aviation element in theEUSA-theEUSAG3 Aviation Division. The division is composed ofthree branches: Hight Standards, AirTraffic Control (ATC) , and HightSimulator. The EUSA Aviation officer also "wears three other hats,"within the joint and combined staff,serving as the Army Aviation operations officer in CFC, GCC, and theU.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

These great soldiers and civiliansare seen among the Crisis ActionTeam and the Battle Staff duringtraining exercises, or when situations

12

dictate. Routinely, however, they maintain a high operational tempo daily inproviding assistance to unit aviation standardization officers and managing theEUSA's aviation programs.

An important program is the AviationResources Management Survey(ARMS), which helps commanders seetheir unit strengths and weaknesses. Moreimportantly, these soldiers and civilianssolve problems when needed. Anotherprogram is Air Traffic Control (A TC)ARMS, which assures air traffic controllers are ready; airspace managementprocedures are understood and followed;and the aviation force is safe. Korea canbe a fatal experience for the disoriented

aircrew. Taking resources "out ofhide," a small staff provides aircrewcoordinator instructor training andnew aviator orientation classesflight simulator training. Korea is amost hazardous environment foraviation, but we hold to the principlethat there is "SAFETY in STANDARDS."

I have shared some of the information that you should know about EUSAAviation (figure 6). Call that assignment officer and ask him to put yourcareer in Korea where the flying isgreat, the mission meaningful, and theexperience absolutely the best available in today's Army.

u.s. Army AviationDigest July/August 1993


15/52

Lieutenant Colonel Garry McNieshExecutive Officer, 17th Aviation Brigade andChief of Staff, Combined Aviation ForceRepublic of Korea

Although Desert Stonn is over andthe conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovinais still uncertain, th e 40-plus yearconflict in the Republic of Korea(ROK) remains tempered only byan annistice.

Vigilance is the name of the gamehere as the North Korean Army,th e 5 th largest in the world, remainspoised just north of the 38th Parallel,ready to strike at a moment's notice. The "North's" recent withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Prolir-

- D -: 0 . .Ig,round Air

eration Treaty only intensifies this already tense situation.It is in this politically provocativeell v ironment that the Co m hi nedAviation Force (CAF) trains tor a tight.The concept of the CAF, first developedin 1982, was tested and ev al uatedin 1984. A Memorandum or Agreement (MOA) was drawn up as aresult. Since that time, the CAFhas gone through a series or MOArefinements until its final update inMay 1993.

k,omblnedforcesk,ommand

I INaval k,omblnedk,omponent k,omponent k,omponent Marinekommand .c.ommand k,ommand forcesk,ommand

Think of the CAF as a combinedforces team .... The CAF consistsof two organizations - theROK Anny(ROKA) Aviation Command, commanded by a ROK major general, andthe 17th Aviation Brigade, commanded by a U.S. Anny colonel. Whenthe CAF is formed, only duringexercises and war, it falls under theGround Component Command (GCC):one of the live component commands(figure 1) supporting the CombinedForces Command (CFC).

"S.

I~ o m b l n e d II~ n c o n v e n t l o n a l~ a r f a r eIask

Jorce

Figure 1. Five Component Commands Support the Combined Forces Commandu.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993 13


16/52

II I !

31 GP

Ix x/AVN CMOl ROKI

(2,521 Perlonne/) I I( m _ ~

CAFIx

/17 AV!J US(2,033 P.raonM!)

(13' Aircraft)

- - ' - I ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - - h - - - - - ---- i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - -- --'" ','1" ~ ~ - 1 ~ " h u ~ ~ ; ~ .... I I * AH-64. FY94. I CH-47 I :~ I !: AH-1 (_) II: I CH47 I :: I UH .60 I . :: ................. ~ . C ? ~ ~ ................. : ................. < l ! ~ J ................ :

Figure 2. Combined A viation Force ()rganization

While supporting CFC operationsacross the peninsula, assets com-bined from both the ROKA Avia-tion Command and the 17th Avia-tion Brigade produce a division-level aviation unit (figure 2), whichis the largest combined aviationstructure of its kind today. Orga-nized into 14 battalions with nearly340 aircraft and more than 4,500personnel, the CAF is commandedby the ROKA Aviation Commandcommander. The 17th AviationBrigade commander becomes thedeputy commander. The brigadeexecutive officer becomes the14

CAF Chief of Staff. Both COIll-manders command their organicforces along national lines. I n au-dition, ROK and U.S. staffs arecombined throughout the organi-zation.

Although the CAF's primarymission is killing tanks. it alsoconducts a number of other mis-si ons induding air assault. air movement. reconnaissance and secu-rity, command and control, medicalevacuation and Special Opera-tions Forces (SOf) Aviation fix theCombined Unconventional War-fare Task Force (CUWTF). The

CAF. formed during war or formajor exercises, is centrally contro Ikd, iL'i mentioned earlier, by theGCC. Once missions are receivedand analyzed, units are task orga-nized into task force structures fordecentralized mission planning andexecution. This concept is prac-ticed on a weekly basis throughstandard ized air assault and jointair allack team (JATT) trainingwith ROK and U.S. units alternat-ing duties as the air mission com-mander.

CAF mission flow proceduresand wartime mission support are

U.S. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


17/52

...... : - : .. ' : : '6::. : [ ] IGCC IA,OUEITJ \. ..AECTION ~ APPROVAL ~. '.::. . ~ COORDINATION~ ~ . - - - - - - - - - - ~ I C ~ F IREQUEST 11 PPROVAL 1 IRECTIONSle;:sl COORDINATION c!J

REQUEST 1 1 PPROVAL1 0 1 v ~ ; J

Figure 3. Combined Aviation Force Mission Flow Proceduresshown in figures 3 and 4. Once amission is requested by the Field Annyand approved by the ground componentcommander, it is sent to the CAF. At theCAF. the mission is analyzed through thestaff estimate process. risks are assessed,and task organizationisdetermined. Then,the mission is assigned to the designatedTaskForce commander for detailed plan-rling. coordination. and execution withthe supported corps or division. Duringthe process. coordination and feedbackat every level is an absolute necessity.Wartime support is normally focused onthe forward field armies--Third ROKAnny (TROKA) and First ROK Anlly(FROKA), with attack helicopter battalions operationally controlled (OPCON)to each.

Support to the Second ROK Anny(SROKA). which covers two-t.hirds of

the peninsula, involves such missionscombat service support. evacuation. airmovement. or rear area operations. Thepoint to be made here is that several CAF task 10rces could be limnedat one time. depending on the enemy'sintentions and requirements ofsupport tothe ground component commmltler.

The CAF has had the opportunity toex,unine these mission flow procetluresanti wlUtime mission support in the p a . ~ t10 months with its participation in thesethrcc major annual combined exercises:ULCHI FOCUS LENS '92, FOALEAGLE '92, and TEAM SPIRIT '93.

All three allowed the CAF to supportthe varied missions of the CFC and theComm,ulder in Chief (CINC) with tleepattack hcl icopter operations, regillll'ntalsizetl air assault". single or dual shipCUWfF missions, and rear-area opera-

tions against simulated OpposingForces (OPFOR) Special Forces. toname a few. In all cases, the CAF allowsthe CINC to exploit the third dimensionof maneuver. The CAF provides binlwith the ability to overcome the manysevere terrain restrictions of the ROK.thereby placing troops on theground and steel on targets.

The CAF is a critical element ofcombat power to the CINC-his mostversatile combat multiplier to supportcac.;h field Army and contribute to theachievementofnational defense goals inthe ROK. As a large and lethal organization providing the CINC with a signifiCrult force of attack, assault. cargo. andobservation aircraft. the CAF trainsas it will fight-combined. The CAF isproud mul ready lor our watch ..whichnever ends on Freedom's Frontier.~ ~ F R O K ~

CAMPllfDCLOVD R?KA."""' - > : ~ J / ~ -~ - WWONJU~ ~ SROKA

L d l ~ t D \ ~ " ' ~ - vFigure 4. Combined Aviation Force Wartime Mission Support Areas

u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993 15


18/52

Team Spirit'" '93

.. :: .. . The 17th Aviation Brigade tookpart in Team Spirit '93 from 1 to 18.March 1993, as part of the Combined Aviation Force (CAF) . TeamSpirit '93 was a Republic of Korea(ROK)/U.S . Joint Chiefs of Staffdirected, U.S . Pacific Command(USPACOM)-sponsored, combined/joint field training exercise, command field exercise, and commandpost exercise (FTX/CFX/CPX) conducted by United Nations Command/Combined Forces Commandfrom 21 January to 21 April 1993.

The intent of the exercise was toincrease combat readiness andinteroperability of ROK and U.S.forces through training in com bined/joint air, ground , sea, amphibious,and unconventional warfare operations. The exercise consisted ofthree phases: strategic deployment,employment, and strategic redeployment. The exercise actuallybegan before D-Day, with the employment of Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF)infiltrations into the maneuver box.Team Spirit was a force-an-force,controlled, free-play exercise featuring the FTX/CFX/CPX concept.Two opposing field armies commanded five corps. Field Army Bluein the west fought one corps in anFTX/CFX mode, and two corps in asimulation-driven CPX, using theCorps Battle Simulation (CBS)model.The opposing force, FieldArmy Orange, in the east foughtone corps in an FTX/CFX mode,and the 10th A"ied Corps (CFCBattle Simulation Center) Opposing Force (OPFOR) In the CPXmode.

The combined naval and marineforces supported the land war byseizing objectives in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and inth e vicinity of Maeng BangRLCombined naval operations wereactive in the AOA and in blue waterareas around the Korean peninsula .

16

A theater-wide joint and combinedair operation was conducted to support both field armies. Unconventional warfare operations were alsoconducted in support of both fieldarmies.

The CAF was tasked to supportboth field armies with priority ofsupport going to the force on theoffensive. Since CUWTF also supported both sides, the CAF wasactively involved in supporting theirinfiltration and exfiltration missionsthroughout the exercise.

Most actively involved in theexercise were attack helicopter battalions (AHBs) of the CAF. The sixAHBs that took part in the FTX hadmissions every day of the exercise.The lift battalions, although not asactively involved on a recurring basis, did have significant opportunities to plan and execute air assaultand air movement missions.

The exercise presented the opportunity for the CAF to conducttwo atypical night missions. Onewas a night, cross-FLOT, deep attack/air assault-type raid supporting the 75th Ranger Regimentagainst the Orange Force high-priority targets . The other was a NightJoint Air Attack Team (JAAT). whichwas conducted by the 4-501 st Aviation in a cross-FLOT mission targeted against an OPFOR tank brigade.

This mission was conducted incoordination with U.S. Air ForceLANTIRN-equipped F-16 aircraft.Both missions were well coordinatedand flawlessly executed, demonstrating the capability and flexibility of Army Aviation on the battlefield.

Besides CAF participation inthe FTX portion of the exercise, agaming cell, which represented theCAF, participated in the CPX BattleSimulation Center (BSC) at WalkerCenter in Yongsan. The CAF gaming cell consisted of representa-

tives of the 17th Aviation Br ...", ... . ....and the ROK Army Aviation ' : ' . x : : : : ; = : :mand.Four U.S. officers and four officers p e r f o r m ~ d (juty in the BS .. : .and initially planned to play one "'representative CAFtaskforce r which .consisted of two AHBsand one as,)


19/52

Team Spirit '93

Colonel John K. SchmittCommanderAviation Brigade2 (U.S.) Infantry DivisionRepublic of Korea

Major Oren L. HunsakerAssistant S3

This article highlights the missions and employment conceptsof, and lessons learned by, the Aviation Brigade, 2 (U.S.) ID,during Team Spirit '93. Although it does not break significantnew ground, i t provides insight into the operations andwarfighting of the Aviation Brigade, 2 (U.S.) ID, in theRepublic of Korea (ROK).

We write about and practice the artofWAR during peacetime to prepareourselves for future conflict.Introduction

Team Spirit '93 displayed the cen-tral role of aviation and the AviationBrigade, 2 (U.S.) Infantry Division(ID), as a combined arms maneuverforce in the Republic of Korea (ROK).The brigade fought as a true maneu-ver brigade under 2 (U.S.) ID and II(ROK) Corps with operational control(OPCON) U.S. and ROK CombinedAviation Forces (CAF). The brigadefaced many challenges and lessonslearned that will impact on divisionalwar plans and training for years tocome.Orange and Blue ForcesTeam Spirit '93 began with Orangeand Blue Forces in a hasty defense.Blue Forces had initiated hostilitiesdays earlier.Orange Forces were now preparingto attack against the Blue Forces (fig-ure I) . Orange Forces, commanded by

2 (U.S.) Infantry Division Patch

II (ROK) Corps, were comprised of 2(U.S.) ID, one ROK infantry division,one ROK motorized division, and oneROK armor brigade during the offen-sive phase of operations (9 to 12 Mar93). During the defensive phase ofoperations (14 to 18 Mar 93), the ROKarmor brigade was not assigned to

P lTON G il

~ (ROK)

~ ~TONGIL

BLUE FORCES

8 ~(ROK)

NAMHANP l \ RIVERSONGYANG

Figure 1. Operationallaydownfor the offensive phase

lD/ lC



20/52

PL PLPLTON GIL

e r ~I ROK)

I I IROK)xxxXIROK)

Withouta U.S. Corps intelligence support system, the Aviation Brigade became2(U.S.)ID'sandll(ROK) Corps'primary source for locating the 30 (ROK)Mechanized Division, seeing the battlefield, and developing the situation foremployment of 2 (U.S.) ID.

This intelligence collection requirement led to a new and challengingmission for the brigade-attack helicopter battalion deep and close armedreconnaissance operations. The armedreconnaissance, coupled with multiplelaunch rocket system (MLRS), calls forfire and a ttack helicopter hasty attacks,identified and seriously attrited the 30(ROK) Mechanized Division.

Figure 2. 2 (U.S.) ID operational sketcJzfor offensive pJzaseAttack helicopter deep operations

(routes, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and tactical air

II (ROK) Corps. Blue Forces, commanded by I (U.S.) Corps, consisted oftwo ROK infantry divisions and the 30(ROK) Mechanized Division in theoffense and also included the 2 (ROK)Armor Brigade in the defense.

Throughout the offensive and defensive phases, 2 (U.S.) ID served asthe II (ROK) Corps reserve, conducting the corps main attack in the offenseand the corps counterattack in the defense.First Phase-The Offense

In the first phase of Team Spirit'93-11 (ROK) Corps in the offense-2 (U.S.) ID's mission as the corps maineffort was conducted in four operational phases: Phase I-Tactical assembly area (TAA) occupation andmovement; Phase II-river-crossingoperations and forward passage oflines;Phase III-attack in sector to destroythe I (U.S.) Corps center of gravity ,the30 (ROK) Mechanized Division (figure 2); and phase IV-end state.

The Aviation Brigade missions covered the entire framework of the battlefield during these phases: deep, close,rear, security, and reserve operations.The brigade was task-organized (fig

ure 3) to execute deep attacks, air assaults, and hasty attacks in support ofground maneuver brigade close operations; screen of the division's flankduring the attack, counter-reconnaissance (CR) patrols in the division rear

18

area (DRA); employthe tactical combatforce (TCF) agai nstLevel 11+/111 threats,and establish the divi-sion reserve.

The Aviation Brigade conducted itsmissions throughoutthe depth of the battlefield based on theconcept of operationoutlined in figure 4.

I AVIATION BRIGADETASK ORGANIZATION

1-503 IN BN(-) (OPCON)1-506 IN BN(-) (OPCON)1-2 AVN (ATKHB)(C-NITE)109 (ROK) AVN (ATKHB)(OPCON)CAF (US) AVN (ATKHB)(OIO OPCON)2- 2 AVN (AHB)(-)A/1-72 AR (010 OPCON)

BOE CONTROLSCT PLT11- 506 INTARP/ C/ 2- 2 AVN (AHB)4/0/122 SIGOET/A/4- 58 ATC

AVN BOE TNSC/ 2 AVN (AVIM)0/1-2 AVN (AVUM)0/2-2 AVN (AVUM)F/5-17 CAV (AVUM)

Figure 3. Aviation brigade task organizationfor offensive operations

AVIATION BRIGADECONCEPT OF OPERATIONDEEP D P E R A I I U ~ " NIATION BRIGADE SUPPORTS DEEP OPERATIONS THROUGH RECONNAISSANCE, TARGET ACOUISITIONAND DEEP ATTACKS TO DESTROY 'OIROKlIDIt .O , ON ORDER , TARP/C/2-2 NN IAHB) CONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCEOPERATIONS TO LOCATE .0 IROKlIDIM) MECH / ARMOR FORCES , ON ORDER , CONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCE/TARGETINGOPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEEP ATTACKS TO ATTRIT THE .0 IROK) 101M) MECH/ARMOR FORCES . ON ORDER ,'- 2 NN IATKHB) CONDUCTS DEEP ATTACK OPERATIONS TO ATTRIT MECH/ARMOR FORCES OF THE 30IROKlIDIM) ,BE PREPARED TO ATTACK TO ATTRIT THE DIVISION ARTILLERY OF 30IROK)IDIM).CLOSE OPERATIONS, AVIATION BRIGADE CONDUCTS CLOSE OPERATIONS EMPLOYING AIR ASSAULT AND ATTACKHELICOPTER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE DIVISION ATTACK IN ZONE , ON ORDER , 2- 2 NN IAHB) AIR ASSAULTS , -503 IN BNI-)TO SEIZE OBJ DOG IN SUPPORT OF 2D BDE RIVER CROSSING , BE PREPARED TO AIR ASSAULT , -503 IN BNI-) TOSEIZE OBJ BULL I N SUPPORT OF 2D BDE RIVER CROSSING , BE PREPARED TO AIR ASSAULT , -SD3 IN BNI -) TO SEIZETHE YOJU BRIDGE. ON ORDER, 2- 2 NN IAHB) AIR ASSAULTS , - soe IN BNI - ) TO SEIZE OBJS MANTIS OR TOKIIN SUPPORT OF SIROK)AR BDE RIVER CROSSING , BE PREPARED TO AIR ASSAULT , - soe I N BNI - ) TO SEIZE THE IPOBRIOGE , ON ORDER , AVN BDE CONDUCTS LINKUP OF ,-50S IN BNI-) WITH SIROK)AR BDE AND RELEASES , -50e IN BNI-)OPCON TO SI ROK)AR BDE . ON ORDER , ,- 2 NN I ATKHB) CONDUCTS HASTY ATTACKS IN SUPPORT OF 2D ID E ' SATTACK A LONG AXIS RED TO ATTRIT THE 30IROK)IDIM). AND TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN ALONG PL TON GI L . ON ORDER ,CAF IUS) AlIN IATKHI) CONDUCTS HASTY ATTACKS IN SUPPORT OF SlROK)AR ID E ' . ATTACK ALONG AXIS BLUE TO ATTRITTHE 30 IROK l IDIM) , AND TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN ALONG PL TONGIL.SECURITY OPERATIONS NfATION BRIGADE SCREENS THE DIVISION RIGHT FLANK TO PROTECT THE DIVISION"S

ATTACK IN ZONE . ON ORDER , ,OOIROK) AlIN IATKHB) AND SCT PLT/1 -505 IN SCREENS NORTH ALONG THE DIVISION ' S RIGHTFLANK , FROM PL PAT TO PL SONGYANG . ON ORDER , ,OOIROK) AVN IATKHI) SCREENS WEST ALONG THE DIVISION ' S RIGHTFLANK FROM c s ee . s u TO csessose . ON ORDER, SCT PLTI1-S0e IN BN EXTENDS SCREEN FROM 'CSseS"3 TOc s rOH " . TARP / C/ 2 - 2 NN IAHB) BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE SCREEN DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESSFROM cseeOHO TO csse.OSO .REAR OPERATIONS , ""'IATION BRIGADE CONDUCTS DIVISION REAR AREA OPERATIONS TO PROTECT FORCES IN THEDIVISION TAA AND LOC. IN THE DIVISION AREA . ON ORDER , , -e03 IN BNI-) AND , -505 IN BNI - ) CONDUCT PLATOONSIZE COUNTER - RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AGAINST LEVEL II . THREAT IN THE DIVISION TAA/REAR AREA , ON ORDER ,, -50S IN SNI-) IS TCF TO DEFEAT A LEVEL 11./111 THREAT IN THE DIVISION REAR AREA . ON ORDER , 2- 2 NN IAHB)AASlT. , - 50 3 IN BNI- ) AND ,-50S IN BNI-) TO CONDUCT COUNTER- RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND DEFEAT ALEVEL 11' / 111 REAR AREA THREAT , ,- 2 NN IATKHB) IE PREPARED TO CONDUCT HASTY ATTACKS TO DESTROY LEVELIII REAR AREA THREAT .RESERVE OPERATIONS , AVIATION IRIGADE IS THE DIVISION RESERVE . ON ORDER, , -503 IN IN I - ) IS OPCON TO NIATIONBRIGADE UNTIL COMMITTED, PRIORITY OF PLANNING FOR AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF 20 BDE .ON ORDER , AI1-12 AR IS OPCON TO THE AVIATION BRIGADE, OCCUPIES IP COUGAR TO ILOCK ENEMY COUNTERATTACKI NTO THE DIVISION REAR AREA , -

Figure 4. Aviation brigade concept for offensive operations

u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/Aug 1993


21/52

(TACAIR, although planned in detail, were not as successful-I-2 Aviation Attack Helicopter Battalion(ATKHB) (C-Nite) was turned back 2consecutive nights because of weather.

However, well-coordinated attack helicopter operations and execution ofmultiple joint air attack teams (JAATs)during the close battle in support of 2(U.S.) Brigade and 5 (ROK) ArmorBrigade, ensured their freedom of movement and ability to maintain the momentum of attack. 1-506 Infantry airassaulted deep into 5 (ROK) ArmorBrigade sector to sever key lines ofcommunication and await linkup with5 (ROK) Armor Brigade.

Until linkup with 5 (ROK) ArmorBrigade was completed, the AviationBrigade remained the command andcontrol (C2) headquarters. This C2 relationshi p placed a great demand on A viation Brigade communications capabilities and coordination for fire supportanother challenge met but not withoutdifficulty.

The day/night screen of the division's flank was a real success story.The scout platoon and TOW sectionsfrom 1-506 Infantry, with attack helicopter battalions and the target acquisition and reconnaissance platoon(TARP), provided excellent intelligence to the di vision as well as protecting the division's flank during movement.

Corps main effort. Once identified, 2(U.S.) ID then counterattacked to destroy the enemy's main effort. TheAviation Brigade was task -organized(figure 6) again to execute missionsthroughout the battlefield.Concept of Operation

The concept of operation, outlinedin figure 7, focused the Aviation Brigade on conducting both division andcorps missions.

The defensive phase began with a24-hour day/night aerial screen. TheAviation Brigade identified the I (U.S.)Corps main attack and attrited forcesof the 30 (ROK) Mechanized Divisionthrough day hasty attacks, night deepattacks, and MLRS fires.

This allowed the 2 (U.S.) ID commanding general to select the appro-

nized Division in the north.The close battle against 30 (ROK)

Mechanized Division stressed the needfor short air assault planning cyclesand timely execution of air assaults tokeep pace with the TEMPO of thebattle.

The 1-503 Infantry and 1-506 Infantry were air assaulted to secure keychoke points to block the enemy's advance, while attack helicopters provided security for the ai r assaults andconducted flank hasty attacks to destroy advancing forces.

In close operations with the groundmaneuver brigades, the Aviation Brigade employed attack helicopterscoupled with MLRS and cannon artillery fires. In the DRA, enemy air assaults by the 3 Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment, demonstrated our vulnerabilities.

I I (ROK)xxxX(ROK)PLKYUKMYUL

Finally, 1-506 Infantry's role in rearbattle operations, executed in the formof counter-reconnaissance patrols andtactical combat force (TCF), defeatedand disrupted Special OperationsForces (SOF) activities in the divisionrear area (DRA) during the offensivephase.

Figure 5. Operationallaydown for defensive phase

Second Phase-The DefenseIn the second phase of Team Spirit'93, II (ROK) Corps transitioned to the

defense (figure 5). The 2 (U.S.) ID'smission as the II (ROK) Corps reservewas conducted in two operationalphases: Phase I-corps screen, andPhase II-counterattack,to defeat the I (U.S.) Corps main effort.

During the screen, 2 (U.S.) ID focused all aviation and intelligenceassets towards identifying the I (U.S.)

priate CONPLAN-"SANDY" (figure 8}--to counterattack against the30 (ROK) Mechanized Division.

Through continuous armed reconnaissance and hasty attack operations,coupled with MLRS fires, the Aviation Brigade also located and severelyattrit the 2 (ROK) Armor Brigade asit attacked the II (ROK) Corps fromthe south.

The identification and destructionof 2 (ROK) Armor Brigade by theAviation Brigade allowed 2 (U.S.) IDto focus ground maneuver elementsprimarily against the 30 (ROK) Mecha-


Although all divisional units hadmoved two or three times over theprevious 8 days of the exercise, therangers raided all brigade headquarters, the DMAIN, and the AviationBrigade tactical assembly areas (TAAs).

Th e rangers were successful in airassaulting and inflicting some casualties and minor damage against theirtargets but every enemy aircraft (CH-47 Chinooks and UH-60s) with personnel aboard were destroyed during theextraction.

The OH-58D Kiowa Warriors andattack helicopters responded within 12

19


22/52

minutes of alert and com bined artilleryfires with hasty attacks to target anddestroy these forces.Operation Successes and OtherResultsThe operational successes of theAviation Brigade, including cavalrysquadron operations, provided the division increased leverage and battlefield lethality.However, Team Spirit '93 will belong remembered not only for thewarfighting results, but also for accomplishing a first in the AviationBrigade-deploying the entire aviation intermediate maintenance (A VIM)company and aviation unit mamtenance (A VUM) companies to form abrigade support area (BSA) in the TeamSpirit maneuver area.

Dedicated maintenance from a forward field location rather than fromhome station significantly increasedthe brigade's readiness posture forcontinuous 24-houroperations throughout the exercise.Lessons LearnedA key part ofevery exercise, whethersuccessful or not, is the lessons learned.The Aviation Brigade not only learnednew lessons but rein forced the old. Thekey lessons learned are highlightedbelow.The first lesson learned is that ofarmed reconnaissance and screen missions for attack helicopter battalions.Traditionally, these mission have beena cavalry mission; attack battalionsengaged lucrative, massed enemymechanized/armor formations.

With the nature of future conflictsand the need for real-time intelligence,these missions should become moretraditional for attack helicopter battalions. This is especially true in Korea,where aviation provides a key source ofbattlefield intelligence.Attack helicopter battalions shouldlook hard at incorporating these tasksinto their unit mission essential tasklist (METL); we will in Korea.

An old lesson learned but validatedis the importance of detailed parallelplanning, synchronization of battlefield operating systems, and the con-

20

I AVIATION BRIGADETASK ORGANIZATION1-506 IN BN (OPCON)

2/B/44 LT EN1-2 AVN (ATKHB)(C-NITE)5-501 (US) AVN (ATKHB)(OPCON)50 4 (ROK) AVN (ATKHB)(OPCON)5-17 CAV(-) (PHASE I ONLY)2-2 AVN (AHB)(-)

BOE CONTROLTARP/C/2-2 AVN (AHB)4/0/122 SIGOET I AI 4-58 ATC

AVN BOE TNSC / 2 AVN (AVIM)0/1 - 2 AVN (AVUM)0/2 - 2 AVN (AVUM)F/5-17 CAV (AVUM)

Figure 6. A viation brigade task organization fo r defensive phaseduct of rehearsals by all headquartersand unit. Although branches evolvedto plans, dedicated early preparationpaid great dividends in ensuring successful mission accomplishment on afluid battlefield.

Another old lesson learned is that wehave to provide a quicker and morereliable method for aviation units toreceive fire support. MLRS priority offires for SEAD and in response to callsfor fire were given to the AviationBrigade.In fact, 50 to 60 percent of all MLRSfires were from the Aviation Brigade.Yet, where pre-planned SEAD firesworked extremely well, calls for firewere too slow. Extended communica

tions with retrans for OH-58D digitalfires and for units' voice calls for firewere not always effective.Backup calls for fire over the command net accomplished the mission,but not as timely as needed to synchronize all firepower. This system waseven more difficult with cannon artillery support, which we received fromROK units.The extended distances over whichaviation operates necessitates a betterarchitecture for fire support. Anotherold lesson learned is command, control, and communications (C3) for anAviation Brigade over the width anddepth of the division and corps battlefield.A viation Brigade modification tablesof organization and equipment(MTOEs) lack the manning and equipping for 24-hour C3. The Aviation Brigade MTOE equips but barely mans aMain CPo Once the ground tactical air

coordinator (TAC)-in our case twoconverted M997 ambulance high mo-bility mUltipurpose wheeled vehicles(HMMWVs}-is employed, effective24-hour manning of the Main and TACcheck points (CPs) for deep, close,rear, security, and reserve operations isdifficult at best. On employment of theaerial TAC under more fluid situations, it is even more difficult.Furthermore, the aerial TAC of aUH-60 with an AN/ASC-15B consolelacks adequate C3 radios. With onlyone single channel ground and air ra-dio system (SINCGARS) radio, whichis placed on brigade command, noneare available for division command orfire support.This requires the commander's orS3 's vehicle to move to that TAC site,when possible, to provide effective C3or the Brigade Main CP has to receive/pass all division information to theTAC and coordinate fire support. Thus,eavesdropping on key nets is totallyabsent.We must improve our Aviation Brigade MTOEs in both manning andequipping as well as upgrade the AN/ASC-15B console to a minimum oftwo SINCGARS radios.

A final lesson learned peculiar toKorea is the mission tasking (doctrinal employment) of CAF units withArmy, Corps, and Division units; thetactical training of ROK CAF attackbattalions; and C3 for CAF units. CAFassets are allocated to units only on amission basis for a defined period oftime.This allocation is routinely madeabout 12 hours before time ofu.s. Army Aviation Digest July/Aug 1993


23/52

AVIATION BRIGADECONCEPT OF OPERATIONDEEP OPERATIONS , NIATION BRIGADE SUPPORTS DEEP OPERATIONS THROUGH RECONNAISSANCE. TARGET ACOUISITIONAND DEEP ATTACKS TO DESTROY 30(ROK)ID(M)/2(ROK)AR BDE . ON ORDER. TARP/C/2 -2 NN (AHB) CONOUCTSRECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS TO lOCATE 30(ROKlID(M)/2(ROK) AR BDE MECH/ARMOR fORCES . ON ORDER . CONDUCTSTARGETING/RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT Of DEEP ATTACKS TO ATTRIT THE 30(ROKlID(M)/2(ROK)AR BDEMECH / ARMOR fORCES . ON ORDER. '- 2 NN (ATKHB) CONDUCTS DEEP ATTACK OPERATIONS TO ATTRIT TH E30(ROK)ID(M) AND 2(ROK)AR BDE.

CLOSE OPERATIONS , NIATION BRIGADE SCREENS THE CORPS fRONT BETWEEN P l TONGIL AND P l KA EMPLOYINGAIR CA""lRY AND ATTACK He l iCOPTER ASSETS . ON ORDER. 5-17 CN CONDUCTS A 2< HOUR SCREEN BETWEENPL TONGl l AND P l KA fORWIIRD O f 2(ROKliD SECTOR . ON ORDER. 50 . NlN (ROK) (ATKHB) CONDUCTS DAY SCREENBETWEEN P l TONGl l AND P l KA fORWIIRD O f 5(ROK)AR BDE AND 81(ROK)ID SECTORS. ON ORDER.5- 50 ' NlN (ATKHB) CONDUCTS DAY HASTY ATTACKS AGAINST IDENTi f iED BATTALION SIZE FORCES TO ATTRITAND DISRUPT THEM PRIOR TO PENETRATION O f PL KA . ON ORDER ' - 2 (ATKHB) CONDUCTS NIGHT SCREEN BETWEENPL TON GI L AND PL KA fORWIIRD O f 5(ROK)AR BDE AND 81(ROKliD SECTORS . ON ORDER. Co/ ' -2 NN (ATKHB)CONDUCTS NIGHT HASTY ATTACKS AGAINST IDENTi f iED BATTALIONSIZE fORCES TO ATTRIT AND DISRUPT THEMPRIOR TO PENETRATION O f PL KA. NIATION BRIGADE EMPLOYS ATTACK HELI COPTER AND ASSAULT HELICOPTERASSETS TO SUPPORT 2(US)ID COUNTERATTACK CONPlANS . ON ORDER. , - 5 0 0 IN BN CONDUCTS AIR ASSAULTSTO CONTROL KEY CHOKEPOINTS BY BLOCKING AND DESTROYING PENETRATING FORCES. ON ORDER. 50.(ROK)(ATKHB)

SCREENS (DAY ONLY) THE COUNTERATTACKING fORCE ' S FLANK TO PROTECT THEM FROM ENEMY COUNTERATTACKS.ON ORDER . 5- 50 ' NN (ATKH B ) CONDUCTS (D AY ONLY) HASTY ATTACKS TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES VICINITYCOUNTERATTACK OBJECTIVES . ON ORDER . '- 2 NN (ATKH B ) SCREENS (NIGHT ONLY) THE COUNTERATTACKING FORCE'SFLANK TO PROTECT fROM ENEMY COUNTERATTACKS , ON ORDER. CONDUCTS (NIGHT ONLY) HASTY ATTACKS TO DESTROYENEMY FORCES VICINITY COUNTERATTACKING OBJECTIVES. ON ORDER 2- 2 NN (AHB) AIR ASSAULTS , -500 IN BN TOCONTROL KEY CHOKEPOINTS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERATTACK OPERATIONS.REAR OPERATIONS , NI ATI ON BRIGADE SUPPORTS REAR AREA OPERATIONS TO PROTECT DIVISION FORCES .ON ORDER. , -500 IN BN CONDUCTS PLATOON SIZE COUNTER- RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AGAINST LEVEL II ' THREATIN THE DIVISION TAA /REAR AREA . ON ORDER . , -500 IN BN(-) AIR ASSAULTS AS TCF TO DEFEAT LEVEL 11/111THREAT IN THE DIVISION REAR AREA . ON ORDER . 2- 2 NN (AHB) AIR ASSAULTS ' - 500 IN BN TO CONDUCTCOUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS AND DEFEAT A LEVEL 11'/111 REAR AREA THREAT . '- 2 NN (ATKHB) AND

Figure 7. Aviation brigade concept of operation fo r defensive phaseemployment. During Team Spirit '93the Aviation Brigade required threecontingency plans for both the offenseand defense based on anticipatedOPCON units: task organization withorganic units only, with required CAFassets, and with partially requestedCAF assets.This was further complicated by theallocation of assets based on the re-quirement for a day or night fightingcapable attack helicopter battalion.This flawed method of late allocation on a mission basis resulted in allAviation Brigadedetailed planning andrehearsals being conducted with organic aviation units only.The OPCON CA P units arrived intime for coordination briefings only,followed by employment. This type offorce allocation must change.Once the Aviation Brigade and division derives relative combat poweranddefines a requirement for additionalaviation (CAF) assets, these assetsshould be allocated by phase of operation, not by time and type of mission.The battle rarely unfolds identical toa timetable or synchronization matrix.Much like a pre-planned JAA T seldomoccurs, a pre-planned time for CAFemployment by mission and time isunrealistic.

responded well.However, as expected, the ROK attack helicopter battalions were unfamiliar with these missions and hadlimited ability to perform them. U.S.Army, Europe (EUSA) Aviation andthe U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) liaison officer,along with U.S. aviation commanders,must play an active role in increasingROK capabilities in these areas.Finally, communications betweenROK and U.S. forces must be improved. U.S. secure frequency modulation (FM) radios are incompatiblewith ROK FM radios. This necessitates a single channel RED FM brigade command net to communicatewith ROK units.With insufficient radios in aircraftforC3, U.S. commanders cannot eavesdrop on this RED FM net; and,

\~ TONGll

PL.A(GOP'

obviously, ROK units cannot monitor U.S. nets. This greatly increasesthe workload for keeping all unitsabreast of the current battlefield situation.OurTRADOC and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) communitiesneed to work with the ROK military toimprove standardization in communications.Although only highlighting our lessons learned in Team Spirit '93, these,and the many not addressed, provide agood framework for the Aviation Brigade to train and prepare for any futureconflict. This alone has made TeamSpirit '93 a large success.ConclusionThis article has informed you howone brigade-the Aviation Brigade, 2(U.S.) ID--operates as member of adivision combined arms team. Needless to say, the accomplishments of theAviation Brigade on Team Spirit '93are a great source of pride.Yet this pride is not jus t forthe division and units involved but forthe aviation community as a whole.One again, aviation has shown thelethal warfighting capability it candeliver to the battlefield.Now with the lessons learned, theAviation Brigade, 2 (U.S.) ID, canincrease Army Aviation's contributionto the battle and increase U.S./ROKreadiness in preserving peace and freedom in the Land of the Morning Calm.'WINGS OF THE WARRIORS!'

JI I ( ~ ~ ~ ) _______X IROK)

PLKYUKMYUL

A second concern is the differencein tactical training of U.S and ROKattack helicopter battalions. In executing the armed reconnaissance andscreen missions for U.S. attack helicopter battalions, 2 (U.S.) ID and U.S.CAF attack helicopter battalions Figure 8. 2 U. S. ID CONPLAN "SANDY" for defensive phase

u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993 21


24/52

Captain Barry A. Midkiff, Commander, B CompanyCW4 Jack B. Lawton, Standardization OfficerCW4 Randall J. McGuire, Assistant S-3

Scenario

4th Battalion, 501 st Aviation RegimentRepublic of Korea

Spring, 0200 hours, somewhere in the heart of he Korean peninsula. Diplomatic relations between the Northand South have completely broken down. The demilitarized zone has been violated in force by the North KoreanPeople's 3d Army.A sWift, violentresponsetothis unpro voked aggression has been mountedby U.S. andRepublic ofKorea (ROK) Forces.North Korean Army Colonel (COL) Rho, Tae Un stands in the open hatch ofhis command tank andsmiles. The lessons his42d Tank Regiment has learned over the pastfew days have not been without cost. U.S. and ROK Air Forces have hadoverwhelming air superiority. The accuracy of close air support (CAS) has destroyed entire battalions in a singleengagement. This, together with the many smaller battles with attack helicopters, has stalled COL Rho's push towardSeoul. The Americanpilots have thwarted every penetration the 3dArmy has made in thefirst 72 hours ofbattle. Tonight,however, would be different.

"Tonight we'll crush the enemy and push forward under the cloak ofdarkness to secure the objective," COL Rho hastold his battalion commanders and staff.

The reportsfrom the head oftheformation aregood-verygood. The M48 tanks of he ROK Army armored battalion wereno match for COL Rho's specially trained night ighters. Suddenly, a brilliant explosion turns night into day. One ofcoLRho's self-propelled antiaircraft artillery guns has exploded in flames. The regimental executive officer's armoredpersonnel carrier is also engUlfed in fire and secondary explosions. He has seen this before-the American attackhelicopters-but how? Then comes the terrifying sound of ets screaming low overhead. Ten of his tanks are dead orcrippled with one pass. Chaos and panic freeze the attack as COL Rho watches his plan crumble right before his eyes.

This scenario may seem like some-thing out of a Tom Clancy novel. Itisn't! It is one of the many simulatedbattles that took place during TeamSpirit '93. What scenario is this? It'sthe Night Joint Air Attack Team(NJAAT). The NJAAT was validatedby AH-l F C-NITE Cobras of the 4thBattalion, 501 st Aviation Regiment,17th Aviation Brigade, and theF-16Clow altitude navigation target infrarednight (LANTIRN) aircraft of the 36thFighter Squadron.22

Three times during Team Spirit'93, the gunfighters of the 4thBattalion, with the 36th FighterSquadron from Osan Airbase, Korea, executed a coordinated allackon a simulated enemy force at night.The first mission was a companysized, deliberate attack on a tacticalassembly area. During this operation, B Company "Paladins" tookpart in the first NJAAT conducted inthe ROK, using the LANTIRN sys-tem.

Planning for this mission, as in anynight attack, was thorough and com-plete, but as always, weather and en-emy actions soon changed the targetarea. The battalion planning cell, in-cluding the combat veteran enlistedterminal air controllers (ETACs) of the5th Air Control Group, responded tothe changes quickly and did not allowthe obstacles to delay or degrade themission.

Initially, it was not known if theLANTIRN system would be sensitiveu.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


25/52

enough to identify friendlies and allowthe F-16s and Cobras to simul taneouslyengage the target. The problem ofpositive identification became a majorconcern to all involved, besides thedeconfliction of airspace-at night, inlow illumination, and in the ruggedmountains of South Korea. Here, unlike the deserts of Southwest Asia, thealtitude above ground for an aircraftchanges rapidly. Battle positions forthe Cobras may be at 2,000 or 3,000feet above sea level.

With the mission brief completed,the Paladins launched and were soonset in their battle positions according tothe battalion standing operating procedure. The C-NlTE telescopic sightunits (TSUs) soon were acquiring targets; however, the order to fire washeld to preclude fratricide and ensureall segments of he operation were fullycoordinated. As the fighters checkedin with the ETACs at the initial point(IP), they reported they had identifiedthe friendly helicopters and the targetarea. This call synchronized all theelements and cleared the air battlecaptain (ABC) to give the order toengage. The ABC also made radiocontact with the fighter lead and contirnled the position of B Company andthe disposition of the target. The Cobras umnasked and completed theirfrrstengagement using TOWsand 2.75-inch mUltipurpose submunition rockets to suppress all known and suspected air defense systems.wren fighterlea:l called, "Thunder," 10 secondsout from the target, the Cobrasremasked. The F-16s, simulating theattack with CBU-57 cluster bombmunitions, swept through the targetand returned to the IP.Later re-engagements were madeby the attack helicopters afterthe fighters called clear of the targets. As thefighters completed their fourth pass,ammunition management and fire distribution became critical to the Cobras.After the last engagement, the ABCrequested a preplrumed artillery striketo cover the withdrawal of B Com-


pany. The Paladins made their wayback to the brigade forward arming andrefueling point and returned to thebattalion assembly area.

Twice more, during Terun Spirit,the 4th Battalion gunfighters completednight missions with the F-16s. Thefinal mission validated the experienceof the two previous missions and involved the most complex plruming ofall attack helicopter missions--thecrossflot deep attack. This operation was atrue combined, joint, multi echelonoperation involving Army Aviation,ROK Army field artillery, andU.S. AirForce (USAF) CAS. This mission disrupted the forward progress of theenemy's counterattack forces and allowed the friendly ground forces toconsolidate and continue to offensivewithout delay.Many in Army Aviation have expressed a "loss of faith" in J AA T as aviable option for today's combinedarms operations. The arguments arestrong, but the concept of combinedfires on a target involving Army Aviation, Field Artillery, and USAF CAScontinues to be one of he most flexi bleand lethal tools of the ground commander on the modern battlefield.

This concept is further amplifiedby the N J AA T. The attack helicopter is certainly a lethal weapon by

itself, as is field and rocket artillery. However, the combined fireof these two highly effective weaponsystems, plus the F-16 LANTIRN,can be absolutely overwhelming toeven a well-trained and motivatedenemy. The whole conceptof JAATis evolving and changing, not dying.

There are limitations to considerin maximizing the effectiveness ofall three systems when employed simultaneously at night. Attack helicopters must have targets pinpointed or a targeting mechanismavailable to acquire individual targets. The AH-64 Apache and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior both have thiscapabi lity. However, the AH-IF CNITE must use other means oftarget identification because of thelimited range of the C-NITE TSUs.OH-58D and special operations on site personnel can be used to handof f targets to AH-lFs. Artillery shouldbe used deliberately and sparingly.The bright explosions shut downnight vision goggles. The fires andhot debris caused by the explodingrounds and secondary explosionscreate problems with target acquisition for the C-NlTE gunners. I f heartillery is to continuously engage, itmust be preplanned and shifted boldlyfrom the target area to cut off reinforcements or limit escape. Keepingthese restrictions in mind, artillerysti II remains a viable partner in thiscombined arms operation. Finally,the F-16C LANTIRN must be terminally guided in the target area by anexperienced ETAC or helicopter for-ward air controller who is on station with the attack helicopter unit incontact.The NJAAT is a credible anddynamic option for commanders.The 4th Battalion, 501 st AviationRegiment gunfighters have proventhe concept and added substanceto the meaning of JAAT. We standready to execute this mission tosupport the Combined Forces Command in Korea. STRIKE DEEP!

23


26/52

Above: Korean soldiers enter anAmerican helicopter in a pickup zone.

Right: The American hel icopterapproaches a Korean pickup zone.

So You1re HeadedForKorea

Lieutenant Colonel John R. MartinCommander1 st Battalion, 501 st AviationRepublic of Korea

So you just received orders toKorea, huh? I imagine you'relooking forward to the chance tovisit another part of the world, tomeet some Koreans and to experience their culture.

Have you thought anythingye t about working with the Re-

public of Korea Army (ROKA)in a combined environment?

Well, I'm sure excited aboutgoing to Korea, but I haven'tthought much about combinedopera tions.

I imagine it's pretty tough,though. What kinds of things

can go wrong in a combined ai rassa ult opera tion? What are thetricks you need to know to solvethese problems?

There are lots of things thatcan go wrong in combined operations in the Republic ofKorea (ROK):

- On operations with nightvision goggles (NVG), there infrequently are soldiers in thepickup zone (PZ) who want totake pictures. You can imagine

24 U.S. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


27/52

the effect of a flashbulb or twoas your try to lead the flight toan on-time touchdown. Just aboutas often, a vehicle in or near thePZ will turn on its lights in aneffort to "help" you. The effectmay be only temporary, bu t thepotential for disaster is high.

- Soldiers in the landing zone(LZ), trying to open the UH-60Black Hawk cargo door, pullthe emergency exit handle instead. Precious seconds are lost

as the crewchief scrambles to ge teverything back in place.

- Soldiers unfamiliar with thefour-point UH-60 harness taketoo long to buckle their seatbelts. Again, more time is lostand the precise time scheduleplanned goes down the drain.

- Ground commanders planroutes that are too short or toolong and select PZs and LZsthat ar e too small or too dustyor contain too many obstacles.The ground commander's tactical plan can't be accomplishedwith the assets available.

Wait a minute!Those problems aren't uniquetocombined operations. They're

the same challenges I've seen atFort Campbell (or Fort Hood orFort Bragg), working withAmerican units!

You're getting smarter by theminute!

To tell the truth, there arefew really unique difficultiesassociated with combined ai rassault operations.

And there aren't really any"tricks," or any need for them, toproducing successful combinedai r assault operations.

You do need to understandthat ROKA units are no t quiteas well-versed as American unitsare in ai r assault operations.The Korean Army is, in many

ways, an infantry Army. They


have many infantry units, bu tvery few aviation lift units. Divisions don't even have organicaviation assets. Thus, groundunits have very limited opportunities to execute air assaults.

The positive side to this isthat the Koreans pu t a great dealof emphasis on taking full advantage of the few ai r assaultopportunities they do have.

For U.S. forces, that meansyou have to emphasize the basics. That's what brings theresults that put Korean soldiersinto an LZ, on time and on target, every time. These are thesame basics that produce simila r results with American soldiers.

That's easy to say, butI know not being able to speakthe same language must makethese operations nearly impossible ... Ho w do you overcomethis barrier?

Again, there's no "trick,"but you're right: communicationis tough. It 's also the key tosuccess.

Few American soldiers haveeven a rudimentary ability tospeak Hangul, the Korean language. It 's no t like a tour isEurope, since many of us speakGerman or French.

And for years, battalioncommanders headed for command in Europe have been sent

25


28/52

Korean soldiers continue to buckle their seat beltsbefore take off.

to language school to hel p themwork wi th ou r allies there.

None of the officers sent toKorea receive the same instruction, which could make a bigdifference in Korean-Americancommunications. Th e ai r assaultplanners, whether the BattalionS-3 or the Company OperationsOfficer, must plan to overcomethe language barrier.

In Korea, Korean Augmentees to the U.S. Army (KATUSA)are serving in every unit. TheseROKA soldiers, assigned asanintegral part of Americanunits since MacArthur's days,provide many valuable services,

bu t one of the most important istranslation. Taking one or twoof these soldiers with you is vi talwhen you are going to meet withyour Korean Army counterparts.

Most American units alsohave one or two KoreanAmericans serving in the USArmy who also perform thisval uable transla tion function.Also of enormous assistance isthe fact that most Koreanofficers, and many of the enlis ted soldiers, have studiedEnglish for years.

Use of KATUSAs, KoreanAmerican soldiers and KoreanArmy soldiers is essential from

planning-to-execution if yourcombined air assault is to besuccessful.

The planning phase is themost important. Koreans, likeAmericans, sometimes select un-tenable LZs and PZs and routesthat don't make sense for protection of the forces while theyare in the air.

But you can't go to the initialmeeting and completely dismissthe planning they have done.Their planning is a clear indication of the ground commander'sintent.

Support of that intent, withinthe capabilities of your aviationunit, is your job. Picking an"ideal" PZ or LZ that is too farfrom the objective doesn't support the ground commander.

Very few ground commanders are absolutely insistentupon use of their plan to useyour avia tion unit.

If you point-out a better way,because of safety, the threat orother operational concerns toaccomplish their mission, theyare usually flexible enough toaccommodate that.They are smart enough torealize the advantages aviationcan provide in accomplish

ment of their missions.So far you've only discussed

the ground units. Don't you alsofly with ROKA Aviation units?

You're right; the groundunits aren't the only combinedpart of these operations. Aviation units from the ROKA Aviation Command also participate.As a rna tter of fact, they're fre-quently in charge of the operation and you simply provide support. Formation of combined taskforces is the norm.

Because of that, planning hasto include a realistic assessmentof all units' capabilities. AKorean unit using UH-IH Huey

26 U.S. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993


29/52

American aircraft wait for Korean troops in a pickup zone.helicopters can't go as fast asthe U.S. unit with UH-60s. Koreans using AN/PVS-5 NVGcan't see as well on the reallydark nights as the Americans canwi th ANVIS-6 NVG.

The Koreans are rapidlymaking UH-60 units operationaland are training with ANVIS-6,so these limitations are startingto disappear, bu t they will re-main with us for the foreseeablefuture.

Th e split-second timing required for some operations can'tbe achieved by ground and/oraviation units working togetheronly infrequently or for the firsttime. Good plans and rehearsalsare essential.

Plans must be developed tha treduce the need for such precision and provide flexibility ifschedule requirements aren'tmet. I f the planning is good, theexecution will be, too.

There may be radio and communications security differences,bu t use of simple code words orstrict control mea sures can eliminate al l but the most complexcommand and control problems.

Rehearsals should be a partof every combined operation. Arehearsal can be as simple ashaving each flight lead provide abrief-back to the air mission com-

mander, using a map with theair assault graphics superimposed. Even better is a "sandbox" with good depictions of theterrain.

Having flight leads sim ula tetheir actions while walkingaround a sand box has more thanonce shown a problem with synchronization. That problemcould be solved then ra ther thanbeing a "show-stopper" duringthe execu tion phase.

Another "rehearsal" is donebefore every peacetime operationand will be done in combat- i ftime permits. This is a practiceloading and unloading of eachtype helicopter involved in theai r assault.

Ideally, it should be done asclose as possible to the actualevent, bu t a day prior may beacceptable. It must be done infull combat gear, just as for theai r assault.

It 's okay to teach the soldiers how to buckle their seatbelts while they're wearing softca ps, bu t they need to practiceloading with full gear. It's a lo tharder getting into a helicopterwhen you 're carrying amachinegun and wearing a pack.

Air assault planners need toknow how long it will really takeso they can allot adequate time in


the PZ. This training session andrehearsal is also an ideal time toteach the soldiers about the emergency exits.

Some mistakes may happenanyway, but this process helpsto minimize them. Informationcards or packets given to groundtroops by the pathfinders can alsoreduce confusion in the PZ.

Just the basics. Concen tra teon communications. Good plans.Rehearsals are manda tory. I thinkI've got it. This is going to beeasy!

Well, you're starting to ge tthe idea. It's professionally challenging and rewarding, but it 'sstill not going to be easy.

A British officer once commented that the Americans andBritish are "two peoples separated by a common language."

I f there is such a separationbetween these nations, you canimagine that the gulf must beeven larger between Americansand Koreans, separated by vastlydifferent languages and cultures.

However, the Korean Armysoldiers are every bi t as professional as our American soldiersare. Emphasis on the basics ofair assault operations ensuresthat combined opera tions for bothof these fine Armies will be asuccess every time.

27


30/52

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. RiniCommander2d Battalion, 501 st Aviation RegimentCamp Humphreys, KoreaThe 2d Battalion, 501st Aviation

Regiment, stationed at CampHumphreys, Korea, has providedmedium-lift helicopter supportto U.S. and Republic of Korea(ROK) forces for the past 22years-and stands ready to extend its support into the nextcentury.

The battalion was first activated in March 1971 as theAviation Battalion, Army KoreaSupport Command, Taegu. On 1July 1973, the battalion relocatedto Camp Humphreys and wasredesignated the 19th AviationBattalion. On 16 October 1988,the ba ttalion received its regimental designation.

The battalion consists ofheadquarters and headquarterscompany, and two CH-47DChinook helicopter companies.These com panies were formedfrom the 213th and 271st Aviation Companies and each has it sown proud heritage.

The 213th Aviation Company was activated 1 June 1966at Fort Benning, GA, and deployed to Vietnam in January1967. The "Blackcats" loggedover 54,000 combat hours fromFebruary 1967 to March 1972before beginning their proudservice in Korea.

The 271st Aviation Company was activated 25 April 1967at Fort Benning an d deployed toVietnam in February 1968. The28

"Innkeepers" logged more than42,000 combat hours from February 1968 through December1971 before beginning theirproud service in Korea.

The 2d Battalion currentlyhas 32 CH-47D aircraft, but thebattalion is no longer the onlyChinook battalion in Korea.

Formed in 1988, the ROK301st Aviation Battalion is alsoequipped with CH-47Ds. TheROK Chinooks have new airframes and operate at a 4,000-pound higher gross weight of54,000 pounds.

Other enhancements in-clude improved engines, anexternal hoist system, andweather radar capability. Additionally, the ROK Air Forceemploys Chinooks with twice theexternal fuel capacity in aerialrescue operations.

Both the 2d Battalion,501stAviation Battalion, and the301st Aviation Battalion are keyparticipants in the CombinedAviation Force. On a regularbasis, both units are involved inair assault traInIng, whereROK ground units work handin-hand with U.S. and ROKAviation units to conduct largescale air assault operations.

The 2d Battalion's higherheadquarters, the 17th AviationBrigade, supports this trainingwith CH-47, UH-60 BlackHawk, AH-1 Cobra, and OH-58

Kiowa aircraft.The 301st's higher headquar

ters, the RO K Army AviationCommand, supports the training with CH-47, UH-60, UH-1Huey, AH-1, and 500 MD(formerly OH-6) aircraft.

This air assault traininginvolves large numbers of aircraft and is conducted underchallenging night vision goggleconditions in perhaps themost demanding and hostileflight environment in the worldtoday.

The 2d Battalion, 501st Aviation, and the 301st AviationBattalion are critical elementsof projecting combat power tothe Commander in Chief-hismost versatile asset to logistically support each field army!Both the 2d Ba ttalion and the

301st Aviation Battalion standready with bright, highly trainedsoldiers and operationallyready Chinooks to provide thissupport whenever and whereverneeded.

U.S. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1993


31/52

Captain Anthony S. PelczynskiCompany Commander5th Battalion, 501 st Aviation Regiment

Camp Eagle, Wonju, Korea

Captain Cho, Choon HoCompany Operations Officer105th Attack Helicopter Battalion

31 st Aviation GroupArmy Aviation Command, Republic of Korea

INTRODUCTIONToday, multinational forces quickly

are becoming a nonnal way of conducting strategic, operational, and eventactical operations. Officers and soldiers must face the reality that theymay someday be directed in battle bya cOllllnander from another country.Attack helicopters are an essential element of the combined arms team. Withtraining, attack helicopters easily canbe placed under the operational controlof a commander from an allied nation.Learning about attack helicopter operations in a combined environment isimportant to all aviation leaders.

In Korea, interoperability betweentile Anned Forces of the Republic ofKorea (ROK) and the U.S. AnnedForces is essential to successful military operations on the peninsula. Preparing our two great armies to fightside- by-s ide in the region of the worldwhere tile last vestige of the cold warstill looms over the ROK is acontinuingchallenge.

The ROK Anned Forces are welltrained and very capable. They haveu.s.Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993

invested a great deal of ime and moneyin high-tech weapons and force restructuring. This year, the ROK hasassunled command of the CombinedForces Command, Korea, which includes all U.S. ground forces. TheU.S. Government remains committedto being a part of the South Koreandefense plan against a possible NorthKorean aggression well into the nex tcentury. Our two forces are stronglylinked by a common cause and purpose.

To prepare for war, U.S. and ROKForces conduct combined training atall levels. Major exercises. such asTeam Spirit and Ulchi-Focus Lens,rehearse large-scale operations andtactical scenarios involving divisionsand brigades. While other smaller exercises and ranges work the smallerunits' capabilities. On amonthly basis,attack hel icopter battalions in tile R 0 Khave tile opportunity to train wi til ROKground forces. Conducting attack helicopter training under the operationalcontrol of a ROK commander witilground troops presents some uniquechallenges.

DOCTRINE AND TACTICALPROCEDURES

OUf operational doctrine and tactical procedures are similar and compatible. The ROK has purchased most ofits military hardware from the UnitedStates and, tilerefore, has adopted muchof tile doctrine and force structure tosupport the equipment.

As a result of our similarities, theROK and U.S. Forces have developeda closely knit force that operates as onecombined army. Still, tilere are someminor obstacles when combining U.S.attack helicopters in support of ROKground forces. These obstacles can beovercome wough effective trainingand good communications.One obstacle is that ground commanders always do not understandhow to successfully employ tile attackhelicopter assets assigned. This problem exists in both ou r armies.However,the ROK has had the AH-1Cobra helicopter only since 1988.Many of its ground commanders havehad limited training exposure to attackhelicopter operations.

29


32/52

Also, during training, we send onlya company-sized element to support arange. This is done to conserve ourlimited resources and maximize ourtraining opportunities. Some commanders may view this as standardoperating procedure.

This problem can be solved byconducting combined operations training as often as possible; and by teaching our capabilities and limitations atevery opportunity available,whether it is during a coordinationmeeting or an officer professional development session. Effective COll1l11U-nications between the ground commander and the attack helicopter commander will resolve many of the problems during the onset of war.COMMUNICATIONS

Language remains the foremostbarrier to effective communicationsduring combined operation betweenROK and U.S. Forces. An interpreteris needed to conduct joint coordinationmeetings. During coordination meetings, the U.S. liaison officer (LNO) isassisted by a Korean Augmentee tothe U.S. Anny (KA TUSA).

These young enlisted soldiers aremembers of the Korean Army butwork directly with the U.S. Annythroughout their enlistment. Theyhave a good command of the Englishlanguage, but do not always possessthe tactical acumen required to successfully translate the information being passed. At times, hand gestures andsimple drawings are needed to communicate.

ROK planners usually will havedetailed graphics of the opera-tions plan. but these too requiretranslation. Their graphic symbolsare the same as ours;however,Hangul. the Korean language, isdifficult to read unless one is fluent.The most important thing to rememberis to try and understand fully theoperation plan and the commander'sintent by whatever means available.30

The attack helicopter air battlecaptain (ABC) must conduct detailedplanning and precise execution whensupport,ing ROK wtits. He also mustremain flexible enough to meet thechallenges on the fluid battlefield.Understanding the commander's intent assists the ABC when the groundconmumder has to change the plan tomeet the enemy. Communicationsbetween the ground commander andthe ABC during a rapid mission changeis difficult. One solution is to assign anLNO to the supported commander'soperations center. The LNO. assistedby an interpreter, will be able toadvise the growld commander on thebest use of the attack helicopters aswell as provide effective communications with the ABC. Another solutionis to assign a ROK aviation officer tothe attack battalion toserve as an LNO.The ROK LNO can assist duringcoordination meetings and handle allKorean language traflic over the radioduring the missions.

Radio commwtications also can af-fect the operations. U.S. and ROKultrahigh frequency (UHF) and veryhigh frequency (VHF) bands are compatible. This provides excellent commwlications between the ABC and thesupporting Air Forces during joint airattack team (JAAT) operations. However. the ground forces use onlynonsecure, single channel frequencymodulation (FM) radios. This is incontrast to the frequency hopping,secure single channel groWld and airradio system (SINCGARS) FM radiosystem of the United States. Theproblems of nonsecure radio conversation can be minimized by detailedplanning and the use of code words.B ~ D ~ G C O ~ E N C E B Y C O M -DINED TRAINING

Each time we conduct a combinedoperation. both the U.S. and ROKparticipants benefit immensely fromthe experience and exposure to eachother's operational procedures. Bothsides remain l1exible to changes. At-

tack helicopter ABCs must under-stand the Korean commander's intentto complete the mission according tothe ground commander' s course ofaction.

On the other hand, the groWld commander must understand the attackhelicopter's capabilities and limitationsto effectively use the deadly powerof the attack helicopter. As we do withour own ground forces, Anny Aviationmust sell itself and emphasize itsabilities to become a decisive asseton the battlefield.

The opportunity to do this isduring combined operations training.JAAT and ai r assault security mis-sions involve close coordination between the U.S. and ROK Forces andgive prime opportunity for both tolearn and rehearse our wartime missions.CONCLUSION

Combined operations between Korean and American Forces are anessential element of the defenseplan for the ROK. As members of theCombined Aviation Force. the 5thBattalion. 50lst Aviation Regiment(U.S.). and the 105th Attack Helicopter Battalion (ROK) have had theopportunity toconduct many joint andcombined operations.

On e important lesson to belearned is to remain flexible. but insistent when working with the groundcommander to adhere to the doctrinalemployment of his aviation forces.The lack of an habitual relationshipwith anyone ROK unit has caused usto continuously face the same stumbling blocks during the coordinationmeetings and execution of the missions.

We have proven to ourselves andour Korean counterparts that U.S. andROK Army attack helicopter units canand will continue to be a vital assetduring any political conflict. Fightingside-by-side, in a combined effort wecan maximize our combat power regardless of which COWltry we support.

U.S. Army Aviation Digest July/August1993


33/52

Major Marilee D. WilsonAviation Officer501 st M I BrigadeRepublic of Korea

Lessons learned from Team Spirit '93 will make the fielding of VA V-Short Range far smoother forthe V.S. Army and host nation allies.

Pioneer, the Anny s wunanned aerialvehicle CO A Y), deployed to Korea tosupport Team Spirit '93 exercises 7through 18 March 1993. This annualU.S.-Korean exercise marked the firsttime an Anny UAY system had beendeployed to the Korean theater forother than demonstration purposes Italso was the first overseas deploymentfor the Army's Pioneer since Operation Desert Storm.

With virtually nopriorno tice, Company C, 304th Military Intelligence(M!) Battalion, the Anny's only UAYcompany, packed up their UAYs at theJoint Readiness Training Center(JRTC), Fort Chaffee, AK, and headedfor the "Land of the Morning Calm."CAP ABILITIES

Pioneer can significantly enhancethe commander's view of the battlefield through its capability to providenear-real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battledamage assessment. Driven by a pusherpropeller, and powered by an aviationgasoline-fueled engine, Pioneer canreach out 185 kilometers Oems) fromits ground control station (GCS). Itcarries a payload designed to obtainand relay high-quality video imagery,using either a daytime television cameraor a forward-looking infrared (FLIR)system that can be used effectivelyboth in day and night conditions (see chart).u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1993

Characteristics of the PioneerMaximum Gross Weight 4211 pounds

Wing Span 16 .11 feeta. Rolling Takeoff210

Launch Methods m metersb. RocketAssisted Takeoff

Recovery Rolling Recovery withArresting GearEndurance 6 hours

Maximum Range 185 kmsMaximum Altitude 15,000 MSL

TEAM SPIRIT OBJECTIVESTeam Spirit objectives for this de

ployment were- Integrate the UA Y into Combined

Forces Command (CFC) and U.S.Forces-Korea (USFK) operations as acorps-level intelligence and targetingasset.

Identify operational issues andlogistical support requirements, uniqueto the UAY, to anticipate the plannedfielding of U A Y-Short Range (U A YSR) to Korea in the mid-1990s.CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

Pioneer was used in a direct supportrole for the Corps conducting the defense and in general support to otherTeam Spirit forces, as tasked throughthe command and control/joint staffintelligence collection process. TheUA Y company was placed under theoperational control of the 3d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) to facilitatethe coordination of ntelligence taskingsand airspace usage.

MISSION EXECUTIONTeam Spirit tasking consisted of

point and route recOlmaissance. Liaison officers from the supported corps(I Corps and 2d Republic of KoreaCorps) observed near-real-time targetimagery on a remote monitor in theUAY Operations Center establishednear the GCS. These liaison officerscould evaluate the imagery presentedand redirect the UAY in-flight over themaneuver area, if necessary. Pioneersuccessfully imaged Team Spirit targets over 75 kms from the GCS.INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

Communications equipment organicto

Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1993

Documents

Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1993