Armor, November-December 1997 Edition - Fort Benning · 2018-11-27 · 19 3rd Armored Cavalry...

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Transcript of Armor, November-December 1997 Edition - Fort Benning · 2018-11-27 · 19 3rd Armored Cavalry...

  • By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

    DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

    Chief of Staff

    Official:

    JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

    Secretary of the Army03941

    The Saint George award program, in existence since 1986,provides the mounted force with a way to recognize outstand-ing performers, their spouses (Order of Saint Joan D’ Arc), andArmor Force supporters (Noble Patron of Armor, with a newlyresized, much larger medallion). The highest level of the Orderof Saint George is the Gold Medallion.

    Those who have received the Gold Medallion are a selectgroup, as you will see if you ever visit the St. George Room atthe Fort Knox Leader’s Club, formerly the Brick Mess. Look atthe gallery gracing its wall. There you will see portraits of eachGold recipient drawn by ARMOR’s former artist, the late SFCRobert J. Torsrud, and Mr. Jody Harmon, our current artist.Frankly, it is an inspiring sight.

    As one can see from the list below, the number of peoplechosen for this award each year is small indeed, befitting thehigh honor attached to receiving it. Each man was retired at thetime of the award:

    COL Jimmy Leach May 86 MG George S. Patton May 91LTG Robert Baer May 86 GEN Michael Davison May 91MG Ernest Harmon Sep 86 CSM Donald E. Horn May 92GEN James Polk Sep 86 COL William Marshall May 92GEN Donn A. Starry May 87 COL Jim Spurrier May 93MG Lawrence Schlanser May 87 BG Albin Irzyk May 94GEN Bruce C. Clarke Feb 88 LTC Burton Boudinot May 94COL Hap Haszard May 88 COL Fred Greene May 951SG Patrick J. Rocco May 88 MG Lewis Stephens May 95GEN William A. Knowlton Jul 88 MG R. J. Fairfield, Jr. May 96LTG William R. Desobry Mar 89 MG Robert J. Sunell May 96LTG Julius Becton, Jr. May 89 MG Thomas Tait May 97CSM William Price May 89 Mr. Dick Hunnicutt May 97BG Phillip L. Bolté May 90 LTG Walter Ulmer May 97GEN Glenn K. Otis May 90

    I know there are other similarly esteemed and well-deservingpeople who have never been considered for the award be-cause they didn’t get nominated. It isn’t anyone’s fault, but inthe previous ten years, word about the nomination processhasn’t been known widely in the Armor and Cavalry force.There is a nomination process and a deadline for each year’snominations. If you are reading this, consider yourself now in-

    formed that we are asking for nominees. The presentations willtake place during the 1998 Armor Conference Banquet, beingheld 20 May at the Armor Inn at Fort Knox. That means thenomination packet must have a postmark prior to 20 February1998.

    I won’t take the time here to lay out all of the qualificationsnecessary for the award, except to say that a nominee must beeligible for the other levels of the Order of Saint George to beconsidered. He must meet the criteria for both the Bronze andSilver medallions to even be in the hunt; however, he doesn’thave to have received either or both to be eligible.

    There are two important facts that will tell you if the personyou are considering nominating is in fact a viable candidate.First, he must have a demonstrated record of lifelong serviceto the Armor Force. Of course, a superb record while in uniformis a given, but the nominee must also have continued to servethe force in later years. Second, barring an unusual circum-stance, the nominee has to be able to attend the banquet toreceive the award. A copy of the nominating rules is availableby calling the Association at (502) 942-6219.

    A note of caution: only a couple of people are chosen eachyear to receive the award from among the qualified candidates.Several of those on the list above were nominated severaltimes before being selected. Also, the more nominations re-ceived, the more disappointed nominators there will be, and thestronger the field of candidates will also be.

    A word of advice: Don’t tell the person you are nominatingthat you are doing so, because you don’t want to raise theirexpectations and then see the nomination fail. That said, pleaseconsider lifelong contributors to our force that you know, andgive serious thought to nominating them to the prestigious GoldMedallion in the Order of Saint George.

    A final note: Because of rising costs, the Armor Associationhas had to raise the price of the Order of Saint George to $30per bronze and silver medallion (vice the earlier $25 price), be-ginning with nominations postmarked after 1 January 1998. Butthere is no cost involved in nominating a candidate for the GoldMedallion.

    — TAB

    Stand To

  • The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-97-6

    Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

    Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

    Commandant MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER

    ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

    Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

    Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor-in-chief.

    Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

    Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

    November-December 1997, Vol. CVI No.6

    Features

    7 Reports from Fort Knox

    7 1997 Armor School Update 9 It Takes a Village to Prepare for Urban Combat __

    And Fort Knox Is Getting One

    by Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D

    12 16th Cavalry Regiment

    15 Directorate of Force Development

    17 Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development

    19 Reports from Active Component Units

    19 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 21 Museum Commemorates 150-Year History of the 3rd ACR

    by Specialist Jamie J. Arundell

    22 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse)

    23 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light)

    24 New LAV Variant for Light Forces

    25 Building a Lions' Den in Bosnia (1st AD)

    by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Anderson and Major John Hadjis

    30 Active Component Unit Locations/Commanders

    33 Army Reserve -10Oth Division Training (IT) Unit Locations/Commanders

    34 Army National Guard Unit Locations/Commanders

    38 Reserve Component Reports

    38 Gowen Field Tank Battles

    40 116th Cav Brigade

    41 49th Armored Division, TX ARNG

    42 218th HSB (Mech), SC ARNG

    43 Camp Ripley Ranges Are Flexible, MN ARNG

    45 48th Separate Infantry Brigade, GA ARNG

    46 31st Separate Armored Brigade, AL ARNG

    46 Light and Heavy Work Together at JRTC

    by Scott Seyler, Ft. Polk PAO Intern

    47 Managing Career Progression in a Smaller, Higher Tempo Army

    by Colonel Mark Hertling

    53 Tactical Vignette 97-2: "Ambush at Dogwood Crossing"

    Back Three Things I Learned in the Army Cover by Colonel (Ret.) Paul Baerman

    Departments

    2 Contacts 6 Driver's Seat

    3 Letters 60 Books

    5 Commander's Hatch

    Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40)21-5210.

    Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

    USPS 467-970

    1

  • Directory - Points of Contact

    DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX

    ARMOR Editorial Offices

    Editor-in-Chlef LTC Terry A. Blakely 2249 E-Mail: [email protected]

    Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249 E-Mail: [email protected]

    Editorial Assistant Vivian Oertle 2610 E-mail: [email protected]

    Production Assistant Mary Hager 2610 E-Mail: [email protected]

    Staff Illustrator Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 E-Mail: [email protected]

    U.S. Army Armor School

    Director, Armor School COL Richard P. Geier E-Mail: [email protected]

    Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Johnny D. Duncan E-Mail: [email protected]

    NCO Academy CSM Kevin P. Garvey E-Mail: [email protected]

    16th Cavalry Regiment COL Gregory M. Eckert E-Mail: [email protected]

    1st Armor Training Brigade COL Scott R. Feil E-Mail: [email protected]

    (ATSB-DAS) 1050

    (ATSB-CSM) 5405

    (ATZK-NC) 5150

    (ATSB-SBZ) 7848

    (ATSB-BAZ) 6843

    U.S. Army Armor Center

    Commanding General MG George Harmeyer E-Mail: [email protected]

    Deputy Commanding General BG Robert Wilson E-Mail: [email protected]

    Chief of Staff COL William E. Marshall E-Mail: [email protected]

    Command Sergeant Major CSM David L. Lady E-Mail: [email protected]

    Directorate of Force Development COL John F. Kalb E-Mail: [email protected]

    Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development COL William R. Betson E-Mail: [email protected]

    TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI COL Robert L. Westholm E-Mail: [email protected]

    TRADOC System Manager for Abrams COL David M. Cowan E-Mail: [email protected]

    Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab COL Karl J. Gunzelman E-Mail: [email protected]

    Office, Chief of Armor COL Patrick F. Webb E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

    Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) LTC Randall Williams E-Mail: [email protected]

    (ATZK-CG) 2121

    (ATZK-DCG) 7555

    (ATZK-CS) 1101

    (ATZK-CSM) 4952

    (ATZK-FD) 5050

    (ATZK-TD) 8247

    (ATZK-XXI) 4009

    (ATZK-TS) 7955

    (ATZK-MW) 7809

    (ATZK-AR) 1272

    (ATZK-SA) 1315

    ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced in near-letter-quality printer mode, along with a 3\1z or 5Y.,-inch disk in WordStar, Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Ami Pro. Microsoft Word for Windows, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter and include a double-spaced printout). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we can receive articles as e-mail or attachments at:

    [email protected]

    SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue. we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one Army journal at a time.

    GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed formats - .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. If you use Powerpoint (.ppt), please save each illustration as a separate file. Try to avoid the use of color and shading, but if you must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an unshaded version of the illustration along with a printout of your shaded version. (We have found that when we convert files

    to a format we can use, the shading gets lost or distorted_) If you have any questions concerning electronic art submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.

    MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

    PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Darlene Kennedy, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121, or call (502) 9428624; FAX (502) 942-6219; E-Mail: [email protected],

    UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of address to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

    ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force.

    ISSUES IN ARMOR: Visit the ARMOR Web site at the following address: http://www.entelechy-inc.com/docslknoxdoc!armormag/index.html.

    ARMOR - November-December 1997 2

  • Audacious Exploitation:We’ve Done It Before

    Dear Sir:

    While I rarely respond to the numerous let-ters to the editor that my infrequent contribu-tions to ARMOR seem to elicit, I feel com-pelled to answer LTC O.T. Edwards’ letter inthe July-August issue. It seems to me that hehas failed to see the forest for the trees. Thisin no way detracts from his professional abili-ties; it just serves to highlight that this is in-deed an area towards which we as an Armyshould devote some attention.

    LTC Edwards provided us with a litany ofadmirable goals for the regular rotations tothe CTCs. Nobody argues with his points,least of all me. But apparently what he hasmissed was the fact that in content, my arti-cle, “Training for Maneuver,” encompassed allof his points about what CTC rotations “areabout.” In my article, in the very first para-graph, I stated that “the number one skillwhich our tactical echelons must perfect ishow to destroy the enemy.” Given that, howdoes one arrive at the conclusion that I amnot in favor of “training for the tactical fight” or“training for the present” or “learning hard les-sons?”

    Moreover, somehow LTC Edwards got theimpression that I advocated some sort of fu-turistic field of battle upon which these con-cepts should be employed. Far from it. Infact, had he only reviewed the skimpy foot-notes which accompanied my article he wouldfind no visionary, pie-in-the-sky theoreticalsources, instead he might have realized that Iwas referring backwards, towards Sun Tzu,Clausewitz, and the historical precedent ofour own 4th AD in World War II. I assure you,LTC Edwards, when MG “P” Wood drove the4th AD hell-for-leather across France...OUT-NUMBERED...that he had not previouslybeen “training units to fight on a digitized tac-tical battlefield that is still at best years awayfrom reality.” I am afraid that then-LTCAbrams and MG Woods had never heard ofdigitization. I am unclear on how you drewthe conclusion that I was referring to the fu-ture, when the sole example that I providedwas from 53 years in the past, but I assureyou, what I suggest is possible today.

    Next, lest it be forgotten, I will state it aTHIRD time. I agree that the CTCs are abouttraining to DESTROY at the tactical level. Iam NOT advocating 100% “Free Play.” WhatI do suggest is that in perhaps one scenarioin five, perhaps just one in an entire rotation,at LEAST provide the potential that thebn/sqdn/bde/regt commander might exploitmanuever warfare. As an infantryman, I canassure LTC Edwards that I am no great fan ofwhat he cal ls, “ free wheeling cavalrycharges.” However, his assertion that wenever do it is patently false. What else wouldhe call the breakout from Normandy (which Icited in the article), or much of the attack (atthe tactical level) across Iraq, (which I did notcite)? It would appear to me that indeed we

    do execute “charges across the desert,” oftenwithout the benefit of “perfect intelligence.”That sir, is called “exploitation,” and I contendthat it is just about one of the most difficultmissions to accomplish. Therefore, we shouldtrain for this mission. Currently we do not.You are not suggesting that we not train for adifficult mission, are you?

    Finally, LTC Edwards suggests that I haveadvocated training LTCs and COLs on “op-erational art.” Lest we all forget, “operationalart” is tied to the operational level of conflict,which, according to FM 100-5 begins (usu-ally) at the corps and above. He is mistaken.I am suggesting training LTCs and COLs, andmost especially their staffs and units, on TAC-TICAL MANEUVER, not “operational art.”One thing does worry me, though. He sug-gests that we have “other tools to do that”(train), such as computer simulations andclassroom instruction at Fort Leavenworth,and that I and my fellow company-grade offi-cers should “rest assured” that the LTCs andCOLs will “gladly opt to hit the enemy’s rearand flank.” But then he follows that with “if, if,if....” That, sir, is EXACTLY what I am talkingabout. “if, if, if....” is the litany of the timid.Computer simulations do NOT create auda-cious leaders, training at the CTCs has thepotential. WE SHOULD TRAIN TO CREATEAUDACIOUS LEADERS. Currently we aretraining to create efficient set-piece fighters,and this is good. We must have the ability towin in the close-in fight. But we are not train-ing, at all, at any echelon, to be “audacious.”Therefore, I suggest that my modest proposalthat perhaps one in four or five scenarios atleast provide the potential for this type of be-havior is not at all out of line with our pastand current doctrine and capability, let alonethat of the future.

    GARRY OWEN,

    ROBERT L. BATEMANCPT, IN

    An Author’s Update

    Dear Sir:

    Since its development and publication in theSeptember-October 1997 issue of ARMOR,some of the information contained in my arti-cle, “The Russian T-90S: Coming into Focus,”has changed. The well-publicized sale of 320Ukrainian T-80UD MBTs to Pakistan may bedead in the water. According to a variety ofopen sources, a total of only 35 T-80UDswere delivered to Pakistan in two separatebatches in March and May 1997. These 35tanks were reportedly drawn from UkrainianArmy stocks and had capabilities below thelevel agreed to by the two countries. Accord-ing to Moscow’s Kommersant Daily, this ap-parently caused the Pakistani government tocancel the sale.

    The Russian government has been publiclyagainst this sale from the very beginning, and

    has repeatedly refused to supply Ukraine withcritical components needed to build the T-80UDs. According to one source, while themore modern Ukrainian T-84 MBT is “80%Ukrainian-made,” the T-80UD is “a largelyRussian product.” According to the Pakistaninewspaper The Hindu, Pakistan has been as-sured by Ukraine that the contract for the T-80UDs would be honored in spite of pressureand lack of support from Russia. The remain-ing piece to this puzzle is the level of impor-tance the Russians put on the supply of de-fense-related products to Ukraine. If it is de-termined that the Ukrainian market is impor-tant enough to Russian arms suppliers,maybe “quiet” support would still be possible.Without Russian support, its likely that theonly T-80UDs to be seen in Pakistan will bethose few already paraded through Isla-mabad.

    JAMES M. WARFORDLeavenworth, Kan.

    Correction

    Dear Sir:

    I was using the spreadsheet (Road MarchTable) on page 9 of the September-Octoberissue of ARMOR Magazine and noticed anerror in one of the formulas.

    The formula for CP Arrival Time {for cellG10} should be:

    = IF($B10"",(F10+G$8/$B$4/60),"")

    The correction is the insertion of a paren-thesis between the comma and F10 to com-plete the formula. Just thought you and yourother readers would want to know.

    SGT JOHN SILBERSchweinfurt, Germany

    Maneuver Warfare:“Not Just Moving Around”

    Dear Sir:

    In his Jan-Feb 97 ARMOR article, “Trainingfor Maneuver,” Captain Bateman askswhether the U.S. Army embraces the tech-niques of maneuver warfare. However hedoes not actually answer the question, andconcludes only that what he regards as ma-neuver warfare is not taught in training cen-ters. And I think the question itself ought tobe considered fully, for voices are now assert-ing that not only Army but Marine Corps doc-trines are straying from and discarding ma-neuver warfare. A corollary question iswhether the U.S. Army did, in fact, employmaneuver warfare techniques at the tactical,operational, and strategic levels, as set forthin FM 100-5 and other related doctrinal state-ments, in the Gulf War. In the opinions of nota few commentators, Operation Desert Stormwas conducted more like a firepower slugfestthan anything else, with “maneuver” most

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 3

  • often utilized to move and concentrate fire-power directly upon the enemy to wear himdown, which is not a manifestation of the ma-neuver of maneuver warfare.

    It would certainly be revealing for the twoquestions I’ve posed to be analyzed and an-swered by persons deeply familiar with bothU.S. Army doctrine and how Desert Stormwas actually fought. Of course, doctrine is notdogma, and commanders should be permit-ted individual judgment, but there seems nopoint in developing and setting forth doctrineif it is cast aside and ignored as a source ofguidelines in actual combat.

    I expect an indignant, “But ’twas a famousvictory!” objection to the suggestion that per-haps victory is not an automatic insulationfrom analyses which might suggest inadequa-cies, shortcomings, or more appropriate alter-natives. But can learning take place withoutquestions?

    I understand that military analyst StevenCanby suggested the alternative approach toliberating Kuwait — shifting the Schwerpunktto the Medina-Baghdad road and drivingnorth to lever the Iraqis out. Was Canby’sidea feasible? Reasonably derived from, andcompatible with, Army doctrine? Ever seri-ously considered?

    Returning to the text of Bateman’s article, Idisagree with his contention, “Simply stated,‘maneuver warfare’ is the embodiment of SunTzu’s... maxim that the essence of general-ship is... to win the war having never had tofight a battle.” And extrapolating from his SunTzu citation, Bateman goes on to describemaneuver warfare as “warfare that empha-sizes avoidance of contact at any level in fa-vor of positioning.” I think Bateman’s state-ments lead to the common misunderstandingthat maneuver warfare means basically win-ning by just moving around. From the begin-ning of the maneuver warfare debate, peoplehave seen the first word of “maneuver war-fare,” thought of movement, and misper-ceived maneuver warfare as essentially justmoving around. I think Captain Bateman hasbeen so influenced, given the titling of his arti-cle — “Training for Maneuver,” rather than“Training for Maneuver Warfare.” Actually, ma-neuver warfare involves both movement andfirepower, and is more than flank attacks. It isnot in contradiction of, or incompatible with,firepower or with hard fighting, and would infact often involve hard fighting, and inflictingsome attrition upon the enemy, though notwinning through attrition.

    Ideas more relevant to maneuver warfarefrom 500 B.C. Chinese military thinker SunTzu’s Art of War are that movements shouldbe like water, avoiding strong points andseeking weak points, and that one shouldknow where and when to fight and not tofight.

    Sun Tzu’s statement about achieving goalswithout fighting appears to have been maderegarding avoiding a war altogether, throughstrategic and grand strategy which balk theenemy’s plans, rather than by actually havinga war and not fighting in it.

    Deeper into his article Bateman does dem-onstrate an appreciation of hitting the en-

    emy’s field trains, rear areas, his logistical un-derbelly, and his air defense. And he objectsto the training center approach of “setting outto destroy the enemy’s main body” in a“struggle to determine the strongest.” Perhapsthis emphasis derives from readily acceptingthe Clausewitzian stress on battles of mass v.mass.

    JOSEPH FORBESPittsburgh, Pa.

    Battleship AnalogyDoesn’t Apply to Tanks

    Dear Sir:

    I find Stanley C. Crist’s article, “The M1A2Abrams: The Last Main Battle Tank?,” to beremarkably misinformed.

    Mr. Crist argues for the missile to replacethe tank gun so that the armor community willnot “stay on the same dead-end street thatdoomed the battleship to oblivion.” NOT SO!

    First, the analogy is not there, i.e., ships totanks. Second, what all combined arms com-batants know is that you need a mix of bothchemical energy and kinetic energy warheadson the battlefield to ensure the enemy cannotcountermeasure you out of lethality. Third,there is still huge growth potential in gunsand ammunition, both conventional, as repre-sented by the XM291 long barrel 120/140and, eventually, electro-magnetic or electro-thermal weapons. Guns and bullets providethe larger number of stowed kills needed inintense close combat that missiles can neverequal, not to mention firing time differences.

    How about the M1A3 Abrams, “The NextMain Battle Tank?”

    D.S. PIHLLieutenant GeneralU.S. Army (Retired)

    M113 Solution Wouldn’t ProtectThe Gunner in a Firefight

    Dear Sir:

    The only flaw I see in Mr. Crist’s advocacyof an M113 with a 106mm RCLR is the factthat the gun can’t be fired from under armor.It is easy to picture an M113 in a duel with amachine gun bunker with the gunner pinnedinside the vehicle. If you can’t fire from undercover, the advantages of the rest of the armorare minimized.

    The inability of air-dropping the M1 is onlythe beginning of the logistics difficulty. Itweighs so much that it requires almost an en-tire C5 sortie per tank. This huge amount ofairlift is unlikely to be used to bring more thana small handful of M1s to support the wholedivision.

    Another possibility would be an ITV, whichwould be aided in this role by the develop-ment of an HE warhead for the TOW2. I am,however completely unsure whether this vehi-cle could be air-dropped.

    Like the cancellation of the DIVAD, losingthe XM8 does not get rid of the mission. Iguess the fact that so much thought and inkis going into the debate over the weapons toequip the 3/73 is a measure of everyone’ssatisfaction with the M1 series in the heavydivisions.

    JAMES AGENBROADTechnical Information SpecialistU.S. Army Research Laboratory

    His Experience ContradictsCriticisms of Guard Units

    Dear Sir:

    CPT Michael Kelly’s letter to the editor inthe July-August 1997 issue of ARMOR wassimply disgusting and unprofessional. His in-sulting remarks about National Guard officersand the National Guard armor communitymay accurately reflect his personal bitternesswith “the system,” but they are far from reality.My 17 years of service in Cavalry and Armorhave been split almost 50/50 between activeduty service and the National Guard in twodifferent states. I served as a cavalry troopcommander twice in one of the highest profileactive duty cavalry units (11th ACR) and amnow commanding a National Guard tank bat-talion. I have had the opportunity to see bothactive and reserve component armor unitsfrom the inside.

    The days of the stereotypical NationalGuard officer are over. With the implementa-tion of a requirement of federal recognition forpromotion, and the recent implementation ofROPMA, the “good old boy” promotion trackin the Guard is a distant memory. All Guardofficers are required to meet active dutystandards for civilian and military schooling,height and weight, and physical fitness forpromotion and command positions. The offi-cers in my Guard battalion are every bit asdedicated, physically fit (yes, I said physicallyfit), and educated as officers I served with inthe 11th ACR. One of my lieutenants (myscout platoon leader) set an APFT record atFort Knox during AOB. A team of five of myofficers beat some Marine Corps teams in theannual 10 km Obstacle Course/Mud Run atCamp Pendleton. One of my company com-manders is a Master Fitness Trainer. All CPTsand above have four year college degrees(most LTs do as well), and there are five offi-cers with postgraduate degrees. Four of thefive company commanders are AOAC gradu-ates. These young men are studs, they areeducated, and they are leaders.

    The only difference between the officercorps in the Guard and the officer corps onactive duty is time — time on duty to gainexperience, time to train soldiers, and time toplan. However, many of my officers have ac-tive duty experience, and I have a number ofVietnam and Desert Storm veterans in theunit. Further, we do have sufficient time totrain individual, crew, and platoon tasks to

    4 ARMOR — November-December 1997

    Continued on Page 57

  • The First Armor Training Brigade atFort Knox, Ky., is organized with sevenbattalions and has the diverse mission ofconducting Basic Combat Training, 63Eand 45T Advance Individual Training(AIT), and Career Management Field(CMF) 19 One Station Unit Training(OSUT).

    The OSUT mission of training CMF 19is conducted within three battalions, 1-81Armor, 2-81 Armor, and 5-15 Cavalry.Training is the brigade’s daily business,and, unlike other Army units, the brigadeis always “Green.” The brigade hasmade great strides in improving thequality of its training over the past sev-eral years, which is evident from posi-

    tive feedback from the field. The Pro-gram of Instruction (POI) has been re-vised to incorporate changes in doctrineand force development. Additionalchanges incorporated into the POI resultfrom TM changes, safety messages, andsuggestions from YOU in the field.These changes are essential to keep oursoldiers trained in the fundamental com-bat skills necessary to fight and win ournation’s wars. Units or individuals thathave a suggestion or comment on a par-ticular task or lesson plan can providefeedback via the brigade’s home page.The address is:http:/knox-www.army.mil/school/1atb/1atbimo.html

    The brigade conducts a quarterly re-view to adjust its POI. Based on the re-sults of this critique, we implementmodifications to improve the course. Thebrigade has made numerous additionsand deletions over the last two years, re-viewing over 1,750 lesson plans and re-sulting in over 728 changes. Some ofthese changes include revisions thatmake good sense due to Fort Knox’sparticular needs, while others ensure thegraduate is exposed to the skills requiredof a TO&E unit.

    Several initiatives have been commonto both 19K and 19D. These include therevision of the Excellence in Armor andCavalry program, the re-introduction ofjob books, and the identification offriendly and threat vehicles via noun no-menclature.

    This enables the cadre members tocontinually improve their instructiontechniques. Both programs (19K and19D) have made significant changes, andeach need to be discussed individually.

    Specific 19K Improvements:

    Some of these changes include the ad-dition of a tank crew gunnery skills test(TCGST) conducted to mirror the stand-ards of the TO&E unit. Previously, thetasks were tested throughout the 14-week training cycle. Now, the testing re-

    MG George H. HarmeyerCommanding General

    U.S. Army Armor Center

    In 1st Armor Training Brigade

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 5

    19D and 19K Training

    Continued on Page 56

  • As promised last issue, I am includingseveral charts to show the actual changesbeing made to our NCO rank structure.These changes are due to the Change inNCO Structure (CINCOS) initiativeadopted by the CSA on 22 July 1997(and the subject of my last article).

    As you can see, the master gunnerspaid the price on the TOE side. By 1 Oct1998, tables of organization and equip-ment will show all company MGs asSSGs, all battalion/squadron MGs asSFCs, and division and separate brigadeMGs as MSGs (in units where the op-erations sergeant is a sergeant major po-sition).

    On the TDA side, the reductions af-fected Ft. Knox IET instructors andother-TRADOC post range control per-sonnel most heavily.

    Since the CINCOS was adopted, theSFC-selection list has been published,and many Armor/Cavalry NCOs and

    commanders are concerned with the se-lection rate. CINCOS impacted on theCY 97 promotion selections to SFC. Atthis time, there are 1,251 19K and 54319D SFC positions authorized. In FY 99there will be 1,051 19Ks and 513 19Dsauthorized. The smaller selection rate(7.8% versus 9.4% in 1996) reflects thesmaller need for SFCs in the restructur-ing force (we currently have about 1,368SFCs on active duty). The good news isthat the reduction in slots has alreadybeen factored; the bad news is that selec-tion rates will be no greater for nextyear.

    Having read the “Career ManagementField (CMF) 19 Review and Analysis”of the board results, I am left with onevery strong impression: Those NCOs

    selected for promotion had succeededas leaders in the traditional leadershippositions. They had served in troop as-signments prior to their selection for spe-cial duty and they returned to similar po-sitions immediately on release from spe-cial duty. They stayed competitive withtheir peers, and maintained their PMOSand grade competency.

    Secondary zone selectees had alreadysucceeded in the leadership positionsnormally filled by sergeants first class.In addition, they have served or are cur-rently serving in at least one specialtyassignment, are in excellent physicalcondition, and have a very strong back-ground in troop-leading positions.

    6 ARMOR — November-December 1997

    NCO RestructuringMakes Its ImpactOn the Armor Force

    CSM David L. Lady,Command Sergeant Major,

    U.S. Army Armor Center

    • TOE Div/Sep Bde/Regt Master Gunners: If theunit has an E9 Ops SGM (-4 E9)

    • Recoded Asst Ops SFC/SGT in Corps/Div/Bdefrom MOS 19K to 19D (+39 E5; +22 E7)

    • Company master gunners (-146 E7)

    • Battalion master gunners (-38 E8)

    TOEDowngrades/Changes

    E5 E6 E7 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9

    USAREUR +9 +5 -9 +30 -27 -7 -1

    FORSCOM +27 -3 +21 -26 +119 -106 -28 -4

    PERSCOM +1 -1

    8TH ARMY +3 +3 -3 +11 -11 -3

    TRADOC +61 -33 -24 +61 -38 -87 -5

    TOTAL +100 -36 +5 +23 +122 -231 -42 -6

    Proposed Change by MACOM

    MOS 19D MOS 19K MOS 19Z

    Continued on Page 56

  • This has been an extremely busy yearfor the Armor School. We are continuingour pursuit in establishing the highestquality institutional training achievable,and the important initiatives we’ve intro-duced will ensure that we meet this ob-jective. The first and most readily visibleof these initiatives is the realignment ofthe School’s infrastructure. The ArmorSchool currently occupies the same num-ber of buildings that it did in 1989, butdue to Army downsizing that has oc-curred since that time, student enrollmenthas decreased over 40%. Naturally, thissituation drives us to pursue more effi-cient, cost-saving methods of instruction.

    We are now in the process of movingsome departments and classrooms out ofold, one-story wooden and masonrybuildings and consolidating all ArmorSchool classes into Skidgel, Harmon,Marshall, and Boudinot Halls. Staff andFaculty, Automated Instructional Man-agement Systems Redesign (AIMS-R),and the International Military StudentOffice (IMSO) will join the school head-quarters in Gaffey Hall. The Directorateof Training and Doctrine Development(DTDD) will join the Armor School Li-brary in Harris Hall. The Master Gun-ners and gunnery instructors will moveinto Serio Hall (the old 194th HQs). Theentire Noncommissioned Officer Acad-emy will join the Armor School complex

    and occupy facilities opposite SkidgelHall. PLDC, BNCOC, and ANCOC willgain “state of the art” classrooms, refur-bished offices with enhanced communi-cation links, and modernized billeting forsoldiers attending these NCOA courses.

    The 1st Armored Training Brigade willinherit several of the buildings vacatedby the NCOA and use them to housetwo newly constituted basic trainingcompanies and some headquarters ele-ments.

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 7

    1997 ARMOR SCHOOL UPDATE

    Relocation, ConsolidationMark Year of Changes

    Reports from

    THE ARMOR CENTER

  • This new organization enables us totear down 43 obsolete, inefficient build-ings that used to house classrooms andoffices. We will apply the money nor-mally spent in maintaining these oldstructures to the upgrade and refurbish-ment of classrooms in the remainingbuildings. The savings and benefits asso-ciated with this major project are indeedsignificant.

    Another upgrade to the Armor Schoolin 1998 will be the construction of sixcomputer-enhanced classrooms on thesecond floor of Skidgel Hall. This is partof Classroom XXI and the Army Dis-tance Learning Program. These are notmerely classrooms equipped with com-puters, but rather a place to share studentwork products, access information fromthe Fort Knox local area network, the In-ternet, the Army Training Digital Library(ATDL), and other TRADOC schoolsand centers.

    We also plan to begin the evolution to apaper-free classroom in 1998. Oncegiven the funding, we will issue laptopcomputers to our students when they in-process into our schools. These state-of-the-art laptops will contain all the coursematerials the student will need, includinga CD-ROM containing all manuals andtexts needed during the course. Addition-ally, students will have the ability to

    download updates to these manuals,whenever they occur, via the Internet.We believe that laptop computers will bea common management and training toolutilized by all units in the near future. Inthe future, we hope to allow students to

    take their laptop “classroom” with themafter graduating from their course; thenwe can ensure that units in the field willbe directly linked to the schoolhouse atall times. Thus, we need to begin train-ing tomorrow’s leaders on computer ca-

    8 ARMOR — November-December 1997

  • pabilities and limitations today. Oncefunding for this concept is approved, weplan to start issuing them initially toAOAC students, followed by ANCOC,AOBC, and BNCOC.

    Large-scale distance learning will arriveat Fort Knox in 1998. We have con-verted the Battalion Maintenance OfficerCourse (BMOC) into an interactive CD-ROM, and the resident BMOC will endhere at the Armor School in the secondquarter of 1998. Personnel wishing totake that course can receive the CD-ROM through a normal request to theArmy Training Support Center (ATSC).We have begun the conversion of the Ar-mor Officer Advanced Course to a dis-tance-learning format for our ReserveComponent officers. Our plan is to pro-vide “Individual” Phase One instructionover the Internet, beginning in October1998. Phase Two “Small Group” instruc-tion, with emphasis on collective tacticaltasks, will be in the video tele-trainingformat beginning in October 1999. ThePhase Three, two-week “resident” phasewill begin at Fort Knox in the summerof 2000. Our goal is to phase out thecurrent AOAC-RC course by FY00.

    We plan to convert a portion of 19DANCOC to distance learning in FY99,and we expect a relatively small TRA-DOC common core portion of BNCOCto be converted that same year. Thesedistance-learning portions are orientedtoward reserve component soldiers, of-fering them more and better opportuni-ties to attain the same state of profi-ciency as their active duty counterparts.It is not our intention to attempt to con-vert “hands-on” equipment or initial en-try tasks to the distance-learning format,now or in the immediate future. We in-tend to make the time spent on thesecritical “hands-on” tasks as the capstonetraining event of the courses.

    Lastly, we expect to have our M1A2Virtual Maintenance Trainer operationalin Skidgel Hall in 1998. This device be-gins the initial mechanic training in avirtual world, transitioning them to a“hands-on trainer” for their validationtraining and testing.

    The future of the Armor School ispromising, and we will remain the bestschool of mounted warfare in the world.We will use emerging educational tech-nology to our greatest advantage, know-ing full well that the true test of our ef-fectiveness occurs on the battlefield andnot in the classroom.

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 9

    by Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.Fort Knox Historian

    For the future, Mounted Forces must beready to operate in urban settings. Manysoldiers put urban operations in the ’toohard’ box. Instead, mounted soldiersmust begin to think of fighting in urbanterrain as another battlefield condition,like cold weather or NBC. TraditionalArmor practices of either avoiding urbanareas or destroying them by indirect fireor long range direct fires are no longeracceptable. To meet the challenges thaturban areas pose, the Army must de-velop doctrine, training, organizations,materiel, and soldier-leaders. At FortKnox, a facility is arising to fill thesegaps. This new facility, a test bed forForce XXI, will integrate heavy weaponsand mounted forces in urban operations.By doing so, the site will reveal short-falls in new technologies, organizations,and tactics. Finally, it will provide an un-

    equaled opportunity for joint trainingacross the spectrum of conventional andspecial forces.

    The Urban Combat ProblemOperations from Somalia to Bosniashow that the U.S. Army must operate inurban settings. The Gulf War showed theeffectiveness of armored forces in openterrain, but it did not represent eithercurrent or future military operations. Fu-ture battlefields will include city streets.Europe and Asia now have the highestdensities of urban population. In 1983,an average American brigade sector inGermany included at least 25 villagesand one town, and this number has sincerisen.1 Data for Africa and Latin Americashows rapid urbanization in these likelyhot spots.2 The increase in unconven-tional operations since the Berlin Wallfell underscores the need for MOUT ca-pability. Actions in Panama City, Port-au-Prince, and Mogadishu proved criti-

    Figure 1: Principal MOUT Site Structures

    MOUT Site

    School

    Condominium

    CommunicationsCenter

    Open AirMarket

    Embassy

    Cemetery

    Air TrafficControlAirfieldGas Station

    Bridge

    Houses

    Sewer System

    Businesses

    Industrial Area

    NEW EMPHASIS ON MOUT TRAINING

    It Takes a VillageTo Prepare for Urban Combat...And Fort Knox Is Getting One

  • cal to Operations Just Cause, UpholdDemocracy, and Restore Hope. Ongoingstability operations in Bosnia involve theuse of mounted forces in and around vil-lages. Cities like Sarajevo are importantsymbols and house key force headquar-ters.

    Foreign and American experienceshows that failure to prepare for urbanconditions carries a high human and po-litical cost. MOUT readiness proved acritical factor in Israel’s 1982 invasion ofLebanon. The Israeli Defense Force(IDF) overran much of Lebanon to driveout the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-tion (PLO). The PLO withdrew into thecities where the urban setting offset itslack of sophisticated weaponry andsuited its decentralized tactical leader-ship. With its force structure and doc-trine ill-equipped for urban fighting, theIDF found itself trapped in a dilemma. Itcould use artillery and air power to crushresistance in cities still populated withcivilians, or it could use scarce infantryin slow and costly clearing operations.Initial Israeli use of blanket firepowerbrought international condemnation.

    The IDF resorted to infantry operationsthat brought heavy casualties and politi-cal discontent at home.

    By war’s end, Israel found itself de-nounced by the international communityas an aggressor nation, torn by internalpolitical disputes, and dissatisfied withthe conflict’s military outcome.3 The un-happy results for U.S. forces inMogadishu similarly showed the risk ofsending unsupported dismounted forcesinto a hostile urban setting.

    The U.S. Army is not well prepared forurban operations. World War II-era tac-tics shape the weak mounted forceMOUT doctrine that exists. In WWII,MOUT doctrine encouraged tanks toavoid cities, since urban terrain increasedtheir vulnerability when already outgun-ned and underarmored. Today, Armorunits do not list MOUT as a primarymission. Consequently, urban training re-ceives low priority.

    The Army still considers the city fightto be the foot soldier’s domain.4 TheArmy also lacks the facilities for devel-oping and training new Mounted ForceMOUT doctrine and matériel. MostCONUS MOUT sites focus upon dis-mounted operations and cannot supportexperimentation or training, since theycannot withstand tank and Bradley use.The lack of training facilities designed tohandle the stress, weight, and impact ofheavy armored vehicles encourages ne-glect of mounted force MOUT training.

    Therefore, CONUS mounted training forurban conditions rarely occurs.

    Steps Toward a SolutionFor almost a decade, Fort Knox workedtoward improved capabilities for urbanoperations. In the 1980s, Soviet interestin MOUT operations increased sharply,resulting in creation of the OperationalManeuver Group. This organization tar-geted key NATO command and controlcenters located in urban areas. Its crea-tion led Armor Center Commander Ma-jor General Thomas H. Tait to identifythe need for Mounted Force MOUTreadiness. He recommended building atest bed at Fort Knox to develop doc-trine. His vision resulted in a range facil-ity known as the Wilcox Project. Thisdesign incorporated long range gunnery,maneuver, complex obstacle breach, andan urban combat training site.5 Despitefunding delays, interest in the projectcontinued into the 1990s. By 1997 Con-gress had provided $13 million to builda Mounted Urban Combat Training Siteat Fort Knox. This funding permittedcompletion of the planning and designwork. Construction will begin this falland training should start in early 1999.

    Urban Combat Training SiteThe new Mounted Urban CombatTraining Site will give the Army an un-equaled training and doctrine develop-ment capability. The site will be largeand sophisticated. Plans include a 26-acre spread located on Fort Knox’s

    northern training area. A permanent staffof 13 military and civilian personnel plusan 8-man observer/controller team willoperate the site. Its features will repre-sent typical residential, municipal, andbusiness districts found in cities (seeFigure 1). Plans include specializedbuildings for mounted soldiers to learnand practice basic tactical principles forany urban setting. Some structures willinclude working utilities, while otherswill represent rubbled shells.

    The building designs permit modifica-tion of their outward appearance to suit agiven scenario. Interior rooms, closets,and furniture will increase realism andthe complexity of training activities. Re-inforced structures and roadbeds willhandle the weight and bulk of tankswithout need for costly range repairs,and a functional railroad will permit theoperation of trains through deploymentareas.

    Site plans emphasize preparing soldiersfor the chaos of urban operations. To-day’s cities are dirty and debris-strewn.The MOUT site will be no different.TRADOC’s emphasis upon “training theway you fight” spurred the planners tocreate a town filled with trash, debris,and abandoned, burnt-out vehicles. Inaddition, soldiers will encounter fire,smoke, and noise indoors and in thestreets. After reviewing special effectsused by moviemakers, current plans an-ticipate using propane gas to generateexplosions and flames throughout themock town. The gas station, for exam-

    10 ARMOR — November-December 1997

    Deployment toFort Knox

    AAR facility for overview briefingre safety, admin, ROE, and threat

    Leader and staff training• develop course of action on

    JANUS or terrain board

    Soldier training

    Rehearse skills at MOUT site• tactical movement• building clearance• individual or team

    Practice basic skills• COFT• SIMNET/CCTT• PGS/TWGSS

    AAR facility• leaders brief soldiers

    Mission preparationBackbriefs

    Equipment issue MOUT site ops AAR

    Return tohome station

    One-Stop Training Forthe Mounted Force

    • SIMNET/CCTT/COFT• JANUS• Gunnery Ranges• Small Arms Ranges• Grenade Throwing Ranges• Tank Driving Courses• Simultaneous Training

    in conjunction withMOUT site usage

    Figure 2: Sample Training Rotation

  • ple, can be ignited to send streams offire into the streets. Additions to the sen-sory chaos include reconfigurable build-ings and a Class 100 bridge that can ex-plode and burn. Amid such planned con-fusion will be pop-up targets of friendly,neutral, and hostile personnel. Suchscenery tries to simulate the urban set-ting’s assault upon the soldier’s senses.Soldiers must learn to filter key informa-tion from these sights, sounds, andsmells in order to survive in actual com-bat in built-up areas.

    For use inside buildings, Range Controlpersonnel devised a MILES machinegun. It emulates the sound and flash of amachine gun and can be deployed insidebuildings to automatically sweep hall-ways. It fires when it detects motion andrepresents another hazard for the traineealready likely to be stumbling over furni-ture and searching through a maze of un-familiar rooms. He can also expect to beshot at by another unique “weapon”: atracer shootback device. It uses fire-works similar to a Roman Candle andwill be aimed directly at personnel, notthe regulation 110 inches above the headfor conventional small arms. The deviceproduces a spectacular visual effect thatsimulates tracer ammunition, but carriesa minimal safety risk. It does, however,force personnel to identify the source ofthe fire from among the buildings anddebris and rapidly respond.

    War games of modern urban combatanticipate Threat use of subways andsewers to provide subterranean mobility.Thus the MOUT site will include asewer system. With adjustable water lev-els and floating debris resembling rawsewage, doses of commercially devel-oped stink perfume will complete theimpression of a real sewer. The individ-ual soldier must focus upon protectingpersonal equipment. He will also need torespond to simulated biological andchemical agents. Finally, he will copewith a host of psychological factorslikely to emerge after confinement in adark and filthy atmosphere. For safety,the sewer plans include powerful over-head fans and lighting, and continuousvisual monitoring to prevent accidents.Upon demand, the sewer can be floodedwith light and the air cleared almost in-stantaneously.

    MOUT operations do not require basicchanges in leadership principles or doc-trine; they do require wider coverage ofdetails in planning. Dangling powerlines, rules of engagement that prohibitdestroying city blocks, and the suddenappearance of “real” trains carrying haz-ardous cargo such as propane tanks areall present in the MOUT site plans. Sce-

    narios will force commanders to balanceimmediate tactical needs against the po-litical impact of conducting operations insensitive areas, such as the fake cemetery.The urban ambush threat to tanks fromantitank weapons ranging from Molotovcocktails to ATGMs will be represented.Range Control personnel also plan to usepaint-spewing .50 caliber and 37-mmweapons for added effect.

    The constricted nature of the mocktown requires special attention to fieldsof fire and gun tube elevation to engagetargets in upper stories and basements.While buildings provide advantages toan attacker, the Mounted Force leaderwill have to assess the impact uponstructural integrity before firing mainguns or deploying tanks and Bradleys inbuildings. Moreover, the varied height ofbuildings, the presence of a subterraneansewer system, and the expected close en-gagements will force coordinated plan-ning of dismounted and mounted ac-tions. Of considerable value across theforce will be the enhancement of com-bined arms operations that results.

    The MOUT site will exist to provide re-alistic experience in urban operations.While built to accommodate theMounted Force, all interested active andreserve units plus law enforcement agen-cies can use it. A comprehensive set ofscenarios will permit training from peaceand humanitarian operations throughmid-intensity combat.

    The scenario mix can be continuouslymodified and expanded to reflect the en-vironment in emerging trouble spotsworld-wide. Reflecting the importanceof PSYOP and Civil Affairs actions dur-ing contingency operations, the site willinclude a communications building capa-ble of radio and television broadcasts.Furthermore, the surrounding terrain per-mits airborne and river assaults upon thetown.

    The MOUT site has the capacity tosupport squad- through battalion-size op-erations. Four separate companies or asingle battalion task force can train si-multaneously. It can easily accommodateactivities at the squad, team, or platoonlevel, including task-intensive trainingrequiring only a single structure. Thetraining unit determines the size and na-ture of the training activities desired.Current plans expect the MOUT site tobe available 24-hours daily for 320 an-nual training days. Armor Center usageshould account for about 40 percent ofthis time.

    Arranging to use the MOUT site willfollow the same process for other FortKnox ranges.

    A unit schedules the site at least sixmonths in advance. During this period,the training unit’s commander consultswith the Armor School to link the unit’sneeds with training support packages andaddress any special requirements. Hewill also select the type of target interac-tion he wants. Options include force onforce, using paint balls or blank fires,blank fires against a computer-controlledopponent, live fire in specially desig-nated areas, or a mix of the above. Simi-larly, the unit commander will selectsimulation complexity, special effects,and the type of threat (i.e. — conven-tional force, paramilitary, or other). Fig-ure 2 shows a sample training rotation.

    The planned AAR capabilities parallelthose of the major combat training cen-ters. Eighteen video cameras — whoselocations can be altered — recordings ofall radio transmissions, and the computerrecords associated with both MILES andTWGSS/PGS operations capture data.Experienced observer/controllers willcirculate through the training area andprovide their personal observations andassessments of this data. Currently, theArmor School plans to conduct an AARwithin four hours after a unit completestraining. The unit’s take-home packagewill include all compiled data, assess-ments of operations, and a video of theAAR itself. The latter will be conductedin a specially designed facility withstate-of-the-art video and computermonitoring stations and a detailed modelof the MOUT site.

    MOUT site development will not endwith its physical construction. Instead itwill become a test bed to develop newtactics, techniques, and procedures forthe Mounted Force. In this way it willaddress a deficiency clearly identified byArmor Center commander MG GeorgeH. Harmeyer at the 1997 Armor Confer-ence as Armor School Commandant andproponent for the Armor Force. The sitewill support Armor School instruction,and it is expected to be incorporated intothe POIs for Armor and Cavalry person-nel. Co-located with the source of Armorand Cavalry doctrine at Fort Knox, theMOUT site offers an accessible mediumfor testing new concepts before theiradoption throughout the force.

    The MOUT site’s experimentationvalue extends into the virtual arena. Fu-ture actions will link it with Fort Knox’sClose Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)and Janus, and similar facilities on otherposts. Interaction between virtual opera-tions at other posts and the actions of aunit on the ground in the mock town willbecome possible by building upon con-cepts demonstrated during Advanced

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 11

  • The 16th Cavalry Regiment is the heartof the Armor School. The regiment ag-gressively stays engaged with the field toprovide the best possible current, compe-tent, and relevant instruction. Its primarymission is to train mounted force leadersin the operation, training, and mainte-nance of armor and cavalry weapons,equipment, and units from platoonthrough brigade. The regiment also pro-vides technical overwatch and subjectmatter expertise in the development andevaluation of mounted force doctrine,training development, and force develop-ment; and it demonstrates excellence inmounted operations, capabilities, tactics,techniques, and procedures. The regi-ment accomplishes its mission by em-phasizing task-based structured trainingon critical warfighting skills. It supportsArmy and TRADOC initiatives and is aleader in applying distance learning andClassroom XXI in institutional training.The regiment continues to improve digi-tal instruction in all its POIs as themounted force makes the transition fromanalog to digital. In addition, the 16thCavalry is continuously refining the useof virtual and constructive simulations inPOI training and in support of activeand reserve unit training.

    1st SquadronThe 1,100 soldiers in the 1st Squadron

    provide world-class soldier and equip-ment support to the Armor School andFt. Knox. It is equipped with 116 M1A1tanks, 20 M1A2s, 20 M3 Bradley Fight-ing Vehicles, 9 M113 APCs, 72 LightScout HMMWVs, and over 250 othercombat and combat service support vehi-cles. It maintains the equipment, trainsthe crews, and provides them daily to therest of the Regiment and Fort Knox insupport of training. Additionally, 1stSquadron teaches, and is the proponentfor, the M1A1 and the M1A2 TankCommander’s Certification Courses(TC3).

    M1A1 TC3 (2 Wks, 3 Offerings inFY98) has experienced a significant re-duction in enrollment in recent years andhas been converted to The Total ArmyTraining System (TATS) format. The

    resident course at Ft. Knox will bephased out during FY98. We expect thiscourse to be picked up as a residentcourse by the reserve component.

    M1A2 TC3 (3 Wks, 8 Offerings inFY98) is designed to train qualifiedM1A1 tank commanders on tasks spe-cific to M1A2 tanks. 73% of the courseis on the tank and 21% uses M1A2training devices, including crew stationtrainers (CSTs), Advanced GunneryTraining System (AGTS), and TankWeapon Gunnery Simulation System(TWGSS). The 2.51 M1A2 software up-date will be incorporated in FY98.

    2nd SquadronThe 2nd Squadron’s mission is to pro-

    duce Armor and Cavalry leaders imbuedwith the warrior spirit and proficient inthe fundamentals of tactics and gunnery,maintenance, and leader skills. Thesquadron accomplishes this by conduct-ing the following courses: Armor OfficerBasic Course, Scout Platoon LeaderCourse, M1A1/M1A2 Master GunnerCourses, M1A2 New Equipment Train-ing (NET), and Bradley OrganizationalMaintenance NET, UCOFT, and AGTSSenior I/O and Bradley COFT I/O.

    The Armor Officer Basic Course(AOBC) (15 Wks, 2 days, 11 Offeringsin FY98) serves as initial-entry trainingfor all Armor second lieutenants in theArmy and Marine Corps, as well as for-eign students from 34 countries. The endstate is an officer who is technically andtactically competent, capable of effec-tively leading combat soldiers, andphysically and morally strong. He is pre-pared to assume command of a tank pla-toon immediately upon graduation. Theprogram of instruction focuses on tactics,and gunnery, maintenance, and sol-dier/leader skills.

    The focus of tactics instruction is thetank platoon. The student learns througha combination of classroom instruction,Tactical Exercises Without Troops(TEWT), and simulations, culminating ina six-day FTX. Students are exposed toall facets of tank gunnery, with the goalof producing confident and competent

    12 ARMOR — November-December 1997

    16TH CAVALRY REGIMENT

    Fort Knox Cav UnitTrains Armor Force Leaders

    Warfighting Experiment Focused Dis-patch. This end state requires additionalresources; particularly, urban databasesmust be designed for use in simulators.Currently, their complexity in compari-son with rural areas and their creationcosts make them unobtainable, but theseobstacles are temporary. The technologyalready exists, and the Mounted Forcecan look forward to the benefits fromlinking live, virtual, and constructivetraining in a MOUT environment. Thestart point, however, lies in the physicalfacility planned at Fort Knox.

    Notes1Paul Bracken, “Urban Sprawl and NATO

    Defense,” Military Review, 57 (October1977), pp. 33-34; TRADOC Liaison Office,Federal Republic of Germany, M-22-83, “De-fense of Villages Applicable Today?” Analy-sis of 1944 publication of German Army, 7December 1983, p.1.2George Schecter, “Urban warfare poses

    substantial new military problems,” DefenseSystems Review, (April 1984), p. 30.3See Eric F. McMillin, “The IDF, the PLO,

    and Urban Warfare: Lebanon 1982,” Univer-sity of Chicago Master’s Thesis, May 21,1993.

    4FM 90-10-1: An Infantryman’s Guide toCombat in Built-Up Areas, 12 May 1993; TC90-1: Training for Military Operations on Ur-banized Terrain, 30 September 1993.

    5John J. Mahan, “MOUT: The Quiet Im-perative,” Military Review, 64 (July 1984),48-50.

    Note on Sources

    Other than the sources identified in thefootnotes, background information for this ar-ticle came from discussions with MountedForce personnel at the Armor Center and thespecific sources listed below:

    Briefing slides entitled “Observations” fromClose Support End-to-End Assessment(CSEEA) MOUT Wargame Executive Ses-sion, February 28, 1997.

    G3/DPTM, “Mounted Urban Combat: Meet-ing Challenges of Future Urban Combat En-vironment,” Briefing prepared for LTGLeonard D. Holder, Jr., March 10, 1997.

    Notes of interview with F.L. Andrews,Range Division Chief, March 31, 1997.

    Notes of discussion with Michael Kelley,DTDD Training Development Division, April18 and 21, 1997.

    Range Division, “Mounted Urban CombatTraining Site, Fort Knox, KY,” summarysheet, 1997.

    Range Division, “Mounted Urban CombatTraining Site, Wilcox Range, West, FortKnox, KY,” January 14, 1997.

    Range Division, Chronology of MountedUrban Combat Training Site, 1997.

    Video Teleconference, CSEEA, February18, 1997.

  • tank commanders. Gunnery includes of-fensive and defensive engagements, pre-ceded by a Tank Crew ProficiencyCourse (TCPC) utilizing TWGSS. PGTexercises are also incorporated into thecourse.

    Students also receive extensive hands-on instruction on maintenance operationsand PMCS. Soldier/leader skills instruc-tion includes battle-focused training, ter-rain appreciation, common task training,troop-leading procedures, and theUCMJ.

    Current initiatives for AOBC in FY98include increasing the course to 17weeks (currently, the shortest basiccourse in TRADOC). An additional 8days will include job-specific equipmentinstruction and tactics to support thelieutenants’ follow-on assignments in acavalry organization, or in one of theM1A2 tank variants being fielded. Thisinstruction is complementary to the in-struction a student receives in the ScoutPlatoon Leader Course (SPLC), whichfocuses exclusively on tactics. Addition-ally, in keeping with the force’s M1A2fielding, AOBC will embed an M1A2branch in the course in 3d QuarterFY98.

    The Scout Platoon Leader’s Course(3 Wks, 9 Offerings in FY98) preparesofficers and Noncommissioned Officersto lead and employ heavy and light cav-alry and scout platoons. Students receivetwo weeks of fast-paced classroom in-struction, followed by a rigorous six-dayfield exercise. Instruction is primarily(97%) focused on critical scout skills,such as threat organizations and tactics,the IPB process, evaluation of routes andobstructions, platoon level obstacles, cal-culating and designating demolitions,and advanced reconnaissance and secu-rity techniques. Students are trained andevaluated on their ability to employthese skills during classroom practicalexercises and mounted tactical training.

    SPLC is changing the present prereq-uisite to include 19K30s in response torequests from the field. Also, sharedtraining is conducted with the CavalryLeader’s Course and with D Troop, 1/16CAV to broaden students’ perspectives.

    The M1A1 Master Gunner Course(11 weeks, 7 Offerings in FY98) contin-ues to produce well-trained NCOs whocan assist commanders in developingand executing a comprehensive year-round gunnery program. Course en-hancements include assigning faculty ad-visors to each student, conducting videoteleconferences semi-annually, and pub-

    lishing a quarterly Master Gunner News-letter. The course has also added a 40-hour block of instruction that certifiesMaster Gunners on TWGSS. AdditionalTWGSS instruction has been added tothe M1A2 Master Gunner course. TheM1A2 Master Gunner TransitionCourse (3 Wks, 8 Offerings in FY98)transitions M1A1 Master Gunners toM1A2 Master Gunners. This course con-tinues to increase offerings in responseto the needs of the field. The MasterGunner Branch communicates with thefield through electronic mail distributionand is also located on the World WideWeb. Also, Master Gunner Branch hasdeveloped several videos now in localTASC offices, enabling soldiers to pre-pare for the course. Current tapes ad-dress Simplified Test Equipment (STE),Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test(TCGST), Breakout Box (BOB), andboresight procedures.

    Advanced gunnery training is furtherenhanced by the operation of tank andBradley COFT facilities for visiting ACand RC units. Additionally, COFT per-sonnel conduct UCOFT and AGTSSenior I/O courses (3 Wks, 6 Offeringsin FY98) and the BFV COFT I/Ocourse. The M1A1 Master GunnerTransition Course (4 Wks, 2 days, 0Offerings in FY98), which transitionsM60-series Master Gunners to theM1A1, will not be offered after FY97.

    The M1A2 NETT provides basic crewand organizational maintenance trainingto units receiving the M1A2. 3-8 CAV,1-7 CAV, 1-8 CAV, and 2-12 CAV havebeen fielded. The NET for 2-12 CAVwas a successful contractor pilot consist-

    ing of 26 Tank Automotive Command(TACOM) contract instructors (all for-mer armor NCOs/MGs) hired by Gen-eral Dynamics, along with 14 TRADOC(military) instructors from the 16th Cav-alry and augmentees from the 1st CD.

    2-8 CAV and 1-12 CAV will completethe 1st CAV Div. OMNET begins in 1stQuarter FY98 and OPNET in the sec-ond. The M1A2 NETT is adding AGTSand more TWGSS training to the POI.The 16th Cavalry Regiment has con-ducted several monthly OMNET andOPNET classes for soldiers in the 1stCD going to units that already have theM1A2.

    The BFV OMNETT (our contribu-tion to Bradley NETT) trains activeand reserve units receiving the BFV onorganizational maintenance. The teamtrains three separate courses, a hull, tur-ret, and a supervisors course. The teamis currently at Ft. Stewart, training the3rd Infantry Division on the M2A2 ODS(Operation Desert Storm) variant of theBFV. It recently completed training the49th Division of the Texas NationalGuard on the basic BFV version. It willsupport NETT for subsequent variants ofthe Bradley, such as the ADA version(Linebacker).

    3rd SquadronThird Squadron’s primary mission is to

    train and develop mounted officers tocommand and serve as staff officers atcompany, battalion, and brigade level.3rd Squadron accomplishes this missionby teaching the Armor Officer AdvancedCourse, Cavalry Leader’s Course, SeniorOfficer Logistics Management Course,

    ARMOR — November-December 1997 13

    •WARTHOGS

    •SENIOR O/C TM

    • M1A1 TC3

    • M1A2 TC3

    16th Cavalry Regiment

    VIRTUAL ANDCONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION

    SUPPORT FOR RESERVEAND ACTIVE COMPONENT

    PLT THRU BDE

    •SIMNET AND CCTT•JANUS AND BBS•CONDUCT OF FIRE TRAINER•ADVANCED GUNNERY

    TRAINING SYSTEM•PLATOON GUNNERY TRAINER

    • AOAC• AOAC - RC• CLC

    • APCC•SOLMC

    • BMOC

    16

    3/16

    •AOBC

    •SPLC• MASTER GUN M1A1

    •MASTER GUN M1A2 (T)

    •M1 COFT SR I/O•M1A2 NET

    •M3 ODS OMNET

    •M2A2 OMNET

    HHT 1/16 2/16

  • the Battalion Maintenance OfficerCourse, and the Armor PrecommandCourse.

    The Armor Officer Advanced Course(20 Wks, 4 Offerings in FY98) preparesthe mounted officer to command at com-pany level and serve in a battalion or ona brigade staff with an emphasis on hisrole as a battle captain. The instructionincludes tank gunnery, tactical training,logistical and maintenance procedures,training methods and techniques, leader-ship skills, and staff support functions. Inaddition to Armor officers, AOAC alsoincludes officers from other combat andcombat support branches, NG officers,Marines, and Allied officers from 34countries.

    AOAC is also changing to meet theneeds of the mounted force in the 21stcentury. AOAC initiatives will includeintegration of BCB2 (Battle Command,Brigade and Below) and the five ATCCS(Army Tactical Command and ControlSystems) instruction into the POI.

    To further enhance task-based struc-tured training, the POI will also begin toincorporate several Force XXI trainingproducts. These include a self-pacedcomputer instructional package designedto train individual staff skills — the Bri-gade Staff Training System (BSTS), anda comprehensive brigade staff trainingpackage known as COBRAS.

    The current AOAC is aligned withCPT-PME Phase II. Officers now attendthe 6-week CAS3 after graduation (TDYat Ft. Leavenworth), then return to Ft.Knox to PCS to their follow-on assign-ments. Major changes to the FY98course include increased brigade instruc-tion, decreased planning time — increasedamount of time for execution, refinedSASO training, increased hours for bat-tle-focused training, added brigade/bat-talion battle captain class, an R&S plan-ning class, and additional hands-onmaintenance instruction. In FY99 as partof CPT PME Phase III, the course willbe reduced to 18 weeks. The regimentalso offers an AOAC R/C course (2Wks, 4 Offerings in FY98) which fo-cuses exclusively at the company level.

    The regiment is at the forefront of insti-tutional training with several other initia-tives in support of the Army and TRA-DOC’s CLXXI and distance learningplan. The Military Decision-Making Tu-torial (MDMP TUTOR), being testedwith the Iowa National guard, uses theInternet and other computer- and instruc-tor-assisted technologies to teach stu-dents in remote locations.

    Classroom XXI - Starting in FY98, thesecond floor of Skidgel Hall will be re-modeled into 14 small-group rooms, fourlevel-III (hybrid) command posts toemulate FBCB2 and ATCCS, and a cen-tral room for recon/rehearsal visualiza-tion of the battlefield. All systems willbe laptop-based and will also be able totie into Janus/BBS and SIMNET/CCTTfor exercises. Ultimately, students willalso be able to link in with other TRA-DOC advanced courses, and graduateswill be able to access a complete suite ofdoctrinal and instructional material fromanywhere in the world.

    The Cavalry Leaders Course (3 Wks,4 Offerings in FY98) prepares Ad-vanced Course graduates for assignmentto cavalry units as troop commandersand squadron operations officers. In-struction includes tactical employment ofcavalry troops and squadrons in econ-omy of force, reconnaissance and secu-rity missions, planning and directingthese operations, and the integration andsynchronization of combat power andcombat service support. Current initia-tives in CLC include the formation ofMobile Training Teams (MTTs) thatteach at unit home stations.

    The Senior Officer Logistics Manage-ment Course (1 Wk, 10 Offerings inFY98) is a survey course on currentpolicies, procedures, methods, and con-cepts used to achieve an effective unit-level logistics management program. Itis focused on senior-level field grade of-ficers. Current initiatives include the for-mation of MTTs. Certain classes can betailored to the specific needs of the post.

    The Battalion Maintenance OfficerCourse (4 Wks, 2 days, 6 Offerings inFY98) prepares company grade and war-rant officers for assignments that are di-rectly related to maintenance responsi-bilities at the unit level, with emphasison management and supervision of bat-talion maintenance operations. Instruc-tion includes organizational maintenanceforms and records, administrative controlof licensing and dispatch, use and con-trol of tools and test equipment, repairparts (to include PLL), material readi-ness, and familiarization with vehiclesystems and power generating equip-ment.

    Current initiatives include the creationof a Multi-media Distance Learning(MMDL) CD-ROM version of thecourse. Version One of the CD-ROMwill be sent to the field by the 2nd quar-ter FY98. The course will be phased out

    of resident instruction at Ft. Knox duringFY98.

    The Armor Pre-Command Course (1Wk, 3.5 days, 5 Offerings in FY98) isdesigned for officers selected to com-mand armor battalions and brigades orarmored cavalry squadrons, or regi-ments. Armor officers selected for garri-son commands and those selected for ac-quisition commands also attend thecourse. Instruction includes tactics,CS/CSS planning and operations, train-ing management, tank weapons, mainte-nance communications, and fratricideavoidance. Students visit the NTC to ob-serve tactical operations and participatein the Leadership Training Program(LTP). They also participate in VTCswith JRTC and CMTC, and in sharedtraining with an AOAC in session. Fu-ture initiatives include the formation ofclass elective tracks for those LTCs andCOLs identified for garrison/BSB com-mands and in acqusition.

    WARTHOGObserver/Controller Team

    The Virtual Training Program (VTP)trains active and reserve component ar-mor, mechanized, and cavalry units fromplatoon through brigade level using vir-tual reality and constructive simulations.The three key components of the VTPare the Mounted Warfare SimulationsTraining Center (MWSTC), the Ob-server Controller (OC) Team and Train-ing Support Packages. This very suc-cessful program has grown significantlyin the last several years for both activeand reserve component units.

    The MWSTC is the site of the VTP andhouses the (SIMNET), comprised of 41M1 tank simulators, 10 Bradley FightingVehicle simulators, and 10 desktop re-configureable simulators (which can beused as either HMMWVs or M113s).Thirteen Observer Controller Worksta-tions (OCWS) allow training to be ob-served, controlled, and recorded. The ex-ercise can be played back for AARs. Thecurrent mix of simulators and worksta-tions enables simultaneous training of 12platoons, four companies, one armor taskforce or one brigade in CFX mode. TheMWSTC also includes two Janus suitesand one BBS suite with a STOW – AHub.

    The Task Force Observer/ControllerTeam, made up of quality officer andNCO observer/controllers and civilianexercise controllers (E/Cs), is designedto provide Combat Training Center(CTC)-quality AARs. The O/Cs have ex-

    14 ARMOR — November-December 1997

  • tensive field experience at their level, and many are experienced CTC OICs. The ElCs manipulate the computer hardware and software to induce battlefield effects and control the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) to meet the commander's training objectives.

    The Senior Observer Controller Team (SOCT) assists the active and reserve force in improving their brigade-level operations competencies with compressed, task-based, structured training (battalion and brigade). The SOCT are civilian contractors, retired senior officers, and NCOs with combat and CTC experience at the battalion and brigade level. The SOCT also mentors Armor Officer Advanced Course students in brigade tactics, techniques, and procedures, providing a level of experience not available anywhere else in the Armor School.

    The training support packages that support the VTP enable the training unit to focus on execution with limited planning and preparation. The structured tactical exercises include scenarios, operations orders, and operational graphics that cause specific tasks to be trained and observed to meet the unit commander's training objectives. Current scenarios include movement to contact, deliberate attack, and defense in sector, all on the National Training Center database.

    Scheduling is through the Ft. Knox G31 DPTM. A unit normally receives advance materials in a training support package six months before its VTP rotation, enabling it to conduct troop-leading procedures prior to its arrival at Fort Knox.

    Conclusion

    The 16th Cavalry Regiment is committed to providing highly trained leaders for the mounted force. If you have an officer or NCO who would be able to make a significant contribution to the mounted force as either an AOB or AOAC instructor, an OIC in our VIrtual Training Program, or an instructor in one of our other courses, please contact ArmorBranch.

    We, like the rest of the field, continue to find ways to operate more efficiently; what we have not done is sacrifice the quality or rigor of the training we provide. We will continue to provide the mounted force the best possible armor and cavalry leaders. To that end, we remain responsive to the needs of the mounted force in the field. If you have comments, suggestions, or questions please direct them to our web site at www.knox.army.millschoolll6cav.

    DIRECTORATE OF FORCE DEVELOPMENT

    Development Mission:

    Getting The Best "Stuff"

    For Mounted Force Soldiers

    MISSION: The Directorate of Force Development, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, conducts combat and force development functions for the Armor Force that provide soldiers and commanders the equipment and organizations to decisively win on the 21st century battlefield.

    SYSTEMS DIVISION. The Systems Division is responsible for the development and management of programs that result in the fielding of new items of equipment for the mounted force. The division chief is LTC Groller.

    Suite of Survivability Enhancement Systems. SSES is an integrated combination of detection, hit, and penetration avoidance measures to enhance the survivability of ground combat vehicles. The technologies that contribute to SSES are signature management, sensors, countermeasures, and armor. Two approaches for the application of SSES exist: an incremental and a total suite application. An Integrated Concept Team (lC~) was established to develop a CRD. Current efforts evolve around the TRA

    DOC Survivability ICT and staffing of the draft CRD for SSES. The TRADOC Survivability ICT is focused on establishing a total force survivability requirements list. POC is CPT Taylor.

    Future Scout and Cavalry System Team. FSCS is the replacement combat vehicle for the MI114 HMMWV in armored and mechanized infantry battalion scout platoons and the M3A2I3 CFV in division and regimental cavalry squadrons. FSCS is targeted for fielding in 2006. It includes a sophisticated sensor system, survivability technology, a selfdefense gun, and a three-man crew. POCs are MAl Begeman, CPT Pulford, and Mr. Bair.

    Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System. LRAS3 is a sensor system that will replace the current UAS1l on the HMMWV s in armored and mechanized infantry battalion scout platoons and will be a part of the FSCS. LRAS3 is targeted for fielding in 1998. It includes, 2nd-generation FUR, high definition TV, eye-safe laser rangefmder, far target location capable, chemical de-

    AftDECTARDEC LNO .•••, LNO

    CECOM LNO

    NVL LNO =Support/Liaison

    ARMOR - November-December 1997 15

    www.knox.army.millschoolll6cav

  • T /. ,IDSN 464-5050

    tection filters, integrated GPS, and it will be mounted/man-portable. POCs are CPT Jones, SFC Wagner, and SFC West.

    M1114 Up-annored HMMWY. The Ml1l4 Up-armored HMMWV will replace the M10251M1026 HMMWVs currently used by armored and mechanized infantry battalion scout platoons. A conditional release was granted to TF Joint Endeavor, but full fielding authority is still pending. The Mlll4 includes 7.62mm ballistic protection, 155mm overhead protection, 12 pound HE mine protection (front) and 4 pound (rear), 190-hp turbocharged engine, central tire inflation system, strengthened frame, lift points, drive train, and air conditioning. POCs are CPT Jones, SFC Wagner, and SFC West.

    M3A2/3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (all variants). The M30DS/A3 models of t.he Bradley Fighting Vehicle are the fourth and fifth generation of the Bradley CFVs. First Unit Equipped (FUE) is 3ID in FYOO. The M30DS/A3 includes a driver's vision enhancer (DYE), GPS with digital compass (far target locationcapable), eye-safe laser rangefmder, Battlefield Combat ID System (BCIS), missile countermeasure device (MCD), digital comms, core electronic architecture, ballistic fire control, commander's independent viewer (CIY), and Improved Bradley Acquisition System (IBAS), both with second-generation FUR. POCs are SFC West and SFC Wagner.

    Command and Control Vehicle. The C2V is a Bradley Fighting Vehicle-derived chassis, providing inherent mobility with the fighting force, as well as significantly improved survivability compared to the M5771M1068 command post vehicles that it will replace. The vehicle is equipped with a 43-kw primary power unit, a 40,OOO-BTU heating and cooling environmental control unit, and an NBC overpressure system. A 10 meter telescoping mast antenna enables the crew to quickly increase its communications systems, line-of-sight while at the halt. The mission module accommodates four work stations, electrical and LAN connectivity for key automation and communications systems, and seating for two additional personnel. The C2V has a unique inter/intra communications capability which allows staff officers to communicate digitally or by voice from one work station to another within the same vehicle, or between vehicles via a wireless local area network, as long as vehicle separation distance does not exceed 500 meters. POC is Mr. Spencer.

    Soldier Systems Team. The Soldier Systems Team is responsible for issues

    Commerical (502) 624-XXXX

    Userid @Flknoxdfd-emh 1 3.army.mil

    FAX (Unclass) DSN 464-7126

    MILITARY CIVILIAN

    Name Phone E·Maii Name Phone E-Mail COL John Kalb 4-5050 Kalb@ LTC Bob Groller 4-8994 Grollerr@ LTC Pete Rose 4-2517 Rosep@ MAJ Paul Begeman 4-8802 Begeman@ MAJ John Bronaugh 4-1491 Bronaugj@ CPT Michel Jones 4-4679 Jonesm@ CPT John Keith 4-8346 Keithj@ CPT Tom Meyer 4-7563 Meyert@ CPT Scott Pulford 4-3962 Pulfords@ CPT Joe Taylor 4-2453 Taylo~@ SGM Dale Walker 4-4457 Walkerd@ SFC Amold 4-7021 Amoldr@ SFC Sumpter 4-1697 Sumptera@ SFC Wagner 4-8836 Wagnerc@ SFC West 4-7801 Westr@ SSG Ainsworth 4-4794 Ainsworr@

    dealing with the individual equipment used by crew members of mounted combat systems. The team chief is Mr. Larry Hasty. Current programs being addressed by the team are:

    • Advanced Protective Eyewear System. This system consists of goggles that are compatible with all military headgear and provide ballistic, sun, wind, and dust protection to the wearer. The system will also provide the capability for optical inserts. POC is SFC Sumpter.

    • Mounted Warrior. MW is an integrated ensemble composed of modular subsystems that will improve the combat vehicle crewman's lethality, survivability, sustainability, and C4IS (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and sensors). The MW system will significantly enhance the crewman's ability to leverage host platform capabilities while mounted or dismounted. MW will also provide improved biological and chemical protection and the ability to remotely monitor host platform NBC sensors.

    MW clothing and individual equipment will consist of protective boots, a coverall with quick MEDEVAC capability, cold weather coverall liners, individual armor protection, small arms holster, a tailorable load-carrying capability, directed energy eye protection, wet weather protection, cold weather head and face protection, and safety/cold weather gloves. MW will also provide the crewman the ability to leverage host platform communications and computer capabilities. Modular MW components will provide for the wireless use of platform radio and intercom systems while the crewman is dismounted. POC is SSG Ainsworth.

    Jim Montgomery 4-7287 Montgomj@ Charlie Shepard 4-4526 Shepardc@ Dale Stewart 4-1060 Stewartd@ AI Winknehofer 4-8064 Winkenha@ Norm Bair 4-8685 Baim@ Martin Bosemer 4-2045 Bosemerm@ John Butler 4-4951 Butlerj@ Terry Dewitt 4-8132 Dewim@ Bill Dibble 4-1587 Dibblew@ Larry Hasty 4-3662 Hastyl@ Chris Mayer 4-6714 Mayerc@ Greg Skaff 4-1347 Skaffg@ Steve Spencer 4-1323 Spencers@ Wanda Teegarden 4-8063 Teegardw@ Larry Vowels 4-6347 Vowelsl@

    • M25 Stabilized Binoculars. 14x binoculars with a stabilized optical feature for better target identification and battle damage assessment while on the move. POC is SSG Ainsworth.

    SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DMSION. The Science, Technology and Programs Division provides centralized management, DA-wide coordination, identification, prioritization, and integration of armor force requirements, and management for technology base programs supporting materiel systems. The division chief is Mr. Winkenhofer.

    Science and Technology Team. The S&T branch provides synchronization between the ArmorlMounted Force Future Operational Capabilities and the basic and applied research and advanced technology development. The S&T branch also creates Armor's input into the Army S&T master plan and the DOD tech area plan. They review and support science and technology objectives and individual work packages in basic research. The Concept Experimentation Program (CEP) is a vehicle for experimenting with new technology and ideas within the mounted force. The Advanced Technology Demonstration (AID) is the Army's process for demonstrating the military feasibility of mature technology. The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACID) is a joint-service effort to demonstrate the operational capabilities of mature technology in user-dominated environments. POCs are Mr. Martin Bosemer and SFC Arnold.

    Future Combat System. The FCS is a revolutionary, "leap-ahead" system to form the centerpiece of the Army's ground combat force beginning in FY

    ARMOR - November-December 1997 16

  • 2015. It will be a highly mobile, deployable, lethal, and survivable platfonn, incorporating advanced technology components to enable a significant increase in combat effectiveness. POC is Mr. Butler.

    Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. FBCB2 is the consolidation of C2 requirements for brigade and below systems to provide battle command infonnation on the move, and in real time or near-real time to tactical combat, combat support, and combat service support leaders and soldiers. FBCB2 is the key component of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS); it also searnlessly interfaces with the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) at the battalion level. POC is MAl Bronaugh.

    Research Development, Engineering Command's (RDEC) Liaison Officers (LNOs). Four major Army Materiel Command subordinate elements have assigned LNOs working with both this directorate and the Mounted Warfighting Battle Laboratory. Mr. Paul Barns is

    TARDEC and AMC HQ LNO, DSN 47193, [email protected]. Mr. Johnny Wright is the on-site ARDEC LNO, DSN 4-2239, and Mr. Jim Garrett is the ARDEC contract LNO, DSN 44152, [email protected]. Mr. Dick Ardisson is the contract CECOM LNO, DSN 4-7152, ardissor@ftknox-mbbl-lan. army.mil. Mr. Dave Moody is the NVL LNO, DSN 4-2068, [email protected].

    ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION. Organizations Division is responsible for concepts, analysis, structure and force design. The division chief is Mr. Charles Shepard.

    Division Redesign. A TRADOC study to redesign the heavy division. POCs are LTC Rose and Mr. Mayer.

    ACR Redesign Strategy. A design and analysis effort to modernize and/or redesign the ACR. POCs are Mr. Vowels and Mr. Mayer.

    Armor Functional Area Assessment. Identifies sig