The Paradox of Prime Matter

D A N I E L W. G R A H A M

TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF Aristotle hold that he posited the exis- tence o f pr ime m a t t e r - - a purely inde te rmina te subs t ra tum under ly ing all ma- terial composi t ion and prov id ing the ul t imate potentiality for all material existence. A n u m b e r o f revis ionary in terpreta t ions have appea red in the last thir ty years which deny that Aristotle had a concept o f p r ime matter , pro- voking an even la rger n u m b e r o f vigorous defenses claiming that he did have the concep t? T h e traditionalists are clearly in the majority, but some obstacles s tand in the way o f a general acceptance of p r ime mat te r as an Aristotelian concept . In a recent contr ibut ion to the debate, William Charl- ton, an o p p o n e n t o f p r ime mat ter , has pointed out that the oppos ing parties have reached a s ta lemate in large measure because most o f the relevant texts are ambiguous ; consequently, "the question whe ther or not [Aristotle] be- lieved in p r ime mat t e r really comes down to the question how far, if at all, it is d e m a n d e d by his ph i losophy as a whole. "~

I t seems to me that Char l ton is r ight to shift the focus o f the debate f rom questions o f textual exegesis to questions of systematic relevance. However , within the context o f Aristotle 's general theory o f change, the challenge implicit in his s ta tement can be met , for the concept o f p r ime mat te r and its associated doctr ine is the p roduc t o f a series of ontological and scientific

i Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter," Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (a 958): 243-52 and A. R. Lacey, "The Eleatics and Aristotle on Some Problems of Change," ibid. 26 (1965): 451-68; reply to H. R. King's argument against prime matter, "Aristotle Without Prime Matter," ibid. 17 (1956): 37o-89; H. M. Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle," Phronesis 19 (1974): 168-88 and C. J. F. Williams, Aristotle De Generatione et Corrpuptione, Oxford (1982), Appendix reply to an appendix rejecting prime matter in W. Charlton's Aristotle's Physics Books I - H (Oxford, 197o ). See also Alan Code, "The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter," Philosophical Studies 29 0976): 357-67, who defends the traditional interpretation of matter against Barring- ton Jones, "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter," Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 474-5 ~ See also Russell M. Dancy, "Aristotle's Second Thoughts on Substance," Philosophical Review 87 (1978): 372-413 �9

William Charlton, "Prime Matter: A Rejoinder," Phronesis 28 (1983): a97-2a a, 197.

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commitments made by Aristotle. At the same time, opponents of prime matter have a legitimate basis for criticizing the tradition, for there is some- thing fundamentally wrong with the doctrine. Given Aristotle's assumptions and commitments, the doctrine of prime matter is not only dialectically inevitable but also systematically incoherent. In this paper I shall not defend the existence of a doctrine of prime matter in Aristotle's philosophy, al- though my argument will provide an incidental justification for it by exhibit- ing its function within Aristotle's system. My aim here is to explain what is wrong with the doctrine of prime matter. (1) I shall examine a problem concerning prime matter--a problem of which Aristotle was aware and which he thought he had solved. (2) I shall argue that he did not solve the problem, for the doctrine of prime matter entails a paradox for his system. (3) I shall reply to some objections, and (4) I shall offer a tentative diagnosis of how Aristotle could have come to embrace a paradoxical position.

1 .

According to Aristotle's theory of change, there is a substratum which un- derlies every change (Ph. 1. 7.19oa33ff). When a thing changes its features, we call that accidental change and identify the substratum as substance. When a thing comes into being or ceases to be, we call that substantial change 3 and identify the substratum as matter. 4 The most simple bodies of the Aristotelian cosmos are the four traditional "elements": earth, air, fire, and water. 5 The elements are characterized by the contrary powers hot, cold, wet, and dry. Each element has one member of the contrary pair hot-cold, and one of the contrary pair wet-dry (Gen. Corr. 2.2-3). For Aristotle, it is a fact that the elements are transformed into one another; for instance, water evaporates to become air. Aristotle understands this change to be a kind of substantial change. Accordingly, there must be a corresponding substratum for the several contraries and this is prime matter.

In his treatise on substantial change, On Generation and Corruption, Aristo-

3 Aristotle uses the terms qualified and unqualified coming-to-be for accidental and sub- stantial change. His terms are based on a syntactic criterion: do we say 'x comes to be F' (qualified) or 'x comes to be' simpliciter (unqualified) in describing the change? See Ph. 1. 7. t9oa31-33, Gen. Corr. 3, 317a32ft., 319 al 1-14.

4 Gen. Corr. a. 4, 32oa~-5: the substratum of substantial change is matter in the pr imary sense, though any substra tum of change (i.e., including substance) can be called matter.

5 Aristotle is unhappy with the traditional name 'element ' (stoicheion) for earth, air, fire and water, and of ten refers to them as "the so-called elements" (Gen. Corr. 1 . 6 . 3 ~ b l f ; ~.a.3~8b3 a, 3~9aa6). He prefers to call them 'perceptible bodies ' (aisth~ta sOmata) because they are them- selves complexes of mat ter and form and hence not e lementary (329a24ff). He sometimes calls the elements 'simple bodies ' (hapla sOmata), e.g., Cael. 1.1.268b~6-3o; here the epithet has reference to the elements ' simple movement ra ther than their composition (cf. Cad. 3.3.3o2b7f).

THE PARADOX OF PRIME MATTER 477

tle notes two problems for an account o f substantial change: (1) if the sub- s tratum out o f which a substance comes to be is not itself a substance, accidents will inhere in non-substance; (2) if the substratum is nothing at all, something has come to be out o f nothing. 6 Problem (1) is a general problem for any substantial change and is easily solved; I shall ignore it. Problem (2) does not arise for the change o f substances (call them complex substances) above the level o f the elements. For in a given case of substantial change of a complex thing, ano the r thing can be identified as its substratum. A bronze statue comes to be out o f bronze. Bronze is less thing-like than a bronze statue, but it is nevertheless thing-like, so that in this case we find a substra- tum for change.

But in the t ransformat ion o f elements (hencefor th "elemental change") problem (2) is not resolved, for no substratum is verifiable (cf. Gen. Corr.

1.4). T h e contrar ies that, by being present in pr ime matter, constitute the elements, are ex hypothesi basic and the mat ter they reside in is irreducible. (Why Aristotle analyzes the elements in this way I shall explain later.) For every fea ture F, pr ime mat ter is not-F. But because it is devoid of all charac- teristics o f its own, pr ime mat ter is indistinguishable f rom pure indetermi- nacy. Aristotle identifies pu re indeterminacy with the concept of nothing- ness o f the Presocratic (specifically: Eleatic) tradit ion (Gen. Corr. 1.3.317b28- 31). T h e r e is evidence that indeterminacy is just what Parmenides had in mind as the parad igm case of nothingness, 7 and Aristotle seems to accept the paradigm. He also shares with the Eleatics an abhor rence of ex nihilo cre- ation. How then can Aristotle escape the charge that his elements are created out o f nothing? For it appears that the something which Aristotle posits as under ly ing elemental change is really no thing at all. I shall call this difficulty the pa radox o f pr ime matter, s

In a prel iminary discussion in the GC, Aristotle advances a distinction that provides a tentative solution to the problem: "Perhaps the solution is that their mat te r is in one sense the same but in ano ther sense different . For that which underl ies them, whatever its nature may be qua under lying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same" (1.3.319b~- 4, Oxford tr.). 9 Aristotle confirms the solution later in the treatise: "Our own doctr ine is that a l though there is a mat te r o f the perceptible bodies (a mat ter out of which the so-called 'elements ' come-to-be) it has no separate existence, but is always

6 Gen. Corr. 1. 3. 317b5-13, b2o-33. 7 See A. P. D. Mourelatos, "Determinacy and Indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the

Fragments of Parmenides," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. vol. 2 (1976): 45-59. 8 This preliminary characterization of the problem will be replaced by a more precise one. 9 Translations are my own except as noted.

478 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:4 O C T x987 bound up with a contrariety" (2.1.3~9a24-96, Oxford tr.). In other words, prime matter escapes the charge of being nothing by its status as part of a compound of form and matter. Some form always attaches to it in fact, and hence no pure nothingness is involved in elemental change. Some feature imparts determinacy to the underlying matter. Nothing comes to be out of pure indeterminacy, for there is always some preexisting determinant, even in the case of elemental change, namely the forms of hot or cold, wet or dry.

Aristotle's solution to the problem of prime matter is to point out that it is never found actually separate from the powers that make up the elements. In effect, he is willing to concede that prime matter per se is nothing, but he is not willing to concede that prime matter is ever found by itself. To bolster his position he refers ~~ to his discussions of matter elsewhere, alluding to his exposition of the concept in Physics 1.6- 9. But that passage does not support his point. Rather, a study of his doctrine there reveals the impossibility of his solution to the paradox of prime matter.

2 .

In Physics 1 Aristotle is faced with a challenge to a philosophical study of nature. The Eleatics have raised the problem that the notion of change is incoherent, for how can what-is come to be from what-is-not? The Eleatic formulation suggests that change involves something coming to be from nothing, an implication that appears to be absurd.

Consider an analysis (call it A1) that will avoid the devastating implica- tions of the Eleatic challenge. We begin with an umproblematic case of change: Socrates becomes educated. Suppose also, for purposes of compari- son, Socrates is pale. We might describe two successive states of affairs, S~ and S~ which obtain at times t~ and t~, respectively.

AI: S~ S~ uneducated educated pale pale Socrates Socrates

We notice that one element changes in the description and two remain the same. The first item in the list has a negative, or more precisely, privative description in S~ and a positive description in S,. What items are relevant to explaining the change? The ordinary-language report of the change sug- gests the answer. We say, "Socrates, who was uneducated, has now become educated" or "the uneducated man became educated." Paleness does not

1o 317bt3s

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enter into such a report , and we may fairly conclude that it is irrelevant to accounting for the change. As to what does enter into the report, we note that there are two adjectives, one privative and the other a corresponding positive adjective, and a noun. This survey suggests that in the case before us the change consists in a change of features in a thing which remains the same. Call the privative adjective a description of a privation, and call the thing a substratum.

What is interesting in the foregoing anlaysis relative to the Eleatic chal- lenge is that it provides the basis for an answer to that challenge. The change in question is a case of what-is (what is educated) coming to be out of what-is-not (what is uneducated , i.e., not educated). But what we have is a counterexample to the implicit inference f rom (a) 'What-is comes to be from what-is-not' to (b) 'Something comes to be from nothing'. For in this case what-is has not come to be out of nothing but out of something else, namely a certain man. There was a something present all the time, something un- derlying the change, namely the substratum. Now we are in a position to see that the Eleatic challenge involves a fallacy: to make the move from (a) to (b) in the present case is to confuse privation and substratum. For in (a) 'what-is- not' refers to the privation, whereas in (b) 'nothing', which is taken as syn- onymous with 'what-is-not' refers to the substratum.

My analysis A1 embodies a hypothesis concerning the interpretation of Aristotle's analysis o f change in Physics 1.7. Privation is to be understood as what is referred to by a privative adjective in a report of a change and substratum as what is referred to by the subject of the sentence. The analysis is motivated by the Eleatic challenge as Aristotle understands it and is successful in replying to it (see Ph. 1.8). However, it is not enough for Aristotle to reveal the fallacious- ness of the Eleatic challenge in general. He must show that the challenge is not valid for the description of any type of change. So far we have considered only an example of accidental change. What of substantial change? Here is a case in which it is not clear whether there is a substratum and hence whether the same move can be made to defend against the Eleatic objector.

Consider another analysis o f change, A~. A lump of bronze is taken and cast into the shape of a man. The bronze is used as a statue. A state descrip- tion of the change might be as follows:

A2: S~ S~ un fo rmed formed brown brown bronze bronze

By applying a method similar to that of A 1 we may determine that we have a privation, unformed , a corresponding positive feature, formed, and a substra-

480 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:4 O C T 1987 rum, bronze. T h e fea tu re b ronze is i r re levant to the change. What is int r iguing about A2 is that it may be t hough t o f as a model for instances o f substantial change. T h e coming to be o f a na tura l substance, says Socrates, may be under - stood to be similar to the imposi t ion of shape on a previously unshaped stuff. W h e t h e r we have in mind the mold ing into h u m a n f o r m of an imate ectoplasm or the communica t ion to a seed-mater ia l o f the b rea th of life, we are able to give some account o f h u m a n creat ion in te rms of the bronze statue analogy. I f the analogy gives a reliable p a r a d i g m for the creat ion of living things, the Eleatic challenge is met for cases o f substantial change.

I take A~ to r ep re sen t the extension o f Aristotle's analysis o f change to substantial change in Physics 1. 7 . T h e subs t ra tum of substantial change is called matter by analogy to the c raf t sman 's material and the positive fea ture form by analogy to the shape the c ra f t sman imposes. Having general ized the concepts privation, form, and subs t ra tum to apply to all instances o f change, Aristotle r egards t hem as necessary conceptual componen t s o f any t rue analysis o f change. He achieves not merely a negative expos6 o f a logical fallacy but a positive theory o f change. An essential c o m p o n e n t of that theory is a theory o f mat ter .

F rom Aristotle 's analysis and examples we may infer several principal theses o f his theory o f mat ter . 1' (a) Mat ter is someth ing determinate . In the case o f both the uneduca ted m a n and the u n f o r m e d bronze, there is a de te rmina te e lement to which the pr ivat ion attaches. T h e r e is a dialectical reason for assert ing this proposi t ion: without it, Aristotle cannot answer the Eleatic challenge. T h e chal lenge can be directed to substantial change as well as accidental change, and Aristotle must be able to appeal to a subs t ra tum that is a real be ing for substantial as well as for accidental change. Accord- ingly, ma t t e r mus t be something. But if it were not someth ing in part icular, the Eleatic could object that Aristotle's postulat ion of mat te r was ad hoc and his claim that there is a subs t ra tum for every change was quest ion-begging. '~ Aristotle seems to conf i rm the view that mat te r is in some way de te rmina te when he says that ma t t e r "is a l m o s t - - i n d e e d in a sense it i s - -substance [or real being: ousia]" (192a6). One of the characteristics o f substance is thisness,

" It has been suggested to me that the Ph. a analysis is merely an analysis of predication and not of physical change. I see no basis in the text for invoking this distinction, Indeed Aristotle here as in other places seems to take for granted that language (when properly understood) directly mirrors reality.

'~ At this point the traditionalist wishes to say: what is important about matter is not its actual nature but its potentiality. Yet Aristotle in Ph. a clearly presupposes that the Eleatic challenge can be met without appeal to the potentiality-actuality distinction, which provides an alternative solution (191b27-29). Accordingly I wish to examine how matter provides the basis for a solution independently of any other scheme, I shall deal with potentiality below,

THE PARADOX OF PRIME MATTER 481

o r de t e rminacy , which Aris tot le ascribes to ma t t e r in Physics x. 'a O f course ma t t e r is relatively i n d e t e r m i n a t e - - r e l a t i v e , tha t is, to the c o m p o u n d or the f o r m - - b u t tha t does no t m e a n tha t it is comple te ly i nde t e rmina t e o r no th- ing in the Eleatic sense. Mat te r can be no par t icu lar th ing, i.e., no complex substance, w i thou t be ing n o t h i n g at all.

(2) Cer t a in fea tu res o f the m a t t e r o f case A2 have exp lana to ry value. We can accoun t fo r the c h a n g e in shape o f the b ronze in terms o f the p roper t i e s o f b r o n z e - - i t s ductil i ty, malleabili ty, me l t ing point , etc. T o say that cer ta in fea- tures o f m a t t e r have e x p l a n a t o r y value is no t to say that all fea tures do. I n d e e d , typically the re will be m a n y fea tures o f ma t t e r which are i r re levant to explain- ing a g iven change . I n the case o f the b r o n z e statue, the b r o w n color o f the b r o n z e is i r re levant , as is the pale c o m p l e x i o n o f the m a n who changes f r o m u n e d u c a t e d to educa t ed . Moreove r , even the c o n t o u r s o f the l u m p o f b r o n z e be fo re it was cast are i r re levan t to exp la in ing its c h a n g e o f shape. All tha t is r e levan t is the fact t ha t the or ig ina l shape was not tha t o f a statue.

(3) I t is in v i r tue o f tha t subset o f p roper t i e s tha t have exp lana to ry value that s o m e s tu f f is the m a t t e r relative to change . It is because bronze has a cer ta in me l t ing po in t tha t it has a s sumed the shape o f a m a n and can be used as a statue. I n genera l , ma t t e r is a d e t e r m i n a t e k ind o f s tuf f tha t is ap t fo r d e t e r m i n a t e k inds o f change . Aris tot le def ines mat te r as wha t persists in a change . Bu t m a t t e r is no t jus t any character is t ic that persists, fo r m a n y incidenta l character is t ics may e n d u r e t h r o u g h a change , fo r examp le the b r o w n color o f b r o n z e which becomes a statue. Aristot le adds the rest ict ion mY kata symbeb~kos: "I def ine ma t t e r as the first subs t r a tum o f each th ing f r o m which, by its pers is t ing as an essential i ng red ien t o f the c h a n g e (enhyparchon- tos mY kata symbeb~kos), s o m e t h i n g comes to be" (191b31-3~) . T h e ma t t e r relative to a c h a n g e m u s t be the p r o p e r subject o f the fea tures which c h a n g e so that its o w n p rope r t i e s expla in its aptness fo r change .

C o n s i d e r now a state desc r ip t ion o f a case o f e lementa l change . Suppose that some wate r evapora t e s and is t r a n s f e r r e d into air:

~s 7.19ob24_26" Contrary to his usual practice (see note 4 above), Aristotle conflates sub- stantial individuals and stuffs (man and gold) in the passage. In fact, Aristotle consistently uses hyl~ to in Ph. I refer to sustratum in general (see D. Graham, "Aristotle's Discovery of Matter," Archiv fi~r Geschichte der Philosophie 66 [a 984]: 37-5 l, 49). One might object that his confusion here nullifies the claim that matter is significantly like ousia. However, the point of the argu- ment is that matter, whether substance or stuff, is the source of determinacy in contrast to the privation. Furthermore, it is not clear that when Aristotle says that matter is countable (arithm~t~, 19ob25) he means that instances of matter can be counted--which is clearly false for stuffs unless they are already individuated by some prior form. He may simply be saying that we can count matter as a principle distinct from privation. Thus there is no obviously fallacious reason- ing behind his identifying matter as substance-like.

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A3: S~ S~ cold warm moist moist prime matter prime matter

Cold has been exchanged for warm, or, under another description, not- warm has been exchanged for warm. Aristotle notes that a l though both air and water are translucent, the translucence itself cannot be the subject of a change f rom air to water: if it were the change would reduce to alteration (Gen. Corr. 1.4.319b21-24). This observation supports our analysis of the bronze case and tells us what the subject is not. But we still wish to know what it is. Do the principles of change enumera ted above suggest a positive account of the subject, prime matter? I f (1) holds, prime matter must be a real something. But Aristotle has given us no grounds to think that it is. He attributes no properties to prime matter apart f rom the simple powers. As far as we know, prime matter per se is completely characterless, and hence it has no principle of determinacy in its own nature and cannot qualify as ousia. Since it has no characters of its own, prime matter cannot fulfill (2) by having a subset of features which explain elemental change. And since (1) and (2) are not fulfilled, prime matter cannot (3) be identified as the proper subject of the change by virtue of the features it has in its own nature.

Does Aristotle's solution resolve the problem of prime matter? We are now in a position to see that it cannot. According to Aristotle's solution, prime matter is something because it is always characterized by some pair of basic powers. But Aristotle's theory of change entails that the matter in question itself be something, and relative to a change of powers, the matter is pr ime matter itself devoid 0f the powers. In the state description above, one power remained the same, but this will not help to characterize prime matter since the persistence of moistness is no more relevant to explaining a change f rom coldness to hotness than paleness is to explaining education or brown- ness is to explaining the product ion of a statue. Aristotle is right to claim that prime matter is never found without the simple powers, but it is equally t rue - - and equally i r relevant-- that bronze is never found without some shape. The point is that the presence of some shape or other in the bronze cannot account for the kind of determinacy that bronze has qua bronze. We must explain the aptness of bronze to receive different shapes by investigat- ing those characteristics that constitute bronze. The shape itself will be inci- dental to bronze qua bronze- -an accident or supervenient characteristic. Bronze is a real something, and moreover a something that is apt to receive shapes, in virtue of characteristics that constitute bronze qua bronze, not due to supervenient characteristics that themselves need to be accounted for.

THE PARADOX OF PRIME M ATTER 4 8 3

Aristotle's solution is based on an error of analysis. He has cast supervenient characteristics in the role of constitutive characteristics.

But perhaps there is a defense for Aristotle in his doctrine of potentiality. Even though prime matter does not have any actual constitutive properties, it has the potentiality to be any of the elements. This potentiality is unique in prime matter and is sufficient to distinguish it from pure indeterminacy. To this I reply that having potentiality must be a consequence of having some actual constitutive properties. Because bronze has a certain melting point, it is able to be cast as a statue. The potentiality for being shaped depends upon some actual characteristics o f bronze. I f we unders tand potentiality in this way, it is a legitimate and illuminating concept. But if we do not require that potentiality be based on some actual property, we make the concept an ad hoc posit which can only serve to beg questions. This is Moli~re's caricature of potentiality: Why does this substance put one to sleep? Because it has a dormitive power.

The problem with taking potentiality to be an independent property can perhaps be brought out by the kind of a rgument W. D. Ross used to clarify problems of value theory. Imagine substances X and Y which are identical in all properties except that X has a potentiality to G and Y does not. Does it seem plausible that such a state of affairs should obtain? I think not. I f we should, e.g., find two samples of the same metal, one of which would con- duct electricity, one of which would not, we would immediately look for some cause of the difference-- impuri t ies , crystalline structure, etc. But we would treat the potentiality as a product of some actual chemical or physical differences. And in general we unders tand potentialities to be consequential properties, not independent features.

Aristotle himself recognizes the need to put restrictions on the ascription of potentiality to subjects: "We must decide when each thing exists poten- tially and when it does not, for it does not exist potentially at just any time. For instance, is earth potentially a man or not? Probably not until it has already become a seed, and perhaps not even then" (Met. 9.7. lo48637-8a3). The reason for saying that not everything is potentially a man is that not everything is in such a state or has such properties, that by a normal process of development it may grow into a man. The properties in question must be constitutive properties of the matter. Moreover, Aristotle's principle that actuality is prior to potentiality seems to entail that a thing's potentially being F depends upon its actually being G. But since prime matter per se is not actually anything, it follows that it cannot potentially be anything either.

There is another serious problem for prime matter that also arises f rom its lack of determinacy. One of the conditions for saying that there is a substratum for change is that we be able to identify the substratum. But by

484 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 5 : 4 O C T I 9 8 7

hypothesis we have no means o f ident ifying p r ime mat te r by itself. This p rob lem can be p u r s u e d f r o m ei ther the s tandpoint o f epis temology or the s tandpoint o f metaphysics. Aristotle recognizes an epistemological distinc- tion between qualified and unqualif ied coming to be in Gen. Corr. 1.4, where he notes that no cont inu ing subs t ra tum is perceived in cases of unqualif ied coming to be. But curiously, he is interested in the p h e n o m e n o n only as a cri terion o f what kind o f change we are dealing with. T h e epistemological p rob lem is this: how could we ever know that p r ime mat te r cont inued in a change? For in the first place, one cannot perceive a continuity of substra- tum for any substantial change; and in the second place p r ime mat te r has no perceivable characterist ics apa r t f r o m those of the elements it underlies. Hence it cannot be perceived by itself even before or af ter a change. T h e p rob lem is a difficult one, but the metaphysical version is even more press- ing: what would it even m e a n to say that a given piece of p r ime mat te r at t ime t, was identical to a piece of p r ime mat te r at t,? It would seem that there is no possible g r o u n d for establishing continuity, since by hypothesis p r ime ma t t e r does not have any characteristic o f its own. ~4 We could not then appea l to Leibniz's Law or to any o ther principle of identity to establish that the p r ime ma t t e r we s tar ted with was the same as that which we ended with. Thus , not only would p r ime mat t e r be epistemologically inaccessible, the whole not ion o f a characterless subs t ra tum that retains its identity is incoherent .

.

T h e most recent contr ibut ion to the p r ime mat te r debate is an article by Sheldon Cohen which, if it is correct , would not only de fend the existence of p r ime mat ter , bu t save the concept f r o m the charge o f incoherence. 1~ It will be convenient to reply to his s ta tement here, since he explicitly rejects cer- tain key points in the a r g u m e n t I am following and provides a thoughtfu l al ternative to views critical o f p r ime matter . Cohen ' s basic a r g u m e n t for p r ime mat t e r is that it is not devoid of characteristics and so it is not in any dange r of be ing nothing. His strategy is the r ight one: if there is any way to

~4 Panayot Butchvarov pointed out the metaphysical problem to me, See his Being Qua Being (Bloomington, 1979), 165-69 .

,5 "Aristotle's Doctrine of Material Substrate," Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 17x-94. Cohen considers three grounds for rejecting prime matter: (a) it is characterless, (b) it has no per se characteristics, and (c) it is not a distinct type of stuff even if it has per se characteristics (181). My position falls under (c) with the specific interpretation that prime matter has no essential or defining characteristics. I hold that Aristotle ascribes characteristics, including per se characteris- tics or Aristotelian Properties to prime matter; but because of (c), it is difficult to see how he can be justified in assigning any characteristics.

T H E P A R A D O X OF P R I M E M A T T E R 485

save prime matter from the charge of incoherence, it must be by showing how prime matter is a something.

Cohen recognizes that one common reason for construing prime matter as characterless is the assumption that it is the matter of all things. He rejects this interpretation of prime matter and hence removes one strong reason for believing that matter is characterless. Cohen is right in rejecting this inter- pretation of prime matter, for this is a view that derives from medieval and modern theories and not from Aristotle. Aristotle's notion of matter is hier- archical: there is a matter for the elements, which in turn serve as matter for chemical compounds, which provide the matter for homogeneous tissues, which in turn compose heterogeneous parts, of which biological substances are composed. There is no reservoir of purely potential matter that can immediately be transformed into some organized object.

On the other hand, as one descends down the chain of being in the direction of prime matter, there is a continual loss of determinacy and con- tent at each level. The behavior of complex substances is a function of their high-level attributes, which are, quite literally, emergent properties inhering only in high-level kinds of matter. For instance, life is a characteristic that can be realized only in a certain kind of body which possesses organs (De An. 2.1.412a27-b6 ). The real question is whether there is anything left when one reaches the ontological cellar. Cohen does address this question, and he offers some specific answers.

1. Contrasting the four elements with the fifth element, Cohen suggests that the four elements possess the potentiality for rectilinear motion (178).

2. Prime matter is essentially spatially extended. (179) 3. Prime matter is capable of motion and rest. (ibid.)

Attributes (l) and (3) are problematic because they are potentialities. But as I have argued, potentialities presuppose actual attributes of some kind. For Aristotle, a potentiality is a consequential attribute that follows from some actual attribute. What, then, are those actual attributes? We do not know. Contemporary philosophers of science account for dispositional pro- perties on the basis of underlying structural properties. For instance, salt has the dispositional property (potentiality) of being soluble in water; this pro- perty can be explained by the crystal structure of NaC1, the ionic bonding, the structure of H20, etc. Obviously Aristotle cannot take this line, because it undermines the claim that the four elements are the ultimate bodies of the (sublunar) universe. Whatever the attributes in question, they cannot be structural (i.e., formal) attributes.

But perhaps there are mysterious attributes that do account for the po-

486 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY o r PHILOSOPHY 25:4 OCT 198 7

tentialities f o u n d in p r ime mat ter . I think that this is unlikely to be the case. For to admi t this possibility would be to make a characteristically un-Aristo- telian move. I suggest that it is not an accident that Aristotle a t t empted to solve the p a r a d o x o f p r ime mat t e r in the way that he did. T h e reason for s topping the regress o f mat ters where he did was precisely to rule out any inaccessible and myster ious attributes. By claiming that p r ime mat te r is never found without some contrar ies he was a t t empt ing to keep myster ious at tr ibutes and substrata f r o m being built into his system. What is r emarkab le about Aristotel ian science is its accessibility to rational cognition. Al though with the advan tage o f hindsight we can find no end of unsolved problems and areas for f u r t h e r research in Aristotle's science, he himself tends to look at na tu re as an o p e n book that can be dec iphered with the aid o f the four causes and some basic rat ional principles. Despite Locke's derogat ions o f substance as a someth ing- I -know-not -what , Aristotle's substance is not un- knowable. O f course ma t t e r is the most problemat ic of Aristotle's concepts in this context, bu t even ma t t e r is knowable by analogy (Ph. 1. 7 .191a7-1~) and by vir tue o f pa r tak ing o f form. Aristotle would ra ther refuse to allow pr ime mat t e r to be scrutinized than to admi t the possibility o f unknowable attri- butes.

Wha t then o f (2)? Can the at t r ibute o f being ex tended save p r ime matter? Rober t Sokolowski has discussed this p rob lem at some length? 6 By examin- ing a series o f texts in the physical works he finds that p r ime mat te r is indeed ex tended . H e then asks the question whether extension is an essen- tial a t t r ibute of mat ter :

Does matter then acquire an essence, since it has something said of it in itself?. This is not the case for Aristotle; he does not consider extension as an attribute of matter. Extended matter is not matter plus extension; extension is not conceived as a predi- cate which is received by something prior to and more fundamental than itself, a sort of unextended matter. For Aristotle, matter is intrinsically spatial, but when we have said this much about it, we have not said anything about what it is. Spatiality or extension does not reveal the nature of underlying matter. It tells us nothing about it . . . . No material predicates could be applied if it were not extended, but extension itself is not a predicate in Aristotle's understanding of matter. (286)

Sokolowski is gene rous to p r ime mat t e r in de fend ing it against objections that extension is not intrinsic to it. But even so, he recognizes that extension is not the essence o f p r ime mat ter . In a sense, the at tr ibute of being ex- t ended has the same limitations as the at tr ibute of being potentially some-

,6 ,,Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 963-88, esp. 277ff.

T H E P A R A D O X O F P R I M E M A T T E R 487 thing: it seems to requi re some fu r the r specification as a g round . T o be potentially F seems to requi re that the subject be actually G, where G is some structural p r o p e r t y which migh t be apt to become F. Similarly, to be ex- t ended seems to p r e s u p p o s e having some at t r ibute G which itself can be dis t r ibuted t h r o u g h space. Thus , it makes sense to say that Newtonian mat- ter is essentially ex t ended because it has mass. I t makes sense to say o f the e lement h y d r o g e n that it is potentially water because it has a certain valence which in tu rn is the manifes ta t ion o f its atomic structure. But it does not make sense to say that p r ime ma t t e r is essentially ex tended or essentially the potency to be one o f the four e lements if we cannot ascribe to it some basic at t r ibute as a consequence of which it has those o ther attributes.

I f Aristotle had wanted to de fend p r ime mat te r by saying that it was essentially ex tended , he could have said so. In fact, what he does is to say that p r ime ma t t e r is neve r found by itself. Ins tead o f stressing the substanti- ality o f p r i m e mat ter , he emphasizes that it is insubstantial. It would be interest ing to deve lop an in te rpre ta t ion of p r ime mat te r a long the lines suggested by Cohen, which might well provide a coheren t and attractive account; bu t it would consti tute a revisionary proposal , not Aristotle's con- s idered response to the p r ob l em o f Gen. Corr. a.3. Aristotle goes so far as to indicate why p r ime ma t t e r could not have a character o f its own. He argues that if there were a single ( independent ) mat te r o f the elements, it would de t e rmine t hem all e i ther to be heavy or light (Cael. 4.5 .3x2b~o-a3) . But since some are heavy and some light, this cannot be. One of the candidates for i n d e p e n d e n t m a t t e r he names is megethos--extension. Thus it appears that the d ispara te charac te r o f the four e lements effectively rules out a c o m m o n na tu re for p r ime mat ter : for they have no physical attributes in c o m m o n and thus the ma t t e r cannot have any physical attributes. Were extension a physical a t t r ibute constitutive of matter , it would limit the poten- tiality for t r ans fo rma t ion o f the elements. 17

We get a g l impse o f the d i f fe rence between Aristotelian p r ime mat te r and essentially ex t ended mat t e r by compar ing Aristotle with Descartes. For Descartes, ma t t e r is essentially ex tended . Since mat te r has its own essence, it can exist i n d e p e n d e n t o f any higher-level substances. In fact, Descartes

,7 The most interesting kind of revisionary account would be one attributing not just extendedness but a certain quantity of extension to prime matter. This quantity could then form the basis of a law of conservation of matter. Note, however, how difficult the law would be for Aristotle to conceive; since two elements are heavy and two are light, and of each pair one is extremely heavy/light while the other is moderately heavy/light, the quantity in question have to be determined independently of weight. Thus Aristotle would have to come up with a concept of mass; yet the modern notion of mass as a measure of inertia would be extraordinarily difficult to handle in Aristotelian physics.

488 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 5 : 4 OCT 1987

speaks as if bodies were modifications o f an infinitely ex tended mat ter and thus dependen t s o f matter , whereas for Aristotle pr ime mat ter is unthink- able apar t f rom the elements. Descartes tends to reify extension '8 and to think o f it as an adequate g round for all physical properties, for which extension holds the promise o f a quantitative derivation. Aristotle, on the o ther hand, sees the basic powers exhibited by the elements as tactile charac- teristics, and hence as quali t ies-which cannot be explained quantitatively (Gen. Corr. ~.2). Thus Descartes differs f rom Aristotle in two fundamenta l ways: for Descartes the relation between body and mat ter is something like that between par t and whole while for Aristotle it is that between a compo- site substance and its substratum; and for Descartes the relation is deter- mined quantitatively while for Aristotle it is de te rmined qualitatively and categorially. By assigning mat te r an essence of its own, Descartes constitutes it as an i ndependen t type o f substance. By assigning it an essence f rom what Aristotle would call the category o f quantity, he grounds physics in quantita- tive determinat ions. And finally by avoiding strong vertical f o r m - m a t t e r distinctions in b o d y - - a n d also by ruling out phenomenal propert ies as non- physica l - -he saves himself f rom having to explain propert ies emerging f rom a characterless substratum.

O f course Descartes does not banish phenomena l or secondary quali t ies-- he simply assigns them to the realm of soul. This paves the way for a radical dualism of substance types. Because of the dualism we do not call Descartes a materialist. But for Aristotle his move is a materialistic move, and the resulting theory is much too materialistic to be satisfactory. From an Aristo- telian perspective, Cartesian mat ter seems to be given a life of its own apart f rom form, and the Aristotelian focus on middle-sized biological objects disappears into a mechanistic materialism on the one side, opposed by a detached idealism of soul on the other. In Descartes the tenuous unity o f Aristotelian natural ism dissolves into the philosophical extremes Aristotle opposed in the Presocratics and Plato.

4. Why did Aristotle treat pr ime mat ter as something indeterminate in itself?. Our previous discussion provides some grounds for an answer. In the first place, we have no knowledge o f any characteristics which accompany that

:s See Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume (Ithaca, 1981 ), 93, who claims that Descartes tends to identify material substance with extension rather than with the subject of extension. However, I think that ultimately the most plausible reading makes extension an essential pro- perty of an underlying subject; see Richard J. Blackwell, "Descartes' Concept of Matter," in E. McMullin, ed., The Concept of Matter in Modern Philosophy (Notre Dame, 1963), 6o-64. It is not surprising that Descartes should focus on the essence rather than the subject since the subject without the essence would be something like a bare particular.

T H E P A R A D O X O F P R I M E M A T T E R 489 matter o f e lemental change. Fur the rmore , if pr ime mat ter were supposed to have certain constitutive characteristics o f its own, there would be a danger that it might turn out to be an entity which existed independent ly o f the contrary powers. And if it d id exist independent ly , pr ime mat ter would prove to be a substance more basic than the elements, which contradicts Aristotle's intuit ion that the elements are basic. Moreover, pr ime mat ter would be myster ious- - i t would constitute a substance o f which we could have no acquaintance. These scientific and epistemological considerations provide a s t rong presumpt ion against reifying pr ime matter. But as we have seen, there is a more compell ing metaphysical presumpt ion against pr ime matter. For on the given in terpreta t ion pr ime matter would prove to be i ndependen t o f higher-level entities and in virtue o f its ultimacy would be a serious compet i tor for the title o f pr imary subs tance-- threa tening to col- lapse Aristotle's idealistic metaphysics into a materialism.

From ano the r point o f view the paradox o f pr ime mat ter may be seen to result f rom a tension in Aristotle's criteria o f reality. On the one hand reality is a funct ion o f de te rminacy and concreteness: to be is to be a 'this', a part icular th ing? 9 On the o ther hand reality consists in being a subject for predications, but never a p red ica te? ~ As one approaches the limits o f being in descending th rough the chain o f being to simple substance, the substances become more real or at least no less real as subjects; at the same time they become less real as de te rmina te particulars. At the point where one meets pr ime mat te r the divergence has become complete. Prime mat ter is both an ultimately real substratum and an ultimately unreal particular.

T h e problem concern ing pr ime mat ter is a paradox in the strong logical sense that it yields a contradict ion (see appendix) . T h e incompatible pre- mises that genera te the contradict ion seem to be deeply-rooted principles of Aristotle's world view. One way to block the contradiction would be to revise Aristotle's scientific assumptions; but this expedient would not ultimately resolve the tension in Aristotle's criteria o f reality. We must contemplate a more radical revision o f principles to save Aristotle not only f rom the para- dox o f pr ime matter , but f rom the causes of the pa radox? ~

Brigham Young University

,9 Met. 5.8.1o17b24-26, 7.3.xo~9a27f. so Met. 5.8.1ot7b~3f; 7.3.1o~9alf; Cat. 5.2al 1-13. 2, My interpretation of Aristotle's concept of matter is developed further in Graham, "Aris-

totle's Discovery" (note t3). Versions of this paper were read at the Iowa Philosophical Society (Nov., 1981), the Conference on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Epistemology (Florida State U.,Jan., 1983) and the 17th World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, Aug., 1983), at which I received helpful suggestions. I also received constructive criticisms from two anonymous referees. The themes of this paper are dealt with further in my Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford, 1987).

.

4. "~176 5 "

Appendix Deduct ion of

The Paradox o f Prime Matter

1. The re is a subst ra tum for every change. (Ph. :-7- 19oa33f, b l - 3 ) 2. In a change the new state o f affairs comes to be directly f rom the

subst ra tum and indirectly f rom the privation. (Ph. : .9 .192a3:f ; 8. 19xba5f) A substra tum is real (0us/a). (Cat. 5 .2b15- :7 ; cf. Ph. : .9 .192asf) A Privation is not real. (Ph. 1.9.192a5f) In a change the new state of affairs comes to be directly f rom some- thing real and only indirectly f rom something not real. (2,3) (Ph. x.8. 191b13-16)

6. The re is substantial change. (fact) �9 ". 7- The re is a substra tum for substance. (1,6) (Ph. a .7 .19obl -3)

8. The subst ra tum for substance is matter. (def.) (Gen. Corr. 1.4.32oa2f) �9 ". 9. Matter is real. (3,8) (ousian pOs [einai] t~n hyl~n: Ph. 1.9.192a5f)

:o. The re is elemental change. (fact) (Cael. 3.6) 11. The elements are the most basic substances. (fact) (Cael. 3.3)

.'a2. The re is a substra tum for elemental change. (1,1o) (Gen. Corr. 1. 3. 319b2-4 ; 2.1.3~9a24-~6)

.'.13. The substra tum for elemental change is matter. (8,11,12) (Gen. Corr. ~. l .329a24f)

14. The substra tum for elemental change is prime matter. (def.) (cf. ibid., 329a29 f)

.'.x 5. Prime mat ter is real. (9,13,14) 16. Prime mat ter has no characteristics of its own. (cf. a l) (ibid., 329a25 f) 17. What has no characteristics is not real. (assumption) (m~den: ibid.,

x .3.317b27-3x) �9 "a8. Prime mat ter is not real. (16,17)

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