Aristotle on friendship's possibility.pdf

8/11/2019 Aristotle on friendship's possibility.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/aristotle-on-friendships-possibilitypdf 1/27

Approaching Others: Aristotle on Friendship's PossibilityAuthor(s): Bradley BryanSource: Political Theory, Vol. 37, No. 6 (December 2009), pp. 754-779Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655519 .

Accessed: 06/06/2014 05:39

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 6 Jun 2014 05:39:33 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655519?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655519?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage



Political

Theory

37(6)

754-779

?TheAuthor(s)

2009

Reprints

and

permission:

http://www.

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0090591709345463

http://ptx.sagepub.com

?SAGE

Bradley Bryan

Abstract

The

essay

sheds

light

n

Aristotle's

understanding

of

friendship

nd

its

elation

to

political

life.The uthor

challenges

the

usual

view

thatAristotle

postulates

three

distinct

kinds of

friendship.

nstead

the author

argues

that

Aristotle

understood

there

to

be

only

one

kind of

friendship,

nd

that other

"friendships"

were

to

Aristotle "unfinished"

and thus

not

friendship

t

all.

Aristotle

shows that the

relation between

friendship

nd

politics

is

grounded

in

friendship'spossibility

for human

beings,

nd

not

as

something

cherished for

its

actuality.

y

looking

t

proper

friendship

s

possibility

and

not

actuality,

e

could

only

ever

interpret

the

infamous

statement

attributed

to

Aristotle?"my

friends,

there

are

no

friends"?not

as

illuminating

f what

friendship

is but rather

as

a

nostalgic

diagnosis

of

the

decay

of

the

possibility

of

friendship,

nd hence of

politics.

By

extension,

and

more

poignantly,

nterpreting

ristotle's

work

on

friendship

in

this

light,

e

stand

ready

to

reinterpret

the mobilization

of

Aristotelian

friendship

for

contemporary understandings

of

democratic

practice.

Keywords

Aristotle,

friendship, emocracy, politics,

nostalgia

Introduction

In

considerations

ofAristotle's

account

of

friendship,

much has been

made of

a remark attributed toAristotle by Diogenes Laertius inLives: "My friends,

Corresponding

Author:

Bradley

Bryan

Department

of

Political

Science,

University

ofVictoria,

PO Box

3060

STN

CSC.Victoria,

BC,

Canada

V8W

3R4

Email:

[email protected]

Approaching

Others:

Aristotle on Friendship's

Possibility







Bryan

755

there

are no

friends."1

In these

considerations,

it

is

claimed

that

Diogenes's

anecdote suggestsmore toAristotle's discussion of friendship than isusually

believed?and

in

this

the

following

discussion

concurs,

as

the

phrase

itself

begs

the

question

of

the

possibility

of

friendship.

The "secret

history"

that

such

an

anecdote reveals

admonishes

us

to

reconsider

Aristotle and

our uses

of

him: for

what

else

might

this otherwise

hidden

story

serve to

do?2

And

so

rather than

simply

seek

the conditions

under

which

friendship

does

or

does

not

occur,

in

this

essay

I

consider

the

nostalgic

tenor

of

such

an

anecdote

by

thinking

through

what

could

possibly

be

meant

in

saying

that

friendship

is

"possible." While echoing Derrida's suggestion that the very question of

friendship

has

been

constitutive

of

politics,

I aim

to

clarify

the

way

nostalgia

can

occupy

the anecdote

("friendship

is

no

longer")

and

our

own

preoccupa

tions

with

Aristotle

on

friendship

("friendship

is

a

model

for

our

politics").

The

nostalgia

of both

the anecdote

and

our

theorizing

ofAristotle

on

friend

ship

demands

that

we

think

through

how

we come across

something

like

"Aristotle

on

friendship,"

and thus

continues

to

beg

the

very

question

of how

something

like

friendship

is

possible

at

all.

It

demands

this

thinking

because

it isnot clear how nostalgia has come to animate our thinkingabout politics

by

way

of

friendship.

This

final

phrasing

lets

the

rich

ambiguity

of

our

own

nostalgia

press

us

into

the

question

of the

relation between

possibility

and

excellence

in

poli

tics

in

general

for

Aristotle,

and

yet

it does

so

by housing

the

pursuit

of

politics

in

the

question

of

friendship.

As

I will

suggest,

it is

of

no conse

quence

whether Aristotle

actually

ever

uttered thewords

Diogenes

attributes

to him

because

they

do

not

illuminate

his

own

thinking

on

friendship

except

togive us pause towonder at thepossibility of truefriendship,of belonging

among

the

good,

or

to

wonder

at

the

sense

that

the anecdotal

can

have in

such

matters.

Once

we

give thought

again

to

Aristotle

on

friendship,

we

will

be

in

a

place

to

fathom

what

such

an

utterance,

were

it

his,

could stand

to

tell,

both

about

the

Aristotelian

posture

toward

politics

as

well

as our

own

posturings.

What is

at

stake

in

this

interpretation

s

not

simply

the "number"

of

the "kinds" of

friendship

Aristotle

delineated,

but rather how

friendship

constitutes

theAristotelian

polity?but

not

our own.

That

is,

when

we

think

through thepossibility of friendshipforAristotle, we will be hard pressed to

see

its relevance

for

contemporary

political practice.

Indeed

we

do well to

wonder

after

our own

nostalgic

longing

for

theAthenian virtue of

excelling

with

and

before

our

friends.

If

"friendship"

is

what

we

have with

our

"friends,"

its

presence

and

possibility

envelope

us

in

the

lonely

desire

to

see

this

promise

of

friendship

and

having

friends fulfilled.







756

Political

Theory 37(6)

How does

friendship

belong

to

politics

forAristotle?

I

argue

that

friend

ship forAristotle exists only in itspossibility (dunamis) not its actuality

(energeia),

and

it

is

only

in

this that

it

holds

out

excellence

for

human

beings.

To

see

the

importance

of

prioritizing

friendship's

possibility

over

its

actuality

(in

existence,

not

time),

the

following

discussion

begins

with the

usual

interpretation

f

Aristotelian

friendship.

That

account

usually

stresses

three distinct

kinds of

friendship?as

laid

out

in

Books

8

and

9 of the

Nicomachean Ethics.

In

what

follows

I

depart

from this

view

by suggesting

that

ristotle's

account

of

proper

friendship

needs

to

be

interpreted

n

light

of

his work on the difference between thepotential and the actual, on identity

and

excellence,

and in

light

of his

own manner

of

interpreting

he

problem

of

the

relation

between doxa

(as

opinion

and

semblance)

and

truth. o

say

that

there

are

not

three kinds of

friendship,

that there

is

only

one,

is

to

say

that

anything

other

than

proper

friendship

does

not

properly

or

fully

bind

us

to

each

other.

Is the

binding

of

the

polls

of

thiskind?

By

reconstructing,

first,

ristotle's

method of

distinguishing

kinds

of

things

based

on

how

they

appear

or seem

(or, as Iwill show, as the "semblance" thatbelongs todoxa), and second,

Aristotle's

arguments

on

potentiality

and

actuality

as

the basis of how human

beings

become

excellent

by becoming

who

they

properly

are,

I

suggest

why

Aristotle's

understanding

of

friendship

occupies

the central

position

of his

political

and ethical

writings.

For

Aristotle,

proper

friendship

is

political

only

because

it is

possible

and

not

actual?the

sense

of

which

becomes

clear

if

we

give

thought

to

a

politics,

and hence

a

polity,

where

we

"become

human"

through

the

possibility

of

a

deep

engagement

with

our

otherness,

an

otherness

we experience best and most properly in the sight of our friends.Only by

grasping

Aristotle's

account

of

a

singularity

to

friendship

can

we

possibly

make

sense

of the

phrase

cited

by Diogenes

as

a

kind of

commentary

on

the

political

life

of

the times.

If

there

"are"

no

friends,

"is"

no

friend,

is

friend

ship something possible

for

we

who

come

to

political

life

today?

In

thinking

about

friendship

in

Aristotle's

work,

all

the

while

we

must

consider

theback

ground

yet

open

question

as

to

what

sense

approaching

others

as

friends

makes of the

political

life of

our

day,

a

questioning

that situates

nostalgia

as

an animating force of modern political theorizing. This is not to say we

should

not

do

it.

But

by

implication, gathering

Aristotle's rich

understanding

of

friendship

as

existent

in

its

possibility

and

not

its

actuality,

one

can

also

surmise

that

ristotle has been

mobilized

and

misused

by

contemporary

the

orists

to

give

credence

to

a

deliberative ideal

for democratic

politics,

to

forms

of effective association

around

common

values. The

so-called

humanizing







Bryan

757

effect

of

deliberation

in

politics

"with"

or

"among"

friends in

fact

misplaces

reconstructions

of

Aristotelian

notions

of

friendship

as a

particular

form

of

being

with

others

(as

"society").

Proper

friendship

tells

us

not

what

we

gain

from

others

by

consort

(i.e.,

we

do

not

"gain"

our

excellence),

but how

we

approach

them

and

what

approaching

others

shows

of how

we

already belong

together,

because how

we

come

to

approach

others is

always

latentwith

the

possibility

of

politics

for

Aristotle.

I.The

Traditional

Account

of

Aristotelian

Friendship

The traditional

interpretations

of

Aristotelian

friendship

assert

that friend

ship

is of three

kinds,

based

as

they usually

are on

the

existing

translations

of

Aristotle's

Nicomachean

Ethics?

These

interpretations

state

that friend

ship

is

based

on

utility,

pleasure,

or

virtue.4

Friendships

based

on

utility

are

convenient;

that

is,

they

involve the kind of

familiarity

one

might

have

with

another

insofar

as

the

two

meet

around

some

kind of

activity

or

purpose

such

that their

engagement

furthers

the

achievement

of

their

respective

ends.

For

example,

I

may

come

to

know the

owner

of

a

local

coffee

shop

that

I

frequent,

and

our

acquaintance

is

convenient and

useful,

since it

provides

a

limited kind

of

companionship

that

revolves

around

my

use

of the

ser

vices

she

or

he

provides.

Pleasurable

friendships

are

those

acquaintances

that

bring pleasure

or

are

occasioned

through

our

mutual

participation

in

pleasurable

activities.

For

example,

I

may

come

to

know

someone

whose

company

I

enjoy

and who

also

enjoys

my

company?this

friendship

is

plea

surable

because

the

mutuality

is

grounded

upon

the

pleasure

that

we

bring

to

each

other.

It

may

be that

many

of

our

so-called

friendships

are

of

this kind.

These

two

fall short

ofwhat is

often called

"virtue"

friendship,

which

I

will

call

proper

or

true

friendship.

Arete is

often translated

as

"virtue,"

but

makes

us

think

of

it

s

a

capacity

of

strength

or

manliness);

I

prefer

to

think

of it

as

an

"excellence"

or

"fitness"

that rients

us

to

what is

required

of

us.

Arete

is

a

capacity

of

sorts.

Excellence

does

not

suggest

a

capacity,

but does

suggest

something

that

an

individual

has

or

bears,

fitness likewise.

The

ambiguity

of

fitness,

however,

is

that

it

does

not

necessarily

specify

excellence,

whereas

arete

presumes

it.

In

arete

we

hear

reference

to

Ares?the

god

that

calls

forth

the

war-like

exercising

of

muscle,

drawing

one

into

a

kind

of

physical

excel

lence

(not

like

the call

to

war

of

Athena).5

Arete

is

the

"property"

of

excellence

or

fitness,

of

being

"up

to"

a

call;

it

can

belong

to

an

individual,

as

does the

possibility

for

the

individual

to

be called

forth

by

excellence

or

by

that

which

would make

us

excellent.

The fact

that

friendship

is

described

as

akin

to

"virtue" in

the

Nicomachean

Ethics should

not

confuse

us.

For

friendship

is

in







758

Political

heory7(6)

one

way

something

excellent

and in another

is

not

an

excellence

(or

"virtue"

for

that

matter)

like

courage

or

temperance.

"Virtue"

friendship

is,

for

Aristotle,

"proper"

or

"true"

friendship

because

it

is

what

orients

us

to

what is

required

of

us

by

those

we

love and who love

us.

Proper

friendship,

where the telos of

friendship

has

been reached

(inso

far

as

this is

possible

at

all),

is

commonly interpreted

s

both

involving

arete

and

being

one.

Some view this ultimate

friendship

as

not

fully possible

for

humans

because

it

would still be convenient

or

advantageous

for human

beings

in

the

attainment

of their

ends.6

Elsewhere

it

is

interpreted

s

thekind

of

friendship

that

exists

among

the

excellent,

and is

exhibited

in

the

love that

is

mutually

felt

for

the other?a love

that

is

also

a

love

of

(not

desire

for)

the

good.7

It is

traditionally

held

that

proper

friendship

is

rare

because

it

is

not

often

that the

excellent

come

to

share

in

the

sight

of

the

good

together.8

In

sympathy

with the

view

that there

are

three kinds of

friendship,

it

is

admitted

that

Aristotle often

provides

descriptions

of

"kinds"

that

approach

taxonomy,

and

so

an

elaboration

of threekinds

of

friendship

would

not

be

out

of character.

Furthermore,

this

simple

taxonomy

also

allows for

a

teleologi

cal

rendering, namely,

that

friendshipprogresses

into its fullness

as

proper

friendship precisely

because

the actualization of

arete

is,

for

Aristotle,

what

leads

to

flourishing

(or

to

become

"happy").

It is

important

to

the traditional

account

that

the

three kinds

of

friendship

are

not

only

taxonomically

explained,

but also

delineate the

progression

that

friendship

often takes

from

its first instance

of

convenience,

through

pleasure,

to

the kind

of

excellence

that

belongs

to

friendship.

This

progression,

it is

held,

can

inform

politics

because of

the

way

"virtue"

and

politics

are

thought

to

be

corequisite

insofar

as

the existence

of

the

former

allows

the

latter

to

enable

the

good among

citizens.

Indeed,

proper

friendship

as

"virtue

friendship"

is

at

times under

stood

to

be the

model

of

political

community

among

citizens who have

come

to

properly

understand

each

other and the

nature

of

their

bond,

even

though

such

friendship

is characterized

as

both convenient

and

pleasurable.9

Jill

Frank has noted:

Citizens

are

made

not

only

by

their

particular

or

individual

activities but

also

by sharing

in

a

constitution,

in

other

words, by

their ollective

activ

ity.

t

the

same

time,

collective

activity

produces

the

social and

political

institutions

hat

contribute

to

the

making

of citizens

in thefirst

place

...

There

is

an

interdependence

between

polity

and citizen

identity.10

On the

other

hand,

"political

friendship"

for

Frank

and

others

need

not

be

entirely

virtuous:







Bryan

759

Modeled

on use

friendship

and

involving

the

practice

of

virtue,

politi

cal

friendship

is best

understood

as

a

mixed

good

concerned

with

judging

and

acting

well

with

a

view

to

a

polity's

common

good.11

Notice

that,

for

Frank,

the

sharing

in the

good?which

is what

the

polity

allows?makes

political friendship contingent

on

an

effective

practice.

By

contrast,

Arendt claims that theGreeks "dreaded" the

degradation

of

their

citizenry

bond

by

considerations

of

utility:

It

is

quite

obvious

that theGreeks dreaded this

devaluation

of

theworld

and

nature

with

its

inherent

anthropocentrism?the

"absurd"

opinion

that

man

is

the

highest being

and

that

everything

else

is

subject

to

the

exigencies

of

human

life

(Aristotle)?no

less

than

they

despised

the

sheer

vulgarity

of all

consistent

utilitarianism.12

Arendt

goes

on

to

clarify

that the

kind

of "love" that

the citizen has for

another is

brought

forth

in

public

in

a

sense

because

of the kind of

sharing

that the

citizen

has with

another.

It

is,

she

says,

a

kind of

friendship

that is

somehow without

intimacy

and

closeness,

and

yet

is

forged

out

of

a

firm

regard

and

respect.13

So

while

Frank's

instinct

is

likely

correct

regarding

the

politics

of

today

(as

it is

difficult

to

imagine politics

that

does

not

involve

"using"

others

to

promote

collective

aims),

Aristotle

seems

to

think that

there

is

no

"using"

others

in

the

polis

strictly

speaking

because all

activity

there is

singularly regarding

the

good.

A

friendship

is

not

good

because of

what it

leads

to,

but

because

of

the excellence

it

shows.

The

cultivation of

arete

is

strengthened through

its

performance

in

the

polis among

others.

Our

friends

are

those

others

before

whom

we

shine,

and

we

have

a

kind

of love

for

them

not

reducible

to

a

desire for them

or

for

something

for

which

they

would

be

mere

means?something

both

Arendt and

Frank

are

clear

on.

But

I think

the

demarcation

regarding

"use"

begs

the

critical

question

of the

possible

difference

between

political

friendship

and

proper

friendship,

both

for

Aristotle and

ourselves.

(As

we

will

see,

there is

no

difference between

political

friendship

and

proper

friendship

for

Aristotle,

whereas

it

would be

hard

to

imagine

otherwise

for

us.)

What

is

perhaps

most

"traditional" about other

accounts

of

Aristotelian

friendship

is

the

way

they

seek

to

translate the

Greek

experience

into

our

own

by

mobilizing

it

to

make

sense

of the

democratic

politics

of

our

own

time.

Rather

than

approach

Aristotle this

way,

my

approach

privileges thinking

through

the

sense

that

ertain

specific

key

words had for

Aristotle.

This

means

something

other than

simply

finding

an

appropriate

English

word,

and rather







760

Political

Theory 37(6)

involves

attempting

to

translate

a

host

of

English

words

and

phrases

into

the

words Aristotle

used,

to

translate ourselves

into

the

Greek,

an

impossibility

that

allows

us

to

see

the

very

limit

of

our

own

thinking

in the

approach

to

Aristotle, and,

I

would

argue,

in

the

approach

of

and

to

our

friends.14

n

what

follows

I

attempt

to

shed

light

n

the

sense

that

some

of

Aristotle's

key

words

have

for

how

we can

think f

the

possibility

of

friendship

for thekind of

poli

tics

he

contemplates

in

his

work.15

While

we

contemplate

Aristotle

we can

remain

cognizant

not

only

of the

foreignness

of

these

words,

but of the

limit

that

allows

us

to

see

the

possibility

of their

presence

in

our

own

thinking?a

limit conditioned

by

our

own

sense

of

longing

for

the

kind

of

belonging

said

to

constitute the

Athenian

polity.

II.

Definition,

Interpretation,

and

the Problem of

Doxa

What

is

perhaps

most

striking

bout

the traditional

account

is

how

easily

one

can

reconcile

itwith

contemporary

friendship

and

politics?that

somehow

our

devotion

to

each other

must

"run

its

course"

throughutility

and

pleasure

before

we

discover its truth

n

the

pursuit

of

thingsworthy

of

us,

as

in

poli

tics. But

I

think the traditional

account

errs

not

only

because

of

the

ease

with

which

we

think

we

can

grasp

friendship

as

existing

in

three

kinds?indeed

its

ease

only

suggests

we

have

overlooked

something.

Is

the

fragility

of

friendship

and the

elusiveness

of

intimacy

not

signpost

enough

that somehow

friendship

and

politics,

like

friendship

and

freedom,

have

something

other

than

an

automatic

and clear relation?

I

take it

that

we

do

not turn to

Aristotle

simply

to

see

where the

fragility

of

friendship

is

something

other

than the

way

we

experience

it

today,

even

though

this

begs

the

question

of

what

we

expect

to

unearth

in

our

meditations

on

friendship

in

Aristotle.

When

we

hear

the

famous anecdote of

Aristotle's

utterance to

his

friends,

"my

friends,

there

are no

friends,"

we

are

unable

to

reconcile this

contradictory

story

ofAristotle

among

his friends

with

a

vision of

friendship

as one

that

is

"perfected"

or

has

"arrived"

at

its telos.

If

we

can

linger

a

moment

on

friendship

and

our own

impressions

and intuitions of

it,

there is

nothing

obvious

about there

being

"kinds"

of

friendship,

much

less

a

certain number.

Anyone

who

has had

a

friend

knows

that

friendship

is

precious

and

requires

time

to

develop beyond

its

first

awkward

strivings?strivings

that

may

not

be convenient

nor

pleas

ant,

even

if

they

fill

us

with

hope.

Derrida's

gentle

suggestion

of

a

friendship

of

promise

does

hold

something

for

a

politics

of the

future,

ven

if

it

obscures

his and

our

nostalgia

in

thinking through

friendship

in

the

first

place.

In addition

to

thewisdom

of

our

immediate

intuitions,

two

specific

aspects

of

Aristotelian

thinking

do

indeed

tell

us

that

friendship

does

not

need

to

exist







Bryan

761

as

a

natural evolution

through

pleasure

and

utility.

First,

Aristotle follows

Plato's

dialectical thinking

to

ground

or

negate

the

existence

of

things

and

their

aspects:

if

utility

friendship

is

not

proper

(or

"true"

or

"finished"

or

"perfected")

friendship,

then

it is

quite

clearly

not

friendship.16

tility

friend

ship

may

never

arrive

at

being

friendship

proper,

and hence

was never

really

friendship

at

all

because

it

must

have

always

been

deficient,

indeed it

was

deficient.

The

acorn

that

rots

is

not

an

oak,

though

it

held such

in

it

s

poten

tiality.

tility friendship

can

be said

to

approach friendship

only

insofar

as

it

is

possible

for

that

form of

acquaintance

to

become

proper

friendship.

While

our

convenient

relations

may

hold

the

possibility

of

friendship, they

are

not,

strictly

speaking,

friendships.

Second,

and

in

my

view

more

importantly,

Aristotle is

very

careful and

very

explicit

to

note

that

the first

two

kinds

of

friendship

suffer

from

the

semblance of

opinion: they

"seem"

to

be friend

ship,

and

are

imbued

with

doxa}1

"It

seems

[dokei]

not

everything

is

loved,

only

what is

lovable,

and

this

is

eitherwhat

is

good,

or

pleasant,

or

useful."18

Doxa

is

never

simply

"our

views"

or

"their views"

on

something,

or

what is

held

in

one's

mind,

rather

it

is thatwhich

we

hold

in

our

view,

that

is,

the

content

of

that

view,

what is

manifest

in

a

viewing.

It

is

a

feature of theworld

and

our

existence

in

it.

To

thinkof

doxa

as

simply opinion

is

to

thinkof

it

as

one's

view,

and

to

arrogate

to

the

subject

more

of

a

presence

than is

contem

plated

by

Aristotle

or

the

Greeks

in

general.

By

noting

that

friendship

seems

to

have different elements

invites

us

to

think

that the

appearance

of

friendship

in

semblance

is

what itmust

be,

rather

than

methodologically

beginning

with

our

first

impressions

and

moving

toward

what

must

be the

case.

Here Aristotle

notes

that

we

seem

to

love the

good,

the

pleasant,

and theuseful.

This

is

not

only

a

statement

ofwhat

friendship

seems

to

be,

but

is

Aristotle

characteristically

following

a

method of

moving

from

what

is familiar

to

most

of

us

most

of the time

(as

the

opinions

or

doxa

of the

hoipolloi?who

we

are

most

of the

time)

toward

what is

true.19

or

Aristotle,

any

inquirybegins, always,

with

what

appears

to

us?we

have

no

choice,

not

being

able

to

clearly

see

what

beings properly

are

in

the

first

nstance.20

oxa

is

not

necessarily

untrue,

it

is

simply

unthought,

and

sowe

must

think

ur

way

through

what

appears

to

us

(by

semblance,

by

opinion).

It

may

be thatwhat

seems

to

be

actually

is: the

true

always originally

seems

to

be.

Beginning

with

the

way

friendships

appear

to

us

in

everyday

living,

we

can

indeed

notice

that

sometimes friends

do

seem

devoted

to

each

other

out

of

convenience

or

pleasure.

However

forAristotle

the

activity

of

thinking

about

friendship

shows it

to

be also

something

of

a

singular

kind

beyond

these,

as

an

excellence

proper

to

human

living.

Let

us

turn

to

carefully

parse

the

account

given

in

The

Nicomachean

Ethics

to

see

how Aristotle

moves







762

Political

Theory 37(6)

from

seeming

to

proper

friendship,

how it

is

a

true

possibility

for human

beings

in

a

polis,

and

how

friendship

is

thus

related

not

just

to

"flourishing"

but

to

the

kind of

shining

forth

in

the

sight

of

the

gods

that

belongs

to

every

human

as

their

own-most

possibility.21

Furthermore,

and

finally,

let

us

also

turn

to

see

what

there is inAristotle's

account

of

friendship

that

simply

does

not

hearken

to

a

politics

of

today,

notwithstanding

that it

may

indeed tell

us

much about

what

modern

politics

must

resign

itself

to.

III.The

Singularity

of

Proper

Friendship

Aristotle claims

that

the three

kinds

only

"seem"

to

be

friendship

based

on

the kinds

of

things

that

can

be

loved,

and the

way

they

are

loved.

Dokein

is

what

"seems,"

and is

not

what

"is"?einai.22

Note that

Aristotle

begins

with

what

is lovable:

"It

seems

(dokein)

that

not

everything

is

loved,

but

only

what

is

lovable,

and

that

this

is eitherwhat is

good,

or

pleasant,

or

useful.

.

.

."?

and then

proceeds

to

distinguish

how

the human loves:

"Then,

do

men

love

what is

properly good,

or

(only)

what

is

good

for

them?"23

s

we

have

noted,

Aristotle arrives

at

thiscritical distinction between love ofwhat isgood and

what is

"good

for

us"

only

after

examining

the

way

our

love

of

things

comes

to

us

"in

the

first

instance"?that

is,

as

it

"seems"

to

most

of

us

most

of

the

time

(hoi

polloi).

This is

captured

in "it

seems,"

that

is,

dokein. His initial

differentiation

is

between whether

we

pursue

what

we

love

out

of

a

sense

of

self-interest,

or

whether

we

pursue

it for its

own

sake. To

begin

with what

"seems"

forAristotle

may

seem

similar

to

Plato,

and

both

are

concerned

with

the

problem

of

how

things

seem.24

But

rather

than

distrustwhat

"seems"

as

necessarily deficient,Aristotle,

much

more

prominently

than

Plato,

refuses

to

privilege

the

ideational

over

the

phenomenal;

that

is,

Aristotle

says

we are

always

confronted

first

with the

phenomenon,

not

the eidos

or

form

of its

look.

This

is

important

because

of

the

way

entities

come

to

presence

before

us

prior

to

their intellection.

The

elaboration

of the kinds of

friendship

as

progressions

away

from

how

they

seem

is

important

if

we are

to

make

sense

of

why

Aristotle lists

what

belongs

to

proper

friendship

while also

describing

the

kinds of defec

tive

friendship

as

friendship

nonetheless.

For

proper friendship

to

exist

certain elements

must

be

in

place:

To

be friends

therefore,

men

must

(i)

feel

goodwill

for

each

other,

that

is,

wish each other's

good,

and

(ii)

be

aware

of

each other's

goodwill,

and

(iii)

the

cause

of

their

goodwill

must

be

one

of the

lovable

qualities

mentioned

above.25







Bryan

763

Notice also

that

in the

description

of

proper

friendship

we

are

not

directed

to

understanding

friendship

as

"what

seems,"

or

dokei,

but

as

it

is

and

in terms

of the constituent elements that friendshipmust have to be friendship.26

Recall

thatfor

Aristotle,

there

is

no

difference between

"friendship"

and

"per

fected

friendship"

in

the strict

ense

because

"perfected

friendship"

is

simply

friendship

that

has reached

it

telos

and

thus is

what

it

most

properly

is.

This

notion

of

true

friendship

as

a

way

of

relating,

one

grounded

in

virtue,

is

strictly peaking

possible

for

human

beings.

Perfected

[or

"finished"

or

"proper"-te/e*'#] riendship

is thatbetween

the good, who resemble each other in excellence [areten homoion].

These

friends each

wish the

other's

good

(in respect

of their

goodness),

and

are

good

in

themselves;

(only)

those who wish the

good

of

their

friends

for their friends'

sake who

are

properly

friends,

they

love

the

other

for

themselves

and

not

accidentally.27

Aristotle

speaks

of

friendship

as a

wishing

of the

good for nothing

but

the

friend

s

sake,

because

friendship

is

not

pursued

for

anything

else

but this

good.

Thus the other two "seeming" or "defective" kinds are opposed to "proper" or

"perfected"

friendship precisely

because

they

are

not

undertaken

for

the

good

of

the

friend.

As

such,

they

cannot

be

friendships,

and

will

only

ever

"seem"

like

friendship

unless

properly

pursued

such that

it

can

become

it.

Proper

friendship

is

the

kind that

s

"perfected"

or

has reached its

telos

as

friendship.28

The

traditional

account

has

an

important bjection

to

offer

here:

if

friend

ship

is

not

inherent,

but

develops,

then

how

are we

to

understand

the

way

friendship

emerges

out

of its absence?

Or,

more

directly,

is there

not

some

ground fornaming convenience and pleasure friendships as stages of friend

ship's blossoming

rather than

almost

arbitrarily

dismissing

these

unfulfilled

friendships

as

nonfriendships?

Or

is the

kind

of

friendship

one

finds

in

a

polis

political

friendship

or

simply

on

the

way

to

friendship

proper?

These

three

questions

are

important

because

they

ask

after

the

identity

f the

unfulfilled,

and

as

such bear

a

direct

relation

to

what

it

is

for

a

human

being

to

become

excellent

among

a

variety

of forms

of

acquaintance.

These

questions

also

help

us

see

that

friendship's

existence

can

be tied

to

the

identity

of its

own

possibility rather than itsactuality, thusdemanding we clear on the relation

between

identity

ousia,

or

what

something

is)

and

excellence

(arete).

IV.

Identity

and Excellence

Ousia denotes

identity,

nd I

recognize

that I

am

using

the

term

in

perhaps

a

more

philosophical,

less

political

way

than

is

usually

understood.

And

while







764

Political

Theory 37(6)

"identity"

is

not

a

common

translation

for

ousia,

a

point

helpfully

clarified

by

Martha

Nussbaum,

I

agree

with and follow

Nussbaum

in

claiming

it

as a

defensible sense of the term,within limits.29 usia denotes what something

is

in

its

own

particularity,

as

it

is

on

its

own

as

what

it

is.30

The word for

identity

is

not

commonly

thought

in

terms

of

essence

but

in

terms

of

particu

larity,

ut

note

that

ristotle

thinks of

the

essence

of

something

as

what it

is

in the

particularities

that

belong

to

it?x

Aristotle

begins

with convenience

friendship

as

the first

kind

not

because

it

is the

first

ne

in

a

taxonomy

but

because

it

is the

first

ind

of

acquaintance

that

"appears"

to

us

in

our

dealings

with

others:

we

ordinarily

deal

with

and

are

"friendly"

with

others

because

it

is convenient and useful todo so. It is theordinaryway we encounter others.

In

The

Ethics,

Aristotle

says

that

once we move

past

the

phenomena

of

utility

and

pleasure friendship,

we come

to

understand

true

friendship.32

verything

here

hinges

on

what itwould be

to

"move

past"

convenient

or

pleasurable

friendship

to

arrive

at

proper

friendship,

and

it

is

the

critical

place

where

Aristotle differswith Plato: how

to

capture

what

something

most

properly

is.

Rather

than

see

friendship

as

resting

in

the idea

of

it,

Aristotle

notes

that it

always

must

be what it

primarily

is

in

itself?its

"substance"

or

"essence"

here denote simply its identity, rwhat isproper to friendship in itself.For

friendship

to

be

"proper" friendship,

the

ousia

of

friendship

is

what

"belongs"

to

friendship

as

friendship,

is its

necessary

"property."

This is

why

we

also

translate

ousia

as

"property."

The

ousia

of

friendship

is the

"property"

of

it that is

most

clear

to

those

who look

upon

it. Its ousia iswhat

"belongs"

to

friendship

as

friendship.

Something

is

"proper

to"

it

only

in

the

sense

that

what renders

it

as

it is

belongs

to

it

as

what it is. So

we

can

say

that the

essence

of

friendship

is

proper

or

true

friendship.

(But

it

remains

a

question

as towhat is actualzzed infriendship?to which we will return.)

Because

we

come

to

friendship

(it

is

not

innate)

it

makes

sense

to

think

of

it

as a

kind

of excellence

(arete)

to

which the human

being

is

both

called

yet

may

fail

to

actualize

even

though

we

occasionally

do

speak

of

friendship

as

though

we

already

"have"

it.

The

acorn

is defined

by

its

telos

to

be

an

oak,

though

it

may

fail

to

actualize

it.

For the

Greeks,

we

remain

a

long

way

from

blaming

the

acorn

for its

failure,

just

as we are

a

long

way

from

blaming

someone

for

failing

to

be

all

she

or

he

can

be.

Consider the

analogous

arete

of courage. Courage iswhat one gains from theperformance of courageous

acts.

The

difficulty

for those

young

and faint

at

heart

is

that

gaining

courage

must

somehow

occur

out

of its

absence?and

so

Aristotle

counsels

mimesis.

It

is clear

that

imitating

courageous

acts

does

not

make these

acts

coura

geous,

but it does

dispose

the soul of

one

in

a

certain

manner,

such

that

subsequent

courageous

acts

are

easier

to

imitate,

until

they

are

easier

to

per

form.

Standing

tall and

shaky

atop

the

high-diving

board,

the

child trembles







Bryan

765

during

her

first ive. But after

a

few

attempts,

her

confidence

increases

and

she

no

longer

fears what she

once

did.

She

has

gained

some

courage.

For

Aristotle,

such

"training"

involves

the

actual formation

of

a

habit

(hexis)

that

disposes

one's

soul.33

In

"disposing"

of

oneself,

one

puts

a

disposition

that

belongs

to

one's character

into action?which iswhat

a

habit

is:

a

disposition

of character.

But

the

actuality

of

a

habit lies

not

in

the

appearance

of the

act

or our

performance

of the

habit,

but rather

in

the

way

the

habit,

as a

disposi

tion

of

our

character,

exists

in

a

kind

of

quiet

reserve

that

actually

diminishes

our

ability

to

see

itwhen it is

brought

into

actuality

in

a

particular

deed;

for

when

we

do

something habitually

it

belongs

to

a

habit

that

we

do

not

notice

the habit but

merely

the

act

the habit allows.

Because

we

"have"

habits

lying

within

us,

as

it

were,

we

must

take

steps

to

encourage

the

good

ones

or

to

root

out

the bad

ones.

And

as

Aristotle

shows

at

length,

the

journey

between

care

fully

established habits

and

the

excellences

they

endow

is

not

far,

since virtue

is

nothing

other than

a

habit

of

the

heart

for

the

good.

So

too

with

friendship?occurring

neither

in

a

day

nor

easily

among

those

we

may

take

as

convenient

to

our

ends

or

pleasurable

in

our

company.

The

ease

with

which

we

make

acquaintances

belies

the

difficulty

of

partici

pating

in

or

witnessing

true

friendship.

Even if

we

gain

the "habit"

of

"being

friendly"

and

of

"having

friends,"

our

friendships

sufferfor it.

While

a

habit

harbors

possibilities,

it

also

accrues

its

own

constancy.34

The

disposition

of

character

that

fosters

friendship

is

not

as

easily

characterized

as

an

arete

like

courage.

Proper

friendship

is

beyond

the kinds of ends

that

we

have for

our

selves,

and

involves

sharing

in

the

sight

of

something

that

is

not

necessary

to

our own

discrete ends?as with

contemplation

of the

good.

Friendship

is

then

not

just

the

state

of

having

friends but of

a

situation

where the

friend

can come

to

presence?it

is the

possibility

of

having

a

friend that

is housed

in

our

every

friendliness.

Put this

way,

friendship

may

well

seem

impossible

to

attain

by

virtue of

its

infrequency,

for

we

may

well

wonder

whether such

an

aim is

possible

any

longer,

let alone

those with

whom

to

share

it.

Indeed,

even

in

the

thics

Aristotle

himself

notes

the

rarity

of

friendship

in

such

a

way

as

to

beg

the

question

of

its

existence

at

all.35

It

is

helpful

to

distinguish

friendship

from

brotherhood,

to

show the

language

of

kin

and

bond that

sits

in

Aristotle's

work,

but

we

must

also ask

about

how

this

bond

binds.

To

see

the

way

friendship

exists

requires

a

grasp

of

how friend

ship

emerges

from its

possibility

into

actuality,

and

what stands

revealed

in

actuality.

Friendship's actuality

is

itself

possibility.

Let

us

briefly

remind

our

selves

how

a

possibility

can

be

an

actuality.

Aristotle refutes

Zeno's

paradox

(i.e.,

that

motion is

impossible

because it

is

not

a

being

that

can

be

represented

to

the

intellect)

by explaining

that







766

Political

Theory 37(6)

motion exists

as

a

mode

of

being?and

that all

beings

are

continually

in

motion. While

we

might imagine

that

the

being

before

our

eyes

exists

in

actuality,

Aristotle

notes

that

beings continually

come

into

being

and

pass

away

in

time.At

any

given

moment,

a

being

is

no

longer

what it

once was

and

is

also about

to

perish

and

become

something

else.

Aristotle

expressed

this transience

by

way

of the distinction

between dunamis

(potency, potenti

ality, possibility)

and

energeia

(the

being-at-work

of

a

being,

actuality).36

A

being's

potential

is

always

working

itself

toward its

actuality

or

the

moment

of its

activity?or,

to

avoid

the

Latin,

its existence

in

the

ergon,

or

work,

that

has become.

The

ousia

or

"essence"

of

a

being

is therefore

not

found

in

its

being

actual

or

"at

work" in

front f

us,

but

in

the

potential

it

holds

for

trans

forming

itself:

beings

are

in

continual

movement

"toward" who

or

what

they

really

are.37

Because

the

unseen

potency

of

a

being

supervenes

on

its existence

at

every

given

moment,

the

potentiality

of

a

being

is

most

properly

what the

being

is,

if

only

because

it

bears the

being

towardwhat it

will

become.

It

is

because of the relation between

potentiality

and

actuality

that

ne

"becomes"

over

time: the dunamis

(potency, potentiality)

of

a

being

has

"more

being"

than its

energeia

(being-at-work,

actuality) precisely

because

the

"being-at

work" of

a

being

is

always already

in

motion,

and thus is

not

just

the

"being-at-work"

but the

power

of

transforming

intowhat

it

is destined

to

become.38

For

the

human

being,

it

is

possible

to

take

a

stance

of

"cultiva

tion"

with

respect

to

oneself,

to

"care"

for

oneself,

and

to

engage

in

practices

that allow

the

unfolding

of one's

proper

self

in

the

way

that ismost "true"

to

who

one

is.39

This

possibility

is

itself

possible

only

if the

potentiality

of

a

human

being

has

priority

over

its

actuality?we

not

only

can

change

but

do,

and

we

play

a

role

in

such

a

change.

Thus for

Aristotle

the

good

human,

a

human

being

of

action,

is

excellent

because

she

is

"well-turned

out,"

and

is

excellent for

"reaching"

this

stage?for

becoming

excellent.

But

excellence

is

not

simply

the actualization

of

excellence,

not

the

being-at-work

of

excellence

as

it

appears

to

us

who

see

it,

but because

the

human

being

is

the

ousia

of

excellence?what

it

properly

is,

as

a

kind

of

fitness

that

has

come

to

expres

sion

in

action.

This

"state" of

being

is

not

simply "flourishing"

or

"being

happy"

but

is

a

particular

form

of

shining

before

others

in

the

light

that is

provided by

the

gods

as

the

word

says:

eudaimonia.40

The blessedness

of

one

in the

sight

of the

daimones,

those

spirit-beings

that call

us

forth

to

act,

is the

highest

way

anyone

can

express

how

perfected

a

human

being

has become.

One

shines

forth.41

o

become excellent

is

to

become

who

one

is

by shining

forth

in

the

light

of the

gods

before

others,

and in

a

vital

sense

to

become

fully

human

before others

in

the

open

(which

iswhat theword eudaimonia







Bryan

767

says),

which is the

space

the

polls

provides.42

This iswhat

proper

friendship

gives

to

the

human,

since

no

human

would

ever

wish

to

be human

without

such

a

space.43

Thus the

two

other

kinds of

friendship

do

not

belong

to

friendship

as

friendship,

as

what

belongs

to

a

friendship

that ennobles

the

human,

and

as

such

are

m/s-leading.

They

are

not,

on

their

own,

a

friendship

and

we

are

not

freed

or

made

virtuous

through

our

associations

with

others

in

this

way.

(They

do

not

lead

to

proper

friendship necessarily

because

they

are

not,

strictly speaking,

friendship.)

Indeed,

forAristotle these unfinished friend

shipsmay

somehow

forestall

friendship proper.44Friendship's

excellence

does

not

lie

in

what

it

does for

us or

how

it

makes

us

into

something

other

than

we

have

been,

but

rather

as an

end

in

itself

consonant

with

both

our

proper

identity

and the

arete

(excellence)

that

belongs

to

us

in

the actual

ization of

our

eudaimonia

or

shining

forth.

This is theAristotelian

heritage

of

politics

today:

it is

a

specific

and

particular

place,

among others,

where

we

become

truly

human. And

for

Aristotle

it

goes

much further

than

we

today

may

be comfortable

with: he

says

we

may

somehow fail

to

exist

as

properly

human

without

becoming

a

friend.

(Could

we

imagine saying

that

someone

is "not human"

because

of

being

friendless?)

Whether

we

find

Aristotle's view

compelling

remains

important

for

us,

but better

to

think it

through

than

to

sanitize Aristotelian

notions of

friendship

and

humanity

so as

to

bolster

our own

experiments

in

political living.

Indeed,

and

again,

recog

nizing

this

question

(of

whether

Aristotle's view is

compelling

for

us)

is

part

of the exercise of

thinking throughwhy

and how

we

approach

something

like

"Aristotle

on

friendship."

Discussing

arete

(excellence)

this

way

makes

it

sound

as

though

the indi

vidual

is

not

a

"finished"

being,

and is

only

ever

emerging

into his

or

her

possibilities

through

various

activities,

as

though

these

"possibilities"

are

simply

akin

to

"things"

that

we

somehow "have."

A

life of

eating

ice

cream

does

not

bring

excellence

or

fitness,

ut

a

lifeof devotion

to

excellence

might.

One

can

become

excellent,

which

presumptively

says

that

one

exists

initially

in

its absence. Just

as

courage

is

gained through

the

performance

of

coura

geous

deeds,

so

toowith

excellence.

That

is,

one

begins by being

called forth

to

arete,

to

become it.

To

understand how

one

becomes

excellent,

we

need

to

recall

that for

Aristotle the

individual "becomes"

other thanwho he

or

she

initially

is. This is the

question

of

identity:

how

we

become excellent

as

who

we

most

truly

re.45

But

this

is the

life of

politics:

the

polis

is the

pole

of

existence,

we

revolve

(pelein)

around it nd take

our

bearing

and

being

from

it.

To

say

we

exist

in

a

profound

otherness

forAristotle is

simply

to

say

that

we come

to

be who

we are

precisely

because of

being

granted

the

space

in







768

Political

Theory

37(6)

which

to

shine

forth efore

others,

our

peers

and friends.

Political

friendship,

in the

Aristotelian

polis,

is

always already

the

possibility

that

friendship

is.

V.

Becoming

Excellent and

Human

Among

OthersrThe

Polity

and

Friendship

The

excellence

that

belongs

to

being

human,

the

ousia

of

being

human,

is

at

once

also

the

telos:

eudaimonia.

What

is

it

to

stand

before

others,

and how

is

it

related

to

who

we

properly

are? Aristotle breaks

with

the

traditional

Greek

understanding:

the

perfection

of the human

is

not

articulated

over

against

the

divine,

but rather

occurs

as

a

differentiation

of

human

from

animal

only

among

and with

other

human

beings

in the

light

of

day.46

And

it

is

not

sociability

but

political

existence

that

matters

because

mere

associa

tion

with others

is

not

sufficient

for the

kind

of bond

one

must

share

with

a

fellow of

one's

polity.

Hence

Aristotle

is

clear

that

a

proper

polity

must not

be

too

large,

nor

simply

an

enlarged

oikos.

To

flourish

only

makes

sense

among

others

who

in

some sense

know

you

and

know

who

you

are,

which

is

why

no one can

be human outside

of the

polity

Aristotle's

proof

of this

lies

in the

peculiar

way

we are

with

our

friends

in

the

polity,

in

our own

moments

of

excellence

that

lead

us

to

flourish.

We

are

struck

by

the

phenomena

of

this

world,

and

even

though

we

are

conscious

of

our

own

perceiving

of the

world and

our

own

contemplation

of

it,

we are

not

aware

of ourselves

in

a

complete

fashion,

for

we

lack

nous

with

respect

to

ourselves.

We

are,

in

some

peculiar

way,

unable

to

see

ourselves

in

the

way

that others

do:

we

do

not

properly

see

ourselves

as

others

can

and

do

47

That

is

to

say,

it is

not

possible

to

perceive

one's

own

"shining,"

since

one's

shining

is

not

for

oneself but

for others.

The

sense one has

of

one's own

shining

is

restricted

precisely

because,

in

shining (being

eudaimon),

one

is

not

absorbed

in

shining

but

is

instead bound

up

in

the

activity

that

llows

one

to

become

who

one

is.

If

I

perceive

myself

flourishing,

I

am

suddenly

no

long

flourishing,

but

merely

a

spectator

to

myself.

Friends

see

us

in

ways

we

cannot

see

ourselves.48

This

is

important

not

only

because

it

specifies

some

thing

of

human

fmitude,

but

also of

the

way

an

other

can

be

there

for

us

in

a

way

that

we

cannot

be for

ourselves:

friends

are

"other selves"

precisely

because

they

see

something

important

about

us.

Only

because

they

do

can

they

be there

for

us

or

stand

as

a

witness

to

the

particular

excellence

we

embody,

which

is

another

way

of

being

there

for

us.

Aristotelian

finitude

is

the

ground

of

friendship,

that

we can

be

other.49

egel

saw

this

as

the

partial

ity

of

consciousness,

and the

necessarily

one-sided

essence

of

dialogue.

But

Aristotle

hangs

human

one-sidedness

on

our

finitude

as

integral

to

friendship







Bryan

769

and

flourishing,

such

that

not

perceiving

or

grasping

our

own

excellence is

what authorizes the

polls by making

it

the site

of

greatness.50

Just

as

we

cannot

perceive

how

funny

or

humorous

we

are,

we

cannot

perceive

our

sor

rows

or

longings

in

quite

the

same

way

that the

friend

can

and does: this is

the latent

possibility

of

being

a

friend 51

Our

sorrow

is

of

course

always

our

own,

and

the solitude

of

sorrow

turns

us

both

away

and

toward

others.

They

can

be

there

for

us

precisely

because

they

are

not in

the

same

place.

Like

courage,

which

appears

only

when

a

courageous

act

becomes

necessary,

friendship

appears

when

we are

called

forth

to

be therewith

and for

others.

To

become excellent with

and for

others,

Aristotle

grounds friendship's

possibility

in

dialogue

because

friendship

both

makes

proper

dialogue

and

contemplation

possible

while also

requiring dialogue

as

its

own

possibility.

The human

is

the

political

animal

because

of

logos,

and

it is the

logos

that

allows

us

to

properly

come

to

presence

before each other.This

is

why

friend

ship

is

both

arete

on

its

own

and

yet

required

for

flourishing.

It

is

a

fitness

required

for

the

fullness of

shining

forth.

Finitude

is

the

key

to

friendship

for

Aristotle

not

simply

because

we see

others

in

a

light

other

than

they

see

themselves (and for that reason can "be there"with and for others), but

because

in

being

there

we

can

say

something

to

them that

they

cannot

say

to

themselves,

something

that

they

cannot

help

but

have

missed.

Friends

are

"other

selves"

in

other

bodies,

but

they

have the benefit

of

"seeing"

us

in

much

the

same

way

as we are seen

by

the

daimon

that

calls

us

to

be who

we

are.

In

eudaimonia

we

shine

forth

in

our

excellence

among

others,

and

others

see

us as

blessed

in

the

light

of

the

daimon

or

god.

As

a

form of

excellence,

we

can

understand

friendship

both

in

itself and

what it is excellent for. In someways it is easy to say thatfriendshipmust be

excellent

in

itself

because

it

is

what

the

good

human

being

does,

and

is thus

pursued

for its

own

sake. But it is

not

possible

to

pursue

"friendship"

in

the

abstract,

since

we

can

only

ever

be

before others

as

friends,

and hence

it

is

not

clear how

friendship

is

"pursued"

for its

own

sake

at

all.We

do

not

stand

in

a

relation

to

friendship

such that

we

can

pursue

it;

the

best

we can

do

is

pursue

a

friendship

with

someone

in

particular,

which

we

do

by being

there

with

and

for

him

or

her.

To

say

it

is

pursued

for its

own

sake

and

forwhat it

produces will only mystify theexperience of friendship throughabstraction.

Friendship

produces

and

is

produced

by dialogue.

Through

dialogue

we

come

to

thoughts,

and

to

a

moment

of

wordless,

even

breathless,

contempla

tion.

During contemplation,

our

thoughts,

as

the

motion

of the soul toward

the

wordless

state

of

nous,

move

from

occurring

with

others

to

a

moment in

which

we

each

stand

before

the

kosmos. Just

as our

participation

in

the

good

is

not

a

"taking"

or

"portioning"

of

the

good,

but

our

embodiment of

it,

so







770

PoliticalTheory

7(6)

too

does

friendship bring

forth

our

participation

in

the

good: friendship

delimits

a

space

between themultitude

and

the

singular

in

which

we

stand

not

only

before others

but

before

the

kosmos

in

a

moment

of

pure

isolation.

For

Aristotle

(as

for

Plato),

the friend is

integral

to

the

revelation

that

truth,

as

aletheia,

is.52

That

revelation,

however,

can

only

ever

be one's

own,

and

its

possibility

is

something

that

belongs

to

who

we are

at

any

given

moment,

just

as our

allegiance

to

ourselves and

others

is

always already

a

possibility,

the

possibility,

for

us.

The

way

friendship

stands

as a

possibility

tells of the

faithful

striving

of the human

to

flourishwith

others,

to

stand

in

the

space

of

the

polis

that

is constituted

by

such

standing.

But if

no one

stands

forth,

this

possibility

fails

to

properly

actualize,

and

yet

without

ever

becoming

an

impossibility.

Or could

the

possibility

of

friendship

itselfbe another

possibil

ity

that

surges

and recedes?

Conclusion:"...ThereAre

No

Friends"

It

is

curious,

then,

that ristotle would

say

something

like

Diogenes

has him

saying, that "there are no Friends." For it seems like a statement about the

actuality

of

affairs,

while the

analysis

of

friendship

suggests

that

friendship

exists

in

its

possibility

not

in

its

actuality.

It

remains

a

far

cry

from

saying

that

friendship

is

not

possible.

In this

essay

I

have

tried

to

articulate the

ground

of

Aristotelian

friendship

in the

possibility

of

becoming

a

friend.

This

possibility

is

grounded

in

the

shared

appreciation

of

the

good,

and

Aristotle

recognized

its

rarity.

He

understood this

rarity

as

showing

some

thing

precious

about

friendship,

and

insofar

as

friendship

was

possible

at

all,

it llowed for thegood

to

gather and share inthe sightofwhat isgood beneath

the firmament.

On

the

basis of

what

has

been said

here,

friendship

need

not

be

thought

of

as

amenable

to

a

typology,

or as

something

we

have

that

pro

vides

a

basis for

a

politics

as

governing.

Friendship

is

something

that lies

ahead

of

us,

as

a

possibility

for

us.

And

even

when

friendship

is

"actual"

it

remains

still

only

ever

a

possibility

for

shining

before others.

Beyond

this

one

worries

that

we

want to

ground

our

politics

this

way.

Based

on

the

foregoing,

then,

if

we

think

friendship

is said

to

be

a

foun

dation for today's democratic politics, it is clear thatwe must no longer be

talking

about Aristotle?for

the

possibility

of

friendship

as

the

possibility

of

politics

is

no

longer

as

it

was.

Why

turn to

Aristotle

in the

service of

today?

Our

nostalgia

can

edify

us

without

being

vengeful.

If

we are

to

follow

Aristotle

(and

perhaps

we

should

not),

we are

not

friends

when

we

help

others

that

way.

This is

not to

say

that

such

actions

are

not

necessary

or

desirable

(what

self-respecting

society

cannot

afford

to

provide

for those

in







Bryan

77I

need?),

but

that

we

cannot think that

a

moment

of

"friendship"

has

existed.

Nor can we honestly imagine that a Senate debate shows anything like

friendship.

It

is

ordinary,

modern

policy

debate.

If

we were

to

take

Aristotle

seriously

at

all,

it

would be

to

avoid

looking

for

friendship

in

these

places,

just

as we

would

not

be

looking

for

politics

(in

today's

sense)

there either.

Today

we

ordinarily

think

of

our

friends

and

friendships

as

chosen,

not

won,

like

most

other

things.

The friend in

today's

world

may

not

be the

long-standing acquaintance,

and

may

be,

in

some

sense,

the

stranger.

The

one

we are

unacquainted

with,

the

one

we

are

not

familiar with.

The friend

isnot a familymember, but someone else, "a friend inneed." The person

who

sees us as we

are

not,

and

can

respond

with

what

is

called

for

is the

nurse,

the

teacher,

the

physician,

and

the

bureaucrat.

The

stranger

who

comes

to

us

in

an

hour of need-this

"generalized

other"53?who

stands

in

a

relation of

anonymity

to

us

(are

we

not

all

more

and

more

anonymous?),

is

identified

only by

roles:

paramedic,

mother,

police

officer, librarian,

waiter,

entertainer.

But

they

all

come

to

us

with

gestures

of

some

form,

inviting

us

to

dialogue,

and

perhaps

even

there

lingers

a

possibility

for

contemplating

the kind of existence we seem to share. To say "my friends, there are no

friends"

may

have

nothing

to

do with

contradiction,

and

everything

to

do

with

dismissing

from

our

minds

an

antiquated

understanding

of

friendship,

of

one

who

comes

along

and

sees us as

no

others

see

us,

of

those

who

are

there for

us.

Where Nietzsche invertsAristotle's

understanding

by

claiming

that

the

enemy

makes

us our

best,

and

Derrida

conceives of

friendship's

promise

(and

any

other relation

with others for that

matter)

as

something

"at

hand" that

we can

examine rather than

fleeting

and

ahead

of

us,54

we

have

to

look furtherafield to think through friendship's possibility in relation to

Diogenes's

invocation.

Friendship's possibility

may

reside

in

kind

of

hope

fulness,

longing,

prayer,

or

promise:

but

if

we

house

friendship's

possibility

there,

are we

not at

once

chastened

by

the

wherewithal of

promises?

"To

breed

an

animal

with the

right

to

make

promises,

isn

i

this the

question

that

nature

has

posed

with

man?"55

And with that

we see

that

we

do

not

escape

moral

ground

with architectures of what

friendshipmight

hold

for

politics

for

us

today.

Aristotle requires that

we

find such possibilities inexistent beings

or

situ

ations.

But

what solace

can

the

thought

of

Aristotle be

to

anyone

who

sees

the

politics

of

an

age

as

friendless,

as

the

polity

as

something

other

than the

place

of

shining

and

belonging.

Does it

make

sense

to

speak

of

friendship

and

politics

any

longer?

I

turn to

the

poet

Rilke

because he

gestures

to

the

moments

that render

friendship's possibility today:







772

Political

Theory

37(6)

. . .

there is

only

one

solitude,

and

it

is

vast,

heavy,

difficult

to

bear,

and

almost

everyone

has hourswhen

he

would

gladly exchange

itfor

any

kind

of

sociability,

however

trivial

or

cheap,

for the

tiniest utward

agreement

with

thefirst

erson

who

comes

along,

the

most

unworthy

..

,56

While

we

might

initially

spot

contradiction,

moments

of solitude

among

oth

ers

can

let

wonder

ring

at

the conditions

under

which

the

self

can

be

a

friend

of itself and

another,

can

be there for itself

and

for

others,

can

be

at

home in

the

world,

can

imagine

the

pain

of others

but

not

feel

it,

r can

in

some

sense

avail itself of others. The condition of the

possibility

of

friendship,

with

oneself

or

with

another,

is

a

profound

otherness

or

distance between the

two

who would

be friends.

The

man

.

. .

who

is

in

love

with

goodness

can

never

afford

to

lead

a

solitary

life,

and

yet

his

living

with

others and

for

others

must

remain

essentially

without

testimony

and lacks firstof

all

the

company

of

him

self.He is

not

solitary,

but

lonely

.

.

,57

Today's

friend

is

a

refuge

and bulwark

against

massification and

anonymity,

witnessed

in

Thoreau's sorrowful observation

that

our

lives

are

lead with

a

quiet

desperation.

Diogenes's

invocation of Aristotle

can

thus be

more

despairing

and

somehow

worse

than

simply

being

about

the

absence

of

friendship.

If

some

how

linked

to

politics,

as

escape,

refuge,

or

the

(only) possibility

of

shining,

then

it

becomes

an,

or

the,

uncanny

moment

of

politics precisely

because

it

underwrites

the

fragility

of

our

place

with others

as a

vulnerable

possibility

that

fades. For with

this

onemust

wonder

not

just

at

the

conditions

of

cross

cultural

communication,

but

at

the

very

possibility

of

being

understood

by

another.

In

theorizing friendship

perhaps

we

(merely) struggle

to

keep

poli

tics

alive,

as

something

we

imagine existing

in

a

particular

way,

so

as

to

grasp

the loss of

a

certain kind

of closeness

beyond

intimacy.

It

may

be said

that

such

a

notion of

friendship's

possibility

as

fragile

is

bleak

or

misplaced,

that

we

should

maintain

hope

for

politics

as a

place

for

levelheadedness,

such

that

Diogenes's provocation

could

only

ever

be

the

beginning

of

a

solil

oquy

on a

friendship

that

is

never

public,

or

where friends

are

named and

provoked

as

friendless

only

to

gather

near.

The

possibility

of

these

medita

tions

(i.e.,

a

possibility

that

belongs

to

them) suggests

something

entirely

differentfor

friendship

and

politics.

Recall

that

lato,

in the

"Seventh

Letter,"

discloses

a

certain kind

of

nostalgia

or

experience

of loss?that

something

ended

with the

death

of Socrates and

was no

longer possible,

and

that

a

very







Bryan

773

different

form

of

activity

and

being

with

others

came

in

its

place;

that

is,

the

Academy.

So

in the anecdote

of

Aristotle,

we

might recognize

that

something

was

perhaps

lurking

not in

its

diminished

possibility

but

in the

sense

that

friendship

as

possibility

does

not

require

that

there

actually

be

a

friend

or

friends.

Or

might

we

go

even

further?

Might

we

wonder

at

the

very

possibil

ity

of

friendship's

possibility?

This doubled

sense

of

possibility

may

be

the

sorrowful

legacy

of

Aristotelian

political thought,

but

I

would

argue

only

if

we

turn

to

political

theory

without

recognition

of

our own

nostalgia

in

doing

so.

We

do

not "use"

political theory,

or

turn to

it

to

solve

our

problems,

but

to

think

through

who

we

have

become

and

are

becoming,

to

think

through

what

we are

doing

when

we

speak thusly.

nd

thus

perhaps

the

only thing

we

stand

to

learn is

our

own

nostalgia,

or own

placelessness,

and

that,

when

we

learn

it,

it

is

something

very

important

to

have

learned.

In

learning

what

we

no

longer

have,

we

also

learnwhat

will

count

for

us

as

some

kind

of

possibil

ity

of and for

politics

in

our

time.

"My

friends,

there

are no

friends."

Have

we

not

felt

this?The world

"turn

ing"

and

"moving"

as

though

relations

are

lost

in

history?58

The

thought

placed

in

the

mouth ofAristotle invites

us

to

think that

he

saw

the

decay

of

the

politics

of

his

time

in the

very

way

it

was

becoming

harder

and harder

to

be

there

for

others.

Diogenes's

invocation

of

friendship

invites

nostalgia. By

thinking

through

the

place

of

friendship

in

Aristotle,

we

necessarily

also

ask

how

our

vision

of

politics

is

informed

by

possibility,

for

possibility

is

some

thing

other

than the

courses

of

action

that I

may

choose.

It

iswho

I

stand

to

become

with

and

before

others. And

I

wonder

if this

kind of

friendship,

the

kind

that is

fleetingly

recognized

in

my

discussion of

Aristotle,

may

be

a

pos

sibility

that

slowly

sets,

like

the

sun,

casting longer

shadows with

beautiful

purloined

rays

of

remembrance?all

the timewhile

night

approaches.

Acknowledgements

The

author

would

like

to

sincerely

thank Mark

Antaki,

Wendy

Brown,

Sagi

Cohen,

Marianne

Constable,

Mary

Dietz,

Jill

Frank,

Warren

Magnusson,

James

Tully,

Robert

Nichols,

Philippe

Nonet,

Shalini

Satkunanandan,

and three

anonymous

readers for

thoughtful

discussions and/or

commentary.

Notes

1.

Diogenes

Laertius,

Lives,

vol.

I,

trans.

R. D. Hicks

(Cambridge,

MA:

Harvard

University

Press,

1980),

5:21.

Important

discussions of

Diogenes's

account

occur

notably

in

Nietzsche,

Human,

All-Too-Human,

trans.

R.

J.

Hollingdale

(Cambridge,

K:

CambridgeUniversity

ress,

1986),

ss.

376,

531;

and

especially

and

at

length

in

Jacques

Derrida,

The

Politics

of

Friendship,

trans.

G.

Collins







774_PoliticalTheory

37(6)

(London:

Verso,

1997).

It

is also

notable

that

Aristotle's

statement

is

spelled

out

rather

fully

by

Aristotle himself in his

Nicomachean

Ethics,

trans.

H.

Rackham,

Loeb edition

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press,

1934),

Bk.

IX,

X,

6,

1171al5-17

(hereinafter

cited

as

NE);

in

the Eudemian

Ethics,

trans.

H.

Rackman,

Loeb edition

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press,

1981),

7:12,

1245b20;

and

to

a

lesser

extent

in The "Art"

of

Rhetoric,

trans.

J. H.

Freese,

Loeb

edition

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press,

1959),

2:4.

2.

Cf.

Marshall

MacGregor,

"Greek

in

its

Anecdotage,"

Studies and Diversions in

Greek

Literature

London:

Kennikat

Press,

1937),

235.

3.

I

have

worked

across a

number of translations of The

Nicomachean

Ethics,

and

specify

which

translations

I

use

or am

guided

by

for

specific quotations.

I

have

been

aided

tremendouslyy

H. G.

Liddell

and

R.

Scott,

A

Greek-English

exicon,

with

Supplement,

ed. E.

A.

Barber,

9th ed.

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1940).

4. These

interpretations

are

indeed

legion,

added

to

yearly.

But

for

eloquent

and

careful

elaborations,

see

John

M.

Cooper,

"Aristotle

on

Friendship,"

in

Essays

on

Aristotle

Ethics,

ed. Amelie

Oksenberg

Rorty

(Berkeley:University

of

Califor

nia

Press,

1980)

301-40;

Jill

rank,

A

Democracy

of

istinction: Aristotle nd the

Work

of

Politics

(Chicago: University

of

Chicago Press, 2005) chap. 5;

Hannah

Arendt,

The Human Condition

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1958),

chap. 1?specifically

p.

13.

5. On

this

distinction,

see

Walter

Otto,

The Homeric

Gods,

trans. M.

Hadas

(London:

Thames

&

Hudson,

1955),

43-60.

6. This

view

of

the

impossibility

f

proper

friendship

n

the

grounds

that

t

must

still

be convenient

or

useful

is found

in

Lorraine

Pangle's

discussion

in

Aristotle and the

Philosophy of

Friendship

(Cambridge,

UK:

CambridgeUniversity

Press,

2003),

chap.

2. It

should become

clear

why

I

most

respectfully disagree?friendship

is

not

something

one

"has."

If

friendship

is

"advantageous,"

then

it is

something

achieved

on

the

way

to

another

end,

and

thus

something

that

we

can

"have"

in

a

sense.

If

it is

this,

hen t

s

not

an

end

unto

itself,

ut

rather

something

hat

e can

gain

and

then

get

beyond

or

simply eep,

as

though

t

were

just

another

art

of

our

activities nd

daily dealings.

hilia

must

be

not

just

more

than

his,

ut

beyond

it

entirely.

7.

Philia,

not

eros.

See

Cooper,

"Aristotle

on

Friendship,"

334n.

8. Cf.

Maclntyre,

After

Virtue

(Notre

Dame,

IN:

University

of Notre Dame

Press,

1981)

148ff; rendt,

TheHuman

Condition,

chap.

2,

section

6.

9. See

Maclntyre,

After

Virtue,

155.

10.

Frank,

Democracy of

Distinction,

24.

11.

Ibid,

162.

12.

Arendt,

Human

Condition,

157.

13.

Ibid.,

243.

It

is

interesting

hat

rendt claims

that

friendship

s

without

intimacy

even

though

ristotle

claims that such

friendships

equire

intimacy

o

bloom:







Bryan

775

"Perfected

[or

"finished"

or

"proper"-te/e/<z]

friendship

is that

between

the

good,

who resemble

each other

in

excellence

[arete]

. . .

Such

friendships

are

rare

because

the

good

are

few.

And

they require

time and

intimacy.

. .

."

NE,

VIII,

iii,

6;

VIII,

iii,

8.

(Guidance

taken rom . Rackam's

translation

n

the

1934

Loeb

edition.)

I

am

not

convinced

that Arendt understood

a

stark

differentiation

between

perfected

and

political

friendship,

as

she

seems

to

eschew both

use

and

pleasurable

friendships

as

somehow

not

proper.

See Human

Condition,

192-207.

14. There

is

nostalgia

in

looking

to

our

words

as

well,

but is

not to

be

strategically

avoided. One

can

heed words

for

their

provenance

without

seeking

their

origin.

The word

itself,

what it

says,

is lost

to

us

if

we

think

it

the

referent of

an

elemental

thought

or

experience,

for the word remains

somehow,

and

mysteriously,

apo

phantic.

I

admit

there

is

more

to

this

matter

than

can

be addressed

in

this

essay.

See Martin

Heidegger, Being

and

Time,

trans.

J.

Macquarrie

and E.

Robinson

(New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1962),

s.

7.

15.

If

anything,

Aristotle

was

keen

to

clarify

the

sense

of

the words he

used.

And

while

I

take

my

bearings

for

such

thinking

rom

variety

of scholars

of

theGreek

world,

I

have been

most

influenced

by

the

reading

of the

Greeks

in

general,

and Plato

and

Aristotle

in

particular, given byHans-Georg Gadamer,

Martin

Heidegger,

and

Jacques

Derrida.

16.

Aristotle,

De

Interpretatione,

chap.

5,

6.

17.

See

"Doxa" in Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

366. See also

Plato,

Gorgias,

527B,

and

contrast

the

doxasophia

of the

sophist

in

Plato,

Sophist,

233B.

These

accounts

tell

us

that the doxa of

a

view

or an

opinion

is

housed in that

it

seems

to

be

true,

though

is

not

necessarily.

Liddell and Scott

note

that

dok

eow

(and

dokein)

is

a

root

of

doxa,

as

the

opinion,

belief,

fancy,

or

expectation

is

grounded (rooted?)

in the semblance

that

belongs

to

visions.

18.

NE, VIII,

ii,

1.

Greek from

Aristotle,

Ethica

Nicomachea,

ed. J.

Bywater

(Clarendon,

UK: Oxford

University

Press,

1894);

guidance

in

the translation

from editions

by

J.

L.

Akrill

and H. Rackham.

19.

While this

is

a

basic

point

of

interpretation

for

Heidegger,

it

is

hardly

con

troversial:

see

Thomas

A.

Szlezak,

"For

Whom

is Plato

Writing,"

in

Reading

Plato,

trans.

G. Zanker

(London:

Routledge,

1999).

See

also

Martin

Heidegger,

Plato

s

"Sophist,

"

trans.

R.

Rojcewicz

and

A.

Schuwer

(Bloomington:

Indiana

University

Press,

1997),

7-8,

105,

421.

See

also

Hans-Georg

Gadamer,

"The

Question

at

Issue,"

in

The Idea

of

the

Good

in

Platonic-Aristotelian Philoso

phy,

trans.

P.

Christopher

Smith

(New

Haven: Yale

University

Press,

1986),

7-32.

20.

Aristotle

explainswhy

we

begin

with what

is

before

our

senses

in

orderof

time,

even

though

he

intelligible

ealmhas

more

truth,

nd hence

the

primacy

of theo

retical

over

practical

activity:







776

PoliticalTheory 7(6)

In

itself then the

prior

is better

intelligible

than

the

posterior,

e.g.

the

point

better than the

line,

the line than

the

surface,

the surface than the

body,

and

in

the

same

way

also

unity

better

than

number.

Similarly

also the

letter better

than

the

syllable.

To

us,

however,

at

times

it

comes

along

the

opposite

way;

for

the

body

falls

most

under

the

senses,

and

the

surface

more

than

the

line,

and

the

line

more

than the

point.

Men

as

theymostly

are

know the

likes

of

these

(the

posterior)

before;

for

they

the

posterior)

are

to

be

learned

y

any

intellect

(dianoia)

that as hit

upon

them,

hereas theother

the

prior)

only

by

a

pen

etrating

(akribes)

and

superior

intellect.

Aristotle,

Topics,

VI,

iv,

141b6-14. Translated

from E.

S. Forster's

Greek

text

in

the oeb

edition;

guidance

in the

translation rom

Philippe

Nonet.

21.

I

pose

these

two

possibilities

as

differing interpretations

of eudaimonia. "Flour

ishing"

is

decidedly

secular

and

seems

to

leave

us

only

with the

characteristics

of the

individual,

whereas

a

proper

translation

of

eudaimonia

requires

that

we

hear the "blessedness" of

eu-,

and

the

presence

of the

divine

in

daimon. Thus

a

better

translation,

though

difficult

to

grasp

for

the

ear

of

today,

would be

"bless

edness

in

the

sight

of the

gods."

See

Arendt,

The Human

Condition, 192-93ff,

193n;

Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

596.

22. Cf. "Doxa" and "dokeow"

in

Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

366;

NE,

VIII, ii,

1.

23.

NE, VIII,

ii,

2.

24.

Cf.

Gadamer,

"The

Question

at

Issue,"

in

The Idea

of

the Good.

25.

NE, VIII,

ii,

4,

1156a3-5,

trans. H.

Rackham.

I

prefer

Rackham's translation

to

others

as

it

tracks three elements

present

in

the

Greek,

which,

oddly,

most

others

synthesize

into two?the first

two

expressed

as

"mutually

recognized

as

bearing

goodwill"?which hardly

captures

it.

26. As

he

notes at

NE,

VIII,

iii,

6,

the

perfected

form of

friendship

estin,

or

"is,"

among

the

good.

27.

NE, VIII,

iii, 6,

1156b6-l

1.

Greek

text

from

ed.

J.

Bywater,

translation

guided

by

H. Rackham's

(Loeb edition).

28. See Liddell

and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

1221.

29. See Martha

Nussbaum,

The

Fragility

of

Goodness

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press,

1986),

386. And

also,

see

the

helpful Jacques

Derrida,

"Ousia

and Gramme:

Note

on a

Note

from

Being

and

Time,"

in

Margins of Philosophy,

trans.

Alan

Bass

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1982),

29-68,

at

51-52.

The translation

s also defensible

by

the

lights

f Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

1069. Allan Silverman also

suggests

an

ambiguity

to

"essences"

that is

found

already

in

Plato,

as

ambiguity

that is

not

quite

"essences" and

not

quite

"par

ticularities." See

Allan

Silverman,

The

Dialectic

of

Essences:

A

Study of

Plato

s







Bryan

777

Metaphysics

(Princeton,

J:

Princeton

University

Press,

2002),

specifically

the

"Introduction."

Many

translations of Aristotle often

take the

question

of the

ousia

of

a

citizen

to

be his "nature" rather than "substance"

when

in

fact the

question

of

citizenship

revolves around who the citizen is

as

what he

is

(it

was

only

ever

"he"

for the

Greeks).

But

phusis

is

not

ousia.

On

this,

see

Frank,

Democracy

of

Distinc

tion,

2

In;

Heidegger,

"On the

Essence

and

Concept

of

Phusis

in

Aristotle's

Phys

ics

B,

I"

Pathmarks,

trans. T.

Sheehan

(Cambridge,

UK:

Cambridge University

Press,

1998)

183-230.

30. As

W. K.

C. Guthrie

notes,

Aristotle's

pursuit

of the

"identity"

of

beings

as some

how

corequisite

with

their

essence

and/or their

substance

was

not

his

alone,

and

was

his

way

of

being

true

to

the Plato's

question

regarding

the immanence of

form:

see

Guthrie,

The Greeks and their

Gods

(Boston:

Beacon,

1955),

355-73.

Werner

Marx

echoes the notion that the

question

of

the

proper

translation

(and

interpretation)

of

ousia

was

not

only

a concern

for

Heidegger,

but

consistent

with

a

variety

of

interpretations

of Aristotle.

Werner

Marx,

Heidegger

and

the Tra

dition,

trans.

T.

Kisiel and

M. Greene

(Evanston,

IL:

Northwestern

University

Press,

1971),

4-5.

31. This

is

why,

for

Aristotle,

ousia

ranks

higher

or more

essential than

idea,

and

thus

constitutes the fundamental

differentiation of Aristotelian

and

Platonic

thought.

See

Metaphysics,

V, 8;

Categories,

5;

Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

1069.

32.

NE,

VIII,

iv,4-5.

33.

"Hexis"?Liddell and

Scott,

Greek-English

Lexicon,

479.

Derrida also

notes

the

sense

and

place

of hexis

for Aristotle:

Derrida,

Politics

of

Friendship,

16.

34.

A

hexis is

opposed

to

both dunamis and

energeia

because it is

actual

in

its

poten

tiality

and

yet

is

by

definition

potential

only

because

it

is

actualized

potential.

Cf.

Liddell

and

Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 373, 458,

and

479.

35. "Such

friendships

are

of

course

rare,

because such

men are

few. Moreover

they

require

time and

intimacy

..."

Aristotle,

NE,

I,

iii.

It

is

a

short distance

from these

words

to

"My

friends,

there

are no

friends."

36.

Aristotle clarifies

these

in

both the

Physics

and

Metaphysics.

See

Metaphysics,

Books

I-IX,

trans.

H.

Tredennick,

Loeb edition

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

Uni

versity

Press,

1933);

Physics

I-IV,

trans.

P.

H.

Wicksteed and F. M.

Cornford,

Loeb

edition

(Cambridge,

MA:

Harvard

University

Press,

1929);

Physics

V-VIII,

trans.

P. H.

Wicksteed and F. M.

Cornfor,

Loeb

edition

(Cambridge,

MA:

Harvard

University

Press,

1934).

I

am

assisted

in

this

by

Heidegger,

Aristotle's

"Meta

physics"

1-3,

trans.

W

Brogan

and P.

Warnek

(Bloomington:

Indiana

University

Press,

1995).

37.

Giorgio

Agamben,

"On

Potentiality"

Potentialities:

Collected

Essays

in

Philoso

phy,

trans.

D.

Heller-Roazen

(Stanford,

CA:

Stanford

University

Press,

1999)

179-80.







778_PoliticalTheory

37(6)

38. Cf.

Physics,

III,

i;

Aristotle's refutationfZeno

hinges

upon

thedifferentiationf

potentiality

from

actuality,

and

on

establishing

the existence of the

former;

that

is,

that

a

dunamis exists

as a

being

and that

motion is

only

a

mode of

being.

39. Cf.

Michel

Foucault,

The

Hermeneutics

of

the

Subject:

Lectures

at

the

College

de

France,

1981-82,

trans.

G. Burchell

(New

York:

Palgrave

Macmillan,

2005)

17,26.

40.

NE, X,

vii,

1177b. See also

Guthrie,

Greeks and their

ods,

367ff;

tto,

Homeric

Gods,

236.

41.

Cf.

Liddell

and

Scott,

596. This

"shining"

is

capturedby

Heidegger

in

his lec

tures

on

Antigone:

Heidegger,

Holderlin

s

Hymn

"The

Ister,

"

trans.

W. McNeill

and

J.

Davis

(Bloomington,

IN: Indiana

University

Press,

1996),

91,

94-6.

One

must

recall that

the

presence

of the

gods

and

spirit-beings

in

the

everyday

was

not

a

sign

of

religiosity

n

the

sociological

sense

in

which

we

speak,

but

simply

the

way

beings

were

properly

manifest:

see

Walter

Otto,

The Homeric

Gods: The

Spiritual

Significance of

Greek

Religion,

trans.

Moses Hadas

(London:

Thames

&

Hudson,

1954),

chap.

4.

42. Arendt

characterizes the ristotelian

olls

this

way

(see

TheHuman

Condition,

26-37,

but

see

207-11),

but later characterizes the

political

space

not

as

a

separate

space

into which human action

comes

to

shine but rather

as

the

very space

consti

tuted

by

the

ction itself

see

On

Revolution,

chap.

6).

43.

NE,VIII,

i.

44.

Note

that Derrida conceives of "the friend"

this

way: Derrida,

The Politics

of

Friendship, chap.

1. The

fragility

of the friend is better

captured

in his medita

tions

on

the

gift

and what is owed:

see

Derrida,

Given Time:

I.

Counterfeit Money,

trans.

Peggy

Kamuf

(Chicago: University

of

Chicago

Press,

1992),

6-32.

45. See

Jacques

Derrida,

Ear

of

the Other:

Otobiography,

Transference,

Transla

tion:

Texts and Discussions with

Jacques

Derrida,

trans.

Avital Ronnel and

Peggy

Kamuf,

ed. Christie MacDonald

(Lincoln:

University

of Nebraska

Press,

1985),

19ff. nd in

thinking

his

through

t

seems

Butler's

caveat

will

always

keep

us

from

becoming

aware

of

ourselves

as

excellent. See Judith

Butler,

Giving

an

Account

ofOneself

(New

York: Fordham

University

Press,

2005),

38,

where she

writes: "There

are,

then,

several

ways

in

which the

account

I

may

give

of

myself

has the

potential

to

break

apart

and

to

become undermined.

My efforts

to

give

an

account

of

myselffounder

in

part

because

I

address

my

account,

and

in

address

ing

my

account

am

exposed

to

you" Emphasis

added.

46. The transformation of the

subject

with

Aristotle

is

profound,

and

can

be

wit

nessed,

if

nowhere

else,

in

the

way

pre-Platonic

thinkers

placed

the human

in

contrast

with

the

Divine,

while Aristotle

differentiated humans from "other

ani

mals."

Compare

the

portrayal

of the Greek

poets

in

Walter

Otto,

The Homeric

Gods,

trans.

M. Hadas

(London:

Thames &

Hudson,

1955),

231-3,

with Aristo

tle's

description

f the

point

of

inquiry

nto

ature

in

Metaphysics,

XII,

1072b4.







Bryan

779

47.

NE, IX,

iv, 5-7; ix,

7-10;

Also

see

Guthrie,

Greeks and their

Gods,

364-70.

48. NE,IX, ix, 5-10; xi, 2-3.

49.

I

take this

to

be the

sense

and force

of Frank's

discussion of

friendship

s a

unity

grounded

in

multiplicity:

cf.

Frank,

Democracy

of

Distinction,

156-61.

50.

Ibid.,

24.

51.

Helpfully

discussed

andmeditated

upon

by

Peter

Euben,

"The Politics ofNostal

gia

and Theories

of

Loss,"

in

Platonic Noise

(Princeton,

NJ: Princeton

University

Press,

2003),

85-111.

52.

A

question

remains whether

one

can

exist

as a

friend

to

oneself

not

just solely

but at all. This question requires a critical stance of differentiating Aristotle and

Plato

methodologically,

since

we can

grasp

that

friendship

with

oneself

is

per

fect

justice

forPlato

{Republic,

Bk.

IV)

while also

recognizing

the

near

practical

impossibility

of

proper

friendship

with oneself

precisely

because

we

cannot

see

ourselves

completely

Aristotle,

E,

IX):

an

important

uestion

that

ies

beyond

the

purview

of the

thinking

ffered

ere.

53. G.

H.

Mead,

"Play,

the

Game,

and

the Generalized

Other,"

in

Mind,

Self,

and

Society

rom

the

Standpoint

of

the ocial

Behaviorist,

ed. C. W.

Morris

(Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1934), 152-64.

54.

Nietzsche,

Human,

All-Too-Human,

ss.

376, 531;

Jacques

Derrida,

The Politics

of

Friendship,

trans.

G. Collins

(London:

Verso,

2005)

chap.

1.

55.

Nietzsche,

Genealogy

of

Morals, II,

1.

56. R.

M.

Rilke,

"Eighth

Letter,"

Letters

to

a

Young

Poet,

trans.

S. Mitchell.

57.

Arendt,

The Human

Condition,

76.

58. The

sense

of "lost

in

history"

is

captured

beautifully

n

Philippe

Nonet,

"Time

and

Law,"

Theoretical

Inquiries

in Law

8

(January

2007).

Bio

Bradley

Bryan

is theDirector of the

Technology

and

Society

Program,

and

an

Adjunct

Professor

n

the

epartment

of

Political Science

at

the

University

of

Victoria,

Canada. He has also written "Reason's Homelessness:

Rationalization in

Bentham

and

Marx,"

Theory

& Event

(2003),

and

"Property

as

Ontology:

On

Aboriginal

and

English Understandings

of

Ownership,"

Canadian Journal

of

Law and

Jurisprudence

(2000).

Aristotle on friendship's possibility.pdf

Documents

Transcript of Aristotle on friendship's possibility.pdf