ARES The occasional papers of the Centre for Historical ...chacr.org.uk/docs/Ares-Athena4.pdf ·...

The occasional papers of the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research

MAY 2016

4ARES ATHENA&

Faith and the Force: Should the Army

be more alert to the relevance of religion?

RELIGION AND VIOLENT CONFLICT4

“If you don’t understand religion – including the abuse of religion – it’s becoming ever harder to understand our world.” – Lyse Doucet, BBC1

The ‘Religion and Violent Conflict’ workshop hosted by the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR) in March provided a fascinating range of views for the attendees to ponder. Most importantly, there emerged from the discussion a view that religion, for perhaps the considerable majority of the world’s population, is not a discrete activity to be conducted apart from the daily run of people’s lives (which can characterise much of a secular society’s view of religion), but rather is an all-encompassing influence that defines individuals, communities and cultures.

Religion is not just about the spiritual beliefs that one practices, but rather who you believe you are, both singly and collectively. It helps to form personality, character, habit, culture, behaviour, strategy, politics, and laws; in short, it finds its way into every corner of people’s lives.

With this conclusion reached as a result of some quite excellent and insightful presentations, the subsequent debate explored two important angles.

First, how understanding this all-encompassing view of religion helps one to comprehend people’s approach to the world – including how it can drive, generate, contribute to, influence, mitigate or moderate conflict or violence.

Second, how the deeply entrenched gap between a secular world’s view of religion and a religion-centred world-view can be reconciled or, at the very least, understood and negotiated to mutual benefit, rather than simply accepting it as a source of friction or conflict.

This collection of papers is a product of the workshop. It is published on a ‘Chatham House’ basis, and as such is not attributable to any one individual, but is offered as a collection of ‘individual views’. Should authors subsequently wish to use their own papers, attributable to themselves, they are of course free to do so.

Faith and the Force: Foreword

Published by: Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Robertson House, Slim Road, Camberley, Surrey GU15 4NP. Tel: 94261 2644 / 01276 412644

CHACR business partner: NSC, Norwich House, Knoll Road, Camberley, Surrey GU15 3SY. Tel: 01276 678867

Cover and internal photographs: © Crown copyright unless otherwise credited

ares&athena / religion and violent conflict / 2

CONTENTSIntroduction The relationship between religion and violence Three case studies

Lessons learned from Northern Ireland

Lessons learned from Afghanistan

Summary of discussions

Personal reflections: 77 Brigade

Personal reflections: Challenges to military chaplaincy

Conclusion: Some implications for the British Army

03

04

06

10

12

14

16

17

18

1As quoted by Lord David Alton of Liverpool, House of Lords, Motion: Freedom of Religion and Belief, Column 768, 16 July 2015.

ATTENDANCEMr Josh Arnold-Forster, CAMSAI

Lt Col JP Clark, CGS’ CIG

Dr Edward Flint, RMAS

Brig Christopher Ghika, DPersCap

Mr Olivier Grouille, CAMSAI

Imam Asim Hafiz, CDS’ Islamic Advisor

Brig Ben Hughes, ARRC PHQ Engr Chief

Maj Fasiel Iqbal, SAG SCBT

Col Jefferson, DCDC

Brig Rupert Jones, ADOC ACOS

Col Peter Kumik, Asst Comd HQ 77 Bde

Prof Murray Last, UCL

Dr Shiraz Maher, KCL

Dr Roland Marchal, Sciences Po, CERI

Mr Ziya Meral, CHACR

Rev Mike Parker, RMAS Chaplain

Canon David Porter, CoE

Dr Mike Rennie, RMAS

Lt Col Nicholas Serle, SO1 Concepts

Mr Stuart Scott, CAMSAI

Maj Gen (Retd) Andrew Sharpe, CHACR

Maj Gen Skeates, JFC

Maj Tom Oakley, Fd Army Warfare

Ms Amy Taylor, CoE

Col Martin Todd, CHACR

Revd Andrew Totten, ACG 1XX

Mr Malcolm Venning, MoD

Maj Gen Nicholas Welch, ACGS

Col Stuart Williams, D Comd 7Bde

Col Andrew Wood, AH Cap CS

INTRODUCTION“By the twenty-first century, religious believers are likely

to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture.” – Peter Berger,

The New York Times, 1968

“The assumption that we live in a secularised world is false: The world today, with some exceptions... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.” – Peter

Berger, The Desecularization of the World, 1999

Peter Berger is one of the world’s leading sociologists of religion. In the 1960s, he – like many of his contemporaries – forecasted the “death of God”, to borrow Nietzsche’s words. The idea was that the process of secularisation, economic and scientific developments and increasing literacy rates would inevitably mean the decline of religion and that religious belief would be reduced to a private matter for individuals. Europe, particularly Northern Europe, was seen to be following a trajectory that the rest of the world would inevitably follow.

Most similar theories were in due course abandoned, particularly after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and a wave of religious resurgence was observed across the world throughout the 1980s and 1990s, spawning books with titles such as Revenge of God and God’s Century. The reality is that God never died, but the way prominent commentators espousing deeply secularised starting points in Northern Europe and North America viewed the world led to the forecasting of the aforementioned erroneous trajectory. This becomes ever clearer when studies on the importance of religion in today’s world are taken into consideration. For example, research company Gallup surveyed some 114 countries in 2009 and asked respondents the question: “Is religion an important part of your life?”2. The study showed that a global median of 84 per cent say that religion plays an important part in their lives, with that figure passing 90 per cent in some countries.

A quick survey of the Gallup findings reveals some startling insights about our world and our place in it. Only 27 per cent of British respondents think that religion is an important element in their lives, with an overwhelming majority of 73 per cent saying it is not, making the UK one of the most irreligious countries in the world. Which begs the question of how British biases and perceptions shape our analysis, our strategy-making and our understanding of people and issues from other societies, cultures and religions with whom we are engaging.

These are not merely intellectual questions. They cut across worrying developments in the world and have direct implications for the British Army. For example, most recent studies show an increase in religious hostilities and violent conflicts with religious characteristics across the world (see chart above right). How do we analyse such a phenomenon? How do we respond?

When it comes to making sense of religious developments in the world, there are two common mistakes: first, ignoring religion as an important variable and second, buying into simplistic arguments that reduce all of the world’s problems down to an imagined core of religious conviction. Thus, some see no role for religion as a driver and feature of contemporary conflict and highlight other factors such as personal grievances and identities, while others explain violent conflict as inevitable outcomes of religious beliefs.

In order to help the Army develop a more nuanced understanding of the deeply religious world we operate in, CHACR held a workshop at Robertson House on ‘Religion and Violent Conflict’. The aim was not only to challenge assumptions about the role of religion with particular regard for the Army’s engagement in conflicts around the world, but also to reflect on practical ways in which the Army can respond to this critical issue.

This edition of Ares&Athena captures the presentations and discussions conducted during the workshop to allow a wider audience to enter into the debate.


Only 27 per cent of British respondents think that religion is

an important element in their lives, making the UK one of the most irreligious countries in the world

“”

2For a detailed account of the Gallup survey see: “Religiosity Highest in World’s Poorest Nations”, 31 August 2010: www.gallup.com/poll/142727/Religiosity-Highest-World-Poorest-Nations.aspx#1

Year % of world’s population20072012 33%

20%

Year % of countries20072012

76%66%2007

2012

33%20%

39%18%2007

2012

32%7%2007

2012

25%11%2007

2012

18%8%2007

2012

37%30%2007

2012

15%11%2007

2012

Rising tide of religious hostilities, violence and conflictThe number of countries with high religious hostilities has increased by 65% since 2007, rising from 20% of countries in 2007 to 33% in 2012

Religious hostilitiesHigh levels of religious hostilities

Religious hostilities, violence and conflictHigh levels of religious hostilities

Crimes, malicious acts of violence motivated by religious hatred or bias

Individuals or groups used violence or the threat of violence, including so-called honour killings, to try to reinforce religious norms

Women harassed for violating religious dress codes

Mob violence related to religion

Sectarian or communal violence

Religion-related terrorist activities

Religion-related war or armed conflict

Data: Pew Research Center: Religious hostilities reach six-year high (2014)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND VIOLENCE


Britain’s culture, history and educational system all shape our assumptions regarding the place of religion and violent conflict in human experience and the relationship between the two. Thus, any attempt to develop a nuanced understanding of this complex issue has to start with an awareness of the assumptions we in the UK already hold.

When it comes to religion, we have a tendency to think that it is an issue of personal belief, mostly concerning personal morality and life after death. Thus, we see religious institutions and figures as ministers to such personal matters and often feel unease when religious figures make public on social issues. In fact, we feel uneasy talking about religion and personal beliefs in politics. Famously, Alistair Campbell interrupted an interview with Tony Blair that touched on the latter’s religious beliefs with the assertion “we don’t do God”. Thus, it is puzzling for many of us to see how politicians in the US, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia cannot conduct politics without references to religious beliefs and often need to demonstrate an image of personal piety.

In contrast, when we step back from our UK context and take a look at the world and history of Homo sapiens, we see a fundamental role played by religion that captures not just personal space but social and political spaces too.

Religion is ultimately about providing meaning to a world that seems chaotic and disorderly. What lie at the core of religious belief systems are answers to questions such as, “who are we?”, “why are we here?”, “what is happening around us?”, “how shall we live?” and “what gives us hope for a better, safer future?”. These are deeply social and political questions as well as personal. Thus, all societies and all state structures and political ideologies try to answer the same questions. Yet, with their transcendental reference points, hope in the face of immediate chaos and the strong social bonds and solidarities they create, religions arguably play a much more powerful role than ethnic, religious or political visions. That is why often religion (both as law and a unifying force in communities) can assume a central role in the re-creation of order in some failed states.

When it comes to violent conflict, there is a common tendency to think that the ‘other’ is always more violent or evil than ‘us’. Yet, human history reveals a sobering reality: under certain conditions, human beings deploy violence for a wide range of reasons. These range from personal gratification to assertion of interests, protection of resources and one’s own life and country and the advancement of a political cause. The ever-present violent potential of human beings is hidden from the eyesight of the general public by the modern nation state that monopolises the use of force through its professional organisations such as police forces or the armed services. Yet, any condition of chaos or collapse in the rule of law is almost always followed by violence. There is a direct link between criminal violence in our cities and ‘jihadis’ claiming to be fighting imaginary cosmic causes. In fact, a substantial proportion of radicalised youths joining religious extremists

abroad tend to have criminal backgrounds.

Thus, if one starts from erroneous assumptions regarding religion and the human potential for violence, it is an easy mistake to think that religion is to blame for many violent conflicts around the world. The place of religion in some forms of violence cannot be denied, but the critical question is what exactly that place is. When we look at anthropological studies on the emergence of religions, an interesting insight emerges into sacrificial ceremonies, which represented the very early emergence of religion in human history. Almost all of these followed violent conflicts (to ease them and appease opponents), or after violent natural incidents (with the hope of preventing their repeat). It seems likely that religions emerged from human experience of the extraordinary and as a response to violence and disorder.

The role of religion in providing meaning is exactly why it is always present in human violence. It shows itself as a legitimisation, since the deployment of violence remains contrary to the instincts of healthy human beings and their societal norms, such as self-preservation and not harming others. An enemy needs to be dehumanised before they can be dealt with, and often, dehumanisation goes through religious imageries of the ‘evil’ qualities of the enemy and why they are somewhat less human and why morality can be suspended when dealing with them. This is why religion often serves as an identity marker between different communities, since it serves as the most visible and timeless difference between them.

Religion shows itself as an ideology providing an alternative universe, where fairness and morality is re-established amidst chaos. Thus, in failed states religious extremist networks

The ever-present violent potential of human beings is hidden from the eyesight

of the general public by the modern nation state that monopolises the use of force

through its professional organisations such as police forces or the armed services

“”

Almost all commemorations of past violence are religious in nature. This is certainly the case for us in the UK, as our war memorials, ceremonies and the

language we use all have a deep religious heritage behind them

“”

emerge with a powerful appeal, or Islamists emerge as a viable option in the face of corrupt and abusive secular powers ruling poor countries. In fact, demands for Sharia are often loud and clear in protests against corrupt and brutal rule by authoritarian states. What that signifies for Muslim protesters is not the medieval punishments imposed by some schools of Sharia law, but instead the demand for a system that upholds fairness, justice and moral order.

Religions serve as the most basic form of welfare systems and civil society and thus they play a strong role in weak states and ungoverned spaces as they offer help, solidarity, education, and platforms to find spouses and jobs. Religious places of worship are often the only form of social gathering that remains free under authoritarian regimes. Thus, they emerge as powerful political platforms both for opposition and for those in power to communicate messages, obtain recruits and seek support. Violent clashes therefore emerge after religious gatherings, or people are recruited for violence from such networks.

Religion also serves as a memory carrier for a community. Almost all commemorations of past violence are religious in nature. This is certainly the case for us in the UK, as our war memorials, ceremonies and the language we use all have a deep religious heritage behind them. Thus, religion glues a community together in commemoration. This brings a redemptive quality to past grievances in the form of reconciliation, healing and forgiveness, but they might also enable new conflicts to emerge and old cleavages to remain. In fact, while conflicts do not start for religious reasons, once they assume religious characteristics and justifications, they last

longer and positions become more entrenched. If you believe you are fighting a cosmic war that you cannot lose since God is with you, even if reality contradicts that belief and you are set to lose, you can maintain an apocalyptic hope of a divine intervention that will turn the outcome in your ultimate victory.

What is often missed in discussions of religion and violent conflict is how exposure to violence shapes religions, and forces them to accommodate practices that often contradict orthodox theological convictions. Thus, one can see Christian militias causing havoc, as was seen in the cases of the Central African Republic and Lebanon, while the Gospel of Christ preaches of turning the other cheek and reconciliation. Similarly, Buddhist monks have been involved in the killing of Muslims and other religious groups in Sri Lanka and Myanmar in full contradiction to their own religious traditions and calling as monks and priests. Likewise, there have been Catholic clergy who have been found guilty of actively partaking in killings during the Rwandan genocide. Thus, there is often a gap between tenets of faith and the actions of people of faith in the context of violent conflict. Often, theology follows actions and is shaped by it, rather than theological beliefs resulting in those actions.

Therefore, religion remains an important aspect of violent conflicts in the world. Depending on the local context, local religions and the influence of local religious actors, the way in which religion has an impact on violence can be different. Religion is ultimately ambivalent about violence and peace: it can be seen both as a powerful force bringing reconciliation or it can be seen as a brutal enabler of mass atrocities.

© Crown copyright

THREE CASE STUDIES


All of the points made thus far about religion and violent conflict can be seen in three cases of religious militancy that are of interest to the British Army: Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and ISIS (also referred to as Da’esh, IS or ISIL).

The official name of the group is Jamaat Ahl al-Sunna lid-Dawah wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) and thus it is referred by the name given to it by the people: ‘Boko Haram’, which roughly translates into ‘Western education is forbidden’. No

one knows the exact size of the group, nor its current formation or leadership structures. Some experts have estimated 5,000 or so members, with a wider network of enablers and supporters in the far north-east corner of Nigeria. There seem to be multiple factions within the organisation and no clear strategy being pursued in the use of violence.

The group emerged from the preaching of Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s. There is a

lot of mystery surrounding his life but his preaching certainly attracted large crowds. Initially the organisation did not preach or use violence, but sought to establish an Islamic order and challenged corrupt politicians and the Islamic elite of the North. It has provided welfare and practical support

and still prides itself on its commitment to widows and families under its care.

While the group increasingly found itself in tension with local authorities, it was the murder of Yusuf while in police custody in 2009 that marked the turn of the organisation into a violent one. Since 2011, Boko Haram has unleashed numerous revenge attacks on police and army outposts as their main target. Brutal responses and indiscriminate use of force by the Nigerian forces have only increased the support Boko Haram gets in the region and have fuelled further violence.

Their fighters do not seem to uphold a dedicated religious piety and include a wide range of backgrounds including non-Muslims. The justifications they use are as much political as they are religious and reactive to epidemic problems in Nigeria such as corruption and the lawlessness of the authorities and security forces. They depend on extortion, selling of bounty items gathered in attacks, and at times donations. They operate in large swathes of ungoverned territory astride the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Ethnic links that cut across these borders and inter-state rivalries have provided spaces for support and supply to the organisation.

While there have been military successes against them,

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, often referred to as al-Shabaab, emerged as an amalgamation of multiple groups and became a publicly known jihadist movement in 2006. It was only one of multiple Islamist and ‘jihadi’ factions under the umbrella of Islamic courts that were seeking to establish jurisdiction and governance in Somalia. Early on it enjoyed practical and financial support from international jihadist networks, including links with Al-Qaeda and various Somalian diasporas.

While the movement was almost destroyed during the Ethiopian intervention in late 2006, it re-emerged with a new narrative and focus in 2007. The group positioned itself as a nationalist reaction to regional and international actors undertaking military operations in the country. This remained a key factor in its recruitment during both US and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operations. In fact, disproportionate use of external military force

and corruption and abuse associated with regional troops continue to attract fighters and local support to the organisation. However, al-Shabaab is known to force young men to join its ranks, which was seen

following the 2011 military operations by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM. Throughout 2011-2012 the movement lost substantial territory and was pushed into the countryside.

Al-Shabaab has acted as a proto-state in the areas that it governed. Not only has it focused on delivering education and ensuring standards of services such as medical care and facilitation of trade, it has provided security and a clear legal order for people living under its territories. It has served as an arbitrator for people’s disputes over land and

business deals and also as the provider of secure and orderly transit routes for traders using its territory.

In addition to the taxes it receives from activities

Brutal responses and indiscriminate use of force by the Nigerian forces have only increased the support Boko Haram gets in the region and have fuelled further violence

“”

Disproportionate use of external military force and corruption and abuse associated with regional troops continue to attract fighters and local

support to the organisation

“”

[ BOKO HARAM ]

[ AL-SHABAAB ]


ultimately Boko Haram is part of a much larger problem. It is neither the first nor the last religious militancy in Nigeria. In the 1970s, a very similar group to Boko Haram, named

in its territory, it has benefited financially from piracy and kidnapping as well as donations from international networks. Thus, it has been able to pay its fighters upfront every month and to take care of its wounded and the widows of dead fighters.

Al-Shabaab’s attack at the Kenyan shopping mall in 2013 and declared allegiance to ISIS were both seen as attempts by the weakened organisation to galvanise its jihadi credentials. The organisation also began to lose its appeal among Somalians and there have been significant levels of defections.

When the group’s leader Ahmed Godane was killed in a missile strike in 2014, some forecasted the end of the movement or a split into factions, as his successor Ahmed Diriye could not match his charisma, religious knowledge, legitimacy, skills and networks.

However, 2015 saw new attacks by al-Shabaab

in Kenya and against AMISOM, which inflicted significant casualties. There have also been increasing questions regarding the actions of AMISOM troops in the country, and the wider

developments in Somalia and the region. Developments in Yemen and al-Shabaab’s closer relations with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have brought new momentum and supplies.

Al-Shabaab is also seeking more reach within north-eastern Kenya, as seen in the prevalence of violent attacks as well as a large volume of online content put out in Swahili. These point to the fact that the group is more resilient than forecasted in 2013-14. It is able to move beyond clan factions that dominate Somali politics, and even though its terror attacks cause a large portion of Somalis to condemn

the group, it is still able to maintain local support and galvanise local grievances. It has learned how to govern territory and balance religious legitimacy and appeals with the use of fear and terror tactics.

Maitatsine caused havoc in the country. Just like Boko Haram, the organisation did not start as a militant one, but increasingly found itself in tension with local authorities. The Nigerian government declared success by over-running Maitatsine’s base, killing thousands of people in the process. Maitatsine, just like Boko Haram, had begun focusing on restoring a moral order and preached against corrupt local rulers and Islamic establishment in the country.

Beyond such groups, Nigeria sees tremendously high levels of on-going violence between Muslim and Christian groups across the Plateau state, and never-ending militancy in the Delta state, which harbours major oil reserves.

Thus, Boko Haram remains a symptom of a larger problem that demands governance and economic reform, as well as the establishment of the rule of law and emergence of a professional army that operates within clear legal boundaries.

Boko Haram remains a symptom of a

larger problem that demands governance

and economic reform, as well as the establishment of the rule of law

and emergence of a professional army

“”

Even though its terror attacks cause a large portion of

Somalis to condemn the group, it is still able to maintain local support and

galvanise local grievances

“”


The brutal organisation that styles itself as the Islamic State (but is often referred to by its Arabic acronym Da’esh) is rooted in the Sunni insurgency that erupted in Iraq after the US-led intervention in 2003. In fact, its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was captured in Iraq and spent time in Camp Bucca as an inmate. Many inmates and disenfranchised Saddam-era military and security officers have played a key role in the development of the Islamic State, first within Iraq and then as it expanded its operations into Syria when that country fell into civil war. It also had its roots in Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other jihadist groups that formed the Mujahideen Shura Council. The Council was disbanded in 2006 and Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was declared. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over as the leader of ISI in 2010, expanded operations to Syria in 2011, declaring an Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in 2013 and the proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014.

Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate had attracted wide criticism, not just from mainstream Islamic scholars but even from jihadist groups. In fact, ISIS and Al-Qaeda (AQ) publicly condemn each other and even clash directly in their pursuit of power and positioning. AQ in Syria aims to be a more moderate force and seeks to win populations slowly and carefully and even condemns ISIS tactics of extreme brutality. One of the criticisms of ISIS by other groups including AQ has been that it does not have any leading religious scholars or a robust theological grounding for its actions.

ISIS’ use of brutal executions is an ancient strategy of causing fear among the enemy. This strategy is clearly explained in the popular text The Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji. The book, which is widely read and cited, promotes a ‘scorched earth policy’, causing fear and increasing costs for anyone seeking to attack ISIS. Beheadings and theatrical executions

and ‘fear propaganda’ play a crucial role. As the author says: “It behoves us to make them think a thousand times before attacking us.” The burning of Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kassasbeh was part of such a strategy, yet it has caused widespread condemnation, as theological justification for such actions is thin and contradicts traditional Islamic thought.

ISIS has mimicked the performances of a state in the large territory it took control of in Iraq and Syria. It has provided healthcare, education, welfare support, rule of law and even created ID cards and passports, and has brought order to places that faced anarchy and chaos. It was this performance of establishing an Islamic state ruled by a Caliph that made it an attraction for a wider global recruitment pool. While ISIS’

demonstration of military success, an ability to pay salaries and provide weaponry served to recruit fighters from other jihadi groups or Syrian militias, its marketing of the establishment of a new religious-based state order became a selling point for international recruits. In fact, some of its international recruitment calls included phrases such as “where were you when the caliphate was being established?”. The group’s military successes and use of social media made it

an exciting adventure for a wide range of people with different backgrounds to seek to join it and move to its territory.

The last 12 months have been difficult for ISIS. Coalition strikes and operations have resulted in a loss of territory and funding and, most importantly, have damaged the image of an unstoppable movement in history. Its brutal excesses have attracted condemnation from Muslims worldwide. Better international cooperation has resulted in a decline of international fighters travelling to join its ranks. However, we have also seen an expansion of ISIS activities and networks with terror attacks in North Africa and Europe. As ISIS suffers losses in its home territory, it is expected to seek to undertake more terror attacks outside of the Middle East.

ISIS’ use of brutal executions is an

ancient strategy of causing fear among

the enemy

“”

[ ISLAMIC STATE ]


A comparative analysis of these three groups yields some interesting insights into how they emerge and evolve and thus ultimately how they can be resisted:

l The most important factor to notice is how these groups emerge in failed or weak states that have colonial origins and chronic political instability.

l They all emerged in contexts with pre-existing high levels of violence either due to civil war, international intervention or disproportionate use of force by governments.

l They all evolved, not only in their theological outlooks and political aims, but also in their levels of accommodation of violent tactics and levels of brutality.

l They all have theologies ‘in progress’, and were not established upon clear and robust ideologies from their outset.

l Shifts in leadership and clashes with other jihadi groups demonstrate that for all their self-declared cosmic aims and leadership legitimacy, their aims are very temporal and their management structures weak.

l Their local appeal is partly about offering order and governance and partly about their military successes and financial capacity. l Their international appeal is mostly about promises of a ‘Utopia’ actualising itself here on Earth: a chance to get away from troubles, boredom and alienation at home, and play a part in a larger story than one’s own life. It is also about actual and imagined grievances individuals have about global politics, discrimination and their day-to-day personal lives.

l Their successes often capitalise upon the failures of domestic political actors and problematic interventions by regional and international stakeholders. They show political astuteness in capitalising on developments outside their control.

l Religious framing of their causes provides a ‘contagion factor’ beyond the actual parameters of

local conflict and also enables them to hold together multiple ethnicities and nationalities.

l Their successes and failures are both dynamic; they all have demonstrated resilience and an ability to adapt to new realities on the ground, to find new ways to recruit and perform and new narratives to attract support.

l Effective challenges to their legitimacy do not come from the military successes of external powers but by other Muslims questioning their theologies, credibility, piety and chosen tactics.

Similarities observed in these three extreme examples of religious militancy in three distant geographies raise serious questions about how we approach the issue of religion and violent conflict. First and foremost, it raises serious doubts regarding theories that try to explain these groups merely by allusion to Islamic texts or extrapolate arguments about Muslims globally. In fact, as mentioned before, the presence of religion in violent conflict is not limited to a particular religion, and human history is a record of violence legitimised by grievances, competition over resources, ethnic and political ideologies. Yet, violent conflicts with religious characteristics have unique aspects. As can be seen in the cases discussed here, groups operating under a religious banner are able to recruit from a much wider audience and offer legitimisations and prolong the duration of conflicts for longer than regular ethnic or political conflicts. They also have much larger ‘butterfly’ effects in their capacity to trigger violence across the world through imagined narratives of a global Manichean battle unfolding between ‘good and evil’.

It is clearly unhelpful to ask whether or not religion leads to violent conflict, but better to examine how violent conflict emerges and how religions respond to it and are shaped by it. Only with such a re-orientation in our approach to understanding a worrying trend can we develop better responses that seek to not only contain radical groups militarily, but address the social and political issues that gave birth to them and maintained their appeal, and work with religious actors to offer constructive alternatives to extremist projects.

Groups operating under a religious banner are able to recruit from a much wider audience and offer legitimisations and prolong the duration of conflicts for longer

than regular ethnic or political conflicts. They also have much larger ‘butterfly’ effects in their capacity to trigger violence across the world through imagined

narratives of a global Manichean battle unfolding between ‘good and evil’

“”

[ SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CASES ]

LESSONS LEARNED FROM NORTHERN IRELANDTwo images symbolise where military engagement in Northern Ireland began.

First, the famous Army map of Belfast, divided into orange and green. Everybody bought into the sectarian narrative, part of which was ‘religious’ if we understand this term in the wider sense of incorporating cultural and political narratives. The orange and green map was a symbol of this apparently religious divide.

Second, a picture from 1969 of a platoon of soldiers walking into the Oldpark area in Belfast with a roll of barbed wire and a banner over their shoulder which read something like ‘This is a riot, disperse or else’. When they were suddenly told to deploy, they unfolded the banner for the first time but did so the wrong way round. On the other side it was in Arabic: it was from Aden. There was a deep sense in which some of the early mistakes in 1969 were made due to the rolling out of the strategy of the last engagement.

There are five points of learning about religion and violent conflict that we can draw from Northern Ireland.

1. It is always political. Politics is the art of negotiating relationships. We are always negotiating relationships; at work, in families, in neighbourhoods. At the heart of that is creating shared stories to help us share space together. And at the heart of that are issues of identity. “Who am I?”; “who are you?”;

“who are we?”; “who are we in relation to the other?”. For the vast majority of people in the world, religion is at the heart of that sense of who they are and how they relate that to other people. But it is a deeply political function of religion because it is about creating communities and shared narratives in order to share space, which is the essence of the political enterprise. So in those ways it is shaped by religious conviction.

In Northern Ireland since the Belfast agreement, particularly in the Catholic community, church attendance has plummeted. During the conflict it was part of your duty to attend church on Sunday and to remind people who you were, particularly in rural areas and in the Protestant community around Orange Order parades. So identity of religion makes for a very powerful political contribution.

2. Bad religion always trumps good. This is the hardest thing for religious leaders to get their heads around. The reality is that Paisley’s soundbite “For God and Ulster” always had a bigger emotional appeal than the more nuanced “For God and his glory alone”. What does that look like in a situation of conflict where you feel you are under threat, where the ‘other’ is going to eradicate your identity? In the Protestant community, it was easy to allow symbols and soundbites to determine the religious response and to have that hold on people.


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3. History does matter. It is no accident that in the Gospels we are given two accounts of the genealogy of Jesus; one that takes him back to Adam and one that takes him back to Abraham. It is establishing his identity: his belonging as part of humankind and as part of Jewish identity. History allows us to take account of the ancestral voices, particularly in religion because of the re-enactment of religious rituals – for example the Eucharist – that remind us of the ancestral voices that require us to be faithful to the past and to be faithful to the historic community to which we belong. It also keeps alive the wounds because many religious festivals, such as many of the saints’ days that we commemorate, are those who were killed in defence of their Church.

4. Reconciliation is elusive. There is no full reconciliation in Northern Ireland. There is a peace settlement, many attempts at an inclusive legal society, but not a reconciled society; the two are not the same thing. There is no resolution to the underlying conflict. 53 per cent of the people still believe the state should be British and

47 per cent believe it should be Irish, so there is not even a reconciled understanding of the nature of the state in Northern Ireland. We have just agreed that we are not going to use violence to resolve that question and that we are going to try to work together for a while on other political issues

and come back to that. It is extremely fragile and at the same time extremely robust because this generation of leaders are determined to make it work. The challenge for them, and this is why reconciliation is so elusive, is how they deal with that past, because it requires a hard telling and an honest remembering. There is a terrible reluctance to make that remembering acknowledged because it threatens their fundamental identity of who they are.

5. Religious leaders play a key role. We have seen all examples of how religious leaders played a part in deepening social tensions, how they were able to provide bridges between communities, stop escalation

of tensions and reach out to vulnerable youth who might be at risk of joining violent groups. Therefore, engagement with religious leaders has played a key role in enabling peace conditions.

Flashback: A specialist team from 321 EOD Royal Logistic Corps deploys a Wheelbarrow bomb disposal robot on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1978 © Crown copyright

The reality is that Ian Paisley’s soundbite “For

God and Ulster” always had a bigger emotional appeal

than the more nuanced “For God and his glory alone”

“”

LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTANReligion is an important element of any society that needs to be understood, particularly in many of the places that we have been involved in militarily in the past decade. Religion in these places is a ‘lived’ religion and not just a nominal attribution of one’s identity.

In the West, religion is something that you do privately in your spare time. It is not mainstream. In many places religion is part and parcel of society. If you ‘do’ religion in the West, there is something wrong with you. In other societies, if you do not ‘do’ religion there is something wrong with you. It is a badge of honour that you wear on your sleeve.

Whether we understand it or not – whether we like it or not – we live in a faith-based world. In places where modern concepts and modes of working and ideas have not developed (democracy, rule of law, personal and political freedom, accountable justice or education) religion is the reference point, world view and the prism through which people see themselves and the other. Religious ideology is all-pervasive.

There is no distinction between the sacred and the secular. Religion, culture, nationalism and politics are intertwined where religion is the glue that binds. In order to be a good citizen, you have to be religious. In order to be religious, you must exemplify good cultural norms. It does not matter if you are not religious – in order to succeed and gain credibility you have to put on a facade of religiosity because that is what people understand. Through it you gain legitimacy. It is for that

reason that the insurgencies or terrorist groups we have fought in recent years are able to gain support and mobilise people. It is through the use, or rather the abuse and manipulation, of people’s religious sentiments. They use religious rhetoric to promote the legitimacy of their political and violent motives. But it is a very thin veneer of religious misinterpretation and they are not the only religious voice.

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Experience in Afghanistan has shown that there will always be an alternative indigenous religious voice. Unfortunately, but quite rightly, we are busy fighting the malign actors and forget about the positive, moderate and passive voices in society. We put so much energy in to them that the counter voice either becomes ineffective or ends up joining the malign actors because they are getting the most attention. Religious scholars, religious school teachers, clerics and preachers enjoy particular trust in these societies and the public listens to them. Experience has shown that this group plays an important role in building public opinion against or in favour of the government.

There has been a global resurgence of religion and it contravenes theses that with modernisation and progress, religious influence would erode. This has also meant that we have not been prepared well enough to deal with traditional societies and religiously motivated behaviour. In order to navigate this minefield we need experts to help us and, unfortunately, in the last decade whether in Iraq or Afghanistan we have not employed such experts at the scale that is required. We employed cultural, policy and legal advisers but no Religious Advisers (RELADs).

Taking Afghanistan as an example, there were numerous reasons for this: l Religion mixed up with Talibanism – thus it was only seen as part of the problem. l We did not understand religion and religious sensitivities, so we felt safer in ignoring them. l There was an attitude of ‘we don’t do religion’. The issue was seen to be outside of our remit.

This has come at the cost of many lost opportunities. Strategic and focused engagement with religious leaders and a much better understanding of the issues by our forces would have had a serious impact on our achievements.

So what is it that we would expect from the employment of a RELAD? What is the effect that we have seen? Overall it is about leveraging the value and influence of religion, first and foremost in conflict prevention and secondly in conflict transformation and termination. If religion is such an inherent identity of the people we engage with then to ignore it would be a huge mistake. So these were the desired objectives identified by this author in Afghanistan:l Counter the violent religious rhetoric and narrative of the insurgents.l Promote peace, stability and reintegration through better Islamic understanding of good governance, development and security.l Afghan National Security Forces are accepted as religiously credible and in the lead for security.l Build civic capacity of Mullahs and religious institutions.l Improve religious awareness and competency of regional ISAF headquarters.l Reinforce ISAF’s commitment and support to the Afghan Government for a stronger and safer Islamic Afghanistan. l Encourage the population to reject the violent and abusive religious interpretation of the insurgents.

Over the three years in Afghanistan this author has been engaged in this work, he has seen a gradual acceptance and appreciation of the influence and force of faith in conflict areas. Though his regular visits to the country, he has been able to shape the focus on how the influence of faith has been utilised. However, much work needs to be done to build on lessons learned in Afghanistan, not just for the Army but for all of the Services and wider UK engagement with conflicts that have deep religious characteristics.


Experience in Afghanistan has shown that there will always be an alternative indigenous religious voice. Unfortunately, but quite rightly, we are busy fighting the malign actors and forget about the positive, moderate and passive voices in society

“”

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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONSFollowing examination of the case studies and the experiences of operations in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan, delegates broke into syndicates to discuss the implications of these insights, particularly with regard to the British Army’s future approach to operations. The following are the key points that emerged from the syndicate discussions.

It was agreed by all participants that what the increasingly secular West views as distinct political, social or religious issues are often viewed as inter-related or even synonymous in other parts of the world. As with many other issues, it was felt that the Army must at all costs avoid the trap of assuming that other cultures, societies and religions view the world through the same set of lenses as ‘us’. It was recognised that this is difficult, and that often the Army thinks it understands things when in fact it has merely identified the surface-level issue.

Several participants cautioned applying a tick box approach to achieving ‘understanding’ in the Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP04) sense of the word and it was noted that the military more generally and – as the Service that most frequently interacts with foreign populations on a large scale – the Army in particular, needs to become more comfortable with ambiguity between religious and political issues.

Some participants added a further note of caution and highlighted that in certain parts of the world in which the British Army has recently operated and in other regions where it may operate in future (either in defence engagement or combat operations), religion provides a strong and highly visible moral component. It provides a way to mobilise and carry out activities that would not normally be justified, and that there in fact may well be underlying motives that could be economic or political in origin. Furthermore, it was noted that in many cultures people vote along sectarian lines and the case of Northern Ireland was cited. This is one way in which religion can be tied to politics which can make getting parties engaged in violent conflict to a dialogue very difficult indeed.

Generally speaking, it was felt that the Army has had a poor record in engaging with religious leaders and it was suggested that without improvements in such engagements, the Army will never achieve the influence it needs as it tries to persuade populations to behave in ways conducive to achieving its strategic objectives.

Participants debated the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ instances of religious behaviour. An example of the ‘good’ might be a religious leader negotiating a ceasefire between warring factions; while the ‘bad’ might be typified by a terrorist attack claiming a religious justification. Delegates were resigned to the fact that as with most forms of messaging, sensationalist reporting of bad news will usually trump

coverage of good news. However, the point was made that the Army is too often guilty of focusing only on the ‘bad religion’ examples. One participant went so far as to say that the Army needs to have permanent targeting boards for ‘good’ religious groups, individuals and events, which is to say a persistent focus on positive stories that it can use to reinforce its own aims and objectives.

There was a long discussion of the Army’s post 9/11 operations, which identified an internal cultural bias towards action and ‘doing stuff’ and an overly-simplistic approach towards achieving large-scale behavioural change in societies with very different views on politics and religion to its own. A number of participants feared that this cultural bias could restrict even a religiously-aware Army to fall back on ‘lazy-shortcuts’ in war-zones, finding short-term fixes that do little for

the long-term benefit of the countries in which it has to operate.

A consensus emerged that whilst the Army is often obliged to show quick results, it nonetheless has a duty to warn politicians of the potential dangers of taking short-term approaches to enduring challenges. Instead, it must emphasise the likely benefits of persistent engagement that include detailed and nuanced religious engagement, as well as a careful analysis of the relationship of religion to violent conflict germane to each theatre of interest.

It was conceded that the Army is significantly more nuanced in its recognition of the interplay between religion and violent conflict after its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that it still struggles to make a counter-narrative work, especially a religious one. It was noted that a more effective tool would be the adoption of a top-level narrative that is clear and consistent, while also being able to reflect the nuanced approach required on the ground.

Several practical ideas were put forward. These included the commissioning of a study by CHACR and the Army Historical Branch on successful historical examples of political re-integration in places where religious dynamics were a prevalent factor in violent conflict and during the subsequent peace process (e.g.

Northern Ireland and the Balkans).

Another suggestion was a programme to better understand, develop and make use of UK-based diaspora communities, noting how influential they can be, and a similar approach to leveraging the understanding of expatriate British citizens living overseas. Whilst there was some dissent as to just how formal, structured and institutionalised such initiatives should be, it was noted that the new Defence Attaché and Loan Service Centre at Shrivenham was probably the organisation in defence best placed to run the latter. It was also suggested that those aspects of defence engagement relevant to counter-


In many cultures people vote along

sectarian lines... this is one way in which religion can be tied

to politics which can make getting parties engaged in violent

conflict to a dialogue very difficult

“”

Helmand Province politics: Votes are counted during the September 2010 Afghan elections © Crown copyright

radicalisation and community engagement in the UK must be taken into account, so as to ensure coherence with Her Majesty’s Government’s cross-Whitehall ‘Prevent’ programme.

Looking inwards, it was suggested that the Army should explore the concept of a ‘religious affairs adviser’ analogous to the posts of stabilisation, cultural and policy advisers on which it has recently come to depend for specialist external advice. Perhaps surprisingly, the attendees representing various religious organisations unanimously agreed that such a person would not necessarily need to be a religious believer. They felt that the essential qualities of such an adviser were a deep understanding of and respect for religion and a ‘pluralistic heart’, but ultimately analytic skills and depth of

knowledge on the complex ways in which religion intersects with politics, conflict and peace and development. Thus, such an adviser may not be a theologian or a cleric, but an expert grounded in both the social sciences and religious studies. A few participants were sceptical of just how seriously Army commanders would take such a person, but it was acknowledged that the concept merited further exploration and sponsorship by the Army leadership.

Finally, it was felt that the Army should do more to constantly and consistently broadcast a confident belief in its own values, ensuring that it communicates a positive set of messages about British moral and religious standards and how the British have always had a strong sense of right and wrong.


The Army is significantly more nuanced in its recognition of the interplay between religion and violent conflict after its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it still

struggles to make a counter-narrative work, especially a religious one

“”

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PERSONAL REFLECTIONS: 77 BRIGADEUnderstanding religion in conflict brought to mind all sorts of conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, Sunni and Shia in Iraq and the wider Middle East, Buddhists and Maoists in China and so on. The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research aims to facilitate a deeper level of thinking about conflict. Religion in conflict is clearly a significant factor in a lot of 77 Brigade thinking, so how did a day spent looking at religion in conflict move my thinking?

The day started with some global statistics on the importance of religion in everyday life measured by country. Typically 90 per cent of people rate religion as an important factor in their everyday lives. This contrasts radically with the UK where it’s around 30 per cent. At whatever organisational level we are tasked with thinking, I am sure we can all recall situations when considering a course of action with an adversary in mind we have thought ‘what would I do if I were in their position?’. Top marks for putting ourselves in the shoes of our adversary, but if by definition they think very differently to us because of their religious views we are almost guaranteed to get the answer wrong. It is a simple point but one that lies at the heart of the content of what the speakers had to say.

Before recalling some of the ‘take-aways’, I should say that what was most beneficial was hearing from individuals who had first-hand experience of how religious issues had played a part in various conflicts. All these discussions were held in a forum in which there was no pressure to reach a conclusion or promote a particular agenda.

It is clear that from a UK cultural perspective we have issues in getting involved in the religious aspect of conflict. At home we are schooled in being sensitive to political views, to avoid racial discrimination and to be neutral to gender issues. This in broad terms boils down to treating everybody equally. I think we feel instinctively that if we avoid getting into religious factors then we can avoid the risk of appearing partisan or worse still making a costly cultural blunder. The problem is that when considering other cultures, our western European approach is most definitely not the norm. All the evidence from the day’s presentations was that if we don’t address the religious issues we are by definition making a costly blunder. Religious views have to be understood and considered and need to be accommodated and potentially exploited in order to achieve any sort of furtherance of objectives.

So how should we behave? How should we think to encompass religion? This is where the speakers really helped move my thinking from seeing religion as a red versus blue dichotomy to a factor in plan development; a factor that could be accommodated to reduce risks and potentially exploit extra levers in moving towards an objective. The suggestion came out that when dealing with a community or even just at a meeting,

we should take advice from someone with religious authority; more than that, we should be seen to take advice. When I think about it, this is really no different to taking a subject matter expert to a meeting where you know something complex needs to be discussed. It’s not just what they say at the meeting that matters. It is that the people around the table know that your position takes into account a religious perspective provided by someone with authority that they recognise.

It was interesting that in many of the presentations the content would be equally relevant to a day spent thinking

about politics of conflict and also the history of conflicts. These three factors interplay and need to be understood in relation to each other. Whilst we in the Armed Forces strive to be neutral when it comes to religion, it is clear that religion is a fundamental tool of the politician. Again this is something that we would miss if we looked at our UK politics for an example, but we have to recognise that we in the UK do not represent the norm here. Generally we accept that religion is a tool of politicians and we also accept that for a community or nation to become stable and secure, ultimately a political settlement

is necessary. It seems therefore that the Armed Forces – as actors in a conflict whose role it is to set the conditions for a political settlement – may be missing a trick if we only consider securing ground. Should we not also consider securing the other elements of a settlement such as religion and, for that matter, there may be other significant influences such as commercial interest. Where are the boundaries in a conflict between the role that the Army plays and what is the responsibility of others?

77 Brigade is at the forefront of a number of challenges facing the Army as the character of conflict changes. It is all well and good saying that we should have a better understanding of the role religion plays in conflict. On the face of it this could be addressed with some extra training modules and changes to doctrine but it is more fundamental than that. Traditionally the Army looks for physical robustness, analytical thinking and other personality traits that suit individuals to fight in the sort of wars we have seen in the last century. We run our own assessment days for

potential members of 77 Brigade because we are looking for individuals

with innate emotional intelligence and an intrinsic ability to be culturally sensitive. What we face now are conflicts that require individuals with skills that in the past we did not expect soldiers to possess. Once we have a cadre of individuals who possess these skills the problem is then how we should best organise them, equip them with the tools they need and train them so that they deliver what the operational commander needs in order to prevail in future conflicts.

Whilst we in the Armed Forces strive to be neutral when it comes to religion, it is clear that religion

is a fundamental tool of the politician

“”

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PERSONAL REFLECTIONS: CHALLENGESTO MILITARY CHAPLAINCYContemporary western military forces, reflecting the new awareness in the western perspective concerning the role of religion in conflict, are trying to adapt to this ‘new’ factor in the battlespace. Religion, now acknowledged by military planners as an important driver in human behaviour, is perceived as something which must be understood in order to be reckoned with, controlled, mitigated against or manipulated to achieve military outcomes. This brings new challenges to the traditional roles and boundaries of military chaplaincy, as its religious role is seen as an asset in addressing religious conflicts. Among the western militaries, the United States (US) has taken the lead in the effort to ‘grapple’ with religion. Its efforts have resulted in two significant developments within the conduct of US military chaplaincy3. First is the development of command-directed, chaplaincy-led religious engagement capability. Second is the use of military chaplains to provide external advisement to commanders through formal staffing processes4.

Although these expanding chaplaincy capabilities are in part building on the more traditional role of chaplains, both developments represent a step change both in the impetus and scope of chaplaincy activity. This expansion of the capability and role of military chaplains raises serious questions as to whether these new tasks are legally legitimate.

Military chaplaincy is a national responsibility. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) chaplaincy guidelines state: “Personal care – including religious ministry – is a national responsibility. Organisation of military chaplaincy depends on national regulations…Therefore, even in multinational force operations military chaplaincy is executed under national responsibility5.”

This principle extends beyond the NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations and therefore there are considerable variations on how practice of military chaplaincy is organised and conducted within the international community. However, regardless of divergent national practices, all military chaplains are classified under the Geneva Conventions as religious personnel6 and considered non-combatants7. They are afforded

the status of protected persons. This privileged position accorded to military chaplains by international law is due to the unique nature of the chaplains calling and role in conflict.

Such latitude is offered to military chaplains with the clear understanding that they are not participants in hostilities. It is important to note that the Geneva Conventions’ non-combatant criteria for chaplains are not reliant upon chaplains serving unarmed. Chaplains, like medical personnel, are

entitled to carry weapons for their personal protection and a number of nations’ chaplains do so.

Despite the legal clarity concerning chaplains carrying personal weapons, there is a common misunderstanding on this point. Debates rage, particularly in countries whose national policies decree that military chaplains do not bear arms, about whether a chaplain as a non-combatant must remain unarmed.

The question of military chaplains bearing arms is more an ethical and theological question than a legal one. The confusion on this issue, while understandable, is unhelpful and distracts attention from a more serious examination of the

potential limits of military activity which can be undertaken by chaplains. Focusing the debate about chaplains’ non-combatant status on the carriage of personal weapons provides the comfort of an illusory certainty in an ill-defined area.

There is uneasiness within the US military about the expanding roles of chaplains reflected by the repeated and somewhat strident claims that “chaplain activities in religious support operations will not compromise the non-combatant status”. This disquiet is also evident in Canadian doctrine as well8.

Although great emphasis is placed upon the chaplain as non-combatant and restrictions about activities are stated, there is no clear articulation as to how these restrictions are delineated from legitimate chaplaincy activity. Where does advisement on religious dimensions of the targeting process cease and intelligence work begin? By directly participating in military planning, chaplains lose control of any

3These changes in chaplaincy are now being implemented in the Canadian Armed Forces. See Canada. Canadian Armed Forces Chaplaincy. Religious Leader Engagement. Land Force Doctrine Note 1-13. Kingston, Ontario: CAFC, 2013. 4“As the religious staff advisor, the chaplain advises the commander and staff on religion and its impact on all aspects of military operations…Externally, the chaplain advises the command on the specifics of the religious environment within their area of operations that may impact mission accomplishment.” United States. US Army. Religious Support and

External Advisement ATP 1-05.03, Headquarters Department of the Army, May 2013, 1-1, para 1-3.

5NATO/PfP Chief of Chaplains Conference. Chaplaincy Guidelines for Religious Ministry and Chaplains Cooperation in a Multinational Environment. Unpublished paper, Ottawa, 2007, 1, paras A3-A4.

Religion is perceived as something

which must be understood in order

to be reckoned with, controlled, mitigated against or manipulated to achieve military

outcomes

“”

6Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International armed conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, Section I, Article 8 states: “…‘religious personnel’ means military or civilian persons, such as chaplains, who are exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry and attached…to the armed forces of a Party to the conflict…to medical units or medical transports…to civil defence organizations of a Party to the conflict.… The attachment of religious personnel may be either permanent or temporary…” 7United States. US Army. Religious Support: Army Chaplain Corps Activities Army Regulation 165–1. 11, para 3-1f. The author has had numerous discussions with US colleagues on this point, but without any clear articulation of what safeguards are in place to preserve the chaplains’ non-combatant status in light of contemporary doctrine.

8Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. Land Force Doctrine Note 1-13 Religious Leader Engagement, 7-9.


information they contribute. What safeguards are there to ensure that such information is not subject to further staffing processes and does not end up on a targets list? Similar ambiguities exist around engagement activity.

Whether the American model of command-directed, chaplaincy-led religious engagement and its accompanying external advisement is compliant with the Geneva Conventions remains unclear. There is much that seems contradictory and doubtless the question of legitimacy will continue to be debated. It is clear that the law with all its ambiguities cannot provide moral certainty.

Undeniably chaplains, by virtue of their training and expertise, are ideally placed to advise commanders on religious issues and to undertake engagement with religious leaders and their

communities. It is important to note that much of military chaplains’ effectiveness in engagement work rests upon their unique nature. Answering to both military and religious authorities within their proper spheres, military chaplains work to higher principles which are greater than mere military expediency. This fact allows the chaplain to be seen and to act as ‘an honest broker’ in uniform which engenders trust between the chaplain and other interlocutors; simply working to achieve command-led outcomes risks degrading that trust.

Chaplains have much to offer to the military in its attempt to grapple with religion and should do so. However, this budding capability is not without pitfalls. The legal, moral and ethical integrity of chaplaincy activity must be safeguarded. To ensure this, there remains

further work to be done.

CONCLUSION: SOME IMPLICATIONSFOR THE BRITISH ARMY

The workshop offered a rich seam of insights into religion as a factor in conflict and as a key determinant of individual and collective behaviours in cultures beyond our secularised western experience. In plenary discussion and syndicates, delegates alighted on a wide range of implications for the Army and its activities, especially for our preparation of forces for future operations. The fact that the nature of these operations is more likely to be at short notice and for limited duration brings its own challenges in terms of achieving persistent engagement and generating essential understanding.

Perhaps the key lesson is to recognise that religion is a ‘blind-spot’ in the western psyche. While the causes and issues of conflict are more likely to be political than religious, religious identities, ideologies and actors may well be critical factors in the chaotic situations into which the Army will be committed. Indeed, as a principle, we were reminded that the more chaotic the circumstances, the more likely people are to cling to the ‘certainties’ of their religious beliefs. This creates rich potential for ‘bad’ religion to offer powerful motivation for peoples of many different backgrounds to resolve essentially political differences through violence under a religious banner. Failing to understand such fundamental drivers in a conflict would be a grave repetition of acknowledged past faults.

Recognition of this blindness places an imperative upon the Army to be ready to engage with the concept of religion and those of religious faith. This encompasses not just the potential opponents and the civilian populace, but also – and perhaps most directly – indigenous security forces with which we may be in intimate partnership. This means preparing our forces in a manner that admits and mitigates, as far as possible, this short-coming. The problem here is one of breadth and depth; the Army has only limited contingent forces and these must be prepared to intervene in multiple theatres encompassing almost infinite variations in cultural characteristics. Given the

impossibility of preparing forces in any depth for even a few specific conditions, it would be better to ensure that troops receive a routine base of generic cultural training so that they at least ‘do no harm’. This base could be overlaid with more specific instruction should time allow and the requisite expertise exist. Even if it is not, awareness of the need to accord religious beliefs, leaders and practices with respect and deference, will offer some assurance that we will not heedlessly inflame sensibilities that would be readily exploited against us and from which we might never recover.

More specifically, commanders at almost every level, ideally supported by regional specialists from the ‘engaged force’, must be ready and willing from the outset to engage with religious leaders. It was recognised that orthodox religious figures are a potentially powerful ally in whom particular investment should be made. They exercise unique authority in ways we do not instinctively understand and have the ability to counter the narratives of ‘bad’ religion in its own terms – something we cannot achieve and should not attempt. Of course this requires that we have sufficient understanding of the theatre to know with whom we should engage, ideally with a pre-analysed network map across all elements of society, polity and military.

This theme of understanding was repeatedly referenced in discussion, reflecting a clear and conscious lesson drawn from failings in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the term is potentially problematic in that it is in danger of becoming a neat label that is commonly used but seldom explored in sufficient depth or breadth. Evidently, we all now see it is imperative to understand the complexities of a situation before we commit military forces, but achieving that ideal state drives a significant set of demands across all lines of development. There is a risk that we assert we have learnt the lesson of failing to understand, but do not actually apply sufficient resources (principally those routine scarcities: money, people and time) to

Military chaplains work to higher

principles which are greater than mere

military expediency

“”

© C

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ensure we are not again found wanting in this domain.

It was widely recognised that maintaining persistent engagement in areas where intervention is deemed most likely will be critical to building understanding of local conditions, including the extent, character and diversity of religious belief as a factor in political, social and military dynamics. There is confidence that the Army has recognised this imperative in policy and structural terms, and is busy refining how it is realised in practice. However, the case studies revealed just how complex and fluid these situations can be, suggesting that they can only be understood by the sort of prolonged in-depth engagement that cultivates deep understanding and enduring connections with key figures. Given the geographic spread of responsibility assigned to brigades within regional commands, the array of other tasks they have to deliver and the turnover of key commanders, there are some reasonable grounds for questioning whether we can fully realise the depth of persistent engagement required, at least without far more rigorous prioritisation.

Finally, there was recognition that a general blindness to religion also affects the Army in its dealings with domestic UK communities that do not conform to the secular norm. If we are to maintain recruiting and reflect the diversity of UK society then it is critical that the Army is welcoming (and seen to be so) of those with strong religious beliefs. In turn, inclusion of this diversity will in itself help to cure the cultural blindness that afflicts us on operations overseas, offering us

internal conduits to understanding alien cultures and their attendant belief systems. However, there are reasons to be cautious that we do not rely too much upon these sources. Diaspora populations can quickly become detached from local dynamics and their attitudes may remain shaped by factors that are connected with their original migration.

This workshop was thought-provoking and certainly challenging for military delegates, even those who felt we have successfully gathered and applied many of the lessons from recent campaigns. Its premise was that Britain has become a very secular society and religion plays increasingly less of a role in determining the average British citizen’s view of their personal identity; but in many cultures religion is the single most important factor in determining an individual’s identity. It is not just realising this fact, but also understanding its implications both for other people’s behaviour and for interaction with others, that is the first (and perhaps even the biggest) hurdle for the British military. Religion may not be the cause of a conflict, but it can bring unique characteristics and visceral emotions into play, which we, through a secularised lens, fail to understand fully. These are aspects that we would do well to understand thoroughly before we enter the fray. In this light, it is arguable that the workshop was more about the ‘Clauswitzian’ fundamentals of conflict than religion per se. Hence, it was a shame that it was not attended by more representatives from the Field Army, which is the organisation that must find solutions for the majority of these challenges.

Religion may not be the cause of a conflict, but it can bring unique characteristics and visceral emotions into play, which we [the British military],

through a secularised lens, fail to understand fully

“”

Cultural exchange: British Army personnel meet with village elders and tribal chiefs to discuss security concerns at a shura in the town of Musa Qala in Afghanistan in 2006 © Crown copyright

CHACR MISSION STATEMENT

To conduct and sponsor research and analysis into the enduring nature and changing character of conflict on land and to be the active hub for scholarship and

debate within the Army in order to develop and sustain the Army’s conceptual component of fighting power.

For further information about CHACR and its activities, please contact NSC on

01276 673855 or [email protected]

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