ARCTIC COUNCIL

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arctic coUNcilYale Model UN Korea

May 17 - 19, 2013

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Table of Contents

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History of the Committee Topic IntroductionHistory of the Arctic Climate Change and the ArcticThe Laws of the Sea TreatyKey Ideas of the TreatyCommission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)Claims and Submissions So FarMajor Stakeholders and Their Positions Russian Federation Canada United States China, European UnionConclusionQuestions to Consider A Note on ResearchNotes

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The Arctic Council was formally es-tablished in 1996 by a Declaration in Ottawa as “a highlevel intergovern-mental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arc-tic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues ofsustainable development and environ-mental protection in the Arctic.” The Arctic Council consists of the eight Arctic States: Canada, Den-mark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Nor-way, Russia, Sweden and the United States. Members of certain indigenous groups inhabiting the Arctic have the status of permanent participants. Six European nations also have permanent observer status (but not voting rights on declarations). Besides these are a number of “ad-hoc” observer states who apply (and almost always granted) separately to attend each meeting they want to.

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History of the Committee

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The Arctic Council convenes once ev-ery six months, and passes non-bind-ing declarations that are signed by all eight member states. While unanimity is not necessary on all declarations (except the induction of new members and such), the Council does not usual-ly pass resolutions that are not accept-able to all member states. Initially confining itself to mat-ters such as fishing rights, the rele-vance of the Arctic Council has grown in recent years, and it is fast being recognized as the primary forum for discussion on the growing tensions in the Arctic region regarding matters of

The Arctic has become a key region in global politics in the recent past. Sever-al nations have laid claim to vast tracts of the Arctic, including the North Pole, and the resources that lie therein - re-sources that are a huge proportion of the world’s remaining oil and gas.

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Topic Introduction

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and setting up infrastructure to exploit the Arctic as a primary resource base by as soon as 2020. Alongside these larger claims are a number of bilateral territorial disputes between the Arctic states. These issues, while not quite at the limelight, will set the tone for cooperation and negotiations in the Arctic. In this backdrop of rising ten-sions in the region, the Arctic Council has been elevated to the status of su-preme mediator. An intergovernmen-tal body with the eight Arctic states as its members, the Arctic Council is the only dedicated forum for dialogue on environmental, cultural and sover-eignty disputes in the Arctic. Were the council to fail as a mediator, the Arctic could become, literally and figurative-ly, the arena for the next “cold” war.

Climate change has only intensified the race for the region. Waters frozen since centuries are becoming ice free in the summer, opening up new ship-ping routes which are of keen interest to even non-Arctic shipping states. Yet states’ sovereign rights over these routes and resources is neither easily established nor easily chal-lenged. In an assertion of these rights, alarmingly aggressive “Arctic road-maps” have been released, which out-line plans for opening Arctic airbases, military training for Arctic combat

On the matter of sovereignty, the his-tory of the Arctic can be broadly talked of over three periods.

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History of the Arctic

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unfulfilled fantasy of explorers over the centuries.3

However in the 20th centu-ry, increasingly so during and after World War II, the Arctic became a strategic arena for the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies. Throughout the cold war, the Arctic was heavily militarized, with frequent submarine sightings by both sides, and air bases being set up in locations as remote as northern Greenland .The beginning of the militarization of the Arctic marks the second period of Arctic history. Finally, two developments towards the end of the 20th century irrevocably transformed the dynamics of the Arctic and set apart the recent history of the Arctic: the adoption of an international agreement on water bodies and resources across the globe called the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the global acceptance of climate change. Subsequent sections will discuss these two landmark events in detail and analyse the consequences of the same.

The first, starting right from the first voyages to the Arctic Circle circa 300 B.C.1 up to as far as the 19th century, while being of least immediate im-portance, is crucial to understand the roots of the claims and sentiments of the Arctic states. The exploration of the Arctic moved at an extremely slow pace, given the harsh conditions and lack of technological advancement. During this period (starting from the late 15th century, around which Co-lumbus made the first recorded search for a westerly passage from the Orient to Europe2), the primary importance of the Arctic was as a potential route between Asia and Europe, a long-

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Climate Change and the Arctic

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Climate change, in particular global warming, is now a widely accepted and recorded phenomenon. Organi-zations such as the UNFCC are con-certedly working on understanding its negative consequences and how to mitigate them. In the Arctic, ice is melting at an accelerated rate of between 2.2 to 3% and some models predict a complete loss of ice in the summer by the latter half of this cen-tury.4 No scientific evidence suggests that the Arctic has ever been ice-free in as far as the last several hundred thousand years. This poses a variety of environmental issues that are the major focus of bodies monitoring the Arctic, including the Arctic Council. Yet the human nature is ever ready to find opportunity in the face of adver-sity, and the Arctic is a classic case in point. The United States Geological Survey reports that a staggering 22% of technically recoverable resources lie in the Arctic, and 84% of those offshore. There are 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas alone in the Arctic.5

With the Arctic melting, these resources are fast becoming ripe for the plucking. The melting of ice has also opened up sea routes that are frozen for most part of the year. The two main sea routes of the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, can radically re-duce the distance between parts of Asia and Europe.

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They cannot because Canada claims that the waters are their own internal waters, a claim contested by other na-tions. Similarly, the US, EU and most shipping nations disagree with Rus-sia’s view that parts of the Northern Sea Route close to the Russian coast are their internal waters. States such as China would like both these pas-sages to be considered international straits so that unrestricted movement through them is possible. What de-cides whether a route is an interna-tional strait or not is in many ways ambiguous (though the UNCLOS does try to define the rights of States bordering straits or having internal waters passing through them in Part III). Consequently, a dispute of sov-ereignty has also become a matter of economic interest to nations, leading to an increasing militarization of the Arctic.

The Northwest Passage is a sea route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans via the Canadian Arctic ar-chipelago (the group of islands in the northern part of Canada). It connects Western Europe to the West Coast of the US through a much shorter route than the current one through the Pan-ama Canal. The Northern Sea Route is a similar shipping route roughly along the coast line of Northern Russia and Europe that shelves the distance be-tween opposite ends of Europe and Asia by as much as 7,000 kilometres. These routes were previously unnavigable due to thick ice in the re-gion, but that is beginning to change. In 2011, 22 ships were able to make passage through the Northwest Pas-sage –higher than all years on record put together. So why can’t all ships start using this route for shipping in the future?

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The Laws of the Sea Treaty

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“The oceans had long been subject to the freedom of-the-seas doctrine - a principle put forth in the seventeenth century essentially limiting national rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation’s coastline. The remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none. While this situation prevailed into the twentieth century, by mid-century there was an impetus to extend national claims over offshore resources. There was growing concern over the toll taken on coastal fish stocks by long-distance fishing fleets and over the threat of pollution and wastes from transport ships and oil tankers car-rying noxious cargoes that plied sea routes across the globe. The hazard of pollution was ever present, threatening coastal resorts and all forms of ocean life. The navies of the maritime powers were competing to maintain a presence across the globe on the surface waters and even under the sea…..

…The oceans were generating a multitude of claims, counterclaims and sovereignty disputes. The hope was for a more stable order, promoting greater use and bet-ter management of ocean resources and generating harmony and goodwill among States that would no longer have to eye each other suspiciously over conflicting claims.”6

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Delegates are not expected to under-stand and remember the ideas of every single article. The most critical aspects of the treaty concerning the Arctic de-bate shall be explained at some length in this guide. However, to get a basic sense of the exhaustive nature of this treaty, it is recommended that dele-gates quickly read through the index (i.e. the contents guide) of the treaty. It is available online at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/conven-tion_agreements/texts/unclos/UN-CLOS-TOC.htm 7

Conflicts over marine resources and territorial rights forced nations to convene in New York in 1973. Negoti-ations and discussions lasted for nine years, resulting in a massive constitu-tion of the sea- the UNCLOS. With 320 articles, extensive annexures and ratification by 163 nations, this hefty instrument has become customary in-ternational law (though there is some controversy over this). This treaty effectively defines how far from the coastline a country can claim sovereignty and resources, the rights that they and other nations have over these waters, military prac-tices in the oceans, responsibilities for conservation of marine ecology and answers every conceivable question on the seas.

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Key Ideas of the Treaty

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The UNCLOS defines fundamental boundary lines of the sea:

1. The first is the area defined as territorial waters which extends up to 12 nautical miles from a certain baseline of the mainland (generally speaking, from the coastline). These waters are as much a part of the nation as its land.8

2. Ships of all states have the right to “innocent passage” through the territorial waters of a country free of charge. That is, a ship can pass through territorial waters freely, given that it does not pollute, utilize resources of the waters etc. Under conditions of safety and documentation being maintained, even military and nuclear powered ships may pass.

3. Beyond this is another 12 mile zone called the contiguous zone, where the state can exercise some special control (though not as much as over territorial waters) for pre-venting “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-tions within its territory…punish infringement of the above laws and regulations”.9

4. Then comes the now widely known exclusive economic zone (EEZ), an additional 200 mile zone from the baseline where the State has absolute control over all resources in the waters and seabed (and assumes responsibilities such as controlling pollution). Other nations must seek out permission before using the resources of these waters.10

5. Finally there is the continental shelf which can offer certain special sovereign right up to an extra 150 miles beyond the EEZ. For legal purposes, the continental shelf is defined by Article 76 as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin”. In layman terms, it refers to the projection of the mainland submerged underwater far into the ocean. Part VI, which deals with continental shelves, gives complete rights over the resources to the state, such as fish-ing and drilling.

6. All other waters are high seas, and part of the global commons.

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It is on the basis of continental shelf that nations such as Russia and Denmark lay claim to vast parts of the Arctic, including the North Pole. Clearly, there needs to be some body that verifies and approves these claims.

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Every nation, after ratifying the UNCLOS, gets a period of 10 years to gather the data required to file its claim. This is an extensive period of research for the ratify-ing state as it tries, through bathymetric analysis (drilling, collecting and examining seabed samples) to prove that underground ridges, plateaus and other reliefs are in-deed a part of their continental shelf. It is worth noting that the review of the infor-mation by the CLCS is a closed and often controversial process, raising important questions that need to be answered about their accountability.12

And the debate over where the Arctic states’ continental shelves end is where we find ourselves in the present day.

In the third and final round of discussions of the UNCLOS, the CLCS was set up to verify all claims made regarding a state’s continental shelf. As per Annexure II article 3, the purpose of the CLCS is as follows:

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

“(a) To consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States con-cerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits ex-tend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;

(b) To provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during preparation of such data.

In accordance with article 76(8), the Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”11

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To date, each of the Arctic states have ratified the UNCLOS with the notable exception of the United States (the reasons for which delegates are en-couraged to explore. Since 2009, espe-cially in 2012, there has been signifi-cant renewed debate in the US Senate on the subject). Many of them have already presented their claims to the CLCS. Russia, for example, ratified the UNCLOS in 1997 and made a submis-sion to the CLCS in 2001, claiming an enormous sector of the Arctic extend-ing till the North Pole. The international response to Russia’s submission gives a true sense of the tension in region- consider the United States’ reply- pointing out “major flaws” in the Russian submis-sion, the US summarizes a number of reasons why they find Russia’s position untenable. At the same time, Can-ada and Denmark intensified their research, culminating with Denmark making its submission in June 2012 and Canada nearly on the verge of the same. After roughly a year of review-ing Russia’s research (a sense of the process may be gleaned from here) the CLCS in 2002 decided to neither

Claims and Submis-sions So Far

accept nor reject Russia’s claims, ask-ing them to compile more data and submit their revised findings-which Russia plans to submit in 2013. If the claims of different nations overlap, then it becomes a matter beyond the mandate of the CLCS to be resolved as outlined in the sections on arbitration and bilateral/multilateral negotiations in the UNCLOS. Rising tensions, adoption of aggressive policies, and controver-sial, assertive acts by Arctic States indicate that they cannot all going to be satisfied by the judgement of the CLCS – in whichever party’s favour it happens to be. To compound matters further, the final verdict of the CLCS is years, probably more than a decade away given the backlog they are deal-ing with. In the meantime, it is nec-essary that the Arctic states come to a consensus on its policies in the Arc-tic, especially regarding military and security. However, as per its current mandate, the Council cannot make decisions on issues of security – some-thing which delegates must address early on in the conference if they seek to arrive upon and adopt some form of a military accord.

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Russia’s claim to the Arctic hinges on establishing the Mendeleev and Lo-monosov Ridges are a part of their continental shelf. The Lomonosov Ridge (an underwater relief that projects out of the mainland into the ocean, thereby making it a part of the continental shelf) happens to be particularly contentious as both Den-mark and Canada claim at least parts of it to be their own13 (While most of Russia’s sector is not claimed by any other State, the North Pole is another issue. Even states who have no basis to assert sovereign right over it are quick to suggest that it is and should remain part of the “global commons”). After the CLCS ruling of 2002, Russia launched intense efforts to es-tablish their claim. The Artika Expedi-tion of 2007 saw Russian scientists and submarines dive down thousands of metres in an attempt to gather bathy-metric data. During this time, Russia also planted its flag under the North Pole – an action strongly criticized by the United States, Denmark and Cana-da. Time and again, Russian scientists have declared they have found conclu-sive proof to back them and have

Major Stakeholders and Their Positions

reaffirmed their confidence in their claim being accepted in 2013. In documents detailing Russia’s Arctic policy until 2020, Russia has mandated an expansion of its military presence in the Arctic, increasing the radius of operation of its fleet of sub-marines, reopening Arctic airbases14, and spending about $44 billion on projects in the Arctic. Russian naval authorities claim Russia’s aggressive policy is the result of other nations scramble for a “piece of the Arctic pie”. Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, a senior navy official, said in October 2010 regarding the matter, “We are observing the penetration of a host of states which... are advancing their interests very intensively, in ev-ery possible way, in particular China,” and that Russia would not “give up a single inch”.15

Russia also faces opposition on the Northern Sea Route front. It con-siders certain sections of the route to be a part of Russia’s “internal waters”. Internal waters differ significantly from territorial waters in that no ships can travel through internal waters (even innocent passage) without permission. The United States and the European Union contest this claim.16

Russian Federation

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Canada is the current chair of the Arctic Council, until 2017. Its North-ern Strategy and Arctic Foreign Policy Statement both reaffirm its commit-ment towards “exercising sovereignty” in the region. It will make its submis-sion to the CLCS in 2013 itself, and has been compiling data for several years now.17

Canada is fending off threats to its sovereignty on multiple fronts- first, with respect to its continental shelf. Second, from the United States in the Beaufort Sea and from Den-mark at Hans Island-both of which are bilateral issues that come under the topic of Arctic sovereignty. Final-ly, and arguably most importantly, is along the Northwest Passage. Canada faces similar prob-lems as does Russia in this regard. The Northwest Passage clearly passes through archipelagic waters of Canada and Canada has enough reasons to feel that the passage constitutes internal waters. However, the United States has persistently denied Canada’s sover-eignty in the waters, considering them international waters, and to prove their point, sent ships and submarines through the passage much to Canada’s

chagrin. Several other nations have at least tacitly supported the US. Central to this debate are the interpretations of Part III and Part IV of the UNCLOS, which delegates should closely analyse.

Canada

United StatesThe US is an arctic nation through Alaska (which it purchased from the Russian Empire for less than $5 a square km in 1867) and its surround-ing waters. It has not ratified the UN-CLOS yet, and hence has no timeline for filing any continental shelf claims (and is not likely to have any major oppositions whenever it were to do so). However, it is a key player in many Arctic disputes, and has one of the most alarming Arctic policies. The Homeland Security Pres-idential Directive (HSPD) 25 / Na-tional Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, released during the last month of Bush’s Presidency establish “the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region and di-rects related implementation actions.”

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They divided the policies section into 7 different areas including:

claim to be flawed and offered objec-tions when they first made their sub-mission (referenced above). It was one of the first nations to oppose Canada’s rights over the Northwest Passage, though former US ambassador David Wilkins comment that this was not a matter of Canada v. the US, but a dis-pute between Canada and the world20, is now truer than ever. Interestingly, it can be argued that other nations joining in the clamour makes the US a little less happy about its stance simply because global access to the passage poses possible security threats to it as well. That said, the US is not necessar-ily so concerned that Canada will not US ships pass or impose harsh ship-ping regulations given the strength of their bilateral ties. To paraphrase the opinion of Donald McRae of the University of Ottawa, the US probably has little issues with the policies that Canada will implement; rather, it is a matter of principal for the US that Canada recognize the status of Inter-national Strait.21

The United States is also the rea-son the reason why the members of the Arctic Council do not refer to the issue of militarization directly.

• National Security and Home-land Security Interests in the Arctic • International Governance, Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues • Economic Issues, including Energy • Maritime Transportation18

The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap19 talks about strengthening under-water warfare and strike warfare mechanisms in the Arctic, con-ducting missile analyses, making investments in weapons , platforms, sensors, command, control, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance and much else. As of today, the US still has much poorer capabilities and infrastructure than either Russia or Canada, in terms of icebreakers, equipment and soldiers trained for Arctic condition. However, these aggressive policies are fast bridging that gap. The US has abrasive relations with most nations regarding Arctic issues – it strongly believes Russia’s

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The US said they would only partici-pate in the Arctic Council if there was no discussion on issues of security in the council, leading to 1996 Ottawa Declaration including a clause to that effect. Naturally, the clause has faced severe criticism from both members and external observers, and there is a growing hope that Canada’s upcom-ing chairmanship will rectify this gag order.22, 23

Of all non-state actors, China has one of the biggest stakes in the future of the Arctic. Shipping and related in-dustries accounts for a major share of their GDzP24, and a share in the hydrocarbon reserves of the region would be more than useful for the massive industrial sector of one of the world’s fastest growing economies. There is no authoritative official Arctic policy released by the Chinese govern-ment, but their interests in the Arctic are clear. The Northwest Passage is a possible 7000 odd kilometre short-cut, and along with nations such as South Korea and Japan have advocat-ed thepreservation of the Arctic as a “common heritage of mankind” (read as: forget Arctic sovereignty and free access to the Arctic and its routes for

China

Chinese firms and state actors are in-vesting all over the Arctic – from $400 million in mineral and petroleum projects in northern Canada to a series of agreements on Arctic cooperation with Iceland.25

European UnionThe interests of all European Union members are difficult to categorize under a single umbrella and their EU Arctic Policy is a work in progress. Ac-cording to their introductory page on the europa.eu webpage26 (the official EU website where it publishes infor-mation from all its institutions), The EU Arctic policy is built around three main policy objectives, one of them being “international cooperation”. Their 2008, 2011 and 2013 speeches and communiques (links to which can be found on the same webpage) dis-cuss sustainable use of Arctic resourc-es, fighting climate change, supporting indigenous people and maintaining peace and cooperation between stake-holders. However, EU nations contin-ue to develop robust military policies with the US through the NATO. These scarcely acknowledged undertones of military assertion indicate a truer and less benevolent picture of their interest in the Arctic.

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The only true way to resolve these conflicts is through open deliberation without any reservations, and the willingness to compromise on some interests to forward others. The atti-tude with which the participants of the Arctic Council choose to present their interests and demands at this confer-ence will determine whether the Arc-tic will set a precedent for cooperation or for conflict.

What was once a barren wasteland of ice has become the energy source of the fast approaching tomorrow. There are overlapping bilateral and multilateral conflicts over it, and with the CLCS lagging behind by years, no permanent resolution appears forthcoming even by the end of this decade. Nations are us-ing their militaries to tacitly assert their rights over the region, and the only forum that brings all the par-ties together on a round table has its tongue tied by a declaration in 1996. In this free for all for resourc-es, it becomes easy to forget that the true target should not be to get the biggest share of the melting Arctic; rather, it should be to minimize the effect of climate change in the first place. It is imperative that states re-alize the importance of dialogue and cooperation before tensions get any more serious than they already are. To allow territorial conflicts to reach a state where arbitration through international legal mechanisms be-comes necessary will be detrimental to international peace and security, and cooperation in the Arctic.

Conclusion

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This section highlights a few questions raised and (deliberately) not answered completely in the topic guide.

• Should the Arctic Council be al-lowed to discuss matters of security?

• If so, what were the initial opposi-tions and how can they be addressed? And if the Arctic council should be able to discuss military issues, how can the militarization of the Arctic be stopped, or at least slowed down?

• Prominent territorial conflicts in the Arctic: o Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges o North Pole o Northwest Passage o Certain sections of the North ern Sea Route o Beaufort Sea dispute (resolve on paper) o Svalbard dispute (resolved) o Hans Island o Ellesmere Island

• Should territorial conflicts that are essentially bilateral issues be discussed in the Council? If so, then what role should the opinion of States not di-rectly involved play?

• Should the North Pole remain a part of the “global commons” regardless of continental shelf claims?

• Taking the previous question further, are the demands of several non-Arctic states for other parts of the Arctic to be declared as global commons justi-fied/feasible? Or perhaps something along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty System?

• Do the Northwest Passage and parts of the Northern Sea Route constitute internal waters? International straits? Or is there a possible middle ground that can appease all parties?

• Regardless of sovereignty, should heavy shipping traffic even be per-mitted in the region given the fragile Arctic ecosystem?

Questions to Consider

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need to fill in the gaps are there in the footnotes. If at any point you get stuck or need help understanding some aspect of the argument, send me an email and I’ll try to explain it to you to the best of my understanding –but only after you’ve tried hard enough yourself. Included below is the link to an official report prepared for the US congress regarding the Arctic. It is worth reading, as it candidly talks about the interests of the Arctic States, NATO, China and the European Union. It also touches upon a number of tensions between different States. The facts you find in this report will give you a sense of contemporary debate and should give you subtopics to research on. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf

Some of the most important links for research are embedded in the text and footnotes themselves – the text of the UNCLOS, articles and studies analysing Arctic conflicts, and a few videos in case you get tired of reading. Going through all the research material can be very tedious and technical. For example, someone trying to understand the Beaufort Sea dispute may spend hours trying to understand the arguments endorsing sinusoidal section projection principles and hours trying to understand the principle itself. Similarly, the jargon of the UNCLOS can get extremely legal and analysing it directly can be difficult. Nevertheless, a mastery of these fine points is the only way to responsibly represent your nation’s sovereign rights. Throughout the conference you’ll be coming back to what the relevant legal instruments say about various matters to assert you rights. I deliberately did not try to explain too many of them in depth myself as this analysis will form the crux of your arguments. However, all the resources you will

A Note on Research

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1. Pytheas of Massalia , an Ancient Greek explorer (4th century B.C) wrote extensive records of his travels in the Arctic. Only fragments of his records survive, most notably in Strabo’s Geographica.2. http://geography.about.com/library/misc/ucarctic.htm3. Exploring Polar Frontiers: A Historical Encyclopedia by Mills, William James ISBN 97815760742204. Thule air base, Greenland [video]5. IPCC Assessment Report, 2007. Image taken from http://visual.ly/arctic-ice-melting6. http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=19807. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) Originally prepared for the International Year of the Ocean, 19988. Part II of the UNCLOS9. Part II section 4 of the UNCLOS10. Part V of the UNCLOS11. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm12. Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor by Anna Cavnar13. http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/09/15/20533385.html14. http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20120530/173757083.html15. Reuters, ‘Russian navy boss warns of China’s race for the Arctic’, 4 Nov. 2010, 16. Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, Margaret Blunden17. Canada’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea18. Text of the NSPD 66/HSPD 2519. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf20. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8S4RN3RUjE (10:40)21. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0xcodrazPw22. http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2012/08/canada-and-arctic-council-what-will-change-2013-201523. http://www.sipri.org/research/security/arctic/arcticevents/the-arctic-council-in-transition-nor-dic-to-north-american-leadership24. 46%, according to certain sources [China And the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon, Joseph Spears, China. Brief 9, no. 6 (March 18, 2009)] though that figure may be off.25. China, Iceland announce deal on oil-rich Arctic (AFP) – Apr 20, 2012 26. http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/index_en.htm

Notes