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This document is archival in nature and is intended for those who wish to consult archival documents made available from the collection of Public Safety Canada. Some of these documents are available in only one official language. Translation, to be provided by Public Safety Canada, is available upon request.
Le présent document a une valeur archivistique et fait partie des documents d’archives rendus disponibles par Sécurité publique Canada à ceux qui souhaitent consulter ces documents issus de sa collection. Certains de ces documents ne sont disponibles que dans une langue officielle. Sécurité publique Canada fournira une traduction sur demande.
ANALYSIS OF' RESULTS OF' FALLOUT PROTECTION
SURVEY OF CANADA
JULY 1970
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CONTENTS
I INTRODUCTION 1
II FALLOUT PROTECTION SURVEY OF CANADA 3
1. Purpose and Scope 2. Survey Response 3. Organization 4. Interim and Final Survey Results 5. Updating 6. Field Survey Statistios 7. Expenditures
III ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 11
1. Introduction 2. General Analysis Considerations 3. Population Distribution by Risk Area 4. Potential Fallout Shelter 5. Distribution of Shelter Space by Risk Area 6. Factors Affecting Usability of Potential Space
IV IMPLICATIONS 33
1. Introduction 2. Potential Space 3. Consequences of Exposure 4. Activity Steps and Related Costs
ANNEXES
A Population Distribution by Risk Area A-1 • Potential Shelter Spaces by Protection
Factor Category with Population B-1 Population by Risk Area and Total Potential Shelter Space C-1
D Development of Casualty Estimates D-1 • Casualty Estimates by Province E-1 • Development of Cost Estimates F-1 G Risk Area Maps by Province G-1
A
•
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964 the Government of Canada agreed to a recommendationthat a national survey be carried out of all existing buildings to
identify the potential fallout-protected spaces available. * This
survey entitled the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, and now
completed, provides:
a national inventory of existing potential
fallout shelter space
information on which to carry out necessary
shelter planning
information on which recommendations can be
made concerning future development of a
national fallout shelter program
•
The development of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada resultèdfrom a series of studies in Shelter Survey Techniques during theperiod 1959 - 1964. These studies are summarized as follows:
1959 - Brockville Pilot Study: Initial survey, by sampling, to
determine the feasibi,lity of survey techniques in conjunction with
a preliminary method of computation.
1961 - Survey of Federal Buildings: Conducted to evaluate the
fallout protection available in basements of federally owned buildings.,
In the Province of Ontario, the first computer program written for
calculation of protection factors was developed by the Department of
Highways of Ontario, in conjunction with the Department of Public
Works of Canada.
1962 - Survey of Mines: A preliminary survey to determine the
suitability of using mines as protected space,, The principal
factors under consideration were habitability, access and emergency
power supply.
1964 - Alberta Pilot Study: The purpose qf this pilot survey was
to:
Develop fallout protection survey techniqueswhich could be applied to a national survey.
Determine the amount of fallout protection in
the Province of Alberta, in terms of protection
factor and space which could be made available
for public use.
Memorandum to the Cabinet1'on Emergency Plans,,
Document CEP 4/64 dated August 10, 1964.
1
• 1965 - Analysis Study No. 1; Alberta Recion: This first analysis study on fallout protection, was aimed at estimating the costs of developing existing shelter potential, but without regard to geographic location.
1969 - Fallout Protection Survey of Canada - Completion: This event represents the culmination of a series of projects designed to determine existing national resources that may be made available for protection of the public against fallout gamma radiation in a nuclear war emergency. Analysis of the results of this work tcgether with details of the inventory, provides the basic information necessary for shelter planning and programming.
The present document - The Analysis of Results of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, includes among other matters, an a.ttempt to correlate the risk of fallout to fallout shelter distribution as revealed by the Survey. The study does not take into account the potential shelter space that may be available in the various operating and disused mines across the country or the possible fallout protection that may exist in private homes. This analysis is essentially an examination of the number of potential communal shelter spaces located and identified in both public and private buildings across Canada.
In order to provide a better understanding of the results of• this study, a brief description of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada has been included as Section II.
2
II. FALLOUT PROTECTION SURVEY OF CANADA
•
1. Purpose and Scope.
The purpose of the survey was to determine the amount and quality of existing potential fallout shelter space that could be made available to the public in a nuclear war situation, on this continent.
The survey included all categories of buildings and structures having a minimum protection factor of 10 and a minimum floor area of 1000 square feet, with the exception of:
All DND owned and operated buildings . and structures.
Note: DND staff surveyed these departmental properties in 1961.
All residential dwellings including detached or double homes, town housing or row housing, duplex, triplex, fourplex and apartments with fewer than seven units.
All floor space above and below ground was considered and environmental factors recorded for each surveyed building. Special-entry cards were used to record essential services buildings such as relay stations and generator buildings.
2. Survey Response
In June, 1966, over 300 people were employed on the task of gathering building data for the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada. This task could not have been carried out without the adequate coverage given by the news media and all persons who generously gave permission to allow survey teams on their premises. Public reaction to this project was most positive and resulted in a great deal of interest as indicated by the many questions concerning the survey.
In addition, full industry, provincial and
While the project were excluded because of considerations.
cooperation was received from private municipal governments.
was widely acceptable, some buildings commercial and industrial seciirity
•
CANADA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION
Figure 1. SURVEY WORK FLOW
pI 1-••■■
Distribution of output Tabulation
Sheets
Analysis of Results
Computer Program
Training Manual & Technical Advice
Initiation by Canada EMO
Development of Survey
Data Record Forms
• ..........
'Keypunching Agency •
Computer Programming
Data Processing
• ..• ....••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • •
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF CANADA
SURVEY
Field Survey Operation
an,
Field Operations and Admin.
Managament 1-)1 1••■•--->1
Plan including Areas of Survey
Saskatchewan Contract
Public Relations PLogram
.1■••
>
•
Training
•
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
COMPUTER SERVICES BUREAU
COMPUTATION
Reports
Data Forms • Completed
A
3. Organization
The survey work flow and related areas of responsibilityare shown in Figure 1..The three main areas of Survey; Computation;Technical Management and Analysis were conducted by the Departmentof Public Works of Canada, the Computer Services Bureau and theCanada Emergency Measures Organization. A departure was madefrom normal survey procedures during 1967, when the Departmentof Public Works of Canada contracted with the University of
Saskatchewan to carry out field survey work in the Provinceof Saskatchewan. The value of the contract was $85,000.
Survey work has not been carried out in the Yukon andNorthwest Territories or Canadian Embassies and other buildingsabroad.
®
.4. Interim and Final Suryey Results
The Middle East crisis of 1967 gave impetus to allaspects of civil emergency planning, especially with regard
to crisis action planning. The inventory of potential shelterspace at that time was incomplete, yet it seemed appropriatethat the recorded information be made readily available.Subsequently, Interim Survey Results were produced and held
in readiness for any demand that might arise should therebe'further deterioration of the international situation.
in May, 1968, Final Survey Results for all provincesexcept Quebec and Ontario, were produced and distributed.
Because data collection was still continuing in the Provincesof Quebec and Ontario, Interim Survey Results were sent tothese provinces. The distribution of survey results enabledprovincial and municipal engineering staff to become familiarwith the survey result format and interpretation of data. FinalSurvey Results werè,issued ultimately to Quebec and Ontariôduring March, 1969..
5. Updating
A pilot updating survey was conducted in the Provinceof Alberta in fiscàl.year 1968/69 to identify problems likelyto occur in updating existing records. On completion of this
pilot survey, revisions were made to data processing routinesand to the Annual Updating-Survey Procedures.
Although a large number of new buildings and structureshad been erected throughout the country since the survey began,the amount of field survey work was restricted by the fundsavailable. During fiscal year 1969/70, some updating survey
5
Pl
work was carried out in the Provinces of Quebec, Ontario
and British Columbia, In the case of British Columbia, the
survey was completely updated for that province. However,
work in Ontario and Quebec was restricted to the peripheralareas of Toronto and Montreal.
Limited funds are being made available to continueupdating surveys within each fiscal year. ^-^ - 1 I I-^t_
6. Field Survey Statistics J ^^ iL113For the purposes of the survey, provinces were divided
into Zones and Subzones. Figure 2 gives the number of zones andsubzones in each province.' A bound set of Fiiial Sur%fey Resultshas been issued for each subzone which contains an acceptable'building part'.
A building part may constitute a whole structure or a
portion of a structure which has been subdivided for computationalpurposes. Figure 3 shows the number of structures surveyed and the
number of acceptable building parts derived from the survey.
POLITICAL
DIVISIONTotal Number
of ZonesTotal Numberof Subzones
Newfoundland 1 1
New Brunswick 2 25
Prince Edward Island 1 1
Nova Scotia 3 20
Quebec 8 47
Ontario 7 50
Manitoba 3 65
Saskatchewan 9 13
Alberta 3 112
British Columbia 6 102
TOTALS: 43 436
Figure 2, Provincial Zones and Subzones
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An important consideration in the preliminary planning
and development of the survey was the magnitude and extent of the
required field suryey work on a nationwide basis. This is reflectedin Figure 3 which ^hows, for each province, the total number of 9 r4`^structures surveyeA, tht number of building parts recorded for (N ^'these structures, and oLer pertinent details within the scope pO(H eof the surve.y ..
a^~ ' ^ 7_^^ ..1.(1 G
POLITICAL
DIVISION
SurveyCompletion
DateStructures
-Surveyed
Building
PartsRecorded
ShelterAnalysis
Cards
AcceptableBuildingParts
Newfoundland Dec.1966 1965 2785 178f 1477ff
New Brunswick Sept.1966 3,940 5741 118 4065b
Prince Edward July.1966 484 642 21 474 tipIsland
Nova Scotia Dec.1967 1582 2091 41 1827
Qu6bec Mar.1968 18989 27957 245 25003
Ontario Oct.1968 28548 54687 465 47201
Manitoba Sept.1967 3373 5258 132 4543
Saskatchewan Sept,1967 3070 4209 837 3221
Alberta(Pilot Survey)
Sept.1964 3310 4430 177 3657
Alberta(Updating Survey) Oct.1968 434 557 41 420
British Columbia Sept.1968 4704 6813 504 5536
CANADA Mar.1969 70399 115190 2759 97424
Figure 3. Survey Task Record
f'
is
In the survey, each building part was recorded
separately on a data collection sheet which had 406 rvcordingboxes for coded entries; the location of the building wasthen sketched on the reverse side of the sheet.
It is estimated that over 40 million recording boxeswere completed to record the data for the Fallout ProtectionSurvey of Canada.
7. Expenditures
Planning of the main durvey was carried out duringthe fiscal yeâ.r 1965/66 with field work commencing in five
provinces in the Spring of 1966. The majority of the fieldwork was completed during the Summer months of 1966, 1967and 1968, using stndents on the field survey teams.
Essentially, expenditures were allocated to twomajor functions; field survey work and data processing.Figure 4 shows a breakdown of expenditures for this project
for each of these two functions from fiscal year 1964/65 tofiscal year 1968/69. The expenditures incurred for the AlbertaPilot Study are included because they constitute an essentialpart of the whole survey and analysis.
Fiscal Year Field Survey
WorkData Processing Total
1964/65 $ 90,000 $ 10,000 $ 100,000
1965/66 139,000 38,000 177,000
1966/67 992,000 46,000 1,038,000
1967/68 447,000 66,000 513,000
1968/69 165,000 55,000 210,000
TOTAL: $1,833,000 $215,000 $2,038,000
Figure 4. Expenditures - Main Survey
0
•
0
8
teLy thf Au.otiAn „9.notex.17,4c
■•+
• Expenditures for the updating survey work carried out
during the fiscal year 1969-70 in the Provinces of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia were as follows:
Fiscal Year Field Survey Data Processing Total Work
1969-70 $45,000 $7,000 $52,000
Figure 4a. Expenditures - Updating Survey
In summary, the following statistics are noteworthy:
Main Survey_ (1965-69)
• 70,399 structures were surveyed at an average cost of $27.32 per structure.
S. Cost to completely process 115,190 data collection sheets averaged $1.81 per sheet.
• Average cost for field survey work and data processing was $17.69 per record.
. Cost per head of population for the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada was 9.7 cents.
• Cost per potential shelter space, 3.7 cents.
Updating Survey (1969-70 only)
• 1,360 structures surveyed at an average cost of $26,90 per structure (to January 31, 1970).
• Average cost for field survey work and data processing was $23.50 per record.
, Cost per potential shelter space, 2.9 cents (considering only spaces with PF 50 and better).
•
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III. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS ,^(1^
Introduction ^^^^^
1. Summary figures of the final results of the FalloutProtection Survey of Canada indicate that there are about 21
million potential fallout shelter spaces with protection factorsof 50 or better and about 31 million with protection factors of
25 or better. On a national basis, these figures may not appear
to be meaningful but when correlated with fallout risk areas,likely target areas and the relative geographic location of theseshelter spaces, to that of the population, they become extremely
s ignif icant.1 a t v"Pt ".6
• ^In November 1969, the paper, "The Thréat to Canada 1970" , ^uL
was produced to provide civil emergency planners with an est-mate ,"^
on which to base their program and their contingency plans for a ^J`^^
war emergency. This paper has been used as a basis for defining p
and locating the various risk areas of Canada, to develop a risk
oriented analysis. The emphasis of this analysis, therefore, is
on the correlation of risk to distribution of shelter space and
population. It should be noted, however, that the existing
deployment of Minuteman missile sites by the United States along
its northern border has not been considered in this study, sinceadequate information was not available at the time of preparation.
may exist in these figures at the Emergency Government Zone level,but they are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of this study.Population figures for those people likely to be subjected to directweapon effects were taken to be the likely target metro o itan area
2. General Analysis Considerations
Population figures used in this study were developed from
the latest information available from the Dominion Bureau of Statisticsand adjusted to match the 1970 population totals. Some discrepancies WN°
figures. Discrepancies may also exist here, but they should no r0rl*
be too significant.
The risk maps (see Annex G) included in this report, are a
development of the original risk maps from which Annex C3, of "Threatto Canada 1970" paper was prepared. The apparent precision of these
risk maps may be somewhat misleading and therefore, it should beemphasized that boundaries of the various risk areas cannot betaken as being so precisely defined.. The geographic areas used
to determine shelter spaces and population in given risk areaswere generally somewhat more extended than those on the attached
maps,.to allow for boundary variation.
11
• The curves of population for each province by risk area, given at Annex A, show, among other matters, the distribution of unattenuated 14-day possible doses of gamma radiation by percent population surviving direct effects. Major plot points are given in the table above each chart. It is likely that some shelter occupants would be required to stay in shelters for periods up to 14 days. Since the radiation doses noted in the"Threat to Canada 1970" paper, are for 7 days only, projected 14 day doses have been included in this study. Converted dose figures are as follows:
7 - day dose . 14 • day dose
5000 5400
750 820
3. Population Distribution by Risk Area
Population figures developed for this study, show that about 112i million people are located outside likely metropolitan target areas. Of these, 4-1.- million are located in high fallout risk areas (see Figure 5) where, in the event of a nuclear attack, there is a high probability that the 14-day gamma radiation dose will exceed 5,400 roentgens. More than 2 million people would probably be subjected to 14-day doses varying from 5,400 roentgens down to 820 roentgens and a further 4 million subjected to something less than 820 roentgens.
Four risk areas were used in this study and they are compatible with the risk areas defined in "The Threat to Canada 1970" paper.
DIRECT - metropolitan areas of those likely target areas.
HIGH areas where there is a high probability of the unattenuated 14-day dose being in excess of 5400 roentgens. Although this category includes those areas which may be exposed to much higher radiation intensities, it is realized that such areas would have to be dealt with separately,
MEDIUM - areas where the unattenuated 14-day dose is likely to be in excess of 820 roentgens but less than 5,400 roentgens.
12
•
areas where the unattenuated 14-day dose is likely to be less than 820 roentgens (This risk area embraces the remaining areas of each province.)
Risk Area Population
Direct 9,592,000
High 4,518,000
Medium 2,327,000
Low 4,774,000
Total 21,211,000
Figure 5, CANADA - Population Distribution by Risk Areas
The risk area population distribution characleristics of Canada resemble those of Ontario, Quebec and Alberta, but are quite different from those of other provinces (see Figure 6). This is a result of the variation of risk across the country and it indicates that public protection requirements of each province may differ somewhat according to risk.
A set of curves . (see Annex A) was developed for all provinces showing the distribution of population surviving direct effects by risk area and the percent population that would be at risk to various unatten-uated 14-day doses of gamma radiation. The curves give only a general indication of the likely distribution of population by risk areas and therefore, should not be too precisely interpreted.
Protection factor levels marked on these curves indicate the percentage of people surviving direct effects that would be sufficiently protected to limit the 14-day exposure dose to 20 0R or less. For any given point on the curves, the protection factor required to limit the 14-day dose is derived as follows:
Protection Factor (PF) Unattenuated Dose Dose Limit
For example, if a 14-day dose of 200R is not to be exceeded, a protection factor of 25 would satisfy this requirement for about 58 percent of the population surviving direct effects (about 6.7 million). If the 14-day dose is to be limited to say, 100R, then a protection factor of 50 would be needed to satisfy this requirement for the same 58 percent of the
•
LOW
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0
01
Figure 6
14 DAY DOSE - R
POLITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOWDIVISION (> 5400R) (820R- 5400R) (<820R)
NEWFOUNDLAND - - 0.516
100%
NEW BRUNSWICK - 0.623 - -
100%
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND - 0.11 -
100%
NOVA SCOTIA 0.099 0.35 0.17
16% 57% 27%
QUEBEC 1.66 0.474 0.94
54°/a 15.4% 30.5%
ONTARIO 2.11 0.448 0.696
65% 14% 21%
MANITOBA 0.074 0.095 0.259
17% 22% 61%
SASKATCHEWAN - - 0.948
100%
ALBERTA 0.386 0.212 0.254
I 45% 25% 30%
BRITISH COLUMBIA 0.19 0.015 0.991
16% 1% 83%
CANADA 4.519 2.323 4.774
39% 20% 41%
Figure 6. POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS- DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREAS
(Expressed in millions and percentage ofsurviving population)
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0
population. These figures are intended to illustrate the use of thecurves and should not be interpreted as constituting recommendedlevels of protection.
4. Potential Fallout Shelter
Of the 21 million potential shelter spaces in Canada, with
protection factors of 50 and better, more than 15 million of these arelocated in likely target areas. The total population of these likely
target areas is somewhat in excess of 9 million, indicating a probablesurplus of shelter. In other areas the situation is generally thereverse. Figure 7 shows numbers of potential shelter spaces in Canadafor given minimum protection factor levels.
Protection Factors
equal to or better
than
Existing PotentialShelter Spaces
100 15,184,699
50 21,256,457
20 36,555,040
10 53,785,552
Total 53,785,552
Population 21,211,000
Figure 7. CANADA - Potential Shelter
Spaces
These population - versus - shelter figures clearlyindicate a significant amount of existing potential fallout shelterspace, Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded from these figuresthat an adequate level of shelter space is available for thetotal population. This disparity is due mainly to localizeddeficiencies and surpluses of potential shelter space when equated
to all of the various degrees of risk and population densities.
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Ile
PROVINCIAL POPULATION
1970 Levels
516,000
623,000
110,000
765,000
6,004,000
7,567,000
978,000
948,000
1 ,586,000
2,116,000
21,211,000
PROTECTION FACTOR CATEGORY
POL IT ICAL PFC2 PFC3 PFC4 PFC8 PROVINCIAL
DIVISION PROTECTION FACTOR TOTAL
10-19 20-49 50-99 > 100
NEVVFOUNDLAND 184,980 133,151 28,741 106,480 496,879
NEW BRUNSWICK 458,050 252,806 109,104 219,809 1,039,769
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316
NOVA SCOTIA 275,531 270,042 83,763 203,849 833,185
QUEBEC 5,702,974 4,930,748 1,155,267 6,037,366 18,625,059
ONTARIO 7,170,072 6,636,137 1,498,840 5,837,393 22,328,569
MANITOBA 789,761 646,433 248,590 702,573 2,387,357
SASKATCHEWAN 431,681 402,646 146,698 409,142 1,390,167
ALBERTA 836,048 792,434 287,039 784,000 2,699,521
BRITISH COLUMBIA 1,322,944 1,206,174 478,269 863,293 3,870,730
PF CATEGORY TOTALS 17,230,512 15,298,583 6,071,758 15,184,699 53,785,552
>
Figure 8
e
Figure 8. POTENTIAL FALLOUT SHELTER SPACES - Total Number from Survey Data (Based on 12 sq. ft./person)
e 19
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Figure 9
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0
AGENCY
POLITICAL: DIVISION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NEWFOUNDLAND 38246 204961 2595 46548 37491 920 166118
NEW BRUNSWICK 72693 75287 56972 219785 172321 9694 433017
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 7918 26503 922 21683 20391 582 36317
NOVA SCOTIA 74641 89016 92616 102313 99652 7841 367106
QUEBEC 530946 1108882 579576 2943376 2772200 123738 10566341
ONTARIO 1201260 799434 944750 2921578 1097672 86080 15277795
MANITOBA 135723 165023 142561 223707 99827 12255 1608261
SASKATCHEWAN 130639 171857 107826 252663 90995 23468 612719
ALBERTA 119262 450634 190391 243701 116168 28230 1151135
BRITISH COLUMBIA 239907 313484 260847 358089 106291 52831 2539281
TOTAL 2551235 3405081 2379056 7333443 4613008 345639 33158090
Agency refers to the ownership categories which are as follows;
Agency Code Agency Code
Federal 1 Religious Organizations 5Provincial 2 Public Utility Undertakings 6Municipal 3 AIIOthers 7School, Collegiate & Other Boards 4
Figure 9. SUMMARY - Potential Fallout Shelter Spacesby Province and Agency.
0
21
Figure 10
TYPE
POLITICALDIVISION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NEWFOUNDLAND 151772 9891 70986 42183 49074 12109 47894 29914 83056
NEW BRUNSWICK 317482 27670 122774 164332 115991 42747 90450 53989 104334
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 37004 3643 17292 20781 13189 345 7306 3210 11546
NOVA SCOTIA 158652 27460 201244 126424 89421 8276 62850 26996 131862
QUEBEC 4409841 438709 4861574 2346043 780543 435852 1930441 1937461 1484595
ONTARIO 3724319 338950 8847657 3091872 1408471 919040 1584666 1111404 1302190
MANITOBA 328096 37397 715012 497121 133827 96120 155435 249629 174720
SASKATCHEWAN 307989 48057 255507 291159 118696 63789 89773 83570 131627
ALBERTA 472143 185058 619056 716406 170221 69828 114074 193128. 159607
BRITISH COLUMBIA 590887 70283 1106101 745527 283071 48771 321109 365096 339885
TOTAL: 10498185 1187118 16817203 8041848 3162504 1696877 4403998 4054397 3923422
Buildings are classified according to the Type Classification given in the NationalBuilding Code (1965). The assigned type codes for the different types are as follows:
Assembly 1 Commercial and IndustrialInstitutional 2 Division 1 6Residential 3 Division 2 7Business and Personal 4 Division 3 8Mercantile 5 Hospitals and Nursing Homes 9
Figure 10, SUMMARY - Potential Fallout Shelter Spacesby Province and Type.
0
, 23
r.
CANADA B.C.
3
ALTA SASK
MAN ONT QUE
N. B. N. S. PEI NFLD
Agency Code Agency Code
1111■
Agency refers to the ownership categories which are as follows:
Federal 1 Religious Organizations 5 Provincial 2 Public Utility Undertakings 6 Municipal 3 All others 7 School, Collegiate & Other Boards 4
Figure 11, DISTRIBUTION OF SHELTER SPACES BY AGENCY
2 2
ALTA SASI(
• MAN ONT 2
N.B.
6 7 8 9
1 Commercial and Industrial
2 Division 1 3 Division 2
Division 3 5 Hospitals and Nursing Homes
Assembly
Institutional Residential Business and Personal Mercantile
Buildings are classified according to the Type Classification given in the National Building Code (1965). The assigned type codes for the different types are as follows:
Figure 12. DISTRIBUTION OF SHELTER SPACES BY TYPE •
26
Figure 13
0
0
PROTECTION FACTOR
EQUALTO ORBETTER THAN
DIRECTHIGH
(>5400R)MEDIUM
(820R-5400R)LOW
(<820R)TOTAL
100 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,899 15,184,699
50 15,705,410 2,191,795 818,854 2,540,398 21,256,457
20 26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647 36,555,040
10 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894 53,785,552
PERCENT 72 12 5 11 100
Figure 13. CANADA - Distribution of PotentialShelter Spaces by Risk Area.
27
•
•
• Figures 8, 9 and 10 contain details of provincial distribution of potential fallout shelter space by protection factor category, agency (that is, building ownership category) and type, as classified by the National Building Code.
A proportional graphic representation of the distribution of shelter spaces by agency and type is shown in Figures 11 and 12.
5. Distribution of Shelter Spaces by Risk Area
A major proportion of existing potential shelter space and the greatest.concentration of population are located within likely target areas. However, the very significant remaining balance of shelter spaces in the other areas of risk, totals some 14.9 million spaces and represents a valuable non-military defence inventory resource.
Distribution of shelter spaces for Canada by risk area is given in Figure 13 with spaces grouped by minimum protection factor. Distribution of shelter spaces for each province is given in Figure 14. Further breakdown by protection factor category for provinces can be found in Annex B.
POLITICAL RISK AREAS
DIVISION Direct High Medium Low
NEWFOUNDLAND - - 496,879
NEW BRUNSWICK - 1,039,769 -
PRINCE EDWARD - 114.316 ISLAND
-,
NOVA SCOTIA 585,436 700 179,056 67,993
QUEBEC 13,850,122 2,867,169 397.272 1,510,496
ONTARIO 17,149,689 3,464,376 565,598 1,148,906
MANITOBA 2,094,260 57,654 13,050 222,393
SASKATCHEWA - - - 1,390,167
ALBERTA 2,309,663 35,607 92,054 262,197
BRITISH COLUMBIA 2,857,857 96,675 5,335 910,863
CANADA 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894
Figure 14 - PROVINCES - Distribution ofrSlié1i-er Spaces by Risk Area.
29
• 6. Factor; 3 Affecting Usability of Potential Space
Potential fallout shelter space in a building or structure means that the existing fabric of the building, in terms of construction and configuration, has a protective shielding capability against the effect of nuclear radiation, or to be specific, gamma radiation as a result of fallout. Usable fallout shelter space is that inherently shielded portion of a building or structure which has no impediment to the habitability of a sheltering population, commensurate with ventilation and volumetric requirements, and therefore, can be used as fallout shelter.
Some of the adverse factors likely to affect the usability and hence reduce the number of available shelter spaces, include:
availability of building
fixed or heavy equipment
ventilation ûlpiiit êtpeej11. 914"Y"'"e'("44
protection factor requirements
relative location
The data pertaining to potential fallout shelter spaces were derived from the shelter area figures given in the final results of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada, on the basis of 12 square feet per shelter space. The usable spaces however, will be considerably less than these because of the factors listed above. It is important to emphasize here that the main purpose of the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada was to identify potential shelter space. Determination of the usability of this space was not included in the project, even though information on usable areas of basements was recorded.
Although a building could be made available during an emergency by special legislation, it may not be feasible to plan in peacetime for its use. Many areas of existing buildings are taken up with fixed or heavy equipment which would effectively prevent use of this space and since the ground floors and upper storey areas indicated in the survey results, are based on gross floor areas, there is likely to be a significant reduction in numbers. Ventilation requirements of a shelter space may not be adequate for maximum space utilization, although this is likely to be less of a problem for upper storeys than for basement and sub-basement areas. Protection factors may not be good enough to provide adequate protection and some potentip., shelter areas may not be conveniently located to plan on their use.
30
There is one other important consideration that should be
mentioned here. The AREA FACTORS used in the computation of shelter
areas (shown as S-AREA on results printout) are conservative in many
cases. 1rcŸ examp es i the dominant gamma radiation is from the roof,
then protection factors will generally be greater at the perimeterthan at the centre of a shelter area. It is quite likely, therefore,
that additional spaces could be found by further careful examination
of each shelter area
A realistic estimate of usable shelter space would be of theorder of 60 percent of the total surveyed potential spaces. This
represents a sz.gni ican y valuable life-saving capability - if plans
are developed in peacetime for use of those spaces in a war emergency.
Amu,L,^k( to
•
31
0
•
•
IV. IMPLICATIONS
1. Introduction
Development of plans and preparations in peacetime that will increase the nation's ability to survive and recover from a war emergency embraces a very wide range of non,mllitary national defence activities and protecting Canada's most important single resource, namely its people, is by no means the least important. Provision of protection for the public from the effects of nuclear weapons is not an easy problem, but the range of possible solutions is much clearer and more definitive than for many other defence problems. The casualty limiting usefulness of almost any step taken in this direction is very significant and the implications of providing various levels of protection compared with the consequences of no protection are given in this section. Other aspects of public protection such as dispersal and blast protection are not discussed here since this report is concerned only with the fallout protection component.
Before discussing the various implications of providing fallout protection, a few notes on some of the terms used in this section and in other parts of the report may provide additional clarification and avoid possible misinterpretation,
Radiation Dose Probable Early Effect Probable Effects on within.24 Hours
on Individuals Group (unit) Efficiency (roentgens)
100-150 r Acute effects of operational significance are Probably no significant loss in group (unit) improbable. Long-terni hazard. effectiveness. A few men may be incapacitated
for varying lengths of time.
150-250 r Nausea and vomiting within one day. Minor The effectiveness of a group (unit) would incapacitation after two days. possibly be reduced by one-third for periods of
about 48 hours.
250-350 r Nausea and vomiting in under four hours' fol. A group (unit) will be greatly reduced in effec-
lowed by a symptom-free period, lastingfrom tiveness during the nausea period, but less about the third day to the end of the second reduced If the emergency is great. The offer w eek after exposure. Some deaths in four to six tiveness may return almost to normal in two weeks and most of remainder incapacitated. days and remain so for up to a week but will
then fall off to complete ineffectiveness in about two weeks.
350-600 r Nausea and vomiting in under two hours. Death A group (unit) may be pa rt ially effective is almbst certain in four weeks. Incapacitation several hours, but the effectiveness will then until death , be steadily reduced to complete uselessness.
600 r Nausea and vomiting almost immediately. Any group (unit) will be quickly reduced to Death in one week, complete ineffectiveness.
5,000 r Immediate incapacitation. Death within 24 Any group (unit) will become ineffective hours , immediatel y.
Figure 15. Probable Early Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Individuals and Groups
WITHOUT PROTE 2TION
WITH PROTECTICN
SHADED AREA REPRESENTS DOSE IN SHELTER PF-100
INTENSITY REDUCED
BY FACTOR OF 100
FALLOU ARRIVES
RÉLATIVE DOSE iraieÉ Figure 15b
peeetzezeteue OUTSIDE DOSE RATE
1000 R/hr
GRAPHICAL
REPRESENTATION INSIDE DOSE RATE
10 R/hr
FALLOUT
ARRIVES
Figure 15a
TIME
Figure 15c PF 60-STRUCTURE = 100
SHADED AREA R-EPRÉSENTS DOSE RECEIVED IN OPEN
7///l /agooddsm,
-1-000
R/hr
DO
SE
RA
TE
34
.111.•
11111
Although it may be necessary to specify radiation dose limits for the general public and for personnel engaged in operations in a fallout environment, IT CANNOT BE OVER-EMPHASIZED THAT ALL RADIATION IS DANGEROUS AND THEREFORE, PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY TO KEEP DOSES TO A MINIMUM ARE ESSENTIAL. The table of probable early effects shown in Figure 15, gives some indication of the hazard of fallout gamma radiation.
Protection from this hazard can be achieved by removal of the sources of radiation, by remedial evacuation of the people from the radioactive environment or by providing shelter to reduce the radiation level. The ratio of the dose that would be received outside, without protection, to that received inside the shelter is referred to as the protection factor and this is the measure used to indicate the relative protective qualities of structures, (refer to Figures, 15e, 15b & 15c); the higher the protection factor, the better the fallout protection. A fallout shelter however, requires to have more than just protection from radiation if it is to perform its function. It must have adequate ventilation for its intended occupants, adequate sanitary facilities, i,,later and food. The provision of water and food could be undertaken at some U'age in the emergency, provided adequate plans had been made for this, but the provision of protection, adequate ventilation and even primitive sanitary facilities needs to be part of a peacetime program.
Adequacy of the various levels of protection referred to in this section, can only be estimated on the basis of risk location and anticipated radiation levels', and can only be determined specifically during the event, when radiation levels become known. It follows, therefore, that even low levels of protection could be adequate and may mean the difference between life and death . Planning, however, must consider the best protection that is available or that could be provided. Some shelter may be improvable from the point of view of protection and habitability. In most cases, the concept of improving the protective qualities of existing structures is rather difficult to implement, but many additional spaces could be made usable ifadequate ventilation were provided.
The term "potential space" refers to those spaces identified by the Fallout Protection Survey of Canada and provides for 12 square feet of floor space, but it does not imply that adequate ventilation exists. The term "usable space" means 12 square feet of floor space . adequatel ventilated.
In the paragraphs concerning the short-term consequences of exposure to fallout radiation, reference is made to people being fit, unfit, and unfit requiring medical care. The "fit" category refers to those people that might have been subjected to fallout radiation, but who have received 200 roentgens, or less, whole body doses in a period of two weeks. The "unfit" category includes those that may be sick, yet not requiring medical care, having received
two-week whole body doses of between 200 and 330 roentgens.
At the higher and of this exposu:;^-e range there may be up to5 percent deaths. Those people in the category "unfit, requiringmedical care", will have received two•-•week doses varying from
220 to 810 roentgens and many of these would die, as would thosereceiving greater closes.
2o Potential Spac•.=.
There a:-e more than 9 million people in Canada at riskfrom the direct effects of nuclear weapons. These, together
with the 11 miLlion people outside the likely target areas, couldbe subjected to various levels of dangerous radiation. Analysisof the results of the fallout protection survey shows that a
significant amount of potent:i_a1. fallout shelter space exists
that could be developed into a .7aluable life-saving and injury
limiting defen:,ive system for the people of Canada, if plans aremade in peacetime for its use in an emergency.
In the :l.ikel.y target areas, potential shelter spaces withprotection factors of 7_00 or better, exceed 11 million, many of
wh.i.ch may have some inherent low level blast protection capability.Planning for the use of these spaces however, must includeconsiderations not contained in this study, but they do provide a
base for contingency shelter planning within these highly vulnerableareas.
The high fallout risk areas across Canada contain about2 million potential spaces with protection factors of 50 or better
for a population of 4.5 million. In the medium and low risk areag,there are near:-y 5.5 million potential spaces with protection factors
of 20 or better for a population of about 7 m:^lliofi (see Figure 16).
Direct_^
High...- .-^ Mediüm
--
^
Low
Population 9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000..^....
4,774,000
PF 100 or better 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,1399
PF 50 or better 15,705,410 2,191,795 818,554 2,540,398
PF 20 or better 26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647
PF 10 or better 38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894
Figure 16. Population and Relative Potential
Shelter Spaces by Risk Areas
36
While these figures indicate a shortage of potential
spaces in the high and medium risk areas, they also show thatthere is a very significant amount of shelter, which represents
a valuable potential asset, Recent studies* show that the bestreturns for defence expenditures would result from development
of fallout shelter and therefore, existing facilities shouldbe exploited by the development of plans for their use in anemergency.
As a continuing function, identification of additional
spaces, development of spaces in areas where there is a deficit
of shelter, and incorporation of these spaces into municipalshelter plans, would contribute to an increase in the populationsurvival potential.
3. Consequences of Exposure
General
0
Exposure to fallout gamma radiation can produce acuteradiation sickness, with symptoms appearing in hours to days
and resulting in illness and possible death. Variations in
biological response, however, do not permit accurate prediction
of the effect of any individual dose and therefore, only the
probable consequences can be predicted. Additionally, althoughclinical evidence exists Lo indicate the probable short-termconsequences, no such evidence exists to indicate the severity,
or indeed the nature, of the long-term consequences to persons
who receive radiation or to future generations.. Having regardfor these two points, the following sections indicate the possibleconsequences to people,'of exposure to fallout gamma radiation
resulting from a nuclear attack..**
The Short Term
Four categories of exposure effects have been developed
in order to illustrate the casualties that might result from
different radiation dose levels. These are given in Figure 17,"Possible Short-Term Consequences of Various 2 Week Doses ofFallout Radiation". It should be noted that this chart applies
only to average healthy individuals and the effects on the sick,
the young, the aged and pregnant women would be much more severe.
These groups comprise 47 percent of the total population.
ID
^ "The Strategy and Economics of Intercontinental Missile Defence"
by J. S. Vigder, 1968.DORE cost effectiveness study of shelter options, 1968,
See Group 3 attack effects given in the paper "Threat to Canada.-1970"
The short-term consequence chart was developed from information given
in Table II of "Radiation Protection in Emergency Health Service Units",
EHS, 1965; from Section 5 of "Casualties from Nuclear Weapons", EHS,1968;and from "The Effects of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation",Canada EMO,
January 12, 1970.
37
•
PE
RC
ENT
OF
EXP
OSE
D PO
PU
LA
TIO
N
100%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
•
Figure 17
POSSIBLE SHORT—TERM CONSEQUENCES OF VARIOUS 2 WEEK DOSES OF FALLOUT RADIATION
UNFIT UNFIT AND REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE
100 200 300 400 500 600
Figure 17. 2 WEEK DOSE IN ROENTGENS
t
What are the possible short term consequences to persons exposed to a 2-week radiation dose of 500 roentgens (500 R)
STEP 1• Note the 500 R level on baseline of chart
(N.B. This baseline is the only entry on the chart).
STEP 2 Enter chart at 500 R; the vertical line above this value intercepts point P on curve C. In the case of 500 R, only
one curve is intercepted by the corresponding vertical line.
STEP 3 The related horizontal value at point P, in the example, is 20 percent of the exposed population.
STEP zh Below point P, 20 percent of persons exposed w-ill die from the effects of this radiation dose (500 R). Above
point P, 80 percent (i.e., 100-20 percent) of persons exposed to 500 R will be unfit and in need of medical
care (see values on vertical line).
FIT DEATH
700 800 900 1000
EXAMPLE USE OF CHART
39
•
II
Application of figures from the "Consequence" chart to
portions* of the population at risk indicates a range and number
of possible casualties. These figures do not include deaths andinjuries likely to be sustained from the direct effects, that is,from the effects of blast and initial nuclear and thermal radiation.Aggregated figures ** for Canada are shown in Figure 18, and are
based on the assumption that the population is sheltered in homesto the extent bf PF 2 for those wit ou asemen s, an for
Chose with basements.
CANADA
CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY
FIT
UNFIT
UNFIT REQUIRINGMEDICAL CARE
DEATHS
NUMBERS & PERCENT
OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
0"5%
10.5%
13%
Figure 1E - CASUALTIES FROM FALLOUT - FROM THREAT EVALUATION III
These casualty figures, while relatively small compared
with estimated likely casualties from direct effects, are not so
small that they can be ignored, The Fallout Protection Survey of
Canada indicates that there is much better protection availablethan that provided by homes only. Considerable usable fallout
shelter space with higher protection factors does exist and theimplications of its use in an emergency are reflected in Figure 19
and in a comparison of Figures 18 and 19.
* Casualty figures produced from Canada EMO Threat Evaluation III
Study were used to determine the numbers of people that would
likely be exposed to various dose levels in the event of an
attack. For details see Annex D.
Aggregated figures for Canada were produced from figures developed
for each province. For provincial figures see Annex E.
See assumptions of study given at Annex D.
76% 8,824,405
58,095
1,213,600
1,522,900
41
100% CANADA
13%
7.5%
THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL THREAT EVAL EXISTING SPAcES
EXISTING SPACES
0.5%
EX ISTING SPACES
2.8%
10.5%
EXISTING SPACES
7.7%
FIT FOR WORK UNFIT REQUIRING UNFIT MEDICAL CARE DEATHS
ADDITIONAI
FI
82% ,
L PERSONS
ADDIT ONAL CASUALTIES
.255,200
ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED 321,140
ADDITIONAL DEATHS PREVE NTED 658,825
CANADA
NUMBERS & PERCENT CONSEQUENCE CATEGORY
OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
FIT 82% 9,549,470
UNFIT 2.8% 313,295
UNFIT REQUIRING
7.7% 892,160 MEDICAL CARE
DEATI-15 7.5% 864,075
Figure 19. CASUALTIES FROM FALLOUT - Using Existing Space
The short-term survival capability as shown in Figure 18 could be enhanced by bringing into use all usable shelter space. This would improve Canadals overall defence posture against nuclear attack and thus reduce the number of casualties. Casualties likely to be prevented are given in Figure 20.
PE
RC
ENT
OF
PO
PU
LA
TIO
N S
UR
VIV
ING
DIR
EC
T E
FF
EC
TS
Figure 20, ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED - USING EXISTING SPACE
(comparison of charts 18 and 19)
42
0
The Long-Term
The objectives of all radiation protection are to prevent
or minimize somatic injuries and to minimize deterioration of thegenetic constitution of the people. Ionizing radiation can result
in injuries to exposed individuals and to their descendents.
Injuries to the exposed individuals are called somatic and those
to his descendents, genetic. Late somatic injuries include leukemia
and other malignant diseases, impaired fertility, cataracts and
shortening of life. Genetic injuries manifest themselves in theoffspring of irradiated individuals and adverse hereditary effects
may not become apparent for many generations.
In a nuclear war emergency, the national objectives of providing
fallout protection would be the LEAST NUMBER OF DEATHS, THE FEWEST
PEOPLE REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE, THE SMALLEST AMOUNT OF GENETIC INJURYAND LOWEST PROBABILITY OF LATE SOMATIC EFFECTS. The long-term goal
of any fallout shelter program, therefore, should be fallout shelter
wtth`t1ze ig est protection, say minimum 1 00, for all people at risk.
The possibil"i y o gene ic in^ury an a e matic effects, however,
should not be the principal determining factor when making decisionsduring a war emergency, but they should be considered in the peacetime
planning.
Consequence of Application of Various Levels of Protection
The relative casualty reducing capability of providing
fallout protection -for the people outside direct effects areaswill vary according to the number of shelter spaces available and
to the protection factor levels of these spaces, At one end of theprotection spectrum is a desirable PF 100 or more for all at risk,while at the other end is the inadequate miscellany of existing
shelter space with PFs varying from 10 to 100.
11.619 MILLIONS
POPULATION
SURVIVING DIRECT
EFFECTS
8.96
5.81
3.33
USABLE
SPACES
(millions)
2.37
PF10 PF20 PF50 PF100
OR BETTER OR BETTER OR BETTER OR BETTER
Figure 21 - ESTIMATED USABLE SHELTER SPACES OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS
43
The estimated number of usable shelter spaces (see Figure 21) shows there to be insufficient shelter particularly at the higher levels of protection. The penalties for using the lower grade spaces, however, must be examined and compared with the penalties for not providing shelter and for providing various levels of protection. Figure 22 gives a comparison of these penalties in terms of casualties likely to be sustained for a range of protective options. It should be emphasized that in selecting an option, by keeping the protection factors as high as is practicable, the solution will remain reasonably stable with changes in risk. Additionally, the higher the protection factors, the sooner can people be released from shelter.
Fallout Shelter in Likely Direct Effects Areas
Although little has been said about the use of fallout shelter in direct effects areas, its potential cannot be ignored, since such areas may flot in fact be subjected to direct effects in a nuclear war emergency, but could very well be subjected to fallout from weapons detonated elsewhere. A public protection program for these direct effects areas must, of course, consider the implications of such actions as blast protection, fire and dispersal as well as fallout protection. It follows, therefore, that because of the uncertainties about the size, distribution and timing of any possible attack, some consideration should be given to contingency fallout
shelter planning in likely direct effects areas.
4. Activity Steps and Relative Costs
An examination of Figure 22, referred to in the previous section, shows that the existing shelter space constitutes a very significant casualty reducing asset. It also shows that, while provision of shelter with a protection factor level of 100 would result in a minimum of casualties, shelters of PF levels 40 to 50 would also provide a high degree of protection approaching that of the 100 level, if only the short-term survival requirements are considered. With minimum levels of protection less than these a rapid increase in casualties would result as indicated in Figures 23 and 24.
Commencing with the planned use of existing space, a number of graduated steps that could be taken to provide fallout shelter for the population at risk are described in Figures 25 and 26. Information presented in Figure 25 is for the total population (excluding that of Yukon and Northwest Territories) and that presented in Figure 26 is for the population outside likely direct effects areas. The same information for the population outside likely direct effects areas is also presented (Figure 27) in a form in which the benefits and costs can be more easily compared. The relative costs for deaths averted in this Latter population group are shown in Figure 28.
44
Figure 22.
CANADA
PROTECTION Requiring Medical FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS
LEVEL Care
r /
PF 100 99,9% TRACE TRACE TRACE
y
89.5%
50
/
/ 10,404,150
.4 4 1,140,962 bums 13,840
e
40 ,
4
e
30
/ 4 . . :.,:%
20 1,067,246 266,332 9,549,470 / A 735,952
d , :
10 76% 10.5%
e 13%
8,824,405 À ,5. e
4 1,522,900
À 1,213,600
'. 58,095
.,
EXISTING ::;::::::::::: 827 2.8% 7.7% 7.5% ..::.:•:-*
SHELTER USED :::::::::::..:-:: 9,549,470:::-.: - • ... ... 313,295 892,160 864,075
:::::::::.:....:•.:.:.•....;.:.:.:.:.-...:.:•:-: ...: ... - •
100% = 11,619,000
Figure 22. CASUALTIES LIKELY TO BE SUSTAINED FOR A RANGE OF PROTECTION LEVELS OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
•
45
It is quite apparent from the foregoing that a most
significant step in providing the people of Canada with fallout
protection is to take the action necessary to be able to bringinto use in an emergency the existing shelter space. The planneduse of this space alone would form a sound base for furtherdevelopment towards the long-term goal and would provide a firstphase casualty limiting defensive system at lowest cost.
47
3.0
2.0
1.0
15
0 7, < 1— 0 Z 15 LU
t CY co LLJ `..- CL
4- Z u 0 02
-0 D
0 n
PE
RC
EN
TA
GE 10
5
CA
SU
ALT
IES
(MIL
LIO
NS)
24% Percentages relate to population outside
17.8% direct effects areas -
10.4%
0.1% __...... 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
PROTECTION FACTORS
Figure 23. TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR GIVEN LEVELS OF PROTECTION
1 EATHS UNFIT REQUIR NG
/ MEDICAL CARE
UN FIT'
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
PROTECTION FACTORS
Figure 24. CASUALTIES FOR GIVEN LEVELS OF PROTECTION
10 90 100
90 100
48
0
tww Pr 4 lb,^® C11aqa,"-k ^-A I ftg) W;Jow jzqj
1 W^ l
O^ ^,î . "Mi- »a4re1% Ce-^^ 4",
^^ ^ r10 1°1 laaa 'Zvy'" ^'20
PA^I
^ Soo^
Figure 25
BASIC STEPSADDITIONAL CASUALTIES ESTIMATED COSTS $ STEP DETAILPREVENTED (CUMULATIVE) (CUMULATIVE)
STEP A Includes:
MAINTAIN UPDATED $1.00 000 ^ • Updating field surveyA INVENTORY OF MARGINAL NUMBER ONLY
,
NNUAL REQUIREMEf^POTENTIAL FALLOUT • Data processing ofSHELTER SPACE recorded information
• Distribution of results ^ Qp
STEP 9 includes:
^%^ ry^,^• Development of Commu ity Shelte lans
B PREPARE PLANS FOR 725,065 11,059,000 by professional urban plannersUSE OF EXISTING SPACE
•Shelter marking and licensing, provision
of emergency sanitary facilitieso
STEP C Includes:
EXPLOIT EXISTING • Exploitation of existing space by ventilationC POTENTIAL SPACE TO
947,335 30,268,281 improvementto increase usable spaceINCREASE USABLESPACE ^^Q^
• Activities in Step B (O,yf{y
STEP D includes:
• Use of all existing usable spaces
PROVIDE SHELTER having minimum PF 50D WITH MINIMUM PF 50 1,579,745 299,336,000
FOR TOTAL POPULATION• Provision of additional shelter spaces n
• Activities in Steps B and C
STEP E includes:7.
PROVIDE SHELTER• Use of all existing usable spaces
PF 100i i ih av n mumng mE WITH MINIMUM PF 100
^FOR TOTAL POPULATION
2,794,595 $398,580,000• Provision of additional shelter
spaces minimum PF 100
• Activities in Steps B and C
Figure 25. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED & ESTIMATED COSTSFOR TOTAL POPULATION
49
9
•
Figure 26
ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES ESTIMATED COSTS $ BASIC STEPS STEP DETAIL PREVENTED (CUMULATIVE) (CUMULATIVE)
STEP A Includes:
MAINTAIN UPD ATED • Updating field survey
A INVENTORY OF MARGINAL NUMBER ONLY $50,000 POTENTIAL FALLOUT
ANNUAL REQUIREMEN'. • Data processing of SHELTE R SPACE
recorded information
• • Distribution of results
STEP B includes:
PREPARE PLANS FOR • Development of Community Shelter Plans B 725,065 5,587,000 by professional urban planners le 6
USE OF EXISTING SPACE 1
• Shelter marking and licensing, provision of emergency sanitary facilities.
STEP C Includes:
EXPLOIT EXISTING
POTENTIAL SPACE TO • Exploitation of existing space by ventilation C 947,335 13,268,281 INCREASE USABLE improvement to increase usable space
SPACE
• Activities in Step B
STEP D includes:
• Use of all existing usable spaces having minimum PF 50
PROVIDE SHELTER
D wiTH MINIMUM PF 50 1,579,745 229,766,774 FOR TOTAL POPULATION • Provision of additional shelter spaces
minimum PF 100
• Activities in Steps 13 and C
STEP E includes:
• Use of all existing usable spaces PROVIDE SHELTER having minimum PF 100
E WITH MINIMUM PF 100 2794,595 266,097,778 FOR TOTAL POPULATION • Provision of additional shelter
spaces minimum PF 100
• Activities in Steps B and C
Figure 26. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED AND ESTIMATED COSTS OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS
51
•
I
ES
TIM
AT
ED
CO
ST
(MIL
LIO
NS
*)
400
500
300
200
100
ES
TIM
AT
ED
CO
ST
IN (
MIL
LIO
NS)
500
400
200
300
100
O 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
O 2.5 0.5 1 1.5 2
Figure 27 CASUALTIES PREVENTED (MILLIONS)
OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS
Figure 28 DEATHS AVERTED (IN MILLIONS) OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS
53
ANNEX A
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
BY RISK AREA
I
•
ANNEX A
L±NADAA
0POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING^
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 11,619,000
39% 20% 41% 100%
100 00080 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
C420 000
8 000
HH
zR
60005400
4000
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
PF figures sh own based on an Potential Shelter
d 14 DAY DOSE 200 Spaces in each Riskassume , of RArea (Millions)
PF 50or better
PF 100
or bett re
PF 100
igh riskh PF 50/^i 2 191,795 1,491,927:,
FF 25
PF 20
b ttPF 50
bor e er or etter
medium risk ^
1,435,105 818,854
^
I PF 10 PF 20
or better or better
^ I 6,009,894 4,124,647
low risk,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 . 60 70 80 90 100
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A- 3
0
ANNEX A
•
rL
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
NEWFOUNDLAND
14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
516,000 516,000
100% 100%
100 0008o 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
^
10 000
8000
H 60006 5400
z4000
3000
o
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
.200
100
Potential Shelter
Spaces in each Risk
Area (Millions)
PF 50
or better
PF 100
or better
high risk I - -
PF 20
or better
PF 50
r bettero
medium risk - -
PF 10 PF 20
or better or better
496 879 311 899
low r isk
, ,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A- 5
.
.
ANNEX A
Î NEW BRt7NSVV^ICK
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
100 00080 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10000
8000. ^
0
60005400
4000
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
14 DAY DOSE - R "TOTAL SURVIVING:
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
623,000 _ 623,000
100% 100%
ure shown based on anPF fiPotential. Shelterg
f 200R Spaces in each Riskassumed 14 DAY DOSE oArea (Millions)
!•
PF 50or better
PF 100
or better
high risk
PF 25
tti PF 20
or b tt r
PF 50
r bettere e o
med•ium risk
E 581,719 328,913
-^-
(î ^ PF 10 PF 20or better or better
lM1ow r isk
0 . 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-7
.
s
100 000
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
e 8000
E-4 6000 5400
•-••• 4000
W 3000 o
>4 2000 ‹ A
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
I 1 1 1 - PF figure shown based on an Potential Shelter _ assumed 14 DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk .
Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100 or better or better
high risk
LPF2 I-- PF 20 PF 50
or better or better -
medium ris( r
55.895 27,883
- , -
PF 10 PF 20 _ or better or better _
'
— — _
low risk
H 10 000
70 100 90 50 80 60 40
ANNEX A
I PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 1
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
110,000 110,000
_ — 100% 100%
o 10 20 30 • PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-9
•
•
ANNEX A
NOVA SCOTIA I POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
99,000 350,000 170,000 619,000
16% 57% 27% 100%
100 000
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
r4
E-4 10 000 ‹
Fl8000
6 000
‹
5400
4000
ti) 3000
o
y, 2000 ‹
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
L [ 1 1 1 PF figures shown based on an Potential ShelËer
assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100 or better or better
high risk PF50 _ _
,-
[IF 25
PF 20 PF 50 or better or better
97,239 40,528 medium risk
A-
l_ PF 10 PF 20 . or better or better
low risk 67,993 38,231 -r
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ....
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A.-11
0
ANNEX A
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
r` ^ TRTBrTTION BY RISK AREA
QUEBEC
14 DAY DOSE.- RTOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
-----------.-1,660,000 474,000 940,000 . . 3,074,000
54% 15% 31% 100%
100 00080 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
..;
^ 10000
P 8000
H ' 60005400
40)0
wC/)oQ
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelterassumed 14•DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk
Area (Millions)
PF 50b t
PF 100bor et er or etter
PF 100
high risk PF 50'_00^ 1,092,419 786,567
PF 25
I. T I PF 20 PF 50or better or better
medium riskf I 264,191 169,344
PF 10 PF 20I I or better or better
I ^_ -- - -----
1 510 496 1 131 452
low r isk
, , , ,
0
100 ,10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-----------------------PERCENT (OF POPULATION.SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
ii
A-13
•
100 000
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
• 20 000
10 000
8 000
6000 5400
4000
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
I I 1 I I ' . . .
____ PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter - _ assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk _
Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100 - or better or better -
PF 100 -
high risk PF 50 1,034,314 662,723 .
-
PF 25
I PF 20 PF 50 or better or better -
-
363,870 212,172 medium risk
PF 10 PF 20 or better or better
low risk I
1,148,906 804,147 .
14 D
AY
D
OS
E (U
NA
TTEN
UA
TED
)-R
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 . 80 90 100
ANNEX A
ONTARIO
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING 5400 R 820R -,540OR 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
2,109,000 448,000 696,000 3,253,000
65% 14% 21% 100%
• PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-15
•
•
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9
ANNEX A
MANITOBA
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING 5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
74,000 95,000 259,000 428,000
17% 22% 61%' 100%
•
100 000
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
1:4 1
Ç:1
E-1 10 000
8 000
,E-4 6 000 5400
- 4000
cn 3000
- o
2000
P
- 1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter
assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 20 0R Spaces in each Risk Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100 or better or better
high risk PF 50 25,009 18,704 '
.■Miii PF 25
I PF 20 PF 50 /
ri or better or better
I I
I / 1 1 7,484 3,908
medium risk r I■1IMIIBIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII■W/
j'
FF 10 FF 20 I or better or better
I
222,393 137,943 I I
low risk -- --
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-17
0
0
ANNEX A
0
CPOPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
100 000 -- -------
14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
948,000 . 948,000
100% 100%
0
0
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
-20 000
10000
8 000
60005400
4000
WLno
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
high
medi
r isk
um ris
low risk
I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1
80 90
SASKATCHEWAN
Potential Shelter
Spaces in each Risk
Area (Millions)
PF 50
or better
PF 100
or better
PF 20
or betterPF 50
or better
PF 10
or better
PF 20
or better
1,390,167 958,486
100
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-19
Ô
s
ANNEX A
A L3CPl TA
POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK AREA
14 DAY DOSE - RTOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 820R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
386,000 212,000 254,000 852,000
45% 25% 30% 100%
100 00080 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
E-4 10 000
8000
60005400
4000
3000
2000
1000
820
600
500
400
300
200
100
ô
PF figures shown based on an
assumed 14• DAY DOSE of 200R
high risk
medium risk
low risk
]0 20 .
7
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Potential Shelter
Spaces in each Risk
Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100or better or better
9,044 .7,652
PF 20 PF 50or better or better
61,842 33,449
PF 10 PF 20
or better or better
262,197 165,048
100
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS)
A-21
(
•
100 000
80 000
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 0 0 0
8000
6000 5400
4000
3000
2000
100
820
60
500
400
300
200
100
L . I ' I 1_
- PF figures shown based on an Potential Shelter assumed 14. DAY DOSE of 200R Spaces in each Risk
Area (Millions)
PF 50 PF 100 - or better or better -
high riSk PF 50 31,009" 16,281
PF 25
PF 20 PF 50 . I or better or better
i
I 1 2,865 2,657
medium risk I I 1
PF 10 PF 20 or better or better
910,863 577,441
I 1 low risk I
14
DA
Y
DO
SE
(U
NA
TT
EN
UA
TE
D)-
R
o 1 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ANNEX A
BRITISH COLUMBIA I POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS
DISTRIBUTION BY RISK . AREA
14'DAY DOSE - R TOTAL SURVIVING
5400 R 82 0R - 5400R 820 R DIRECT EFFECTS
190,000 15,000 991,000 1,196,000
16% 1% .83% 100%
PERCENT (OF POPULATION SURVIVING DIRECT EFFECTS) .
A-23
0
ANNEX B
POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES BY PROTECTION FACTOR
CATEGORY WITH POPULATION
•
i
•
POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES BY PROTECTION FACTOR CATEGORY (PFC) WITH POPULATION ANNEX B
POLITICALDIRECT EFFECTS AREA HIGH RISK AREA (above 5,400 roentgens) - 14 day dose
DIVISION PFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTALPOPULATION PFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL POPULATION(PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100+ ) SPACES (PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100+ ) SPACES
CANADA 11,969,063 11,172,554 4,464,226 11,241,184 38,847,027 9,592,000 2,404,857 1,925,529 699,868 1,491,927 6,522,181 4,518,000
NEWFOUNDLAND - - _
NEW BRUNSWICKPRINCE EDWARD
ISLAND
NOVA SCOTIA 163,252 191,923 66,021 164,240 585,436 146,000 700 - - - 700 99,000
QUEBEC 4,200,008 3,728,514 1,446,819 4,474,781 13,850,122 2,930,000 990,841 783,909 305,852 786,567 2,867,169 1,660,000
ONTARIO 5,281,825 5,105,952 2,106,586 4,655,326 17,149,689 4,314,000 1,341,760 1,088,302 371,591 662,723 3,464,376 2,109,000
MANITOBA 680,950 558,360 222,391 632,559 2,094,260 550,000 18,795 13,850 6,305 18,704 57,634 74,000
SASKATCHEWAN - - - - - - - - - -
ALBERTA 691,132 695,926 252,469 670,136 2,309,663 732,000 17,555 9,008 1,392 7,652 35,607 386,000
BRITISH COLUMBIA 951,896 891,879 369,940 644,142 2,857,857 920,000 35,206 30,460 14,728 16,281 96,675 190,000
MEDIUM RISK AREA (820 - 5,400 roentgens) LOW RISK AREA ( below 820 roentgens)POLITICAL
DIVISION(PFC 2) PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL
POPULATIONPFC 2 PFC 3 PFC 4 PFC 5-8 TOTAL
POPULATION(PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100 + SPACES (PF 10-19) (PF 20-49) (PF 50-99) (PF 100 + SPACES
971,345 616,251 251,165 567,689 2,327,000 2,327,000 1,885,247 1,584,249 656,499 1,883,899 6,009,894 4,774,000
NEWFOUNDLAND - - - - - - 184,980 133,151 72,268 106,480 496,879 516,000
NEW BRUNSWICK 458,050 252,806 109,104 219,809 1,039,769 623,000 - - - - - -
PRINCE EDWARD 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316 110,000 - - - - - -ISLAND 58,421 28,012 7,089 20,794 114,316 110,000 - - - - - -
NOVA SCOTIA 81,817 56,711 14,850 25,678 179,056 350,000 29,762 21,408 2,892 13,931 67,993 170,000
QUEBEC 133,081 94,847 43,137 126,207 397,272 474,000 379,044 323,478 158,163 649,811 1,510,496 940,000
ONTARIO 201,728 151,698 63,761 148,411 '- 565,598 448,000 344,759 290,185 143,029 370,933 1,148,906 696,000
MANITOBA 5,566 3,576 2,782 1,126 13,050 95,000 84,450 70,647 17,112 50,184 222,393 259,000
SASKATCHEWAN - _ - - - - 431,681 402,646 146,698 409,142 1,390,167 948,000
ALBERTA 30,212 28,393 10,236 23,213 92,054 212,000 97,149 59,107 22,942 82,999 262,197 254,000
BRITISH COLUMBIA 2,470 208 206 2,451 5,335 15,000 333,422 283,627 93,395 200,419 910,863 991,000
TOTAL SPACES IN ALL T^HREcT AREAS
PFC 2(PF 10-19)
17,230,512
PFC 3(PF 20-49)
15,298,583
PFC 4(PF 50-99)
6,071,758
PFC 5-8(PF 100+ }
15,184,699
TOTALS
53,785,552
PFC 2(PF 10-19)
5,261,449
TOTAL SPACES IN FALLOUT RISK AREAS ONLY
PFC 3(PF 20-49)
4,126,029
PFC 4(PF 50-99)
1,607,532
PFC 5-8(PF 100+ }
3,943,515
TOTALS
14,938,525
3
ANNEX C
POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE
•
•
0
0
ANNEX C
Figure Cl
POLITICAL RISK AREAS DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW
516,000 P NEWFOUNDLAND
496,879
623,000 NEW BRUNSWICK
1,039,769 S
110,000 P PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
114,316 S
146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA
585,436 700 179,056 67,993 S
2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC
13,850,122 2,867,169 397,272 1,510,496 S
4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P ONTARIO
17,149,689 3,464,376 565,598 1,148,906 S
550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA
2,094,260 57,654 13,050 222,393 S
948,000 P SASKATCHEWAN
1,390,167 S
732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA
2,309,663 35,607 92,054 262,197 S
920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P BRITISH COLUMBIA
2,857,857 96,675 5,335 910,863
9,592,000 +,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA
38,847,027 6,522,181 2,406,450 6,009,894 S
P POPULATION S - SHELTER SPACES
(Potential)
Figure Cl. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF10 or better)
C-3
•
•
•
ANNEX C
Figure C2
RISK AREAS POLITICAL DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW
NEWFOUNDLAND 516,000 P
311,899 S
NEW BRUNSWICK 623,000 P
581,719 S
110,000 P PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
55,895 S
146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA
422,184 97,239 38,231 S
2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC
9,650,114 1,876,328 264,191 1,131,452 S
ONTARIO 4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P
11,867,864 2,122,616 363,870 804,147 S
550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA
1,413,310 38,859 7,484 137,943 S
948,000 P SASKATCHEWAN
958,486 S
732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA
1,618,531 18,052 61,842 165,048 S
920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 BRITISH COLUMBIA
1,905,961 61,469 2,865 577,441 S
9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA
26,877,964 4,117,324 1,435,105 4,124,647 S
P POPULATION S = SHELTER SPACES
(Potential)
Figure C2. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF20 or better)
C-5
0
ANNEX C
Figtite C3
RISK AREAS POLITICAL DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW
516,000 P NEWFOUNDLAND
178,748 S
623,000 P NEW BRUNSWICK
328,913 S
110,000 PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
27,883
146,00C 99,000 350,000 170,000 P NOVA SCOTIA
230,261 40,528 16,823 S
2,930,00C 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P QUEBEC
5,921,60C 1,092,419 169,344 807,974 S
4,314,00C 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P ONTARIO
6,761,912 1,034,314 212,172 513,962 S
550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P MANITOBA
854,950 25,009 3,908 67,296 S
948,000 P SASKATCHEWAN
555,840 S
732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P ALBERTA
922,605 9,044 33,449 105,941 S
920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P BRITISH COLUMBIA
1,014,082 31,009 2,795 293,814 S
9,592,000 4,518,000 2,327,000 4,774,000 P CANADA
15,705,410 2,191,795 818,854 2,540,398 S
P = POPULATION S = SHELTER SPACES
(Potential)
Figure C3. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTAL POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF50 or better)
•
ANNEX C
Figure C4
POLITICALRISK AREAS
DIVISION DIRECT HIGH MEDIUM LOW
516,000 P
NEWFOUNDLAND 106,480 S
623,000 P
NEW BRUNSWICK 219,809 S
110,000 P
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND 20,794 S
146,000 99,000 350,000 170,000 P
NOVA SCOTIA 164,2401 25,678 13,931 S
2,930,000 1,660,000 474,000 940,000 P
QUEBEC 4,474,781 786,567 126,207 649,811 S
4,314,000 2,109,000 448,000 696,000 P
ONTARIO 4,655,326 662,723 148,411 370,933 S
550,000 74,000 95,000 259,000 P
MANITOBA 632,559 18,704 1,126 50,184 S
( ^ 948,000 P
SASKATCHEWAN
-
409,142 S--I
732,000 386,000 212,000 254,000 P
ALBERTA 670,136 7,652 23,213 82,999 S
920,000 190,000 15,000 991,000 P
BRITISH COLUMBIA 644,142 16,281 2,451 200,419 S
9,592,000 4;518,000 I 2,327,000 4,774,000 P
CANADA 11,241,184 1,491,927 567,689 1,883,899 S
P = POPULATIONS = SHELTER. SPACES
(Potential)
Figure C4. POPULATION BY RISK AREA AND TOTALPOTENTIAL SHELTER SPACE (PF100 or better)
'0
C-9
i
0
ANNEX D
DEVELOPMENT OF CASUALTY ESTIMATES
•
• ■■•
Dl
s
s
•
DEVELOPMENT OF CASUALTY ESTIMATES
1. Assumptions
Risk areas were determined using the Group 3 attack situation given in the Canada EMO paper "The Threat to Canada 1970" and form the basis for an assessment of likely benefits that would result in the event of a nuclear attack, from provision of fallout protection for the public.
e Canada EM0e;;;;--E7—ki-dria-a-fibil III)study provides Canadian casualty igures for a speci ic attack on 'or erica and these have been used as the datum for comparing the consequences of sheltering the population of Canada at various levels of fallout protection.
1966 population figures used in the Threat Evaluation III Study have been updated to 1970 estimated population figures and casualty figures adjusted accordingly. It has been assumed that 50 percent of the difference in casualties resulting from this adjustment occur in the direct effects areas.
The number of usable shelter spaces (refer to paragraph 6, Section III) in direct effects areas and outside direct effects areas are taken as 40 percent and 60 percent respectively of the potential shelter spaces in these areas. It has also been assumed that in direct effects areas and outside direct effects areas the potential shelter space which can be made usable by adding ventilation is 10 percent and 20 percent respectively.
Casualty figures developed in Threat Evaluation III, were based on the assumption that the total population would have protection factors of 2 (no basement) and/or 14 (basement). For the purposes of this study, however, it was assumed that the same casualties given in Threat Evaluation III for outside direct effects areas, would occur if the population were sheltered in an average protection factor level of 10. If these casualties occurred with PF 10, then the unattenuated dose ranges creating these casualties would be ten times the doses received. As a simplified approach to determining casualty changes, those people receiving 2-week doses in the range of 220 to 820 roentgens were assumed to have received an average- dose of 485 roentgens. Those people receiving doses in excess of 820 roentgens were assumed to have received an average dose of 1,100 roentgens in the 2-week period.
Existing shelter spaces are grouped in protection factor categories (PFC) each category containing a range of protection factors (e.g. PFC 3 includes all spaces in the range of PF 20 to 49). For the purposes of determining casualty changes, all spaces in each PFC were assumed to have protection factors equal to the minimum for that particular PFC. •
Since there is a shortage of usable space for people at
risk outside the direct effects areas, spaces were allotted to
casualties as follows:
paces allotted = number of casualties x usable spaces
persons at risk
By varying the protection factor levels of the Threat Evaluation
III casualties, changes occu.r.red.in the radiation doses received
and, hence, in the number and severity of casualties. These
casualty changes were derived from Figure 17, "Possible Short-Term
Consequences of Various 2-week Doses of Fallout Radiation", using
the changed radiation dose levels.
In all cases, consequence figures are based on the use of all
existing usable space equal to and better than the protection factor
level specified, except for the Threat Evaluation III figures.
2. PROCEDURES FOLLOWED TO DETERMINE CASUALTIES
Step 1. Updated Threat Evaluation III Casualties
a. Survey Analysis figures for population
surviving direct effects obtained from
Annex B.
b. 1966 population figures for each province
obtained from Threat Evaluation III.
C. The ratio of the 1970 population figure to
the 1966 population figure (group 3) forany province determines the upgrading
factor for the province.
d. Casualties (injured and deaths) obtained from
Threat Evaluation III.
e. Upgrading factors revised to reflect those
casualties assumed in direct effects areas.
f. Updating casualty figures obtained by applying
revised upgrading factors to Threat Evaluation
III casualties.
g• 0.5 percent of the 1970 population outside direct
effects areas assumed to be unfit. The population
receiving 2-Week doses of radiation in excess of
200R but less than 220R in Threat Evaluation III
Study has been assessed at 0.5 percent of the
population surviving direct effects.
h.
J.
d.
e.
f.
g.
•
a.
c .
The difference between the population. surviving direct effects and the sum of all..casualties in each province determines. the nUmber Of persOns said - to be
Summary of fit,,unfit, unfit_requiring . _ _ medical care and deaths in each province shown in Figure D1, Annex D.
Step 2. Casualties Using Existing Usable Shelter Spaces
The totai number of potential shelter spaces by protection factor category (PFC) determined for each province.
. - b. Percentage distribution of shelter spaces calculated in each PFC for each province.
CasUalty ratioa.determined for'each -proVince: The casualty ratio iS equal to the total number of persons injured and dead in a province divided by the population surviving direct effects for that province.
The total number of usable shelter spaces, that is 60 percent of the total number of potential shelter spaces, calculated for each province. .The number of usable shelter spaces multiplied by the casualty ratio determines the number of usable shelter spaces : allotted to casualties in each province.
In provinces where the number.of casualties exceeds.the_number of.allotted'usable,spaces, those casualties without usable shelter Space remain injured or dead in the ratio given by Threat Evaluation III.
The number of casualties provided with usable shelter space were given : space by.distributing Spaces,:using the. percentages - calCUlated • previously for each PFC.
Likely casualties using existing usable space determined for each province by applying protection factors of existing space to average unattenuated doses.
•
h. Casualties si.rnunari:-,cd when usingexist in^.7 usable shelter spaces.Refer to Figure D2, Annex D.
Step 3. Casualties Resulting From Exploiting
Exi.st:iny Shelter Sraces
a. The estimated number of existing usable shelter
spaces increased from 60 to 80 percent of the
total existing potential shelter spaces.
.b. Number of spaces in each PFC calculated for
each province. Redundant spaces determined
and spaces allotted in each PFC.
C. Casualties determined when exploited'
existing shelter space used. Refer to
Figure D3, Annex D.
Step 4. Casualties PF 20 For Entire Population
a. All existing usable shelter spaces in PFCys 4
to 8 allotted and the remaining casualties
provided with a protection factor equal to 20.
b. Casualties determined resulting from persons
allotted spaces in PFC's 3 to 8.
c. Casualties summarized when a minimum protection
factor of 20 provided for entire population.
Refer to Figure D4, Annex D.
Step 5. Casualties - PF 50 For Entire Population
a. All existing usable shelter spaces in PFC's
5 to 8 allotted and the remaining casualties
provided with a protection factor equal.to 50.
b.. Casualties determined resulting from persons
allotted to spaces in PFC's 4 to 8.
c. Number of persons unfit and requiring medical
care calculated in provinces subject to high risk.
d. Risk factors determined for each province. Therisk factor is equal to the provincial numberof persons unfit requiring medical care, divided
by the total number of persons un.fit requiring
medical care.
0
e.
f.
g.
a.
b.
Number of deaths in Canada estimated. It was assumed that one percent of the population surviving direct effects would be subjected to unattenuated doses in excess of 20,000R during the 2-Week period and with a protection factor of 50, the minimum dose received would be 400R. At this dose level about 12 percent deaths are likely to occur (see Figure 17).
Number of deaths estimated in each province. The total number of deaths calculated was allocated to those provinces subject to high risk. The percentage of deaths apportioned to each province was assumed to be the same as those unfit requiring medical care in each province.
Casualties summarized when a minimum protection factor of 50 provided for entire population. Refer to Figure D5, Annex D.
Step 6. Casualties - PF 100 For Entire Population
All persons with a PF equal to or better than 100 were assumed to have received less than 200R.
Casualties noted for Threat Evaluation III in Figure D1, Annex D, would therefore be prevented. Refer to Figure D6, Annex D for summary of casualties prevented with a protection factor equal to 100 for entire population.
As an example of the above procedures, casualty estimates made for the Province of Quebec are detailed below,
3. CASUALTY ESTIMATES FOR THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Step 1.
Population surviving direct èffects: 3,074,000 - Survey Analysis.
b. 1966. Toial population figure for Quebec: 5,764,000 - Threat Evaluation III.
•
• D-7
c. 1970 Total population figure for Quebec: 6,004,000 - . Survey Analysis
6,004,000 5,764,000
1.04 (upgrading factor)
d. Casualties obtained from Threat Evaluation III
Deaths: Injured:
- 373,100 - 324,900
e. 1.0 (50% x 0.4) 1.02 (revised upgrading factor)
f. Revised casualty figures:
Deaths: - 373,100 x 1.02 = 380,000 Injured: - 324,900 x 1.02 332,000
Population surviving direct effects = 3,074,000
Casualties:
Deaths - 380,000 Injured - 332,000
Total - 712,000 712,000
Remaining persons 2,362,000
g. 0.5% x 3,074,000 = 15,370 unfit
h. 2,362,000 - 15,370 = 2,246,630 fit
j- Summary of Threat Evaluation III Casualties.
POLITICAL UNFIT Requiring DIVISION FIT UNFIT Medical Care DEATHS
QUEBEC 2,246,630 15,370 332,000 380,000
Step 2.
a. Potential Shelter Spaces
• D-8
• (a) (b) (a)-(b) = (c)
PF TOTAL SPACES IN SPACES OUTSIDE CATEGORY SPACES ' DIRECT DIRECT
2 5,702,974 4,200,008 1,502.966 '
3 4,930,748 3,728,514 : ' 1,202,234 -
4 1,953,971 1,446,819 "--507,152 -,-.
5-8 6,037,366 4,474,781 1,562,585
TOTAL 4,774,937
b. Percentage distribution of potential shelter spaces:
PFC2: 1,502,966 x 100 = 31.4%
4.774,937
PFC3: 1 202 234 x 100 = 25.2%
4,774,937
PFC4: 507,152 x 100 = 10.6% 4,774.937
32.8% PFC5-8-.'. 1,562,585 x 100
4,774,937
c. Casualty Ratio.
Total Casualties = 712,000
Population surviving direct effects = 3,074,000
Casualty ratio = 712.000 = 0.23 - 3,074,000
d. Usable Spaces.
60% x potential shelter spaces =
60 x 4,774,937 = 2,860,000 100
0.23 x 2,860,000 660,000 (allotted to casualties)
•
• e, Casualties versus Usable Spaces:
Total Casualties Usable Space
Difference
712,000 660,000
52,000 casualties without shelter
f.
Ratio of deaths to total casualties
= 380 000 712,000'
Ratio of injured to total casualties
.7, 332 000 712,000
Deaths:
Number of persons without shelter = 52,000x0.54 28,000
Injured:
Number of injuries without shelter = 52,000x0.46 = 24,000
Deaths:
Number of persons with shelter . 380,000-28,000 = 352,000
Injured:
Number of persons with shelter = 332,000-24,000 = 308,000
Distribution of Existing usable shelter spaces:
Deaths:
0.54
0.46
•
352,000x31.4 76-
= 352,000x25.2 100
= 352,000x10.6 100
Spaces allotted to PFC5-8= 352,000x32.8
. 110,700
= 88,000
= 37,300
= 116,000
Spaces allotted to PFC2
Spaces allotted to PFC3
Spaces allotted to PFC4
100
0
g•
Injured•
Spaces allotted to PFC2 = 308,000x31.4 _ 96,800100
Spaces allotted to PFC3 = 308,OOOx25.2 - 77,500100
Spaces allotted to PFC4 = 308,000xlO.6 = 32,700100
Spaces allotted to PFC5-8 = 308,000x32.8 = 101,000100
Consequences of placing casualties
into existing.shelter:
Number of persons PFC Consequence
with shelter
Revised Threat Evaluation III deaths
110,700 2 110,700 deaths (100%)
88,000 3 22,000 deaths (25%) ±66,000 unfit RMC* (75%)
37,300 4 1,920 unfit iL^IC (5%) +35,380 unfit (95%)
116,000 5-8 116,000 fit (100%)
Revised Threat Evaluation III Injuries
96,800 2 17,200 deaths (18%) +79,600 unfit RNC (82%)
77,500 3 23,250 unfit RMC (30%) +54,250 unfit (70%)
32,700 4 32,700 fit (100%)
101,000 5-8 101,000 fit (100%)
Requiring Medical Care.
D-11
h. Summary of casualties for existing usable space.
Change in status fromThreat Evaluation III
POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHSDIVISION M-qC gIKC
QUEBEC 2,611,700 89,630 194,770 177,900 265,070 74,260 137,320 202,100
+ + - -
Note:
Increasing values found in Step 2(f) by 33.33% determines
the number of 80% usable spaces for each PF category.
In addition advantage is taken of the higher PF categoriesnow found.
a. Increase usable spaces to 80%
b, Deaths: PFC2 110,700 x 1.33 = 144,250PFC3 88,000 x 1.33 = 177,300PFC4 37,300 x 1.33 49,700
PFC5-8 116,000 x 1.33 = 154,650
TOTAL: 410,650
Redundant Spaces - usable spaces - casualties
for deaths 465,900 - 380,000 = 85,900
for injuries = 410,650 -- 332,000 = 78,650
+ increase
- decrease
TOTAL: 465,900
Injured: PFC2 96,800 x 1.33 = 129,050PFC3 77,500 x 1.33 = 103,350PFC4 32,700 x 1.33 = 43,600
PFC5--8 101,000 x 1.33 = 134,650
D-12
-.2., 908 deaths (18%) + 49,492 Unfit RMC (82%)
t .
50,400
103,350
43,600
31,00.0 Unfit RMC (30%) - '1250 Utfit . 00%)
43,6'00:fié.*(100%)
8 134,650 fit (100%)
C.
Deduct redundant spaces Irom lowest PFC spaces
Deaths: 144,250 - 85,900 = 58,350 PFC-2. üsabla
Injured: 129,050 - 78,650 50,400 PFC 2 usa:b.1e
Consequences of placing casualties into exploited existing shelter spaces:...
•
Number of persons with shelter
PFC Consequence
Revised Threat Evaluation III deaths
58,350 2 58,350 deaths (100%)
117,300 3 29,350 deaths (25%) A- 87,975 Unfit RMC (75%)
49,700 4 2,485 Unfit RMC (5%) + 47,215 Unfit (95%)
154,650 578, : 154,650 fit (100%)
Revised Threat Evaluation ULU -juries
d. Summary of casualties exploiting existing shelter space.
Change in status from
. Threat Evaluation III POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC_ RMC
QUEBEC 2,694,900 119,565 170,952 88,583 348,270 132,095 188,948 291,417
St_ep 4: (PF equal to or better than 20)
a. Deaths: Total casualtiesa. .., ......,.380,000
PFC5-8 spaces ...a ..... 116,000
PFC4 spaces ..,,, ... 37,300
Sub-total 153,300 153,300
PFC3 space,_ .......... 226.,700
Injured: Total casualties ........... 332,000
PFC5-8 spaces ........ 101,000PFC4 spaces ........ 32,700
PFC3 spaces
Sub-Total 133,700 133,700
• ., • p • . e • 198,300
b. Consequences of placing above casualties intoshelters equal to or better than PF 20
Number of persons PFC Consequence
Revised Threat Evaluation III deaths
226,7003 56,675 deaths (25%) +
170,025 Unfit RMC (75%)
4 1,865 Unfit RMC (5%) +35,435 Unfit (95%)
37,300
116,000 5-8 116,000 fit (100%)
Revised Threat Evaluation III in_juries
198,300 3 60,490 Unfit RMC (30%)137,810 Unfit (70%)
32,700 4 32,700 fit (100%)
s
101,000 5^8 101,000 fit (100%)
101,000 fit (100%)
231,000 fit (100%)
• c. Summary of casualties using PF20
Change in status from Threat Evaluation III
POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC RMC
QUEBEC 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675 265,070 157,875 99,620 323,325 +
+
Step 5. (PF equal to or better than 50)
a .
•
Deaths: Total Casualties
PFC8 spaces
PFC4 spaces
Injured: Total casualties
• PFC5-8 spaces
PFC4 spaces
380,000
116,000
264,000
332,000
101,000
231.000
b. Consequence of placing above casualties into shelter spaces equal to or better than PF 50.
Number of persons PFC Consequence
Revised Threat Evaluation III deaths
116,000 116,000 fit (1007 )
264,000 4 13,200 Unfit RMC (5%) •+ 250,800 Unfit (95%)
Revised Threat Evaluation III Injuries
101,000 5-8
231,000 4
•
Ç .
g.
• Total number of persons Unfit FISC in provinces subject to high risk is 54,643. The provinces subject to high risk, and therefore some deaths even with a PF-50, are Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia.
Total number of persons Unfit RMC in the Province of Quebec is 13,200.
d. Risk factor = Unfit RMC-Quebec = lq,?oo , 0.24 Unfit RMC-Canada 54,643 ..
e. Total estimated deaths in Canada
, 1% x Population Surviving DE x 12%
= 1 x 11,619,000 x .12 100 100
= 13,942
Estimated deaths in Quebec
= 13,942 x 0.24 ;:.; 3,300
Summary of Casualties using PF 50
Change in status from Threat Evaluation III
POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEAT1,S DIVISION RMC RMC
QUEBEC 2,806;700 250,800 13,200 3,300 460,070 235,430 318,800 376,700
Step 6. (PF equal to or better than 100)
a. With PF 100 minimum, most casualties indicated by Threat Evaluation III Study will be prevented.
b. Summary of casualties using PF 100
Change in status from Threat Evaluation III
POLITICAL FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS FIT UNFIT UNFIT DEATHS DIVISION RMC RMC
QUEBEC 3,074,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE 727,370 15,370 322,000 380,000
C.
• ,
Political Unfit
Division Fit Unfit. Requiring Medical Deaths
Care
Newfoundland 513,420 2,580 - -
New Brunswick 381,285 3,115 105,400 133,200
Prince Edward Island 34,150 550 72,100 3,200
Nova Scotia 444,505 3,095 128,000 43,400
Quebec 2,346,630 15,370 332,000 380,000
Ontario 2,145,935 16,265 427,800 663,000
Manitoba 351,860 2,140 15,000 59,000
Saskatchewan 937,360 4,740 5,500 400
Alberta 760,740 4,260 46,300 40,700
British Columbia 908,520 5,980 81,500 200,000
Canada 8,824,405 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900
Figure D 1. CASUALTIES OBTAINED FROM "THREAT EVALUATION Ill STUDY"
m > Z
c z m
0
Change in status from Threat Evaluation III Study
. Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths
requiring requiring Division medical care medical care
Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -
New Brunswick 446,100 31,220 70,530 75,150 + 64,815 + 28,105 - 34,870 - 58,050
Prince Edward Island 45,950 7,880 49,685 6,485 + 11,800 + 7,330 - 22,415 + 3,285
Nova Scotia 456,310 7,420 114,255 41,015 + 11,805 + 4,325 - 13,745 - 2,385
Quebec 2,611,703 89,630 194,770 177,900 + 265,070 + 74,260 - 137,230 -202,100
Ontario 2,444,700 150,350 322,300 335,650 + 298,765 + 134,085 - 105,500 - 327,350
Manitoba 361,850 3,320 16,990 45,840 + 9,990 + 1,180 + 1,990 - 13,160
Saskatchewan 944,060 975 2,515 450 + 6,700 - 3,765 - 2,985 + 50
Alberta 772,900 3,120 40,655 35,325 + 12,160 - 1,140 - 5,645 - 5,375
British Columbia 949,900 19,380 80,460 146,260 + 41,380 + 13,400 - 1,040 - 53,740
Canada 9,549,470 313,295 892,160 864,075 +725,065 + 255,200 -321,440 -658,825
Figure D:2. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF UTILIZING EXISTING USABLE SHELTER SPACES FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
•
0
•
• Change in status from
Threat Evaluation Ill Study
Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Division requiring requiring
medical care medical care
Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 2,580 - -
New Brunswick 466,650 41,588 65,310 49,452 + 85,365 - 38,473 - 40,090 - 83,748
Prince Edward Island 49,720 10,531 43,562 6,187 + 15,570 - 9,981 - 28,538 + 2,987
Nova Scotia 459,200 9,910 109,690 40,200 + 14,695 - 6,815 - 18,310 - 3,200
Quebec 2,694,900 119,565 170,952 88,583 + 348,270 - 104,195 - 161,048 -291,417
Ontario 2,538,900 200,065 308,310 205,725 + 392,965 - 183,800 - 119,490 -457,275
Manitoba 364,460 4,430 17,645 41,465 + 12,600 - 2,290 + 2,645 - 17,535
Saskatchewan 944,710 1,308 1,641 341 + 7,350 + 3,432 - 3,859 - 59
Alberta 775,500 4,153 38,849 33,498 + 14,760 + 107 - 7,451 - 7,202
British Columbia 961,700 25,815 80,195 128,290 + 53,180 - 19,835 - 1,305 - 71,710
Canada 9,771,740 417,365 836,154 593,741 + 947,335 -359,270 -377,446 -929,159
Figure D3. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF EXPLOITING EXISTING POTENTIAL SHELTER SPACES FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
-T1 - • > z c CD rn
x
I
0
• Change in status from
Threat Evaluation III Study
Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Division requiring requiring
medical care medical care
Newfoundland 516,000 Trace - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -
New Brunswick 446,100 63,630 90,520 22,750 + 64,815 + 60,515 - 14,880 - 110,450
Prince Edward Island 45,950 42,954 20,414 682 + 11,800 + 42,404 - 51,686 - 2,518
Nova Scotia 456,310 85,378 67,065 10,247 + 11,805 + 82,283 - 60,935 - 33,153
Quebec 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675 + 265,070 + 157,875 - 99,620 - 323,325
Ontario 2,444,700 268,885 427,165 112,250 + 298,765 + 252,620 - 635 - 550,750
Manitoba 361,850 11,183 42,205 12,762 + 9,990 + 9,043 + 27,205 - 46,238
Saskatchewan 944,060 2,582 1,292 66 + 6,700 - 2,158 - 4,208 - 334
Alberta 772,900 30,070 39,905 9,125 + 12,160 + 25,810 - 6,395 - 31,575
British Columbia 949,900 58,025 146,300 41,775 + 41,380 + 52,045 + 64,800 - 158,225
Canada 9,549,470 735,952 1,067,246 266,332 + 725,065 + 677,857 - 146,354 - 1,256,568
Figure D4. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR
EQUAL TO 20 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
-r«.1 z
ni c z
"ci3
0
•
• `
Change in status fromThreat Evaluation III Study
Political
Division
Fit Unfit Unfitrequiring
medical care
Deaths Fit Unfit Unfitrequiring
medical care
Deaths
Newfoundland 516,000 - - - + 2,580 - 2,580 - -
New Brunswick 518,000 99,750 5,250 Trace + 136,715 + 96,635 - 100,150 - 133,200
Prince Edward Island 107,150 2,710 140 Trace + 73,000 + 2,160 - 71,960 - 3,200
Nova Scotia 576,700 39,653 2,087 560 + 132,195 + 36,558 - 125,913 - 42,840
Quebec 2,806,700 250,800 13,200 3,300 + 460,070 + 235,430 - 318,300 - 376,700
Ontario 2,728,000 492,575 25,925 6,500 + 582,065 + 476,310 - 401,875 - 656,500
Manitoba 374,200 50,464 2,656 680 + 22,340 + 48,324 - 12,344 - 53,320
Saskatchewan 947,700 285 15 Trace + 10,340 - 4,455 - 5,435 - 400
Alberta 814,000 35,625 1,875 500 + 53,260 + 31,365 - 44,425 - 40,200
British Columbia 1,015,700 169,100 8,900 2,300 + 107,180 + 163,120 - 72,600 - 197,700
Canada 10,404,150 1,140,962 60,048 13,840 + 1,579,745 + 1,032,867 - 1,153,552 - 1,509,060
Figure D 5. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR EQUALTO 50 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
•
•
•
• • Change in status from
Threat Evaluation III Study
Political Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths Fit Unfit Unfit Deaths
Division requiring requiring
medical care medical care
+ _ Newfoundland 516,000 - - -
2,580 2,580 ' - -
New Brunswick 623,000 Trace Trace - +
241,715 3,115 105,400 133,200
+ Prince Edward Island 110,000 Trace - -
75,850 550 72,100 3,200
+ Nova Scotia 619,000 Trace Trace Trace
174,495 3,095 128,000 43,400
+ _ Quebec 3,074,000 Trace Trace Trace
727,370 15,370 332,000 380,000
+ _ Ontario 3,253,000 Trace Trace Trace
1,107,065 16,265 427,800 663,000
+ _ _ Manitoba 428,000 Trace Trace Trace
76, 140 2,140 15,000 59,000
+ _ _ Saskatchewan 948,000 Trace - -
10,640 4,740 5,500 400
+ _ Alberta 852,000 Trace Trace -
91,260 4,260 46,300 40,700
+ British Columbia 1,196,000 Trace Trace Trace
287,480 5,980 81,500 200,000
+ _ Canada 11,619,000 Trace Trace Trace
2,794,595 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900
Figure D6. CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF PROVIDING A PROTECTION FACTOR EQUALTO 100 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
(.;" CD
o
•
•
0
• •
CASUALTIES ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED
BASIC STEPSSE
OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS DIRECT EFFECTSOUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS
DIRECT EF F CT
AREAS FIT UNFIT * *UNFIT RMC DEATHS AREAS FIT UNFIT ;UNFITRMC ; DEATHS
PREPARE PLANS FOR _9,549,470 313,295 892,160 864,075 725,065 255,200 321,440 658,825
USE OF EXISTING SPACE
EXPLOIT EXISTING
POTENTIAL SPACES ITllO *9,771,740 417,365 836,154 593,741 - 947,335 359,270 377,446 929,159
INCREASE USABLE
SPACE
PROVIDE SHELTER
SPACE FOR TOTAL
POPULATION WITH 10,404,150 1,140,962 60,048 13,840 1,579,745 1,082,867 1,153,552 1,509,060
MINIMUM PF 50
PROVIDE SHELTER
SPACE FOR TOTAL- 11,619,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE - 2,794,595 58,095 1 213,600 1,522,900
POPULATION WITH,
MINIMUM PF 100
THREAT EVALUATION III
(THE BASIS,OF COMPARISON) - 8,824,405 58,095 1,213,600 1,522,900
* REDUCTION OF NUMBERS OF DEATHS AND UNFIT
REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE INCREASES THE NUMBER OF
PEOPLE IN THE "UNFIT" CATEGORY.
CASUALTIES IN DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS ATTRIBUTABLE
TO FALLOUT ONLY ARE LIKELY TO BE VERY SMALL AND
THEREFORE NONE HAS BEEN INCLUDED.
Figure D 7. ADDITIONAL CASUALTIES PREVENTED
** RMC - REQUIRING MEDICAL CARE
0
•
ANNEX E
CASUALTY ESTIMATES
BY PROVINCE
0
•
•
0
ANNEX E
NEWFOUNDLAND
PF FIT UNFITUNFIT REQUIRINGMEDICAL CARE DEATHS
100 516,000 - - -
50 516,000 - e. -
20 516,000 TRACE - -
THREAT EVALUATION III 513,420 2,580 - -
EXISTING SHELTERUSED
516 ,000 - - -
•
NOVA SCOTIA
PF FIT UNFITUNFIT REQUIRING DEATHSMEDICAL CARE
l00 619,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE
50 576,70v 39,653 128,000 560
20 456,310 85,378 67,065 10,247
THREAT EVALUATION III 444,505 3,095 2,087 43,400
EXISTING SHELTER 456,310 7,420 114,255 41,015USED
^
•
_
ANNEX E
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT MEDICAL CARE DEATHS
100 110,000 TRACE -
_50 107,150 2,710 140 TRACE
20 45,950 4 2 954 20,414 682
THREAT EVALUATION III 34,150 550 72,100 3,200
EXISTING SHELTER USED
45,950 7,880 49,685 6,485
NEW BRUNSWICK
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT
AL DEATHS
MEDIC CARE
100 623,000 TRACE TRACE -
50 .518,000 99,750 5,250 TRACE
446,100 63,630 90,520 22,750
THREAT EVALUATION IH 381,285 3,115 1Q5,400 133,200
EXISTING SHELTER USED
446,100 31,220 70,530 75,150
•
0
0
A.NNEX E
QUEBEC
PF FIT UNFIT UNFIT REQUIRING DEATHS MEDICAL CARE
100 3,074,000 Trace TRACE TRACE
50 2,806,700 250,800 13,200 3,300
20 2,611,700 173,245 232,380 56,675
THREAT EVALUATION III 2,346,630 15,370 . 332,000 • 380,000
EXISTING SHELTER
2,611,700 89,630 USED
194,770 177,900
ONTARIO
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT DEATHS MEDICAL CARE
100 3,253,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE
50 2728,000 492,575 25,925 6,500
20 2444,700 268,885 427,165 112,250
THREAT EVALUATION III 2,145,935 16,265 427,800 663,000
EXISTING SHELTER USED
2,444,700 150,350 322,300 335,650
•
•
0
0
ANNEX E
MANITOBA
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT DEATHS MEDICAL CARE
100 428,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE
50 374,200 50,464 2,656 680
20 361,850 11,183 42,205 12762
THREAT EVALUATION III 351,860 2,140 15,000 59,000
EXISTING SHELTER 361,850 3,320 16,990 45,840 USED
SASKATCHEWAN
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT ' MEDICAL CARE DEATHS
100 948,000 TRACE -• -
50 , 947,700 285 15 TRACE
20 944,060 2,585 1,292 66
THREAT EVALUATION III 937,360 4,740 5,500 400
EXISTING SFIELTER
944,060 975 2,515 450 USED
•
0
0
ANNEX E
ALBERTA
UNFIT REQUIRING PF FIT UNFIT DEATHS MEDICAL CARE
100 852,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE
50 814,000 35,625 1,875 500
20 772,900 30,070 39,905 9, 125
THREAT EVALUATION III 76 0,7 40 4,260 46,300 4Ô,700
EXISTING SHELTER
772,900 3,120 40,655 35,325 USED
BRITISH COLUMBIA
15-F-- FIT UNFIT UNFIT REQUIRING DEATHS MEDICAL CARE
fod 1,196,000 TRACE TRACE TRACE
50 1,015,000 169,100_
8,900 2,300
--26- 949,900 58,025 146,300 41,775
THREAT EVALUATION III 908,520 5,980 81,500 200,000
EXISTING SHELTER -5-+ 49;960 19,380 80,460 146,260 USED
0
•
•
•
ANNEX F
DEVELOPMENT OF
COST ESTIMATES
F--1
•
•
•
DEVELOPMENT OF COST ESTIMATES
The cost figures produced for this study are only approximate and are based on some of the cost information given in "Analysis Study No. 1, Alberta Region", EMO 1964 and on that given in the United States Office of Civil Defense "Annual Statistical Report", 1969.
Costs are developed for the following five basic steps:
A. Maintain updating inventory of potential fallout shelter space;
B. Prepare plans for use of existing space;
C. Exploit existing potential space to increase number of usable spaces;
D. Provide population with shelter minimum protection factor 50;
E. Provide population with shelter minimum protection factor 100.
STEP A Maintain Inventory of Existing Spa.ce
Estimated costs for:
Direct Effects Areas = $50,000 annually Outside Direct Effects Areas = $50.000 annually
Total: = $100,000 annually
STEP B Plans for Use of Existing Space
1. Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities and for development of community shelter plans.
Potential shelter spaces: 38,847,027
therefore usable shelter spaces = 40% x.38,847,027 = 15,538,810
Population of direct effects areas = 9,592,000
Since there are more usable spaces than population, costs are based only on number of spaces required, that is, 9,592,000 spaces.
a. Licensing and Marking
The cost of licensing and marking is estimated to be $0.15/shelter space, therefore, total cost for this work is:
41, 9,592,000 x $0.15 = $1,439,000 ... (1)
50 100 150 200
b. Sanitation
The estimated cost of sanitary facilities is $0.25/shelter space (U.S, figure $0.16/shelter space), therefore total cost is:
9,592,000 x $0.25
c. Community Shelter Plan (CSP)
$2,398,000 (2)
Since there is little or no experience in Canada of preparing community shelter plans, no useful Canadian cost statistics exist. It was necessary therefore, to use United States cost figures as a basis for developing approximate estimated costs for this type of work in Canada. Cost and population data from over one hundred United States Office of Civil Defense contracts, awarded since the beginning of 1966, were plotted and from a regression analysis of these plots, a rough cost estimating chart was developed.
Mathematically, the line on the chart shown at Figure Fl, is represented by the equation:
COST = $(0.136 x POPULATION) + 5920)
•
POPULATION x 1000
Figure Fl. Community Shelter Planning - Rough Cost Estimating Chart
Costs shown in Figure F2 are derived from
Figure F1 and have been increased by 25 percent
because of general price and wage increases.
They include only for the proper development
of cummunity shelter plans by professional
urban planners in conjunction with local and
provincial emergency planning staffs.
CSP
Risk Area Population Estimated Costs
Direct 9,592,000 $1,635,000
High 4,518,000 795,000
Medium 2,327,000 395,000
Low 4,774,000 812,000
Total 21,211,000 $3,637,000
Figure F2. ESTIMATED COSTS FOR
COMNiUNITY SHELTER PLANNING
0
Community shelter plans for direct
effects areas = $1,635,000 ...... (3)
Total cost for Step A for Direct
Effects Areas = (1) + (2) + ( 3) $5,472,000
2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing,
marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities
and for development of community shelter plans.
Population = 11,619,000
Usable spaces assumed to be 60 percent of
identified potential spaces, that is 8,963,115 spaces
High Risk, Medium Risk Low Risk Total
Population 4,518,000
Licensing & $ 587,000Marking.
Sanitary
Facilities
Community
$ 978,000
Shelter $ 795,000
Planning
Total Costs: $2,360,000
Usable Spaces 3,913,308
2,327,000
$ 217,000
$ 361,000
$ 395,000
$ 973,000
1,443,870
4,774,000 11,619,000
$ 541,000 $ 1,345,000 ..... (4)
$ 901,000 $ 2,240,000 ..... (5)
$ 812,000 $ 2,002,000 .. ... (6)
$2,254,000 $ 5,587,000
3,605,936 8,963,115
0
• Step A - Direct Effects Areas $5,472,000
Outside Direct Effects Areas
Total Cost: $11,059,000
STEP C Exploit Existing Potential Space to increase number of Usable Spaces
1. Direct Effects Areas. Include for licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary fàcilities, community shelter planning and additiônal ventilation. In casting this step, only potential shelter spaces with protection factors of 50 or better, have been exploited. It is assumed that only 10 percent of the total potential spaces can be improved by additional ventilation. For a PF 50 or better level, there is a shelter deficit of 3,340,639.
5,587,000
Spaces that can be developed by additional ventilation
Additional spaces required
= 1,570,541
= 1,770,098
a. Licensing and Marking
refer to Step B = $1,439,000 ,. (1)
b. Sanitation
refer to Step B = $2,398,000 (2)
c. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step S = $1,635,000 . (3)
d. Cost of Ventilating Additional Spaces
From Analysis Study No. 1, average cost per space for various sizes of shelter are given below:
Shelter Ventilation Cost/Space Capacity Costs
50 $ 573 $ 11.46
100 761 7.61
200 1253 6.27
500 2203 4.40
1000 4020 4.02
Average Cost = $6.75/space. Use $7.00/space.
Cost = 1,570,541 x $7.00 .4 $10,993,787 (7) •
Total cost for Step C for Direct Effects Areas
(1) + (2) + (3) + (7)
$16,465,789
2. Outside Direct Effects Areas
Again consider only Pr 50 or better.
Shelter deficit at PF 50 level = 8,288,394 spaces
Spaces that can be developed by
adding ventilation assumed to be
20 percent of total potential spaces.
Spaces to be developed20% of 5,551,047 = 1,110,202
a. Licensing and Ilarkinâ
refer to Step B = $1,345,000 ....... (4)
1,110,202 x $0.15 = 166,530 ....... (8)
Total: _ $1,511,530 ....... (9)
b. Sanitation
refer to Step B = $2,240,000 ....... (5)
1,110,202 x $0.25 = $ 277,550 ....... (10)
0 Total: _ $2,517,550 ....... (11)
c. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step B = $2,002,000 ....... (6)
d. Ventilation
11.110,202 x $7.00 = $7,771,414 ....... (12)
Total costs for areas outside direct
effects = (9) + (11) + ( 6) + (12) $13,802,494
Total costs Step C:
Direct Effects Areas = $16,465,789
Outside Direct Effects Areas = $13,802,494
Total: $30,268,281
0
Costs for Steps D and E are based on the premise that new additional spaces can be most economically provided by a program of shelter space development in new buildings at the design stage. This could be accomplished by paying the additional costs required to provide shelter and these costs are based on a shelter space costing as follows:
Current new construction costs F $25.00/square foot 10 percent of $25.00 per square foot F $ 2.50/square foot Cost of shelter space = $2.50 x 12 sq.ft,
$30.00/space.
•
STEP D, Provide Shelter Spaces Minimum PF 50 for Total Population, but all new space provided as mentioned above to have a minimum PF 100
Include for provision of space, licensing, marking, provision of emergency sanitary facilities, community shelter planning and ventilation.
1, Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional shelter spaces required is 1,770,098 '(see Figure F3, Annex F)
a. Additional pace
Cost: $30.00/space
Cost for additional spaces F 1,770,098 x $30.00
:7 $53,102,940 , (13)
b. Licensing and Marking
refer to Step C $1;439,000 .„ (1)
c. Sanitation
refer to Step C $2,398,000 (2)
d. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step C $1,635,000 .
e. Ventilation
refer to Step C F $10, 993,787 e (7)
Total costs for Direct Effects Areas = (13) + (1) + (2) + (3) + (7) := $69,568,727
0
2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. The number of additionalshelter spaces required is, 7,178,192 (see Figure F4,Annex F)
a, Additional Space
Cost: $30.00/space
Cost for additional spaces 7,178,192 x $30.00
_ $215,345,760 ........... (14)
b. Licensing and Marking
0
Population: 11,619,000
Cost = 11,619,000 x $0.15 $1,742,850 ............. (15)
c. Sanitation
Cost = 11,619,000 x $0.25 = $2,904,750 ............. (16)
d. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step C = $2y0021,000 ............. (6)
e. Ventilation
refer to Step C $7,771,414 ............. (12)
Total costs for areas outside Direct Effects
(14) + (15) + (16) + ( 6) + (12) _ $232,638,050
Total costs for Step D
Direçt Effects Areas - $69,568,727
Outside Direct Effects Areas = 229,766,774
Total: _ $299,335,501
0
STEP E. Provide shelter spaces m^nimum PF 100 for Total
Population, but all new spacesprovidedto have PF 100
Include for provision of space, licensing, marking,
community shelter planning, provision of emergency
sanitary facilities and venl:ilation.
1. Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional shelter
spaces required is 3,971,409 and the number of
spaces that can be improved is 1,124,116 (see Figure F6,
Annex F)
a. Additional Space
Cost: $30.00/space
Cost for additional spaces _ 3,971,409 x$30.00
$1.19,142,270 .......... (17)
b. Licensing and Marking
refer to Step C = $1,439,000 .......... (1)
c. Sanitation
refer to Step C = $2,398,000 ........ .. (2)
d. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step C $1,635,000 ... ....... (3)
e. Ventilation
Cost: $7.00/space
Cost for ventilation = 1,124,116 x$7.00
_ $7,868,812 ............ (18)
Total cost for Direct Effects Areas
- (17) + (1) + (2) + (3) + (18) ^ $132,483,082
2. Outside Direct Effects Areas. The number of additional
shelter spaces required is 8,464,224-and the number of
spaces that can be improved is 788,694 (see Figure F6,
Annex F).
a. Additional Space
Cost: $30./space
Cost for additional space ^ 8,464,224 x $30.00
$253,926,720 .......... (19)
0
• b. Licensing and Marking
refer to Step D $1,742,850 (15)
c. Sanitation
refer to Step D = $2,904,750 (16)
d. Community Shelter Planning
refer to Step C = $2,002,000 (6)
e. Ventilation
Cost: $7.00/space
Cost for ventilation = 788,694 x $7.00
= $5,520.858 (20)
Total cost for areas outside Direct Effects
= (19) + (15) + (16) + (6) + (20)
= $266,097.178
Total Costs for Step E
Direct Effects Areas = $132,483,082
Outside Direct Effects Areas = 266,097,178
Total: = $398,580,260
•
•
• •
d + e = (f) (9) g - f = (h) Political (a) (b) (a + b) = c (d) (e) Increased usable i Population inside PF 50 Shelter Division PF 100 + PF 50- 99 PF 50+ 40% x c 10% x c spaces direct effects areas spaces needed
Newfoundland - - - - - - - -
New Brunswick - - - _ - - - -
Prince Edward Island _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nova Scotia 164,240 66,021 230,261 92,104 23,026 115,130 146,000 30,870
Quebec 4,474,781 1,446,819 5,921,600 2,368,640 592,160 2,960,800 2,930,000 0
Ontario 4,655,326 2,106,586 6,761,912 2,704,764 676,191 3,380,955 4,314,000 933,045
Manitoba 632,559 222,391 854,950 341,980 85,495 427,475 550,000 122,525
Saskatchewan - - _ _ - -
Alberta 670,136 252,469 922,605 369,042 92,260 461,302 732,000 270,698
British Columbia 644,142 369,940 1,014,082 405,632 101,408 507,040 - 920,000 412,960
Canada 11,241,184 4,464,226 15,705,410 6,282,164 1,570,541 7,852,702 9,592,000 1,770,098
Figure F3. -n (E . Z c z
rn
ta
NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR
EQUAL TO 50 FOR POPULATION INSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
i
0
• • (g)
d + e = (f) g - f = (h) Political (a) (b) a + b =- (c) (d) (e) Increased usable
Population
Division PF 100 + PF 50 - 99 PF 50 + 60% x (c) 20% x (c) outside direct P.F. 50 shelter
spaces effects area spo-c. e.,,- pie ed ed
Newfoundland 106,480 72,268 178,748 107,244 35,748 142,992 516,000 373,008
New Brunswick 219,809 109,104 328,913 197,346 65,782 263,128 623,000 3.5.9,8.72
Prince Edward Island 20,794 7,08 . 27,883 16,728 5,576 22,304 110,000 87,696
Nova Scotia 39,609 17,742 57,351 34,410 11,470 45,880 619,000 573,120
Quebec 1,562,585 507,152 2,069,737 1,241,838 413,946 1,655,784 3,074,000 1,418,216
Ontario 1,182,067 578,381 1,760,448 1,056,264 352,088 1,408,352 3,253,000 1,844,648
Manitoba 70,014 26,199 96,213 57,726 19,242 76,968 428,000 351,032
Saskatchewan 409,142 146,698 555,840 333,504 111,168 444,672 948,000 503,328
Alberta 113,864 34, ',.- 0 148,434 89,058 29,686 118,744 852,000 733,256
•
British Columbia 219,151 108,329 327,480 196,488 65,496 261,984 1,196,000 934,016
Canada 3,943,515 1,607,532 5,551,047 3,330,606 1,110,202 4,440,808 11,619,000 7,178,192
> C z
rn ><
Figure F4. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR
EQUAL TO 50 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
-11 -n
i
•
0
i R
Pol iticalDivision
(a)
PF 100 +
(b)
40% x ( a)
(c)
10% x (a)
b + c = (d)
Increased usablespaces
(e)
Populationinside directeffects areas
e - d - (f)
PF 100 shelterspaces needed
Newfoundland - - - - - -
New Brunswick - - - - - -
Prince Edward Island - - - - - '
Nova Scotia 164,240 65,696 16,424 82,120 146,000 63,880
Quebec 4,474,781 1,789,912 447,478 2,237,390 2,930,000 692,610
Ontario 4,655,326 1,862,130 465,532 2,327,663 4,314,000 1,986,337
Manitoba 632,559 253,023 63,255 316,279 550,000 233,721
Saskatchewan - - - - - -
Alberta 670,136 268,054 67,013 335,068 732,000 396,932
British Columbia 644,142 257,656 64,414 322,071 920,000 597,929
Canada 11,241,184 4,496,471 1,124,116 5,620,591 9,592,000 3,971,409
Figure -F5. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOREQUAL TO 100 FOR POPULATION INSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
azzrnX
•
•
•
CD ni
• • (e)
Political (a) (6) (c) b , c .,_ (d) population e - d = (f)
Division PF loot 60% x ( a ) 20% Increased usable , outside direct PF 100 shelter
•x (a)
spaces effects areas spoces needed
Newfoundl and 106,480 63,888 21,296 85,184 516,000 430,816
New Brunswick 219,809 131,880 43,960 175,840 623,000 447,160
Prince Edward Island 20,794 12,474 4,158 16,632 110,000 93,368
Nova Scotia 39,609 23,760 7,920 31,680 619,000 587,320
Quebec 1,562,585 937,548 312,516 1,250,064 3,074,000 1,823,936
Ontario 1,182,067 709,236 236,412 945,648 3,253,000 2,301,352 -
Manitoba 70,014 42,006 14,002' 56,008 428,000 371,992
Saskatchewan 409,142 245,484 81,828 327,312 948,000 620,688
Alberta 113,864 68,316 22,772 91,088 852,000 760,912
British Columbia 219,151 131,490 43,830 175,320 1,196,000 1,020,680
Canada 3,943,515 2,366,082 788,694 3,154,776 11,619,000 8,464,224
Figure F6. NUMBER OF SHELTER SPACES NEEDED TO PROVIDE A PROTECTION FACTOR
EQUAL TO 100 FOR POPULATION OUTSIDE DIRECT EFFECTS AREAS.
•
•
•
\ 6..__
ANNEX G
RISK AREA MAPSBY PROVINCE
Is
•
•
...
e
L
ANNEX GNEWFOUNDLAND
0
•
G-3
•
• ■
NEW BRUNSWICK MEDIUM RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
ANNEX G NEW BRUNSWICK
.■
..
G-5
• •
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND MEDIUM RISK
ANNEX G PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
•
•
• G-7
• e
d>
ANNEX GNOVA SCOTIA
•
0
0
NOVA SCOTIA
HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
G-9
• .
QUEBEC
HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK
LOW RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
•
•
.
ONTARIO HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK
LOW RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
./.
./.
./*
•
•
. . ^ r
ANNEX GMANITOBA
0
i
i
U
mMniiuoM
HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK ^
LOW RISK ^
ZONE BOUNDARY
G-15
? ! •
SASKATCHEWAN LOW RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
i
i 7
i L •■■•• ■■
I 6
•
ANNEX G SASKATCHEWAN
G-17
• •
i
I
2ALBERTA
HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK
LOW RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
0
.
ANNEX GBRITISH COLUMBIA
4
1
1
!
^ BRITISH COLUMBIA
I
HIGH RISK
MEDIUM RISK
LOW RISK
ZONE BOUNDARY
5
PSEPC/SPPCC LIB/BIBLIO
IIIIIIIIII 0000067334 r UA Analysis of results of fallout
927 protection survey of Canada A53a • / •
1970
DATE DUE SLIP
o F255
PSEPUSu111^1^0111 'iu i^^iUA Analysis of results of fallout927 protection survey of CanadaA53a I1970
DATE DUE SLIP
F255 II 0