I n complex military and intelli-gence operations, senior leadersmust make difficult choices onemploying existing capabilities,

improving them, and developing newcapabilities. Decisions are becomingmore intricate because of costs, tech-nology, operational utility, threat un-certainty, system complexity, and sys-tem-of-systems relationships. As

difficulties increase, policymakers con-tinue to seek approaches that bettersupport their decisions.

One popular technique is archi-tecting—considering end-to-end capa-bilities in the context of related capa-bilities to meet expected needs. It isessentially focused on the big pictureto provide insight on the utility andrelationships of the components. TheJoint Requirements Oversight Councilrealizes the importance of identifyingthe way that capabilities fit into an op-erating concept as implemented under

44 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

Brigadier General Stephen J. Ferrell, USA, serves as director of the office of theNational Security Space Architect and Colonel Hal E. Hagemeier, USAF (Ret.), isassistant director of that office for strategy and initiatives.

ArchitectingSpace ProgramsBy S T E P H E N J. F E R R E L L and H A L E. H A G E M E I E R

Horizontal takeoff andlanding vehicle model.

U.S. Air Force

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F e r r e l l a n d H a g e m e i e r

These architectures are long-rangegoals and objectives expressed in termsof a framework for system develop-ment. They represent what the com-munity believes will provide capabili-ties in the far term. Starting withexisting architectures and examiningfuture ones that will be available in thenear and mid term based on plannedinvestments, they also analyze alterna-tives to determine the best long-termcourse, given technologies, operationalconcepts, needs, threats, and resources.The resulting recommendations aresupported by an investment strategyand roadmap.

Architecture recommendationsoften advocate actions necessary to en-sure that the national security spacecommunity develops desired capabili-ties. They are neither point designs norspecific system designs—stakeholderorganizations are capable of designingand building specific systems with thebest available technology. Architec-tures define capabilities, principles,and relationships for achieving theoverall desired capability in the future.

The National Security Space Archi-tect develops these architectures col-laboratively with the representatives ofother interested agencies, spanning themilitary, intelligence, civil, and com-mercial sectors. It does not develop,build, buy, or operate space systems;consequently, the organization can beobjective in considering various com-peting concepts and capabilities. The

a joint integrated architecture. More-over, the defense acquisition process isbeing revised to include architectures

as means of characterizing relation-ships among various capabilities inorder to guide systems developmentand associated investments.

Architectures are the structure, re-lationships, and principles that governthe design and evolution of elementsthat are linked in accomplishing a spe-cific purpose. They inform choices wellbefore they have to be made. Theyhelp explain the possible and the prac-tical. It is important to note, though,that architectures exist on multiplelevels: from specific, existing systemssuch as global positioning and itsmany components to far-term archi-tectures for an entire enterprise such ascommunications.

Although space architectures existon multiple levels, this analysis focuseson the mid and far term. Such archi-tectures are potentially the most im-portant in developing mission capabil-ities by providing a broad context fordecisionmakers. Yet they are probablythe least understood because they ex-tend well beyond the future years de-fense program. They are vectors to vi-sion statements, capabilities-based

strategies, and enterprise-wide plans.Architecting, in this sense, is theprocess of defining national security

space far-term objec-tives, planning near-and mid-term steps toaccomplish them, andimplementing in-formed decisions. Pro-

ducing space architectures requires adedicated effort to consider end-to-endcapabilities across multiple organiza-tions to achieve integrated results.

The Space ArchitectThe Secretary of Defense and the

Director of Central Intelligence estab-lished the National Security Space Ar-chitect to develop and integrate secu-rity space architectures for the mid andlong term across the full range of de-fense and national space missions. Thisorganization is uniquely positioned todevelop architecture over the next 15to 25 years for the entire national secu-rity space enterprise. Recently, it hasbeen tasked to assess trade-offs be-tween space and nonspace solutions aswell as the appropriate integration ofspace with land, sea, and air solutions,and to report on the consistency of im-plementation of national securityspace programs with policy, planningguidance, and architectural decisions.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 45

Major National Security Space Architect Efforts

CY97

MILSATCOM Mission Information Management

Communications

Information Management Transformational Communications

Communications and Information Management

Space WeatherSensing

Hyper-Spectral Strategy

Integrated Spectral

SBR

CY98 CY99 CY00 CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04

Assured Access to Space

Program Assessment

Satellite Operations

Back-up Mission Control Station

Space Sit Awareness Space Protect

ResponsiveSpace Operations

FY04 FY05 FY06

Space Control

Launch onDemand Impact

Integrated ISR

the Secretary of Defense and the Directorof Central Intelligence established theNational Security Space Architect

■ J F Q F O R U M

agency ensures that all relevant ideas,opinions, and concerns are thoroughlyanalyzed and considers both space andnonspace perspectives. It is as inclusiveas possible in all architectures, studies,and activities it leads and relies heavilyon stakeholders and other participantsto bring their considerable expertiseand knowledge to the table. Althoughit strives for consensus, the goal is todetermine the best way ahead for fu-ture national space capabilities.

Past recommendations have beenapproved by the National SecuritySpace Senior Steering Group, which iscomposed of agencies with a stake inthe architecture or study. It is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Command, Control, Com-munications, and Intelligence, theDeputy Director of Central Intelli-gence for Community Management,and the Director for Force Structure,Resources, and Assessments, Joint Staff(J-8). The group has also directed tran-sitional planning to guide implemen-tation of architecture and study results

when appropriate. Stakeholders thendevelop transition plans to implementapproved architecture and study rec-ommendations.

As a result of the Space Commis-sion, the National Security Space Ar-chitect will function as a multiagencyorganization that reports to the UnderSecretary of the Air Force. It expectscontinued review from the national se-curity space community to representstakeholder organizations, provide ad-vice, vet equities, and recommend op-tions for reconciling major differencesamong stakeholders.

Architecture ResultsSince 1995, the National Security

Space Architect (and its predecessor or-ganization, the DOD Space Architect)has completed architectures and studiesand conducted the first national secu-rity space program assessment for fiscalyear 2004. It is currently developingtwo architectures and preparing to as-sess the program for the next fiscalyear. The architecture and study prod-ucts fall into four areas: communica-tions and information management,sensing, assured access to space, and

program assessments. Communicationsand information management effortsinclude military satellite communica-tions, communications, and informa-tion management architectures, andthe transformational communicationsstudy. Sensing includes space weatherand integrated spectral architectures,the hyperspectral strategy and space-based radar studies, and one architec-ture under development—integratedintelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance. Assured access to space in-cludes space control and satellite opera-tions architectures, the launch ondemand impact and back-up missioncontrol station studies, and the otherarchitecture currently under develop-ment, space situational awareness.

Communications/information man-agement. The goal of mission informa-tion management was developing thearchitecture and strategy to guidetechnology investment, acquisitionplanning, and program execution fornational security information manage-ment capabilities in the 2010–2025

46 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

Space tracking andsurveillance system.

Nor

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man

F e r r e l l a n d H a g e m e i e r

National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration, developed an architec-ture for the 2010–2025 era that recom-mended an integrated network overspace, air, and terrestrial environmentswith dynamic routing, prioritization,and bandwidth allocation; an airbornecommunications network; an inte-grated government space relay system;interoperable space cross-links; and thenecessary interfaces to terrestrial opti-cal networks. These capabilities willprovide both more bandwidth andmore accesses to the user.

The vision created by the commu-nications architecture in turn becamethe inspiration for a study that out-lined a relatively near-term plan for atruly transformational capability, in-creasing the bandwidth available tosupport the anticipated explosion of

era. Completed in 2001, it encom-passed all aspects of providing mis-sion-essential information to execut-ing organizations and included DODservices and agencies, the intelligencecommunity, civilian agencies (com-prising the civil applications commit-tee), and other offices concerned withnational security. Mission informationmanagement was split into two relatedareas: an information management ar-chitecture and a communications ar-chitecture.

The information management ar-chitecture contained recommendationsto better integrate information needsacross communities, provide cross-do-main satisfaction management, encour-age smart delivery of information, anddevelop common information stan-dards. It developed a concept for pro-viding the structure to integrate infor-mation technology capabilities, therebycombining information needs acrossthe national security community into acommon needs picture—a conceptknown as national security informationmanagement (NSIM).

This concept helps make efficientand effective use of information to au-tomatically deliver it when generatedwhile protecting sources and methods.It is designed to analyze user informa-tion needs to determine commonalitiesand maintain the association of thoseneeds to individual users. The nationalsecurity information managementfunction has been organized underchief information officers drawn fromthe defense and intelligence communi-ties to guide management architectures

by identifying resident developing ca-pabilities (such as the multi-intelli-gence acquisition program and theDOD horizontal fusion effort) and pro-viding feedback to achieve the infor-mation management architecture vi-sion. This office has paid dividends byproviding assistance in changing theoperations concepts for managing in-formation for users such as the Coast

Guard (high seas drift net concept ofoperations), the Department of State(noncombatant evacuation operations),

and 14th Air Force (informationflow for Joint Air OperationsCenter generation of productssuch as the air tasking order).

As information manage-ment architecture took themeans of managing the infor-mation in the pipes into consid-

eration, communications architectureexamined the pipes themselves farmore comprehensively than the archi-tecture for satellite communicationshad done. The communications archi-tecture team, consisting of 30 stake-holders from across the defense estab-lishment, intelligence community, and

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 47

the communications achitectureteam recommended an integratednetwork over space, air, andterrestrial environments

Launching defensesupport programsatellite.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e

■ J F Q F O R U M

user requirements by using long-de-sired technologies, some with greattechnical risk. It incorporated interop-erable laser communications and othertechnologies to meet the growingneeds in the defense and intelligencecommunities. The study examinedbroadcast, relay, and point-to-pointmilitary satellite communications, in-cluding low probability of intercept/low probability of detection/anti-jamprotected communications to ensurethat future capabilities are as good asor better than the advanced extremelyhigh frequency capabilities planned for2010. It also affirmed the feasibility ofthese efforts and outlined a roadmapto attain them. The recently organizedtransformational communications of-fice is preparing the groundwork in ar-chitecture for the acquisition commu-nity to develop a network-centriccapability to eliminate bandwidth con-straints and connect more users tosatellite communications. This is aclear example of long-term space archi-tecting affecting near-term acquisition.

Sensing. If communications pro-vide the how, then sensing technolo-gies provide much of the what. The in-tegrated spectral architecture andspace-based radar studies establishedimportant groundwork for the ongoingintegrated intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance architecture.

The integrated spectral architec-ture generated an integrated end-to-end spectral remote sensing architec-ture for the 2020 timeframe acrossDOD and the intelligence and civilcommunities. For the first time it iden-tified fundamental capabilities wherean integrated spectral remote sensingarchitecture might have utility:

■ periodic Earth coverage for detect-ing both materials and changes

■ periodic area search of theater-sizedregions to detect and classify facilities, vehi-cles, and equipment

■ focused in-depth target characteriza-tion

■ near-continuous worldwide persist-ent surveillance

■ a user-directed, network-centric en-vironment where the user has direct controlover most of the information product gen-eration.

The Road AheadThe integrated spectral architec-

ture considered that all five capabilitiesshould be included to realize the fullbenefit of technology. It has also laidout a roadmap for achieving them be-fore 2020. Some aspects of the plan areunderway while others remain un-funded. From a military perspective,one of the most important capabilitiesis area search. A proposed program thatdemonstrates this capability is the en-hanced hyperspectral experiment(Noble Eye), which would allowwarfighters to detect vehicle-size targetsover a broad area and cue other sensorsto characterize the objects. This wouldconfirm or deny the existence of targetsin an area of operations and help opti-mize lethal targeting capabilities. Theother critical consideration, whichmust be developed as sensor capabili-ties are fielded, is creation of an infor-mation environment where users havedirect control of much of their ownproduct generation.

Another potential capability of in-terest to military and intelligence plan-ners is space-based radar. Its benefits

are significant, but candidate systemshave either been considered too ex-pensive or the necessary technologiesare seen as immature. That pictureseems to be changing. A study by theNational Security Space Architect in2001 outlined a capabilities roadmapfor the military, intelligence, and civilcommunities. It assessed the state oftechnologies required to realize radarfor ground moving targets and relatedmissions and identified the criticaltechnologies for a capable, affordablespace-based radar. The study also ad-dressed an approach to satisfy as manycommon needs from across the com-munities as possible to prevent multi-ple competing acquisitions.

Spectral remote sensing andspace-based radar represent aspects of abroader mission area: intelligence, sur-veillance, and reconnaissance. The in-tegrated architecture for this missionarea that is currently being developedhas a cross-community investmentstrategy, with air and space study tasksbeing incorporated into the transfor-mational space and airborne project.This study supports military, intelli-gence, and civil needs integrated acrossspace and nonspace solutions for the

48 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

Earth from outerspace.

DO

D

F e r r e l l a n d H a g e m e i e r

leaders received information on whichto base decisions on final adjustmentsto service and agency program costsprior to the budget submittal to Con-gress. The goal is ensuring unity of ef-fort in acquiring and operating preemi-nent space capabilities.

Systems tend to be developed inan evolutionary and often stovepipedfashion, with each version an improve-ment on the last. The exceptions areusually represented by new technologyor operational concepts—or a combi-nation of both. But as the cost of sys-tems has escalated without comparableincreases in spending, the Nation can-not settle for the next generation to besimply better in incremental terms orexploit each new technology or opera-tional concept, however revolutionary.Various systems must work in concertand provide capabilities to achieve thedesired effects.

Leveraging the synergy among ca-pabilities offers the best opportunity toachieve the highest possible utility andperhaps compensate for inadequate re-sources. Mid- and far-term architec-tures are key to developing integratedcapabilities based on technical feasibil-ity, the operational concepts withinwhich the capabilities will be em-ployed, and expected policy and re-source constraints. They also focus sci-ence and technology on ensuring thatfuture capabilities are available to jointwarfighters.

Senior policymakers realize thatlong-term architectures provide a bet-ter understanding of relationships af-fecting complex decisions. Perhaps thisis particularly true for space capabili-ties given their absolute dependenceon technology, interdependenciesamong systems, long lead times, andnumerous relations with terrestrial ca-pabilities. The National Security SpaceArchitect provides a unique perspec-tive and cross-community approach toenable informed decisions. JFQ

2015 timeframe and beyond. A majorthrust is exploring new operationalconcepts and technologies and ad-dressing the objective of persistenceand achieving it in a mix of air andspace capabilities. The architecture isexpected to be complete this year.

Assured access to space. To collectand provide data through space, onemust first have assured access. The Na-

tional Security Space Architect is com-pleting a space situational awarenessarchitecture and will begin architec-tures for space protection and respon-sive space operations.

Space situational awareness is ad-dressing every aspect of the space envi-ronment, including tracking and cata-loging space objects, charactering theobjects (size, shape, payloads, capabili-ties, and activity), gathering informa-tion on the space environment, andmanaging related data. This effort willdevelop an end-to-end architecture for2020 that provides space situationalawareness to a wide range of cus-tomers. Situational awareness is thebasis of space control, the ability to en-sure that the Nation and its allies cantake advantage of space capabilitiesand deny them to potential enemies.This architecture is scheduled to becompleted in summer 2003.

Protection architecture will followthe space situational awareness effort.As dependence on space capabilitieshas increased, the requirement forprotection has grown. However, exist-ing approaches for mission assurance,risk assessment, and protection areusually focused on individual systemsor segments, constrained by limitedbudgets, or overridden by a desire forutmost system performance. This ef-fort will develop an architecture thatoptimizes space system mission assur-ance for national, warfighting, andcivil users across the range of space as-sets and establish a priority for pro-tecting those assets.

The responsive space operationsarchitecture, expected to begin in late2003, will examine the proper blend ofspace assets and capabilities encom-passing launch, infrastructure, andpayload designs to provide space capa-bilities for rapid response to worldevents, technological advances, evolv-ing military doctrine, and other factorswhich drive changes in national secu-

rity needs. This architecturewill provide an integratedend-to-end solution as afoundation for more respon-sive, inherently flexible spaceoperations and acquisitionconcepts providing transfor-mational capabilities and as-

sured support to defense, informationcommunity, and civil users.

Program assessment. Evaluatingprogress in planned architecture capa-bilities is essential. In 2002 the Na-tional Security Space Architect as-sessed the national security spaceprogram in the FY04–FY09 programobjective memoranda. This assessmentemphasized end-to-end architecture todetermine if the programmed capabili-ties would satisfy major civil, defense,and intelligence policies and guid-ance. Based on the recommendationsof the Space Commission, the defenseand intelligence communities identi-fied the elements that made up theirrespective space and space-related pro-grams, referring to them as the virtualmajor force program for space. The as-sessment used these programs, to-gether with other relevant programs,including key civil capabilities, for theFY04 assessment.

The program assessment high-lighted areas of interest to senior poli-cymakers, including the Under Secre-tary of the Air Force and Director of theNational Reconnaissance Office, Direc-tor of Program Analysis and Evaluationwithin the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, and Deputy Director of Cen-tral Intelligence for Community Man-agement, to better synchronize fundingacross the space community. With thebenefits of the space program assess-ment architectural perspectives on ca-pabilities and other program reviews,

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 49

situational awareness is the basis ofspace control, the ability to ensurethat the Nation can take advantageof space capabilities