Arab Nationalism and Soviet-American Relations

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American Academy of Political and Social Science

Arab Nationalism and Soviet-American RelationsAuthor(s): Fayez SayeghSource: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 324, Resolvingthe Russian-American Deadlock (Jul., 1959), pp. 103-110Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and SocialScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034061 .Accessed: 04/05/2011 15:08

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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN CADEMY

ANY * consideration of Arab na-tionalism as related to Soviet-

American relations implies two funda-mentals which have a direct

bearingon

the subject, but which have been oftenoverlooked by political analysts andpolicy makers alike.

In the first place, there is an im-plicit recognition that the Arabs placetheir own aspirations and interests overthe aspirations and interests of eitherparty to the East-West conflict. On thesurface it may appear obvious to saythat the

Arabs give primacy to theirkindred urges for freedom from foreigndomination; for a better life throughpolitical, social, and economic develop-ment; and for increased unity. None-theless, the point is more than purelyacademic for the Arab attitude towardWest and East has been determinedlargely by the fact that West and Easthave entertained diverging attitudes

toward Arab nationalism.Unfortunately, Western observers asa rule have focused so much attentionon their own interests, ideals, andstrategy in the encounter with the So-viet bloc that they have failed to seethe Arab world as a real being with in-terests, ideals, and a will of its own.Much of the American-Arab misunder-standing in recent years may be at-

tributed to this practice of viewingArab nationalism primarily from theangle of the East-West conflict andsometimes expecting the Arabs to sub-ordinate many of their vital interests tothe exigencies of the West. Converselythe Soviet Union, at least since 1955,has professed a readiness to separatethe national interests of the Arab peo-ples from the immediate demands ofthe Soviet struggle with the West.Moreover, the Soviets have put suchprofessions into practice by offering toaid any requesting Arab country with-

* Dr. Sayegh's paper was read by Mr. SamSalem of the Case Institute of Technology,

out demanding that the country sub-ordinate its policies to those of the So-viet bloc or to align itself with Russiain the East-West conflict.

A second fundamental for understand-ing the position of Arab nationalism inthe cold war is the distinction betweenAmerica and the West and, therefore,between American-Soviet relations andthe West-East struggle. The signifi-cance of this distinction rests in therealization that the West as a party tothe cold war embraces, in addition to

the United States, certain Europeanpowers with whom Arab nationalismhad been involved in life and deathstruggles for many many years prior tothe inauguration of the cold war andover issues entirely unrelated to thecold war. Beginning with the Napole-onic invasion of Egypt in 1798 and cul-minating in the post-World War I set-tlement, virtually every piece of Arab

territory was brought under the domi-nation of England and France, and toa lesser extent, Spain and Italy. Eventhe Arab revolt of 1916, which had beenlaunched against the Ottomans in alli-ance with Britain and had ended in theliberation of the Fertile Crescent andparts of the Arabian peninsula fromOttoman rule, was soon brought tonaught by the European powers who

arbitrarily dismembered the region andplaced it under the rule of Englandand France.

The fact that these colonial powershave been identified with America, inthe cause of the West, in the East-Westconflict, has obstructed the rallying ofthe Arab peoples to the cause espousedby the United States. For the Arabs,as indeed many other Asian and Africanpeople, do not experience the cold warprimarily as a clash between Americandemocracy and Soviet communism, butas a conflict between two organic totali-ties-two power blocs-one of which in-cludes the very colonial powers against

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ARAB NATIONALISM AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

which the Asian and African peopleshave struggled or are now struggling toemancipate themselves.

EVALUATION OF ARAB ATTITUDE TO

THE COLD WAR

The forcefulness of these two fac-tors centering around the primacy ofArab nationalism and the Arab mindand the association of European co-lonialism with the cause of the West,has been instrumental in determining

the evolution of the Arab attitude tothe cold war. This attitude has passedthrough four stages since the close ofWorld War II, with the years 1947,1951, and 1955 serving as demarcationpoints.

First phase

The first phase unfolded between

1945 and 1947, when as we know thecold war was certainly in the making,but before its form and ramification hadbeen clearly defined. During these yearsthe attitude of Arab nationalism towardthis approaching East-West conflict wasdecisively affected by vivid recollectionsof a predatory colonialism centered inWestern Europe. In fact, the struggleagainst this colonialism was not over, for

only partial emancipation in some Arablands had been obtained by the end ofWorld War II. As we know, Americawas a conspicuous nonparticipant n thisprocess of alienation between Arab na-tionalism and West European colo-nialism. A century of Arab-Americanfriendship generated by American edu-cators, missionaries, and philanthropistsand nourished by Wilsonian idealismwas extended into the interwar decadesas a result of America's anticolonialdiplomacy. But soon after the close ofWorld War II, America plunged head-long into Middle East politics when itbecame heir to England's policy of sup-

porting Zionism. Ignoring the recom-mendations of the 1946 Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry, the United States

overzealouslyintervened in the United

Nations deliberations over the Palestineproblem and played an instrumentalrole in the establishment of Israel. Bythis policy, America became an accom-plice to an encroachment on Arab na-tional rights which many Arabs fearedand felt was more deadly than colonial-ism. Thus, even before the cold warhad become a paramount fact of inter-

national life, the Western powers hadincurred the suspicion, hostility, and ac-tive opposition of Arab nationalism byvirtue of the colonial policies of Eng-land and France and the pro-Zionistpolicies of England and the UnitedStates.

Second phase

The open outbreak of the cold wardid not alter the situation fundamen-tally, for in its early years the coldwar did not extend to the Middle East,and, therefore, the Arab national move-ment viewed it with apathy and indif-ference, while continuing to be hostileto the West for reasons not connectedwith the cold war.

In this second phase of its evolutionextending from 1947 to 1951, the Arabnationalist attitude toward the coldwar was influenced by four main fac-tors. In the first place, clashes betweenEast and West were taking place out-side the Arab world: the re-establish-ment of the Cominform, the coup d'etatin Czechoslovakia, the first Berlin crisis,the triumph of Communism in China,and the invasion of South Korea-allthese events were relatively remote fromthe daily consciousness of Arabs. TheArabs were far more concerned withproblems of their own, such as the ef-forts to liquidate the British base inSuez, the renegotiation of the Anglo-

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Iraqi Treaty, the first postwar Algerianinsurrection, and finally and above allthe Palestine War.

Secondly, during these years oneparty to the cold war, the Soviet Union,was totally absent and physically re-mote from the Arab scene.

Thirdly, the other party to the coldwar, the West, was present and real inthe Arab situation, and its presence, tosay the least, was unwelcome. For aslate as 1951 the Western colonial powerswere still ruling in Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, and in the south-ern and eastern fringes of the Arabianpeninsula; a Western-oriented Zioniststate had been created in most of Pales-tine, at Arab expense; and Westernforces were still stationed in the thenindependent countries of Egypt, Iraq,and Jordan.

Fourthly, the ideological issue, atleast said to be the core of the East-West trouble, was not alive in the Arabmind. Communism, as a doctrine andas a system of social economic organi-zation had won few adherents in Arabsociety. It was an alien ideology, in-compatible with the religious persua-sions, the individualistic bent, the na-tionalistic compulsions, and the basiccultural traditions of the Arab world.

Thus, lacking involvement in the ideo-logical issues and removed from thepolitical issues, Arab nationalism waslargely indifferent to the cold war from1947 to 1951. The two touched oneanother at best only tangentially, andthe only point of contact was that oneparty to the East-West conflict, theWest, was also in conflict with the ris-ing nationalism of the Arab peoplethrough its colonial pro-Zionist policy.

Third phase

The transition to the third phase inthe Arab attitude, from 1951 to 1955,

was prompted by the Western proposalregarding the establishment of the Mid-dle East defense organization in the fall

of 1951. It will be recalled that in ac-cordance with the Western strategy ofcontainment of the Soviet bloc, collec-tive security organizations were estab-lished in Europe and the Far East inthe first few years of the cold war,notably NATO and ANZUS. Until1951, however, the Asiatic and Africansectors of the Middle East were theonly region adjacent to Soviet territorywhich had remained unattached toWestern security collective systems.This hiatus in the structure of contain-ment was occasioned by the fact thatthe West was already present in manyArab lands, via British occupation forcesand military bases. In 1951, however,having become cognizant of the increas-ing precariousness of Britain's positionin the Arab

world,the West made its

first bid to Arab nationalism. On Octo-ber 13 of that year Egypt was invitedto enter into a relationship with theWestern powers, in terms of which, theSuez base was to be de-Anglicized andsimultaneously internationalized underan inter-Western command.

What was the Arab response to thisoverture? At the outset it should be

observed that Western statesmen wouldhave been incredibly naive to have ex-pected the Arabs to rush eagerly intothe cold war before any Western correc-tive action was taken to ameliorateexisting conditions. Entirely apart fromthis general mood, however, the firstWestern effort to bring the Arab worldinto the containment system was doomedto failure because of its timing, method,and other specifics. For the Westernproposal struck Arab leadership as amere strategy for maintaining in a newguise Western military bases and occu-pation forces on Arab territory at thesame time that nationalist zeal was call-

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ing for unconditional evacuation. Oncemore, then, Arab preoccupation withthe national colonial struggle militated

againstArab association with

the Westas a party to the cold war.But the aloofness from the East-West

conflict expressed until 1951 in termsof relative unconcern came now to ex-press itself in terms of a diplomacy ofnoninvolvement, nonalignment, or non-commitment, the same policy alreadyadvocated in other parts of Asia andAfrica and even in Europe. Moreover,

since the Western proposal on Suez hadassumed the character of perpetuatingunwelcome foreign presence on Arabsoil, Arab nationalists began to viewtheir efforts to remain uncommitted inthe cold war as a continuation of theirearlier struggle for liberation. There-fore, when Western diplomacy persistedin its efforts to involve Arab nationalismin the cold war, the originally nebulous

concept of nonalignment jelled into aformal doctrine. What had originatedas a somewhat vague idea stimulated byexperiences unrelated to the cold warsoon developed into a principle of for-eign policy bearing direct relevance tothe cold war. As one Middle Easterncountry after another placed itself orfound itself placed on the Western sideof the fence through the Balkan Pact of1953, the Pakistani-Turkish agreementof 1954, and the Iraqi-United Statesagreement of 1954, Arab nationalistssaw the shadow of the cold war elbow-ing its way ominously to the very door-steps of their homeland. If indifferenceto the cold war was no longer possible,and if an attitude had to be adopted,then the very issues which had gener-ated the initial indifference, namelycolonialism and Zionism, demanded thatthe new attitude be one of rejection,resting on the principle of nonalignment.To the either or put forward by theWest, Arab nationalists responded witha firm neither nor.

Fourth phaseIn the meantime, Western diplomacy

was evincing little sympathy with Arabresistance to involvement in the coldwar. At the same time that the idea ofinvolvement was becoming a nationalistheresy in the Arab world, the Westernpowers were straining every muscle todrag some Arab country into a Westernalliance. Having failed with Egypt in1951, they at last succeeded with Iraqin 1955 when the Iraqi government

heedless of the intra-Arab treaty ofjoint defense became a founding mem-ber of the Bagdad Pact. This eventbrought the cold war from the out-skirts and into the Arab world. It waspromptly followed in rapid successionby a wide variety of other events, thejoint impact of which was to herald anew phase, the fourth and final phasein the evolution of the attitude of Arab

nationalism towards the East-West con-flict.

Ushered in, in 1955, this new phasewitnessed a transformation of the pas-sive negative principle of nonalign-ment into an active and positive policyof neutrality. The diplomacy of non-alignment was passive and negative inthe sense that it was animated by therefusal to become involved in a networkof existing relations with any outsideparty which might possibly spell Arabdependence and subservience. But theanimating idea of the new diplomacy,which emerged in 1955, was active andpositive. Arab Nationalists now beganto feel that it was not enough merelyto safeguard sovereignty against actualor potential encroachment, it was im-perative to consolidate it. As with theprinciple of nonalignment, Arab Nation-alists tended to equate the policy ofneutrality with their long-standing idealof independence.

But they also began to associate thenew diplomacy with the second basic

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principle of the rising Arab nationalistmovement, namely the desire by theArabs for a better life through social

and economic development. It was be-cause of this dual motivation that thepolicy of active positive neutralitycame to rest on the conviction that newrelations had to be established on newfoundations with Arab national interestuppermost in mind. Trade and industryhad to be expanded and diversified, agri-culture modernized, natural resourcesharnessed and utilized. Arms had to

be obtained; wider markets for Arabproducts, new sources for capital, tech-nical knowledge, raw materials, all hadto be found. Furthermore, the Arabsfelt that as long as these new relationswere freely negotiated and freely en-tered into, and as long as they did notentail encroachment on national sover-eignty, such relations could be estab-lished with any outside power regard-less of the ideological position espoused,or the side of the cold-war fence itstood on.

WESTERN REACTION TO ARAB-SOVIETRELATIONS

If Arab nonalignment had shockedthe West, then the new Arab readinessto establish and cultivate commercial,financial, and cultural relations withSoviet bloc members prompted rash andhysterical reaction. It was viewed asan unprecedented air of policy whichthreatened to give the Soviet Union ac-cess to an area which the Westernpowers looked upon as their immediatepreserve. But Arab Nationalists sawtheir new policy in an entirely different

light. Theycontended that the decision

of a sovereign state to initiate orexpand peaceful relations with otherpowers was an elemental prerogative ofsovereignty, and they charged that ifsome Western powers still believed thatthey were entitled to prevent sovereign

Arab states from trading with othercountries, it was only because they hadnot yet reconciled themselves to the

reality that Arab sovereignty was a factand that Arab nationalism was there,and there indeed, to stay. Moreover,Arab Nationalists argued that it was theWest and the West alone that had pre-cipitated this new development. For itwas the West that had brought the coldwar into the Arab world through theBagdad Pact against the known will ofall Arabs, including the Iraqi people;and it was the West that had madecommercial and other relations an in-strument of bribery, inducement, orintimidation in order to pressure someArab government into joining Westernsponsored pacts and alliances. Whensome Arab governments, notably Egypt,Syria, and Yemen, had endeavored toadhere to their chosen policy of non-alignment they found themselves sub-jected to economic sanctions and ex-posed to punitive measures.

These had been the broad trendswhich had occasioned Egypt's successfulefforts in 1955 to pierce through thecordon of economic sanctions withinwhich it had found itself enclosed. Butother specific events had accelerated theprocess by making it both unavoidableand feasible for Egypt to purchase armsfrom the Soviet bloc in mid-1955.Among these events was the BandungConference of April 1955, which stronglyurged its members to expand trade withcountries outside the region without re-gard to their position in the cold war.Another set of events pertained to thesteady deterioration of Arab-Westernrelations in 1954 and 55 due to con-current

strugglesin

Morocco, Algeria,and Tunisia against France and inOman and Aden against England. Tothese developments must be added therevival of the Israeli activism early in1955. The return of David Ben-Gurionto public life in February of that year

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was followed by the inauguration ofa new policy of government-sponsoredborder raids, probably to satisfy strong

Israeli activist sentiment in preparationfor the national elections in July. Fi-nally, there was the initiation of a newSoviet strategy in 1955 with respect tothe underdeveloped countries into thecold war in general. The Kremlin's re-appraisal of Stalinist strategy in thatyear culminated in the adoption of newapproaches to the Asian-African com-munity into the West. While offeringdiplomatic, economic, and military as-sistance to the embattled national lib-eration movement and to the under-developed countries, the Soviet Unionsimultaneously appeared desirous ofdiminishing East-West tensions throughthe Geneva Summit Conference ofmid-1955.

The joint impact of these events wasto render Egypt's need for arms andeconomic aid more pressing, and at thesame time that the Soviet Union wasbecoming ready if not eager to meetthat need and African-Asian opinion waspredisposed to look with favor uponsuch transactions. By initiating its newrelations with the Soviet bloc, Egyptheralded the transformation of the pol-icy of passive nonalignment into one ofpositive and active neutrality. Howfrom that moment on, Arab nationalismand the West have come to be grippedin a vicious cycle of action, reaction,infuriation, and retaliation is a matterof current history. Aswan, Suez, thetripartite invasion, the Eisenhower doc-trine, and many others are but land-marks in a process of alienation betweenthe Arab and the Western world.

CONCLUSION

This very brief survey of the evolu-tion of the attitude of Arab national-ism towards the East-West conflict re-veals three main conclusions which may

well serve as lessons of the past. Firstly,Arab nationalism has at every stage re-acted to the actions or policies of the

West which adversely affect vital andlegitimate national interest uppermostin the Arab mind. Secondly, the atti-tude of Arab nationalism towards theEast-West conflict has been decisivelyaffected by Arab conflicts with the West-ern powers over issues of colonialism,and Zionism, the first antedating thecold war, and both unrelated to the coldwar. Thirdly, Western policies towardsthe Arab world before and since theadvent of the cold war have been predi-cated on inadequate recognition by theWest of the legitimacy and reality ofArab sovereign rights and nationalistinterest.

These factors are vital in understand-ing why Arab nationalism greeted thecold war with initial distrust of the Westand why the Arab attitude has evolvedfrom unconcern and indifference, o pas-sive negative nonalignment, and finallyto active and positive neutrality. More-over they go a long way towards ex-plaining why the Western position hasdeteriorated and why the Soviet positionhas improved in the Arab world sincethe advent of the cold war into thatregion in 1955.

Toconclude,

ahopeful

look at thefuture suggests a possibility that a newphase may emerge in the attitude ofArab nationalism to the East-Weststruggle: a more balanced attitude ofnormal neutrality instead of correctiveand, therefore, onesided neutrality whichthe Arabs have felt constrained to de-velop since 1955. However the initia-tive in facilitating such a transformation

must come from the West. At least onemajor factor inviting such Western ini-tiative has recently come into being.For Arab nationalism has given con-crete evidence in recent months that itis not willing to submit to Soviet inter-vention in Arab affairs despite the fact

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that some Arab governments have goneto the Soviet bloc for economic assist-ance. Similarly Arab nationalism has

vindicated its claim to be the only bul-wark in the Arab world against commu-nism, or the only effective alternative tothe appeal of communism. This factorprovides Western statesmanship withthe opportunity to recognize, at last,

that in coming to terms with Arab na-tionalism and its legitimate aspirations,and in tolerating its neutralist bent, the

West has a much better chance forsafeguarding its legitimate interests inthe Arab world than it has found possi-ble by opposing Arab nationalism or byseeking to involve it unwillingly in thecold war.

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