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Hello everyone and welcome to the Arab League! I’m Chrissy one of the senior staffers here at YMUN XL. I am currently a sophomore in Ezra Stiles College, hopefully double majoring (fingers crossed!) in Global Affairs and Modern Middle Eastern Studies. I was born and raised in Saline, MI (a tiny ‘Lake Woebegone’-esque slice of suburbia outside of Ann Arbor – go blue!), but now consider Yale my second home. Aside from the Yale International Relations Association (YIRA), I am heavily involved in an eclectic assortment of other Yale activities. A very large portion of my time is consumed by the Yale Precision Marching Band (YPMB). While I boast absolutely no musical talent myself, I have been a competitive baton twirler since the age of five. The YPMB has been so gracious as to let me perform with them at the halftime of football and basketball games, and even brought me along to perform at the NCAA Frozen Four Hockey National Championships last year. We have such great topics this year, and I’m so excited to see how you guys handle the many challenges that Diana and I have come up with for you guys in this topic guide. I am very much looking forward to a weekend of interesting debate, alliances, disagreements, but most of all innovation and enthusiasm. The future of one of the world’s most volatile regions lies in your capable hands; let’s see what you can do with it!

- Chrissy Houle, Yale’16 Hi guys, and welcome to the Arab League! My name is Diana Orozco, and I’m a senior staffer in who’s excited to help run the Arab League committee this year. I’m from Los Angeles, California, and I’m currently a sophomore majoring in Economics in Ezra Stiles College. In addition to Yale International Relations Association (YIRA), I’m very involved in Sabrosura: Yale’s Latin Dance team as a choreographer, dancer, and treasurer of the organization. I’m also very involved in an investing group called Refraction Capital that manages its own portfolio in the stock market. I am also on the board for Building Bridges, a group that coordinates spring tips to China to foster relationship between Chinese and American students. In my free time, I volunteer for the Young Eisner Scholars, an organization in New York and Los Angeles that helps students from under-served communities attain educational resources to get higher education. I’m very excited for the topics we have this year. Our current world leaders struggle at coming up with solutions to these prominent and complex issues in the Middle East; I’m looking forward to seeing the ideas you guys come up with to solve some of the biggest problems the world faces today.

-Diana Orozco, Yale’16

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TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee 5 Democratization in the Arab World

Topic History 7 Current Situation 16 Questions to Consider 27

Sustainable Economic Development in the Middle East

Topic History 29 Current Situation 33 Questions to Consider 38

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Footnotes 40! !! ! !!!!

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The League of Arab States, generally

referred to as the Arab League, is a regional organization of Arab States located in Northern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Southwest Asia. Working among its 22 member nations, the Arab League’s mission is to promote closer relations between its members, coordinate collaboration between their various governments, safeguard Arab nations’ independence and sovereignty, and to consider the affairs and interests of Arab countries in all League activities. The Arab League works with the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its member nations, its aim to mediate disputes among member nations or between member nations and third parties. The Arab League strives for the universal betterment of Arab nations and the relations between them. The Arab League was formed in Cairo, Egypt on March 22, 1945 with the signing of the “Charter of the League of Arab States” by the original member nations of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (now Jordan), Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Yemen joined a few months later on May 5, 1945. All seven of these nations gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Therefore, the origins of the Arab league are largely rooted in a strong theme of nationalism and pride within Arab nations. At its onset, the League hoped to win the independence of all Arabs still under colonial rule and to prevent the Jewish minority in the British-governed territory of Palestine from creating an independent Jewish state. In fact, from 1953 onwards, the Arab League strongly encouraged other Arab nations to join the League upon gaining their independence from colonial powers.i The primary organ of the Arab League is its Council, consisting of all member nations with each

country having one vote within the Council. Decisions made by the Council are only binding on all members if unanimous. Any majority decisions made by the Council are only applicable to those nations that voted in favor of that statute. As a consequence, the effectiveness of decisions made by the League is often times diminished, especially on highly-contested issues. The Council meets twice a year, in March and September, and may convene a special session at the request of two members. The Council is mainly concerned with pursuing the realization of the objectives of the League and following up the implementation of plans and programs that the member-states draw up with respect to joint Arab action.ii The day-to-day operations of the League are run by the Secretariat. It is the administrative body of the League and the executive body of the Council. The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, who is currently Nabil El-Arabi. They are elected by a two-thirds majority of the Council and are the senior most official in charge of steering the work of the Secretariat and affiliate bodies.

Thirteen Specialized Ministerial Councils exist within the Arab League. Their role is to hold regular meetings with the purpose of proposing common policies to the Council and Secretariat. Each member’s corresponding government minister sits on the appropriate ministerial council. The Specialized Ministerial Councils include: Information, Interior, Justice, Housing and Reconstruction, Transport, Social Affairs, Youth and Sports, Health, Environmental Affairs, Telecommunications, Energy and Electricity, Water, and Tourism.

There are also a large number of Specialized Arab Organizations such as the Council

History of the Committee!

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of Arab Economic Unity or the Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC), etc. All of these organizations help contribute to the workings of the League and facilitate further cooperation among member nations.iii

In 1950, the Arab League signed the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, creating two of the principal institutions of the Arab League: the Joint Defense Council and the Economic Council (renamed the Economic and Social Council in 1980). Both of these institutions report to the Council.

The treaty established that any act of aggression against a member nation was an attack on the League of the whole and allowed for any or all member nations to take immediate actions, including an armed response, to reestablish peace and security. Such actions and responses would be coordinated by the Joint Defense Council which is composed of the Ministers of Foreign and Affairs and Defense of all member states. The Economic and Social Council’s aim is to establish the objectives of, and to promote the means for the economic and social development of the Arab world.

It also coordinates the activities of several of the Specialized Organizations which have been set up in the framework of the League of Arab States as mentioned previously.

Among the most important of these are the

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Fund for Assistance to Arab and African Countries, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, the Industrial Development Centre for Arab States, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Council for Civil Aviation, the Arab Postal Union, the Arab Telecommunication Union, the Arab Labor Council, and the Council for Arab Unity.

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There have long been divisions among the

member nations, hampering the effectiveness of, and cooperation within, the League. During the Cold War some nations were Soviet-oriented while others supported the Western camp. There are hostilities between the member nations with different political systems, such as the traditional monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, and “revolutionary” nations such as Baathist Syria and Iraq or Libya under Muammar Gaddafi. A significant test to the Arab League’s ability to cooperate was during the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in the 2000’s. Member nations were split into three categories – supporters of the war, those against the war, and those who took no position throughout the conflict. These divisions, because of the voting rule within the Council that only binds decisions to those countries that voted in favor of them, severely reduce the political efficacy of the Arab League.

Over a hundred million people in the world call themselves Arabs; however, there has long been

debate as to what exactly is meant by that term.

The Britannica Encyclopedia defines ‘Arab’ as: “Any of the Arabic-speaking peoples living in the vast

region from Mauritania, on the Atlantic coast of

Africa, to southwestern Iran, including the entire Maghrib of North Africa, Egypt and Sudan, the

Arabian Peninsula, and Syria and Iraq.”

Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Arabs are not a distinct ethnic group. For example, by the

Britannica definition, there are both white Arabs

and black Arabs, ruling out ethnic homogeneity. However, the Britannica definition itself is

contradictory. It is difficult to use the Arabic

language as a sufficient measure of being an Arab

since there are many Arabic-speaking people of

both the Jewish and Christian faiths who would not normally define themselves as Arabs. ! The figure of a hundred million, initially

mentioned, is drawn from the populations of the countries in the Arab League. The Arab League

defines “Arabs” as: “An Arab is a person whose

language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, and who is in sympathy with the

aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples.”iv

Nonetheless, several of the nations within the Arab League would not fit all three of the criterion

within that definition. Simply put, there is truly no

universally recognized definition of an Arab.

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!The Middle East, origin to some of the

world’s earliest civilizations and the birthplace of three great religions, presents a profuse mixture of ways-of-life and traditions. Equally unique, the region’s political history, both classic and modern, has been characterized by the rise and fall of great powers, colonial domination, the birth or creation

TOPIC 1:

Democratization in the Arab World Topic History

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of new countries, and attempts toward political and economic development. !

The significance of these occurrences in the Middle East has been particularly prominent since the early decades of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the consequences of political upheavals can be traced as far back as the second half of the 1500s, when the Ottoman Empire began expanding its domain throughout the region. Even before that, the early development of Islam in the seventh century A.D. still has major implications in the modern day Middle East.!

From its inception, Islam has shaped politics and society in the regions where it is dominant; nowhere does this ring truer than the Middle East. Even as political authority in the Muslim lands underwent vast changes, such as when the Ottomans controlled much of the Middle East, Islam continued to be a powerful social bond and a potential source of communal solidarity. In much of the Middle East meaningful local political institutions never had the opportunity to emerge. !

The Ottoman Empire collapsed in the early twentieth century. In the vacuum that resulted, European colonialism was introduced in the Middle East as a byproduct of WWI and continued through the 1940s. European colonialism took place within a historical context radically different from that during Ottoman rule. However, the basic pattern of a relationship between the colonial states and their subject societies consisting of detachment, minimal contact, and top-down flow of power remained largely the same.!

The foundation of state-society relations in each Middle Eastern country was radically altered in the 1940s and 1950s through the emergence of sovereign states. These newly independent states were largely unprepared for the competitive international environment they suddenly found themselves within. They had to foster rapid economic and industrial development, along with political stability in order to satisfy the growing nationalist fervor of their citizens. These nationalist yearnings emerged from a wide variety of factors, both domestic and regional. It was a response to social and political developments within each nation, as well as the as the poignant issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. All of this would serve as a catalyst for the regional conflict and instability we are familiar with today in the Middle East.v!!The ‘Democratic Deficit’ of the Middle East

It has long been considered that there is a ‘democratic deficit’ within the Arab World and Middle East. Of the 22 Arab League Countries, the Freedom House considers only three of them (Comoros, Libya, and Tunisia) electoral democracies. Nonetheless, not a single Arab League country is ranked as entirely ‘Free’, and the overall ranking for the Middle East and North Africa region (this would exclude five nations within the !Arab League that are located in the Sub-Saharan Africa region) is only 2% free. In fact, of the nine lowest ranked nations in the world, four of them are Arab League member nations (Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria).vi !

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It has long been debated among academics and experts as to why the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ exists in the Arab World. Starting in the 1970s, and persisting through the 1990s, a global expansion of democracy took place. However this movement seemed to be isolated to Latin America, East Asia, and much of Europe. For some reason, the Arab world was excluded from this global transition, and few significant improvements in political openness, respect for human rights, or transparency have been observed in the region. This evokes the question – why? – why has the Arab world been left out of the trend of democratization witnessed in so many other places throughout the world? Many a times it has been proposed that Arab culture, or the religion Islam, are inherent obstacles to democracy. However, when held-up against scrutiny, this hypothesis seems to fall short. For example, certain majority-Muslim nations, such as Turkey, Indonesia, Albania, Bangladesh and Malaysia have functioning democratic systems. This seems to imply that just the mere presence of Islam or Islamic culture does not condemn democracy’s prospects. The same can be true of the broader Arab culture. If you look at the neighbors of the Arab World – such as Chad, Iran, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan – these countries are definitively not Arab, and still they struggle to implement any sort of democratic systems, and share in the Arab world’s democracy deficit. !

Other studies have stressed the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict as an impediment to democracy. Such studies, however, explicitly claim that any negative effects on democratic outcomes

should be limited to the Arab world. However, it is obvious that the region’s democratic deficit extends to a sizeable number of countries outside of the Arab League.!

In recent decades many have begun to explore the possibility that large amounts of oil wealth are inimical to the development of democratic institutions. It is true that if you look at oil-rich states in the region, you find that nations with vast energy reserves tend to lack democracy (Saudi Arabia for example). Still, wealthy oil nations are not distinct in their lack of democracy; there are numerous states in the region that have little-to-no oil wealth, yet that factor has done nothing to aid their prospects for democracy seeing as they are still entirely undemocratic (consider Syria).!

The democracy deficit today exists in lands that were conquered by Arab armies centuries ago. Lands that the Arabs controlled in the 12th century remain economically stunted today. There was something in the political development of the Arab imperial system that seemed to be detrimental to economic pluralism. Arab imperial control tended to mean centralized political authority, weak civil society, a dependent merchant class, and a large role for the state in the economy.! The government's share of GDP is 7% higher on average in countries that were conquered by Arab armies than in those that were not. Countries historically conquered by Arab armies generally have fewer trade unions and less access to credit – both of these are features of a vibrant civil society.!

It is also noted that the dictatorships of the Middle East form close alliances with religious

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leaders, effectively crowding out other leaders and groups. Coupled with a historically weak civil society, this has created a one-sided political system in which religious parties enjoy powerful advantages in ideology, organization and, perhaps most of all, lack of competition. The general lack of powerful groups that are less religious, more moderate and entirely secular does not lend itself to a pluralistic political system – necessary for a functioning democracy. In a democracy, all political groups should compete for influence on an even footing, something that is not happening in the Arab world.!

Another issue found in the political structure of such nations in that often times the military keeps power concentrated, undivided and unchecked. It maintains the central role in the economy. Even when it loosens control of the economy, it is often to benefit a handful of cronies and friends, which in turn perpetuates corruption within the country. The chief challenge in the Arab world remains creating a vibrant civil society, which means political parties and also a strong, self-sustaining private sector. Until there is some sort of paradigm shift within these institutions, the quest for democracy in the Arab world will continue to be encumbered.vii! The Arab Spring

In the spring of 2011, a series of political protests swept through the Middle East region, in a movement commonly referred to as the Arab

Spring. This movement touched many nations, and led to events that have broad implications for the region as a whole. Every nation has witnessed a variation in outcomes from these protests, and several of the conflicts are still raging to this day, with the potential for continuing or furthered escalation.!!Tunisia:! The catalyst for these events can be attributed

to one man – Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old fruit and vegetable vendor in Tunisia. Mohamed,

on December 17, 2010, self-immolated himself in protest after police seized his cart for not having the

proper permit. His act provoked hundreds of others

to riot in protest of economic decline and increasing

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unemployment within Tunisia.viii Protests in

Tunisia were rare, as dissent was usually

suppressed by the regime. Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in power since

1987, threatened punishment for those

participating in the protests, and yet they continued for about a month, escalating in number and

violence with every passing week. What started out

as a protest of high unemployment for college graduates grew into a comment on the increasing

corruption of President Ben Ali’s government and

eventually a call for new presidential elections.ix On January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali and his family

fled to Saudi Arabia. In his wake, Prime Minister

Mohamed Ghannouchi took over as interim president during the transitional period. The

protests in Tunisia had successfully galvanized

some sort of political change – the question, one that would pervade throughout the entire Arab

Spring, was as to what sort of political change it would turn out to be.!!Algeria:!

However, in such a volatile region, dissent would not be isolated to just one county. In January 2011, protests arose in Algeria over high food prices and unemployment. Such protests were responded to and put down somewhat violently by security forces. Algeria in February continued with violent clashes between police and about 2000 organized demonstrators.x In hopes of mitigating the uprisings, the Algerian government used its vast oil wealth to boost pay for certain vocations, decrease food prices, and generally crack down on the economy. In the past two years government

spending in Algeria has increased 50% in hopes of appeasing political dissent.xi !Egypt: !

On January 25, 2011 nation-wide protests broke-out in Egypt, calling for the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. The government responded with force, along with shutting down twitter, mobile phone, and internet networks. After only 18 days of mass and violent protests, it is announced that Hosni Mubarak was stepping down from power, and in turn the military would take over temporary control of the country.xii!!Libya:!

On February 16, 2011, mass protests also broke out in Libya, calling for the resignation of Muammar Gaddafi, the !country’s authoritarian leader who had been in power for 42 years. Protestors were continually attacked by security forces, resulting in numerous casualties and deaths; nonetheless, the protests continued in greater strength.xiii

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By March 2011, protests in Libya had manifested into a full-fledged armed civil war that has the government using deadly weapons against its own citizens. As the situation grew direr with every passing day, the international community decided to intervene. Condemning Gaddafi’s use of violence against his own people, the UN Security council voted to establish a no-fly zone over Libya. They also commenced operations for air strikes on Gaddafi’s strongholds. Deploying Western troops on the ground, however, was strictly ruled out of the question.xiv The uprising and ensuing civil war lasted six-months. In October 2011, the main opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), declared the country to be officially "liberated" and pledged to turn Libya into a pluralist, democratic state. In August 2012, the NTC handed over power to Libya's newly elected parliament, the General National Congress.xv!

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Jordan:!Protests in Jordan remained smaller and

mainly peaceful throughout 2011, with no calls for the King Abdullah II to be removed. Jordanian demonstrators called for the election of the prime minister by popular vote, to see corruption seriously tackled and unemployment alleviated. The king responded to calls for political and economic reform by establishing a national dialogue committee tasked with amending the constitution to give the public greater political say. The monarch also unveiled a new system to select future cabinets that would involve parliament in forming cabinets until prime ministers can be popularly elected. Still, there has been much delay throughout the process of reforms, and little meaningful change has been made. There was the creation of a civilian court system, however the security agency-based old court system remained in place to try civilians accused or terrorism or ‘insulting the King.’ Therefore, this specific Constitutional reform, along with other attempted reforms, has been largely symbolic without much legitimate effect on the nation’s political system.xvi!!Bahrain: !

Bahrain also experienced mass protests in 2011 centered in Pearl Square. What started out as a call for mild political reform and removal of the country’s prime minister was escalated to anti-monarchy cries and demands for removal of the ruling family. This was in response to increasing police violence against protestors as several people were killed and hundreds injured by tear gas and bullets used against demonstrators.xvii Nonetheless

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protests continued until the ruling family was besieged by rioters, and with the aid of Saudi Arabian and U.A .E. security forces, declared martial law against protestors. !

Numerous pro-democracy activists were arrested and sentenced to death. !Medical personnel that helped treat injured protestors were arrested and given 10+ year sentences for aiding demonstrators. Employees of Bahrain’s main oil company were also arrested for participating in protests. The ongoing rebellion’s base of protests, Pearl Square, was destroyed by government forces while protestors attended a funeral for a pro-democracy activist that was shot and killed by security forces. For a time, this quelled the uprisings in the nation.xviii!

Kuwait:!Kuwait's ruler, Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-

Sabah, ordered the dissolution of parliament in December 2011 amid a crisis over corruption allegations. This was in response to the country's cabinet resigning before parliament could question the former Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah over the charges of corruption. Dozens of protesters surged past police barricades on November 17, 2011 and briefly entered the parliament chamber amid attempts by opposition MPs to bring the prime minister in for questioning. Kuwait's ruler ordered the authorities to tighten security measures and make arrests if necessary after protesters stormed parliament.xix Following the December dissolution, elections were subsequently held in February 2012, in which Islamist-led opposition made significant gains.

Nonetheless, Kuwait’s constitutional court

ruled that dissolving the previous government was unconstitutional. In response to this ruling, the previous parliament was reinstated.

As a result, massive rallies arose in opposition to the constitutional court’s decision.xx As new elections approached for December 1, 2012, a controversial electoral law was proposed. Protests against the new law that numbered in the thousands continued for months and were often met with violent repression from government security forces. Eventually the government declared a ban on protests. Amidst the new electoral law and violent clashes between demonstrators and government forces, key opposition parties announced they would boycott the December elections. As a result, pro-government forces won the election, sparking renewed protests calling for the dissolution of parliament. These protests were again violently put down by government forces.xxi Morocco:

On February 20, 2011 an estimated 37,000 people protested across Morocco demanding better civil rights and an end to corruption. A direct response to these demonstrations, on March 9, King Mohammed VI pledged constitutional reforms that would reinforce the independence of the judiciary, boost efforts to tackle corruption, guarantee freedom of expression and gender rights, and make Berber an official language, alongside Arabic.

He also appointed a committee to work with political parties, trade unions and civil society groups to draw up proposals for the reforms by

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June 2011.xxii A referendum vote on proposed changes was held in July 2011. All the country's main political parties, unions, civic groups, religious leaders and media urged Moroccans to vote in favor of the new constitution. Official figures reported that 98% of voters backed the reforms, but there were contestations as to how accurate of a figure that could be after numerous reported incidents of voter fraud. Still, if the results were confirmed, the king would remain the head of state, the military, and the Islamic faith in Morocco, but the prime minister - to be chosen from the largest party elected to parliament - would take over as head of the government. The reform plan was actually welcomed abroad by the European Union who claimed it "signals a clear commitment to democracy". Nonetheless, there is skepticism as to whether or not the reforms would be merely superficial. Protests for greater political reform have continued despite the proposed constitution changes.xxiii Saudi Arabia: In March 2011, a restive Shia population in the eastern quarter of Saudi Arabia staged a series of protests. Their grievances ranged from lack of equal economic and employment opportunities to detentions without trial. In response, Saudi Arabia banned all protests and marches, and deployed approximately 10,000 security personnel to the region to help quell protests.xxiv To further appease citizens’ discontent King Abdullah promised a multibillion dollar package of

reforms, pay raises, cash, loans and low-income apartments on March 18. He also called for the creation of 60,000 jobs in the security forces; this would both employ huge numbers of otherwise jobless young men, along with bolstering the government’s ability to halt protests. Up to the point of the King’s announcement, protests in Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia had been tiny and swiftly quelled. Nonetheless, there were still underlying fear within the monarchy that the protests could escalate as others did across the Arab world. Saudi demonstrators have mostly come from the Shia-dominated eastern quarter of the kingdom. It is important to keep in mind that the changes announced by King Abdullah did not loosen the monarchy's tight hold on power, a key demand of Saudi opposition figures.xxv

On September 25, 2011, in an attempt to further reform the fundamentalism state, King Abdullah announced that women in Saudi Arabia will be given the right to vote and to stand for election by 2015. This move appeared to mark a cultural shift towards a new era in the rigidly conservative Islamic kingdom. Women will be able to run as candidates in municipal election and will even have a right to vote in council elections.xxvi

In October 2011, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, heir to the Saudi throne died. His successor, Prince Nayef, was the Saudi interior minister, in charge of the security forces, and was close to Islamic ultra-conservatives. He was directly involved in the decision in March 2011 to send soldiers into neighboring Bahrain to help crush

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pro-reform demonstrations. This brought into question whether the new Crown Prince, distinguishably more conservative than his predecessor, would allow the reforms on women’s voting rights to move forward.xxvii However, Prince Nyef passed away as well in June 2012 and was succeeded by Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, who was known to favor close political and economic ties with the West and was expected to help further promote King Abdullah’s reform agenda.xxviii Syria:

In March 2011, political protests erupted in Syria’s southern city of Deraa. Syrian security officials responded violently, killing several civilians as they tried to halt the protests. The violence only increased, spreading throughout the country and becoming a full-fledged civil war between the regime and an armed resistance known as the Syrian Free Army. By the summer of 2012, the clashes had reached Damascus, Syria's capital, and Aleppo, its largest city. It is estimated that over 100,000 people have been killed during the past 28 months of conflict, with approximately 36,000 of those civilian deaths. President Obama first called for Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to step down from office in August 2011, proclaiming the need for a transition to a democratic government within Syria. Nonetheless, regime violence against its citizens continued to escalate. One year later, in August 2012, President Obama declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government against civilians would be the “red-line” to United States involvement.xxix

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Yemen:

On January 27, 2011, tens of thousands appeared in the streets of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, calling for President Saleh to leave office. These protests spread to other major cities and continued throughout the year despite violent reaction by pro-government forces. For example, on March 18, 52 protesters were killed.

This prompted a string of generals, tribal leaders, diplomats, and ministers to resign from office or declare their public allegiance to protesters. In late April, President Saleh agreed to resign under a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, but then eschewed signing it. In parts of the country uprisings degenerated into tribal warfare. On June 3, Saleh was wounded by an explosion in his presidential compound, and was flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Over three months later he returned to Yemen unexpectedly. He continued to refuse to resign until February 2012, after a presidential election was held in which his vice-president, Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi, won 99.8% of the votes. Throughout this time violence continued to spread in the country and Al-Qaeda visibly expanded its grip in certain areas.

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Current Situation

Since the onset of the Arab Spring in December 2010, there have been widespread political changes across the Middle East, with several of the conflicts provoked by the movement still raging. As this movement approaches three full years of existence, it brings into question the various uprisings’ success. Has there been a meaningful and lasting shift toward political reform, or is this simply the first step on a long, difficult, and violent road toward democratization in the Middle East? New Electoral Democracies – Libya and Tunisia: Libya:

In July 2012 Libya legitimately elected a General National Assembly in its first free election nearly 50 years; this was championed as the first positive step in a smooth transition to democracy. Yet, in some parts of the country, especially the eastern province of Benghazi, armed militias have taken over. Some in

Benghazi are even calling for the province to secede from the country. Another one of the challenges facing Libya in its transition to democracy is its general lack of government institutions in place before the revolutions. In Libya, activists are struggling to create those institutions.

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In August 2012, Libya’s new National

Assembly elected former opposition leader Mohammed el-Megarif as interim president. He led efforts to establish a committee to draft a constitution, but mass protests swept the country,

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declaring the committee should be elected, not appointed. Libya's national assembly passed a law on July 16, 2013 providing for the election of a committee to draft a new constitution. The 60 members of the constitutional committee will be elected by popular vote, and will have 120 days to draft the charter. They will be divided equally between Libya's three regions: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east and Fezzan in the south. Additionally, six seats will be reserved for women and another six will be given to members of the Amazigh (Berber), Tibu, and Tuareg communities. Candidates will stand as individuals, not representing political parties. The draft will be put to a referendum; however, the election date has yet to be announced but it is expected to take six months to organize.xxx

Another controversial political move is the decision to not allow anyone who had any connection with the Qaddafi regime to participate in the new government. Called the “political exclusion law” it bars thousands of former members of the regime’s bureaucracy from holding public office. This has made it increasingly difficult to find experienced governmental officials. Those currently serving in the General National Assembly have minimal experience in running a country.

The killing of the U.S. ambassador Christopher Stephens in Benghazi has also affected Libya economically. Most Western countries still have travel advisories in place and many investors have fled for fear of their safety and security.xxxi Tunisia:

In Tunisia, under the leadership of transitional governing institutions, political actors

agreed on a broad framework for a democratic transition, including elections for a National Constituent Assembly (NCA), tasked with drafting the country’s new constitution.

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On Oct. 23, 2011, Tunisians seized their first opportunity to make free choices at the ballot box, electing 217 members of the NCA. For the first time in Tunisia’s history, an independent election commission organized the poll and adopted measures to support citizen aspirations for free and fair elections.

The moderate religious party Ennahda won a plurality of the votes in the country's first post-Arab Spring election, and formed a government in alliance with two smaller secular parties. The election wasn’t flawless, with an array of administrative problems being identified, including mistakes in the voter and candidate registration process and campaign restrictions that limited the information available to voters.

In post-revolution Tunisia, more than 160 political parties are benefitting from newfound

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freedoms and competing to represent citizens in elected government. In a short timeframe, these parties are establishing internal structures, defining platforms, recruiting members, competing in elections, forming coalitions, and learning how to negotiate the contours of a new constitution within the NCA.xxxii

While the one-year deadline to complete the constitution has passed, the NCA continues work on a draft constitution, but in the face of great adversity.Two members of the NCA have been assassinated in drive-by shootings believed to have been committed by a Salafi jihad cell, the most recent shooting occurring in July 2013. The NCA members’ death sparked antigovernment protests and threatened further instability, disrupting the nation's attempts to cement its transition to democracy. A similar shooting back in February resulted in the near-collapse of Tunisia’s new government and a restructuring of the Cabinet. Efforts to draft the new constitution continued to be delayed in a charged partisan atmosphere that makes reaching a consensus on many issues difficult. Nonetheless, the NCA has continued its work on the new constitution and the completed document is expected to have a mix of protections for both religious and secular Tunisians.xxxiii Egypt: Egypt initially appeared to hold the most promise of the Arab Spring nations as far as democratic transition was concerned. Despite a

long delay in the military handing over power after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt finally held democratic elections in November 2011.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party won a plurality of the vote, capturing 37% of the nearly 10 million valid ballots cast in the first of three electoral rounds for the Egyptian parliament. Coming in a close second at 24% was the Nour Party, a group of ultraconservative Salafis seeking to impose Islamic law.xxxiv Muslim Brotherhood party member Mohamed Morsi was elected President of Egypt in June 2012. However, during his first term in office, opposition parties criticized him for becoming increasingly authoritarian and conservative in his policies as well as failing to revitalize the Egyptian economy. As the one-year anniversary of Hosni Mubarak’s ousting approached, there was growing discontent among the Egyptian people, which ignited renewed opposition protests. Hundreds of thousands of people massed in Cairo's Tahrir Square and elsewhere in June 2013 to demand that Morsi step down and call fresh presidential elections, or face a campaign of civil disobedience. Military generals set a deadline for Morsi to enact political reforms with the threat of intervention. As the deadline neared, he offered to form an interim coalition government to oversee parliamentary elections and revise the constitution that was enacted in January. Many Christian and other minority opposition groups had decried the constitution claiming they had been left out of the

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drafting process. Egypt’s military finally intervened on July 3rd, claiming Morsi had failed to meet demands to share his power with opposition forces. After being deposed by the military, Morsi was placed under house arrest.xxxv Under the timetable for a new constitution issued July 8th by interim president Adly Mansour, two appointed panels would be created. One, made up of judges, would come up with amendments. The other, larger body consisting of representatives of society and political movements would debate the amendments and approve them. The new constitution would be put to a referendum within 4 1/2 months from now. Elections for a new parliament would be held within two months of that. Once the new parliament convenes, it would have a week to set a date for presidential elections.xxxvi The military-led interim government acted as quickly as possible to establish a plan for transition back to a civilian-led government after controversies over whether or not their actions constituted a coup, thus excluding Egypt from receiving billions of dollars in U.S. aid under U.S. law provisions.

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to protest both the new road-map and the ousting of President Morsi through mass protests and sit-ins. These have increasingly been met with violence by interim government security forces, provoking cries of outrage from the international community as the office death toll reach 278 on August 14, after security forces stormed protest sites in Cairo and clashed with supporters of deposed president Mohamed Morsi elsewhere in the country. A curfew was imposed in 14 provinces across the country on the 14th as well, along with a month-

long state of emergency. The Muslim Brotherhood is claiming that the actual number of dead was much higher than the number reported by the Health Ministry.xxxvii Syria:

In June 2013, U.S. intelligence agencies confirmed that around 100 to 150 people have died in Syria due to chemical weapon attacks by government forces. As a result of this, the Obama administration officially announced on June 13 it would begin to send small arms and ammunition to the Syrian rebels. This marked a noted shift in United States policy toward Syria. Before, President Obama had been opposed to sending U.S. weapons to the Syrian rebels. Instead he encouraged other nations such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar to send weapons, while the United States stuck strictly to humanitarian aid, includin g food and medical supplies.

Two months after this announcement and the U.S. has yet to send U.S. weapons and ammunition to America's allies among the Syrian rebels. Both the delivery date and what the shipments will include remains unclear. However, the weapons are expected to be small arms and not the more powerful anti-tank and antiaircraft missiles rebels want. The administration remains conflicted about the move, fearing that the arms could fall into the hands of Islamist militants who make up a growing part of the rebel forces. U.S. officials have been moving carefully to vet potential recipients of the arms. Because the rebels are already receiving arms from Persian Gulf countries, the U.S. shipments are not expected to shift the balance in the war. The move was intended to

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strengthen U.S. ties to the rebels and send a message to the Syrian government, as well as its Iranian and Russian allies, that the United States could increase its involvement.xxxviii Israel, however, has carried out several airstrikes on key Syrian military locations.xxxix

President Bahsar Al-Assad’s government has been consistently backed by weapons from Russia and Iran. Additionally, the Islamist militant group from Lebanon, Hezbollah, has joined the conflict on the side of the Syrian government, further tipping the conflict in favor of the Assad regime.

In recent months there have been many military defeats and setbacks for the rebel forces as the Syrian Army continues large-scale bombardments of the Syrian Free Army strongholds.

The stability of the entire Middle East region has become threatened by the Syrian civil war as millions of Syrian refugees flee the violence in their country. These refugees place undue strains on neighboring nations of Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and most recently the northern Kurdish province within Iraq, as they struggle to find food and space for the thousands of Syrians flocking across their borders. Additionally, the conflict has begun to spread into Syria’s neighboring nations with frequent clashes between Syrian rebel forces and the Lebanese Army occurring along their shared border throughout the 2013 summer months. xl

Syrian rebels captured the Minnig Military Airport near the border with Turkey on August 6, consolidating their hold on a key supply route north of the city of Aleppo. After an eight-month siege, this development marks an important symbolic victory for the opposition, following a string of defeats in confrontations with President Bashar al-Assad's forces in central Syria.xli

As the conflict in Syria continues to rage, there seems to be no resolution in sight.

http://syriahr.com/en/images/news/15417915Syrian-refugee-children-f-023.jpg

Neither the rebels nor the Syrian army

show any signs of relenting as they fight back-and-forth with no side winning a clear advantage. The prospects for peace talks are slim, but not hopeless. Syria, on August 19, called on the United States to end delays in organizing an international conference that would end the war. The peace conference, known as Geneva II, was originally

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supposed to convene in June, then July, and is now likely to take place sometime after October. It will be co-hosted by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The two are scheduled to meet at the end of August to prepare for the proposed talks. Although the Syrian government has announced its willingness to participate in the conference without preconditions, Syria’s divided rebel groups continue to insist on the precondition of President Bashar al-Assad’s removal.xlii There are still several issues, such as whether Iran should be included in the conference and the lack of unity within the Syrian rebel factions, that must be resolved before talks can proceed. Softening of Authoritarian and Conservative Regimes?

While not all nations affected by the Arab Spring experience regime change or full-fledged civil war, their nations’ political status quos did not remain unchanged. Several of the most extreme and authoritarian regimes within the Arab world implemented political reforms in hopes of mitigating uprisings before they escalated to complete government overthrow. While such steps may seem inconsequential in comparison to the events in Tunisia and Libya, they could also be a sign of a shift toward democratic progress within the Arab world. What is the prospective for democracy in nations with long-standing monarchies or repressive regimes? What implications do the political reforms in the Middle East over the past three years have for the region as a whole?

Saudi Arabia – Monarchy: With the exception of protests in the country’s Shi’a-majority Eastern Province, nothing of significance materialized within Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring. There are many reasons for the absence of broad mobilization within the country, the most significant being the lack of major economic grievances, the generally conservative nature of Saudi society, and the kingdom’s low level of tolerance for open dissent. However, taking into consideration the latter, Saudi Arabia’s modest mobilization movement was remarkable relative to the prevailing conditions within the country.

Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring revolved around three main axes: regional Shi’a mobilization, rights-based urban protest, and cyber-dissent. Small protests among the country’s eastern Shi’a population began as early as February 2011 and continued throughout the year. The cycle of protest and repression continued through 2012, climaxing in July. Since then, low-level protests have continued in several Shi’a-majority towns in the country’s east.

On June 17, 2011, protests against the ban on a woman’s right to drive arose as part of a civil disobedience campaign. Although women being allowed to drive may seem of trivial consequence to regime survival, the fact that female driving is outlawed in Saudi Arabia is symptomatic of broader tensions that have been heightened by the Arab Spring – the uneasy coexistence of modernity and elite extravagance on the one hand, and an austere and intolerant primitivism perpetuated by

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the religious establishment on the other. This delicate balance has thus far held up. The Arab

Spring, with its message of popular empowerment and broader citizen participation, however, poses new challenges to this arrangement.

The Saudi regime has used three main strategies in its response to mass mobilization and protests: a policy of minimal tolerance, assistance programs to prevent economic grievances from materializing, and occasional piecemeal reform efforts that are conducted with great caution, given the brittle nature of the ruling coalition. While this has helped avert mass mobilization, the regime’s main challenges lie elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia’s political system is exceptionally inflexible; even marginal political reforms are conducted with care, given the considerations of conservative elements within the ruling coalition and a general lack of political pressures from the citizenry. The Shi’a are the kingdom’s strongest mobilized disgruntled group, but are not numerous or unified enough to present a strong challenge to the state.

The key political challenge to Saudi Arabia’s ruling regime emanates from the question of power and succession. King Abdullah is sickly, and two crown princes died in 2012. The current crown prince, Salman, is nearing 80 and ailing as well. Problematically, however, Salman is considered the final candidate to the crown from among the sons of the kingdom’s founder, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. The looming succession process could pose challenges to the precarious political

balance currently in Saudi Arabia. It could potentially provide a window for increased political activism in light of loosened political repression after the Arab Spring, especially in the realm of social media.

Unlike the majority of the other nations rocked by the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia was not experiencing the economic hardships that were often the stimulus for protests. As the world’s largest oil-producing country, it is unlikely to face significant economic threats in the near future. While there is growing inequality and continued corruption within the royal family, economic grievances are unlikely to translate into mass discontent in the near term. King Abdullah utilized spending programs – starting with a $37 billion one in February 2011 – to effectively preempt or diffuse popular discontent. There is no reason to think this will cease to be the kingdom’s preferred

means of dealing with economic discontent.xliii http://s2.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20110617&t=2&i=441202576&w=&fh=&fw=&ll=460&pl=300&r=2011-0617T214226Z_01_BTRE75G1OB500_RTROPTP_0_SAUDI-DRIVING

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Oman – Monarchy:

The Arab Spring in Oman has been largely ignored, overshadowed by events in Egypt, NATO intervention in Libya and Syria's slide into civil war. Oman is frequently in danger of being overlooked or portrayed as somehow having escaped the Arab Spring. The protests in Oman did not appear to represent a threat to the regime and were largely brought under control after just four days before briefly reigniting a month later in early April 2011. Yet these protests had a profound impact on Oman and spurred Sultan Qaboos to action in restarting a neglected political-reform process. Protests in Oman began on January 17, 2011, when some 200 people focused their attention on the rising prices of basic goods and on corruption, ending up outside the housing ministry to demand higher wages and lower prices. The authorities took a relaxed attitude, though, which may have been the spur to larger protests.xliv

Despite being classified as an absolute monarch, Sultan Qaboos Bin Said al-Said has brought remarkable prosperity to his Oman while modernizing the country's infrastructure.

In response to protests that arose in early 2011, Qaboos fired 12 cabinet ministers and raised government salaries while agreeing to boost unemployment benefits by the equivalent of $380 (U.S.) a month. He also increased minimum wages by 40 percent. After these economic and political reforms, the unrest subsided almost as quickly as it had erupted. $10 billion (U.S.) has also been allocated to create 10,000 Omani government jobs, mostly to staff its military and police forces. Moreover, 125 women are currently undergoing training to join the country's foreign ministry

as part of an effort to enhance gender equality across its diplomatic corps. This development is not overwhelmingly surprising considering the Sultan granted women right to vote and stand for elections in 1994. Today, Oman has three female cabinet ministers while the Sultan's ambassadors to Washington and to the United Nations are two sisters.

Oman was the second Arab League country to hold parliamentary elections, after Tunisia, on October 15, 2011. 1,133 candidates competed for 84 seats in the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council established in 1991. There has been speculation as to whether Oman would evolve into a constitutional monarchy. Since assuming the throne, Qaboos remains unmarried and has not appointed any successor. There are hopes for a transition towards liberal and inclusive governance after the Sultan's death. In the meantime, Qabbos has been building institutions and strengthening the rule of law. At the same time, the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Egypt has raised questions among Omanis on whether they indeed want radical change, and the risk for chaos and violence that often comes with it.xlv

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/.a/6a00d8341c630a53ef0148c7a2e70d970c-pi

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Bahrain – Constitutional Monarchy: Despite a lack of media coverage, state

sponsored repression of political protests has continued in Bahrain for the past two years. Skirmishes in villages between groups of youths and the riot police occur almost daily. Bahraini protesters clashed with riot police in neighborhoods around the capital on August 13, 2013 amid opposition calls for a general strike inspired by the mass movement behind the military coup in Egypt.

A tight security clampdown managed to stop large-scale demonstrations in the city. Bahrain has seen over two years of unrest linked to the Shiite majority's demands for a greater say in the affairs of the Sunni-ruled kingdom, but in recent months security forces have mostly kept protests away from the center of the capital. Demonstrators marching toward the capital met barricades manned by security forces that fired tear-gas and stun grenades to disperse demonstrators. Bahrain's opposition-less parliament recently passed reactionary laws banning peaceful gatherings in Bahrain's capital city of Manama and at checkpoints.xlvi Jordan – Constitutional Monarchy: On March 24, 2011 Jordanian protesters attempted to emulate Egypt’s Tahrir Square protest by camping out in front of the Interior Ministry, but were dispersed by pro-government thugs. The

repression of the March 24 protest proved fatal to Jordan’s large-scale Arab Spring 2011 protests, but was followed by political and economic reforms, including a new cabinet and the injection of capital directly into the economy. Cosmetic political concessions become a commonplace mitigation technique for Jordan’s government, but the economic woes have proven harder to address, requiring outside revenues given the country’s growing internal debt.

Today, widespread perceptions of government corruption, rising commodity prices, and lack of a fair trial system, are some of the major causes that have led to small, daily demonstrations by not just youth, but people of all ages: nurses, teachers, and even accountants. But despite growing discontent, the dire situation on the northern border with Syria, and more chaos to the West in Egypt, has cultivated widespread fears of civil war-like-unrest, preventing full-scale rebellion from pouring onto the street.xlvii

The recognized opposition calls for reforms rather than popular overthrow. Their political demands are centered on transitioning to a constitutional monarchy. The key step in that direction could be allowing the direct election of a prime minister with powers to appoint his own cabinet, or as an alternative, amending the electoral law and allowing parliament to nominate a prime minister with powers to appoint his own cabinet. There are numerous intermediate steps that could

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be created between the present political structure and substantive, irreversible reforms. This appears to be what the Jordanian regime is doing – since protests began in January 2011, Jordan has been through five prime ministers, all appointed and dismissed by the king. In addition, cosmetic constitutional amendments were enacted and the number of seats in parliament was increased.

The parliamentary elections in January 2013 were boycotted by the opposition, and yet participation was still relatively high and the legitimacy of the elections was not contested. Politically, the Jordanian regime has a room to enact substantive reforms without fear of sweeping political unrest.

Nevertheless, in the economic realm, near term threats to the kingdom remain very real. The economic woes of Jordanians will only intensify with the flood of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees into Jordan that shows no sign of abating. This has exacted a heavy toll on the Jordanian economy. Renewed upheaval in Egypt has drastically cutback Jordan's ability to import natural gas, causing the government, as they faced a ballooning multi-billion dollar deficit and dwindling natural gas imports, to approve another rate hike in electricity prices. Last year's gas rate hikes brought thousands of Jordanians together in some of the largest protests yet.

Calculated austerity measures, along with continued external rents, can keep the Jordanian economy afloat for, and thus far the ruling coalition has been able to absorb protests that arose to cuts in social welfare support. The economic malaise coupled with the increasing prosecution of protestors, and recent blocking of hundreds of

opposition websites, has likely only exacerbated tensions within the country. Still, as Jordan continues to struggle with security issues and the upheavals disturbing its neighbors, economic and political reforms will remain on the back burner.xlviii Kuwait – Constitutional Emirate:

The National Assembly election on December 1, 2012 took place under the newly created and controversial one-vote system (as opposed to the previous four-vote system) and was boycotted by a majority of opposition groups. They declared that only parliament, not the emir, had the right to amend the electoral system. Many Kuwaitis believed the emir was overstepping the boundary of his authority by intervening directly in political life. The December 2012 election took place against the backdrop of extreme political tension, mass protest, and an opposition boycott comprising a loose collection of liberal, Islamist, and tribal blocs. Due to the boycott, pro-government forces regained power within the assembly.

Kuwait's has increasingly become more polarized as demonstrated by the two elections in February and December 2012. Nonetheless, the migration of the political opposition away from the parliamentary chamber did not prove as destabilizing as many observers predicted. The loose umbrella of opposition groups failed to agree on a common political platform, leading to fragmentation. In addition, the protracted political stalemate has reinforced feelings of political apathy and cynicism with the electoral process as Kuwait headed toward yet another election on July 27, 2013.

These elections took place after the Constitutional Court ruled on June 16 that the

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parliament elected in December 2012 was unconstitutional, citing technical irregularities in the emir's decree that set up the National Election Commission in October 2012.xlix Liberals, Shiites, Sunni Islamists, merchants and almost all Bedouin tribes have representatives in the new parliament. The Liberals, who had no seat in the previous parliament, won at least three this time. Sunni Islamists increased their presence from five to seven seats and tribal groups have maintained their strength of 24 seats out of the parliament’s 50 seats in total. The liberals’ gains in the polls in July were a major blow to Kuwait’s Shiite minority, who lost more than half of their seats in parliament from the 17 they had help in the previous parliament. Kuwait also formed a new cabinet on August 4, 2013.l Morocco – Constitutional Monarchy:

During parliament elections in November 2011, the Islamists came to power, obtaining 107 seats and forming a new government in coalition with other parties; yet, for some reason, unlike developments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the rise of the Islamists in Morocco did not bring overwhelming turmoil. The country seems to have conducted a transition into what is promised to be a more representative government that follows democratic principles. Morocco’s smooth transition can be best explained by the monarchy’s willingness to recognize, and allow to function, moderate Islamists as a legitimate political party. Morocco’s Islamists have also shown maturity by accepting a measured, step-by-step reform process, instead of calling for a total change of the regime, as

was the case in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Despite Morocco’s smooth transition, there

still remains significant debate about the extent of the reforms in the country. Some believe the king has retained too much power, especially in the military and religious sectors. Still others consider the reforms to have been sufficient, especially in comparison to the king’s previous levels of power. Regardless of whether the reforms went far enough to transform Morocco into a “true democracy,” the PJD remains content with the political changes, and it favors a gradual, step-by-step reform process.

Nevertheless, Morocco still suffers from a rapidly growing population, limited natural resources, high unemployment (especially among young university graduates), as well as geopolitical challenges. All of these pose as challenges to the newly elected parliament and ruling PJD party.li Still, internationally there is growing hope that Morocco will transition into becoming a European-style constitutional monarchy with King Mohammed VI retaining a minimal role within the government.

http://media.worldbulletin.net/250x190/2011/11/26/morocco_1.jpg

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Questions to Consider

• How can the Arab League work together to help promote and support burgeoning democratic

governments, such as in Tunisia or Libya?

• What potential tensions will arise between the countries within the League that are transitioning toward

democracy, and those trying to preserve a monarchy structure?

• Will the Arab League take any action against leaders that used violent measures against citizens to quell

protests?

• What are the largest obstacles to democracy in the Arab world? Are they inherent in the culture and

historical institutions of the region?

• What will the Arab League’s role be in negotiation a peace settlement within Syria?

• Given that the underlying cause of many Arab Spring protests was economic hardships within many Arab

nations, what measures can the Arab League take to help promote economic development in hopes of

restoring peace to volatile nations?

• In the power vacuum that many of the past several years’ regime overthrows created, radical groups and

terrorist organization have increased their influence in the region. What can the Arab League due to help

ensure its member nations’ security against terrorist threats and violence?

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Suggested for Further Research

• Pact of the League of Arab States: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp

• Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League:

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp!• Arab League Official Website:

http://www.lasportal.org/wps/portal/las_en/home_page/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0

os3gXy8CgMJMgYwOLYFdLA08jF09_X28jIwN_E6B8JG55C3MCuoNT8_TDQXbiNwMkb4ADOBro-

3nk56bqF-RGVHjqOioCAKQoUKM!/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/

• Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline

• Arab World Uprisings: A County-by-County Look:

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/middleeast/middle-east-hub.html?_r=0

• Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1192.pdf!

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TOPIC II

Sustainable Economic Development in the Middle East Topic History

Over the last forty to fifty years, the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) has experienced immense development. The creation of the modern Middle East was catalyzed by the independence of Middle Eastern nations from European nations, the importance of oil exports, and the formation of Israel. In the last few decades, there have been substantial decrease in poverty rates, rapid economic growth, and vast human development; however, the lack of sustainable economic development, high unemployment, and high poverty rates continue to be critical issues in the Middle East. Mid-1960s to mid-1980s Snapshot:

Rapid economic growth occurred from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980’s. Average GDP per capita increased from $1.6 a day in 1965 to $11.7 a day in 1985. By 1987, the poverty incidence rate was around 25 percent, the lowest amongst the developing nations at the time. This economic growth was a result of high western investment, increased humanitarian and money aid to the Middle East, and robust demand for oil production

During this period, the economic boom went hand-in-hand with the human development. Human development indicators such as literacy rates, mortality rates, and life expectancies showed drastic improvement.

Adult literacy doubled from 24 percent in 1965 to 47 percent in 1985. The average schooling above the age of 15, during the same time frame, rose from 0.8 years to 3.4 years. Mortality rates for children less than 5 years old fell from 233 per thousand to 108 per thousand as life expectancy in

the region increased from 50 to 60 years. In comparison, the MENA region easily kept up with the other developing regions such as Latina America and East Asia.lii

Figure 1http://arabiangazette.com/saudis-lead-opec-fears- climate-change-talks-hurt-oil-revenues/

Between 1975-1985 the Arab region experienced a tremendous economic boom owing to high oil prices. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The cartel proved very profitable in the 1970s as the oligopoly used their significant market share to artificially raised prices. OPEC countries declared an oil embargo in 1973 when the US and Western Europe showed support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The wealth generated by high oil prices in the region gave Arab countries the confidence to embark on ambitious socio-economic development plans. . liii

The increase of the standard of living in the Arab region was also caused by the implementation of the “archetypal social policy model” of the region after constant assertion from western nations. This

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period between 1965-1985 was mainly characterized by state domination of the economic system with heavy dependence on public spending as the main engine for economic growth.

Governing institutions in the Arab region promised its citizen’s primary healthcare services, free education, consumption subsidies, and increased permanent jobs through public employment that included old-age pension benefits. liv

Figure 2 Operations at a port in Bahrain http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf

Mid-1980s to present Snapshot: The period of the mid-1980s to the present

presented a different growth outlook for the MENA region. Economic growth staggered, poverty rates remained stagnant, while human development indicators continued to show substantial improvement.

Economic growth collapsed as the price of oil—a key economic resource of Arab countries—decreased and increased debt coupled with decreased productivity growth. In response to the 1973 oil crises, western nations took steps towards reducing dependence on oil by switching to alternative energy resources in the 1980s. Countries in the Arab region subsequently experienced significant hardships as oil prices plummeted and their market share of oil decreased. lv

Economic decline continued as the unwinding of heavily debt-finance public projects proved unsustainable. The 1990s began to show a negative relationship between public employment and poverty rates, as government employment of “welfare employment” lvi many times became the sole source of income for many families. Arab governments started to emerge from the 1980s unspoken agreement in which citizens forfeited their political freedoms for public sector jobs, public services, and state handouts. Most of the public subsidiaries did not reach the bottom quartile of the population and proved to be inefficient means of social protection.

Governments introduced various economic reforms beginning in the early-1990s to achieve

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objectives such as reducing inflation and debt. As a result, the Arab region had growth rates averaging about 5 percent at the turn of the century; these economic growth rates, while positive seeming, were still the lowest of any other region except Latin America.

Privatization was a key element of economic reforms in the 1990s. Arab governments cut expenditures on the assumption that public investment crowed out private investment; therefore, total investment remained low. Arab governments measured their economic success by “openness” instead of by how quickly the Arab region was growing in respect to the rest of the developing world. Consequently, the stimulated private sector did not produce sufficient gains to trickle down to the middle class and poor. According to the IMF, “successful privatization requires sound trade, financial, and foreign investment policies as well as transparency and sufficiently developed capital markets and accompanying intuitional reforms”; unfortunately, most Arab nations lacked in many if not most areas.

lvii

Figure 3 : Students at a seminar in Ain Shams University in Cairo,Egypthttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf

Human development substantially

improved but failed to increase productivity in the region. By 2000, the region’s population reached literacy rated of 67 percent. The average years of schooling after the age of 15 rose to 5.2 years, and mortality rates plunged to 46 deaths per thousand as the life expectancy climbed to 68 years. Despite significant human development, the Gini measure of inequality fluctuated between 0.32 to 0.44 for the region between the 1970s and 1990s. Although the Gini coefficient lowered for Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran, the region as a whole failed to decrease inequality, which suggests that structural economic reforms in the region were largely ineffective. Slow growth was evident as GDP per capita output per day by 2000 was $11.3 ($PPP), which didn’t recover to its 1985 level of $11.7 ($PPP). lviii

Low growth rates and high persistent poverty rates suggest that the structural reforms did not increase productivity as they simultaneously increased human capital. The unemployment rate was just above 13 percent and was even higher for the educated youth. Social safety nets weren’t as effective, as both energy and food subsidies resulted in resource leakage that mostly didn’t reach the poor. In Egypt, for example, 93 percent of energy subsidies only reached the top quintile. Consequently, most 11.5 million people were added to the bottom quintiles between 1987 and 2001. The picture depicted by these statistics is clear: after the Arab region significantly reduced poverty by the mid-1980s, the region failed to make further progress. lix

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Current Situation

Figure4 :http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/mcd/eng/pdf/mena0513.pdf!

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in December 2010, many countries in the Middle East are still facing economic, political, and social transitions. In 2012, oil-exporting countries substantially outgrew oil-importing countries in the region. Countries in the region continue to face the daunting task of maintaining or establishing economic stability amid political uncertainty and social turmoil while generating growth through diversification of its economies and job creation.lx

Current economic outlook of oil-exporting countries:

The Arab region currently has a projected economic outlook of moderate growth at 3.1 percent this year and recovering growth of 3.7 percent next year. Last year, the growth rate was 4.7percent. Since then, dwindling oil demand has decreased oil production in oil-exporting countries such as Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Algeria and has lead to decreased economic growth.lxi

Figure5:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf

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Oil exporting countries experienced a

robust growth in 2012 and followed by a steep decline in 2013. The growth rate of exporting countries was 5.7 percent growth in 2012 following the complete restoration of Libya’s oil production. The rapid decline of growth in the region to 3.2 percent in 2013 demonstrates the heavy reliance on oil and subsequent vulnerability the region still has. However, the oil- exporting countries’ non-oil economic growth rate is around 4.5 percent and signals improvement in the non-oil sectors and improving resilience to oil-price fluctuations. Resilience could also be improved if oil-exporting countries decrease government spending and deficits that further put countries at risk. Effective spending policies that promote growth in non-energy sectors would create jobs for the educated. lxii Current growth outlook of oil-importing countries

Oil-importing countries in the Arab region are currently at a steadily recovering low growth rate of projected 3 percent for 2013 from 2.7 percent in 2012. According to the International Monetary Fund Economic Outlook, the economic gap between exporting countries and importing countries is “expected to narrow”. Importers include Tunisia, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Mauritania.

Investor confidence in these countries also remains weak as political and social uncertainty increase investment risk. Syria’s spillover effects into neighboring countries also negatively affect neighboring countries by increasing costs of helping refugees, heightened security, and

disruption of trade. Corruption also remains an issue as business regulation and governance remain low in the region, which further curtail investment sentiment.

Sluggish global growth, particularly the recession in Europe, has also adversely affected the Arab region’s oil-importers. The external economic environment impacted all tourism, exports, and foreign direct investments. Higher food and energy prices have racked up import prices, which further strain current account balances on oil-importing countries in the Middle East. The governments in the region have responded to increasing international prices by increasing spending on subsidies and the public-wage sector bill. Thus, increased spending during weak economic periods has further increased public debt. Subsidy reforms are currently in the midst of addressing inefficient government expenditures by creating measures to

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improve the way social protection is targeted at the poor. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are gradually reducing subsidies as Jordan has directed large cash transfers to the poor in response to price hikes. lxiii Key economic challenges (Finance IMF) Business regulation and governance

Corruption is a significant obstacle that crushes investor sentiment throughout the Arab region. More than half the firms in the Arab region reported having been asked for bribe in 2013, which is significantly higher than any other region in the world. Lasting and successful systems of checks and balances are key for creating accountable governmental institutions that generate revenue. Although some countries have begun business reform and countries differ on the reform needs, Arab countries should also focus on decreasing barriers to entry for businesses. High capital requirements, highly discretionary ministry approval, rules criminalizing business failure, and restrictions of foreign ownership all represent high barriers to entry. lxiv Trade integration

Arab countries’ exports are small compared to other region in the world and disproportionally to Europe. Hence, the region has not ridden the emerging market wave, as have other emerging markets in Latin America and Asia. Better trade integration is crucial for new job creation and

economic growth. Agricultural exports are considerably restricted by quota restrictions, high tariffs, and farm subsidies. Arab countries in transition could benefit from increased integration by harmonizing policies. lxv Access to Finance

Another major to economic growth is Arab countries’ access to finance. Private credit is disproportionately given to large corporations and is sometimes even crowded out by the financing of large government debt. Only ten percent of firms in the region finance investment through debt, by far the lowest of any other region in the world. Therefore, small businesses cannot finance investment plans that would help improve the economy. Improving financial infrastructure, strengthening financial competition, and developing financing alternatives should be a priority of the region in order to have healthy growth. lxvi Diversification of economies

As previously mentioned, Arab countries must diversify its economies to in order to stop the vulnerability to oil price shocks. The United Arab Emirates is a great example of successful diversification efforts as it has booming tourism and commerce despite its abundant energy resources. Around 60 percent of the region’s revenues come from energy resources. Most Arab countries, including oil importers, still lack in the

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diversification of their economies, which consequently reduce incentives from outside investors. lxvii Political reform must occur in tandem with economic reform

Political reform must go economic reform in order for it to be effective. Until 2011, political leaders argued for the “bread before freedom approach” by insisting that economic reform must precede political reform. While these reforms momentarily kept economic stability, they failed to promote growth or reduce corruption. The lack of parallel political reform meant that there was no infrastructure for checks and balances and many reforms only benefited a small elite population instead of the whole countries.

Market-based economic policies that ignored political reform only widened the gap between the rich and poor during the last two decades. Jordan was a clear example of how political reform must go hand-in-hand with economic reform in 1988. Jordan faced a severe economic crisis in which its currency devalued about 50 percent against the dollar, and as a result the King Hussein decided to have elections that gave the people their first representative government. Hence, Jordan survived the crisis, had a stronger government, and applied several liberalization reforms that led to high growth rates in the 1990s. lxviii

Protests in Egypt: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/10148408/Foreign-Office-warning-on-Egypt-protests-and-marches.html

Reforms on government expenditures In response to tough pressure and high

international prices, governments have increased subsidies and passed wage bills to create safety nets for the poor. However, IMF estimates that 8 percent of the region’s GDP is currently spent on untargeted subsidies. Only about 35 to 45 percent of general subsidies reach the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution compared to the typical 50 to 75 percent. These expenditures increase debt and vulnerability of countries in the region. Most of the government needs to appropriately target safety nets for the poor and dedicate effective public spending for infrastructure, health, and education in order to have more effective spending policies. lxix

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Specific economic goals

The Arab region lacks clear and measurable economic goals and heavily relies on abstract goals such as a higher standard of living for all. In 2004, Arab leaders met at a summit in Tunis and agreed to “expanding participation and decision making in the political and public spheres; upholding justice and equality among all citizens; respecting human rights and the freedom of expression; ensuring the independence of the judiciary; pursuing the advancement of women in Arab society; acknowledging the role of civil society; and modernizing the education system.” lxxHowever, there were no evaluations mechanisms were planned out, no time frames, and no performance indicators were used to work towards these

objectives. Consequently, the Arab region failed to fulfill most of these goals. The Arab League Subcommittee, The Council of Arab Economic Unity, has proposed revisions to GAFTA, the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement, to strengthen cross-regional trade within the League's member states in order to improve economic unity. lxxiNevertheless, substantial disparity remains between member states and there is room for stronger and more effective agreements with measurable goals. lxxii lxxiii

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Bloc Positions

In terms of economic development, the interest of the countries in the Middle East and North African region can be split into oil-exporters and non-oil exporters. The most prominent divider between the Arab Region’s economies is whether or not they export oil amongst other factors since a large growth gap exists between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Oil Exporters:

The oil-exporters in the Arab League are Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Algeria. Oil exporters tend to be more vulnerable to oil-price shocks. Since revenue and expenditures to come from oil revenue, oil-exporters’ economic policies have to involve oil. Their interests are in reducing dependence on oil through increased infrastructure and development in other sectors of their economies and generating more jobs. Their interests also involve greater trade integration within the Arab Region. Oil Importers:

The oil-importing countries are countries Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Comoros, Djibouti, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Mauritania. Oil importers are also interested in increased infrastructure and trade integration. Arab countries exports are considerably small compared to other regions; diversification of their economies is crucial in order to attract outside investors. Decreasing barriers to entry such as high tariffs and lack of business reform also lie in the best interests of oil-importers.

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Questions to Consider: • How can the Arab League create sustainable economic goals and what type of monitoring system should

the Arab League implement?

• How can economic issues be resolved within the Arab League with different countries having different economic needs?

• What would be the most comprehensive approach in addressing multiple issues and how can political reform be involved?

• How do can countries effectively target safety nets for the lower income bracket and what tools should be used to help those in need?

• What can the Arab League do to promote growth in the financial sector (i.e. lending and investment companies) in all the Middle East?

• How should the Arab Region increase non-oil business growth and decrease oil-shock vulnerabilities?

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Suggestions for Further Research

• International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/external/research/index.aspx

• World Bank Publications: http://www.worldbank.org/reference/

• The World Bank’s Development Report: http://wdronline.worldbank.org/

• Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/

• The Economist: http://www.economist.com/

• AlJazeera: http://www.aljazeera.com/

Please also make sure you are registered on the delegate forum, your advisors should provide you with a sign up ink. For the latest information, updates, topic guides and more, visit Yale Model United Nations online at: http://ymun.yira.org

For the second year, YMUN will be offering a competitive essay competition. For the rules and guidelines visit: http://ymun.yira.org/essay-contest/

Interested in participating in a challenging new program for highly motivated and exceptional delegates? Apply for the Global Exchange Program at: http://ymun.yira.org/global-exchange/

Get connected and download the new Yale Model United Nations iPhone application: https://itunes.apple.com/tc/app/yale-model-united-nations/id721125366?mt=8 or search for Yale Model UN

Like Yale Model United Nations on Facebook and receive all the latest updates: https://www.facebook.com/yalemun

Stay up to date and follow Yale Model United Nations both before and during the conference: @YaleModelUN

Find the latest pictures on Yale Model United Nations’s Instagram: ymun: http://instagram.com/ymun

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NOTES !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!i International Democracy Watch. http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/arab-league- Accessed July 12, 2013. ii BBC Profile: Arab League. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15747941 Accessed July 12, 2013. iii The London Office of the League of Arab States. http://www.arableague.org.uk/league/internal_system.html Accessed July 12, 2013. iv Francona, Rick. “Middle East Perspectives”. http://francona.blogspot.com/2007/04/who-is-arab.html v Kamrava, Mehran. The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War. vi Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Report 2013” vii Chaney, Eric. Brookings Institute. “Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present.” 2012 viii Reuters. “Witnesses Report Rioting in Tunisian Town.” December 19, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/19/ozatp-tunisia-riot-idAFJOE6BI06U20101219 ix Borger, Julian. The Guardian. “Tunisian president vows to punish rioters after worst unrest in a decade.” December 29, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters x Chulov, Martin. The Guardian. “Algerian protesters clash with police as Egypt fervor spreads.” February 12, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/12/algerian-protesters-clash-police-egypt xi Mandraud, Isabelle. The Guardian. “Algeria’s leaders buy time with oil revenues.” March, 15, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/15/algeria-arab-and-middle-east-protests xii McGreal, Chris. The Guardian. “Hosni Mubarek resigns – and Egypt celebrates a new dawn.” February 11, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo xiii Black, Ian. The Guardian. “Arrests and deaths as Egypt protest spreads across Middle East.” February 14, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo xiv Watt, Nicholas. The Guardian. “Libya: UN Security Council backs no-fly zone and air strikes.” March 17, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/libya-un-security-council-air xv BBC Country Profile: Libya. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897 Accessed July 12, 2013. xvi Gavlak, Dale. BBC News. “Jordan searches for answers to Arab Spring Demands.” November, 4 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15579864 xvii Chulov, Martin. The Guardian. “Bahrain soldiers fire on protestors.” February 18, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-soldiers-fire-on-protesters xviii Chulov, Martin. The Guardian. “Bahrain destroys Pearl roundabout.” March, 18, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/18/bahrain-destroys-pearl-roundabout xix Associated Press. The Guardian. “Kuwait Security Crackdown after crowd storms parliament.” November 17, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/17/kuwait-protesters-storm-parliament xx BBC News. “Kuwait protest at court ruling dissolving Parliament.” June 27, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18606540 xxi Hasan, Omar. Agence France-Presse. “Kuwaiti protestors rally to scrap new parliament.” December 8, 2012. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j0GAnCcI0knzihY6cTCAN0vNHOdg?docId=CNG.97b8b23c0bf286d052ca7b78caff4943.751 xxii Karam, Souhail. Reuters. “Thousands in Morocco march for rights, end graft.” March 20, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/20/morocco-protests-idAFLDE72J0F920110320?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 xxiii BBC News. “Morocco vote on King Mohammed’s reforms corrupt.” July 4, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14011212 xxiv Aljazeera. “Saudi Arabia bans protest rallies.” March 5, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201135143046557642.html xxv Associated Press. The Guardian. “Saudi Arabia’s king announces huge jobs and housing package.” March 18, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/18/saudi-arabia-job-housing-package xxvi Chulov, Martin. The Guardian. “Saudi women to be given right to vote and stand for election in four years.” September 25, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/25/saudi-women-right-to-vote xxvii McVeigh, Tracy. The Guardian. “Prince Sultan’s death fuels debate about who will succeed the Saudi throne.” October 22, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/22/prince-sultan-death-nayef-saudiarabia xxviii Said, Summer. The Wall Street Journal. “As Region Teeters, Saudi Arabia Sets Its New Ruling Hierarchy.” June 18, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303836404577474420382674062.html

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!xxix Delaney, Ja’anai. PBS News Hour. “Timeline: Syria’s Bloody Conflict.” August 2, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/08/syria-timeline.html xxx Reuters. “Libya moves a step closer to new post-Gaddafi constitution.” July 16, 2013. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/16/libya-constitution-idINDEE96F0ED20130716 xxxi Gradstein, Linda. Arab News. “Libya Creeping towards Democracy.” February 22, 2013. http://www.arabnews.com/libya-creeping-toward-democracy xxxii The National Democratic Institute: Tunisia. Accessed July 13, 2013. xxxiii Coker, Margaret. The Wall Street Journal. “Tunisian Politician Assassinated, Sparking Protests.” July 25, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324110404578627660210949042.html xxxiv Lynch, Sarah. USA Today. “Muslim Brotherhood Top Winner in Egyptian Election.” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-04/israel-egypt-elections/51641978/1 xxxv Smith-Spark, Laura. CNN. “The Rise and Rapid Fall of Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi.” July 4, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/world/meast/egypt-morsy-profile xxxvi Michael, Maggie. The Huffington Post. “Egypt Political Roadmap Announced amidst Mass Protest.” July 9, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/egypt-political-roadmap_n_3565902.html xxxvii Aljezeera. “Death toll soars in Egypt protest crackdown.” August 14, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/20138141715620312.html xxxviii Richter, Paul. The LA Times. “U.S. has yet to deliver arms to Syria rebels.” August 17, 2013. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-arms-20130817,0,2608869.story xxxix Barnard, Anne. The New York Times. “Israel Targeted Iranian Missiles in Syria Attack.” May 4, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/israel-syria.html?_r=1& xl The UN Refugee Agency. “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php Accessed August 9, 2013. xlixli Reuters. “Syrian rebels capture military airport near Turkey.” August 5, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-syria-crisis-airport-idUSBRE97411J20130805 xlii Lekic, Slobodan. Stars and Stripes. “Syria urges U.S. to facilitate peace talks with opposition.” August 19, 2013. http://www.stripes.com/news/syria-urges-us-to-facilitate-peace-talks-with-opposition-1.236126 xliii Winter, Lucas. Foreign Military Studies Office. “Jordan and Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring.” http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Jordan-Saudi-Arabia-After-Arab-Spring.pdf Accessed August 9, 2013. xliv Worrall, James. Middle East Policy Council. “Oman: the Forgotten Corner of the Arab Spring.” http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/oman-forgotten-corner-arab-spring xlv Neubauer, Sigurd. The Huffington Post. “How the Arab Spring Skirted Oman.” December 13, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer/oman-arab-spring_b_1144473.html xlvi Khalifa, Reem. ABC News. “Bahrain Protests Meet Security Clampdown.” August 13, 2013. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/bahrain-edge-ahead-opposition-called-protest-19949086 xlvii Schienberg, Jonathan. Foreign Policy. “Jordan’s Simmering Spring.” August 14, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/14/jordan_s_simmering_spring?page=0,2 xlviii Winter, Lucas. Foreign Military Studies Office. “Jordan and Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring.” xlix Ulrichsen, Kristian. Foreign Policy. “Kuwait votes, again.” July 25, 2013. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/kuwait_votes_again l Al Arabiya. “Kuwait announces new Cabinet after parliamentary election.” August 4 2013. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/08/04/Kuwait-announces-new-Cabinet-names-after-parliamentary-polls.html li Tawil, Camille. West Point Combatting Terrorism Center. “Morocco’s Stability in the Wake of the Arab Spring.” May 23, 2013. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/moroccos-stability-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring lii The World Bank: Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf liiiOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm liv The World Bank: Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf lvOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm lvi The World Bank: Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!lvii International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lviii The World Bank: Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf lix The World Bank: Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Poverty_complete_06_web.pdf lxIMF Survey Magazine. Economic Across the Middle East http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/car052113a.htm lxi CNBC: Middle East and North Africa’s Growth to Slow http://www.cnbc.com/id/100754710 lxiiInternational Monetary Fund: Regional Economic Outlook Update. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/mcd/eng/pdf/mena0513.pdf lxiiiInternational Monetary Fund: Regional Economic Outlook Update. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/mcd/eng/pdf/mena0513.pdf lxiv International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxv International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxvi International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxvii International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxviii International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxix International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxx International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxxiGAFTA. http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=732 lxxii International Monetary Fund: The Middle East Focus on the Future. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/03/pdf/fd0313.pdf lxxiii The Economic Unity Agreement Among States the Arab League. http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks/web/treaties/constituent_treaties/19._The_Economic_Unity_Agreement_Among_States_the_Arab_League_establishing_the__Council_of_Arab_EconomicXX3June1957.pdf