Aquinas and Scotus in 14th-15th century Orthodoxy? Could Palamas have relied on a 14th century...

1 S. Guichardan, a pioneer scholar on the subject, attempts to be open to the question of whetherGennadius is open to many schools. His conclusions admit that Scholarius was under more thanone influence, but only minimally. In short, Scholarius breathed heavily the air of Aquinas. See S.GUICHARDAN, Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles:Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios, Lyon 1933, pp. 183-184.

2 For an idea of Jugie’s background, expertise and literary production, see V. LAURENT, L’œuvrescientifique du R. P. Martin Jugie, in Mélanges Martin Jugie, Paris 1953, pp. 7-32.

3 M. JUGIE, Georges Scholarios et saint Thomas d’Aquin, in Mélanges R. Mandonnet II/1 (Bi-bliothèque Thomiste 13), Paris 1930, pp. 423-440. For his contrast of Gennadius’ Thomism andScotism, see ID., Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia Catholica dissiden-tium, II, Paris 1933, p. 125.

4 For an early example from Jugie’s time, see S. SALAVILLE, Un thomiste à Byzance au XVe s.:Gennade Scholarios, in Échos d’Orient 23 (1924), pp. 129-136. More recently, see H. BARBOUR,The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios and His Translation of the Commentary of

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CHRISTIAAN W. KAPPES

THE LATIN SOURCES OF THE PALAMITE THEOLOGYOF GEORGE-GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS

The Question of Gennadius Scholarius and Thomism

George Gennadius Scholarius has been recurrently described in modern scholar-ship as a “Byzantine Thomist”1. Yet, this nomenclature is open to a wide variety ofinterpretations, even if it purports to delineate a certain Thomistic school of thought.“Byzantine Thomist” necessitates a dual consideration of the essential notes to qual-ify a writer as “Byzantine” under the more general heading of “Thomist”. Certainly,the first question (of defining Thomism) does not admit an easy answer. It is difficultto know (a priori) exactly what essential beneplacita a thinker must profess to fallwithin the Thomist camp. Martin Jugie, while often employing neo-Thomist critiquesof Palamas (et alios), gave this appellation to Scholarius2. Jugie, judging Scholariusto be a fervent Thomist, was also one of the few scholars who knew well the thoughtand sources behind Scholarius’ literary production. Thus, Jugie’s evaluation ofScholarius’ underlying convictions should naturally possess a certain gravitas3.Furthermore, Jugie’s narrative has been more or less assumed and defended by manyscholars. More recent scholarly works have branded Scholarius a “philosophicalThomist” who accommodates Thomism to Orthodox sensibilities when necessary4.

However, this general consensus on Scholarius’ Thomism does not resolve thepetitio principii that remains with respect to this preliminary question. Scholarius, asa Scholastic philosopher, occupied himself with logical definitions. Presumably,were it possible, Scholarius himself would not have objected to anyone categorizinghis philosophy by employing the traditional use of genus and specific difference toname the “species” of philosophy that Scholarius himself represents. Yet, such anapproach to categorize a philosopher assumes some sort of universal under which hecan be collocated. Is there really a genus by which one merits the epithet “Thomist”?It seems to me that Roman Catholic authors (especially of a neo-Thomist bent) haveaccustomed themselves to use the canon of the famous twenty-four theses, publishedunder Pope St. Pius X5, as a litmus test for awarding someone the badge of“Thomist”. Though anachronistic, it is certainly a clear and convenient way to dep-utize someone a defensor viae Thomae. However, when looking at the historicalrecord, it becomes very difficult to predicate the term with respect to many follow-ers of St. Thomas. For example, Hervaeus Natalis should be denied what he wouldhave considered to be an honorable appendage to his title of Doctor rarus6. Hervaeus,a self-described Thomist and champion of first-generation Thomism, hardly qualifiesas “Thomasian” when judged for his adherence to Pope Pius X’s standards7. As such,it seems to me that one must at least allow for some consideration of historical crite-ria in order to arrive at a working definition of “Thomism”. In Frederick Roensch’sclassic treatment on the matter, he permits doctrinal divergences among individualThomist authors, while arguing for a general core set of doctrines that (more or less)constitute Thomist thinking8. Yet, even by Roensch’s less stringent standards, self-

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Armandus de Bellovisu on the “De Ente et Essentia” of Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City 1996, p.78.

5 SACRA STUDIORUM CONGREGATIO, Theses quaedam, in doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis con-tentae, et a philosophiae magistris propositae, adprobantur, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 6 (1914)383-386: 384-385. Relevant propositions for the current discussion: “III. Quapropter in absolutaipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Deus, unus est simplicissimus, cetera cuncta quae ipsum esseparticipant, naturam habent qua esse coarctatur, ac tamquam distinctis realiter principiis, essen-tia et esse constant […] XI. Quantitate signata materia principium est individuationis, id est,numericae distinctionis, quae in puris spiritibus esse non potest, unius individui ab alio in eademnatura specifica.”

6 R. FRIEDMAN, Dominican Quodlibetal Literature c. 1260-1330, in TQMA, p. 432. Among his“heresies” are: a) denial of the essence-esse real distinction; b) admission of only 2/5 of Thomas’proofs for God’s existence; c) rejection of matter as the sole principle of individuation; d) distinc-tion of “formalities” with respect to the persons of the Trinity.

7 This is exemplified by his work Defensio doctrinae Thomae. See FRIEDMAN, DominicanQuodlibetal Literature c. 1260-1330, in TQMA, pp. 432-433.

8 The author defends the existence of “core tenants” of Thomism at the beginning of the book.He writes: “Besides the unicity of substantial form, the related controverted theses were the purepotentiality of primary matter, the spirituality of separated substances, matter as the principle of

individuation, and the real distinction between essence and existence. It is by the acceptance orrejection of these theses along with their correct understanding that the Thomism of an earlydefender of St. Thomas must be judged.” F. ROENSCH, The Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa1964, p. ix. Oppositely, in his conclusions, he admits: “If an answer to the question ‘What is aThomist?’ is to be forthcoming, it may well be that the historian, in studies similar to the oneabove, will have to determine it within the context of a particular age and only in terms of the stageof development which Thomism had reached at that time.” IBID., p. 316. Even by these rather lib-eral standards at the beginning of the book, Hervaeus Natalis is not Thomasian since he rejects areal distinction between essence and existence. He also rejects signate matter as the principle ofindividuation.

9 I. IRIBARREN, Durandus of St. Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas,Oxford 2005, p. 4. This “common opinion” of Thomas Aquinas had a wide enough berth forHervaeus to adopt Scotistic theses in his Trinitarian theology and alternatives to Thomas’ princi-ple of individuation and the essence-existence distinction. The opinio communis was a turn ofphrase adopted by the general Dominican chapter at Metz in 1313. However, judging from bothRoensch’s and Iribarren’s treatment of the matter, such a “common opinion” only demands a reve-rential and referential reading (expositio reverenter) of the Sentences with respect to Thomas. Thisphrase cannot be read –historically– to demand a rigid Thomism that became typical in theRenaissance.10 In reaction to the highly rigid Neo-Scholastic Thomism, John of St. Thomas (=1644) became(wrongly) symbolic of a fideistic Thomism. John of St. Thomas was famed for his claim to havenever departed from a word of Thomas in his teaching. This was interpreted to mean that he wasnot open to theological or philosophic developments, especially those that transgressed an ad lit-teram reading of Thomas. In his famous post-Conciliar diatribe, Louis Bouyer spends consider-able space criticizing rigid Thomism employing this epithet. See L. BOUYER, The Decompositionof Catholicism, Chicago 1969.11 This orthodox or stringent Thomism was especially a facet of Renaissance-Italian Thomism(see M. TAVUZZI, Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renais-sance, in Doctor Communis 45 (1992), pp. 132-152). It is exactly this sort of Thomism that wasintroduced into Byzantium during Constantinople’s “first period of Scholasticism”, which waseventually crushed by Orthodox authorities c. 1368. This first period of Greek Scholasticism didnot experience a “natural death,” rather a brutal persecution. Anti-Palamites, by and large, becameThomists. If they did not formally subscribe to the synodal decrees on Palamism against Prochoros

described Thomists like Hervaeus Natalis are still found wanting. The example ofHervaeus is apt to use since he was a Dominican, a devout self-styled follower ofThomas, the principal agent in Thomas’ canonization, and his champion againstScotist and so-called Augustinian attacks. He also fervently persecuted dissent fromthe “common opinion”9 of Brother Thomas within the Dominican order. Hervaeusobliged Dominican professors –teaching on the Sentences of Peter Lombard– to fol-low this common opinion. In short, if what has been termed “John-of-St.-Thomism”10is the only name brand of Thomism, then Hervaeus’ Thomism is odd indeed.Consequently, he must be relegated to a generic school of Thomism, whose imitatorsstrangely opposed anti-Thomists. Even if Hervaeus’ fortunes waned in theRenaissance, due to a more orthodox and monolithic Thomistic emphasis11, I know

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THE LATIN SOURCES OF THE PALAMITE THEOLOGY OF GEORGE-GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS

Cydones, they were threatened with beatings and imprisonment. See N. RUSSELL, Palamism andthe Circle of Demetrius Cydones, in: Porphyrogenita…, pp. 171-172. Gennadius’ Thomism fallswithin a “second Thomism” in Byzantium (at least ex professo Thomism among Byzantineauthors). Still, latent yet direct adoption of crucial Thomistic ideas occurs in many Palamiteauthors (combined with ex professo Byzantine Thomists). This constitutes a bridge between thesetwo phases of Byzantine Thomism. For a list of theologians known to be partim Thomists, see J.A.DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction betweenGod’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium, in GLIH, pp. 263-372.12 The subject of Hervaeus’ Thomism (et aliorum) was explicitly discussed from a philosophi-cal, theological and historical point of view in AA.VV., Saint Thomas au XIVe siècles. Actes ducolloque organisé par L’Institut Saint-Thomas-d’Aquin les 7 et 8 juin 1996 à l’Institut Catholiquede Toulouse (Revue Thomiste XXVII/1), Toulouse 1997. The overall conclusions lead the readerto reject an a priori definition of “Thomism” for evaluating each author. An a posteriori approachis the only way to maintain the existence of a “Thomist school” among first generation Thomists.If this approach is not used, the only early Thomist may be Thomas himself! I am thankful to Fr.Walter Senner, O.P., for providing me with the relevant texts.13 The question of a school often necessitates defining the positions of the “Master” that consti-tute the sine qua non for a faithful student to maintain the appellation of “disciple.” With first gen-eration “Byzantine Thomism,” one can argue just as much –if not more– metaphysical consisten-cy with Thomas on the questions of God and being than among the first generations of “Thomists”in the West. The various positions of Thomists in the West are again in Roensch’s The EarlyThomistic School.14 Recently, J.A. Demetracopoulos has pointed out this glaring petitio principii. One must firstprovide for a “unitary principle” of what makes “Byzantine Theology” Byzantine. Only afterdelineating such a principle can one presume to select certain authors that fall within the school of“Byzantine theology” to the exclusion of others. From a Scholastic perspective, I might add thatnegations are not sufficient to define the object. By their nature, negations are multipliable adinfinitum! See J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Échos d’Orient – Résonances d’Ouest: In Respect of: C.G.Conticello / V. Conticello (eds.), «La théologie byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIIIe-XIXe S.», inNicolaus 37/2 (2010), pp. 67-148, at pp. 70-71.


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of no Dominicans –dedicated to defending the life and teaching of Aquinas– whowould be comfortable calling Hervaeus a “non-Thomist” or worse, a “Scotist”12!Instead, I would suggest, that one can speak of a theological school (like Thomism)by way of an aggregate of theologians and/or philosophers who adopt many of thesame foundational theological principles of a common doctor in order to theologize13.Although this introductory point does not seem to have immediate bearing upon

Gennadius’ sources and his systematic theology of the essence and energies of God,hopefully it will shortly become clear that the example of Hervaeus Natalis is apt forunderstanding Gennadius as a systematic theologian (as well as commentator andcompilator). However, before treating Scholarius’ use of sources and his systematictheology de Deo uno et trino, it may be appropriate to indicate how I will be employ-ing the adjective “Byzantine” with respect to Scholarius. The adjective is meant tohighlight his unalienable affection for his homeland (!"#$%&) and race ('()*&). Recentdiscoveries of many Latin sources for “Byzantine” theologians make it difficult toalways demarcate the lines separating a Byzantine and Latin theologian14. The adjec-

15 This description may not be satisfactory to everyone. However, I do not wish to engage in thedebate (in this context) about the denomination of “Eastern Roman Empire” and the “ByzantineEmpire.” The first part of such a question concerns one of substantial change from one entity toanother. The second part necessitates a precise or proximate date of the said mutation.16 The essence-energies debate can be divided into three points of consideration, justified fromtwo criteria. Mark Eugenicus himself divided the subject into three “chapters” or themes. The firstdivision concerns the intra-Trinitarian relation of attribute to the divine substance and to any otherattribute. See MARCUS EUGENICUS, +,-./"0" 12//*'01#034 3"#4 #5& "6$(1,7& #8) 930):2)01#8)!,$; :0"3$%1,7& <,%"& *=1%"& 3"; >),$',%"&, inMNC, pp. 217-225 (esp. Nos. 1-26 on the ad intra).Mark divides section one from section two by the title “!"#$ %&' (")&* +,%-..” Gennadius alsoexplicitly distinguishes between the ad intra and ad extra energies in GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS,Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, pp. 281, 284 (OCGS VI, c. 94, ll. 6-7; ibid.,l. 23). He makes the same division in his first and second treatise on the subject. See ID., Contreles partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p. 213 (see ll. 6-7). Gennadius also affirms such a divisionin his second treatise, via an argumentum ex silentio, on the essence-energies doctrine. He leavesuntouched the doctrine of the uncreated light and how it is participated. However, prescindingfrom Mark and Gennadius as historical justifications, it is metaphysically sound to classify theenergies (attributes and/or operations) ad intra and ad extra (along with their potential for partic-ipation). Finally, there is the metaphysical question of an “uncreated” light. I make this divisionbased upon the systematic distinction among the: 1) immanent Trinity; 2) Economic Trinity; 3) anda tertium quid between God and creature, i.e. “an uncreated aliquid”. Mark’s division is differentwith regards to points (2) and (3). He proposes: 1) the intra-Trinitarian energies; 2); light; and 3)divine charisms. See MACRUS EUGENICUS, +,-./"0" 12//*'01#034..., in MNC, pp. 217-232. Gass’edition is not critcal. J. Demetracopoulos has corrected the chapter division of Mark’s text on thebasis of the manuscript used by Gass. See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, in GLIH,p. 347.17 M.-H. BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400 - vers 1472): un intellectuelorthodoxe face à la disparition de l’Empire byzantin (doct. Diss.), Paris 2008, p. 318. Blanchet


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tive, as used here, does not necessarily exclude either sources or theological andmetaphysical principles (directly or indirectly) dependent on non-Byzantine sources.Here, “Byzantine” merely denotes that the author tenaciously held cultural, religious,and political values, which have been historically identified with those of theByzantine state/sman, i.e. within the Eastern Roman Empire after Constantine’sfounding of his Polis15.

The Background of Gennadius’ Palamite Works

In order to resolve the question of Gennadius’ hybrid theology of Thomism andScotism, several established facts about Gennadius’ sources need to be taken intoconsideration. Due to the sheer magnitude of the opera omnia of Scholarius, I wishonly to discuss works on the essence-energies question of the Trinitarian life adintra16. These works are principally his “commentary (i.e. translation)” on ThomasAquinas’De ente et essentia (1445)17, his treatise Contre les partisans d’Acindyne (c.

opts for a date suggested by Scholarius’ correspondence with his pupil John. I am grateful to Dr.Blanchet for her helpful comments to me with respect to questions of Scholarius’ chronology.18 M. JUGIE, La polémique antibarlaamite..., in OCGS III, pp. xviii-xix. Jugie notes that this trea-tise was written in the monastery of the Prodromos. Blanchet has given a chronology of his tenurethere. See BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios…, p. 467.19 BARBOUR, Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, pp. 74-75. For Gennadius’ ex pro-fesso reasons for writing his commentary: SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», inOCGS VI, p. 177.20 BARBOUR, The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, pp. 92-95.21 Only in 1435 does Scholarius give satisfactory indications of direct familiarity with theCydones brothers’ Summae. See M. CACOUROS, Georges Scholarios et le Paris. gr. 1932: JeanChortasménos, l’enseignement de la logique et le thomisme à Byzance. Contribution à l’histoirede l’enseignement à Byzance, in ? @//A)03B '$"-B 3"#4 #*C& 15* 3"; 16* "D8),&, Athens 2000,pp. 397-442, at p. 431. This falls within the same period that Mark Eugenicus is a monk in theLaura of Mangana. Mark had already been on intimate terms with the young “George Scholarius”as George’s tutor. Mark’s father, George Eugenicus, ran a school where George Scholarius wastaught by Mark. Their relation was maintained from that time. In the 1430’s, when a monk atMangana (with its impressive library), Mark seems to have acquired first hand knowledge ofAquinas Graecus. Correspondences between the two have been preserved from the year 1440. Assuch, it is reasonable to suspect that Gennadius’ own familiarity with Aquinas Graecus is due toMark’s studies at Mangana. See M. PILAVAKIS, “Introduction. The Life of Markos”, in M.PILAVAKIS, Markos Eugenikos. On the Distinction between Essence and Energy: First Antirrheticagainst Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps, London 1987 (unpublished doctoral dissertation), pp.23, ll. 28-30. I would like to thank Marios Pilavakis for his kindness and stimulating conversationson Mark Eugenicus.22 Scholarius expresses shock that the “marvelous” Thomas may not only be a protagonist forthe Filioque (hardly a surprise), but –to his horror– a crypto-Akindynist. Scholarius reserves, how-ever, final judgment and only expresses his suspicions about Armandus’ section on the divineattributes-names (OCGS VI, c. 94; p. 283, ll. 3-19). He informs his reader that he wishes to writean ex professo treatise on the matter in the future, should the opportunity present itself. This desireis only fully accomplished thirteen years after the fact (c. 1458). At that time he was already a vet-eran-professed monk. Retired to the monastery of the Prodromos, he finally found the time to com-plete his definitive work on the matter.


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August 1445), and his second essence-energies treatise, Sur la distinction entre l’es-sence divine et ses opérations (c. 1458)18.The commentary on the De ente et essentia is a labor dedicated to Gennadius’

disciple Matthew Camariôtês. Gennadius expresses enthusiasm to provide his pupilwith a deeper knowledge of philosophy19. Notably, Scholarius alters some of Ar-mandus of Bellovisu’s titles in his translation to protect the Orthodox essence-ener-gies doctrine20. Given the date of composition (1445), it is not surprising thatScholarius was concerned to promote Palamism21. This theme goes hand in hand withhis burgeoning anti-unionism and anti-Latinism in theological matters. This was per-haps a factor motivating Scholarius to identify Latins’ divergencies from Palamitetheology22. Generally, Scholarius retained a broadminded approach to philosophy

23 Florence was also an occasion for Scholarius to intensify his cooperation and friendship withMark. Emperor John VIII had commissioned both of them as “study partners” in a commissiondedicated to Neilus Cabasilas’ writings and gathering of codices (April 1437). Certainly, this wasan occasion to discuss the essence-energies doctrine and Latinophrôn opposition. See J. GILL, TheCouncil of Florence, Cambridge 1959, p. 76. This event may explain Gennadius’ oblique refer-ences to Cabasilas’s Regula theologica in his 2nd essence-energies treatise (e.g. OCGS III, p. 230).Compare their accusations against anti-Palamites. Gennadius writes: “Surely then if this were saidonly about God only according to our thought, it would not actually be and in truth in GodHimself, but would be as if God were only three and one merely by reason, which are the brain-children of the insanity of Arius and Sabellius! (Distinction entre l’essence divine et ses opéra-tions, c. 4, ll. 29-30; translation mine)” Nilus writes: “Wherefore, if the divine hypostasis is thesame thing with the divine nature, then they absolutely differ according to nothing; for either,because of one nature, the hypostasis will be one – and then for what reason should we persecuteSabellius? –; or because the three hypostases there are just as many natures – and this dogma isnot far from the insanity of Arius! (Regula theologica IV, ll. 14-17; translation mine)” See NILUSCABASILAS, Sancti Patris nostri Nili Cabasilae, archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis, compendiaria dis-sertatio in sententiam illam divi Gregorii Nysseni, perperam ab haereticis acindynianis intellec-tam, qua dicitur “nihil esse increatum praeter naturam divinam”; ubi ostenditur non solam Deinaturam, sed simul cum ipsa etiam naturales eius proprietates increatas esse, ed. M. CANDAL, inOrientalia Christiana Periodica 23 (1957), pp. 240-257, at p. 246.24 Scholarius explictly cites Mark’s antirrhetic against Manuel Calecas in his first treatise on theessence-energies question. See SCHOLARIUS, Contre les partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p. 212,ll. 7-17. He also seems to employ citations from Mark’s patristic anthology. For example,Gennadius cites verbatim, and at length, the same passage from Basil the Great (among others)with similar words of introduction. See MARK EUGENICUS, On the Distinction between Essenceand Energy: First Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps, London 1986 (unpub-lished doctoral dissertation), p. 169. Gennadius employed this passage in his Contre les partisansd’Acindyne (OCGS III, c. 6; p. 215, ll. 21-34). I have found several other dependencies on Markfrom citations within his first antirrhetic with his citations of Mark himself (e.g. OCGS III; p. 236,ll. 34-38 vs. Mark’s 1st Antirrhetic, p. 229) and Maximus the Confessor (OCGS III, c. 6; p. 216,ll. 8-24 vs. Mark’s 1st Antirrhetic, p. 231).25 There is the prospect that Gennadius’ addendum to Armandus’ commentary signals the influ-ence of Mark of Ephesus. This influence might account for his suspecting Aquinas as guilty of“Barlaamite and Akindynist” heretical views. Gennadius is clearly troubled and openly wondersabout the consequences of Aquinas’ philosophy of divine names-attributes in SCHOLARIUS,Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 283.Mark’s two main works on the essen-ce-energy debate remain unpublished. I am indebted to Dr. Marios Pilavakis (Thessaloniki) for hisgenerosity in providing me with his edition of both works. They are as follows: MARCUSEUGENICUS, On the Distinction between Essence and Energy: First Antirrhetic…; ID., On theDistinction between Essence and Energy: Second Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio prin-


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throughout his life. In contrast, his post-Florentine reflection on theological matters(c. 1440) pushed him in a different direction23. His spiritual Father and tutor Mark ofEphesus had by this time composed polemics against Greek Thomist works likethose of Manuel Calecas24. This led to a significant development in Scholarius’ atti-tude towards some peculiarities of Latin theological thought25. After Mark of

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Ephesus’ writings began associating Thomism and Latin theology with anti-Palamism26, Gennadius himself explicitly began to associate latinophrôn theologywith the essence-energies question. In 1445 he already sees latinophrôn theologiansas propagators of heresy during the Palamite struggle, to which he alludes in his firsttreatise.Still, I do not think that a narrative of an aloof Scholarius gradually inculpating

the Latin Church as a whole –via the waxing influence of Mark– sufficiently explainsthe evidence. Even while Scholarius was editing Armandus, he suspected thatThomas intrinsically lent himself to be used for pro-Akindynist propaganda27. Givenhis friendly relations with Mark, tutor and fellow lover of Aristotle28, it is likely to

ceps, Athens (forthcoming). A translation project of these treatises (et Marci alia) is still forth-coming in Modern Greek online at: http://www.markoseugenikos.gr/.26 Mark’s association of Latinism itself (via Thomas) to anti-Palamism seems to have been madearound the time Scholarius’ own period of reassessing the Council of Florence (1440/1442). J.A.Demetracopoulos has shown the exact passage of the Summa contra Gentiles of Aquinas thatEugenicus cites and condemns (SCG I, 73). Aquinas, naturally, argues for no real or formal dis-tinction between God’s “will” and his “essence”. Mark does not merely see in this “essential iden-tification” of God’s attributes and substance, but rightly interprets this as a denial of anything likea distinctio formalis a parte rei. See J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, in GLIH,p. 342.27 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 283. “/"01&2%". &32 %4

502("%&2 2&µ)567 %4 ("8&2, 96%: ;<)2&762 µ-2=2 %6'%: ;2-µ7562 >769#)2"5(67. ?@&2%& >A 96$ %42>7>B596C&2 %&'%&2, %42 ;D E9)2&* CF1, G,µH2, 5*2I1&#&2 %60%=. JK"72 %L. >-D=., <#61µ6%79M.µA2 >769"9#)5(67 %6'%6 &N9 O2"K-µ"2&2, C-1P >A >76+F#"72 OD7&'2%6.Q 1R# S6#C6Rµ ;9"82&. %R%&' >7>659BC&* %&0%&* <2"82 ;>-9"7, "T 9O2 %U <"#$ %L. ;9<&#"05",. %&' !2"0µ6%&. V=%Iµ6%7<B2* %&0%&* 96%6<"+#-2=9"2, W >X 96$ 1F1&2" %&8. <"#$ %42 S6#C6Rµ 96$ %42 E9)2>*2&2 6Y%7&2%&' %R Z7ZC)6 %&' >7>659BC&* %&0%&* µ"%6Z6C"82 "T. %X2 [\CCI2,2 +,2I2, ]. ^2 96$ ;9 %L. %&'>7>659BC&* %&0%&* 5&+)6. _962X2 ;<61-µ"2&7 %X2 5*µµ6K)62 %&`. aCC&*. <B2%6. 5*µ<")(,57,<#4. %&0%&7. >A 96$ %X2 b,µ6c9X2 ;99C=5)62 ;<626%")2,572, %6N%R 96$ 6N%X2 >7R %&' G,µH>&9&'562 <#"5Z"0"72, &N9 "T>-%". W%7 <&CC&$ %M2 <6#R d6%)2&7. >7>659BC,2 5*µ+,2-%"#&2 %U_"#U e#=1&#)P %U G"556C&2)9=. 96$ %f 96(: gµH. ;99C=5)h 5*µ<B5i, j 6N%&8. %R <"#$ %&0%&*%&' <#&ZCIµ6%&. >7,#)562%&, k2 &N9 ^2 l2 >)967&2 96%6+#&2"82, 5&+,%B%,2 %" m2%,2 96$ %X2O<4 %L. gµ"%F#6. ;99C=5)6. nL+&2 ;K-2%,2, j %6N%R +#&2"82 J>&D62 ;26#1M.. (OCGS VII, c. 94,ll. 3-19)”28 In his personal correspondence with Mark of Ephesus (1440), he makes the point of citingexplicitly Aristotle as an authority for some of his opinions. See SCHOLARIUS, À Marc d’Ephèse(1440), in OCGS IV, p. 447. Mark, for his part, writes his response as a loving father to a son. Inwarm pathetic terms, he asks George to come back to the path of Orthodoxy. He begins his letterpraising Gennadius as the “most learned, most wise, etc.” However, by the end of the letter it isobvious that they are not morally equal in their friendship. Mark of Ephesus is speaking to his spir-itual son who has “erred” from the path, even if not tenaciously or perniciously. Scholarius is bid-den to “flee the unphilosophic thinking of the Philosopher (E,F #5& G-0/*1H-*2 :0")*%"& #*F-0/*1H-*2!)” and align himself with the traditional Orthodox mindset. Mark makes a spiritualexhortation, exclaiming: “O miserable (George)!” See MARCUS EUGENICUS, IJ KL*/"$%M N

suspect that Gennadius informed Mark about the incriminating evidence he discov-ered linking Thomism with Barlaamites and Akindynists29. Even if Gennadius hadbeen more sanguine about union with Rome, both men shared a common devotion toGregory Palamas’ legacy30. If such an exchange of information occurred in the1430’s, this would help explain the negative evaluation ofAquinas in Scholarius’ ear-liest treatise on the essence-energies. Mark’s Syllogistic Chapters against theAkindynists can be firmly established as a production in the 1430’s31. Scholarius, in

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O-(1*2, in: P. BISERICII (ausp.), Sfântul Marcu Evghenicul. P'0*& Q.$3*& N R=',)03H&. Opera.Volumul I. I4 ,S$013Hµ,)" T!")#", I, Bucharest 2009, pp. 274, 278.29 The Thomist anti-Palamites (e.g. Andrew of Rhodes) saw the differentiating factor of theattributes in the mind of perceiving subject, viz., the human intellect. See M. CANDAL, AndreaeRhodiensis, O.P., ad Bessarionem Epistula (De divina essentia et operatione), in OrientaliaChristiana Periodica 4 (1938), pp. 329-343: 334-335, 340. It appears that Andrew heavily relieson the works of Manuel Calecas, even to the point of citing verbatim Manuel’s patristic sources(e.g. the Damascene). The overarching goal of the author is to justify Thomism vis-à-visPalamism. WithAndrew’s virulent anti-Palamism and dependence on Manuel Calecas, it is no sur-prise that Andrew wrote with frightening invective against Eugenicus, following Florence, addres-sing him: “propter te obstinatissimum hominem […]” See ANDREAS CHRYSOBERGES, Testimoniumineditum Andreae Archiepiscopi Rhodi de Marco Eugenico, ed. G. HOFFMAN, in Acta AcademiaeVelebradensis 13 (1937), p. 19. Given Andrew’s fame for provoking Palamite debate at Florence(though outside the context of the formal sessions), and given his textual dependence on Calecas,could this have been the impetus for Mark’s second antirrhetic against Manuel Calecas? ForAndrew’s provocations and his epistle before the Council, see M. CANDAL, Andreae Rhodiensis,O.P., ineditum ad Bessarionem epistula (de divina essentia et operatione), in OrientaliaChristiana Periodica 4 (1938) 329-371: 341, 344-371. See also: A. DE HALLEUX, Bessarion et lepalamisme au concile de Florence, in Irénikon 62 (1989), pp. 307-332: 310-314. Halleux’s cor-rections still allow us to date Bessarion’s query to Chrysoberges on Thomism and Palamism asearly as 1436 and defend Bessarion as a faithful Palamite.30 For the best evidence of Scholarius’ positive thoughts on Church union, see GENNADIUSSCHOLARIUS, Orationes Georgii Scholarii in Concilio Florentino habitae ad fidem manuscripto-rum edidit addita versione latina, ed. J. GILL (Concilium Florentinum. Documenta et Scriptores,Series B.8.I), Rome 1964. Even before the publishing of these sermons (and the ensuing contro-versy over their authenticity), Jugie had already made a fairly detailed study on the matter. See M.JUGIE, L’unionisme de Georges Scholarios, in Échos d’Orient 36 (1937), pp. 65-86.31 J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, in GLIH, p. 343. Demetracopoulos –likePilavakis (c. 1988)– recognizes that authorship in the 1430’s is a “best guess.” For Mark ofEphesus’ clear interest in Aquinas’ doctrine, see EUGENICUS, +,-./"0" 12//*'01#034..., inMNC, p.220. “\T <H56 «>026µ7. <#4.» o%"#&2 CF1"%67 («<#4.» 1R# «%4 >*26%42» O<&>)>&%67) –96$ %&'%&G,µH. p %M2 d6%)2,2 >7>B596C&. q=%M. O<&+6)2"%67–, o%"#&2 a#6 &N5)6 G"&' 96$ o%"#&2>026µ7., "T µX 96$ %X2 &N5)62 %7. "r267 +6)= %M2 <#-. %7.” My translation: “If each power is saidwith relation to something else (i.e. an object), because [power] is predicated/attributed with a rela-tion to the possible [object]; and this same fact Thomas, the Magister of the Latins, expresslystates. Therefore, one item is God’s essence and another item His power, unless someone wouldsay that the essence is among things relative.”

32 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 283 (OCGS VI, c. 94, ll.7-14).33 Scholarius tries to mitigate the circumstantial evidence that Barlaam and Akindynus were“Thomists”. They were suspected because they were contemporaries of the Cydones brothers andthey held a logical theory reconcilable to Thomism via second intentions. Verbal or formulaicusage, even when coupled with a possible chronology, simple does not prove a necessary causaldependence. For arguments that convincingly support Barlaam’s anti-Thomism and non-Scholastic theology and gnoseology, see A. FYRIGOS, Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemi-ca esicastica. Con un’edizione critica delle Epistole greche di Barlaam, Rome 2005, pp. 69-97. Itis fairly clear, judging from Barlaam’s sources, that he was neither a Thomist nor a latinofrôn. SeeJ.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Further Evidence on the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources ofBarlaam the Calabrian’s “Contra Latinos”, in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 96 (2003), pp. 83-122, atpp. 119-120.34 The dating of Jugie has been secured by BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios…, pp.215-216. See Scholarius’ association of Latinism to anti-Palamism in GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS,Résumé de la «Somme contre les Gentils» de saint Thomas d’Aquin, in OCGS, V, 1-2. It is assert-ed in his preface to his epitome of the Summa contra Gentiles in Greek. Gennadius makes thisstatement –like his master Mark– based upon the assumption (not entirely unfounded at this peri-od) that Thomas Aquinas represents an official theology of the Latins. Although Thomas wasbeginning to make inroads, the Council of Florence may have given the distorted impression thatLatins were generally Thomists. There was a larger representation of Dominican bishops thanFranciscans. Furthermore, two principal speakers of the Council (viz., Juan de Torquemada andGiovanni Montero) were Dominicans. See GILL, The Council of Florence, pp. 140-141.35 SCHOLARIUS, Résumé de la «Somme contre les Gentils» de saint Thomas d’Aquin, in OCGS V,p. 2. Scholarius mentions that the Roman Church, as such, agrees that he is the best and brightesttheologian. It is certainly the impression that he would have received at the “Thomistic” Councilof Florence. He had already recognized this in his commentary-translation of the De ente et essen-tia (viz., OCGS VI, c. 94; p. 283, l. 13).


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his addendum to Armandus’ commentary, weighs the argument that Barlaam andAkindynus were authors who used Thomas Aquinas for anti-Palamite purposes32. Ofcourse, Scholarius came to know many of the Thomist and latinophrôn anti-Palamitewritings. It is a tribute to Scholarius’ philosophical acumen that he identified the prin-cipal logical approach of 14th century anti-Palamites. Armandus’ doctrine of the ener-gies vis-à-vis 14th century anti-Palamite Thomists only confirmed his worst fears(expressed in this commentary on the De ente et essentia). Thomist metaphysics andmetaphysical logic could be used as an intellectual scalpel to pick apart the theologyof Palamas33. Nonetheless, an explicit association and condemnation of Latinism quaLatinism (as a theological tradition inherently opposed to Palamism) is only evi-dently stated in Gennadius’ late resumé of the Summa Theologiae (Ia and Ia IIae) in146434. Unsurprisingly, he links this condemnation of Latin theology to the fact thatThomas Aquinas is the Latins’ best and brightest theologian35.

36 Blanchet suggests that Scholarius began reconsidering his theological positions as early as1440. See BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios…, pp. 77-78. John Basilikos is most likelythe addressee (ibid., p. 483). Secondly, Blanchet also records the significant conflict with the Papalrepresentative, Bartholomew Lapacci, and Scholarius in Constantinople. The debates betweenanti-unionists and unionists were raging in the capital. This explains the curious link between theHoly Spirit question and the essence-energies treatise of 1445. See ID., Georges GennadiosScholarios…, pp. 387-390. However, the accusations against a distinctio rationis tantum betweenthe attributes and essence are not called “Latin errors” by Scholarius. Manuel Calecas is namedpassim at the beginning of the treatise. See, SCHOLARIUS, Contre les partisans d’Acindyne, inOCGS III, p. 212 (see ll. 7-17). Thus, it is no surprise that Latinofrones were accused of the heresyof Barlaam and Akindynus. This seems natural enough since the Greek convert to Catholicism,Manuel Calecas, was an intimate of another Greek Orthodox convert and Thomist (viz., DemetriusCydones). As a Byzantine Thomist (and Dominican) Manuel was very much in the image of hisforebearer Demetrius. Scholarius’ explicit association of this theological point as a “Latin heresy”(scil. Latin theology per se) is only made explicit in the Introduction to his abridgement of the SCG(c. 1464) as noted above.37 BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios…, p. 255.38 For Palamas’ seminal arguments, see: GREGORY PALAMAS, U,$; <,%7) >),$',08) 3"; #5& 3"#V

"=#4& µ,<(W,7&, in P.K. CHRESTOU (ausp.), X$A'*$%*2 #*F U"/"µY 12''$.µµ"#", Vol. II,Thessaloniki 1966, p. 111 (see 19,1-20). See also DAVID DISHYPATOS, ZH'*& +2$*F ["\;: #*F[012!.#*2 !,$; #8) #*F ]"$/"4µ 3"; 930):^)*2 \/"1-Aµ08) G!*1#"/,;& !$_& #_) +"\.10/")


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Scholarius’ First Treatise on the Essence and Energies

Scholarius’ first treatise on the essence-energies question is in response to anOrthodox churchman (viz. John Basilicus) curious about the 14th century Hesychastconflict. He seems to be unfamiliar with the subject and its historical debates.Gennadius attempts to respond to his friend’s request for information36. Blanchet, inher biography of Scholarius, has compiled the most updated chronology ofGennadius’ illustrious career. Her presentation of the situation in Constantinoplesheds light on the background to this treatise. Thematically, there is a touch of a mys-tery behind this first essence-energies treatise of Scholarius because it mixes his dis-cussion of the Barlaamites and Akindynists with a discourse against Latins on theFilioque. Blanchet has outlined the debates in Constantinople and the activities of thepromoters of the Council of Florence in the capital during this same time. Scholarius,at the time of the publication of the first treatise, was in the midst of writing and cor-recting his materials for his debates with Latins and Latinophiles, especially on thesubject of the Holy Spirit. These materials served his apologetic purposes againstpersons representing the Roman position. An example of such is BartholemewLapacci, who was in Constantinople in 144537. This background explains the trea-tise’s overt concern about the Filioque. The essence-energies question had tradition-ally involved Trinitarian distinctions to the extent that Gregory Palamas and DavidDishypatos exploited the distinction of the Trinitarian emanations as an analogicalproof for the possibility of distinction among the energies38. In summary, the argu-

3^$0) `03H/"*), ed. D. TSAMIS (S*V62%72R s")µ"26 96$ t"CF%67 10), Thessaloniki 1973, pp. 86-89.39 E. BASSO, Leonardo da Chio, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 64 (2005):http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/leonardo-da-chio_(Dizionario_Biografico)/ (last access: May,31, 2013).40 Jugie and Barbour consider this treatise against “nominalism.” However, it can be argued that“nominalism” could result from a reductio of the Thomist position of a distinctio rationis ratioci-nantis. This, in fact, represents Cross’ critique of Aquinas’ position. See R. CROSS, Duns Scotus onGod, Great Britain 2007, p. 104. In effect, Thomist authors admit that any distinction can simplybe reduced to a distinction of reason. When, for example, R. Garrigou-Lagrange writes his defen-se of Thomas against God’s attributes being a mere tautology, he asserts: “Very many theologiansadmit a minor virtual distinction between God’s essence and His attributes, inasmuch as His essen-ce, which is conceived by us actually and implicitly, but not explicitly, signifies the attributes thatare derived from it.” However, it is the nature of the minor distinction that ought to scandalize atrue Palamite. G.-Langrange states: “The virtual distinction is a distinction founded on reality,which means, contrary to Scotus’s theory, that it is non-existent previous to the mind’s considera-tion, and it does not destroy God’s absolute simplicity.” The referent (signatum) for each of theseconceptually distinct ideas (e.g. goodness, wisdom) in the mind is the unitary principle of the divi-ne essence. Thus, there are no processions, emanations, or other mentally distinct compenetratingor circumstantial quasi-attributes. There is only a singular “principle” that is the kind of thing thatsomehow is all these items that logically differ when considered quoad nos. God is all these attri-butes substantially, even if we conceive them as manifold via creaturely perfections. Each inten-


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ment states that if the persons are of a greater distinction than the energies, and thepersons do not threaten the unity of the essence, a fortiori neither does any energeticdistinction threaten the divine essence. This Trinitarian aspect of the essence-energiesdebate does not intrinsically lend itself to any obvious consideration of the Filioque.Nonetheless, Gennadius is intent on including both themes. Lastly, Gennadius con-demns the Latins’ use of violence and force to turn people toward the Roman Church.In the background are lingering concerns about Latin figures like Leonardo of Chios.He was an Inquisitor in the East (1431) and a forceful promotor of the Union. He hadeven lamented the fact that Emperor Constantine XI did not forcefully rid himself ofGennadius’ Synaxis and its opposition and propaganda against Florence (1452)39.

Scholarius’ Second Treatise on the Essence and Energies

More problematic is the contextualization of the last treatise, which –as far as Iam aware– represents a polemic against an unknown opponent (it is written againstgeneric partisans of Barlaam andAkindynus). Its content and references seem to shiftthe focus from the first treatise against Barlaamites and Akindynists (along with theLatin-minded). Its arguments utilize a Latin logical theory of second intentionsagainst Akindynist heretical teachings on the subject of the Orthodox essence-ener-gies dogma40.

tion refers back to a unitary immutable principle. Thus, from a logical point of view, this explana-tion may still leave Thomas open to Gennadius’ exasperating evaluation that the Akindynist logi-cal theory of God’s attributes as mere second intentions differs in no substantial way from Thomashimself. See R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, The One God. A Commentary on the First Part of St.Thomas’ Theological Summa, London 1955, pp. 392, 168. Gennadius first recognizes Thomas’position to be a distinctio rationis tantum in his translation-commentary of Armandus. SeeSCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 283. Compare with: S. Th. I,q. 13, a. 4 and S. Th. I, q. 28, a. 2.41 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 285. “!"# $"%$" µ&'

()*+,$-, $. /+ '%' 012', 3$+'45 $+ +T)6µ7'" 85 9' 9*:)2µ; *"# <=>2?3$+).' =-5, 85 @' =>+,23A'0*:6>" +Y6. u2 T>)h >A <#61µ6%")h <"#$ %&0%,2, ^2 p G"4. (FCi, ;µZ6(*2&'µ"2 %U V=%Iµ6%7%&0%P, 96$ W56 >"8 <"#$ 6N%&' O27K2"05&µ"2, 96(v. ^2 %-(: gµ82 ;µ<2"*5(")= (OCGS VI, c. 94,ll. 18-22).”42 I base this on several observations. First, the addendum of 1445 De ente et essentia concernsprincipally ad intra Trinitarian attributes. There does appear a passing mention of the attributes“0D,.” However, this is clearly not his concern with the context of Armandus (this does not nec-essarily mean a fuller treatise would neglect the issue of the ad extra energies). Secondly, hisexpress intention in the first treatise is to acquiesce to a learned Orthodox who wanted more detailson the historical conflict. However, Scholarius distracted himself with other issues (the Filioque,the Inquisition). He, or his secretary Syropoulos, also seems to have spliced the section onMaximus the Confessor on the ad intra perfections. The insertion veers off course into the Thabor-light and other related themes. Once that parenthesis is closed, the treatise immediately returnsback to Maximus the Confessor and ad intra discussion of God’s attributes. See SCHOLARIUS,Contre les partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, pp. 219-223. Section eight begins the excursus ter-minating in section ten. A full treatise on intentions is only accomplished in the 2nd work.43 The following is significant for the present discussion: “Dominican eyewitness to the fall ofConstantinople […] died probably Genoa, 1459. After studies in Italy, Leonard became archbish-op of Mytilene (1 July 1444) […] He joined Isidore of Kiev and a papal delegation at Chios andarrived with them at Constantinople on 26 Oct. 1452 to realize ecclesiastical union. Leonardreturned to Italy ca. 1458 to work for a counteroffensive against the Turks and probably diedthere.” See the entry in AA.VV., The axford Dictionary of Byzantium, II, Oxford 1991, p. 1212.However, the best summary of his life and deeds, as well as his personal enmity with Scholarius,was conveniently provided for in the article previously cited and available online at:http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/leonardo-da-chio_(Dizionario_Biografico)/ (access 2012).44 K.-P. MATSCHKE, Leonhard von Chios, Gennadios Scholarios und die «Collegae» ThomasPyropulos und Iohannes Basilikos vor, während und nach der Eroberung von Konstantinopeldurch die Türken, in ]2b")#0). 21 (2000) 227-236. The association with the Palamite controversymay come from the explicit invocation of the Brothers Cydones and especially Manuel Calecas.These anti-Palamite examples are used to challenge Scholarius to a reflection on reconciliation

In light of research by Blanchet and Ganchou, I believe a provisional solution forthis question of the motive and dating of the second treatise exists. It satisfies boththe chronological and theological context of this work. In the 1440’s Scholarius hadmade up his mind to publish an ex professo a treatise dedicated to the subject of theessence and energies question41. Only the second treatise fulfills his earlier inten-tion42. His “inspiration” may have been occasioned by the Latin bishop Leonardo ofChios43 (+1459)44.


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with the Roman Church. See M.-H. BLANCHET / TH. GANCHOU, Les fréquentations Byzantines deLodisio de Tabriz, Domicain de Péra (†1435): Géôrgios Scholarios, Iôannès Chrysolôras etThéodôros Kalékas, in Byzantion 75 (2005), pp. 71-103: at pp. 85; 94. An important edited extra-ct in the article reads: “Hanc predecessores magni viri Graii litteratissimi, Simon et Philippus,effecti clerici in ordine Predicatorum professi, Demetrius Chidonius, Manuel Chrisollora etIohannes eius frater, Maximus perinde ac Theodorus et Andreas, fratres carnales et apudPredicatorum ordinem professi et ad pontificium ultimi duo assumpti, item Manuel Calacha litte-ratissimus et ius frater Theodoritus monacus, sed prior ad Predicatorum reductus clarus evasit,Romanam fidem constantissime tenuerunt (De emanatione recte fidei, f. 138r).”45 TH. GANCHOU / L. CALZAMIGLIA, Un inédit de l’archevêque de Mytilène Leonardo di Chioadressé au patriarche de Constantinople Gennadios Scholarios (1455): le «De emanatione rectefidei». Éd., trad. et comm., in Revue des Études Byzantines 58 (2000). I thank Dr. Ganchou for hav-ing alerted me to the fact that this edition has yet to be published.46 BLANCHET - GANCHOU, Les fréquentations…, p. 85.47 J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Gennadios II-Scholarios’ Florilegium Thomisticum II (Defato) and Its Anti-Plethonic Tenor, in RTPM, p. 340.48 This takes place first at the monastery of Vatopedi winter 1456 until spring 1458. Then, he isinstalled in the Prodromos in August of 1458. See BLANCHET, Georges Gennadios Scholarios…, p.467.49 JUGIE, La polémique antibarlaamite, in OCGS III, p. xix.


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Leonardo wrote an Apologia fidei catholicae45 to Scholarius in 145546.Gennadius, having just become Patriarch, had no time to write a reply47. Only afterhis retirement into a monastery did he begin serious studies (1456)48. However, sup-posing Jugie correct that the treatise was composed in the monastery of theProdromos, Gennadius’ Palamite defense likely dated to a time before the death ofLeonardo. Scholarius had recently taken up his position in the Prodromos monastery(c. 1458)49. Still, this hypothesis does not completely explain why the treatise waswritten in Greek. On one hand Leonardo was a native-born son of Chios, yet he wroteto Gennadius in Latin. However, Leonardo himself was a Greek speaker. The authorsthat he recommended to Scholarius for reflection (e.g. Demetrius Cydones andManuel Calecas, etc.) were outstanding examples of anti-Palamism, who themselveswrote in Greek. Was this the occasion for Gennadius’ “inspiration” (anticipated in1445) in order to expound more deeply on the essence-energies question? At thispoint, my affirmative response is merely a probable guess.

The Philosophical Sources behind Scholarius Translation-Commentaryon the De ente et essentia of St. ThomasAquinas

Hugh Barbour published his doctoral thesis in 1993 arguing that Gennadius hadproduced little more than a translation of Armandus of Bellovisu’s own commentary

50 Most of Thomas Aquinas’ thought has been characterized as a theology heavily reliant onAristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophy. This work represents, in the opinion of many, the youngThomas’ purely philosophical interests. See J.F. WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of ThomasAquinas: from Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Washington, D.C. 2000, p. 404.51 J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Scholarios-Gennadios II, in GGP. In the article the authorprovides updates on some sources for Scholarius’ works, including logic.52 Barbour spends considerable effort demonstrating a number of philosophical points in bothlogic and metaphysics that place Armandus squarely within the tradition of orthodox Thomism.See BARBOUR, The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, pp. 63-73.53 S. EBBESEN / J. PINBORG, Gennadius and Western Scholasticism. Radulphus Brito’s “ArsVetus” in Greek Translation, in Classica et Mediaevalia 33 (1981-82), pp. 263-319, at p. 269.Gennadius’ sources and his contacts suggest that he was aware of the orthodox Thomistic move-ment in Italy. This same movement was generally negative in its evaluation of Hervaeus Natalis.54 For the reforming activities in Italy and his forceful imposition of Thomism in the houses ofreform, see H.-M. CORMIER, Il Beato Raimondo da Capua, XXIII Maestro Generale dell’OrdineDei Frati Predicatori, sua vita, sue virtu, sua azione nella chiesa e nell’ordine di San Domenico,Roma 1900.55 For a brief introduction to his life and works, see G. WILSON, Radulphus Brito…, in CPMA,pp. 550-551.56 EBBESEN / PINBORG, Gennadius and Western Scholasticism…, pp. 263-319.


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on Aquinas’ “only purely philosophical work”50. Since that time, it became more andmore obvious that the early Scholarius was not only very heavily reliant on ThomasAquinas (e.g. translations of his philosophical commentaries)51, but also on Thomistauthors. These findings only strengthened Jugie’s overall evaluation of Gennadius’Thomism. Because Gennadius adopted Armandus’ views for his own (for the mostpart), it might seem a foregone conclusion that Gennadius represents a strict andorthodox philosophical Thomism52. This would certainly be attractive since it wouldplace him on a parallel track with the Thomism that was being propagated on theItalian peninsula53. After all, his humanist, philosophical, and theological contactshad been principally Italians. Even if humanists were eclectic and –as a rule– anti-Scholastic, Italian Thomism (mainly a Dominican phenomenon) was very strictlyorthodox. It had become so especially in the last decades of the 14th century via thereforms of Blessed Raymond of Capua54.Thus, there is a puzzle to solve with respect to Gennadius’ prima facie Thomism.

In his logical translation-commentaries (1430’s), Scholarius was known to haveheavily relied on Radulphus Brito (c. 1270 - d.c. 1320)55. Since Ebbesen andPinborg’s discovery of Scholarius’ virtual plagiarism of Radulphus (published in1982), Scholarius’ early philosophical dependence on Radulphus has been confirmedtime and again56. However, if Gennadius enthusiastically moved to embrace orthodoxThomism it is somewhat a surprise to find that he sometimes went out of his way toinsert Radulphus’ opinions in the commentary of Armandus. This would be espe-cially strange since he inserted opinions that were prejudicial to Thomas Aquinas. It

is now standard fare to assume Gennadius’ Thomism is a simple fact57. This is eventhe case in the matters of logic and philosophy around 144558. The next section of thispaper will attempt to show that Scholarius is more eclectic than his self-styledThomism might suggest. This fact may be important for the discussion of theessence-energies debate as well. For, as we shall see, the point of departure forScholarius’ so-called Scotist sympathies dates from his editing of Armandus by theinclusion of a chapter on the essence and energies.

Radulphus Brito and Scholarius: Byzantine Thomistor Eclectic Philosopher and Theologian?

The young Scholarius’ translations/commentaries have often been assumedto reflect his own doctrinal preferences or his own scholastic allegiances. However,if Thomism is at the core of Scholarius’ thought, how is this reconcilable with whathas already been well established as core philosophoumena of Radulphus Brito59?Gennadius’ use of Brito and his commentary on the Ars Vetus places Scholarius with-in a Scholastic tradition that adopts non-Thomistic foundational principles:

1) Radulphus believes genus, species, etc. (second intentions) are not mind-createdintentions. They really reflect modes of being outside the mind, and are caused by

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57 A certain surprising degree of “anti-Thomism” exists in his translation-commentary of Brito’sArs Vetus. For example, Gennadius writes: “!#4. %&'%& %4 VI%=µ6 >7B+&#&7 >-D67 1"1-26572.w72A. µA2 1R# "r<&2, W%7 %4 a%&µ&2 %L. &N5)6. ;5%$2 a%&µ&2 >7R %X2 xC=2, y >7R %L. xC=.,<#&6K(F2%". %U <#&"9%"("7µF2P C-1P, 96$ 6x%= g >-D6 1F1&2" %&' G,µH 2>A E9)2&. w&'%& µF2%&7&N9 J##,%67, >7-%7, "T %4 a%&µ&2 %L. &N5)6. l2 a%&µ&2 >7: xC=., g xC= ;9")2= y g O2I9&*56 %U"Y>"7 ;5%$2 y g 5"5=µ"7,µF2= z1&*2 g O%&µ79I. (OCGS VII, c. 12, ll. 18-23)” See SCHOLARIUS, Surl’”Isagoge” de Porphyre, in OCGS VII, p. 77. Given the fact that “George” Scholarius is simul-taeously editing Aquinas’ commentaries (like the De anima), it is difficult to reconcile an ortho-dox Thomist image with what is actually found in his translations. This is especially the case sincehe does correct the text and interject opinions from time to time. Are we to conclude that he ismerely a translator here, or does he agree with Armandus? Such a question can beneficially beasked with respect to each translation of Scholarius.58 G. KAPRIEV, Philosophie in Byzanz, Würzburg 2005, p. 340.59 The commentary on the De ente et essentia is later than his translation of the logic ofRadulphus Brito. Thus, if one supposes that Gennadius began to nuance (and virtually) abandonhis old theory of individuation because of his burgeoning Thomism, it is puzzling that he states:“it is better to say materia signata” according to the phraseology of Aquinas. All the while hissolutio is to accommodate Aquinas to Radulphus’ doctrine and not vice versa.

60 S. EBBESEN, Radulphus Brito: the Last of the Great Arts Masters, Or: Philosophy andFreedom, in: J.A. AERTSEN / A. SPEER (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (MiscellaneaMediaevalia 27), Berlin 1999, p. 237. This is certainly notAquinas, Hervaeus Natalis, Duns Scotusor Armandus of Bellovisu.61 This becomes important for analyzing Gennadius’ explanation of second intentions in his trea-tises on the essence-energies. He does not see second intentions via developing a more strictAristotelian parallelism between concepts inside and realities outside the mind. Instead, he assertsthat second intentions are mind-created objects of thought. For example, see SCHOLARIUS, Contreles partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p. 212, ll. 25-26. This follows the doctrine of Armandus inmanner of terminology and theory. See ID., Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI,p. 278, ll. 4-5.62 Gennadius translates him thus: “Now, on one hand, some said that the individual pertainingto a substance is an individual due to matter, or through matter. They have favored the accountmentioned above and this opinion has been produced by Thomas of Aquino. Now, note that thishas not been said, because if an individual pertaining to a substance were ‘individual’ throughmat-ter, that matter or that which properly belongs [to it] (i.e. the ‘signate matter’, or ‘individuatingmatter’) is by means of form (the translation mine from OCGS VII, c. 12, ll. 18-21).” He goes onto say: “%4 a%&µ&2 %L. &N5)6. ;5%$2 a%&µ&2 %f O>767#F%P 96$ 5"5=µ"7,µF2i <&5-%=%7{ W("2 g6T%)6 >7: |2 %) ;5%72 }2 O#7(µU ~<B#K"7 %4 %&760%=2 JK"72 <&5-%=%6, |%7. &N >026%67 ;2 �%F#P"~#)59"5(67. (OCGS VII, c. 12, ll. 10-11)” See SCHOLARIUS, Sur l’”Isagoge” de Porphyre, inOCGS VII, p. 78. This is explicitly in contrast to Aquinas’ and Armandus’ materia signata. It isalso clearly nothing like a haecceity of Scotus and Hervaeus’ principle of individuation, which issubstance and its individual accidents.63 EBBESEN, Radulphus Brito…, in NV, p. 457.64 EBBESEN, ibid., pp. 457-458. Ebbesen has edited excerpts from Brito on univocity. Radulphus’position can be summed up: “[E]ns est unius rationis secundum se ad substantiam et accidens.”Although failing to identify the sources, Paul Tavardon has successfully exposed Scholarius’ “doc-trine” of univocity that is irreconciliable to Thomism. See P. TAVARDON, Le conflit de GeorgesGémiste Pléthon et de Georges Scholarios au sujet de l’expression d’Aristote «#_ c) /(',#"0!*//"L8&», in Byzantion 47 (1977), pp. 268-278. However, the question of Scholarius’ own bene-placita is still open.65 BARBOUR, The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, pp. 86-88.66 EBBESEN / PINBORG, Gennadius and Western Scholasticism…, pp. 269-270.


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these extra-mental things60. They are not results of reflexive activity of the mind61.2) Radulphus explicitly adopts indivisible quantity as the principle of individuation62.3) Radulphus sees the distinction between esse and essentia as something incompre-hensible63.

4) Radulphus favors logical univocity in his Porphyrian commentary64.

Scholarius, as noted by Barbour, edits and rearranges parts of Armandus’ treatisebased upon his Palamite sensitivities65. Ebbesen and Pinborg have also noted thatediting, and not merely a translation, takes place in Scholarius’ translation ofRadulphus66. The question of interest now becomes: “Why does a committed Thomistnot correct these philosophical errors”? Clearly, in Armandus’ commentary,

67 Armandus is fully committed to materia signata as the principle of individuation. Scholariusopts for a conciliatory view that is not that of Armandus and is hardly reconcilable with ThomasAquinas. Barbour edits several excerpts from a manuscript of Armandus. On this score, oneexcerpt reads: “Ad hoc est dicendum sicut dicit doctor, quod materia signata est principium indi-viduationis. Et ratio huius est quia illud per quod individuum habet esse individuum in se et divi-sum ab alio est principium individuationis, sed materia signata est huiusmodi, igitur et caetera.Maior patet quia illa quo sunt de ratione individui. Minor declaratur quia per materiam indivi-duum habet esse individuum in se, quia secundum philosophum in primo physicorum substantiaabstracta a quantitate remanet indivisibilis, per quantitatem autem habet esse divisibile ab alio,quia divisio et distinctio attribuitur quantitati, igitur utrumque coniungendo materiam cum quan-titate tale coniunctum est principium individuationis. Sed talis materia est materia signata, igituret caetera. Ad argumentum in oppositum est dicendum quod forma eo modo dat esse, etiam unumesse in specie, et si dicatur quod forma tamen haec dat esse materiale, dicendum est quod verumest, sed illa forma non est haec nisi per signationem, igitur tota causa individuationis est materiasignata et non forma neque aliquid aliud, igitur et caetera.” This is word for word the same as:ARMANDUS OF BELLOVISU, Expositio Fratris Armandi Ordinis Predicatorum super libellum de enteet essentia compositum per S. Thomam de Aquino Doctorem Angelicum, Padua 1482, f. 15. Thearguments start on f. 11 and are Thomistic.68 In fact, this appears not to be the case. Although Barbour has attributed the commentary onDe ente et essentia principally to Armandus, it appears that Scholarius was mixing and matchingauthors. In the De ente et essentia commentary (OCGS VII, c. 56) Scholarius employs Brito’s sum-mation of some people (he calls “the ancients”) who talk about form as the principle of individu-ation, but he claims in response: “Q �,9#B%=. %U "Y>"7 6N%&' &N57,>M. <62%4. aCC&* >7�#=%67,OCC: O#7(µ=%79M. >7�#=%67, &N %U &N57�>"7 "Y>"7{ g 1R# %&760%= >76+&#R <&N9> &N57�>=. ;5%)2,OCCB %727 5*µZ"Z=9-%7. �("2 >"8 >769#)2"72 &N57�>= %" µ&#+X2 96$ 96%R 5*µZ"Z=9-., 96$ "r267&N57M>F. %" 96$ ;<&*57M>". (OCGS VI, c. 53; p. 235, ll. 7-10).” This line of argumentation andpresentation is exactly that found in Brito’s works on the Ars Vetus. See EBBESEN, Radulphus Britoon the “Metaphysics”, in NV, pp. 459-460. Here, Ebbesen produces some extracts from Brito’scommentary. For example: “dico quod individuum substantiae, licet sit individuum per aliquodaccidens, sicut iam apparebit, illud accidens quod addit super speciem non includit in suo signi-ficato […] dico quod individuum substantiae est individuum per quantitatem indivisam et sig-natam (Quaestiones Porphyrii, 19-21).” This coincides with the doctrine espoused by Scholariusin his translation of Radulphus, where he writes in Sur l’”Isagoge” de Porphyre: “�%"#&7 "r<&2>7R µA2 %L. µ&#+L. O<&C"C*µF2,. µX "r26) %7 a%&µ&2, OCCR >7R %L. µ&#+L., ]. J5%72 W#&. %L.<&7=%79L. ;2"#1")6.{ &x%, 1B# ;5%7 96$ g O#KX %&' <&7"82 µ)6 %U O#7(µU 96$ %->" %7. ECC:;2%"'("2 o<"%67 %4 a%&µ&2 "r267 a%&µ&2 96%R 5*µZ"Z=9-., 96$ 5*µZ"Z=94. O26+&#79-2, 96$ J%7�2 O<&C"C*µF2&2 96$ a%&µ&2 96(: 6~%-, &N 96%R 5*µZ"Z=9-.. �7R %&'%& aCC,. +=µ$ <"#$ %&0%&*%&' V=%Iµ6%&., W%7 %4 a%&µ&2 %L. &N5)6. ;5%$2 a%&µ&2 %f O>767#F%P 96$ 5"5=µ"7,µF2i <&5-%=%7{W("2 g 6T%)6 >7: |2 %) ;5%72 }2 O#7(µU ~<B#K"7 %4 %&760%=2 JK"72 <&5-%=%6, |%7. &N >026%67 ;2�%F#P "~#)59"5(67. (OCGS VII, c. 12; p. 78, ll. 1-11)”


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Gennadius was not shy to correct him if he deemed it necessary67. One would thinkthat Gennadius, if an orthodox Thomist, would rearrange or eliminate materials thatwere contrary to his Tomassian commitments68. For example, as a case in point (viz.#2), Scholarius translates Radulphus’ criticism and rejection of Thomas’ principle ofindividuation. Are we to take this to mean that Scholarius rejects Thomas, or is he

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simply acting as a translator who only sometimes comments and edits Radulphuswhen he deems it necessary (e.g. theological Orthodoxy) or interesting to do so69?Scholarius’ apparent rejection of Thomas in his translation-commentary of

Radulphus is turned on its head with his translation and editing of Armandus. Heintroduces Radulphus toArmandus and proposes a conciliatory view between “quan-titas indivisa”70 and “materia signata” as the principle of individuation71. Scholariuspresents the arguments of some philosophers for matter simpliciter (d/A e!/8&) asthe principle of individuation. After noting other variants, he argues that: “a%&µ-2;5%7 >7R %L. <&5-%=%&. […]”72 Finally, he proposes that Thomas essentially is in

69 Although a modern scholar can clearly draw great contrast between Radulphus and Thomas,this was not necessarily the case in the generations of 14th and 15th century philosophers comingafter Brito. Bn fact, he was sometimes considered by authors to be a Thomist. Commentaries wereeven found invoking Radulphus to defend Thomas Aquinas. See EBBESEN / PINBORG, Gennadiusand Western Scholasticism…, p. 270.70 Viz., “O>76)#"%&. <&5-%=.”. The discussion is found in SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «Deente et essentia», in OCGS VI, pp. 235-236.71 EBBESEN, Radulphus Brito on the “Metaphysics”, in NV, p. 459. Ebbesen’s collection ofextracts clearly illustrates “Ralph’s” ontology. Those who claim that materia signata is the princi-ple of individuation are “metaphysical wimps.” The materialists are simply unwilling to admit thatonce matter becomes the principle (along with its first manifestation through combination withform, viz., accident of quantity), honesty forces us to reduce everything to form. Form is that outof which matter’s accidents arise and, by speaking of matter under modification, one implies thatit is “informed.” Only when quantity is taken in isolation, does one have something not intrinsi-cally divisible among forms since it is a “this” that results after the combination of matter andform. An accident –in isolation– individuates for Ralph. The effect of this thesis for the Christianis that each man is only “accidentally” different from another. These consequences require aChristian to abandon the theory (as Ralph does upon becoming a theologian). Gennadius’ recon-ciliation of these two positions is not –in my opinion– due to naiveté on his part, but due to his lec-tio reverenter of Aquinas, even if he disagrees with his doctor. Ralph’s reductio is actually sup-ported by Thomas himself in less cited passages on individuation: “Ad tertium dicendum quodessentia proprie est id quod significatur per definitionem. Definitio autem complectitur principiaspeciei, non autem principia individualia. Unde in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, essentiasignificat non solum formam, nec solum materiam, sed compositum ex materia et forma commu-ni, prout sunt principia speciei. Sed compositum ex hac materia et ex hac forma, habet rationemhypostasis et personae, anima enim et caro et os sunt de ratione hominis, sed haec anima et haeccaro et hoc os sunt de ratione huius hominis. Et ideo hypostasis et persona addunt supra rationemessentiae principia individualia […] (S.Th. Ia, qu. 29, art. 2 ad 3)”72 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, pp. 236,2-237,3:“O9#7Z&C&1&0µ"2&7 CF1&*572 6N%&), ]. a#6 #_ #5& *=1%"& f#*µ*), f#*µH) >1#0 :04 #5& !*1H#A#*&{W("2 %&' "r26) %7 }2 O#7(µU 6Y%7-2 ;5%7 %4 %&760%=2 JK"72 <&5-%=%6 |%7. &N9 ^2 "~#"(")= ;2 aCCP[…] �C /D) :A"E7)2F3A' +G:+A $"%$"{ H)" :AI)6µ7'" +J3#' (>>K>-' ()ALµM :AD $N5 =23.$6$25.O>>D :AP 2Q $A 01+A $R :AI)N3L"A (=P a>>2F, :04 #*^#*2 >) @"2#J >1#0) G:0"%$,#*) 3";1,1Aµ"1µ()*), :A.$A $R (:A",)+$2' +S'"A 2C:&' =)"/µ"$A*R' =)23$,L63A $M +S'"A :AI)6µ7'2' […]w6'%6 %R %L. &N5)6. µF#= a%&µ6 "T5)2{ %R %L. &N5)6. a%&µ6 a#6 ;2 �6*%&8. "T572 O>76)#"%6 96$aCC,2 >769"9#7µF26 %f <&5-%=%7 [...] w4 >A a%&µ&2 %L. &N5)6. O>76)#"%&2 96$ }2 O#7(µU +6µ"2

"r267, &NK ]. µX >*2Bµ"2&2 +*579M. >767#"85(67 […], OCC’ T%7 &N >026%67 >767#"U5(67 "J. >0&a%&µ6 %&' 6N%&' C-1&*. (OCGS VI, c. 53)”73 Scholarius refers to them as “as many as” follow “the Philosopher.” See ibid., p. 235.74 Scholarius discusses the question in detail in his commentary: ibid., pp. 235-237 (i.e. OCGSVI, c. 53). This caseof agreement may be where Gennadius agrees with Thomas insofar as Aquinasis reconcilable to Aristotle in Gennadius’ reading of the Physics and Metaphysics which he men-tions in the same discussion. This nuancing of Thomas smacks of a loose Thomism like HervaeusNatalis. It does not represent the Italian Renaissance Thomism then in vogue. In fact, on the sub-ject of Hervaeus, Scholarius’ second treatise on the essence-energies question seems once again toshift his view. He holds something like Hervaeus’ position that primary substance, along with itsindividual accidents, is the principle of individuation. Scholarius asserts in his Distinction entrel’essence divine et ses opérations: “�%%&2 J%7 %&0%,2 %R ~<4 %U 6N%U 1F2"7 �%"#&"7>L>769#)2&2%67, ]. a2(#,<&., C-1&* KB#72, 96$ �<<&. ~<4 1F2"7 %U V�P, 96$ <"#7%%-2 %" 96$ a#%7&2,~<4 >X <&5U %U >7,#75µF2P{ �%%&2 63 %&0%,2 %R ~<4 %4 6N%4 "r>&. a%&µ6 >769#)2&2%67{5*µZ"Z=9-57 1R# >769#)2&2%67 µ-2&7., &�. O%&µ&'2%67, "Y>"7 >A %R 6N%B "T57 96(B<6D, 96$ O#7(µUµ-2&2, &NK$ 96$ &N5)h >7i#=µF26.Q>$ µA2 &32 a2(#,<&. 96$ p>$ &N9 a2 <&%" OCCIC&7. 5*2FC(&7"2"T. }2 a%&µ&2, &N>A a2(#,<&. �<CM. 96$ �<<&. "T. }2 "r>&.{ &N5)6 >A g 5*2(F%= µ"%R5*µZ"Z=9-%&. <B567. O2B1967. 5*2)6572 (OCGS III, c. 1; p. 229, ll. 12-18).” One cannot hypot-hesize a “gradual” development of more Thomist affinities or some sort of on-going “Thomist con-version.” Here, it may be better to say that Scholarius simply changes his mind on philosophicalmatters later in life. This need not be a reason to criticize him. After all, he may simply be con-vinced that the more recent argument is closer to the truth. Hervaeus holds that final principle ofindividuation (after considering informed material as a primary substance): “[M]ihi videtur diffe-runt de quantitate et de aliis accidentibus […] (Quodlibet. III, q. 11)” See HERVAEUS NATALIS,Quodlibeta, Venice 1486, 223r. Gennadius declares: “Still, below these, the diverse speciateditems are distinguished under the genus itself; for example, like a man and like a horse, which areunder the genus animal; and even and odd number are under a certain quantity; and again underthese individuals [such] are distinguished unto the species; for they are distinguished by accidentsalone by which they are individuated, but these very items are in every instance through the [same]species, and they are only distinguished items by number (not at this point by substance). So, onone hand, ‘this man’ and ‘that man’ would not come together at some time or other into one indi-vidual, and a man and a horse into one species; but, on the other hand, the composite substancehas harmoniously come together with accident through necessity (my translation and emphasis isof the passage further above).”


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agreement with such philosophers since the “Aristotelians (i.e. those using thePhysics)”73 don’t explicitly deny that signate matter is the principle of individuation.Since both signate matter and indivisible quantity have their closest link with matter,they are two sides of the same coin. As such, he concludes, two supposed contrarypositions can be made to agree with Thomas. Scholarius merely proposes that “it isbetter to say” what Thomas declares: g 1,1Aµ"1µ()A d/A is the principle of indivi-duation. Nonetheless, in the end, it is merely a matter of perspective74!For the purposes of this paper, this case in point (on individuation) is cause

enough to be wary of a “total Thomistic” approach to even purely philosophicalquestions with Scholarius. I believe that this will be helpful in contextualizing the

75 Gennadius also brings up the subject with Plethon. His discussion of the point is rather brief.See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Scholarios - Gennadios II, in GGP. For a discussion ofPlethon’s anti-Palamism, see B. TAMBRUN-KRASKER, Allusions antipalamites dans le«Commentaire» de Pléthon sur les «Oracles chaldaïques», in Revue des Études Augustiniennes 38(1992), pp. 168-179.76 BARBOUR, Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, p. 86.77 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, pp. 270-272.78 Barbour was aware of Brito’s influence on Scholarius. He cites Ebbesen and Pinborg’s articleon Scholarius in both his bibliography and in his treatment. BARBOUR, The Byzantine Thomism ofGennadios Scholarios…, pp. 110; 122. Nonetheless, he did not notice the pro-Radulphus portionsof the text. It causes one to wonder if there is not much more Radulphus (or Hervaeus) lurking inthe so-called translation.


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essence and energies question. Gennadius’ pattern of philosophizing may favorThomas and tend to read him with a lectio reverentialis, but Gennadius does not feelentirely beholden to him. The purely philosophical discussion above also demons-trates that this loose Thomism does not merely deal with theological considerations.

Palamite Theology vis-à-vis Armandus de Bellovisu

This earliest apologia pro Palama of Scholarius has already been noted for itsconcern to omit certain modes of expression that could be threatening to Palamiteemphasis of a real distinction obtaining between attributes within the essence of theGodhead75. Barbour details some minor title changes that could be indications of aless Thomistic mode of expressing divine simplicity76.In chapter eighty-six of Scholarius’ translation of Armandus, he faithfully trans-

lates the meaning of the text that deals with the production of accidents from the prin-ciples of substance. In this, both Latin and Greek theologians find it uncontroversialthat no real accidents exist in God77. Then, from chapter 87 to 92, Scholarius trans-lates the commentary on separated substances that have no direct bearing onPalamism. In chapter 93, another universal value is affirmed by denying any 1^)<,10&in the Godhead.Despite Barbour’s helpful analysis of these chapters, it may have missed a cru-

cial part of the story of Palamism within the work of Armandus. First, as was shownearlier, we can suspect that there is a metaphysical mixture of Radulphus Brito withThomas Aquinas in Gennadius’ version of the Armandus commentary. So far as Iknow, this has not been mentioned by Barbour or by other authors until present78.However, this fact (illustrated by Gennadius’ factual adherence to Armandus’ undi-vided quantity as the principle of individuation) has potentially far-reaching implica-tions.First, if Scholarius’ Thomism is in an ever progressive crescendo, he should nat-

urally attempt to accommodate his former opinions to Thomas Aquinas. This is only

79 See especially: OCGS VII, c. 12, ll. 10-11. See also SCHOLARIUS, Sur l’”Isagoge” dePorphyre, in OCGS VII, pp. 99-106 (OCGS VII, c. 16, l. 9 - c. 17, l. 11). For the relevant passage,my thanks to J.A. Demetracopoulos for providing me with his article: DEMETRACOPOULOS,Georgios Scholarios- Gennadios II, in GGP.80 DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, in GLIH, p. 344.81 As far as I can see, this is extremely encouraging to defend a school of Byzantine thoughtarguing for an essentially Scotistic formal distinction. One might suppose that Mark himself dis-covered this distinction while reading Thomas’ works in Greek and sharing his insights withScholarius before 1445. Whoever it was that first posited something like the formal distinction(Mark or Gennadius), it is certainly irreconciliable with the Thomistic distinctio rationis cum fun-damento in re (being more “real”) or the Thomistic virtual distinction (due to conceptual distinc-tions within God’s self-knowledge). Iribarren has come to these same conclusions, writing: “Note,however, that this is not yet Scotus’ formal distinction. At this early stage, Hervaeus still presup-posesAquinas’ notion that the ratio of a thing is the result of second intentional knowledge, where-as the Scotist formal distinction presupposes a notion of ‘formality’ as discerned in first intention-al knowledge. The formal distinction is therefore not equivalent to but stronger than the Thomisticdistinction of reason.” I. IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis’s interpretationof Thomism, in The Thomist 66 (2002) 607-627: 620. The proof of this statement is easily demon-strated with Scotus’ understanding of God’s self-knowledge or theology ad intra. God knows eachof the formalities and also knows His will as something formally distinct in His intellect. For thatreason it is not a true proposition to say “God’s intellect chooses A” or “God’s will knows A.” Thewill is simply irreducible, formally speaking, to intellect as a notion because of some meaningfulreferent. As such, even in the divine intellect, the two concepts do not refer to one monadic prin-


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attempted superficially with respect to Armandus’ doctrine of the principle of indi-viduation. This has some importance for other metaphysical considerations in chap-ter ninety-four of the commentary on the De ente et essentia of Armandus.Clearly, this case in point demonstrates that Scholarius is not an ex professo

Thomist such that he is not willing to part ways philosophically with his :0:.13"/*&.Now, in chapter ninety-four he proposes an evaluation of second intentions that areat odds with Radulphus Brito and are largely the standard fare that any self-respect-ing Thomist might adopt.First, second intentions are “creations of the mind” and they are not directly

caused by things outside the mind. For Radulphus, second intentions are caused bythings. For him, a second intention (especially those of the first order like species andgenus) reflects some real mode in a being extra animam. If Scholarius understandsBrito’s commentary on the Logica Vetus79 – and I have no reason to doubt that he did–then this should be the key moment to tear apart Barlaam and Akindynus logicallyand metaphysically. I can think of three main lines of attack:

1) Aristotelian: He could attack according to the conceptions of his friend andteacher, Mark Eugenicus. Mark is notable for a “naive epistemological realism”80in believing that there is always a structural basis for distinctions of thought (e.g.attributes such as intellect and will) in the reality of an object81. Brito reinforces


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this Aristotelian gnoseological approach with well argued-positions. Why didScholarius fail to do so?

2) Metaphysics: He could attack the Barlaamites and Akindynists for being badmetaphysicians. If there is a real mode of existence for “first, second and thirdorder” second intentions, then two realities have escaped the notice of the anti-Palamites82:

a. Their theory of second intentions does not solve the problem of composites inGod. It simply removes the question from first intentions and places the pro-blem at the level of second intentions.

b. Their theory of second intentions actually proves the Palamite position. Everysecond intention (causa Britonis) has a corresponding reality that causes itsconception in the human mind83. Thus, whatever is known to be in the divinity:

i. is some sort of modally distinct real item andii. is caused by a res (or aliquid rei) in the real essence and not by the mindalone.

3) Logic: He could argue that the Palamites are actually the better metaphysical logi-cians because they have noticed that things cause ideas (as opposed to a fictiomentis), no matter how abstract. Brito’s philosophy is apt for this use. TheAkindynists believe that second intentions are only mental fictions. Again, why isScholarius silent when Brito provides him with natural support for Palamism?

ciple that virtually somehow contains these two notions indistinctly. Rather, both what is proper tothe formal notion of being voluntary and what is proper to the formal notion of being intellectualcompenetrate the divine essence as an object, but without composition due to its intrinsic aptitudefor certain attributes to be infinite (without logical contradiction). As such they are apt to both existin a finite mode (as accidents) or an infinite mode indifferently. Incidently, Hervaeus Natalis turnshis attention to the divine “ratio” in each of the three persons as a formally distinct series ofrationes and then applies the same metaphysics to the attributes of God. See Ord. I, d. 2, p. 2, qq.1-4; d. 4, p. 2, q. 1; Metaph. VII, 18.82 Hervaeus, on this question is more reconcilable to Thomas. See F. AMERINI, Realism andIntentionality, in S. BROWN / T. DEWENDER / TH. KOBUSCH (eds.), Philosophical debates at Parisin the Early Fourteenth Century (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102),Leiden 2009, pp. 244; 247. Hervaeus’ notion of a second intention is also unique since it includesnotionally a relation. A first intention, objectively, does not at all contain the notion of a relationto real being. See also L. DE RIJK, Giraldus Odonis, O.F.M. Opera Philosophica. II: De secundisintentionibus, Leiden 1997, p. 352.83 M. DE RIJK, Giraldus Odonis..., pp. 349-350. Brito is a strict Aristotelian with a view to a log-ical-real parallelism from the mind to the world.

84 For example: “u2 %&)2*2 %&8. ;D O+67#F5",. 2&=%&8. %f %&' 2&' >*2Bµ"7, � 96$ %L. ;<72&)6.m2%6 CF1"%67 96$ >"0%"#6 2&=%B, g 96%: ;<)2&762 ;5%$ >7B9#757. […] (OCGS III, c.2; p. 230, ll. 34-35)”85 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 285.When developing afull treatise on the essence-energies question, he asserts more precisely (ad mentem Scoti): “theessence of God is formally infinite. (OCGS III, c. 11, ll. 5-6)” See also ID., Contre les partisansd’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p. 226.86 See OCGS VI, c. 94, ll. 18-22. This was already cited above in footnote 41.87 In part, this is the case because of dividing being and its attributes into the “disjunctive tran-scendentals”. Being is either eternal or temporal, either infinite or finite, either absolute or notabsolute, either participated or imparticipated. See ibid., p. 282.88 G. MERCATI, Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota,ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV (Studi eTesti 56), Vatican City 1931, pp. 37-38. The terminus ante quem for Prochorus’ translations of boththe Sentences commentary and Quodlibeta is 1370-1371. See J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, LatinPhilosophical Works Translated into Greek, in: R. PASNAU / CHR. VAN DYKE (eds.), TheCambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 2010, pp. 822-826, at p. 824.89 These are the most likely. Other mendicant libraries in the East are also possible (viz.,Candia). A more tantalizing possible source of Scholarius’ Scotism lies in the Franciscan contin-gent of theologians at Ferrara. It is very interesting that Pope Eugenius IV commissioned them (notDominicans) to prepare a study on De attributis divinis by the Fall of 1438. If this Franciscans’


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Brito’s arguments are both available and advantageous for apologetic purposes;nonetheless Scholarius adopts the Thomist position that second intentions are mindcreations (and reflexive acts of the mind – not caused by things)84. This line of con-sidering second intentions will be maintained in both the first and second treatisededicated to the essence-energies question. Instead of using a more advantageousline of attack (with both philosophical and ad hominem value), Scholarius chooses amore Thomistic route.Before ending this section of inquiry, however, one last point will become quite

valuable when dealing with the future treatises. Scholarius shows his philosophicalgenius in his intervention contra Armandum in chapter ninety-four. He begins hisdefensio Sancti Gregorii with a startling assertion. He makes the simple propositio-nal claim that “God is infinite”85. From that point de départ Scholarius begins a seriesof propositions and headings that he plans to develop (at some later time) in hisdefense of Palamism86. However, the mode of argumentation is strangely reminiscentof Scotism87. Given the chronology of the work, it is possible to attribute Scholarius’use of Scotist themes to his contacts with the Franciscan Studium in Florence. Onlytwo avenues seem to me to be open. First, there is the more probable route of indi-rect Scotist influences through Prochorus’ translations of Hervaeus Natalis’ com-mentary on Lombard’s Sentences and his Quodlibetales88. Secondly, there is the lessprobable avenue of his contact with the Franciscan convent in either/both Pera or/andFlorence89.


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Hervaeus Natalis: a Link between Scotus and Scholarius

I believe the Hervean option preferable for several reasons. First, Scholarius mayhave had easy access to the Greek translations of the Cydones brothers before 143590.He mentions Thomas’ translations in chapter ninety-four of the commentary of theDe ente et essentia (1445)91. In the translation of the commentary of Armandus, hereferences these translations as if he knows their content and Thomas’ teaching onsecond intentions as contained in them92. Greek translations of ThomasAquinas were

treatment of the divine attributes proved to be thoroughly Scotistic (or even Bonaventuran), itwould go a long way to explain Scholarius’ positive evaluation of the Franciscans’ theology as“more Orthodox”. It would also help explain why Palamism was not a theological issue atFlorence when anti-Palamites likeAndrew Chrysoberges were present. Since the Franciscans wereput in charge of these theological issues, it is doubtful that Palamism (viz., ad intra theology)would have been seen in a bad light. Pope Eugenius IV was satisfied to skip the issue, despite thefact that Thomistically inclined bishops pleaded with him. The Benedictine, Andrew Escobar, inhis De graecis errantibus, pleaded “O most blessed Father Eugenius…” He then proceeded to listthe Greeks errors, accusing them of the heresy of an “essential” distinction between attributes andessence in the Godhead. He concludes: “ergo falsa est conclusio, et errores, aliquorumGraecorum, que dicit quod attributa in divinis differunt essentialiter ab essencia divina (De grae-cis errantibus 94, ll. 3-4).” See ANDREAS ESCOBAR, De graecis errantibus, ed. M. CANDAL(Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scriptores Series B.4.1), Rome 1952, p. 83. Apparently,Eugenius did not accept their objections, but in the open debates the Dominicans pressed thePalamites hard. See GILL, The Council of Florence…, pp. 141, 266-267. This is important, sinceEugenius refused the union pressed for by the Greeks after the Filioque was resolved. Eugenius,a stickler, would not yield until both papal primacy and the consecratory formula of the Eucharisthad been resolved in some way. For this process: ibid., pp. 279-291.90 CACOUROS, “Georges Scholarios et le Paris. gr. 1932…”, p. 431. See also BLANCHET, GeorgesGennadios Scholarios…, p. 487. Gennadius also makes another reference (c. 1464) to the Cydonestranslations, but this is too late to contribute to the current discussion. See SCHOLARIUS, Résumé dela «Somme contre Gentils» de saint Thomas d’Aquin, in OCGS V, p. 2.91 It is true that this is a vague mention. I only wish to suggest that it does not exclude Hervaeus.Gennadius may have easily accepted Hervaeus’ Thomist credentials according to at least two cri-teria: a.) The translator, Prochoros, was a fierce and unwavering Thomist; b.) Hervaeus himselfpays due respect to Thomas in both his commentary on the Sentences and Quodlibeta. WhenHervaeus himself opts not to utilize Thomas, he sometimes remains silent about mentioning him.This is at least the case with the principle of individuation. See M. HENNINGER, Hervaeus Natalisand Richard of Mediavilla, in IS, p. 311.92 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 285. Aquinas was notunder the influence of the 14th century vocabulary of “second intentions.” The logical languageemployed by Scholarius is most easily attributed toArmandus. J. Demetracopoulos has also shownthat in his 2nd treatise on the essence and energies, Gennadius uses language typical of 14th centu-ry modistae. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Scholarios - Gennadios II, in GGP. Demetracopoulossuggests that this is due to Radulphus’ distinction. All the same, Hervaeus Natalis (in the Sentencesand Quodlibeta) avails himself of distinguishing between de abstracto and de concreto with par-ticular regard to the distinction of the persons in the divine essence. For example, he writes: “Unde

also known to Mark Eugenicus in the 1430’s93. This increases the possibility thatScholarius had access to such works in Greek if Mark’s copies also containedProchorus’ translations of Hervaeus.Other historical evidence also allows for this hypothesis, since the only

“Scotistic” works known in Greek are the translations of Hervaeus Natalis. LikeScholarius, Hervaeus was a fierce self-styled Thomist. He also was very outspokenin upholding the “common opinion” of Frater Thomas. Like Scholarius’ grafting ofAquinas onto Brito (viz. the principle of individuation), Hervaeus was accustomed tograft Scotus onto Thomas. This is particularly the case in his metaphysics of both theTrinitarian emanations and the formal distinction (as opposed to a rational distinc-tion)94, which obtains between the attributes and the essence. Hervaeus, I would liketo suggest, has the unique potential to explain satisfactorily Scholarius’ Scotism.Even if Gennadius became more familiar with the Scotistic school in Florence, hemay have already been aware of its clear reconciliability to the “real distinction” ofPalamite metaphysics.Strong arguments exist for dating Gennadius’Florilegium Thomisticum to 144495.

With this in mind, Gennadius is not merely occupied with the Latin question of theHoly Spirit (in the first essence-energies treatise) and the “heretical” application ofthe logical theory of second intentions. He is also worried about polemics against

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ista est vera ‘Sortes est homo.’ Alio modo accipit natura et suppositum pro abstracto et concretosicut est hic homo et humanitas (Sent. L. I, d. 4, q. 2).” See HERVAEUS NATALIS, In quattuor PetriLombardi Sententiarum volumina scripta subtilissima nuperrime in lucem castigatissime prode-nutia, Venice, 1505, f. 17r. As such, it is quite possible that Gennadius is using one or both authors.Brito is still being employed in 1445 for the De ente commentary for the principle of individua-tion. Hervaeus criticizes Brito’s aggregate theory of intentions by resorting to a typical Thomistcritique in Sent. L. I, d. 4, q. 2; f. 18v. However, given Hervaeus’ Quodlibeta and their questionsregarding individuation –which I believe Gennadius adopts– it may be that Scholarius abandonsBrito in several matters. After all, Hervaeus argues against the indivisa quantitas in his Quodlibet(and elsewhere). Is this why Gennadius seems to abandon it in the 2nd treatise on the essence andenergies?Also, Hervaeus’Quodlibet III discusses his logical theory of second intentions. Certainlythe Latin quodlibetal manuscript existed in Byzantium (via Prochoros). G. Mercati asserted hissuspicions that many other translations of Prochoros were probably contained in Vat. Gr. 609.Mercati’s list of distinctiones from the Sentences misses the bulk of Hervaeus’material on the for-mal distinction. Nonetheless, Mercati’s remarks leave the question open. See MERCATI, Notizie diProcoro e Demetrio Cidone…, pp. 37-38.93 Mark’s +,-./"0" 12//*'01#03. were already cited above.94 IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background…, in The Thomist 66 (2002), pp. 607-627, at pp. 624-627.This is especially the case from Quodlibet IV.95 J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Gennadios II-Scholarios’s Florilegium Thomisticum II…,in RTPM, pp. 342-343. Recall that the first essence-energies treatise dates to August 1445 (viaautograph of Sylvester Syropoulos).

Plethonism96. A doctrine that is central to Gennadius’ debate is the notion of,6µ"$µ()A97. Some of the same themes that are part of the Plethon-Scholarius debateare, in fact, also contained in Prochorus’ translation of Liber II of Hervaeus’Sentences commentary (c. 1302)98. The two Greek titles concern the eternity of thecosmos99. Scholarius’ interest may have been initially sparked because of the debateon the eternity of the world with Plethon. Scholarius used the Greek SummaTheologiae for notes against Plethon. Therefore, it is tempting to think thatProchorus’ other translations were available. Thus, he might have had his hands onHervaeus Natalis100. Hervaeus’ treatise provides an ingenious answer to the meta-physical enigma of the essence-energies problem. Thomas’ simplicity criterionproves to be philosophically irreconciliable with true Palamism. Hervaeus’ ad hocuse of Scotism solves a Thomist-Gordion knot of how to distinguish the attributes adintra. Because the first part of Liber II of Hervaeus’ commentary on the Sentencesdeals with De aeternitate mundi, Scholarius may have first been interested in thetranslation for his polemics against Plethon.Hervaeus is a proponent of a positive notion of divine infinity. This is something

altogether lacking in Thomas’ theological preoccupations, due to his negativeAristotelian definition of infinity101. Hervaeus is an apologist for divine infinity rec-onciliable to the divine attributes through their complete actuality while compene-trating the divine essence. He also considers the Scotist analogical argument that is

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96 Jugie long ago investigated the salient points of the controversy. See M. JUGIE, La polemiquede Georges Scholarios contre Plethon, in Byzantion 10 (1935) 517-30. Recently, this controversyhas been explored in exhaustive detail by: J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, U/h<7) 3"; i7µY&9320).#A&: G!_ #B) 61#*$%" #*F \2b")#0)*F <7µ01µ*F, Athens 2004. Inter alia, Plethon’s argumentsfor the eternity of the world are investigated.97 Gennadius was not the first pro-Palamite Byzantine to tackle this theme via Aquinas.Theophanes of Nicaea had already confronted the issue using the Doctor Communis. SeeTHEOPHANES OF NICAEA, i,*-.)*2& `03"%"&, 9!H:,0W0& j#0 >:^)"#* >W Gk:%*2 ',',)51<"0 #4 l)#"3"; G)"#$*!B #"^#A&. Editio princeps. RD1"'7'h, 3,%µ,)*, µ,#.-$"1A, ,S$,#h$0", ed. I.D. POLEMIS(Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi – Philosophi Byzantini 10), Athens 2000.98 For dating, please see FRIEDMAN, Dominican Quodlibetal Literature c. 1260-1330, in TQMA,p. 424.99 MERCATI, Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone…, pp. 37-38. Hervaeus’ commentary is datedc. 1302. See IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background…, in The Thomist 66 (2002), pp. 607-627: 627.Prochorus Cydones certainly translated Sent. L. I, d. 1, qq. 1-4 and 7 and Sent. L. I, d. 9, q. 3 to L.I, d. 17, q. 3. N.b. d. 11, q. 1 only is translated and the last “ad sextum” and q. 2. Also a Greektranslation of Sent. L. II, d. 1 and d. 2, q. 1 (De aeternitate mundi) is known.100 Investigation of Prochoros’Vat. Gr. 609 and Vat. Gr. 1102 is still wanting. A study on the the-ological interplay between Hervaeus, Prochorus and Scholarius is sorely needed.101 CROSS, Duns Scotus, pp. 44-45. Aquinas’Aristotelian simplicity criterion is aptly described byCross as a “controlling idea” that effectively closes the door on any consideration along the linesof Scotism.

dear to any Palamite; namely, if the division of the persons is greater than that of theattributes, then provided that there is a real distinction between the persons, all themore does a less powerful distinction hold between the attributes102.Despite this probable influence, there is still the possibility of Scotistic influence

directly from the Franciscan convent of Pera. The evidence for Scotist influence onScholarius via the convent is currently non-existent. There are no known translationsof Franciscan Scholastic works. All the same, Franciscan writings were being trans-lated into Greek in Byzantium. Fragments of these works still survive103.Other circumstantial evidence is found with Demetrius Cydones. His theological

opinions include the Scotist theologoumenon on the subject of the ImmaculateConception. This suggests access to Franciscan theology104. Furthermore, Demetriusedited Hervaeus’ translations, as remarked by G. Mercati. This suggests that –despiteProchorus’ misfortunes on Mt. Athos– Demetrius was able to provide for dispersionof Prochorus’ works and manuscripts within the confines of Byzantium. The prox-imity of the Franciscan convent at Pera made access to Franciscan Scholasticism areal possibility. However, until the year of Gennadius’ Latin learning can be verified,it is difficult to know how much time he had to peruse the works in the convent atPera before he began his work on translating Armandus. Except for Cacouros’ dis-covery of Scholarius’ probable use of the Greek translations of the Cydones in 1435,I have no knowledge of earlier citations from Gennadius from the Greek works of theCydones brothers105. However, it has been brought to light that Scholarius once paida certain monk (Gregory) to transcribe him a copy of the Summa Theologiae in 1432.It would not be surprising, then, if earlier citations from the Summae are found.Gennadius may have read and cited it around this time. Perhaps, Prochorus’ Latinmanuscripts of Hervaeus were easily accessible as well, whether on MountAthos, themonastery of Mangara, or even within the Dominican Convent of Pera.

Hervaeus Natalis: Ally of Palamas ad mentem Scoti

In this section, I wish to present some initial considerations for proposingHervaeus as a source for Scholarius:

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102 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quodlibetal Questions, Princeton, NJ 1975, pp. 109-111, 118-119(viz., Quodlib. V, 7; V, 30).103 For example, there are fragments remaining from the Rule of St. Francis in Greek: S.SALAVILLE, Fragment inédit de traduction grecque de la Règle de saint François, in Échosd’Orient 25 (1926), pp. 167-172.104 MERCATI, Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone…, p. 38.105 See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Gennadios II - Scholarios’ Florilegium Thomisticum II…,in RTPM, p. 334.

1) Hervaeus is currently the only possible source for the via Scoti in Greek106.2) Hervaeus argues explicitly for a formal distinction in divinis a parte rei in hisSentences107 commentary and Quodlibeta (especially Quodlibet. IV). It is prefer-able to think that Scholarius relied more on the Quodlibeta over and above theSentences, since he matches exactly the terminology of Hervaeus in the former(e.g. instead of speaking of a distinctio formalis a parte rei)108.

3) Hervaeus argues divine infinity as a sufficient justification for the co-existence offormally distinct hypostases109 and actualized attributes within the divineessence110.

4) Hervaeus employs the Scotistic (and Palamite) argument that: “if the persons donot threaten the unity of the essence, a fortiori nor do distinct attributes”111.

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106 A less complete list of Hervaeus’ Greek works than Mercati’s also exists in: ST. G.PAPADOPOULOS, m//A)03"; µ,#"-$.1,0& <7µ01#038) n$'7): -0/*<7µ01#"; 3"; G)#0<7µ01#"; >)]2b")#%M. K2µ\*/B ,D& #B) 61#*$%") #5& \2b")#0)5& <,*/*'%"&, Athens 1967, p. 91.107 This is especially the case in his Sentences commentary in: Sent. L. I, d. 2, qq. 2-4.108 The Sentences commentary is less “Scotistic” in many regards. Hervaeus continuously (espe-cially in L. I, d. 2) refers to his distinctions as a distinctio formalis a parte rei intellectae (smack-ing of second intentions). See HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 10v. It ismore valuable to produce some passages from the later Quodlibeta. There is a repeated use of theformal distinction between velle and intellegere to distinguish persons (see column 2): “prima talisest relatio et fundamentum differunt formaliter ex natura rei […] Differunt formaliter ex naturarei […] albedo et color differunt formaliter ex natura rei […] Sciendum albedo et color dicuntunam rem simpliciter, ergo in una re simpliciter sunt aliqua formaliter differentia ex natura rei(Quodlibet. I, q. 5).” See ID., Quodlibeta, f. 167r. He also makes the same distinctions between resand quid rei with the attributes and essence, as does Scholarius (viz., %# %&' <#B1µ6%&.). The quidrei is defined as: “illud per quod habetur de re cognitio specialis cognoscendo suam naturamspecificam et in speciali (Sent. L. I, d. 3, q. 1; f. 14r).” Nor should it be thought that the “the divinenature” is an opaque and unitary principal such that the divine attributes are not seen by the divineintellect. Hervaeus is quite explicit that the divine ad intra conceptions are of formalities that arenot merely logical but based on real realities compenetrating the essence. ID., Quodlibeta, f. 164r:“Imo sapientia Dei vel in eo quod est sapientia divina est omnis perfectio simpliciter dicata for-maliter formalitate reali. (Quodlibet. I, q. 2)”109 ID., In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 17r: “Unde in Deo bene fundant respectusproducentis et producti in eadem essentia simplici propter infinitatem suam cum cuius unitate fiatdistinctio realis plurium suppositorum: sed in nulli essentia creata hoc potest esse […] (Sent. L.I, d. 3, q. 5)” ID., Quodlibeta, f. 164v: “[D]ico quod non video aliam rationem nisi infinitatemdivine essentie que sicut propter infinitatem suam est sapientia et iusticia et consilia: quae nonpossunt esse idem per essentiam in creaturis: ita etiam possunt esse opposite relationes.(Quodlibet. I, q. 2)”110 IBID., 163r: “Secundum hoc, queritur utrorum attributa (puta sapientia vel iusticia) dicantdiversas formalitates ex natura rei circumscripto omni actu intelligendi distinctas: ita que ista dis-tinctio non sit secundum rationem intelligendi tantum sed ex natura rei. (Quodlibet. I, q. 2)”111 ID., In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 11v. “Et ulterius dicunt quae si ista dis-tinctio deberet reduci in aliquam diversitatem realem magis deberet reduci ad distinctionem per-

5) Hervaeus has a theory of second intentions that utilizes the same terminology ofRadulphus Brito and yet his metaphysical logic112 – like Thomas – presupposesthat second intentions are mind creations and reflexive acts of the mind113.

6) Hervaeus takes up the peculiar question of the essence as formally infinite vs. theattributes that are conceptually finite and potentially modally infinite114.

7) Hervaeus employs the disjunctive transcendentals, e.g. either participatum orimparticipatum ens, etc115.

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sonarum et suarum emanationum que realiter differunt quantum ad distinctionem creaturarum[...] (Sent. L. I, d. 2, q. 4).” He goes on to conclude that such distinctions (formally) exist withinthe divine essence since they are not “real” in the sense of separate res like horse and man, but sep-arate things as understood by the divine intellect ad intra, without any reference to ens extra ani-mam real beings.112 HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 13r: “[C]redo quod recurrendumest ad infinitatem divine perfectionis quae scilicet infinitas perfectionis divine sicut est ratio quaeeadem essentia numero est voluntas et intellectus et iustitia et sapientia que in creaturis non pos-sunt esse una essentia simpliciter propter earum limitationem: ita eadem infinitas est ratio quareeadem essentia et idem esse absolutum sint plures opposite relationes et per consequens oppositeres relative […] (Sent. L. I, d. 2, q. 4)”113 Hervaeus is the first author to explicitly write a treatise on second intentions. See HERVAEUSNATALIS, A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) the “Doctor Perspicacissimus” onSecond Intentions, II, ed. J. DOYLE (Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 44), Milwaukee2008. He argues the reflexive nature of the act of the mind with second intentions early. He alsoasserts that such intentions are products of the intellect (not of things) and results of the intellectcomparing one notion to another. See ID., In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 11v. Atthe end of this question, Hervaeus (like Scotus) thinks of the Father and Son as exemplificationsof the essence (something like an instance of the essence that does not divide it, such that eachexemplar completely partakes of it).114 “Secundo quod: sequeret quod non omnis persona divina haberet omnes perfectiones simpli-citer: quod nulla persona hab[et] omnem relationem […] ratio talis est: infinitum formaliter conti-net omnes perfectiones simpliciter […] nulla relatio divina continet omnes perfectiones simplici-ter et realiter […] paternitas non erit infinita formaliter […D]ico quod si accipiat infinitum for-maliter, si pro ipsa negatione finis sic, nulla res creata vel increata absoluta videtur respectiva estformaliter infinita que nulla ratio quidditativa alicuius positivi est negatio cuiuscunque entita-tis[…]dico quod non solum de relatione divina scil., de quocunque divino accepit per modum sub-stantie vel per modum cuiuscunque attributi si accipiat cum perfectione aliorum licet possit esseinfinitum secundum quoddam modum […] (Quodlibet. I, q. 4; f. 166r)” Compare with Scholarius:“[…] &�5=. O<")#&*, a<"7#-. ;5%72, �5%" g (")6 &N5)6 96$ g (")6 ;2F#1"76, � µA2 6N%B, %U O<")#P96$ &N9 O<")#P >7"2=2-K6%&2� &N 1B# ;5%72 ;9 %&' %L. ;2"#1")6. C-1&* %f O16(-%=%7 %&' G"&'%4 O<")#P "r267, OCCR >7R %X2 &N5)62. (OCGS III, c. 11; p. 226, ll. 8-11)”115 “[O]mne ens finitum vel infinitum quod unitatem habendam de ente participante vel partici-pato, relatio autem non sic est ens […] ens participans nihil aliud est quod ens diminutum habensentitatem et quasi participantem entis; ens autem participatum dicitur ens habens plenitudinementitatis supereminent cuius participatione alia sunt entia (Quodlibet. I, q. 4; f. 166r).” There is nodoctrine of participation (except one paragraph) within the Corpus Scoticum. Thus, these disjunc-tions are fascinating. The Latin source for such disjunctive transcendentals is St. Bonaventure:

8) Hervaeus holds that the principle of individuation is primary substance takentogether with its accidents116.

These considerations are important philosophically (and theologically) since theyare in thematic and theological agreement with the essence-energies solutions pro-posed by Gennadius (in 1445 and 1458).

Hervaeus’ Meld of Aquinas and Scotus in divinis

The first point, i.e. Hervaeus as the unique transmittor of Scotism into Greek, hasalready been discussed in 3.1. So, let us move on to the next point in 3.1 on the divineattributes. Isabel Iribarren’s treatment on the matter has recently illustrated the salientpoints of Scotism within the Hervaean corpus117. In her recent work on the issue,

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“Item, si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio […] Item, si est ens respectivum, est ens absolutum[…] Item si est ens diminutum seu secundum sive secundum quid […] Item si est ens propter aliud,est ens propter se ipsum […] Item, si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam […] (Demysterio Trinitatis Q. 1, a. 1).” BONAVENTURE OF BAGNOREGIO, Quaestiones disputatae de myste-rio Trinitatis, in Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia V, Quarrachi 1891, pp. 46-47.With a slight change in order, Gennadius is saying the same thing in Greek: “]. W%62 6N%R %UO<&C"C*µF2P 96$ µX O<&C"C*µF2P y O26+&#79U >769#)2,57, %U O>769#)%P 96$ >769"9#7µF2P, %U<#4. �6*%4 96$ <#4. aCC&, %U J9 %72&. 96$ %U &N9 J9 %72&., %U µ"("9%U 96$ &N µ"("9%U 96$ %&8.%&7&0%&7., � <B2%6 O2%7+6%79B "T57 (OCGS VI, c. 94; p. 282, ll. 22-26).” Given these obviousaffinities, it may be that this represents the influence of Richard of Middleton on Scholarius, sinceScholarios claims to know this Franciscan. For the identification of Richard, see C. TURNER, TheCareer of George-Gennadius Scholarius, in Byzantion 39 (1969-1970), pp. 420-455, at p. 427. ForRichard’s close link with Bonaventure on questions like created-uncreated disjunctives, see R.CROSS, Richard of Middleton, in CPMA, pp. 573-378. As of yet, I have found no citations fromeither Hervaeus or Francis Mayron that correspond to these disjunctive transcendentals. Richardis the next most likely source.116 This point was already demonstrated earlier. Nonetheless, authors often mention vaguely thatHervaeus argues that matter + quantity = individual. In his mature treatment of the matter he alsoincludes other accidents (not just quantity and its relation to matter). For he said inQuodlibet.VIII,q. 9: “It seems to me that [individuals] differ from quantity and other accidents.” See HERVAEUS,Quodlibeta, f. 223v. Martin Pickavé has also noticed this as an important development, showingthat Hervaeus sees “quantity” in an extended sense (including time and spatial dimensions). SeeM. PICKAVÉ, The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation, in TQMA, p. 73.117 IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background…, in The Thomist 66 (2002), pp. 607-627. It is temptingto derive Scholarius’ doctrine from John Damascene. Scholarius already complains that the here-tics corrupt (or exaggerate) the Damascene’s doctrine of divine infinity (these preoccupations willbe addressed in the conclusions). Thus, he has Damascene on his mind in his compositions. Theexamples of the Damascene (man, horse and cow) vs. Scholarius (man and horse), etc., lend them-selves to direct dependence. Yet again, they are merely common vocabulary and examples of boththe patristic and Scholastic tradition. St. John writes: “�5%7 1R# ~<&9")µ"2&2 <#4. x<6#D72 ]. g

however, one difficulty presents itself for the current hypothesis. All the passages thatIribarren cites in her article, and even in her more recent book, do not coincide withwhat is known of Hervaeus graecus118. Still, this is not necessarily an obstacle to thecurrent hypothesis. First, Mercati’s observations have already been recorded, where-in he suspects far more translations of Latin works by Prochoros exist in Greek.Secondly, Prochorus’ use of these manuscripts, and Demetrius’ knowledge of hisbrother’s sources, sufficiently allow for Scholarius’ potential access to these materi-als. Lastly, Iribarren’s interest principally lies in Hervaeus’ conversion of theThomasian ratio-esse distinction (between persons and essence) into the Scotisticdistinctio formalis119. Thus, the question about the essence-energies (attributes adintra and essence) is not the primary object of her study. Her work is focused onLatin Scholastic debates about the nature of intra-Trinitarian relations.

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&N5)6, ~<-9"7%67 <#4. x<6#D72 %U 5*µZ"Z=9-%7� ;2 6N%f 1R# ~+)5%6%67 %4 5*µZ"Z=9-..(Dialectica 8-9, 27-29)” See JOHANNES DAMASCENUS, Dialectica, ed. B. KOTTER (PatristischeTexte und Studien 1), Berlin 1969, p. 73. Later he writes: “�74 &N>A >76+F#&*572 OCCIC,2 6_~<&5%B5"7. 96%’ &N5)62, OCCR 96%R 5*µZ"Z=9-%6, �%72B "T57 %R K6#69%=#75%79R T>7�µ6%6,K6#69%=#75%79R >A ~<&5%B5",. 96$ &N +05",. […] (Expositio fidei 50, 8-11)” This is extremelyclose to both Hervaeus and Gennadius. ID., Expositio fidei, ed. B. KOTTER (Patristische Texte undStudien 12), Berlin 1973, p. 120. Compare this with Scholarius: “Q>$ µA2 &32 a2(#,<&. 96$ p>$&N9 a2 <&%" OCCIC&7. 5*2FC(&7"2 "T. }2 a%&µ&2, &N>A a2(#,<&. �<CM. 96$ �<<&. "T. }2 "r>&.{&N5)6 >A g 5*2(F%= µ"%R 5*µZ"Z=9-%&. <B567. O2B1967. 5*2)6572. (OCGS III, c. 1; p. 229, ll. 17-18)” They may be reconcilable, but Scholarius looks to be more reliant on Hervaeus’ rejection ofopposing theories in favor of a composite (first) substance + accidents = individual.118 See again Durandus of St. Pourçain by IRIBARREN. The Latin passages of the extant Hervaeusgraece contain hints of Scotism already in the first question. For example: “Item ex lumine natu-rali potest haberi quod omnis operatio terminat ad aliquod operatum: sciendum: in divinis scimusesse duas operationes, scil., Intelligere et velle: ergo oportet ponere in divinis duo producta ad queterminent intelligere et velle […] quod si secundum operationes sint producta cum intelligere etvelle in Deo sint unum secundum rem erit tamen unum productum in divinis: quod est manifestefalsum […] (Sent. L. I, d. 1, q. 1, resp.)” HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…,f. 2r. Hervaeus begins distinguishing: “formalia quae distinctio formalis obiectorum reducit indiversitatem potentiarum. (Sent. L. I, d. 1, q. 2)” He writes on God’s formal infinity: “Prima estquod infinitum secundum quod infinitum et secundum rationem infiniti non potest esse subiectumscientiae finitae: sed Deus secundum quod Deus dicit[ur] aliquid infinitum […] (Sent. L. I, d. 1.,q. 7, ad 1)” One definition of infinity he employs is typically Scotistic: “adhuc potest sciri scien-tia finita precipue loquendo de tali infinito sicut infinitum convenit Deo propter suam immensamactualitatem […] (Sent. L. I., d. 1, q. 7)” Hervaeus comes to the explicit conclusion: “[E]t diverseydee ad diversa ydeata: vel que illa secundum suam absolutam acceptionem nata sunt esse siveinvicem sive differre re sicut dictum est de voluntate et intellectu: ita quo dato quod in aliqua natu-ra sint idem re: hoc accidit eis inquantum talia. Et sic videt mihi quae differentia rationis puta setenet ex parte rei intellecte […] (Sent. L. I, d. 2, q. 2)” ID., In quattuor Petri LombardiSententiarum…, f. 11r.119 For a full discussion of this development, see IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background…, in TheThomist 66 (2002) 607-627.

With respect to the divine attributes, Hervaeus’ position can be summarized asfollows: “ibi etiam ostensum est in Deo esse plura attributa ex infinitate divine essen-tie”120. He explicitly argues for a formal distinction in divinis based on the necessarydistinction made between will and intellect in the divine essence121. Furthermore,Hervaeus argues for a metaphysical logic that requires for every ens rationis there isa corresponding object122. If the entia rationis are diverse, then the referent must besomething not contained under one ens rationis, etc123.Even from the point of view of vocabulary and phraseology Hervaeus fits per-

fectly with Gennadius. He even goes so far as to predicate (in Palamite fashion) cer-tain attributes of the divinity using the terms “quasi-accidents” or “quasi-accidentalitems”124. Throughout the Sentences and Quodlibeta, Hervaeus continuously employsthe attributes of goodness, justice, and wisdom (as does Scholarius)125. Since

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120 HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 10v. This explanation has someresemblance to Palamism: “In Deo esse plura attributa ex infinitate divine essentie: hoc etiamidem est ostendum ex qualitate, ex causalitate autem potest hoc ostendi dupliciter. Uno modo sic:quod Deus est agens primum et nobilissimum. Ideo est agens per intellectum et voluntas. Et sicsunt ibi duo attributa, scil., Intellectus et voluntas. Et ulterius qui est perfectus secundum inte-llectum: est ibi sapientia et scientia. Et quod voluntas eius habet bonum non extra se: ideo est ibibonitas et sic et de aliis. (Sent. L. I, d. 2, q. 2, ad. 2)” Compare Scholarius: “� &N5)6 %&' G"&'a<"7#-. ;5%72 "T>79M.� OCC: g %&0%&* ;2F#1"76 "T>79M. µA2 &N9 J5%72 a<"7#&.� &N 1R# &V-2 %"<C"), "r267 %R a<"7#6� %U >A µ)62 µ"%R %L. &N5)6. x<6#D72 JK"72, &�5=. O<")#&*, a<"7#-. ;5%72[…] (OCGS III, c. 11, ll. 5-9)” See SCHOLARIUS, Contre les partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p.226. Compare the statement of Hervaeus: “nullus dubitat quod essentia sit infinita formaliter […](Quodlibet. I, q. 4)”121 This was already an important theme for Gregory Palamas. See M. CANDAL, Fuentes palamíti-cas. Diálogo de Jorge Facrasi sobre el contradictorio de Pálamas con Nicéforo Grégoras, inOrientalia Christiana Periodica 16 (1950), pp. 303-327, at p. 321.122 He does not hold for a merely virtual distinction. He holds for a full formal distinction admentem Scoti. For example: “iste formalitates non sunt idem formaliter quod differre formaliterest differre in formalitatibus. (Quodlibet. I, q. 2)” HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri LombardiSententiarum…, f. 163v.123 “Ita pluralitas ad pluralitatem. Scil., omne ens rationis sumit ab aliquo ente reali. Ergo plu-ralitas rationis habet ortum a pluralitate reali. (Quodlibet. III, q. 3)”124 See HERVAEUS, In quattuor Petri Lombardi Sententiarum…, f. 14r. I.e. Quasi-accidentia orquasi-accidentalia. On the Greek side of things, this terminology was already present in St. Cyrilof Alexandria: “[….] %#-<&2 %72D 5*µZFZ=9" [...]”; see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, o='*21#p)*& 3";X$A'H$0*& U"/"µY&: #4 !$*\/hµ"#" #8) G$01#*#,/038) 3"#A'*$08) 3"; #5& #$0":035&q2L*<,*/*'%"&, Athens 1997, p. 143. On the latin side, J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS has also alreadyalluded to the concept of quasi-accidents in St. Augustine (De Trinitate, Book V), expressed thesame idea without the term; see Palamas Transformed…, p. 275, note 30.125 E.g., this is found already in the beginning of the Sentences commentary in Vat. Gr. 609, f.201v (see all of l. 16): “Vat. Gr. 609, f. 201v (see all of l. 16): $D :’ H>>" $D (=2:A:.µ+'", 85 $R:,*"A2', (/"L-', 32E-', :2W"3$X' *"# $D Tµ2A", >"µYZ'+3L"A ('$# 3FµY+Y6*.$-' *"L: 6~$D

Armandus himself employs these traits, Hervaeus’ discourse slips seamlessly intoGennadius’ excursus on the essence-energies debate in chapter ninety-four of histranslation-commentary. Also the turns of phrase of Hervaeus: “iusticia et sapientiaet consimilia” and suchlike are shared by the two authors. So far as I can tell,Gennadius has simply compressed Hervaeus’ arguments and language into a fewstatements that are assumed to be obvious or shared theological values amongOrthodox theologians126. Of course, Hervaeus’ actual Quodlibeta are quite extensive.A careful reading of Hervaeus’ questions on the distinction with respect to the per-sons, the attributes, and individuation seems to coincide perfectly with Gennadius’mature doctrine.Considering the numerous references that have already been provided, it seems

to me that the case is quite strong. This is especially true since Hervaeus himself hadfew known imitators, and none of them are known in Greek translation127. However,to be sure, authors like Francis Meyronnes128 and Richard of Middleton129 will haveto be studied and excluded definitively from the Scholarian corpus130.

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:A"E+).'$-' […] (Sent. L. I, d. 1, q. 4)” I would like to thank Dr. Charalambos Dendrinos(London) for his assistance and corrections in reading Vat. Gr. 609.126 This is true generally of the Commentaire du «De ente et essentia» (e.g. OCGS VI, c. 94, pp.282-283). Hervaeus had already harmoniously accomplished the grafting of the formal distinctiononto Thomism. See Quodl. IV, q. 7, ff. 233r-327r. As such, there is no need to posit originality inScholarius for this transition. Nor is it necessary to turn to the like of Francis of Meyronnes. In theScotist spirit, one could adjust the so-called Ockham’s razor to state: fontes non sunt multiplican-di praeter necessitatem!127 For example, Henry of Lübeck. See M. HENNINGER, Hervaeus Natalis and Richard ofMediavilla, in IS, 73-74. However, by the Renaissance, his influence on many matters was begin-ning to wane. See M. TAVUZZI, Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism ofthe Renaissance, in Doctor Communis 45 (1992), pp. 132-152. Hervaeus suffered from multipleopponents within the Dominican Order (even in his own lifetime). Nonetheless, a list of his follo-wers and admirers in metaphysics and logic exists. See J. DOYLE, Hervaeus Natalis on SecondIntentions. Translator’s Introduction, in: A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) theDoctor Perspicacissimus on Second Intentions 1, Milwaukee 2008, pp. 24-31.128 Despite his error in identifying Scholarius’ source as a “Briton” (instead of a Frenchman, scil.,“Breton”) and his misplaced assumption that Scholarius’ “commentary” was original (instead of aLatin translation), Paul Tavardon does seem to have identified Francis of Meyronnes as the Scotistthat Gennadius cites with approval. See P. TAVARDON, Georges Scholarios, un thomiste byzantin?,in ]2b")#0"3. 3 (1983), pp. 57-74, at p. 67.129 C. TURNER, The Career of George-Gennadius Scholarius, in Byzantion 39 (1969-70), pp. 420-455, at p. 427.130 Study of these figures is necessitated by Scholarius’ own mention of them. These are referredto in his texts and cited earlier. On the other hand, if Hervaeus, Armandus, Radulphus andAquinasaccount for all significant theological insights attributable to Latin authors, Scholarius’mention ofthese authors may just be his way of recording the fact that he was familiar with famous Latinsand their philosophical approaches.

Conclusions: Scholarius and Palamismus in fieri131

Authors of the last century (exemplified by Jugie), along with more recentauthors, have successfully highlighted Scholarius’ esteem for Thomas Aquinas.Multiple citations can be found throughout Scholarius’ works that leave little doubtabout his appreciation for Aquinas as an outstanding disciple of Aristotle and an“amazing” philosopher in his own right132. He is even highly lauded for his theolog-ical prowess, despite his deviation from Orthodoxy on some few points133. This paperhas not sought to contradict the standard reading of Scholarius through this lense. Ithas only attempted to refract the full spectrum of color through the prism of othercomments and sources that make Scholarius irreconcilable to orthodox Thomism.Scholarius does at times deviate from Thomas Aquinas. If Scholarius finds him-

self generally in admiration of his doctor’s insights and approach to philosophy andtheology, what can possibly carry more weight than these criteria? If I venture toguess that Orthodoxy is the more powerful regulatory idea that dominatesScholarius’ Trinitarian theology, I would hardly be original. Jugie’s judgment ofScholarius’ apparent Scotism had been true, insofar as Scholarius’ confessionalmotives are concerned. Yet, in my conclusions, I would only like to mention a fewareas that I believe are important for considering Scholarius’ motives for his rejec-tion of orthodox Thomism in order to resolve the essence-energies question. This, Ihope, will explain the process of Palamismus in fieri within the Scholarian corpus.

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131 M. JUGIE, Theologia dogmatica…, 148. Jugie was familiar with Duns Scotus’ Scriptum on theSentences. He had read Scotus’ Ord. IV, d. 13 and correctly noticed parallels between Scholariusand Duns (There also exists a very strong thought-parallel to Scholarius’ OCGS III, c. 3, p. 232;ll. 15-37 in Scotus’ Ord. IV, d. 16, p. 3). However, Duns’ and Scholarius’ vocabulary are quitediverse.A follower of Scotus would not be familiar with Scholarius’ technical terms, but a followerof Hervaeus Natalis would be. Still, Jugie correctly saw Scotistic ad intra metaphysics as an antic-ipation of Palamas. He was also critical of Scotus along Thomistic party lines. Thus, he concludes:“Scotismus in haec quaestione est quasi Palamismus in fieri”.132 This, of course, is complimentary toward Aquinas. Since Aristotle became symbolic ofChristianity in Scholarius’ polemics with Plethon (taking as his standard Plato), Aquinas’unabashed love of Aristotle endeared him to Scholarius. For the full story on Scholarius’ associa-tion ofAristotelianism with Christianity against paganism, see M. JUGIE, La polémique de GeorgesScholarios contre Pléthon, in Byzantion 10 (1935), pp. 517-530. The most recent updating of thisconflict, from the perspective of theology, is: J.�. DEMETRACOPOULOS, U/h<7) 3"; i7µY&9320).#A&. 9!_ #B) 61#*$%" #*F \2b")#0)*F <7µ01µ*F, Athens 2004; ID., Georgios Gemistos-Plethon’s Dependence on Thomas Aquinas’ “Summa contra Gentiles” and “Summa Theologiae”,in Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 12 (2006), pp. 276-341. See also G.KARAMANOLIS, Plethon and Scholarius on Aristotle, in: K. IERODIAKONOU (ed.), ByzantinePhilosophy and its Ancient Sources, , Oxford 2002, pp. 252-282.133 Most recently, J.A. Demetracopoulos has compiled the most outstanding references of admi-ration for Aquinas. See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Scholarios - Gennadios II, in GGP (see sec-tion 3: “Werk und Lehre”).

The key to interpret Scholarius in this realm lies in the philosophical underpin-nings of two authors accepted by Scholarius for their Orthodoxy. Although threeFranciscans are mentioned by name in his works (Duns Scotus, Francis of Mayron134,and Richard of Middleton), only Duns and Francis share the same basic theologicaltenants because of Francis’ reliance on his Master135. Duns and Francis can be read insync with Palamas’ ad intra theology.Gregory Palamas and Scotists both admit of a peculiar reading of two of their

sources: St. John Damascene and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite136. Scholarius’philosophical aptitude and concern for correct interpretation of the Damascene on theessence-energies question naturally disposes him to see the “Scotistic” Hervaeus asthe only plausible solution to a subtle theological problem137.Taking his queue from texts inspired by the Damascene138, Duns’ first argument

for God’s existence and nature (from causality) already aim at understanding theenergies of an infinite being139. Furthermore, in his proof for God as the first agent of

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134 For some remarks about additional developments in Francis of the Subtle Doctor’s theology,see E. BOS, The Theory of Ideas according to Francis of Meyronnes’Commentary on the Sentences(Conflatus), I, Dist. 47, in L.G. BENAKIS (ed.), Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale (SociétéInternationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale - Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale,6), Turnhout 1997, pp. 211-228.135 SCHOLARIUS, Commentaire du «De ente et essentia», in OCGS VI, p. 180; ID., Premier traitésur la procession du Saint-Esprit, in OCGS II, p. 223.136 Especially chapters 8-9 of the DAMASCENE’s Expositio fidei and chapters 3 and 5 of PS.-DENYS’ De divinis nominibus.137 So far as I know, Hervaeus does not justify his claims by St. John Damascene. Instead, he sim-ply argues Scotus’ position. This is what I have encountered up to distinctio 8 in the Liber I of theSentences, as well as the Quodlibeta. For Scotus, the matter is more patristic than dialectical ininspiration. Scholarius mentions the Akindynists’ misinterpretation of the Damascene in severalplaces. For example: SCHOLARIUS, Contre les partisans d’Acindyne, in OCGS III, p. 210 (espe-cially ll. 20-24): “ECC: gµ"8. %R. ~<&(F5"7. ;9")26. &�%: ;<7172�59&µ"2 %L. O#K6)6. 96$ ;<75Iµ&*("&C&1)6. &�56., OCCR 96$ <&CCR 6N%68. JK&µ"2 µFµ+"5(67, "T 96$ %M2 gµ"%F#,2 %72A. ;D~<"#Z6CC&05=. O<"7#)6. %" 96$ �<C-%=%&. qh>),. %60%67. ;%F(=562� � %" 5&+)V&2%67 <#4. %R.%&' µ696#)&* �6µ659=2&' qI5"7. o%"#&7 […]” He believes the Akindynists do n&t understandhow to use the divine infinity as an argument in Damascene to justify essence-energy distinctions.He pairs this complaint with mentioning the combination of simplicity and !$H*:*0 of Dionysiusin the very next paragraph (ibid., p. 211, ll. 5-15). He seems well aware of this reading of the twoauthors. Yet, I have not yet found either Hervaeus or Francis explicitly noting these two sources.138 Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4 (nos. 198-212). IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ioannis Duns Scoti DoctorisSubtilis et Mariani opera omnia 4, IV, Vatican City 1956, pp. 264-270.139 “In ente infinito sunt proprietates respectivae ad creaturas, et ex respectivo esse concludituraliud esse. Ideo, proprietates respectivae Dei ad creaturas sunt propriae viae cognoscendi esseDei et eius infinitatem, et huiusmodi proprietates oportet ostendere. (Lectura I 2.38)”

the universe, he adopts the theme of Dionysian excellence140. In doing so he concen-trates on showing that the divine nature is the foundation of God’s infinity141. Hewrites:

The thesis that God is infinite is shown on account of the divine essence whichexplains divine knowing. Just as an act of knowledge which is distinctly related to anumber of things is more perfect than that act of knowledge which is only related toone thing, so also is the principle for knowing distinctly a number of things more per-fect than is the principle for knowing only one of them. Thus an essence which repre-sents a number of things distinctly is more perfect than the essence which representsbut one. However, the divine essence represents an infinity of things distinctly.Therefore, this essence possesses an infinite power of representation. Therefore, thedivine essence itself is infinite142.

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140 This argument is inspired by both Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of St. Victor, asexplained in: M. WASS, The Infinite God and the Summa Fratris Alexandri, Chicago 1964, pp. 35-36. As an example, Richard himself relies heavily on St. Anselm (as noted in Salet’s edition). InRichard of St. Victor’s magnum opus, a surprising (non-Augustinian and non-Boethian) discourseon divine infinity is found. Richard begins this: “Quod caret initio et fine, procul dubio constatinfinitum esse […] (De Trinitate II,5,3; ed. J. RIBAILLIER, Richard de Saint-Victor. De Trinitate.Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Paris 1958, p. 112)”. It is interesting that both theG. Salet and the editorial team compiling the adjoining commentary lack any footnotes referenc-ing the sources of what follows (esp. L. II, c. 20). Might this be inspired by Ps.-Denys? See Ps.-Denys in De divinis nominibus I.1.2.2. Here, note: 1.) God is infinite, 2.) This infinity makes himone above all other sorts of “one”, 3.) It cannot be participated but its products/energies can“according to measure” (“5*µµF%#,.”). This is like Richard notes 1.) God’s positive infinity, 2.)This makes Him necessarily one, 3.) The result is that he is immense (“aµ"%#&.”). Did, in fact,Richard carry on the Dionysian tradition of Hugh of St. Victor after all? See RICHARD DE SANCTOVICTORE, De Trinitate libri sex. Texte Latin, introduction, traduction et notes, ed. G. Salet, Paris1999, pp. 116-146. Especially note L. II, cc. 5, 12 and 20. As the Victorine school is also impor-tant for Duns, it is certainly a tempting area of study to establish an indirect access to Dionysius’thought. A satisfacory explanation of divine infinity is also lacking in R. ANGELICI, Richard ofSaint Victor. On the Trinity. English Translation and Commentary, Eugene, Oregon 2011. Neithercommentator has indicated the Augustinian origin, yet non-Augustinian development, of divineimmensity and infinity in Richard. For a comparison between Gregory of Nyssa’s and Augustine’saccounts of infinity, see W. ACHTNER, Infinity as a Transformative Concept in Science andTheology, in M. HELLER / W. WOODEN (eds.), Infinity: New Research Frontiers, Cambridge 2011,pp. 27-28.141 The translation is provided by: A. VOS, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburgh 2008,p. 480.142 VOS, from the footnote above, renders his translation from the following: “Hoc ostenditur exparte essentiae divinae, quae est ratio intelligendi: sicut enim intellectio quae est distincte pluri-um, est perfectior illa quae est unius tantum, sic illud quod est principium intelligendi distincteplura, est perfectius illo quod est tantum principium intelligendi unum. Et essentia quae reprae-

When reviewing Scotus’ sources, one is struck by two important parts of his the-ology of God that will make him interesting to a Palamite theologian like Scholarius.In his writings, he shares two main sources for his conviction that a real distinctionwas both a patristic and dogmatically convincing position. First Scotus interpreted –incontradistinction to Thomas Aquinas– Dionysius to argue for a “real” distinction143.Scotus goes on to explain, in the same section, that two kinds of unity-contaiment

objects are possible. For example, when the soul is considered, its intellectuality isnot the same as is voluntariness. These “energies” of the soul cannot be mistaken asreferring to the same kinds of activities/powers. They are “formally (mentally)” dis-tinct and are distinct from the idea of the soul iself. So, there are realities in the soul(intellect and will) as quasi-parts. The soul is a unity (insofar as it is capable of sub-sisting by itself and its quasi-parts are really inseparable from it and from each other),yet it is –in a sense– composed of energies (will, intellect, vegetative and sensitivepowers). Scotus also bases his distinction on the analysis of the fact that “goodness”–taken as a concept– is not concentric with “wisdom”. At least on this score, thesethree authors have a common inspiration for a mode of considering such a question.Palamas144, Scholarius145, and Duns Scotus all rely on Dionysius146.

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sentat distincte plura, erit perfectior illa quae tantum repraesentat unum. Sed essentia divina dis-tincte repraesentat infinita, igitur habet virtutem infinitam repraesentandi. Est igitur infinita(Lectura I, 2.80)”.143 “De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius V De divinis Nominibus quia continentia unitivanon est omnino eiusdem ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive nec esse omnino manentiumdistincte; requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. (Reportatio II 16.1)” See also PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, De divinis nominibus, in Corpus Dionysiacum, I, ed. B.-R. SUCHLA(Patristische Texte und Studien 33), Berlin 1990, p. 180. “[+$A$72' :& '%' 9=# $X' \'$-5 &3562%&% \'$-5 \'$25 L+-'FµA*X' 2C3A-'Fµ,"'. ]232%$2' :& ^=2µ'K3-µ+', T$A $M >-/_ 3*2=R5 2C$X' ^=+)2?3A2' 2C3,"', j ^=+)2?3A25, 9*E",'+A' (H##6$2' /D) $2%$2 *"# H/'-3$.' 93$A *"#="'$+>45 ('7*E"'$2' *"# "C$X' ^=+)"U)2' $X' `'-3A'), (>>D $X' 2C3A2=2AR' +J5 $D \'$" =Z'$"$N5 L+")1A*N5 2C3A")1,"5 =).2:2' ^µ'N3"A. (De divinis nominibus V.1.8-13; PG 3 : 816B)”144 M. JUGIE, Theologia dogmatica…, pp. 81-82. The Latin renderings of Palamas’ texts and quo-tations by Akindynus attributed to Palamas are as follows: “aliud essentia Dei, et aliud ejus oper-atio; aliud ejus vita, et aliud eius sapientia; aliud bonitas, et aliud potentia. Habet Deus aliquidquod non est ejus essentia.” This is the very point of departure for Duns. Jugie accuses Palamasof “new ways of speaking” for the terms: “L+.$65 (=+A)Z*A5 (=+,)-5 ^=+)*+Aµ7'6”, “L+.$6$+5(=+A)Z*A5 (=+,)-5 ^E+Aµ7'"A”, and “H>>2 *"# H>>2”. In fact, Palamas is simply exploitingDionysius’ language. Even calling the divine attributes aliud et aliud is something taken fromDionysius in the same context. J. Demetracopoulos is more nuanced in his critique. He notes thatindeed the terms themselves and phraseology are not unknown in Christian authors (viz., Ps.-Denys). However, he agrees with M. Jugie to the extent that Palamas’ use of the terms cannot bestrictly reconciled to Ps.-Denys. Thus, J. Demetracopoulos emphasizes that Proclus is a more sat-isfactory source with respect to Palamas. See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, inGLIH, pp. 265-268.145 SCHOLARIUS, Distinction entre l’essence divine et ses opérations, in OCGS III, p. 232.146 PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, in Corpus Dionysiacum 1, ed. B.-R. SUCHLA

Ronin William147 and David Bradshaw148 have proposed that Palamas was origi-nal in arguing that Dionysius’ !$H*:*0 and :2).µ,0& were essentially identified withthe Cappadocian and Damascene >)($',0"0149. If this is correct, it is fascinating to seethat –in the West in the very same century– the exact same synthesis is taking placein Duns Scotus! Scotus does not have the wealth of the Eastern tradition to seal hisarguments by heavily basing them on the Fathers150. Instead, he differs from Palamasby employing syllogistic logic to support his reading of Dionysius and theDamascene151. All the same, I propose that Gennadius could have easily read Palamasand the Scotistic-Hervaeus as arguing the exact same position152. Dionysius’ emana-

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(Patristische Texte und Studien 33), Berlin 1990, p. 181: “aC* H>>2 :& +S'"A $(/"L-' E63A *"#H>>2 $R b' *"# H>>2 $X' c-X' d $X' 32E,"', 2C:& =2>>D $D "G$A" *"# H>>-' H>>"5 =")"*$A*D5L+.$6$"5 ^=+)+12?3"5 *"# ^E+Aµ7'"5, (>>P e'R5 G+2% $D5 T>"5 (/"LD5 =)2.:2F5 *"# $D5 =")Pfµ4' 9WFµ'2Fµ7'"5 L+-'Fµ,"5 *"# $X' µ&' +S'"A $N5 ="'$+>2%5 $2% e'R5 G+2% =)2'2,"59*E"'$A*K', $D5 :& $4' g>A*-$7)-' $2% "C$2% *"# µ")A*-$7)-' (De divinis nominibus V.1.16-21;PG 3: 816D-817A).”147 R. WILLIAM, The Philosophical Structure of Palamism, in Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977),pp. 27-44, at pp. 36-37.148 D. BRADSHAW, Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, NewYork 2006, p. 269.149 This reading is hardly original. Already, Mark Eugenicus had explicitly pushed this reading ofPalamas several times in his first antirrhetic against Calecas. See EUGENICUS, On the Distinctionbetween Essence and Energy: First Antirrhetic…, pp. 166-167, 205. E.g.: “s6$ p G"8&. tBD7µ&.;2 %&8. "T. %42 �17&2 �7&2057&2 KL*/%*0&· ‘!#-&>-2 +=572 ;2%6'(6 %X2 (")62 ;2F#1"762, |%7.<H562 &N5)62 <6#I161"’ (p. 205, ll. 21-23).”150 This question, however, is not merely patristic. Mark Eugenicus is convinced that its veraci-ty is a necessary interpretation of the analogy between divine and human hypostases, whose com-ponents (will, intellect), and divine and human natural operations (i.e. “energies”), were pro-nounced upon at Constantinople III. E.g. see EUGENICUS, On the Distinction between Essence andEnergy: Second Antirrhetic…, p. 6. He emphasizes: “>7%%X2 ;<$ %&' e24. �#75%&' %X2 ;2F#1"762.(ll. 6-8)”; ibid., p. 15: “[…] µ6#%*#&'57 >A 96$ &_ %L. o9%=. �*2->&*, %60%=2 "r267 %X2 %L. (")6.+05",. ;2F#1"762 a9%75%&2 &3562, %X2 (6*µ6%&*#1&'562 %" 96$ T,µF2=2 O<&+=2Bµ"2&7. (ll. 15-18)”; ibid., p. 40: “[…] +*579M. %" 1R# ;2*<B#K&*562 %X2 ;2F#1"762 %f &N5)h, 96$ o%"#&2 a#:6N%X2 &3562 ]. K6#69%=#75%7942 6N%L. O<&+6)2"%67, %&8. <#4 6N%&' <H572 �1)&7. 96$ %f o9%i�*2->P %M2 �T9&*µ"279M2 pµ&+�2,.. (ll. 3-6)” Eugenicus (and later Gennadius – as his disciple)utilized this analogy as authoritative in justifying the analogy of the soul as a perfect image applic-able to the distinction of the divine energies in parallel fashion. Scotus would have presumablybeen pleased to have the support by the 6th Ecumenical Council (680-681), whose Exposition hasbeen preserved in the Greek original. See Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, I, Georgetown1990, p. 124. For the texts of Exposition of the Faith making a parallel between the distinction indivine and human nature and activity, see: COeD, pp. 128-130.151 For example, see SCOTUS, Ioannis Duns…, IV, p. 230 (Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4; nos. 8-14). hvenhere he is inspired by the Damascene speaking about predication of attributes.152 The most recent opinion on the subject affirms Scholarius’ intellectual sincerity in believingthis represents a happy solution to the problem. See DEMETRACOPOULOS, Georgios Scholarios -Gennadios II, in GGP (see the section: “ Werk und Lehre”).

tiones (!$H*:*0) are equivalent to Damascene’s operationes (>)($',0"0) for DunsScotus153. He interprets Dionysius in the exact same fashion as he interprets theDamascene154.Scotus’ theology places him within the pale of Byzantine theology (at least on

this point). He is also an apologist for the presentation of the divine essence as animmanent universal (haec essentia) in the line of St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. JohnDamascene155. Fortunately, this patristic affinity has received attention from Scotistscholars156. These studies do not hint at any interest (or awareness) of Scotus’ impor-tance for the Palamite essence-energies debate. Because these authors lack anyapologetic aims in order to demonstrate Scotus’ “Eastern” perspective, their argu-ments are all the more interesting for verifying Scotus’ Palamite pedigree. RichardCross, when noting Gregory of Nyssa’s contribution to Trinitarian predication and

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153 This explains Gennadius’ “sincere belief” that Scotus’ distinction was reconcilable toPalamas.154 J.A. iERTSEN, Being and One: the Doctrine of the Convertible Transcendentals in DunsScotus, in: E.P. BOS (ed.), John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308): Renewal of Philosophy, Amsterdam1998, pp. 25-26: “Dionysius wants to make clear that all beings are in God, not, however, as theyare in created things, where they possess diversity and plurality, but unitively. From the Dionysianidea Scotus framed the notion of ‘unitive containment’. He employs it in the discussion of thequestion concerning the relation between God and his many attributes, but also applies it to otherproblems. One of these is the relation between being and the convertible transcendentals. “Scotuselaborates the concept of ‘unitive containment’ in several passages of his work. What is unitivelycontained are not perfections that are altogether identical, for those are not united but are one.Union presupposes some distinction. Neither are perfections unitively contained that are really dis-tinct in the sense that they are different res, because those are contained multipliciter or dispersim.The distinction presupposed by unitive containment is, as we have seen, ‘a minor real difference’,that is a difference not constituted by the intellect. Elsewhere Scotus calls this difference a ‘for-mal’ distinction, because it exists between different formalitates or realitates, which are not thingsbut quiddities independent of the intellect. Thus the model of ‘unitive containment’ connects a realidentity with a formal non-identity. These two features hold for the relation between being and theconvertible transcendentals. Scotus’s answer to the question whether the transcendental oneexpresses some other res than being is thus affirmative, provided that ‘thing’ is understood in thesense of realitas or formalitas.”155 Most recently, Iribarren’s conclusions have confirmed R. Cross’ argument when viewed underthe optic of Hervaeus’ own synthesis of Aquinas and Duns on this question. See IRIBARREN,Durandus of St. Pourçain…, p. 73.156 It seems that the modern ad fontes approach to Scotism (vis-à-vis the East) was inauguratedwith CROSS’ Scotistic research. See R. CROSS, Perichoresis, Deification, and ChristologicalPredication in John of Damascus, in Mediaeval Studies 62 (2000), pp. 69-124; Gregory Nyssa onUniversals, in Vigiliae Christianae 56 (2002), pp. 372-410; Two Models of Trinity?, in HeythropJournal 43 (2002), pp. 274-294; Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity, in MedievalPhilosophy and Theology 11 (2003), pp. 181-201.

the use of infinity in theology, notes that Scotus does not seem to know Gregory ofNyssa at all157. So how is it that he follows his theological line?Fortunately, the link has been secured in the theology of St. Gregory of

Nanzianzus, especially when considering his Oration XXXI, nn. 12-20158. Gregory ofNanzianzus is the main source text for the Damascene’s own Trinitarian predica-tion159. The dependence is direct. Even if Scotus shows no personal knowledge of St.Gregory of Nazianzus in his works, his reliance on the Damascene forces him to rec-oncile the essence-energies distinction and problems of predication. Scotus relieddirectly and heavily on the Damascene as his point of departure for theologizing. Hethen uses his mastery of dialectics to find a way to justify his theological a priorithinking160.In contrast, Palamas is often assumed to invoke his theoptic experience as his

authority. Clearly, Palamas’mystical intuitions are commonly agreed to be an impor-tant guide and perhaps the “regulatory idea” in his theology of the immanent and eco-nomic Trinity. Yet, where does Palamas propose such an exact parallel interpretationof both the Damascene and Dionysius as Scotus? One clear example is had in hisdebate with Nicephoros Gregoras. Palamas does not argue from <,*!#%", rather heasserts his arguments based on his explicit reading of Damascene and Dionysiusthrough the same optic161. He even argues from categorical predication162! In the

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157 ID., Gregory Nyssa on Universals, in Vigiliae Christianae 56 (2002), pp. 372-410, at p. 410.He concludes by noting that the Damascene is Scotus’ access to Gregory of Nyssa’s thought. Thereis no evidence for it being direct.158 I investigated this link by consulting B. Kotter’s critical text: JOHN DAMASCENE, Expositiofidei, ed. B. KOTTER (Patristische Texte und Studien 2), Berlin 1973, p. 29. Cfr. GREGORY OFNAZIANZUS, Discours 31. Cinquième Discours théologique: Du Saint-Esprit, in Grégoire deNazianze. Discours 27-31 (Discours théologiques). Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes(‘Sources chrétiennes’ 250), eds. P. GALLAY / M. JOURJON, Paris 1978, pp. 300-314. Along withCROSS (see footnote 156), I have detected no references to either Gregory of Nyssa or Gregory ofNazianzus in the philosophical and theological works of Scotus’ (incomplete) critical edition.Several volumes of Scotus’ theological opera omnia are still in need of correction and publication.159 CROSS, Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity, in Medieval Philosophy andTheology 11 (2003), pp. 181-201, at p. 183.160 A. Wolter refers to this as Scotus’ theologic. Scotus’ concerns were, most likely, historicallyguided as a theologian. It is only later in life that he develops themes like the “formal distinction”to enter into his activities of “pure philosophy.” Wolter brings up the point of Duns’ “theologic”multiple times in: A. WOLTER, The Transcendentals And Their Function in the Metaphysics ofDuns Scotus, St. Bonaventure 1946.161 GEORGE FRACRASÊS, Narratio Brevis, Quantum possibile est, disputationis in palatio coramimperatore habitae, Domnum Gregorium Thessalonicensem inter et philosophum Gregoram, aquodam e selectis senatoribus qui praesens adfuit et propriis auribus audivit exarata, ed. M.CANDAL, in Orientalia Christiana Periodica 16 (1950), pp. 328-357.162 See CANDAL, Fuentes palamíticas…, in Orientalia Christiana Periodica 16 (1950), pp. 303-327, at p. 323. If Palamas is read to be logically consistent with his rejection of God’s attributes

debate, Gregoras is not refuted by an appeal to divine vision or personal spiritualauthority. Instead, Palamas argues “one thing is quality x” and “another thing is qual-ity y”163. This is merely a citation of the Damascene and an academic argument fromsome sort of predication. There is little doubt in this since Gregoras’ responses toPalamas are by way of references to either a nominalistic or analogical predicationof the traits in question with respect to the divinity. In short, to my mind, this paral-lel between Scotus and Palamas can be argued as univocal predication in Palamas164.As such, it would be no surprise if Scholarius referred to Scotus as “moreOrthodox”165 than Thomas Aquinas based upon these sorts of readings of the Greek

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fitting into the genus of any of the nine predicaments (exempting substance), then a mental insightinto the transcendental or meta-categorical attributes of God is a safe approach. He calls theseattributes “quasi-accidents”. This reasoning could be based on the fact that there is something uni-vocal in the formal concept of “goodness” between a categorical goodness and a trans-categoricalgoodness. By the Scoto-Dionysian interpretation, it would only be necessary to deny any limita-tion and imperfection to this attribute and then to modify it by the concept of “infinite” withoutcontradiction (i.e. the two terms must be “compossible”). The result is a univocal modus intelli-gendi of the attribute and this expresses itself in the modus significandi even if the modus essendiis really different for both God and the creature. With this view in mind, Palamas can be argued tohave simply taken his mystical insight and analyzed it with reference to the significatum of eachterm in question. This would simply be a sort of “layman’s” logical attempt to avoid total equivo-cation. For a detailed discussion of Palamas’ own employment of the Categories in relation to histheology see: J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, o='*21#p)*& 3"; X$A'H$0*& U"/"µY&…, pp. 13-14; 49-63;191-192.163 First Palamas notices that “operation” and “essence” have a diverse definition in Expositiofidei I, 3 (PG 94: 1048A). He follows up later in the debate with Damascene’s (I, 8-9) -Duns’ pre-ferred texts distinguishing God’s activities from his essence. Palamas explicitly links this withPSEUDO-DENYS’ De divinis nominibus, 3 and 5. FRACASÊS, Narratio Brevis…, in OrientaliaChristiana Periodica 16 (1950), pp. 328-357, at pp. 330-334, 336-341, 346.164 Scotus explicitly attributes his univocal predication to Dionysius, by way of a process. Scotusargues: “[A]dducitur intentio Dionysii De divinis Nominibus, qui ponit tres gradus cognoscendiDeum, scilicet per eminentiam, per causalitatem, et per abnegationem; et ponit illam cognitionemper abnegationem esse ultimam, quando removentur a Deo omnia illa, quae sunt communia crea-turis; ergo non intelligit ipse, quod aliquis conceptus, qui est abstractus a creaturis, remaneat inDeo, secundum quod fuit communis creaturae (Ord., I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 2).”165 “But according to the designation of most of us, the more recent [Schoolmen] are more ortho-dox than Thomas; being that they are closer to us and to the truth; i.e., those surrounding theMaster John Scotus (OCGS VI, Prooemium; p. 180, ll. 32-35; translation mine).” In the same work,he also makes this affirmation about unnamed theologians in order to mitigate the criticism ofThomas Aquinas. He does not defend Thomas directly, but does defend (Thomas’?) successors(viz., Hervaeus?) connected with his doctrine: “[T]hey do not know that many from among theLatin magistri have laid down definitions more in harmony with Holy Gregory of Thessalonicaand with our entire Church. […] It would not be just to despise these men, since they are most wiseand have cast their lot on the side of our Church, being that they have distinctly thought it good toform a lofty opinion about these matters (OCGS VI, c. 94; p. 283, ll. 14-19; translation mine).”

Fathers and fellow Palamites. Nonetheless, Scholarius’ approval of Scotus and hisschool does not constitute a direct dependence on Duns Scotus’ writings. This neces-sitates our mediator, Hervaeus. As Iribarren notes:

Hervaeus’s affinity to Scotus is remarkable. Both theologians believe that the divineessence, as a singular being, is predicated by identity of the three persons withoutthereby incurring division. In this respect, Hervaeus explains the distinction betweenessence and relations as a non-converse identity, which, like the Scotist formal dis-tinction, is based on a fundamental distinction between the reality and the formality ofa thing166.

Scholars may not agree that Palamas allows for a consistent read with respect tohis essence-energies distinction167. It would be unsurprising, therefore, if some willreject the thesis that Palamas can be read in harmony with Duns Scotus on this spe-cific point (scil., the ad intra energies). Still, Gennadius’ reading of Palamas is a sep-arate question. It is sufficient to say that Gennadius was apt to see the reconcilabili-ty between these two positions. Iribarren’s point-by-point comparison of Scholasticauthors in her recently published book on Durandus of Pourçain also helps us solvemany questions about Scholarius168. In short, Scholarius –by using Hervaeus– wasable to preserve an approach that was both built upon Thomistic foundations and yetwas capable of bridging the insurmountable gap between Thomism and PalamiteOrthodoxy via the theology of the Subtle Doctor169.

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166 IRIBARREN, The Scotist Background…, pp. 626-627.167 For example, Williams usefully fills the opening pages of her work on Aquinas and Palamaswith a summary of all the various positions and readings of Palamas on a variety of questions. SeeA. WILLIAMS, The Ground of Union. Deification in Aquinas and Palamas, Oxford 1999, pp. 8-27.Most recently, J. Demetracopoulos has challenged the assertion that there is any consistent read-ing of Palamas within the context of the Palamite tradition of the 14th and 15th centuries. He haseven argued that Mark of Ephesus is not internally consistent with his own presentation ofPalamas’ distinction as being a distinctio rationis or distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re. SeeDEMETRACOPOULOS, Palamas Transformed…, in GLIH, pp. 263-372, at pp. 342-371.168 E.g. IRIBARREN’s demonstration of Hervaean hybrid-Thomism makes certain comments andcritiques of Scholarius anachronistic. For example, Barbour wonders if Gennadius was confusedabout Thomism. Barbour has the impression (like some other 20th century authors) that Scholariusdoes not clearly understand the difference between the Thomistic and Scotistic school. SeeBARBOUR, Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios…, p. 78. In reality, it is modern scholarswho have only begun to understand fully the free mixing and borrowing of “Thomists” fromScotus (and even early Franciscans from Thomas, e.g. Richard of Middleton). As such, Gennadiushad a more accurate view of the Thomistic school of the 13th and 14th century than many 20th cen-tury scholars.169 I would like to express my sincerest thanks to Rev. Dr. Peter Damian Fehlner, F.I., for hisinsights and suggested corrections, especially with respect to the Doctor Marianus. I would alsolike to thank Carol Kappes for her helpful suggested corrections contributing to clarity of expres-sion of this paper’s English.

Abbreviations

COeD Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, EDB, Bologna 1991.CPMA A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Blackwell Publishing, eds. J.

Garcia / T. Noone, Oxford 2003.GGP Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Begründet von F. Überweg. Die

Philosophie des Mittelalters. I/1: Die byzantinische Philosophie, ed. G. Kapriev,Basel (forthcoming).

GLIH Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204-1500, eds. M. Hinterberger / Ch.Schabel (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales. Bibliotheca, 11),Leuven 2011.

IS Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650, ed. J. Garcia, New York 1994.

Lectura IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani operaomnia , Civitas Vaticana 1950-. N.b. This includes Books 1 and 2 of the Lectura(vols. XVI-XIX).

Metaph. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.Libri VI-IX, IV, St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1997.

MNC W. GASS, Die Mystik des Nicolaus Cabasilas vom Leben in Christo, Leipzig1899 (1st edition: 1849), pp. 217-225.

NV Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universitätvon Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts Studien und Texte, eds. J.A.Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin 2000.

OCGS GENNADIUS SCHOLARIUS, Oeuvres Complètes de Georges Scholarios, I-VIII, eds.L. Petit / X. Sidéridès / M. Jugie, Paris 1928-1935.

Ord. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ioannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani operaomnia, Civitas Vaticana 1950-. N.b. Vols. I and IV are part of the Ordinatio(Opus Oxoniense).

PG Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1857-1866.Porphyrogenita Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the

Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides, eds. Ch. Dendrinos / J. Harris /I. Harvalia-Crook / J. Herrin, London 2003.

Quodlibet. Quodlibeta seu Quaestiones quodlibetales.Reportatio IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-

A. Latin Text and English Translation, I, St. Bonaventure 2004.RTPM Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 74/2 (2007).Sent. Sententiae or any general Commentum in Sententias Petri Lombardi.SCG THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra Gentiles. Editio Leonina Manualis, Rome

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