Anti Racist Action the Green Mountain Anarchist Collective Black Bloc Tactics Communique.lt

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e Anarchist LibraryAnti-CopyrightJanuary 13, 2013

Anti-Racist Action & e Green Mountain Anarchist CollectiveBlack Bloc Tactics Communiqu

A Communiqu on Tactics and Organization tothe Black Bloc, from within the Black Bloc

July 2001

Retrieved on January 7, 2013 fromhp://www.sheffieldmayday.ukf.net/articles/blackbloc.htm

Anti-Racist Action & The Green

Mountain Anarchist Collective

Black Bloc Tactics

Communiqu

A Communiqu on Tactics and

Organization to the Black Bloc,

from within the Black Bloc

July 2001


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Contents

Introductory Notes For e Second Amended Addition . . . . . . 5Introductory Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Our Movement Grows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Anarchism and e Broader Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

e Development Of e Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Our Local Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8At Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9e Necessity Of Increasing Our Tactical Abilities . . . . . . . . . 10Increased Tactical Ability Of Street Fighting Force:e Formation Of An Elected Tactical Facilitation Core . . . . . 11Individual Affinity Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14ere are also support AG roles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Reconnaissance and Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Additional Security Precautions: Maps, Radios, IDs,Names, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Communiqus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Anarchist Principles of Tactical Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Physical Training In between Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Pre-emptive Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Preparations For Increased State Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Development Of Our Social and Political Understandings . . . 28Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


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during the times in between actions. Fore the Anarchist movement,as stated by Bakunin, is driven by the instinct to rebel, but it isalso done so by the conscious emergence of a revolutionary people.e folk who make up the Black Bloc should be examples not justofAnarchist fighting courage, but also ofAnarchist awareness. Weshould study the histories of the Paris Commune, RevolutionaryUkraine, Kronstadt, Spain, as well as the Paris revolt of 68.

In addition we should read the writings of Bakunin, Kropotkin,Mahkno, Emma Goldman, Meltzer, Guy Debord, Bookchin, and Ladyto name but a few. In a word, we must expand our relevant under-standings in order to completely transcend the oppressive indoctri-nation that the State has perpetuated on us since the time of ourbirth. We must exercise our capacity for understanding in order torealize our creative consciousness. And finally, we must strive tofurther develop Anarchist theory in directions directly relevant tothe contemporary modes of neo-Capitalism; namely that of radicalcommodification and consumerism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this communiqu is put forward with the intent tospark the constructive development of our revolutionary abilities.It is not meant to be authoritative insomuch as it is intended tofacilitate a positive internal dialogue.

However, it is our hopes that at least some of the above sugges-tions areseriously debated andthenadopted by ourfellow Black BlocAnarchists. We encourage you to replicate and distribute this com-muniqu however you choose (as long as it is not done for Capitalistprofit).

In Solidarity,

Anti-Racist Action -Lady

Te Green Mountain Anarchist Collective -David -X -Natasha

No Rights Reserved.


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is clearly occurred in the late 60s and we must fully understandthat it will happen again. As commied revolutionaries of practicalmind, we must prepare for eventualities. is is no game. In suchwe must form clandestine networks where in we can maintain theability to exist as an underground fighting force if and when thecircumstances demand.

Such an underground force must entail, among other things, ac-

cess to alternative identification, known and trusted safe houses,friends in strategic positions, access to materials of necessary subsis-tence (i.e. food, medicine, etc.), an underground means of communi-cation, ways to pass unseen through international boarders and theknow how to continue our militant activities underground.

e fact of the maer is, when our above ground activities drawthe response of police shotgun blasts, the mass long term incarcer-ation of our militants, or when it all becomes a socially acceptablefarce within the blanket of the spectacle, then we must be preparedto meet the challenges of the State by other means; still militant andun-abstracted, yet underground.

Furthermore, it must be understood that when extreme crisis sit-uations occur, the kind of which that would force us underground,there will not be the time to organize the basic means of such an exis-tence. Likewise, when the greater social break down of the presentlydominate system occurs, there will not be time to organize a solidpopular fighting force. erefore, we must prepare now for thatwhich we recognize as an inevitable outcome of our revolutionaryactivities. We must and will aack the leviathan head on, then fromthe shadows, and then again face-to-face. e only result can besocial revolution.

Here we would like to remind you that firearms are still legal, asof print, and easily aainable in the United States.

Development Of Our Social and Political

Understandings

Lastly, we must practice self-discipline in regards to our contin-uing practical and theoretical studies of social and political ideas

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July 2001, From Somewhere in Te Mid-west

is Document is directly applicable to the particularities of theAnarchist movement in North America. Any applications of thebelow analysis and tactical proposals to the particularities of thestruggle in different regions, should entail a general modification ofcontent in order to maintain an obvious and sufficient relevance.

Introductory Notes For e Second

Amended Addition

e edition which you are currently holding, is the product ofex-tensive conversations between folk from within the ARA and G-mac.rough these conversations, consensus was reached regarding cer-tain principles of revolutionary organization.

Key changes were made to the section proposing the use of re-serves, affinity groups, the tactical facilitation core, as well as minorchanges throughout the document. We feel these changes make for

a stronger proposal. We, of course, welcome further discussion andamendments where necessary.

Introductory Notes

e following document is presented with the intention of further-ing the basic effectiveness of our movement by advocating varioustactical practices that we hope will be adopted by the Black Bloc as awhole. e inspiration for this work comes from our complete lovefor the creative ability/potential of humankind and our uncompro-

mising dedication to social revolution.Portions of this work tend to take on a militaristic tone. is tone

should not be misconstrued as a back door justification for arbitraryhierarchical models of organizing. Rather, the reality of our militantstruggle necessitates the language used in order to most accuratelydepict our objective circumstances and the methods we must implyin order to come closer to victory. Here it should be pointed out thatunder no circumstances do we advocate any organizational modelthat in essence is not compatible with those utilized democratically


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by Anarchists and revolutionary workers as practiced during theParis Commune (1871) and the Spanish Civil War (19369).

In order to put this work together, we reflected on our own col-lective experiences as well as looked to history to learn what workswithin an Anarchistic framework and what does not. It is our inten-tion here to present an accurate, yet brief, analysis of the presentstate of the movement generally, as well as the steps we (the Black

Bloc) must take in order to further the cause. Also, the below pro-posals are directly intended for Black Bloc incorporation only.

Forany acrossthe board Anarchistadaptation of themoremilitantproposals (such as found in the section Preparations For IncreasedState Repression) would lead to the weakening of the all importantabove ground community organizing efforts. We view these effortsas primary to the general cause in that it is through them that thewider populace is brought over consciously to the Anarchist Le.Our struggle must be conducted at all levels.

Lastly, we encourage you to read this work and discuss it withinyour collective and/or with other folk within the Black Bloc Anar-chist community. It is our hope that such collectives and interestedpeople connected with the Black Bloc will sign their names (notnecessarily their given names) to this and implement the tactical pro-posals suggested below. In the likely case that the below documentis partially unacceptable to our community of struggle, it is our hopethat such points of contention be discussed, debated and amendedas necessary in order to reach Black Bloc consensus.

We here ask that the various Anarchist newspapers and periodi-cals open up their leer sections for this purpose.

Anti-Racist Action -Lady

e Green Mountain Anarchist Collective -David -X -Natasha

Our Movement Grows

During the course of the past year (since the bale of Seale) wehave been witnessing/participating in a maturity of the larger socialprotest movement as well as the smaller (yet growing) revolutionaryAnarchist movement. is is a result of eight basic reasons:

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or acts of civil disobedience begin. ey also start their tactical mo-bilization long before the sun comes up prior to the demonstrationson any particular day.

In order to neutralize this advantage, limited elements presentlyengaged in Black Bloc actions should independently take counter-measures. Here sabotage of police (and when necessary, NationalGuard) equipment is our best bet.

For if one of the primary advantages of the forces of the State istheir mechanized mobility, then we should strike out against theserepressive tools by effective, clandestine means. Separate affinitygroups under their own direction should voluntarily coordinate suchactions. ese groups should number very few in relation to thebroader Bloc, and should not take part in any subsequent aboveground actions thereaer during the days events.

In addition, the intent and identity of these groups should obvi-ously remain absolutely secret to the Bloc as a whole. ere can beno chain of command between them and the rest. ey must operatecompletely on their own, voluntarily, and by structural models oftheir choosing (as long as they are consistent with Anarchist princi-ples of organization). Such clandestine activity, if preformed effec-tively, holds the possibility of considerably disrupting the abilitiesof the enemy, and therefore can substantially place new advantageswith the Black Bloc.

Preparations For Increased State

Repression

estronger ourmovement becomes, themorelikely it will bethatthe State will more thoroughly criminalize Anarchism, specifically oftheBlackBloc variety. As we speak, we must assumethat theFBI hasalready compiled a dossier on many of us. We must also assume thatmany of ourlocal Anarchistorganizations andcollectives arealreadybeing watched and that infiltrators are working on penetrating ourranks; in certain cases we have no doubt that they already have.

In addition, as our movement progresses into more serious phases,we must anticipate a much more violent State reaction against us.


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immobilization. And given the forces of the States advantage inweaponry, immobilizationis akin to defeat. Such was the case duringthe A16 action on Monday, where shortly thereaer the tail end ofthe Bloc (who was then immersed with non-Bloc elements) wascordoned off by police and subsequently arrested.

In regards to the later, such ability to call in reserves at relevanttime could be the deference of immediate victory or defeat. And, in

this case it is necessary to place this ability in thehands of theelectedg-tacs in order to guard against any misuse brought on by agentprovocateurs, and/or to prevent general time consuming tacticaldebates which the heat of direct conflict do not allow for. Withthis proposed organizational model, a relatively small Black Bloc(containing no reserves) numbering roughly 200 would have theeffectiveness of twice that number in regards to our present abilities.And likewise, a larger Bloc numbering 700, with a reserve force of300, would dramatically gain in tactical ability.

Physical Training In between Actions

In between actions it is of vast importance that we increase ourphysical abilities through the practice of regular exercise, musclebuilding and self-defense training.

At present, the Black Bloc is considerably lacking in certain ofthese compartments. is is true to the point where individuals whopose muscle tone are sometimes distrusted as potential police agents.e fact is, if we are going to defend ourselves against the forces oftheState, we shouldtake ourphysical conditioning at least as seriousas our enemy, and preferably more seriously. e reactionary policeand military are aware of the importance of this in regards to theirown effectiveness, and so should we.

Pre-emptive Actions

e forces of the State are regularly known to take pre-emptivemeasures against demonstrators prior to their actions. ey regu-larly infiltrate us and make arrests before any general demonstration

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1. e experiential emptiness of intensified neo-Capitalist commod-ification of pseudo-reality and its necessary results of mass alien-ation, anxiety and Boredom.

2. e continuing failure of the present system to alleviate materialdeprivation (poverty) amongst certain sectors of working classand poor.

3. Overt aempts by leading neo-Capitalist powers to homogenize

world economy/culture through elitist centralized organizationssuch as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and WorldTrade Organization has triggered a populist backlash and moti-vated the usually dormant trade unions.

4. e reconciliation of previously splintered counter-culture (ur-ban punk, rural hippy, etc.) has allowed for a wider base fromwhich shis in popular social consciousness are disseminating.

5. Increased communications abilities through out the populoushas resulted in organizational/mobilization advances amongstthe social protest and revolutionary Anarchist movements.

6. Experience gained by organizations through out the last decadehas vastly increased the practical ability of the movement as awhole.

7. e generational maturity of the children of the 60s and 70shas now come to full fruition. is is a fact that should not beoverlooked as we intend to build on and further destroy whereour mothers and fathers le off. And finally,

8. Police repression as experienced through out the United Statesand Canada during the course of this last year has had the resultof radicalizing 10,000s of previously Liberal demonstrators fromone coast to the other and back.

Anarchism and e Broader Movement

While the broader movement has affected some important prac-tical and consciousness building victories, it is still too malleableand indecisive to put an uncritical trust in its visual organizations(as encapsulated in the Direct Action Network). As revolutionaryAnarchists we must continue to support and encourage its participa-tory and directly democratic currents while steering it away from its


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unconscious tendencies towards spectacular abstraction and Liberalcapitulation. We must continue to do this through the disseminationof revolutionary Anarchist theory as well as by direct example, bothof the kind on the streets, in community organizing efforts and inregards to our lifestyles.

is must continue to be a priority both at demonstrations aswell as within the particularities of our local communities. In this

capacity we must be vigilant not to limit our dialectical interactionswith the movement itself. In a word, we must continue to reachout to the yet included masses. For it is only through their directparticipation that the present system of oppression will be foreverdisintegrated and thrown into the wastebasket of history.

e Development Of e Movement

For all of the above reasons, this past year has been marked as aprogressive stepping-stone towards the continuing resurgence of the

revolutionary Anarchist movement. is in spite of certain painfulset backs such as the demise of the Love and Rage organization andthe Fire Cracker Info Shop in Massachuses.

e objective historical situation, as well as our new-found prac-tical abilities, has resulted in us moving two steps forward for everystep back. However, before we become full of conceit, let it be saidthat we have many, many dangerous steps to traverse before wereach the end of this epic.

Our Local Communities

It is in our specific communities that we (Black Bloc and Anar-chists generally) are able to push the revolutionary Anarchist move-ment forward through diligent and relevant community organizingthrough outthe ranks of thedisfranchised. Here we must continue todo this by forming workers co-operatives, community centers, news-papers, the creation of Anarchist art as well as by direct politicalaction when ever possible.

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resolved) or at the general pre-action meeting of the entire BlackBloc (also aer all other issues are resolved.

Such communiqus are important in regards to reaching out tothe broader populous, as well as to debunking the demonization ofour activities as can be expected to emanate out of the corporatepress (and also oen from the Liberal Le and orthodox/conservativeCommunist press).

In addition to a post-action communiqu, it is also important thatseparate communiqus be composed prior to the action and distrib-uted during the action. ese should also discuss the reasons whywe take to the (our) streets the way we do as well as address thebroader social issues, which brought us to the action at hand. eindividual affinity groups should facilitate these. In turn the affinitygroups and/or relevant support persons should take the responsi-bility of distributing them during the action to the public and theindependent media as they see fit.

All such communiqus should be signed with the name of theresponsible affinity group or individual as to maintain accountability.All anonymous statements must be assumed to emanate out of thebowels of State, with the purpose of discrediting us.

Anarchist Principles of Tactical

Leadership

e idea ofseing up such a democratic chain ofcommand is notto diminish the free spontaneity of the Bloc, but is simply to increasethe general mobility and fighting ability of the Black Bloc during

time of need.e primary functions of this general tactical facilitation core

(g-tacs) will simply be to guide the direction of Bloc movement andthe ability to call for the deployment of reserve forces.

In regards to the former, this would minimize regreable timeconsuming debates as to which way to go at various intersections.e more we can avoid such time consuming indecisiveness thebeer, as such slow downs carry with them the potential to putthe whole Bloc in danger of police surrounding and subsequent


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ese maps were not encrypted, and therefore, by detaining,searching and subsequently recovering these maps from these indi-viduals the police achieved the advantage of knowing the intendedmovement of the Bloc before it happened. It is impossible to knowexactly what affect this intelligent had on the days events (as it isalso difficult to surmise whether or not the police had informantsat the prior meeting as some have maintained), but regardless, this

mishap represented a major slip in security.erefore, it is absolutely necessary that for now on all such maps

be encrypted so as to avoid this slip up.In addition, all radio communication should be conducted with

the use of preplanned codes and frequencies where and wheneverpossible. All such codes and frequencies should be made known toall parties who have a legitimate trust in maintaining radio commu-nication with us.

Also, it should go with out saying that nobody, under any circum-stances should carry any form of ID or personal contact information.If you get arrested with this information it will only be used to fuckyou.

Lastly, do not refer to yourself or others you know by your realfull name while in the vicinity of the action. e less we make publicour actual identities the beer off we are regarding possible legalaction and State harassment.

Communiqus

It is important that all Black Bloc actions be followed with a com-prehensive communiqu, which is, whenever possible composed by

a large representative volunteer commiee from the various affinitygroups.

is communiqu should discuss the action in terms of why itoccurred, why specific conflicts/tactics developed and how this im-mediate struggle is connected with the broader Anarchist movementtowards a liberated and creative world. To achieve this, a post-actionmeeting should be arranged at a secure location. e details of whenand where it will be held should be decided upon at the pre-actionmeeting ofelected officers/spokes people (aer all other issues are

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At the large demonstrations we are able to push our movementforward by the organizing and subsequent action of our Black Bloc.

At Demonstrations

It is by virtue of the uncompromising militancy of this (our) Blocthat Liberal demonstrations are transformed into insurrectionary

happenings. By physically defending ourselves against State (police)aacks, we adda serious dimension to an otherwise timid movement.By effectively defending non-violent protesters against the assaultsof the police (such as at the A16 action in DC) we demonstrate theextra-symbolic power of the people while increasing the relativeeffectiveness of the overall action.

By aacking and destroying Capitalist private property (such asin the bale of Seale) we go beyond rhetoric and actually inflictreal material damage upon the urban out-posts of the oppressiveand totally uninteresting commodified empire of the new Capitalists.

By our method we transform indecisiveness and restraint into realaction.ose upper middle class Pacifists who clamor that we are wrong

by virtue of our demonstrated principles should be reminded thatthe only legitimate goal of mass demonstrations is to effect relevantsocial and revolutionary change for the benefit of the working class,poor, and declassed peoples. It is not, nor never should ever be, tobe arrested and brutally beaten for the sake of some vain associationwith Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr.

Furthermore, let us all reflect upon the fact that India today ispresently in shambles due to continued Capitalist exploitation, and

the American Blacks are still treated as second-class citizens bythe State apparatus and plutocracy alike. ese are travesties thatonly a genuine and victorious international revolutionary Anarchistmovement, utilizing both violent and non-violent methods, will beable to fully rectify. It is in this very real context that we fight.

We will not, nor should we, compromise our hatred or love anymore then wewill compromise ourgoal of complete socialrevolution,Anarchy, and the dream of all of humanity unshackled from thechains which are both seen and unseen. We make no apologies.


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e Necessity Of Increasing Our Tactical

Abilities

e forces of the State (specifically the FBI and police) have beenstudying us for some time. Hence it is absolutely necessary thatwe further develop our tactical understanding and practical streetabilities if we are to maintain, and in fact increase our militant capa-bilities.

In this regards there are some basic steps that we must take inorder to meet this challenge:

1. Increased organization of street fighting force2. Regular physical training in between actions3. Facilitation of pre-emptive strikes4. Preparation for eventuality of intensified State oppression and

the shiing of the movement of social protest into that of directsocial revolution

5. Increased internal social and political education between actionsand development of theory.

At the present time, the mobilization of our forces is done insuch haphazard manner that our ability to combat well-trained anddisciplined State forces is limited. In fact it is only by virtue ofourrevolutionary dedication and iron constitutions that we have beenable to combat these forces with the level of relative success that wethus far have.

ey (the forces of the State) fight out of hatred of diversity andfree expression and for a paycheck. We fight out ofhatred ofoppres-

sion and love, and simply because it is the just thing to do. However,as the agents of the State modify their present tactics, based ontheir direct experiences and vast intelligence reports from Seale toQbec City, they can be expected to achieve a further level of effec-tive superiority over us in the near future. erefore, it is absolutelynecessary that we begin to reorganize ourselves in such a way as toagain bring certain advantages to our side.

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full speed, and then immediately engage in bale. is is somethingto keep in mind when such forces are being initially organized.

When and where this reserve is utilized correctly with speed andstrength, it can be expected to cause surprise and demoralizationamong the ranks of the enemy. e very fact that we demonstratethese fairly sophisticated maneuvers can be expected to result inthe enemy questioning their personal security and apparent tactical

superiority. It is just such objective a subjective shis and develop-ments at the acute scene of conflict that can and will lend itself tothe swinging of fighting momentum to our side.

Of course, this positive development can and will only be sus-tained if the bloc holds fast in the face of the increased police fero-ciousness and brutality in the conflict at hand. is situation shouldbe expected to occur in direct relation to police feeling that they arein real danger due to our utilization of serious tactics. Here, oneshould recall that all animals are most dangerous when they arebacked in a corner and sense their own demise.

Additional Security Precautions: Maps,

Radios, IDs, Names, etc.

While it is sensible that all affinity groups (all persons for thatmaer) have a detailed map of the area of operation, it has beenproven that such maps must absolutely be marked only in code.

During the R2k action in Philly, at least two Black Bloc individu-als where arrested in a pre-emptive strike approximately forty-fiveminutes aer a Black Bloc meeting (at which they were in aen-

dance) and an hour and a half prior to the demonstration proper. Ontheir persons were maps of the downtown equipped with pennedin locations of the various Black Bloc emergency convergence sitesas well as areas where the Bloc intended to focus their activity aswell as locations where they planned on marching in order to ac-cumulate material for barricade construction when and if the daysdevelopments demanded.


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are infiltrators leeching around us, and the word reserves shouldnever be used when communicating in public.

Prior to the re-emerging with the Black Bloc, combat with theState should be avoided by these reserves, unless in self-defense, orunavoidable. Maintaining a low profile is vital. It is desirable thatthe reserves de-bloc and become regular.

Black Bloc clothing should be worn underneath regular clothing.

is enables the reserves to blend in beer and become less distin-guishable as members of the black bloc to police helicopters andinformants of the state. When they are called for by the g-tacs, thereserve group(s)/cluster(s) should remove their regular. Clothing toreveal their true colors underneath. e regular clothing could bediscarded and thrown away. However, keeping a change of clothingon your person for later use is, of course, a personal decision.

Anything,which is notof absolute necessity, shouldnot be carried.e absolute condition necessary for reserve effectiveness is deploy-ment speed. Without this, they may be prevented from re-emergingwith the larger bloc and/or fail to reach the scene ofacute action ata time where their force can swing their immediate struggle in ourfavor.

For this purpose the reserves should be organized as a sort oflight infantry. ey should possess only the minimum of riot gearto refrain from their being weighted down. is means that theyshould eliminate gear, which would obstruct in quick lightweightmovement, such as helmets, shields, heavy body armor, or back-packs. ey should be equipped only with gas masks or vinegarsoaked bandannas, and a minimum ofoffensive gear (as individu-als of affinity groups see necessary). e only exception with this

should be the medics, who should carry a skeleton assortment ofrelated equipment.

It would be ideal if all reserves were equipped with bicycles sothat the greatest level of mobility could be reached. Such bicyclescan be used for offense and defense, and must be discard able.

However, in the absence of such bikes, reserve forces should becomposed of affinity groups/individuals who are in good cardiovas-cular shape. ese forces must be prepared to run up to a mile at

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Increased Tactical Ability Of Street

Fighting Force: e Formation Of An

Elected Tactical Facilitation Core

Our experiences over the course of the last year has taught us alot regarding the actual and potential effectiveness ofBlack Blocs

during large demonstrations.A16 demonstrated the incorporation of large blocs used in tight

conjunction with non-violent contingents. It showed us how thecombined tactics of physical self defense (from the Bloc) and non-violent lockdowns can, at this historical juncture, result in effectiveoccupations of large sections of the city shape.

J20 showed how a tightly knit Bloc, lined with defensive bannersaround its perimeters, can help foster confidence and act as a moresubstantial deterrent to targeted police arrests.

A20 showed how even a relatively small Bloc (as on Saturday, the21st) can become a substantial fighting force when the physical and

mental commitment is there.However, our experiences have also illustrated certain shortcom-

ings that we thus far are yet to overcome. Specifically our lack of ademocratic tactical command structure has hindered our abilities toact with more punctuating speed and tactical ferociousness. In cer-tain circumstances this failure has resulted in us becoming boggeddown in indecisiveness(specifically regardingmovement), and hencehas put us in danger as well as lead to arrests (i.e. on the Mondayof the A16 action). erefore, we contend that we need to develop ademocratic tactical command structure that heightens our mobility

while simultaneously not compromising our Anarchist principles.In regards to this, we propose that the present use of electedaffinity group spokes people be expanded to that of acute tacticalfacilitator (a-tacs). e role of this person should be to help facilitatethe organized movementof their immediate section as recommendedby the general tactical facilitation core (discussed below). In addition,each affinity group should also elect an alternate in case the first isincapacitated due to injury or arrest.


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Following the general meeting of the Black Bloc, at which thebroad plans for the days action should have already been discussed,debated and then decided upon based on consensus, all such electeda-tacs should meet in private (such privacy here is recommended asa security precaution). At this meeting a general tactical facilitationcore (g-tacs) should be elected, again by consensus. ese g-tacsshould act as the facilitators of Bloc movement in such a way as it

complies with the general plan of action as defined at the prior openmeeting.

e identity of the g-tacs will be made discreetly known to alltrusted affinity group members through their elected spokes/a-tacsas befiing following the conclusion of the closed spokes meeting.Any affinity group which has had their a-tac elected to the tacticalfacilitation core should elect a new a-tac. In cases in which theBloc is expected to be large and to march on mass, affinity groupsshould be made responsible for specific positions within the Bloc;specifically the front, right side, le side and rear (this should bedone at the general open meeting).

is would essentially create four main clusters within the Bloc.(Note: the use of clusters is further discussed in the affinity groupsection.) In turn the elected g-tacs should number 12 persons. esepersons should emanate out of the clusters, which they will be re-sponsible for (this will be further discussed below).

ese twelve should be further divided into four groups of three.In turn these three should be positioned as such:

1. A person at the specific cluster, which they will be directly re-sponsible for (front, rear, le or right).

2. A person near the middle of the Bloc where they will be togetherwith the representatives of the other clusters.3. A person to act as a runner between their cluster g-tac and the

g-tac group in the middle.

In general, all time sensitive decisions specifically regarding move-ment should be recommended by the consensus of the central g-taccore based on information emanating from the specific perimetertacs, and reliable reconnaissance information.

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this knowledge would almost certainly result in the state (police)aacking our isolated reserves.

In relation to police force, we have smaller (two rows deep/12across each), to reunite with the larger Bloc. Dividing these forcesinto such smaller, more manageable groups/clusters, allows for themto be called in as needed. It essentially skips the step taken to dividenumbers of the reserved Bloc, and allows for greater security in the

event that reserve locations are discovered by the state (where itis possible that one group/cluster is uncovered by the State, it isunlikely that all will be).

As alluded to above, it is not always necessary when reserves areneeded, to call all of their existing numbers. e further divisionof these reserves into smaller groups/clusters allows them to becalled in based on geographic proximity and/or required force, andwill result in optimal mobility. When a relatively large numberof reserves is called in, say three groups/clusters of 50, they couldconverge on the acute scene of bale from several directions. Whenproperly utilized, such tactics could be expected to confuse and stiflethe States comprehension of the developing combat situation.

It is also conceivable that such tactics could be coordinated soas such enemy forces are effectively flanked, there by forcing theenemy into retreat, or re-routing them entirely.

When the reserve force is inactive, a low profile must be main-tained. ey should keep a distance that places them away fromacute aack, while being close enough so that the police cannoteasily break their re-emerging with the rest of the Bloc. e dis-tance the reserve Bloc falls back from the larger Bloc could be just afew city blocks, but nonetheless should be decided by the reserves

themselves, with g-tac input.Leering of the groups/clusters of the reserves would be benefi-

cial for g-tacs to beer manage the location of these reserves. Forexample, group/cluster B resides on the East side of the larger BlackBloc, and the g-tacs know this. A g-tac is then able to call for group/cluster B, without giving an extraneous amount directions and infor-mation over the radio/cell, therefore resulting in less information forthe state to get their hands on. We should assume always that there


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Deployment (where and how many) of the reserves should bele to the g-tacs. Specifics of how to meet this deployment throughwhich streets to take, etc., shouldbe leto theaffected affinitygroups.When speed becomes an issue, the elected a-tacs within affinitygroups should be prepared to make educated suggestions, no reserveshould be posted. With such small numbers, a reserve force wouldonly result in the general weakening of the Bloc, whereas, we need

all able bodies for immediate release on the streets. e details offorming a reserve, if any, and means of communication should bediscussed aer the election of the g-tacs.

Note that the g-tacs receive their information on seriousness ofcombat and the need for reserves from cells of the larger bloc. eg-tacs decision to mobilize a number of inactive reserves is givenwhen groups within the larger bloc call for backup. Deployment(where and how many) of the reserves should be le to the g-tacs.Specifics of how to meet this deployment through which streetsto take, etc., should be le to the affected affinity groups. Whenspeed becomes an issue, the elected a-tacs within the effected affinitygroups should be prepared to make educated suggestions (whichthose effected are free to adopt or not). e exact location of thereserve forces should not be revealed to the Bloc as a whole. eonly people who should be informed of their exact location shouldbe the g-tacs.

It is also suggested that location of the reserves are formally de-cided upon at the last moments, when the position is soon to beheld. is is necessary in that the common knowledge of their loca-tion would expectedly result in this information leaking into policehands through common infiltration techniques. In turn, this knowl-

edge would almost certainly result in the state (police) aacking ourisolated reserves.

In relation to police force, we have smaller of their exact locationshould be the g-tacs. It is also suggested that location of the reservesare formally decided upon at the last moments, when the positionis soon to be held. is is necessary in that the common knowledgeof their location would expectedly result in this information leakinginto police hands through common infiltration techniques. In turn,

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In addition, these g-tacs should also entail certain role specificsupport persons in order that they are able to function efficientlyand safely. Hence, all g-tacs stationed at the perimeters should beequipped with two persons from their affinity group or otherwise.One of which should be responsible for maintaining radio commu-nication with reconnaissance teams and/or other important con-stituents. e other should be present in order to watch the tacs

back.We must be aware of the fact that these folk will quickly be identi-

fied by the forces of the State, and therefore will likely be singled outfor arrest. Likewise, the central g-tac core should also be equippedwith a few persons on radio, and a few persons concerning them-selves with security.

Also, thespecific roles of thevariousg-tacs, be it runner, perimeterperson or core group, should be rotated as the days action ensues.Again, such a rotation is to limit any developing trend aimed ata psychological tendency towards authoritarianism amongst thecentral g-taccore. And again, it shouldbe remindedthat the functionof these folk would primarily have to do with Bloc movement (i.e.which road to take, which way to go at an intersection). ey willnot be playing the role of generals or abstract leaders in anyway.

Here it is important to stress several things. First, we do notadvocate the creating of a permanent officer clique. ese electedpositions should only last as long as the action at hand. If the actionlasts more then a single day, then it would be good to elect new tacsfor the different days. Also, their positions should be revocable bythe general whole at any time.

Lastly, the influence which they shall wield will not be beyond the

role of facilitators of a general plan adopted to the general meetingof the Black Bloc. Any steps they may aempt to take beyond theseperimeters would b e grounds for dismissal. And ofcourse, we are notadvocating the formalization of any authoritarian army structure.

It must be made clear that all participants in the Bloc innatelyreserve the right to disobey tac suggestions as well as to desert. Insuch the adoption ofsuch a structure would be consistent with An-archist principles of organization. e Anarchist militias recognized


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the need for such structure during the Spanish Civil War and soshould we.

Individual Affinity Groups

Affinity groups(AG)should organize themselves in ways in whichthey see fit to reach their goals in the specific action at hand. De-

termining the focus of your AG in relevance to the action at handallows for the creation of a specialized AG. Within these AGs, it issuggested that there be one person who carries a skeletal assortmentof first aid equipment (saline solution, vinegar, lemon peels, waterin a squirt bole, rescue remedy).

Every person involved in the black bloc should take a basic firstaid course, or have general knowledge of protest related first aidpractices. Like physical training, being trained in first aid wouldheighten our endurance and relief of situations to come. It shouldbe decided if the AG must use a radio/cell during the action.

Radio/cell use may be needed in certain AGs, but by no means isit necessary to overflow the streets with unneeded communicationdevices. Communication can in turn be lost by the trampling ofchannels and untrained use. is will also make it easier for stateinfiltration. More radios will never be the answer to organizationand information, but the strategic placing and use of these deviceswill forever enable our effectiveness.

Roles of the other persons in the AG, in addition to the aforemen-tioned role of the medic gear and possible use of a radio/cell, dependupon the type of AG (function). e AG should solely decide thisthemselves. Types of specialized AGs include, but are not limited to,

a front line (defensive), offensive, reconnaissance, property related,medic, support, noise, and pre-emptive.

A front line AG would contain shields and/or heavy body armor.is type of AG would potentially oversee the formation of the frontline. ey would motivate and call for other shields from withinthe bloc, in aiding the formation of a solid line. is AG wouldprovide a rally point to help provide the bloc position. ey wouldnot be a part of a charge line, but instead hold as a point to retreatback to if the charge proves faulty. In addition, this AG is at the

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from the other side, resulting in the police being surrounded by thebloc as a whole. Reserves can be used to hold a location for the largerbloc to later use as a destination for retreat. Sending in a smallernumber of reserves could also be ideal for added force to push apolice line or barricade.

e US Army holds 1/3 of their people back as use for reserves.is is an ideal number for a fighting force that can make a strong

push when an optimal bale point is reached. One weak point inthis is that their numbers are held in the same location, so the enemycan easily find all of them. Not likely aempted, but if desired, theirenemy could disassemble the whole reserve force.

With this in mind, when the black bloc reaches over 1,000, itwould be desirable to hold 300 or so in reserve. is number shouldchange with proportion. If the bloc reaches 2,000, numbers held inreserve should reach about 600. If the bloc is less than 1,000, noreserve should be posted. With such small numbers, a reserve forcewould only result in the general weakening of the bloc, whereas, weneed all able bodies for immediate release on the streets.

ere are pros and cons for our bloc to discover when and if thereis a decision to use a reserve force. ese must be recognized, andtherefore it is important that options be discussed. City shape, bloc/police size, and situation of the action on hand must be weighed. edetails of forming a reserve, if any, and means of communicationshould be discussed aer the election of the g-tacs.

Following election, such sensitive information can be worked outat a g-tac meeting where only those with an immediate in trust arepresent. is meeting should establish the location of the inactivereserves, as well as radio/ cell communication procedures. is

reserve force should maintain radio/cell communication with thebody of the bloc by communicating with the g-tacs. Decision tomobilize should be placed in the hands of the g-tacs.

Note that the g-tacs receive their information on seriousness ofcombat and the need for reserves from cells of the larger bloc. eg-tacs decision to mobilize a number of inactive reserves is givenwhen groupswithin thelarger bloc call for backup. Relyingon this isimportantin order to consider themany needs of theactive membersof the black bloc.


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which the action is taking place, in that such persons would be in abeer position to scout such already known urban terrain.

In addition, those whom choose to act in a communications roleneed to have radio skills. Variouscodes andchannels to useshould bediscussed only with other bloc members who hold radios. ere areseveral tactics which can be used when doing communications. Eachcluster should arrive to the action with methods for communicating

internally.

Reserves

It is true that bales have been won, by the employment of us-ing reserves as a tactical force. is tactic has traditionally beenpracticed and proven successful by the United States military andpolice departments. e use of a reserve force is not currently atactic adopted by the North American black bloc.

It is significant that we consider this new tactic as one that couldpotentially enable us to greater combat the brawn of the state. estate has always had the advantage over us when it comes to bruteforce. eir ability to use reserves, bringing in buses full of fresh,new, geared up soldiers, will always be a threat to us. We, on theother hand, spend hours/days fighting with the same gear and lile,if any, relief from our strains.

In all fairness, we must study the tactics employed by state forcesand adopt those elements which are relevant, effective, and consis-tent with our beliefs as Anarchists. e potential use of Black Blocreserves could prove empowering for several reasons.

One being that the use of reserves has proven to be successful.

Second, imagine the psychological effects this somewhat sophisti-cated tactic would hold over minds of the state.

Both these point being said, this does not mean that reservesshould always be used when a black bloc has presence at an action,it is only to say that such possibilities can be discussed. Decidingwhether reserves will be used should occur in planning, only a fewdays before the action at hand.

Reserves can be used when the larger bloc is surrounded by police.In this circumstance, the reserves are called in to fight a police line

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correct position to oversee the building ofbarricades. An offensiveAG should be highly mobile and enthusiastic. ese AGs should beprepared for confrontation.

e offensive AG canalso come prepared to fill specialized tacticalneeds. Creativity is encouraged. e definition of this group will bele at this. A reconnaissance AG operates outside of the bloc, gather-ing information. Communication is held closely with the larger bloc,

keeping them informed of police movements and numbers. Whenstate weaknesses are detected, this AG should inform the bloc ofopportunities for advancement.

e bloc should have their own medic AG. For optimal coverage,medic groups could split to cover all sides of the bloc as a whole.Having our own medics does not mean that they help only blackbloc members, but ensures their movement with the bloc.

Property related AGs also exist in our movement. e roles ofthese people should not be known to anyone who is not in thatspecific AG. In relation, information on AGs who form for pre pre-emptive strikes against the state should also be held from the bloc.Any information on the plans or existence of these two groups willonly weaken their security and aim.

ere are also support AG roles.

One idea is an AG dedicated to dealing with panic situations.is group would number no more than a few groups per cluster/side (the use of clusters is explained below). ere could also be asupply and networking AG responsible for carrying food, water, andhanding out communiqus to neighborhood people and non-blackbloc protestors. e carrying water also has a dual purpose of usefor eye washing if necessary.

A noise AG is useful in keeping enthusiasm and drive in tiringsituations. e listen of music can create sudden drives of energyand joy within the bloc where none exists, and can send a contra-dicting message of power to the enemy in bale. Creativity is alsoencouraged in this area . . . black bloc bagpipe players could bringimmense joy to many, as does radical cheer leading to others.


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We should continue to embrace, and forever elaborate, on thishumanistic approach to bale through music and cheer. For thisis in our favor, and the state will never employ such an emotionaltactic.

e AG should strive to be a part ofa cluster of 510 diverse AGs.Each cluster should have its own flag to serve as a rally point. eseflags, distinguishable by different paerns or colors, would be used

as markers. e purpose of these markers is to serve as a point ofretreat, or simply as a visual aid if a person(s) is severed from an AG.

Each cluster should be able to function as its own entity. Tofacilitate this, AGs should strive towards communication prior toaendance at the action. Clusters naturally form based on trustrelationships, and should continue by these means.

e general meeting of the Black Bloc should be used as an op-portunity for networking information; such as the specialized AGsneeded to complete the offense, defense, and support of a cluster,enabling the cluster a fully functioning body. Each cluster shouldbe positioned as to encompass all sides of the concentration of theaction, to form the Black Bloc as an entirety. For instance, the blocis composed of four clusters, each with their own paerned flag,positioned front, back, right, and le.

It is also desirable that thevarious defensive andoffensivepersonsof each cluster work in organizedconjunction with each other duringtimes of need. For example, if the Bloc finds it necessary to retreatfrom a given position, all persons from within the effective clusterand all non cluster folkscarrying defensive equipmentsuch as shieldsshould maintain a position in the rear, facing the enemy, in order tocover the retreat from rubber bullets, bean bags, etc.

Likewise, during offensive maneuvers, all persons equipped withthe relevant offensive gear should place themselves in the front,as should a limited number of shield bearers in order to limit theeffectiveness of the enemy baton. When necessary, relevant rein-forcements from the other clusters should be prepared to move intothe fray. However, this should only be done when absolutely nec-essary in that it is always desirable to maintain a strong defensiveperimeter around the Bloc as a whole. is is all common sense ofcourse.

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e organization, or rather ability to call for the practice of suchmaneuvers should be placed with the g-tacs as manifest throughthe cooperation of affinity groups. By doing this, we will achievea higher level of immediate situational tactical ability then we cur-rently posses. In addition, the demonstration ofsuch abilities can beexpected to frighten and demoralize the enemy.

Reconnaissance and Communication

It is necessarythat theBloccontainsa sophisticated systemof com-bat reconnaissance and communications. Reconnaissance should beconducted by pairs and/or affinity groups on bicycles equipped withradios and/or cell phones.

In turn, the general tactical facilitation core should also be inpossession of radios and/or cell phones. roughout the action,reconnaissance teams should be scouting out all possible avenuesofBloc travel and consistently be reporting back to the g-tacs. is

way, the mobilization of the Bloc will be able to be conducted with areasonable level of educated decisiveness.

Other elements of the reconnaissance folk should be operating inaction zones not immediately in the vicinity of the Bloc. e purposeof these is to keep the Bloc informed on the general situation of thebroader action, and in turn, be able to notify the g-tacs ofpotentialhot spots where Bloc presence is required. Individual Affinity groupswho are in possession of radios should be informed as to the channelswhich such communications will occur. is way the Blocasawholewill be generally informed in regards to the broader situation.

Also, non-Black Bloc affinity groups involved in acts of civil dis-obedience should also be informed as to the channels of radio opera-tion as well as the numbers of the relevant cell phones, so as to allowthem the ability to call in for assistance when and where necessary.

Finally, as alluded to above, persons directly evolved in recon-naissance should be expected to emanate out of the various clusters.However, a more desirable method would be for a whole affinitygroup to converge on the action prepared to act as a specialized cellin and off itself. Preferably this group would reside in the city in

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