Anthony Beaver

The Other Great Patriotic War

Russian America 1922-1947

Junograd University Press 2014

2

ANTHONY BEAVER is descended of a

long line of eccentrics who have served

in the armed forces of some nation or

other in various times and places

throughout history, most of them luck-

ily forgotten today. After quitting his

own career as an officer three months

into his term, he attended university for

ten years before achieving an M.A. in

politics and history. He has written ex-

tensively on obscure military topics to

compensate for his personal shortcom-

ings. Beaver lives in Berlin with his col-

lection of replica firearms.

Cover photo: Landing on Kiska, 1943

3

Contents

Preface 7

Introduction 8

Part I: The 1930s

Military Reforms prior to 1940 9

The Great Russian American Armed Forces Reform of 1940 10

Part II: 1942

The Road to War 13

The Japanese Attack 15

Early War Reorganisations 18

Part III: 1943

The Aleutians, Komandorskis and Iceland 21

Preparations for Kiska 26

The Debate on Operational Art 28

The Battle for Kiska 30

Lessons Learned 34

Overseas in America and Europe 36

Preparing for the Komandorskis 40

Part IV: 1944

The Two-Front War 45

Monte Cassino and Rome 47

The Raids on Attu 49

To the Komandorskis and Beyond 53

The Second Battle of the Komandorskis 55

Gold Beach 59

The Mid-1944 Plans 63

The Third Battle of the Komandorskis 67

Operation Dragoon 71

The Air Raids on Paramushir and Shumshu 74

4

The Retaking of Attu 77

The European Question Revisited 79

Dunkirk and the Scheldt 82

Deployment of II Corps 86

The Ardennes 88

Part V: 1945 in Europe

Operation Bodenplatte 93

The Reduction of Dunkirk 96

Yalta and the Soviet Prisoner Issue 100

Operation Varyag 105

Operations Amherst and Dykebreak 109

The Fight for Texel 112

To the Czechoslovakian Border 116

The Vlasov Dilemma 122

The Thrust onto Prague 125

Longboat and Battleaxe 128

The Cossack Problem 134

Redeployment from Europe 138

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

The Minor Allies Initiative 142

The Negotiations about an Allied North Pacific Command

Organisation 145

Operation Spud 149

Concentration on Japan 152

Allied Forces North Pacific Area 156

The Keychain Preparations 159

Operation Fencegate 163

The Island-hopping Plans 166

The Potsdam Conference 168

The Chinese Option 172

The Soviet Attack on Japan 176

Capitulation in the Kuriles 180

5

The Soviet Move onto Hokkaido 184

The Kurile Race 187

The Abashiri Incident 191

The Challenge at the Close 195

Part VII: After the War

The Drawdown Plans 201

Preparing for the Future 204

Pacts and Parades 209

Conclusion 212

Illustrations

1. Location of major Russian American Army commands,

army troops and I Corps troops in May 1943 23

2. Location of major Russian American Navy commands

and ports in May 1943 24

3. Location of major Russian American Air Force commands,

air wings and airbase groups in May 1943 25

4. Revised unit patch of 1st Special Service Force 43

5. Location of major Russian American Air Force commands,

wings and airbase groups in December 1943 44

6. Planned assignments of Russian American forces to Allied

commands in January 1945 92

7. Location of Russian American units in the continental

European Theatre on 7 May 1945 121

8. Location of Russian American, US and Soviet ground forces

in the Okhotsk Theatre on 1 September 1945 199

9. Situation on northeastern Hokkaido on 1 September 1945 200

Appendices

A. 1940 Russian American Order of Battle 214

B. 1942 Russian American Order of Battle 218

C. Revised Rank Tables effective 1 January 1943 224

D. 1943 Russian American Order of Battle 226

E. The Aleutian Task Forces in 1943 233

6

F. Russian Contingent Allied Forces Atlantic in 1943 236

G. 1944 Russian American Order of Battle 238

H. Russian American Type 1944a Division 246

I. The Aleutian Task Forces in 1944 262

J. The Light Task Force 264

K. 1945 Russian American Order of Battle + Homeguard 265

L. The Russian American-Czechoslovakian Battlegroups 277

M. Russian American 1st Airborne Brigade in Europe 278

N. Russian Contingent Allied Forces Southwest Pacific 283

O. Russian American Forces in Europe on 7 May 1945 284

P. The Berlin Memorandum of 9 August 1945 286

Q. Allied Forces North Pacific Area 287

R. Allied Order of Battle for Operation FENCEGATE 293

S. Allied Order of Battle on Hokkaido on 31 August 1945 295

T. 1946 Russian American Order of Battle 299

Abbreviations 308

Bibliography 310

7

To most of the world today, Russian America is a remote nation on the edge of the Arctic, best

known as a destination for those who want to spend a vacation not just off the beaten track, but

indeed off any unbeaten tracks, too – an image reinforced by recent “reality” TV shows featur-

ing crab fishers in the Aleutian Islands or modern-day gold diggers following in the footsteps

of the 19th century Klondike gold rush. To Canadians and US Americans, it is of course a close

neighbour and trade partner, the traditional main export business of wood long since displaced

by oil and natural gas in top importance. Quite surprisingly, other than king crabs, Alaska

salmon and other fish, its most acknowledged contribution to international cuisine is beer.

Yet even the origins of the famous Stoyanka Pilsener are intricately linked to the country’s

tumultuous past of the pre-World War Two era, as brewing there was started by refugees from

German-occupied Czechoslovakia. The important role Russian America played in the war, all

the while performing a delicate act of balancing its own interests with those of its far larger

allies, seems often forgotten these days. As far as it is covered in popular entertainment, you

could be excused for believing Hollywood that fighting there was done essentially by US

troops, and over US territory, too. It is even rarer for the Russian American contributions in

the European Theatre to be mentioned by non-domestic productions, the 1968 film “The

Devil’s Brigade” being among the few exceptions.

It is therefore quite fortunate that the recent debate among historians about the failed 1867

negotiations between Imperial Russia and the United States over a purchase of the former’s

then-colony by the latter – notably Cab in “Unintended Consequences” and Kirk in “A Long

Story” – has generated some interest in the country’s history that also allowed this book to be

created. One can but speculate what course events would have taken if what has since become

known as “Seward’s Folly” had not occurred. Of course the opinion of the US secretary of state

at that time, William Seward – albeit formed under the pressure of a critical public – that the

inhospitable land was not worth the millions of dollars demanded by the Russian government

was only shown to be wrong ex post with the successive discovery of large deposits of gold

and other natural riches, up to the oil and gas of the later 20th century.

The intention of this book however is not to add to this discussion by investigating “what

ifs”, but rather explore the history that followed from the point at which Russian America in-

deed – though quite unwillingly by either side – parted ways with the empire it had belonged

to. The nature of the era as well as the author’s interest and expertise mandate that this will

focus on military developments and the conduct of World War II including the immediate post-

war period; though I hope that in due time and if my publishers see the value of it, I will cover

Russian American history to the present day in subsequent volumes.

There is a relative dearth of English sources on this topic so far, which may explain the pre-

vious sparse treatment it has received by authors not capable of the Russian language such as

myself. However, as a result of the same history portrayed in this book, there is no shortage of

helpful Russian Americans whose knowledge of English would put some native speakers to

shame. I can impossibly name all those who assisted me in my endeavour and without which

this work could not have been created; some I cannot name at all.

However, I want to particularly thank the staff at the Junograd Military Archives who worked

tirelessly to find crucial documents and translate them, too. I am also indebted to the Russian

American Duma and State Council Library for providing other domestic sources; and the Tan-

ski Foundation which usually prefers to stay out of the public light, but nonetheless afforded

me with certain services and comforts which made my undertaking very much easier.

Anthony Beaver

Junograd, 3 August 2014

8

Introduction

After the end of the Russian Civil War, the Provisional Russian-American Government that had

formed in the erstwhile North American colony of the Russian Empire following the successive

defeat of the earlier governments under Kerensky, Kolchak, Semyonov, the Merkulovs and

Diterikhs by the Bolsheviks in the motherland was faced with a difficult situation. While the Red

forces had little means of advancing across the Bering Strait nor much influence among the local

population which consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from their rule, the latter presented their

own problem.

The population of Russian America before World War I had been a mere 200,000 – two thirds of

them deportees under the katorga system, another fifth non-Russian immigrants, mostly Americans

and Canadians who had stayed after the Klondike Gold Rush or were trading in fur and wood

despite the strict imperial immigration policies. During the years of the Civil War, about a million

Russian citizens fled the violence and revolutionary furore to the colony despite the rugged condi-

tions there, many hoping they would eventually return home.1

Instead, refugees from the newly established Soviet Union and émigrés who had previously gone

into exile in Europe, the United States or elsewhere kept migrating to the only part of their home-

land that could be considered a reasonable approximation of free compared to the USSR, even

though it was at this point little more than a military dictatorship itself. While the great natural

riches of Russian America were known even then, the newcomers were disproportionately city

dwellers of white-collar persuasions, academics and aristocrats who had little enthusiasm to work

in fishing, hunting, logging and mining.

More practically-minded folks from Canada, the US and even Japan and China gladly seized

upon the business opportunities arising from the rapidly expanding population of their neighbour

country, but the first decade was troublesome despite, and sometimes because, of their addition.

Besides economic and social problems, the situation across the Bering Strait remained tense.

Though both sides were determined to eventually vanquish the other and reunite the former empire

under their rule, both lacked the means for decisive action.

Upon evacuating from the Siberian Far East, the White forces had taken most of the Pacific Fleet's

remaining ships with the help of the Entente intervention troops, but could not hope to return vic-

toriously against the existing odds. On the other hand, Russian America continued to enjoy the

support of the Entente powers which recognised theirs as the legitimate Russian government rather

than the Bolsheviks in Moscow. In the absence of a distinct strategic advantage for either side, both

engaged in small-scale military action and clandestine warfare.2

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, there was a succession of minor skirmishes at sea and coastal

raids which accomplished little, mostly around the opposing shores of the Bering Strait and the

Aleutians, Komandorskis and other islands in between that were controlled by Russian American

forces. Both sides ran campaigns of agitation, sedition and sabotage against the other, in addition

to White undercover networks helping Soviet citizens escape the USSR. Yet numbers seemed to

favour the latter, since with the Soviet drive for industrialisation it was only a matter of time until

the Red Army would gain the technical means to bring its overwhelming superiority to bear.

1 Cab, M.: Unintended Consequences. The History of Russian America, Vol. 1 (New Orleans 2012), p. 1-66. 2 Kirk, T.: A Long Story. How an American Folly Saved Russian Democracy, Vol. 1 (Durango 2011), p. 3-163.

Part I: The 1930s

9

Part I: The 1930s

Military Reforms prior to 1940

Prior to World War I, Russian America had been garrisoned mostly by the Imperial Navy. This

included a squadron of modern Novik class destroyers, but the only other combatants were six

older gunboats which were backed up by some armed icebreakers and other auxiliaries. On shore,

there was a regiment of marines and the fortifications at the regional naval headquarters in Novo-

arkhangelsk as well as the ports at Kodiak and Unalaska, manned by coastal artillery personnel.

Like all of the Pacific Fleet, the Great War saw a relocation of forces to the European Theatre,

though the comparatively weak numbers and small vessels of the empire's remote American out-

post meant it would contribute little to that draft.

As the tide of the Civil War turned against the White forces, strength was bolstered greatly not

only by the aforementioned Navy ships evacuating from Eastern Siberia, but also refugees from all

other fleets. Most famous was of course Wrangel's Fleet which made its way from the Black Sea

and formed the bulk of the new Russian American Navy. However, the service saw its importance

dwindled by the far greater influx of Army personnel. In 1922, about 60,000 soldiers had congre-

gated in Russian America, compared to just 30,000 sailors. In either service, there was a dispro-

portionate number of officers, particularly generals. This state of affairs could not possibly be sus-

tained by the troubled, still sparsely populated country.

Some effort was made throughout the first decade of its existence to organise the excessive,

widely disparate forces, armed with a motley collection of weapons both built in Russia and pro-

cured from abroad during World War I. By 1932, a system of conscription had been enacted that

required all male citizens to serve two years in the Navy or the Army regiments that had been

formed according to the shifting demographics in the main areas of settlement. The second Russian

American census of that year showed more than a doubling of the Russian population from 1.16

million in 1922 to 2.43 million, the bulk not having settled in the rugged Panhandle area around

the capital of Junograd, but around the rapidly growing economic centre of Stoyanka.3

At this point there was a total of 32 Army regiments – 18 infantry, seven artillery, five cavalry

and two engineer – as well as three port, two marine and two coastal artillery regiments of the

Navy. The regiments generally had only one active battalion with two more in reserve. The Army

was organised into one cavalry and four “square” infantry divisions. Some regiments were being

converted to modern arms that would support the divisions upon mobilisation. 3rd Kenai and 12th

Stoyanka Artillery were being turned into anti-air units, while 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Infantry was

planned to become an armour unit equipped mostly with Vickers Six-Ton tanks.

The Navy had a cruiser squadron of three old and run-down protected cruisers that were in urgent

need of replacement. Further there were three destroyer squadrons and one squadron of gunboats,

submarines and auxiliaries each, plus two reserve transport squadrons. Its flagship was the battle-

ship General Alekseyev from Wrangel's Fleet, and the former unprotected cruiser Almaz was serv-

ing as a training vessel. Like the Army, the Navy operated a small but diverse collection of aircraft,

some single examples of their type. There was no independent air force.4

That would change with the great Russian American Armed Forces Reform of 1940. Throughout

the 1930s, the military had sent observers – some not quite passive ones – to the armed conflicts

3 Russian American Census Bureau: 1932 National Census Data (Junograd 1933). 4 von Sieben, S. W.: Minutiae of War Ministry Plans Department Meetings 1938-1945 (Junograd Military Archives),

79-106.

Part I: The 1930s

10

of the time between Japan and China, to the Spanish Civil War, the early German operations of

World War II and the Winter War in Finland, in order to keep abreast of technological and opera-

tional developments. Ideology played a role, too, as Russian American volunteers fought against

communist forces in Spain and Finland.

This resulted in relations with Germany that were altogether too close for the liking of Russia's

former Entente partners. Neither was it domestically uncontested, particularly after the German

invasion of Czechoslovakia; senior officers who had fought alongside the Czech Legions in the

Civil War took offence at the government's silence on this attack on their former comrades, and

even channelled refugees from the occupied country to Russian America – notably General Sergei

Nicolaevich Vojcechovski.5 Fortunately for the greater picture, the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 and

the subsequent joint German-Soviet invasion of Poland led to a rift in German-Russian relations,

and despite German designs to keep Russian America as a North American ally in the upcoming

World War, the country would eventually end up on the Allied side through circumstances.

The Great Russian American Armed Forces Reform of 1940

It was not before 1936 that a comprehensive attempt at modernisation involving both traditional

services as well as the creation of a Russian American Air Force on the British and German model

started. It encompassed both organisation and equipment as well as the build-up of domestic arms

production capabilities. The bottom-up approach started with the procurement of new small arms

and extended to the order of four new “patrol cruisers” from US yards – really destroyer leaders,

somewhat glorified to placate the Navy which was having a difficult time of playing second fiddle

to the land forces in its former American fiefdom.

The initial two Kolchak-class vessels were designed with both Russian and American interests

in mind, as they allowed US shipbuilders to construct large destroyer-type combatants for a cus-

tomer that was not under the tonnage limits of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, and thereby explore

designs better suited to Pacific ranges. Somewhat of an intermediate step between the US Navy's

Porter- and Somers-class destroyers and the later Atlanta-class anti-air cruisers, the Kolchaks in-

troduced the famous 5”/38 Mk 12 gun into the Russian American Navy when they were commis-

sioned in 1938/39. Three were planned originally, but instead they were supplemented in 1940/41

by two half-sisters of the Nakhimov class which replaced the four Mk 22 low-angle twin mounts

and two Mk 21 high-angle single mounts with four Mk 29 dual-purpose twin mounts.

The Navy was also an early customer for the Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm anti-air guns,

unlike their American counterpart which went with the less successful 1.1”/75 gun at this time. The

new light, medium and heavy AA guns also found themselves in the modernisation of battleship

General Alekseyev done in US yards during the same period despite misgivings in Junograd about

the material and personnel resources this single capital ship was tying up in the Navy. But in the

end, the 1940 Fleet Plan included Alekseyev as well as a squadron with the new cruisers, three with

destroyers including three Clemson-class four-stackers transferred from the US, a gunboat squad-

ron and a squadron of eight submarines built by Elco on the basis of their S-class, replacing the

outright dangerous World War I models. Three transport, two auxiliary and a minesweeper squad-

ron made up the rest of the fleet, much of them in reserve status.6

5 Tuček, M.: Eastward. Russian American-Czechoslovakian Military Cooperation in the European Theatre of World

War II (Junograd-London-Versailles 1954), p. 8. 6 von Sieben, 108-121

Part I: The 1930s

11

Like the Army, the Navy gave up some of their aviation personnel to form the new Air Force,

though proportionally less so. After trials with shipboard spotter planes largely failed due to the

prevalent Russian American weather conditions, they embraced large flying boats. This led to a

fruitful cooperation with early Russian emigrant Igor Sikorsky who had already become a US cit-

izen at this time, but after recent economic fiascos was faced with the threat of having his company

merged with the Vought division of the United Aircraft Corporation which had bought it in 1929.

The Russian American government saved him by not only buying 30 of his S-44 flying boats which

had lost out to the Consolidated Coronado in the US Navy's PB2Y competition, Sikorsky's largest

sale so far; they also established Sikorsky Aircraft Stoyanka, a 50:50 public-private partnership

which formed the seed of a domestic aircraft production.7

The fledgling Air Force took over most of the other existing aircraft, a motley collection of pre-

dominantly light transport and trainer aircraft like the Tiger Moth, Northrop Delta and Fokker Su-

per Universal – less than 30 total, since the Army retained a squadron of Avro 504s and some

Pitcairn-Cierva autogyros for spotting and liaison purposes. Like their British and German role

models, they also became responsible for strategic ground-based air defence, resulting in most of

the heavy anti-air artillery being transferred from the Army. First orders of new aircraft included

the Curtiss Hawk Model 75 fighter and Douglas Model 8 attack aircraft as well as some DC-3

transport planes.

The plans for buildup of the Air Force were quite ambitious considering circumstances, and en-

visioned seven new airfields to be constructed in addition to the only existing ones at Baranov,

Stoyanka and Krasivayaberga – the latter little more than open fields used by pilots flying along

the Baranov-Stoyanka-Krasivayaberga railway line. The future bases were however intended to

have hard-surface runways, and help from Canada and the US was enlisted to build them. Consid-

ering local weather conditions and the time needed to train pilots, the programme was supposed to

last until the end of the 1943 warm period.

At this point, eight Air Force wings were to be established, six comprising a fighter and attack

squadron each, two with transport and training aircraft. Most would be based along the southern

coast and the near Aleutians, with one in the north at Nome on the Bering Strait and the transport

wings in Stoyanka and Krasivayaberga. Each wing would also command an airbase and an anti-air

group, with extra ones at Kenai, the planned government airport at Junograd and a staging airfield

en route to Nome at Makkrazky.

The necessary ground personnel was to be freed mostly by the disbanding of four Army infantry

regiments. Accordingly, an infantry division was struck from the 1940 Army order of battle. These

divisions were quite unwieldy, typically so for a country with no contemporary experience in mod-

ern large-scale land warfare. Each had two brigades of two infantry or cavalry regiments each, an

artillery regiment of three light and one medium battalion, a quartermaster battalion, an HQ and a

signals company. Upon mobilisation, an armour, engineer, anti-air, medical and military police

battalion each would be attached along with an additional cavalry squadron. Army troops also in-

cluded 1st Guards Regiment in Junograd, 1st Northern Yeger in the Arctic North, 11th Stoyanka

Heavy Artillery and 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment.8

The greatest change however happened in equipment at unit level. The rimmed 7.62 x 54 mm

round used in the old Mosin-Nagant rifles and Maxim machine guns was to be replaced by a mod-

ern rimless cartridge along with the variously-chambered mix of light machine guns. The choice

eventually fell on the American .30-06 calibre, which would not only be fired from the new air-

craft's guns but also the future standard infantry weapons, also made in the US: The Enfield M1917

7 Sikorsky Aircraft Stoyanka: A Semi-Century of Excellence (Stoyanka 1989), p. 7. 8 von Sieben, 122-206.

Part I: The 1930s

12

rifle, the Lewis light machine gun and Browning M1919 medium machine gun. In replacement of

various handguns like the Nagant M1895 revolver and American-imported Colt M1911 pistols and

M1917 revolvers, the FN M1935 pistol was chosen as the new service sidearm. The Finnish KP-

31 was introduced as the first standardised submachine gun, though some Thompson M1928 had

found their way from the US earlier.9

Successors to the World War I-era artillery guns of mostly British make were also sought, as

were modern light anti-air and anti-tank guns and infantry mortars. However, world events, politi-

cal infighting, corruption and inter-service rivalry proved of much hindrance in acquisition. The

Czech TNHP tank had already been chosen as the follow-on for the Vickers Six-Ton when the

German occupation of that country and subsequent breakdown of relations with the Third Reich

sent procurers scrambling in search of alternate sources after delivery of only a battalion's worth.

Similiar things happend after the fall of Belgium, and it was not before production of the FN Hi-

Power pistol at Inglis in Canada was in full swing in 1943 that the older handguns were beginning

to be fully replaced.10

Czech refugees were instrumental in establishing arms manufacturer Russkaya-Boheme Zavod

in Stoyanka which would eventually become the chief domestic source of automatic weapons and

artillery guns – but not before at one point the Kutuzov Navy Arsenal at Novoarkhangelsk was

raided by marines on direct orders from the Ministry of War to find dozens of Czech-licensed guns

stashed away in its casemates.11 Many coastal artillery pieces turned out to only exist on paper, and

the old 130 mm guns of General Alekseyev mysteriously vanished after her refit with 5”/38

mounts.12

A centrepiece of the 1940 reform was the motorisation effort due to the difficult Russian Ameri-

can conditions for horses; the rugged terrain and lack of grasslands made the logistics for fuel easier

than feeding the animals. Despite tradition, the cavalry was first to be equipped with motor vehicles

except for a Cossack squadron doing ceremonial duty at the government seat, along with the artil-

lery. The infantry took longest, but retired their last horses and mules in 1942 except for some

doing duty with 1st Northern Yeger.13 Nothing however proved quite as controversial as the re-

placement of the soldiers' traditional footwraps with Western-style socks, bitterly opposed by tra-

ditionally-minded senior officers.

9 von Sieben, 110-113. 10 von Sieben, 118-121. 11 von Sieben, 143. 12 von Sieben, 245-255. 13 Kentukski, R. R.: The Russian American Cavalry (Stoyanka 1961), p. 16.

Part II: 1942

13

Part II: 1942

The Road to War

The reforms proved not an outright success, and continuous changes were made throughout the

next two years after the nominal implementation date. Only after the inter-service conference of

February 1942 the Russian American order of battle solidified into a form that would remain rec-

ognizable for the coming years as war loomed on the horizon, in no small part influenced by reports

of the battles that were already being fought outside the country.

The Army underwent probably the most extensive corrections as it went to a separation between

frontline and territorial tasks. Its wartime organisation now foresaw I Russian American Army

Corps as its operational arm and Territorial Army Command for administrative and home defence

purposes. With most units mobilisation-dependent, both major commands were run in peacetime

by deputies to the Chief of the Army who had shifted headquarters from Junograd to Stoyanka,

closer to the bulk of his forces.

The divisions in I Corps had been further reduced to three, now of mixed triangular structure with

one cavalry and two infantry regiments supported by an artillery regiment and anti-air, armour,

engineer, medical and quartermaster battalions, now permanently assigned. Only 1st Division was

fully active, while 2nd and 3rd had less than ten percent of their wartime establishment of 15,600

present in peacetime, mainly fulfilling territorial tasks in lieu of inactive Territorial Army units.

Corps troops included semi-active 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer and 11th Stoyanka Heavy

Artillery as well as a reserve quartermaster regiment and signals battalion, plus an army aviation

unit variously termed a company or squadron in different documents which was already planned

to test the brand-new Sikorsky R-4 helicopter as a supplement to its Pitcairn-Cierva autogyros.

The reduction to three divisions was mostly a result of the new Air Force's need for personnel to

support its rapid growth, and had been arrived at by way of three-and-a-half, at different times

proposed to include an independent cavalry or even airborne brigade. Airborne trials had been

conducted at battalion level, but manning constraints prevented the establishment of such a cutting-

edge unit, and the prospective paratroopers eventually found themselves folded back into 1st Divi-

sion's infantry. Regiments had to be streamlined too, and the infantry lost its organic engineer com-

panies which were found to contribute nothing that the divisional engineer battalions did not, too.

The Territorial Army was organised into five regional commands, most with an infantry regiment

that would serve as a training and replacement unit for I Corps in wartime as well as in home

defence, and also a signals, quartermaster and military police battalion each, plus a military hospi-

tal. With the exception of the semi-present MP battalions which also fulfilled civilian police tasks

in the thinly-populated rural areas outside the towns and cities, all those were inactive in peacetime.

Central Command, responsible for the population centre of the Stoyanka region, was unique in

having two infantry regiments and MP battalions each, as well as a full quartermaster regiment.

Territorial Army Command also administered the Central Military Court and Prison in Stoyanka.

Army troops consisted of 1st Guards and 1st Yeger Regiment as before, while an extra cavalry

regiment had been elevated to the status of 7th Guards Cossack Regiment, serving as a parent unit

to the previous single Cossack squadron in Junograd. The cavalry was still divided into light and

heavy squadrons, the former mostly equipped with motorbikes and some Canadian-made Fox var-

iants of the Humber armoured scout car, the latter in the process of replacing their Vickers light

tanks with the American M3 Stuart in addition to M2 halftracks.14

14 von Sieben, 135-243.

Part II: 1942

14

The issue of the Stuart was however under a cloud of doubt both due to political circumstances

and the still-lacking number of tanks because of the protracted search for an alternative to the

TNHP. The American M3 Lee was considered less than optimal chiefly due to its armament layout.

This left the Canadian Ram and Swedish LAGO as main contenders.15 In the end the Ram won out

because it was being built close by, but the initial difficulties Canada had with establishing produc-

tion led to considerations of redirecting Stuart deliveries to tank units.16

Things looked better on the artillery side were RBZ was now building Czech designs at its

Stoyanka plant in addition to acquiring licenses for the Bofors and Oerlikon anti-air guns. Old

howitzers and cannon were steadily being replaced by domestically produced pieces except for

previously-ordered things like the Böhler 47 mm infantry/anti-tank gun and American 60 and 81

mm infantry mortars. RBZ was also looking into new light machine guns and submachine guns.

The Army had some interest in self-loading rifles, though this had so far only resulted in some

demonstrations of the American Johnson M1941 family of infantry weapons.

Army HQ was supported by a semi-present signals regiment, with the Army School Command

directly subordinated as well. Centralizing technical and leadership training which had previously

been conducted mostly within the regiments revealed an imminent lack of cadre for the new mo-

bilisation-dependent structure; despite of the abundance of officers in 1922, 20 years later most

had gone into civilian life, many were too old to be recalled to active duty in wartime, and some

had died off. To address this, plans for reserve officer and non-commissioned officer training were

drawn up, whereby promising conscripts would be sent to NCO school, and the best of those on to

take officer candidate classes. Overall, mobilised strength of the Army would come out to 110,800,

with only 30,700 active in peacetime. This included a number of 2,700 respectively 1,100 female

auxiliaries who mostly served as nurses and in HQ and signals units.17

The Navy was now similarly divided into a Naval Operations and a Coastal Command. The for-

mer included Strike Fleet that had lost its old gunboats, transferred to the coastal artillery and

moored as floating batteries at remote ports like Nome and Nikolskoye on Bering Island. Also there

were now only two, but larger destroyer squadrons, one to be fully made up of Clemsons delivered

by the US as replacements for the older Noviks in a scheme similar to the Ships-for-Bases Deal

with Britain. This agreement not only allowed US Army Air Force units to be stationed on the

South Coast to look out for Japanese forces following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December

1941, but also Lend-Lease aid for the USSR to be transported across Russian America and the

Bering Strait after the German attack on the Soviets.

For obvious reasons, this had been a difficult agreement, since the Junograd government was not

at all keen to see military equipment being passed to their arch enemy through their own territory.

However, Allied pressure had been immense and backed up by implicit military threats over Rus-

sian America's earlier close relations with Germany; obviously neither the US nor Canada were

going to allow a possible pro-Axis base at their back. In the end, Junograd also saw the opportunity

to profit of the same pipeline and assented under the condition they would also get American ma-

terièl – naturally not in the same quantity, but if possible of later models than for the Bolshevists.

The Naval Operations Command also included Auxiliary Fleet which had mostly reserve units

except for an auxiliary squadron as before, and Naval Aviation Command with three squadrons of

the new Sikorsky S-44 flying boats, one of which reserve. The shore-based units found themselves

15 Engelsen, T.: Slick Swedish Salesmen. Swedish-Russian American Arms Procurement Relations since 1936 (Ber-

gen 2012), p. 10-13. 16 Colins, C.: Canucks in the Aleutian Islands. As Canadian Military Attaché in Russian America during World War

II (Vancouver 1960), p. 9-10. 17 von Sieben, 225-240.

Part II: 1942

15

under Coastal Command which was again divided in three regional commands at Novoarkhan-

gelsk, Kodiak and Unalaska. Those led the port battalions, navy training and replacement regi-

ments, two coastal artillery and two or three marine battalions each, the latter mostly inactive in

peacetime. Once more the centrally-situated Kodiak Command was larger than the rest since it also

administered the ports of Stoyanka and Baranov, and had two training regiments. The overall mo-

bilised strength of the Navy was set at 49,400, 22,800 in peacetime with 1,200 and 500 female

auxiliaries respectively.

As the junior service, the Air Force was at this point still led by a three-star rather than a four-

star general and had a single layer of higher commands, regionally orientated much like the Navy's

with Central Command headquartered in Stoyanka, Eastern Command at Junograd and Western

Command at Kodiak. Each had one basic training and three operational wings, though semi-present

3rd Wing at the new Junograd government airport had no flying squadrons and 6th Wing at Yakutat

on the “panhandle joint” was a reserve unit. There was also independent 5th Anti-Air Artillery

Group in Kenai under Central Command. Mobilised strength was just 26,900 with 16,700 in peace-

time, including 500 and 400 female auxiliaries respectively.18

However, the Air Force stood to profit most from the Lend-Lease agreement with the Americans,

since the latter were very interested to build up a network of bases for aircraft delivery along the

trans-Russian American route across the Bering Strait. As a result of massive US help, the planned

airfields were finished a year ahead of schedule, and additionally staging bases were built subse-

quently. The deal also opened the way for more modern aircraft. The Lockheed P-38 Lighting was

considered the ideal fighter for Russian American needs due to its long endurance, while the Doug-

las A-20 was planned to replace the Douglas Model 8 attack bomber. Three wings were to be

reequipped in the course of the year.19

Negotiations were still somewhat rocky as Junograd had chosen to stay on the sidelines after the

Japanese raid onto Pearl Harbor despite US and British pressure to join the Allied side in the new

World War. However, since the earlier German attack on the USSR had already brought Moscow

into that camp, neither Russian party was prepared to fight on the same side even with the Lend-

Lease agreement in place. Cooperation was limited to the establishment of a heavily surveilled

Soviet mission in Nome which would take over aircraft from US – rarely Russian – personnel for

the flight across the Bering Strait. The USSR also honoured its non-aggression pact with Japan,

while Junograd feared the Japanese would come north after being done with European possessions

in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. There was the gloomy thought that the Empire of the Rising Sun

might eventually make the decision for Russian America, which turned out to be quite right.20

The Japanese Attack

The 1942 order of battle was to be evaluated in the spring exercises of May that year, a series of

complex problems lasting three weeks. The first week was a full mobilisation drill for I Corps, all

army troops and select units from Territorial Army, as well as part of the Navy's Auxiliary Fleet

and Coastal Command, and all Air Force units. While 2nd and 3rd Division mobilised along with

Territorial Army HQ, signals, quartermaster and medical units in Central, Northern and Southern

Command and all of Western Command, 1st Division was to undertake an embarkation exercise

with 1st Sealift Squadron, reinforced by 4th and 7th Marine Battalion.

18 von Sieben, 245-262. 19 Nikitin, D.: Knocking on Wood. Russian American Military Procurement in World War II (Junograd 1975), p. 14. 20 von Sieben, 134-268.

Part II: 1942

16

Simultaneously, Strike Fleet conducted manoeuvres in the Gulf of Alaska including submarine

and aviation exercises. The Air Force was running mock anti-shipping missions, and USAAF units

newly based on the southern coast and the near Aleutians under the Ships-for-Bases deal partici-

pated as air-to-air sparring partners. After meeting up with the troop convoy out of Stoyanka, the

Navy started an escort operation leading into an amphibious landing west of Stoyanka including

minesweeping exercises, gunnery exercises by 2nd and 5th Coastal Artillery Battalion, and a live

fire shore bombardment exercise prior to landing on the northern shore of the Cook Inlet. At this

point, 2nd and 3rd Division were expected to be fully mobilised and oppose the landing under I

Corps HQ along with corps troops, reinforced by 1st Yeger and 7th Cossack Regiments.

At the same time in week two, 1st Guards and 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment along with 1st

and 4th Coastal Artillery Battalion and Air Force Eastern Command were training the defence of

the Panhandle and Junograd against the other six Marine battalions landed by 2nd Sealift Squadron.

On 15 May, the opposing forces in the Stoyanka area were to unite under I Corps HQ with the

objective to take an unnamed Russian-speaking port on the Pacific played by Stoyanka, though the

problem made it sound suspiciously like Vladivostok. The four activated territorial regiments were

to play defence, each representing an enemy division.

In reality, the exercises revealed severe shortcomings, probably exacerbated by the long delay in

establishing the final 1942 OOB and the corresponding short time troops had had to adapt. But

there was also a lack of training and specialised equipment. A deficit in anti-submarine capabilities

was highlighted when “enemy” submarines “sank” General Alekseyev and some of the troop trans-

ports and escorts, which had to be administratively revived for the next phase to take place. A good

portion of reservists never showed up or came in late for mobilisation, their units deploying at 70-

90 percent strength – though more due to communication and travel breakdowns than ill will.

Whole battalions had not yet received their new jeeps or Czech guns; 3rd Tank Battalion had no

tanks at all, but showed good initiative and was still able to field a very diverse reduced company

of vehicles stolen from neighbouring units.

Several soldiers drowned in the landings, and two tanks were lost along with several other vehi-

cles when one of the pioneer ferries used to land heavy equipment capsized. Fortunately for the

invaders, the defenders were late in getting to the beach, and opposition was only met after the first

wave had already formed ashore. The problem of manning with reservists was even more obvious

in territorial regiments and specifically extended to cadres; in the defence of Stoyanka against I

Corps, many companies were operating with only half their officer and senior non-commissioned

officer establishment, though they ultimately performed no worse than the attackers.21

Air Force pilots showed a particular lack of experience in mock fights with the Americans, though

the use of older Hawk and heavy P-38 fighters against the more agile USAAF P-40 may also have

contributed to negative results. A significant portion of the A-20 attack aircraft suffered engine

problems on long flights, resulting in one crash landing at sea. The Air Force subsequently in-

creased maintenance training, but also went to look for an overall more reliable plane; the de Havil-

land Mosquito had already generated interest due to its good reputation in Canada and the ease

with which its wooden airframe could possibly even be produced domestically. It was also recom-

mended that rather than replacing all Hawks by twin-engine fighters, a long-range single-engine

aircraft should be looked for, though none was available in the current political climate.22

The latter was about to change though, as the Japanese, alarmed by the basing agreement with

the US, were already moving against the Russian American islands. American intelligence had

21 von Sieben, 273-288. 22 Grushchev, O. D.: Reports on Aircraft and Aircraft Production Trials 1940-1948 (Junograd Military Archives),

197-290.

Part II: 1942

17

been aware of this for some time from decrypted radio signals, but even while USAAF planes were

searching heavily for the expected IJN battlegroup, Washington chose not to inform the govern-

ment in Junograd which had still not entered into an official alliance. Considerations of forcing the

issue may have played a part in this decision. Even so, the situation was nervous enough; in the

middle of the spring exercises, a Russian American flying boat had already used live depth charges

against a possible Japanese submarine reported by a Canadian aircraft off Ketchikan to inconclu-

sive results.23

In the end, another Navy patrol aircraft spotted the Japanese carrier group 800 nautical miles

southwest of Unalaska on 2 June anyway, but soon lost it in bad weather.24 The government in

Junograd inquired with the Japanese ambassador, who however feigned ignorance and promised

to check with Tokyo. He then returned to the Government Palace in the dead of night to hand over

Japan's declaration of war over the basing agreement immediately before aircraft from carriers

Junyō and Ryūjō attacked Unalaska Naval Base, quite similar to the playbook for the Pearl Harbor

attack.25

The first air raid by about 20 planes was ill-coordinated, again due to weather conditions, and

they were driven off by AA fire and fighters from nearby Umnak Air Base with little damage to

either side.26 A stronger and better-timed attack on the next day was more successful, with the oil

storage, radio station, hospital and a barracks ship being hit, though the base remained operational.

The Japanese were then again lost in bad weather before any decisive action could be taken against

the battlegroup. They showed up again on 6 June when they started occupying the Aleutian islands

of Kiska and Attu as well as the Komandorskis against little resistance, only Bering Island having

had a meaningful Russian American garrison.27

The Junograd government was now faced with open Japanese aggression, but had few means for

an effective response in light of the results from the recent exercises; the bulk of forces had cer-

tainly proven to be neither personally nor materially equipped for successful amphibious operations

against a competent enemy, the main benefit being that mobilisation was now well-rehearsed as

the armed forces went to full war footing. Naval and air action was the only one possible to be

taken immediately, and over the next months, Russian American submarines were the only units

to score successes to be appropriately celebrated by an initially shocked public. Okun sank a Japa-

nese destroyer and heavily damaged another one off Kiska on 5 July, and ten days later Sardina

sank two subchasers and damaged a third in the same port.28

During the same time, the Air Force bombed Kiska twice in concert with the Americans who

now had five fighter and six bomber squadrons in theatre, but while a Japanese oiler was sunk in

port, losses were more evenly distributed in the skies. On the political front Germany had quickly

followed the Japanese declaration of war, which made the course ahead obvious; within days after

the Unalaska attack, Russian America signed the Declaration of the United Nations, thus making

its joining the Allies official.29

The most important result of the now-clear fronts was that the faucet of US material aid was

turned wide open, including the promise of such highly advanced systems as the radar-equipped P-

70 night fighter variant of the A-20 and surface search radars for ships and aircraft of the Navy –

23 von Sieben, 287-302. 24 Russian American Admiralty: Dispatches 1942-1945 (Junograd Military Archives), 2 June 1942. 25 von Sieben, 302. 26 Admiralty, 3 June 1942. 27 von Sieben, 308-323. 28 Admiralty, 5 and 15 July 1942. 29 von Sieben, 323-333.

Part II: 1942

18

not least in view of typical Russian American weather conditions.30 Canada also offered to con-

tribute to the joint defence of the North American continent within its means, deploying RCAF

squadrons and RCN vessels as well as a ground contingent to secure Ketchikan Air Base against

air raids.31

Early War Reorganisations

Attempts to rectify the structural shortcomings of the armed forces started quickly while aiming

for a long game. The most immediate worry was however that the occupation of the Komandorskis

and far Aleutians was a either a prelude to an island-hopping campaign towards the mainland or a

screening action for landings on Soviet Kamchatka which might also involve the taking of Nome

on the Bering Strait, based upon US intelligence estimates and alleged sightings of Japanese ships

near St. Lawrence Island. The Navy went in search of the reported contacts, Strike Fleet mainly

hunting ghost ships north of the Aleutians in the first months, while 3rd Division was deployed to

the West Coast along the Yukon River together with the reserve squadrons of 6th Air Force Wing

to the not-yet garrisoned Nome airfield, in order to defend against an invasion that ultimately never

came.

With a wartime draft in place, all services were to be strengthened to retake the occupied islands

the next year, hoping that rugged conditions, local weather and long supply lines coupled with

naval blockade operations and frequent air raids would attrit the Japanese garrisons over the long

Russian American winter. Increasing numbers proved to be not so much a problem of available

conscripts, nor of enthusiast volunteers of any age and both sexes, but of the cadre to lead them.

The reserve officer and NCO training schemes already thought of were sped up in implementation

along with a rank reform that went with a thorough cutting of leadership posts at unit level.

Since NCOs could be trained more quickly than officers and territorial units had proven to operate

just as well with less cadre personnel, this concerned mostly officers; company XOs were deleted

as were assistant platoon leaders, half to two thirds of platoons now led by NCOs like the German

army was already doing for similar reasons. Praporshchiks en route to reserve officer rank after

completing platoon leader course could take this role too, or act as company sergeants. Promising

NCOs were also sent to take officer classes.

Overall, a third of officer and a sixth of NCO post were deleted in infantry regiments, along with

about 30 enlisted positions deemed “unproductive”, mostly orderlies; the Type 1943 Division

shrunk by about 750 to 14,841 all ranks. This was to pay not only for staffing of activated reserve

units, but the establishment of additional ones, too. Two new territorial regiments were stood up

for home defence, but also in view of possibly reforming previously-disbanded 4th Division. In

addition, personnel who had participated in the airborne trials were used to form the core of an

airborne regiment after all. School Command was expanded due to greater requirements, and the

equivalent of a full Military Police Battalion formed under the Central Military Court and Prison

to deal with possible higher numbers of POWs. Additionally, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps

was expanded and occupations in the territorial quartermaster units opened to its members. Overall,

the planned 1943 Army OOB foresaw a strength of 116,500, including 3,600 female auxiliaries.

There was a renewed interest interest in automatic rifles to counter the expected greater numbers

of the enemy; since American Garands were not available due to domestic US demand, an order

for Johnson M1941 rifles and light machine guns was placed, intended to equip the guards, marines

30 Bergmann, P. G.: Reports to the Air Force Headquarters 1940-1945 (Junograd Military Archives), 351. 31 Colins, p. 17-18.

Part II: 1942

19

and yegers first. The new airborne force was impressed by a prototype Johnson carbine that would

eventually be produced as the M1943. In Stoyanka, RBZ was trialing belt-fed infantry machine

guns influenced by the German MG 34 that had been encountered by observers in Europe, but for

now put the finishing touches on their M42 which was quite similar to the Czech-British Bren.

There was less concern about enemy armour, though the British Six-Pounder anti-tank gun was

planned to be introduced due to ammunition commonality with the Ram Mk II tank which was

finally beginning to arrive. The American “Bazooka” was also being looked at, but had no priority.

The divisional artillery regiments were assuming a new organisation of two light howitzer battal-

ions equipped with the 100 mm M39, one medium howitzer battalion with the 149 mm K4, and a

cannon battalion with the 105 mm M35, with US-delivered halftracks as prime movers.

The other services saw similar developments. The Navy was to expand its single minesweeper

squadron of drafted fishing trawlers refitted with minesweeping gear to three with dedicated Ca-

nadian-built Isles-class vessels to prepare for the expected mine threat in amphibious landing. The

marine and coastal artillery battalions were expanded and again consolidated into regiments, one

under each regional command, to counter possible further landings. Surface combatants were to be

equipped not only with radar, but increased light anti-air artillery of 20 and 40 mm calibre, follow-

ing Allied experience in earlier naval operations.

Modern American “K-Gun” depth charge projectors were also to be installed during refits in US

yards, and the remaining 18” torpedo tubes on old Russian destroyers swapped to standardize on

the 21” calibre on American-built ships. The Navy had unfortunately lost two of its eight subma-

rines early on already – Sardina probably sunk by the Japanese and the class lead boat Skumbrii

run aground in foggy conditions while recharging batteries – and was looking for replacements.

The total planned 1943 strength for the Navy was 56,200, including 2,200 female auxiliaries in

shore occupations.32

The Air Force was still growing the most rapidly and expected to stand up two additional wings,

13th at Nome and 14th at the Aleutian island of Adak where the Americans were already building

a new airfield closer to the enemy. Another was planned even farther out at Amchitka, and the 1943

Air Force OOB made provision to establish at least a basic air base group there to handle forward-

deployed aircraft detachments. Similiar groups encompassing maintenance, supply and some anti-

air units were stood up for the quickly-emerging staging airfields on the Lend-Lease routes, five to

be operational until the end of 1943. The Air Force found joint US-Russian bases particularly val-

uable, as their personnel could profit from the experience of the Americans, and even attached

pilots to USAAF and RCAF units to learn.

New US-delivered P-38E and A-20C made up for losses in early air combat – though pilots were

not as easily replaced – and the first P-70 night fighters to equip two squadrons were also promised

for later in the year. At this point however an agreement had already been struck with de Havilland

to build their Mosquito domestically, with most parts other than the wooden airframes to be sourced

from Canada. Initially three light bomber squadrons were to be equipped, though long-term plans

extended to fighter-bomber and night fighter variants, too.33 The P-51 Mustang had piqued interest

as a possible new single-engine long-range fighter despite some performance shortcomings of early

models used by the British RAF, but was not thought to be available quickly.34 For the moment,

improving fighter performance concentrated on RBZ modifying the unreliable American variant

of the Hispano 20 mm cannon of the P-38.35

32 von Sieben, 352-373. 33 Grushchev, 305. 34 Nikitin, p. 16. 35 Bergmann, 334.

Part II: 1942

20

In light of the new airborne regiment, airlift capacities were to be increased to three C-47 squad-

rons, the older light transport planes to be distributed to the wings as liaison aircraft. Needful of

personnel to support its growth but still considered the junior service, the Air Force was first to

employ women in other than staff and medical roles, using them as shuttle pilots to transfer planes

delivered from the US to Ketchikan in the far South of the Panhandle like the Americans and British

did, too – though at first on an individual basis rather than in organised units. The 1943 Air Force

OOB called for a total strength of 36,000, including 1,500 female auxiliaries.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had shown no intention of progressing beyond the islands they had

already captured. 3rd Division was living in largely dismal conditions on the undeveloped arctic

West Coast, initially often in tents and holes in the ground until engineers from 5th Krasivayaberga

Regiment pulled somewhat rustic, but complete bases from the soil in place. Classic war diseases

were common at the start, and by autumn, some units reported up to 20 percent of personnel down,

including through a minor localised cholera epidemic. Along with solid quarters, better supplies, a

stepped-up training on nutrition, personal and collective hygiene and health education, backed up

by on-site inspections by senior medical officers, eventual fixed the problems. 3rd Division com-

mander Lebed used the time on deployment to develop and train his troops in a concept of mobile

defence using combined-arms battlegroups similar to the American regimental combat teams.

However, the perceived inaction of the bulk of Russian American forces led to discontent both at

home and among the Allies who were starting to ask if a division or so might be deployed to the

European War Theatre if troops lacked the training and equipment to engage the Japanese at their

doorstep. Domestic worries included the mobilisation of a total of 13 percent of the male population

(and 0.5 percent of the female) under the plans for 1943, and the impact on the civilian economy.

Wartime rationing had been implemented and was projected to support the population until the end

of 1944, but there were no guarantees the war would be finished by then. Again, this apprehension

turned out to be correct.36

36 von Sieben, 335-373.

Part III: 1943

21

Part III: 1943

The Aleutians, Komandorskis and Iceland

In the absence of means for decisive large-scale operations against the invaders, the Russian Amer-

icans did what they knew best, because they had done it for the last two decades: propaganda and

clandestine warfare. Most of this was obviously not carried out by the regular armed forces, but

the Signal Corps, as the innocuous designation for the Russian American intelligence service went.

Signals had initially focussed on espionage, sedition and sabotage operations against the USSR

as well as counterintelligence efforts against similar enemy actions. In addition, it was running

most of the state-sponsored underground networks that helped escapees from communist rule get

to Russian America. As Soviet influence on world affairs grew, so did the scope of Signals' activity:

watching the armed conflicts in China, Spain and Finland and acquiring new military technology

as a clandestine supplement to the open presence of military observers and volunteers. The mission

of increasing the Russian American population soon expanded from helping escapees to recruiting

Soviet POWs from Finland in quiet agreement with the Helsinki government and, after the break

with Germany, refugees from occupied Eastern Europe – mostly Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavians

– as well as Jews from Western Europe in collaboration with the Zionist Organisation.

The propaganda effort included newsreels of commando operations against the Japanese in con-

cert with troops from the Aleutian and Komandorski garrisons cast as keeping up resistance against

the invaders. In reality, activity on the occupied islands amounted to little more than covered re-

connaissance by Signals' small paramilitary arm, the “Signals Escort Battalion”. Most footage of

heroic fights with the enemy was shot in thoroughly unoccupied places, the Japanese soldiers por-

trayed by Russian American residents of Asian descent, possibly backed up by some actual Japa-

nese POWs or even KIAs. In support, a series of movies was commissioned by the armed forces

which depicted valiant commandoes, airmen and sailors fighting the enemy in the Aleutians.37

Meanwhile actual efforts of ground forces were centred on acquiring and training with amphibi-

ous craft. Since Allied priority for delivery to this theatre was low, a deal was negotiated with the

US for Higgins Boats and larger types to be built in Russian American shipyards, but it would take

time before a sufficient number was ready. There were also plans for actual raids in the Aleutians,

Komandorskis or even Kuriles; some in Junograd saw the retaking of the latter, lost to Japan in the

19th century, as an eventual war aim anyway. One rather fantastic variant from the Navy called for

a reduced battalion of marines to be landed by flying boats. An even more high-stake scheme was

to propose a counter-invasion in the largely uninhabited Central Kurils to the Americans, depend-

ant on the latter's considerable material support – expected to be denied for being too aggressive,

thus winning more time from Allied demands for substantial contributions to the war effort.

The sea and air remained the main fronts though. In September 1942, the new airfield on Adak

became operational, and on 12 January 1943, a joint American-Russian force landed on Amchitka

to begin construction of another base. Unfortunately destroyer Schastlivy ran aground and sank

with loss of 14 lives during the operation, but things for the Air Force looked up. The first crews

for the new P-70 night fighters had finished training, and domestic production of Mosquito bomb-

ers begun. Even the Mustang fighter had come into reach as the Americans were about to switch

production to the P-51B, and a surplus run of the A variant was promised for delivery in March.38

37 Tanski, S. S. (ed.): The Pocket Book of Declassified World War II Signal Corps Documents (Stoyanka 1986), p.

13-20. 38 von Sieben, 381.

Part III: 1943

22

The Amchitka base was finished shortly before that, and at this time battleship General Ale-

kseyev, escorted by two destroyers southwest of Attu, also chanced upon a Japanese cargo ship that

failed the radio challenge, was shelled and blew up with no survivors found, likely having laden

ammunition. Alekseyev then continued towards the Komandorskis with cruiser Kolchak and De-

stroyer Division 11 under Commander Strike Fleet, Admiral Nemzov, to search for other expected

Japanese supply convoys. On 27 March, the formation indeed found a transport group escorted by

heavy cruisers Nachi and Maya, light cruisers Abukuma and Tama as well as four destroyers.39

In the ensueing First Battle of the Komandorskis, Alekseyev crippled Nachi who was subse-

quently sunk by Maya after taking her crew off, but was herself hit by a torpedo fired by a destroyer

screening the stricken cruiser.40 She stayed afloat but had her screws and rudders wrecked and aft

engine room flooded from the detonation under her stern. Unable to manoeuver, the rest of the

Japanese escaped her group, and she had to be precariously towed to Unalaska. There she was

found to be not worth to repair since she would have spent months in drydock, tying down resources

urgently needed to build landing craft, and spent the rest of the war as a floating battery in port.41

While the sinking of a heavy Japanese cruiser received appropriate Allied applause, the opera-

tional loss of Alekseyev actually increased dependency on US support, and in the one area where

Russian America had its own national effort going to boot. There were negotiations about a possible

replacement by one or two American light cruisers, but the hope for a damaged US Navy vessel to

be transferred after repair never materialised. Another suggestion was to take over a light aircraft

carrier, which was considered seriously enough for the Air Force to send some pilots to train for

carrier operations with the USN; but that, too, was not to be at this point.42 Instead, the Americans

deployed their own task force of cruisers and destroyers to the theatre.

Under this state of affairs, Junograd could no longer deny Allied requests for a Russian American

contribution in the European Theatre, though a division was considered an all too open-ended com-

mitment. Brigade-sized offers for the Mediterranean or arctic-trained troops to be based in the UK

for raids into Norway were evaluated. But in the end, a rather unexpected proposal to defend Ice-

land and Greenland was settled upon by all involved. Negotiations with the American and Icelandic

governments resulted in a contingent of 13,500 troops in total, mostly taken from 2nd Division;

three regimental groups were formed from 1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry, 1st Kenai Infantry and

2nd Kenai Cavalry with elements of the division's engineer and medical battalions, augmented by

two artillery groups from IV./3rd Kenai Artillery and 2nd Anti-Air Battalion, II./5th Krasivay-

aberga Heavy Engineer Battalion, 2nd Quartermaster Battalion and companies from 4th Military

Police Battalion. Additionally, II./1st Northern Yeger Battalion was to be based in Greenland.

In essence therefore most of a division was sent after all, though the North Atlantic basing was

deemed acceptable. Some equipment was to be brought along across the Gulf of Alaska, the width

of Canada and the Atlantic; some would be taken over on Iceland, some directly delivered there

new from US production. Ultimately the deployment also proved a convenient maskirovka for the

preparations of offensive operations in the Aleutians which had been made by now.43

39 Nemzov, K. A.: Battle at the Komandorski Islands (Junograd 1956), p. 20. 40 Admiralty, 27 March 1943. 41 Nemzov, p. 395-437. 42 Bergmann, 439. 43 von Sieben, 398-440.

Part III: 1943

23

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Part III: 1943

24

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Part III: 1943

25

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Part III: 1943

26

Preparations for Kiska

Simultaneously with the debate on European deployments, the plans for a first reconquest of occu-

pied Russian American territory from the Japanese took shape. They centred on the Aleutian island

of Kiska, since it was the closest, smallest and easiest terrain-wise. Intelligence estimates about

strength of the enemy garrisons had initially been in the regimental range for each island, then later

revised upwards to possibly one of the IJA's independent mixed brigades each, suggesting up to

9,000 personnel including naval and air detachments. Still, reconnaissance missions by the Signals

Corps indicated Kiska was more lightly manned by a regimental group.

Timing was crucial. The conventional campaign period under local weather conditions was from

May to September, with June to August preferable. On the other hand, more time meant more of

the new landing craft ready and troops trained in their use. It was clear from the outset that the bulk

of forces would come from 1st Division which was the most capable one, having been active before

the war and gotten some – if unfortunate – experience with amphibious landings in the 1942 spring

exercises. They would be supported by marines who were trained in landing with conventional

boats, but lacked heavy firepower from divisional support weapons. 3rd Division was still deployed

to the West Coast, while 2nd Division would eventually form the Iceland contingent.

The first draft for the Kiska ground combat element, designated 1st Aleutian Task Force

(Ground), called for three battlegroups following the concept developed by 3rd Division to spear-

head the landings. They would be formed from two battalions of 1st Stoyanka Infantry, 1st and 2nd

Marines respectively, reinforced by the regimental cannon companies and one light and heavy

squadron from 5th Stoyanka Cavalry each. 2nd Stoyanka Infantry and the rest of 1st Division's

troops would follow in their conventional order once the beachheads were established.

I./1st Yeger Battalion was also assigned to the task force, and in the course of the negotiations

about mutual Allied contributions, the US and Canada offered their joint 1st Special Service Force.

This small elite brigade had been stood up for attacks on high-value targets in German-occupied

Norway which never materialised in favour of long-range bombing missions, but was ideally suited

to the Aleutians with its arctic and mountain training. Overall, the first draft for 1st ATF (G) called

for a strength of 20,000. This was found too unwieldy and quickly divided into two echelons, 1st

ATF now consisting of the three battlegroups, 1st SSF and some supporting elements with a total

strength of 13,800 for the landings, and a 2nd Aleutian Task Force (Ground) uniting the follow-up

formations for a total of 6,700 personnel.44

For the naval side, the Aleutian Joint Allied Naval Task Force was established. It commanded

three task groups led by Russian America, the US and Canada respectively. The Landing Force

was entirely Russian with two transport and two minesweeper squadrons, protected by the Kolchak

cruiser division and a destroyer squadron, and supported by an auxiliary squadron. The bulk of

firepower for naval gunfire support was provided by the all-American Covering Force consisting

of heavy cruisers USS Indianapolis, Louisville and Salt Lake City, light cruiser USS St. Louis and

three old Omaha-class CLs, as well as another destroyer squadron. The Screening force was Cana-

dian led with anti-air cruiser HMCS Prince Robert as flagship, two Tribal-class destroyers and five

River-class frigates; the Nakhimov cruiser division and 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron were also

attached from the Russian American Navy.45

Air support was provided by the Air Force's Central Command which was reinforced to five

wings for the operation, including the two night fighter squadrons that were planned to transfer

from the P-70 to the incoming Mosquito NF Mk XII until then – the former planned to replace lost

44 von Sieben, 418-428. 45 Colins, p. 21-22.

Part III: 1943

27

A-20s in the attack squadrons, modified for the night anti-shipping role – and the first squadron

flying the P-51A. In addition, Eleventh US Air Force would bring its 28th Bombardment Group

with three B-24D and B-25C squadrons each, as well as 343rd Fighter Group with another six

squadrons, two of which Canadian. The Americans also planned to deploy 407th Bombardment

Groups with four squadrons of A-24 dive bombers; however, the existing airfields in the Aleutians

were already at the edge of their capacity with current aircraft in theatre.46

To relief the strain, the Americans suggested scouting the small uninhabited island of Shemya on

the far side of Kiska in the Aleutian chain as another possible base. This would also allow flights

to Kiska from two directions and interrupting enemy lines of communication along the chain. How-

ever, its location was also perilously close to heavily Japanese-garrisoned Attu. Reconnaissance

over flights and a visit from S-45, a submarine operated by the Signals Corps for their purposes,

revealed no enemy presence there.47 Securing Shemya was still viewed with apprehension in Ju-

nograd, but also considered good exercise for the Aleutian Task Forces.

Meanwhile the landing craft situation had improved. LCVPs were being built in various Russian

American shipyards, and a first handful of the bigger LCMs had been delivered as patterns. Crews

from the lost destroyer Schastlivy and submarine Skumbrii were recycled to man the new small

craft on the basis that they already had experience in running vessels aground. New, more powerful

davits and derricks were fitted to the ships which would carry them. By June, enough capacity to

land a regimental battlegroup in a single wave was expected to be available. Planners were more

worried about capacity of the transport ships though, due to new equipment introduced. The sealift

squadrons which were once planned to embark a full division each were found to accommodate

only two of the new battlegroups with their various vehicles and support weapons. There was suf-

ficient shipping space to conduct the landing of 1st ATF (G), but without additional Allied support

the reinforcements from 2nd ATF would have to be shuttled in.48

Overall, the Allied logistics network was tightening. In addition to the sea and air links along the

Russian American coast, there were plans for road and rail links to Canada, and ultimately the US.

Despite the challenging terrain that had made such considerations seem economically prohibitive

in peacetime, a road was now being punched from the Canadian side towards Junograd, another

towards Whitehorse, intended to cross into Russian America near Tok, where it would meet with

routes from Stoyanka and Krasivayaberga. In addition, a rail route had been mapped out and par-

tially surveyed heading north from Terrace in British Columbia towards Teslin, Yukon. This would

eventually link to Skaguay on the Russian American side; plans for the farther future were going

on to the Medjreki Railway from the Kenikotski copper mines to the port of Cordova – which had

ceased operations in 1938 after the good ore ran out – and eventually again to Stoyanka.49

Other measures were progressing faster. The initial order of 8,000 Johnson automatic rifles and

400 light machine guns for the Guards, Yeger and Airborne Regiments was nearly completed. The

next batch of 15,000 rifles was destined for the cavalry and marines, who were hoped to be

equipped by early next year; also included were 1,200 MGs which would replace the Lewis Guns

in the Marines. After that, another 17,000 rifles were planned for the infantry regiments in I Corps,

while the RBZ M42 machine gun from domestic production was also being introduced. RBZ was

already working on an automatic rifle design of its own, but MG production was given absolute

priority.50

46 von Sieben, 428. 47 Tanski, p. 22-23. 48 von Sieben, 454. 49 Colins, p. 23. 50 von Sieben, 458-664.

Part III: 1943

28

The new airborne regiment was scheduled to be combat ready at the end of the year, though its

exact organisation was still under debate. Since the Russian American industry was gaining expe-

rience with building wooden airplanes, there were suggestions to look at the British Horsa glider.

With the Mosquito increasingly replacing the A-20, surviving examples of the latter were thought

of being re-roled as tugs for them. While the gliders would be operated by the Army itself, the

greater airlift requirements also led to plans of standing up yet another transport squadron with

more powerful aircraft than the C-47 currently in service. Both the Curtiss C-46 and Douglas C-54

were considered, but would not be available quickly.51

For once, personnel would not be the problem, since the Air Force was enjoying an unexpected

surplus of pilots despite losses in the Aleutians. This was in parts due to increased domestic training

capacities, the new more flexible rank system that allowed flying praporshchiks, and the admission

of women pilots.52 Originally intended to only take over aircraft delivered from the US, they had

quickly gone to fly them directly to the receiving units – officially only in areas where they stood

no risk to be shot at, but when the Air Force began replacing its old light transport craft with the

Beechcraft as the unified liaison plane, female pilots began simply sticking around in the wings as

liaison pilots, even on Aleutian bases. This would be not the last to be seen of them, either.53

The Debate on Operational Art

The landing on Shemya as an important preparation for retaking Kiska was ultimately scheduled

for 11 June 1943. The force consisted of a marine battalion backed up by mostly artillery elements

from 2nd Aleutian Task Force (Ground), using the first dozen available LCMs to bring in enough

firepower for defence against possible Japanese counteractions from Attu, only 15 sea miles away.

Ample sea and air cover was provided, but if it hadn't been for a Japanese submarine taking a shot

at USS Salt Lake City, the operation would have been rather anticlimactic. Fortunately one of the

destroyers escorting the cruiser spotted the torpedo wake, and she managed to evade. The attacker

was subsequently hunted for ten hours by several American destroyers, forced to surface with depth

charges, hit by artillery fire and likely sunk. The only living creatures encountered on Shemya were

some seals and birds, and there were no casualties other than a couple of wet pants and sprained

ankles. American engineers started bulldozing the planned airfield the next day.

The continued rapid expansion of the Air Force caused the planning cycle for its 1944 structure

to start early. The Chief of the Air Force was to be finally elevated to four-star rank, on par with

his colleagues from the other two services, as another level of command was introduced and overall

strength rose to 44,800, including 3,600 women. It was now also divided into an Air Combat Com-

mand and Air Force Auxiliary Command. The former was again divided into the Aleutian Com-

mand and the Home Defence Command, each with four wings. The Auxiliary Command also had

two lower commands assigned: the one Transport Command with three transport wings – one of

them with the female transfer pilots now formed into a single flying squadron – and the Auxiliary

Air Base Command administering the staging airfields; and the other Training Command with now

one flight and four basic training wings as well as Air Force School.54

51 von Sieben, 444-487. 52 Bergmann, 448. 53 Borodin, A. T.: The Forgotten Fighters. The Story of Woman Pilots in the Russian American Air Force in World

War II (Stoyanka 1976), p. 15-23. 54 von Sieben, 503-550.

Part III: 1943

29

The new P-51A had already proven an exceptionally formidable and long-ranged fighter, but

lacked performance at altitudes above 15,000 feet due to the single-stage supercharger of the Alli-

son engine. The Air Force therefore hoped to soon proceed to the B variant with the British Merlin

engine, or rather its US-produced Packard license variant. In addition to the incoming night fighter

version of the Mosquito, a fighter-bomber and reconnaissance variant were also to be introduced

in 1944, the latter replacing various A-20 and P-38 models that were spread throughout the squad-

rons about two apiece.55 Long-term projections revolved around long-range bombers for possible

future action against the Kuriles or even Japan proper.56 British types were prefered due to lower

crewing requirements, either the Canadian-built Lancaster B Mk X or the smaller Vickers Welling-

ton. It was thought that night bombing on the British model would be a distinct Russian American

supplement to US capabilities, but the plans had no priority at this point.57

While marines and army troops trained fighting together in 1st ATF (G)'s mixed battlegroups and

operating with the new landing craft for the retaking of Kiska, their respective parent services were

also already thinking about next year's organisation. The Navy was most occupied with forming

units to operate the quickly growing fleet of landing craft; a dozen LSTs had already been ordered

from the US, which were to be grouped into a fourth (amphibious) transport squadron under Aux-

iliary Fleet; there were also plans for a fifth made up from the surviving old Russian destroyers, to

be converted to fast troop transports like the US Navy was doing with their APDs.

Replacements and reinforcements for the destroyer fleet were sought, but the US was only offer-

ing either more four-stackers, or some of the new mass-produced destroyer escorts – larger than

the older types, but not considered “real” destroyers by the Navy due to light armament and slow

speed. Still, the 1944 draft OOB called for a third destroyer squadron, as well as a fourth mine-

sweeper squadron with the Canadian Isles-class vessels, and a fourth naval aviation squadron with

flying boats. Negotiations were ongoing about transfer of American submarines to make up for the

lost two boats; there was interest in the two Mackerel-class submarines, similar to the Russian-

American Skumbrii-class, but each slightly different from the other, currently used as training ves-

sels by the USN. Overall strength was to grow to 58,500, including 2,200 female auxiliaries.58

The expansion of the Navy and Air Force left little reinforcements for the Army, but then it had

yet to engage in major operations. In the course of a lengthy debate on operational art, changes

were thought of rather within the scope of existing strength, centreing on a possible brigade struc-

ture for divisions that would formalize the battlegroup concept to some degree and was also influ-

enced by Commonwealth practice as employed in Canada.59 3rd Division, having led the way and

still deployed to the West Coast, was chosen as a testbed formation that would also evaluate new

concepts for mechanised warfare as seen in the European Theatre, including use of the M3 halftrack

for the infantry. There were also thoughts of increasing firepower and standardisation with Allied

forces through the introduction of American 105 mm infantry howitzers and 107 mm mortars.

Meanwhile, the bulk of 2nd Division was preparing to ship out for Iceland. A debate was under-

way to form its remaining units into an independent brigade with one of the newly raised territorial

regiments, but this was not decided by 3 July when the North Atlantic contingent was seen off with

a great public parade. The festivities and movement of ships towards Canada however served as a

planful detraction from far more decisive movements into the opposite direction.60

55 Bergmann, 413-429. 56 Bergmann, 508-560. 57 von Sieben, 550-595. 58 von Sieben, 576. 59 Kalugin, I.: An Opportunity Missed. The 1943 Debate on Operational Art (Nome 1992), p. 25-31. 60 von Sieben, 578-584.

Part III: 1943

30

The Battle for Kiska

Initital landings on Kiska were scheduled for 15 August 1943, with units of the Aleutian Task

Forces quietly sailing out to staging grounds on nearby islands while public attention was focused

on the North Atlantic deployments. Planners felt comfortable about the mission; while Kiska is

about 35 kilometres in length, its extreme width is less than ten, the only significant mountain being

the Kiska Volcano at the north tip. The Japanese were building an airfield north of Kiska harbour,

but frequent bombing and shelling by Allied forces impeded their progress greatly according to

overhead imagery. Local aerial opposition was therefore expected to consist mostly of Mitsubishi

Zero floatplane fighters, not as formidable as the carrier-based variant encountered in the Unalaska

raids. About 40 LCMs would be available to disembark troops and equipment.

Original plans called for 1st and 2nd Marine Battlegroup to land on the island's western shoreline

simultaneously with 1st Stoyanka Infantry Battlegroup on the northwestern after preparatory naval

and air bombardment, then advance to the opposite coast behind a walking wall of fire, bottling up

the Japanese main positions reported at Kiska Harbour.61 Some misgivings were voiced about the

swampy area north of 1st Stoyanka's beachhead, but they were expected to land on dead flat terrain,

then spread east and south.62

The US-Canadian 1st Special Service Force would scour the volcano for the Japanese observation

posts reported there. Meanwhile, 1st Marines would cut across the island through the ridgeline west

of Kiska Harbour, while 2nd would turn east towards the harbour itself, taking the enemy in the

rear.63 A possible difficulty was the islet of Little Kiska off the port; scouting by the Signals Corps

had established that there were Japanese shore batteries there, covering the harbour. A diversionary

raid by Signals' fast boat squadron, equipped with American 4.5” beach barrage rockets, would

detract from the landings on the opposite shore, but the guns on Little Kiska remained a hazard for

any eventual attack on the port.64

There was some fine tuning of plans, including delay of 1st Stoyanka's landing into the very early

morning hours of D-Day +1, concentrating landing craft to deliver more mechanised assets in the

respective first waves. The reorganisation of the Air Force regarding the new Aleutian Command

was preponed to accommodate operational needs, making use of the new Shemya base. Since most

combat squadrons were moved under Aleutian Command, the Canadians redeployed some of theirs

to cover the Panhandle; at this point, Ketchikan Air Base was inhabited by Nos. 8 Bomber Recon-

naissance, 135 Fighter and 149 Torpedo Bomber Squadrons RCAF, leaving only No. 14 Fighter

Squadron in the Aleutians while No. 111 had rotated home.

Due to overcrowding of available bases, the Americans had cancelled the deployment of 407th

Bombardment Group (Dive) save for 635th Squadron, and dispatched battleships USS Idaho, Penn-

sylvania and Tennessee instead, armed with 14” guns for shore bombardment and escorted by ad-

ditional destroyers.65 With this firepower, optimists thought Kiska might be secured within a week;

pessimists pointed to American experiences with stiff Japanese resistance in their South Pacific

island campaign and warned it might take 45 to 90 days.66

Landing operations on Kiska commenced on D-Day at 0620 hours. The first wave went in

smoothly and unopposed after minesweepers had cleared the area; in fact the first report surmised

61 von Sieben, 595. 62 Kalugin, p. 30. 63 von Sieben, 597. 64 Tanski, p. 31. 65 von Sieben, 669. 66 Tanski, p. 36.

Part III: 1943

31

the Japanese were surprised by the time and place as planned, and their first warning might have

been the preparatory shore bombardment, since there was no challenge at all to the approaching

vessels. The main problems were that some of the beaches were found to be unusable upon closing,

and the resulting congestion in the approachable sites. Still, by 1200 hours half of 1st and 2nd

Marine Battlegroups each, covered by detached elements of 1st SSF, had established a beachhead

of four kilometres width.

However, as soon as naval fire support was shifted inland in preparation for moving off the beach,

the enemy opened heavy mortar and machine gun fire from well-concealed positions on the over-

looking bluffs. It proved a very sound decision to have concentrated landing craft for mechanised

assets and proceed with the southern thrust first, since the greater number of landed cavalry vehicles

provided more cover for the marines to advance in, though the muddy ground impeded movement.

Unfortunately it turned out most of the direct fire weapons could not elevate enough to engage the

enemy positions, while pinpoint naval gunfire and air support were hindered by foggy conditions.

Advance was halted, and a new effort made only after the rest of the battlegroups had landed by

1600 hours with artillery from 9th Stoyanka Regiment set up on the beaches. Heavy fighting con-

tinued until around sunset at 2200 hours, but the heights over the beaches were mostly secured by

then. Initial casualty reports spoke of about 120 killed and 250 wounded, about five percent of

landed strength though obviously concentrated in the four Marine battalions. Almost no Japanese

prisoners were made, their soldiers preferring to fight to the death.

Meanwhile the bulk of the naval force had moved on to the northern landing site, and the main

body of 1st SSF was first to go ashore at 0100. The landing was unopposed like the southern one,

though there were some casualties from mines on the beach – which were not encountered in the

south – necessitating a sweep of the area by engineer parties. By this time, the southern force had

resumed the advance after the short arctic summer night and a 40 minute shelling of known and

suspected Japanese positions, planning to take the entire ridgeline along the shore in the course of

the day. Resistance was still stiff however, and the reserves of 2nd Aleutian Task Force (Ground)

at Amchitka and Shemya were alerted for likely reinforcements in the next days.67

Continued foggy conditions made it hard for the Allied air forces to do their bit despite no air

opposition, largely reducing them to bombing and rocketing hillsides by dead reckoning. A partial

solution to have ground troops send up flares from known positions was only starting to get imple-

mented, somewhat improving close support.68 The southern force took out a series of Japanese

positions along the lower edges of the ridgeline on the third try after two bogged-down attacks, but

the crests remained contested. 10th Company 2nd Marines managed to secure a high point in the

pass at the Western edge of the advance, thanks in part due to a smoke screen laid down to mask

the assault. They encountered unexpectedly few Japanese, most wearing gas masks, probably hav-

ing mistaken the smoke for a gas attack.

The main body of the northern force advanced south and east, but was pinned down below Hill

1266 by heavy enemy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire for a full twelve hours before massive

naval bombardment enabled them to take the hill around 1700 hours. The Japanese were forced

down the eastern side, but turned right around and counterattacked into their own artillery fire.

Holding the high ground, 1st Stoyanka Infantry troops were able to fend them off rather quickly,

but were behind their schedule to link up with the southern force on D+2 as originally planned.69

Visual conditions improved over the day, allowing better air support – though the Japanese

quickly found out about the employ of flares and started marking their own positions to protect

67 Korichnev, E. M.: Victory on Kiska (Stoyanka 1951), p. 69-70. 68 Bergmann, 704. 69 Korichnev, Victory, p. 70.

Part III: 1943

32

them from Allied aircraft.70 Casualty numbers were not the same as on D-Day since troops pro-

ceeded cautiously, calling in artillery or air support once engaged. However they unfortunately

included Polkovnik Jarlov, commander of the southern force, who was killed by a sniper while

surveying the situation on the frontline. Reports stated about 30 killed and 50 wounded while the

previous day's numbers were revised slightly downwards by about the same after eliminating dou-

ble reports and mistakes made in the confusion of first contact.

Fighting continued throughout the night, and in the morning the ridgeline in the South was more

or less secured. Combat was reported to be done mainly with grenades and bayonets, the latter

leading to some complaint from marines about the small needle bayonet attached to the recoiling

barrel of their new Johnson automatic rifles. Resistance of the individual Japanese soldier was

fanatical. While climbing the crest to the west of a previously secured pass in the ridgeline, an

enemy officer was yelling Russian insults at the marines from above. The stronghold on top could

only be destroyed by direct mortar fire. The last Japanese survivor killed two of the marines, then

jumped off the peak screaming.

On the other hand, many enemies were again killed while trying to done gas masks when smoke

was laid down, which had become a popular tactic of Russian American troops. A number of spider

holes was found empty, but booby-trapped like a lot of other items left behind by the Japanese.

Soldiers quickly became very cautious indeed about touching things. Some troops also went miss-

ing in previously cleared territory, and ATG (G) commander General-Mayor Korichnev started

parties of military police, engineers and dismounted light cavalry – whose wheeled vehicles had

proved of little use on the boggy ground – probing every square foot behind friendly lines for

Japanese stragglers, hideouts and bodies.

There was a fair share of heroism in the Russian American ranks, too. One report cited an efreitor

of 1st Marines in the advance towards Kiska Harbour who slid down a muddy slope towards a

Japanese trench system ahead of his company under enemy fire. When his unit caught up with him,

he had already single-handedly cleared the trench, killing nearly 50 Japanese with grenades and

automatic rifle fire. Conversely, when 1st Stoyanka Infantry Battlegroup advanced towards Kiska

Harbour after finding a Japanese position reported in their way deserted, they were tragically

strafed and bombed by US aircraft which obviously mistook them for enemy soldiers retreating

from that position. Advance was halted for two hours, and afterwards they were counterattacked

by a Japanese force led by a sword-wielding officer. Those were however fought off quickly, and

in the evening the northern force reached the lagoon opposite the airfield at Kiska Harbour.

A tentative linkup between the northern and southern force was achieved on D+3, though an

enemy-held hill jutted into that area. Advance towards Kiska Harbour resumed, but again bogged

down twice. Another efreitor from 1st Stoyanka Infantry was cited for taking action both times,

killing a number of Japanese in their foxholes with his Johnson machine gun in a hail of enemy

fire, reloading as he went, leading his company in the assault. Unfortunately at the last foxhole in

the second charge he was shot in the head himself and did ultimately not survive. A scout patrol

also reached the southern shore from the ridgeline, expecting to find a heavy concentration of Jap-

anese troops, but finding none. The enemy appeared to have concentrated his forces for the defence

of Kiska Harbour. In the early morning of the same day the American destroyer USS Abner Read

was hit by a mine off Kiska that tore her stern off, killing about 70 of her crew and wounding

another 50. Miraculously she stayed afloat and was towed to Adak.

There were more unfortunate friendly-fire incidents during the link-up between the northern and

southern force, this time between Russian American ground troops on either side; after four days

70 Bergmann, 708.

Part III: 1943

33

of constant threat, soldiers were conditioned to shoot anything that moved to their front. The hilltop

interrupting the front was cleared on D+4 though, and the Japanese were further pushed back to-

wards Kiska Harbour. The marines also moved south from the previously held ridgeline, encoun-

tering no enemy troops in the direction of the opposite coast. The Japanese were now pretty much

bottled up at Kiska Harbour and Little Kiska, with Russian troops in a commanding position over-

looking the enemy airfield and port facilities – though the problem of insecure rear areas remained.

1st SSF was providing flank security both in the North and South.

General-Mayor Korichnev tended towards reducing the Japanese by fires rather than assaulting

them in their bases. 1st Stoyanka Infantry began building up former Japanese positions on D+5 in

preparation for the siege, with reinforcements from 2nd ATG (G) expected to land the following

day. It was hoped that some of the artillery still at the landing sites could be moved south through

the passes in the ridgeline then to shell both Little Kiska and Kiska Harbour from the land side in

addition to naval and aerial bombardment. The marines moved up the southern shoreline and down

the peninsula opposite Little Kiska, encountering less resistance than before and making the encir-

clement of Kiska Harbour complete. Meanwhile the more static situation was used to let the troops

catch up on sleep in greater batches, a bitter necessity after the last five days.

However at 0330 in the morning on D+6, the Japanese launched a banzai attack to negate superior

Allied firepower by turning combat into hand-to-hand fighting. The troops holding the main pas-

sage from the landing sites to Kiska Harbour were assaulted by a massive human wave of enemy

soldiers. Unfortunately 1st Marines had just settled in for the siege, with considerable contingents

sent off to sleep, and were taken largely unaware. Another assault hit 1st Stoyanka Infantry to the

north. Some units shattered under the assault and retreated in disorder. Close-quarters battle oc-

curred all the way back to some of the artillery emplacements on the southern landing sites.

Yet as daylight rose, soldiers and marines alike rallied around the cavalry units in the passes

whose armoured vehicles had largely withstood small arms fire, grenades and bayonets; forces on

higher ground were mostly able to hold themselves. The armoured cars that had never gotten far

away from the beaches finally proved of some use too as they defended the artillery emplacements

and logistic parks. The situation remained confused with heavy fighting continuing, but the Japa-

nese attack spent itself over the course of the day. While the solid wave of the initial charge overran

anything in the passes, it lacked organisation and dissolved into dispersed small-scale fights as it

spread out. Enemy soldiers were starting to blow up themselves rather than Allied troops with

grenades. Which may have made little difference ultimately, because many of the latter were not

in the mood for taking prisoners after discovering that in at least one instance the Japanese had

slaughtered the wounded in a first-aid station they overran.

Then around 1730 hours 2nd Stoyanka Infantry started landing. There had been some thoughts

to disembark them in the Japanese rear or flanks, but as nobody had a good idea where those were,

they ultimately went onto the previously used beaches. They were bringing 1/1st Armour Company

with them which helped clearing the situation in the main passage to Kiska Harbour. On D+7, there

were more reinforcements by I./1st Yeger Battalion arriving from Shemya, and on D+8 troops

pushed through to Kiska Harbour. The Japanese bases turned out to be quite literally dead – almost

every enemy soldier encountered was a corpse already, a great many in a sickbay who appeared to

have either shot themselves or been dispatched by morphine injections several days ago. Empty

sake bottles were all over the place, along with the now well-known booby-traps.

Fighting with stragglers continues all over the area, but there was no organised resistance any

more except some fire from the gun emplacements on Little Kiska. Korichnev had artillery being

brought up to suppress and reduce them, starting on D+9. No sign of life was detected on Little

Kiska after direct shelling commenced, and on D+13 the freshest troops available, I./1st Yeger,

Part III: 1943

34

landed on the islet to take a grand total of one Japanese soldier and a dog alive, the rest having been

killed or committed suicide.71

Mop-up operations went on for several days on the main island, including moves into areas not

previously occupied. Dog handler teams from the Signals Corps and military police, previously not

thought of, had been brought in to find hideouts,72 and limited amounts of drink were offered as

bounty for life prisoners to reduce summary killings and help the intelligence effort, following

Allied suggestions based upon experiences in the South Pacific.73 Still, the total of POWs from the

whole operation amounted to just 29 after Kiska was finally declared secure.

Lessons Learned

As the first major ground operation for Russian American forces, Kiska taught several important

lessons. Troop strength was considered overall appropriate if including the reserves from 2nd ATF

(G); however, the latter would have improved the situation considerably if they had been available

on call floating offshore rather than having to be brought in from nearby bases, an option not ex-

isting in the Kiska operation due to limited shipping. Allied forces had been lucky that reinforce-

ments arrived just after the banzai charge, having being requested four days earlier in reaction to

the initial heavy fighting. Given that Kiska was likely the most weakly garrisoned of the Japanese-

occupied islands, the next operations would warrant greater troop strength, and more shipping.

The latter was somewhat covered already due to the planned procurement of seagoing landing

ships and conversion of old destroyers to fast transports, but might also warrant a greater concen-

tration of currently existing Russian American capacity and additional Allied resources. The former

would need either the release of 3rd Division from defence of the West coast – an increasingly

unlikely mission anyway due to the overall tide of war turning against the Japanese – or the utili-

sation of Territorial Army units. Non-deployed remains of 2nd Division – particularly command,

artillery and armour units – were now thought of to be formed not just into a brigade, but a full 4th

Division or appropriate task force with Marine and/or Territorial Army infantry regiments. Another

possibility was the inclusion of Allied ground troops beyond 1st SSF.

Troop performance was generally to the highest expectations throughout the ranks, and in some

notable instances above and beyond. However, there were also instances of mid-level leaders ex-

hibiting an appearance of paralysis in the face of an enemy who “didn't play by the rules”, though

this was often recovered by lower ranks or even privates seizing the initiative and leading their

units in assaults or counter-attacks. There was no real distinction between carreer personnel and

graduates from the reserve cadre programme in this regard. The reduction in cadre posts seemed to

have had no adverse effects. Leadership losses were replaced down the chain of command as in-

tended. It was recommended to rotate some leadership personnel to schools and other units that

might be called up to fight the Japanese in the near future in order to pass on their experiences.

Japanese ferocity and disregard of laws of warfare had a negative impact on morale and led to

some disciplinary problems, including a “no prisoners” mood and some instances of mutilating the

bodies of killed enemies. In several cases, groups of soldiers got themselves drunk on “liberated”

sake, alcohol stolen from medical or other stocks, or smuggled in. Putting a bounty on live prison-

ers, including limited amounts of drink, proved a way to somewhat control either behaviour. A

71 Korichnev, Victory, p. 71-75. 72 Tanski, p. 36. 73 Lewis, E.: The Russians and Oz. Australian-Russian American Relations in World War II (Melbourne 1972), p.

38.

Part III: 1943

35

number of troops was medically evacuated with psychological issues, including self-mutilation to

evade continued fighting or attempted suicides. The count of actual suicides was however quite

low, certainly in contrast to the Japanese side. Soldiers had drawn confidence from the firepower

available to their side, despite complaints about the robustness of the Johnson rifle and friendly-

fire incidents involving Allied air power. Flame throwers had been in much demand to clear Japa-

nese bunkers and spider holes.74

Still, further improvements in small arms were deemed necessary. Two types of infantry squads

were currently in use, one the Type 1940 with six riflemen and an assistant machine gunner armed

with the Enfield M1917, the Lewis gunner who also had an FN M1935 pistol and was going to get

the new Bren-like RBZ M42 machine gun, and a squad and assistant squad leader, the latter both

carrying the Suomi KP-31 submachine gun. The Type 1942, employed by the guards, yegers, cav-

alry, airborne troops and 1st Marine Regiment, had eight Johnson M1941 rifles or the incoming

M1943 carbines and two light Johnson machine guns instead. While this had obvious logistical

advantages, better mobility and overall greater firepower, the problems of the Johnson system

could not be overlooked. The rifle could not accept a grenade launcher either for example, another

thing that might be very useful in the type of battle seen on Kiska.75

Receiving Garand rifles as the obvious alternative from the US was still difficult. However, RBZ

was making progress with other automatic weapons. Not only were they designing a follow-on

model of the M42 which could be converted to belt feed, but also an improved variant of the Czech

ZK-383 submachine gun which fired 9 mm Luger ammunition and lost various complicated fea-

tures of the original like the fire selector, detachable barrel, bipod and rifle sights. This was influ-

enced by the British Sten gun which had been trialed as a supplement to the limited inventory of

KP-31 and Thompson M1928, but found all too shoddy despite the ease with which it was meant

to be producible. Both weapons would eventually be type-classified under the designation M43.76

There were ideas of combining both squad types, resulting in an issue of two SMGs, an M42 and

Johnson LMG each, two M1917 and four Johnson rifles, alleviating the latter's weaknesses. Some-

thing similar would eventually be done in the Marines, but the immediate decision was to increase

the number of submachine guns to four per squad. The experience of the Kiska banzai charge also

led to a new interest in the American M1 carbine which was more readily available than the Garand,

but had been previously rejected due to its weak custom ammunition. As it turned out though,

support troops would finally be so overwhelmingly equipped with the little carbine that it outnum-

bered all other infantry weapons in Russian American service during the war.

Other lessons were the need for close support gunboats in amphibious operations, heavy infantry

mortars and better air-ground-coordination; the Air Force opined that specially trained personnel

should be attached to ground units – preferably down to battalion level – to not only direct friendly

aircraft on target but also secure enemy aircraft and their personnel taken on the ground. Relevant

for the ongoing mechanised warfare trials, while the mechanised elements of 1st ATF's battle-

groups had been excellent for advancing through Kiska's passes, foot infantry was still needed to

climb the hills on either side. Since battlefields would look very much the same for the immediate

future, full infantry mechanisation did not look viable. On the other hand, wheeled vehicles had

been found very much lacking on the boggy Aleutian soil, with the exception of the faithful jeep.77

The first trials organisation for 3rd Division had been for one armour and two infantry brigades,

the latter looking very much like 1st ATF's battlegroups with two infantry battalions, a cannon

74 von Sieben, 746. 75 von Sieben, 734. 76 O‘Eleven, R.: Development of Russian American Arms and Tactics in World War II (Toronto 1956), p. 34-35. 77 von Sieben, 730.

Part III: 1943

36

company and a light and heavy cavalry squadron respectively. The armour brigade would have two

mechanised infantry battalions on halftracks and a tank battalion of three line companies, plus a

mechanised cannon company. The fourth tank company would become part of a divisional cavalry

detachment with a light cavalry squadron and the other remains of the former cavalry regiment.

The support troops of the division remained unchanged. Overall strength would rise only slightly

to 14,937 all ranks.

After deployment of most of 2nd Division to Iceland, its remaining tank battalion was attached

to 3rd Division for a second organisation, this one consisting of two mechanised brigades and a

cavalry brigade. The former again had two infantry ballations on halftracks and a tank battalion of

three companies, plus a mechanised cannon company and light cavalry squadron. The cavalry bri-

gade also had two mechanised infantry battalions plus a mechanised cannon comnpany and a re-

duced cavalry regiment of two reinforced tank companies, one light and one heavy cavalry squad-

ron. The divisional cavalry was shrunk to a single heavy squadron. This fully mechanised formation

would have a strength of 15,526 all ranks.78

After Kiska, this was no longer tenable, though the tested organisation of the mechanised infantry

battalion itself would survive. Previously, new vehicles considered for the cavalry had been even

bigger armoured cars; in addition to the old motorcycle combinations being replaced by jeeps, both

the Greyhound and Staghound were tested as replacements for the Fox, with the Staghound pref-

ered due to its slightly better protection and terrain-capability despite its two axles versus the Grey-

hound's three.79 However, the Kiska experience first led to them being banished to an armoured car

troop in the regimental HQ squadron, then replaced by the much lighter Lynx, the Canadian variant

of the Dingo scout car, which would finally disappear, too; a “light” squadron now was one with

the M3 Stuart light tank and rifle troops on jeeps, while the new, exceptionally fast American M18

Hellcat tank destroyer had raised interest as a vehicle for the heavy squadrons.

The new Type 1944 cavalry regiment would also give up the traditional hexagonal structure and

have one HQ, light, heavy and weapons squadron each, plus an outright tank squadron that would

field the also-new US M4A1 Sherman tank in its 76-mm-armed variant, firing the same ammuni-

tion as the Hellcat. However, in the end all Shermans would find themselves in the tank battalions

after the Type 1944a regiment went to a unified issue of vehicles from the Hellcat family, and the

final Type 1944b also lost its weapons squadron in lieu of a fourth cavalry squadron.80

Overseas in America and Europe

After the retaking of Kiska, attention quickly turned to Attu and the Komandorski Islands, still

occupied by the Japanese. With the Shemya base as a stepping stone already in place, Attu was the

next logical target, but larger than Kiska, with much more forbidding terrain and likely a stronger

enemy garrison; bombing had been stepped up during the Kiska operation to prevent reinforce-

ments from there, but neither incoming nor outgoing transports had been spotted. In fact since the

sea battle at the Komandorskis, the Japanese seemed to rely mostly on submarines for supply of

their island garrisons, or else destroyers and light cruisers which could make the trip from the

Kuriles speedily under cover of darkness to avoid Allied aircraft.

On the other hand, planners were worried that the USSR might break its non-aggression pact with

Japan anytime and land in the Komandorskis, just 90 sea miles off Kamchatka, and swallow the

78 Lebed, A. I.: Report on the Mechanised Warfare Trials in 3rd Division 1943 (Junograd Military Archives), p. 39. 79 von Sieben, 630-644. 80 Kentukski, p. 61-65, 117.

Part III: 1943

37

previously Russian American-controlled islands. There was however no indication of that so far;

in fact the Soviets had interned the crew of an American bomber which had been part of one of

three probing missions against the Kuriles earlier – in part to detract from the planned operation

against Kiska – and been forced to divert to Kamchatka due to battle damage. Shortly after the

retaking of Kiska, Eleventh US Air Force launched a larger attack against the Japanese naval base

at Paramushir Island, but found the Japanese better prepared than previously and lost three out of

eight B-24s and seven out of twelve B-25s dispatched. Some of their crews again managed to land

on Kamchatka and were duly interned by the Soviets, leading to tension between the nominal Al-

lies. Subsequently, the Americans did not fly any more bombing missions for the rest of 1943 and

sharply reduced the number of squadrons to one B-24 and B-25 one each.

What went for relations between the US and USSR went all the more for the view from Junograd,

sometimes quite paradoxically so. The comeback of some pre-Soviet Russian traditions in the

USSR, intended to increase patriotic support on the home front, was seen as an attempt to usurp a

heritage Russian America considered itself the rightful protector of. This extended to details like

the reintroduction of Tsarist features in Soviet uniforms, sending Junograd officials scrambling to

investigate international military fashion trends to introduce some changes of their own just to

maintain the difference. The Synod of Novoarkhangelsk, having elected a Patriarch-in-exile after

the arrest of Peter of Krutisy in 1925, was worried about a possible schism as Moscow propped up

Sergius of Nizhny Novgorod as a domestic leader of the Russian Orthodox Church – so much that

they paid little attention to the influx of other congregations into Russian America.81

Besides North Americans of various denominations, there was a rapid increase of Catholic South

Americans hired to address the emerging manpower shortage in the civilian economy. Good rela-

tions with that region existed not least due to the transcontinental flying boat route of national

carrier Russian American Airlines along the American West Coast, still operating at this point of

the war as a reliable external revenue generator. Pre-war, some of the old Russian Navy ships had

been sold to Peru, and Peruvians accounted for a large portion of the migrant workers. In 1943, the

Catholic Church established the Diocese of Stoyanka and applied for permission to build a cathe-

dral. While some traditionalists railed against the loosening of bonds between the Government and

the Church, the former pointed out that the times of the Tsar were gone – even though the Synod

still sent members into the State Council, the largely unelected body acting as a de-facto legislature

while the Russian constitution of 1906 remained suspended.82

The sensibilities of the Church however had little impact on strategic planning – certainly less so

than military means, weather and distances. Landing directly on Bering Island was seen as an at-

tractive option, akin to chopping the head off a snake rather than cutting bits off the tail by pro-

ceeding to Attu, then Beringa's neighbour island Mednyy. But the logistics were daunting, both

due to distance and the supposedly much stronger garrison; according to intelligence, Beringa was

the regional HQ and supply hub for the Japanese, estimated to house up to 9,000 troops versus the

3,500-4,000 found at Kiska. With September arrived and the warm season at an end, it would also

likely take until May 1944 to act – unless a winter operation was mounted, which would be an even

greater challenge. The Air Force warned that flight distances from existing bases made for sparse

cover in the Komandorskis, despite longer-ranged variants of the Mosquito being on the horizon.

If Beringa was to be taken directly, support from Allied aircraft carriers was suggested.

Canada had long promised to eventually deploy the Bogue-class escort carrier HMS Nabob to the

theatre – technically British, but largely Canadian-crewed and informally under their command –

81 von Sieben, 625-754. 82 Retac, D. U.: Immigration of Spanish-speaking Nationals to Russian America (Stoyanka 1971), p. 32.

Part III: 1943

38

which was finally transferred from the US on 7 September, but would undergo a lengthy refit pe-

riod. The Americans were approached to send two or three light fleet carriers in replacement for

their departing bomber squadrons, but were only prepared to send another Bogue-class CVE. USS

Nassau had already been considered some time ago as a possible alternative to putting more land-

based aircraft on the crowded bases for the Kiska operation, but her place had eventually been

taken by the US battleship group which now was also leaving. In addition, earlier plans to ask for

a light carrier to be crewed by Russian American personnel beached after the operational loss of

General Alekseyev were dusted off.

At any rate, carriers would become only available after the end of 1943. A winter operation to

take at least Mednyy and establish a forward airbase there for the subsequent invasion of Beringa

was seriously considered. The new airborne regiment – at one point designated a brigade to corre-

spond to the ongoing structural reorganisation – would be combat-ready by year's end, and a joint

airborne operation with 1st Special Service Force was thought feasible by some if the Allies would

also contribute additional airlift capacities. However, 1st SSF was also planned to leave shortly

after Kiska, likely to be deployed to the European Theatre. The foreseeable comeback to a request

for putting this off was in what way Russian America might reciprocate in the overall war effort.

Developments in Europe had made a German threat to Iceland less likely just two months after the

deployment of the Russian American garrison troops, but different conclusions were drawn from

this. Junograd would have liked to bring some of the force home, while the Allies would have liked

it to go on to Europe proper.

In the end, as with the Iceland deployment, an outside idea resolved the situation in a complicated

deal. 2nd Marine Regiment would assume protection duties on the Pacific end of the Panama Canal,

thereby freeing up US forces for transfer to Europe. In addition, Army troops would rotate through

the same location over the winter, training with the marines in amphibious operation with the new

landing craft in preparation for the next summer campaign in the Aleutians. The latter thought was

eventually expanded by sending freshly-formed 3rd Marines to Hawaii, training additional forces.

This solution was particularly championed by the Navy, which had fought the plans to assign its

marine regiments permanently to a 4th Army Division tooth and nail.

1st SSF would stay in theatre until the end of winter in case the opportunity for operations pre-

sented itself. During this time, Russian America would provide appropriately qualified personnel

to form a fourth special service regiment, about 600 troops who would be recruited from the air-

borne and yeger regiments and trained to a common standard; 1st SSF had originally been intended

to be a tri-national unit with Norwegian participation for its original mission in occupied Norway,

but the latter was never realised due to lack of sufficient personnel. Applicants would have to have

good knowledge of English, preferably native speakers from immigrant families. After the com-

pletion of joint training, the unit would be put at the disposal of Allied Command in Europe.

Following this transfer, the infantry and cavalry battlegroups on Iceland would be withdrawn via

a training spell in Panama in the next spring. The artillery groups and heavy engineer battalion

would stay with appropriate logistical support, as would the yeger battalion in Greenland – though

its personnel would be included in the selection for 1st SSF. 2nd Division would thus be reformed

under I Corps, obviating the need for transfer of 2nd and 3rd Marine Regiment to the Army. USS

Nassau and HMS Nabob would be deployed as intended. Another CVE might be transferred of

Russian America could provide the manning; the aircraft detachment would likely be American,

since only a handful of Russian pilots had gone through carrier training with the USN. However,

the Russian American Navy had come around to conduct trials of the R-4 helicopter as a shipboard

spotter after initial flat-out refusal, and might deploy detachments to Nassau and Nabob, particu-

larly in the anti-submarine role.

Part III: 1943

39

This made for obvious changes in the planned 1944 OOB, along with the final Army division

structure resulting from the Kiska experience. A number of versions had been discussed, one a

quite small division of 14,295 all ranks that differed from the current organisation only by turning

the two infantry regiments into brigades with one battalion and the cannon company on halftracks,

and a heavy mortar company added. A variant called for three infantry brigades, which would

however necessitate the transfer of three territorial regiments to I Corps; another for joining the

divisional cavalry regiment and armour battalion with an additional infantry battalion in a third

brigade, which would require transfer of only one regiment.

In the end, a slightly different approach with three brigades won out, concentrating all mecha-

nised units in one of them with one tank and two halftrack battalions, and depending more on cross-

attachments according to the now-proven concept for operations. This would require two additional

infantry regiments, which happened to be just the number raised for the Territorial Army that year;

the cavalry would keep its reformed divisional regiment. Most trials organisations had worked with

a tank battalion of three line companies, but as a result of the new Shermans being kept out of the

cavalry, it was restored to four. The ultimate Type 1944a division was also larger than the earlier

variants at 16,360 all ranks. The final 1944 Army OOB therefore included I Corps with three divi-

sions again, plus the North Atlantic Contingent projected to drop to 3,750 personnel, the airborne

forces now again reduced to regimental status as well as a weakened yeger regiment due to transfers

to the Russian contingent of 1st SSF. Territorial Army would lose its two newly established infan-

try regiments, and overall Army strength would be at 116,800 including 4,000 female auxiliaries.

The final 1944 Navy OOB made provision for a crew of 650 for the planned carrier and the re-

equipment of 4th Naval Aviation Squadron with the R-4 helicopter. After looking at the Wickes-

class four-stackers offered by the US, even older than the Clemsons, the service also warmed to

the Rudderow-subtype of destroyer escorts, faster and heavier armed than earlier batches, and

planned to equip 3rd Destroyer Squadron with it. Transfer of the two Mackerel-class submarines

was also confirmed. With 2nd and 3rd Marines deployed, 1st Marines would take over guard duty

in the regional commands. Overall strength would be 58,700 including 2,200 female auxiliaries.

Due to the preponed reorganisation for the Kiska operation, there was little additional change to

the Air Force OOB, overall strength being 45,000 including 3,600 women. However, the anti-air

squadrons of staging airfields far inland were disbanded because any threat was now considered to

be sufficiently covered by the single platoon of 20 mm Oerlikons in their HQ squadrons. This also

freed up the posts to form three forward air control/security squadrons which would be established

under Aleutian Command for future ground operations. Those would soon find themselves in-

volved in plans for the Komandorskis.83

Preparing for the Komandorskis

The first structural step taken towards going beyond Kiska was a reformation of the Aleutian Task

Forces while retaining the same name to conceal the fact that the Komandorski Islands were very

well included in the scope of their possible next missions. However, 1st ATF (Ground) became 1st

ATF (Airborne) with a much lower overall strength of 5,500, including the fledgling 1st Airborne

Regiment and 1st SSF as well as one of the emerging Air Force Forward Air Control/Security

Squadrons; the previous units returned to their parent formations, with Kiska chiefly garrisoned by

a regimental group centreed around 2nd Stoyanka Infantry. The mainstay of 2nd ATF (G), intended

83 von Sieben, 749-772.

Part III: 1943

40

to act as a backup after an initial airborne operation against the next target, became 3rd Marines,

not yet scheduled for the joint training deployment to Hawaii. Various support troops were attached

for a total strength of 6,850.

The Joint Allied Aleutian Naval Task Force initially underwent little change except the American

battleships leaving from the US Covering Force and the assignment of 4th Naval Aviation Squad-

ron to what would become the Canadian-led Carrier Force. No carriers were in theatre yet though;

USS Nassau was announced to leave Pearl Harbor for Russian American waters in early January

with Composite Squadron VC-66 embarked, consisting of twelve FM-1 Wildcat fighters and nine

TBM Avengers. The Avenger was primarily a torpedo bomber, but could also carry 2,000 pounds

of bombs in its weapons bay. HMS Nabob was still being refitted to Commonwealth standards in

Vancouver. She was planned to embark Fleet Air Arm No. 850 Squadron with twelve Avengers

shortly after New Year; another Avenger squadron for her, No. 852, was planned to be stood up at

USNAS Squantum in Massachusetts on 1 November. The squadrons were actually British, but had

been negotiated by the Canadians into the deal that was confirmed at the September inter-allied

conference. Nabob was expected to arrive at about the same time as Nassau.

The “Russian American” carrier would likely be CVE-31 USS Prince William, the only one of

the second group of Bogues not yet lend-leased to Britain. She was currently shuttling aircraft from

the US West Coast to the Pacific Theatre and originally planned to train and qualify pilots off San

Diego in April 1944, but would instead train and qualify her new crew, with officers and NCOs

previously rotated through posts on Nassau and Nabob. She was expected in theatre in early May,

likely carrying a pure fighter USN or USMC squadron to balance the Avenger contingent of Nabob.

However, Russian American Air Force pilots who had participated in carrier training with the

Americans would be recalled from their subsequent postings and sent back to the US, polish their

skills on the future carrier and reinforce the flight detachment.

By then, a first flight of helicopters from 4th Naval Aviation Squadron was scheduled to be com-

bat-ready; the Navy was already testing various missions, including the dropping of depth charges

and the retrieval of downed pilots, though carrying capacity of the R-4 helicopter was very low.

The Air Force Aleutian Command would still have four wings, while the Americans signalled that

they might increase their current single C-47 squadron in theatre to a full troop carrier group; in-

cluding two Russian American squadrons, this would make a total of six available, a sizeable force

to support an airborne operation.84

A reconnaissance mission of the Signals Corps, using ethnic Japanese personnel flying a fake IJN

“Mavis” flying boat clandestinely built by Sikorsky Aircraft Stoyanka, found that the island of

Mednyy was only garrisoned by about a reduced company.85 This made the island look an easy

objective for an airborne assault, though it would obviously have to be defended against likely

Japanese counterattacks from nearby Beringa, with heavy weapons brought in by ship. Conditions

would be particularly difficult due to the expected arctic winter weather, a first for a major Russian

American ground operation. However, 1st Airborne Regiment had been scheduled to undergo reg-

ular military winter training in the last two months of the year before being declared combat-ready

anyway, and the transfer of experience was increased through the recruitment process for and joint

training with 1st SSF. The latter would be finished by late January, making this a likely time for

the undertaking.86

Selection of Russian personnel for 1st SSF turned out to be as hard as anticipated due to the dual

requirements for top military and language skills; after four weeks, only slightly less than half the

84 von Sieben, 773-798. 85 Tanski, p. 39. 86 von Sieben, 784.

Part III: 1943

41

required number of appropriately qualified personnel had been found. The airborne and yeger reg-

iments had been ordered to supply 600 men with good English knowledge. 351 candidates showed

up from the former and 252 from the latter, either recommended by superiors or volunteers. 117 of

the paratroopers and 42 of the yegers had an Anglo family background and were more or less fluent

in English. 74 respectively 58 more had about the same level of fluency because they had worked

at Anglo companies in Russian America, Canada or even the US, or improved on their school

English at university before being called up, had previously worked with American troops – mostly

from II./1st Yeger Battalion in Greenland – or lived with their families in English-speaking exile

for some time prior to immigrating to Russian America.

On the other hand, 59 of the Airborne and 100 of the yeger volunteers proved quite hopeless in

English, the latter mostly native descendants and recent immigrants with a very good military rec-

ord and great enthusiasm, but unfortunately in some cases struggling even with Russian. Moreover,

37 of the yegers failed airborne qualification due to physical or psychological reasons; the latter

mostly by repeatedly refusing to jump off the training tower, and in some cases being troublemak-

ers obviously put in by superiors to get rid of them. As far as they were in the group with top

language skills, some borderline cases were reviewed and about a dozen accepted on medical waiv-

ers. The 115 who made up the rest were formed into a “remedial English class” battalion on the

SSF pattern with an equal number of the top performers and SSF personnel to bring them up to

speed on military language in particular within six weeks, while another battalion's worth started

full training immediately. Only another search throughout the entire ground forces eventually

yielded enough recruits for the planned contingent of 600.87

Decision date for the Mednyy operation was set at 15 December to get a better grasp on weather

conditions. The mission of 1st ATF (ABN) would be to secure the island. After the initial airborne

assault, the mission of III./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion in 2nd ATF along with

some of the experienced American units in the follow-up waves would be to construct an airfield

covering later landings on Beringa. Prior to that, reinforcements and equipment were planned to be

flown in by cargo gliders on provisional landing sites at two inlets or lakes just inland in the centre

part of the eastern shoreline, expected to be frozen solid in winter. Both were in excess of 2,500

feet in length, and the more southern one could likely be used for C-47s with skis, or even on their

normal landing gear with Marsden Matting put on. That would however only be green lighted once

advance parties had checked thickness and solidity of the ice.

However, large-scale trials with gliders in winter weather proved near-disastrous. With Novem-

ber sufficiently progressed for realistic conditions, the Army and Air Force mounted a joint test

with 24 Horsas laden with troops and some equipment towed from Kodiak to Holodnayabukhta,

about the same distance as Kiska to Mednyy. Two of the gliders snapped their cables on the transfer

from Stoyanka to Kodiak already, though they were not loaded then and the crews were able to put

them down on the mainland with little problems. During the actual exercise one Horsa crashed

upon approach to Holodnayabukhta, with eight of the 17 troops aboard killed and another five

injured. Even worse, a C-47 towing another glider experienced icing, released the Horsa at great

altitude, but both crashed into the Pavlov Range trying to land in Holodnayabukhta, with all on

board the C-47 and seven on the glider killed, the rest injured. Overall, that exercise killed 18 and

injured 15 without even a single Japanese shot fired, which put a considerable damper on the en-

thusiasm for use of gliders in general.

A backup plan was for heavy equipment to be landed by ship. The Navy saw no major problems

in landing supplies over ice – frequently done in the Arctic North – provided they had a friendly

87 Marston, M. R.: With the First Special Service Force in Europe (Stoyanka 1957), p. 40-43.

Part III: 1943

42

shore; they were however not giving any guarantees for an opposed landing under the same condi-

tions, with troops having to disembark potentially under enemy fire over long open stretches of ice

with the sea under it. Tests were conducted during the winter with the various landing craft types,

including the incoming LCTs, in cooperation with icebreakers and Army engineers blasting paths

and bays. It turned out the new landing craft pretty much did not care whether they beached on

solid ground or ice that could not be cut by icebreakers, though they needed the latter or at least an

ice-strengthened auxiliary to go up to that point. Some extra care was necessary to transfer person-

nel and materiél in the absence of a gradual slope to run up on, but there were no major problems

with blasting a whole port into solid ice.

However, preparations uncovered a mounting host of problems. Interviews with rare prior visitors

to Mednyy were undertaken and photographs shot during an official pre-war excursion evaluated

to back up maps of the island. From the Navy's point of view, an airfield would be best placed on

Koraber'naya Bay since there was good anchorage there, and equipment could be moved directly

over the beach to the site. Unfortunately this was not the prefered location of the Air Force, which

would have liked the flatter area near Ozhidaniya Bay in the South better – where the cliffs were

making it hard to bring in equipment by sea. This was particularly troubling because there were no

paths on Mednyy, and the best way to move heavy material was by boat or over ice along the coast.

A valley with a seasonal riverbed in the North was looked at as a potential airfield site despite

unclear wind conditions; another idea was to fill in one of the two aforementioned lakes on the

centre eastern coast, or at least build a causeway for the runway, which along with the inlets from

the sea would give 4,000 feet of perfectly flat surface. But the fact remained that Mednyy was

marginally fit terrain for airfields, which was probably why the Japanese had not built one there.

So for the 15 December decision, a range of five options was presented of how to proceed with

operations in 1944.

The first was the airborne operation against Mednyy in early February to secure subsequent sea-

borne landing of reinforcements and equipment for construction of an airfield supporting opera-

tions against Beringa by May. A risk-reduced variant was a combined air- and seaborne operation

in April or May as a diversion from a subsequent landing on Beringa, intended to bait the Japanese

into diverting part of their Beringa garrison for recapture of Mednyy. The third option was an

operation against Attu in March aimed at retaking the island and securing the Japanese-built airfield

there as a diversion from and in support of subsequent landings on Beringa. The fourth was an

airborne operation against southern Beringa itself in early February to secure a subsequent seaborne

landing of reinforcements and equipment for construction of an airfield supporting further opera-

tions. The lowest risks were thought to be entailed in a conventional operation against Beringa in

June including sea and air landings aimed at retaking the island in single push.88

The Signals Corps, based upon results from their reconnaissance missions and strategic intelli-

gence, recommended the last option.89 The Air Force agreed, for reasons of national pride, the

potential risk to Beringa from the USSR, and because it offered a base from which the Japanese

could be harassed more effectively than from any other part of Russian American territory; Attu

was considered a waste of time and effort.90 The Navy stated it could support all options, though

they also liked the Attu variant least because it would likely require the deployment of 3rd Marines

into it, detracting from what they saw as their primary mission, conducting and training others for

short-duration amphibious landings. For the same reason, a partial early landing in southern

Beringa was their second-least favoured variant.

88 von Sieben, 809-843. 89 Tanski, p. 43. 90 Bergmann, 848.

Part III: 1943

43

It was therefore no surprise that the conventional approach won out, though a feint at Mednyy

was not excluded. This meant that 1st SSF would be released to Europe directly after finishing joint

training with the new Russian personnel at the end of January, and 3rd Marines would be deployed

to Hawaii to increase amphibious training capacities for I Corps units which would be used in the

Komandorski operations from April on.91

Fig. 4: Revised unit patch of 1st Special Service Force.

91 von Sieben, 847-852.

Part III: 1943

44

Fig

. 5:

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of

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Part IV: 1944

45

Part IV: 1944

The Two-Front War

Moving the next major campaign into the coming year's warm season allowed more equipment

issues to be addressed. The Sherman tank and Hellcat tank destroyer were both expected to start

being delivered in spring 1944; greater numbers of M3A1 halftracks, M3 infantry howitzers, Six-

Pounder anti-tank guns and M2 4.2” mortars would also be available by then. Most critically, after

the reduction of rifles in infantry squad through issue of more machine guns, the Americans had

finally agreed to deliver a limited batch of Garand rifles to replace the Johnson in frontline units

during the final stage of the Kiska operation. Initially 10,500 were planned for select Army and

marine units, later increased to 12,000 which would equip all of the infantry in I Corps. Support

troops would be armed with the M1 carbine as planned.92

Domestic small arms production was also ramping up. After delivering 4,000 M42 “quasi-Bren”

machine guns, RBZ had started production of the optionally belt-fed M43. The submachine gun of

the same year-designation was also entering service, with 10,000 planned in a first batch before

campaign season. Due to the priority effort assigned to fully automatic weapons, the design of an

indigenous self-loading rifle had been postponed indefinitely, though various foreign models had

been evaluated for inspiration.93

Still, bolt-action rifles were slowly being pushed out of the regular forces and distributed to Home

Guard units, volunteers above or under military age or otherwise not considered fit for full service.

The original plans had called for a company in each okrug to act mostly as aircraft or shipping

spotters, but actual organisation varied widely. Some companies spanned two or more thinly-pop-

ulated okrugs while more heavily-settled areas had stood up complete battalions of diverse strength,

even if they were not close to the Russian American borders. The latter had more regular structures

while in remote regions, a company was likely to consist of individuals or little groups strewn

across the okrug who would be lucky to have access to a radio set for communication with their

HQ; sometimes reports were still sent by carrier pigeon.

Most units were only armed with rifles – many of them being personal property in the rural areas

– and some old machineguns phased out by the regular forces, though a few have managed to get

hold of bigger calibers from surplus stocks. Some battalions fielded an actual HQ company and/or

even a heavy company, the latter mostly with phased-out infantry guns; many Böhlers, Pack How-

itzers and M28/37 mountain guns became available as they were replaced by the newer types while

infantry mortars and heavy machineguns/autocannon were sparse. In some cases even a tank pla-

toon or two were formed with surviving Vickers Light Tanks, Six-Tons or TNHPs when they were

discarded by armour school, now using Rams and Stuarts for training and as targets.

Some of the coastal units were actually coastal artillery with infantry guns or even old WW I-era

pieces, trained and led by veterans of that era; others were straight boat units, using private motor-

boats, yachts and trawlers armed with Maxim MGs or infantry guns as well as the original fishing

trawlers converted to minesweepers to patrol the shores for any invaders and mines. The cake how-

ever had to be taken by the two aircraft “battalions”, one in Stoyanka and one in Krasivyaberga.

There were some air companies and platoons in other battalions too, using the phased-out liaison

aircraft including the Army's old autogyros and the Navy's Vickers Vedettes, plus private aircraft.

92 von Sieben, 730-776. 93 Pulyemyet, G. P.: Reports of the Ordnance Department Small Arms Section 1942-1948 (Junograd Military Ar-

chives), p. 32-41.

Part IV: 1944

46

They were not only doing airspace patrols, but also menial transport missions for the regular forces.

The only problem was that they were sometimes misidentified as strategic Japanese bombers and

shot at by over-enthusiast ground Homeguard units.

By the end of the year, a total of 24,400 volunteers were serving in 21 Homeguard battalions and

18 independent companies under the regional commands of the Territorial Army. Strength was

made up of about a fourth overage volunteers, many of them former soldiers to old for recall who

had taken over much of the leadership and training; a fourth underage between 15 and 18, many

being cadets from local schools; and a fourth females, having some overlap with the first two

groups, the balance being made up of military-age males who were either unfit for regular service

or indispensable at work.94

Their original mission in coastal and air observation was however increasingly taken over by

radar sets delivered from the US, initially operated predominantly on American and joint airbases,

though the volunteers were still filling the rather wide gaps in electronic coverage. The Air Force

was also about to take delivery of the Mustang's P-51B variant, resolving the performance problem

above 15,000 feet – though the new fighters were to replace the last P-38s first. The range-increased

versions of the Mosquito were about to enter service, too, while larger transport planes were still

some time away. The C-54 had been selected over the C-46, largely due to the greater safety of its

four-engine layout and because the Commando had an unfortunate reputation of spontaneously

combusting in mid-flight; however, delivery was not expected to begin before late summer.

With 3rd Marines deploying to Hawaii in December to take part in the amphibious training

scheme for I Corps and 1st Special Service Force scheduled to leave for Europe at the end of

January, concerns arose about the availability of troops for scouting missions and raids to keep the

Japanese from getting too comfortable over winter. Therefore the Aleutian Task Forces were once

more reformed, this time as 1st Aleutian Task Force (Light).

In a total strength of merely 4,200, it included 1st Airborne Regiment (now consisting of only

two line and one support battalion after the transfers to 1st SSF), I./1st Yeger Battalion, one com-

pany from each battalion of 1st Marines, the first of the new Air Force forward air control/security

squadron as well as a detachment from the Navy's 4th Amphibious Squadron. There was no more

2nd ATF as a reserve echelon; instead, a reduced military police battalion and various support

companies were attached, bringing the total to 5,650 troops. The Light Task Force would train joint

force procedures which had been highlighted as necessary in the Kiska operation, particularly air-

ground and sea-land coordination.

Unfortunately the arrival of the promised Allied carriers was delayed; HMS Nabob had had to

wait for delivery of a new turbine rotor from the US which was finally installed on 13 January.

After dock trials she moved from Vancouver to Esquimalt on the 24th to begin working up with

her aircraft detachment, but ran aground on an uncharted sand bank in the Georgia Strait the next

day. She was finally pulled off after three days of trying and went into dry dock at Esquimalt to

check for damage, which fortunately turned out to be minor. After embarking both her British

Avenger squadrons, she arrived off Kodiak on 20 February – even though a quasi-mutiny occured

aboard her en route. The different pay for RCN, RN and the British Merchant Navy personnel

manning her engine room led to some refusals of work and desertions. Fortunately her captain, a

nephew of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, managed to defuse the situation by bringing

the dispute over living conditions on board to the attention of the British Admiralty.95

The Americans had long been requested to send a pure fighter unit instead of the planned com-

posite squadron with USS Nassau to make up for Nabob's straight bomber detachment, but had a

94 von Sieben, 869-897. 95 von Sieben, 1350-1354.

Part IV: 1944

47

surprisingly hard time finding a mere handful of available F4F Wildcat pilots to fill up VC-66 with

fighters. The Russian American Air Force therefore issued an early recall for its surviving dozen

carrier-trained pilots who had been planned to fly from the future transferred CVE, and also sent

them to Pearl Harbor where Nassau was going through pre-deployment work-up.96 VC-66 was

duly renamed VF-66, and though one of the Russian pilots was unfortunately killed in a deck land-

ing accident, an ambitious familiarisation programme to the new FM-1 variant of the Wildcat and

smaller carrier resulted in Nassau leaving for Kodiak on 5 March, joining Nabob there on the 11th.

Her bi-national squadron was planned to eventually transfer to the “Russian American” carrier, but

meanwhile continued training the FM-1's new air-to-ground capabilities.

By that time, 1st SSF had long left, its Russian contingent spread throughout the now four regi-

ments, one commanded by one of their number. About 200 troops who had joined with the second

draft and not completed full combat training were relegated to the service battalion; future replace-

ments would go to the force's base at Fort Helena, Montana for training. Marching orders were for

Italy; Allied progress there was hung up, with Fifth US Army stuck on the German Gustav Line

while US VI Corps had failed to make a decisive breakout from the recently established beachhead

at Anzio. 1st SSF was ordered to report to the New Zealand Corps at Cassino no later than 1 March.

When it joined its new parent formation, the corps was just recovering from a failed attack on

Monte Cassino two weeks earlier, but was to be sent up against the same objective again once the

miserably rainy weather permitted three consecutive days of aerial bombing in preparation.

This would however in fact not be the first time that Russian American troops engaged German

forces. On 10 February the Iceland contingent finally earned its combat pay when 3/2nd Anti-Air

Artillery Battery shot down one of three Fw 200 attempting to bomb a British tanker at anchor in

the fjord of Seydhisfjördhur. The tanker was damaged but remained afloat; a couple of the German

crew made it out and were fished from the fjord before freezing to death, being thoroughly shocked

at being captured by Russians.97

Another mission in Europe was also forming up: To continue its quest of recruiting new citizens

under the conditions of the Allied invasion already begun in Italy and planned for France, personnel

from the Signals Corps along with some troops clandestinely transferred from the Army had been

organised in two troops under No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando in the UK. The task of 9 and 10

Troop would mainly be to whisk away Soviet prisoners of war freed in the Allied offensives, as

well as former Soviet personnel which had defected to the Germans and were serving as Osttruppen

in the Wehrmacht.98 The coming spring would also see other commando actions both in the Euro-

pean and the Pacific Theatre of the war.

Monte Cassino and Rome

1st Special Service Force in its fresh American-Canadian-Russian makeup had fitted right into its

rather chequered new parent formation of a New Zealand, British and Indian division each. For the

upcoming assault, they were tasked with taking the abbey on the hill that dominated the battlefield

of Cassino – thought to be used by the Germans to direct their artillery despite having been bombed

to ruins in the previous attack three weeks ago – thus securing the right flank of 4th Indian Division.

The mission was daunting, but confidence in the special abilities of the force was high, and troops

were eager to prove themselves in the European theatre after most having fought on Kiska earlier.

96 Bergmann, 876-885. 97 von Sieben, 884-899. 98 Tanski, p. 44.

Part IV: 1944

48

The weather forecast for central Italy indicated the required three days of fair skies from 15

March. 1st SSF had trained climbing the Italian mountains over the preceding two weeks in pouring

rain, and their commander Brigadier General Frederick had chosen a route that would allow the

force a somewhat covered approach to their objective. The newly formed 4th Regiment led by

Russian American Lieutenant Colonel Marston – a descendant of US immigrants, formerly com-

mander of III./1st Airborne Battalion and a previous yeger – would be in reserve, but as Russian

troops were spread throughout all regiments, they would be in the front line from the start.

In the actual assault, 1st SSF advanced to their objective quite undetected as planned, and though

they were still discovered earlier than they would have liked and subjected to heavy German fire,

1st and 2nd Regiment managed to drive the enemy back into the actual monastery within two hours,

much faster than anticipated. However, casualties included the commander of 1st Battalion, Lieu-

tenant Colonel MacWilliam. 3rd Regiment was then used to carry the attack to the monastery itself

as planned. 4th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Marston was also committed for a flank attack

on a foothill that was supposed to be taken by elements of 4th Indian Division, but was mistakenly

bypassed by some units and held by the Germans until the regiment attacked from the mountain-

side; taking that position proved critical for interrupting the German links into the town of Cassino.

For the moment though pockets of German resistance behind Allied lines remained, and there

was fierce house-to-house fighting in the town. Major enemy forces were bottled up below the

summit and managed to keep sneaking troops into parts of Cassino previously considered cleared.

78th UK Division was committed as the corps' reserve to seal off their supply routes and secure the

town. However, this meant the division was unavailable to cross the Rapido River south of Casino

and start the planned advance towards Rome. Heavy fighting continued for two more days, at which

point 1st SSF managed to link up with a thrust from 20th Armoured Brigade, preventing their tanks

from being knocked out by German fire from the mountain despite renewed torrential rain prevent-

ing further air support, contrary to forecasts. In its effort, the force suffered an appalling casualty

rate of almost 80 percent killed, wounded or down from exhaustion. Yet the monastery was secured

and the American, British and Russian flag raised above its ruins. The men were finally relieved in

their position by British 1st Guards Brigade and withdrawn for rest and recuperation on 23 March.

US Fifth Army scrambled to secure the limited breakthrough against German counterattacks and

possibly exploit it with the French Expeditionary Corps. The Germans however simply retreated

to a secondary prepared line north and west of Cassino. General Alexander of 15th Army Group

now planned to move the bulk of British Eighth Army west of the Apennine Mountains to reinforce

the success alongside US Fifth Army, simultaneously redeploying some divisions to the Anzio

beachhead in order to finally achieve a breakout. This redistribution of troops was largely finished

by 24 April. The New Zealand Corps had been disbanded, its divisions mostly returned to control

of British XIII Corps; 1st SSF was ordered to relieve the 505th US Parachute Infantry Regiment at

the Anzio beachhead, the latter to rejoin the 82nd Airborne Division for the upcoming landing in

France after having been plugged into the gap torn by the heavy losses of the American Ranger

Force at Cisterna back in February.

1st SSF was back at 75 percent strength after four weeks of recuperation and replacements when

it went to Anzio on 20 April, but additionally absorbed about 300 survivors of the Ranger Force at

the beachhead, including a cannon company. Most of the Russian-American support personnel was

also transferred into the assault echelon at this point as intended, bringing the national combat

contingent back up to 400 from only 85 effectives. It was hoped that a breakout from the beachhead

could finally be achieved in conjunction with a new thrust from Cassino, encircling the German

Tenth Army on the Tyrrhenian coast. 1st SSF was deployed on the beachhead's right flank, holding

quite a big sector for their strength. Still, they were rather offensive, conducting regular patrols and

Part IV: 1944

49

night raids behind German lines. Somebody had come up with a “death card” design depicting their

unit patch and the German motto “Das dicke Ende kommt noch” – “the worst is yet to come” –

which they left on the bodies of killed enemies.

This coordinated offensive commenced on 27 April. Heavy fighting occurred between US VI

Corps and Axis forces at Cisterna, with 1st SSF still on the right flank and planned to be first to

make contact with Allied forces coming from the Cassino area if encirclement of the Germans

succeeded. However, on 30 April US VI Corps suddenly changed its line of attack on orders from

Lieutenant General Clark of US Fifth Army. Rather than advancing to meet the other forces, they

now headed directly for Rome with 1st SSF in the vanguard; encirclement of Tenth Army thus did

not happen. 1st SSF fought its way to National Route 6 leading into Rome, and was given the task

to secure a total of seven bridges in the city to prevent their demolition by the retreating Germans.

Though they had again suffered 40 percent casualties since the breakout from Anzio, they raced

ahead of all other units, supported by tanks from US 1st Armored Division. The task force entered

Rome as first Allied troops on 9 May, meeting only minor resistance; the Germans had largely

honoured its status as an open city. 1st SSF had reached all objectives by noon. General Clark then

walked in and declared himself the liberator of Rome to the press on the steps of the Capitoline

Hill after carefully posting military police all around with orders to keep any non-American troops

away from the event, which led to some consternation among Allied troops. Russian national

strength in 1st SSF was again down to about 240 after the two-week campaign. However, the force

was once more sent to get some rest after Rome, billeted comfortably at the Vatican Summer Palace

on Lake Albano.99

Meanwhile in Russian America, plans had been designed for a major raid by the Light Task Force

to keep up the pressure on the Japanese, and detract from the intention to land in the Komandorskis

directly. Flanked by very public statements about the next target in the quest for liberation of oc-

cupied Russian territory, Attu was chosen as the objective.

The Raids on Attu

The first plans for a raid against Attu were rather large-scale, involving one or several battalions

from the Light Task Force in May. This was aimed at proving new equipment and procedures –

particularly the carrier force, LST and 5” gun-carrying LCG landing vessels, as well as air-ground

coordination – under fire, and also reinforcing the public impression that Attu would be the next

target. The intent was to destroy one or more artillery sites and gather some intelligence on the

overall shape of Japanese troops after one year under blockade, supplied only by submarines and

the odd destroyer. However, concerns quickly arose that such a large operation would be tanta-

mount to full-blown invasion and the Japanese would then be able to claim they repelled such. In

view of the outcome of the Allied 1942 Dieppe Raid, risks of losses and an enemy propaganda

victory were considered too high; the prevailing opinion was that it would be better to mount sev-

eral smaller raids than one big one.

Back in the autumn of 1943 after the Kiska operation, 1st Special Service Force had already

gamed a landing on Attu. They had been eying two landing sites, each at moderate distance from

the assumed concentration of Japanese forces around Chicagof Harbour: one in the North near

Holtz Bay, and one in the South in Massacre Bay. The main problem was that the island's shore

and terrain were much more forbidding than experienced on Kiska, with real 2,000 to 3,000 feet

99 Marston, p. 45-95.

Part IV: 1944

50

mountain ranges restricting movement even more than the ridges there. However, for a light force

the northern landing site would allow a reasonably covered approach to the airfield south of Holtz

Bay's west arm which the Japanese kept working on despite frequent bombing attacks, less and less

contested by their anti-air artillery.

The southern site would be much more in the open and possibly covered by artillery on the points

to either side. There was also at least one observation post at Chirikof Point on the island's eastern

tip, just 15 nautical miles from an Allied counterpart on Alaid Island; as usual, from aerial photog-

raphy alone it was not clear which position was only a decoy and which innocent-looking spot was

really a well-camouflaged infantry platoon base or artillery site. Judging from the experience at

Kiska, the Japanese had probably dug in on high terrain, which however looked suspiciously peace-

ful on images.

The original plans were based around the troop capacity of the new LSTs, each easily accommo-

dating two companies if filled with infantry rather than tanks. Two or three of those might deliver

raiding parties simultaneously or successively in the same or different spots, with contingency re-

inforcements waiting offshore. Of course the use of this large type inshore was risky, and over the

short distance from Shemya, LCTs with smaller parties could also be used, much more inconspic-

uous due to their smaller size though also less comfortable for the troops, being open-decked.100 A

new discovery was the American LVT amphibious tracked vehicle that had been somewhat over-

looked earlier despite being widely used by US forces in the South Pacific.101 Now urgent delivery

of some examples was requested for evaluation by the marine companies in the Light Task Force.

A handful of early-type LVT-1s were delivered from Canada and met with enthusiasm by the ma-

rines trialing them, though improvements along the lines of the British Buffalo IV variant were

recommended.102

With input from the Signals Corps, a much more humble plan for a raid on Attu evolved.103 It

called for a not more than company-sized inter-service element to be landed on the northern edge

of Holtz Bay under cover of darkness, reconnoitring artillery positions and the airfield there, de-

molishing equipment and taking some Japanese prisoners if possible, but also testing air-ground

coordination by directing airstrikes against enemy troops before withdrawing under cover of naval

fire support. Joint training commenced in March with the carrier force, which had been working

up their air-to-air and air-to-ground skills with the Russian American Air Force themselves. The

first helicopter flight of 4th Naval Aviation Squadron was also conducting operational trials on

Nassau and Nabob off Kodiak for various missions, including the rescue of wounded and dispersed

personnel. They found they could store up to four of their R-4s aboard in addition to each ship's

airplane contingent, but would have liked the main rotors to fold easily rather than having to dis-

assemble them prior to stowage below decks.

The future crew of USS Prince William – for which the Navy had not yet decided whether to give

her a new name or just Russify it in reference to the Prince William Sound after the planned transfer

from the US Navy – had also set out for San Diego and training on their new ship, soon to be joined

by USN fighter squadron VF-26 with the new FM-2 Wildcat variant as the air component. The

delay in the arrival of the other two carriers meant there had been little occasion for rotating per-

sonnel through them beforehand as originally planned, except for some who had gone with the Air

Force pilots to Hawaii; it was still hoped for the ship to arrive in late May though.

100 von Sieben, 899-902. 101 Pastukh, E. F.: Torn Between Two Worlds. Russian American Troops Overseas in World War II (Birmingham

1956), p. 46. 102 Colins, p. 46. 103 Tanski, p. 46.

Part IV: 1944

51

The raid on Attu was finally put on 11 May, to be followed by more actions depending upon

success and further opportunities. The Japanese airfield was confirmed as the main objective since

the eventual operation against the Komandorskis would also aim at taking enemy air capabilities

out of the game as quickly as possible; early plans for Beringa called for the landing of two divi-

sions to either side of the Japanese main base at Nikolskoye on the northwestern coast, with a third

possibly in the North to encircle the primary enemy troop concentrations in the flatter parts, then

rolling up the more mountainous South. It was still thought best to take Mednyy first with elements

or the whole of the Light Task Force, by seaborne rather than airborne landing. The Attu raid was

thus treated as a sort of micro-rehearsal for procedures to be employed in the Komandorskis.

A week before the operation, the Light Task Force conducted a full-dress rehearsal on Kodiak

Island. The final plan called for one of the newly-formed inter-arms commando companies – built

out of paratroopers, yegers, marines and Air Force forward observers on the 1st SSF model – to

land by rubber boats under cover of darkness, reconnoitre and demolish enemy sites in the twilight

of morning, then direct air and naval fire support against the expected enemy counterattack, finally

withdrawing by the half-dozen LVTs they had while a line battalion floated offshore in LCMs as a

backup if reinforcements should be needed. Execution of the rehearsal went smoothly, building

confidence though participants were aware that it was merely a live-fire exercise.

In the actual landing on the 11th, the commando company went ashore unobserved at Blind Cove

on the west side of Holtz Bay shortly after 0300, two hours later than planned due to failure of

several of their rubber boats' outboard motors, and began moving south along the shoreline in foggy

conditions. Their first contact was at 0445 with four Japanese soldiers manning a beach defence

site; they killed two of those, however the other two escaped. Shortly thereafter, several artillery

positions around the bay opened fire, but inflicted no casualties, probably due to thickening fog.

The force located the closest gun position emplaced on a ridge overlooking the western shore of

Holtz Bay, and two platoons moved to pincer and take it out. This turned out to be a single gun,

which they knocked out at ca. 0700 hours along with killing its crew of nine, though they suffered

three dead and two wounded themselves from a machine gun position in overwatch that temporar-

ily pinned them down. Meanwhile however the fog had begun to clear and allowed to call in the

planned air support, and heavy bombing and strafing by planes from Nassau, Nabob and the bases

at Kiska and Amchitka allowed them to withdraw to the coast at 0900.

At this point the company's third platoon had already advanced further into the direction of the

Japanese airfield to block any reinforcements. Approaching the ridge that separates the two arms

of Holtz Bay, they came under fire and took losses from machine gun and sniper fire, but were able

to direct an incoming flight of rocket-armed Wildcats onto the enemy position and subsequently

secure the highest point of the ridge. Immediately afterwards they were counterattacked by about

a platoon of Japanese soldiers, but had already set up two medium machine guns and light mortars,

and cut down the charge.

From their vantage point, they were further able to direct air attacks against the airfield and an-

other gun position on the opposite side of Holtz Bay. It was in this course that the Japanese mounted

another banzai charge from the direction of the airfield which was also gunned down. However,

Japanese air defences proved still deadly against low-level attacks, and two Avengers were lost

from a flight off Nabob. Afterwards, the force began to withdraw under continued air cover and

assembled for extraction west of Goltsov Point at 1330 hours.

Extraction turned out to be the most difficult part. The LVTs struggled with the surf on the rock-

strewn shore under accurate Japanese artillery fire despite friendly air and naval gunfire support;

two out of six had to break off coming in, and two more were disabled trying to return, one suffering

engine failure from a near miss, the other sunk from a hit though most of the occupants managed

Part IV: 1944

52

to save themselves back ashore. In addition, one of the LCGs providing fire support was also hit

and had to abort. A company from the backup battalion was called in with their LCMs to recover

the rest of the force. At this point, friendly aircraft had finally managed to take out the coastal

battery across Holtz Bay, and withdrawal was achieved without further losses.

Unfortunately, in the confusion some personnel went missing. Casualty reports cited twelve

killed – including an Avenger crew which was not spotted to leave their aircraft as it burst into

flames at low altitude – eleven wounded and nine missing, including the other Avenger crew which

was observed to crash-land on the opposite side of Holtz Bay. The force did not succeed in taking

any prisoners either; despite the long blockade, frequent air and naval gunfire attacks accompanied

by leaflets calling for surrender dropped, enemy resistance was as fanatical as back on Kiska. How-

ever, the commandos felt the Japanese to be undersupplied, having quickly resorted to another

company-strength banzai charge due to apparently having run out of small arms ammunition, the

dead making a malnourished and rag-clad impression. Coordination with air- and seaborne support

was considered overall satisfactory.

The Light Task Force quickly proposed to undertake another raid against the area of Chicagof

Harbour where the enemy HQ was assumed, hoping both to find some of their missing and to strike

against the Japanese command. Their plans included both an amphibious or airborne assault, but

the Japanese alerted, risks were considered high without precise information on individual targets

– particularly as it had now been decided that the Light Task Force would take Mednyy two days

before the landing on Beringa. This was hoped to serve as another diversion and particularly draw-

ing some of the Japanese air assets into slightly better range to be engaged from the current Air

Force bases, as well as providing an emergency landing site. Most attached units like 1st Forward

Observer/Security Squadron would return to their parent formations for the operation – though

some specialist inter-arms personnel would be retained for the commando companies which the

Task Force wanted to keep, one per each of its three line battalions – and no major avoidable

casualties beforehand were wanted.

Junograd therefore authorised only a small scouting mission on Attu to evaluate effects of the

previous raid; if some of the missing personnel happened to be located and chances for a rescue

mission were determined to be manageable, a later attempt might be launched. However, the cur-

rent mission was just for a squad of twelve men under strict orders to avoid exposure and only

engage the enemy if attacked. The plan was to parachute them in under cover of a night bombing

attack, as the Japanese were sure to be watching for more landings by boat along the shores. Ex-

traction was to be tried by riding out in pairs on the Navy's carrier-embarked helicopters, as prac-

ticed earlier.104

The scout party did indeed return without having fired a single shot; still they had clearly violated

orders when they located one of the downed Avenger pilots in a holding cell at Chicagof Harbour

and freed him with liberal use of knifes, axes, entrenching tools, rifle butts and allegedly even a

sword.105 Not only did they risk being killed summarily themselves, but the extra passenger was

not planned for in the helicopter extraction; even hanging two men off each aircraft in the previous

trials had been testing the limits of the R-4, and with only six available there should have been

absolutely no room for alterations. Miraculously the helicopter they put him on did not crash,

though the flight took its time getting back. Had the submarine waiting offshore for a contingency

pick-up not run out to meet them halfway within coastal artillery range, and the pilots not managed

to put the whole party down on its deck, it would never have made it on its fuel.

104 von Sieben, 914-958. 105 Tanski, p. 48-49.

Part IV: 1944

53

As it was, nothing happened to the commandos because every superior was eager to claim the

success for himself; plus their report that the Japanese made the impression of being in the process

of packing up had piqued much interest. Also on the plus side, the mission was the first demon-

stration of the airborne troops' combat jump capability, and an even greater success considering

they jumped at night into rugged terrain in late winter weather without more ill effects than a

sprained ankle and a slightly concussed head. Air-ground coordination proved to work again too,

particularly in the air cover for the extraction. Unfortunately it was also confirmed that this was the

only survivor from the previous raid, as he reported that the rest of his crew had been killed in the

crash and the Japanese had executed every other prisoner they made. This meant there would def-

initely be no more missions to Attu before the Komandorski operation, though the daring mission

was turned into a movie before a year had passed.106

To the Komandorskis and Beyond

Preparations for the operation against Bering and Mednyy Island had progressed apace while at-

tention had been focused on Attu. Contingents from I Corps troops, reformed to the new brigade

organisation, had rotated through Hawaii and Panama on month-long stints of amphibious training

with the marines deployed there, including forces returning from Iceland by way of the Panama

Canal. New equipment was also coming in; 4th Kenai Mechanised Brigade was last in line to get

Shermans and M3 halftracks. There was some debate whether to reequip them before the Koman-

dorski landings planned for June and send them in with brand-new, but unfamiliar equipment, or

let the units keep their Ram tanks and trucks.

Cavalry regiments would likely deploy with the new Hellcat tank destroyer, but old M2

halftracks, as the Russian American suggestion of a Hellcat-derived scout vehicle had been caught

up in the initial rejection of the US Army's Tank Board.107 Meanwhile production had been green

lighted under the M39 designator and an order placed immediately, but while Russian American

planners were already envisioning a whole family of vehicles including command and mortar car-

rier variants, it was unlikely any would arrive before the operation.108 The same was true for the

LVTs requested by the Marines.

The Russian flag was officially raised on the former USS Prince William on 14 May; after some

back and forth, the Navy had decided to rename her for Admiral Ferdinand von Wrangel, the polar

explorer and quasi-governor of Russian America who had been one of the most prominent voices

to speak out against the proposed sale to the United States in 1867. There were allegations that the

name had been supposed to be that of the general who presided over the exodus of Wrangel's Fleet

from the Crimean, but since General Alekseyev had proven a bit of an unlucky ship, they went for

a naval namesake instead. Rather than working up together with VF-26, it was decided that the

American-Russian squadron on Nassau would swap to Wrangel immediately after meeting off Ko-

diak to ease language problems in ship-aircraft communication.109

The Navy was also receiving the first of its new Rudderow-class destroyer escorts and converting

the old Russian vessels they replaced into fast troop transports on the pattern of the American

APDs. Surface combatants and patrol aircraft were largely radar-equipped by now. The Molins

self-loading six-pounder gun used by the British “Tsetse” variant of the Mosquito against U-Boats

106 von Sieben, 960. 107 von Sieben, 886-914. 108 Kentukski, p. 68-74. 109 von Sieben, 936-964.

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had also been looked at, but the Air Force maintained this was too much of a specialised task for

its comparably small attack fleet.110 The Navy however approached Sikorsky Stoyanka to trial the

gun in a limited-traverse nose turret of their S-44 flying boat.111

Since the US battleship group involved in the Kiska operation was no longer available, the Amer-

icans had been requested to send at least one replacement vessel for gunfire support of the landings.

USS Mississippi had been thought of earlier to be diverted upon her return from the South Pacific,

but had already arrived at Puget Sound for overhaul by mid-May and would not be available again

before mid-July. USS New York however was currently being used for gunnery training in Chesa-

peake Bay and could be requested for deployment with three weeks warning. This would put the

earliest possible date for her arrival on 13 June, while the last troops of 2nd Division could arrive

from Panama on the 18th on a direct course.

New moon would also be on the 20th, but he date for the beginning of the Komandorski campaign

was subsequently narrowed down to 26-28 June. This would not only allow some more room for

the last contingent of 2nd Division to arrive, but also give 4th Kenai Mechanised Brigade more

training time with their new vehicles, following a decision to go in with a common level of equip-

ment. Tides were not considered too critical with a maximum only about one and a half foot below

that at new moon, and at least a quarter moon was wanted to help with any preparatory action

before the landings. Weather was also likely to be better with July approaching.

There was an overall feeling of confidence for the planned operation, to the point of plans already

being made for the next target after the Komandorskis, working on the assumption they would be

retaken well before the end of the warm period in September. The Marines in particular had designs

of forming a division of their own and going after the Japanese outside Russian American territory

after their current assignments were no longer required, either with the Army in the Kuriles, or with

the Americans in the Central Pacific.112 One faction entertained the idea of securing future bases

in the area now controlled by the Japanese, thus fulfilling the old Russian dream of warm-water

ocean ports.113

Others pointed out that any spoils of war would have to be both achievable and sustainable. Of-

fering the Americans a marine division in the Central Pacific might allow Russian America to put

in for post-war administration of some piece from the current Japanese League of Nations mandate,

but the Carolines and Northern Marianas were quite a way off. There were some preliminary ideas

for Allied occupation of Japan proper after victory at this point already, similar to what had been

proposed for Germany by the European Advisory Commission; but this was not very concrete yet

since there was no clear perspective when it might be achieved. Most of all, in no way should this

detract from the liberation of historic Russian territory.

The Northern Kuriles, ceded by the Russian Empire to Japan in the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg,

certainly fit the definition of the latter though; an added incentive was that the USSR, while still

sticking to the neutrality agreement with Japan, was likely to take the islands once the tide had

turned sufficiently if Russian America did not beat them there. The best available intelligence sug-

gested that Paramushir and nearby Shumshu, being close to Soviet territory, were probably the

most heavily garrisoned, with estimates going all the way up to corps strength. They were certainly

heavily defended, as the Americans had found out to their cost during last year's bombing raids.

The northern islands were therefore not considered a good beginning for a campaign.

110 Bergmann, 923-933. 111 Sikorsky, p. 48. 112 von Sieben, 937-964. 113 Tanski, p. 47-48.

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There was also at least one airfield and probably a sizeable garrison on Matua near the centre of

the chain, were Japanese strength was thought to be similar to the Komandorskis. The US Navy

had traded fire with coastal batteries there earlier this year. The next major garrison to be fairly

certain of was on Simushir, as it was the first larger island to the south known to have been inhab-

ited pre-war. There was no very good idea about strength though. The same applied to Urup, the

southernmost of the Kuriles that once were Russian territory. All the smaller islands, most having

never been inhabited and some mere volcano summits rising over the sea, probably only had token

garrisons, but could be counted upon to be used at least for observation posts. The Southern Kuriles,

being old Japanese territory, were likely defended by home defence forces.

The course of thinking at this point was based upon the rather successful Allied strategy of by-

passing Japanese strongholds. Rather than trying to break down the heavily defended front gate

with the Soviets in the back, an entry was considered on one of the lesser-garrisoned islands in the

Northern Kuriles, then to be turned into a base to strike south from while holding off counterattacks

from Paramushir. But all this was still in the future.

Meanwhile, the finishing touches were put onto plans for the Komandorskis. The idea was still

to land two divisions on either side of Nikolskoye two days after taking Mednyy, then follow up

with a third on the Beringa north coast.114 The Signals Corps advocated foregoing Mednyy and use

the Light Task Force as a floating reserve to reinforce success on Beringa.115 In the end the three

commando companies were considered sufficient to overwhelm the small Mednyy garrison, leav-

ing the line battalions to support the Beringa landings. The dates of 26 June for Mednyy and 28

June for Beringa were confirmed, and embarkation of I Corps troops started little after that.

The carrier force would go with the vanguard carrying the remnants of the Light Task Force.

Aircraft squadrons had redistributed themselves among the three ships for mixed fighter and

bomber contingents, with a detachment of two helicopters on each. USS New York had by now

transited the Panama Canal and would be ready to provide naval fire support by 25 June. The

retaking of the Komandorskis was about to begin.116

The Second Battle of the Komandorskis

On 26 June at 2230 hours, the three commando companies of the Light Task Force, backed up by

a Marine company with LVTs, conducted a surprise landing on the western shore of Mednyy, just

opposite the old small settlement on the eastern shore where the Japanese had quartered their gar-

rison. The LVTs did not quite manage to cross the reefs, but the troops were able to wade ashore

uncontested and proceed quickly across the width of the island. The enemy was surprised, but as

expected individual soldiers put up stiff resistance despite being outnumbered more than 1:3 and

their defensive positions mostly oriented the wrong way.

Fighting throughout the night was somewhat confused, with single soldiers and small groups of

Japanese managing several times to sneak through Russian American “lines”, resulting in hand-to-

hand fighting and a lot of grenades being used at short range. At one point they actually captured

a machine gun despite the crew killing a dozen of them before being overwhelmed, but a com-

mando squad quickly moved to close the resulting gap and finished them off. Another half-dozen

Japanese had hidden under a porch in the settlement and managed to kill three commandos at day-

break, but were subsequently grenaded out.

114 von Sieben, 945-958. 115 Tanski, p. 48. 116 von Sieben, 960-967.

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In the morning, the troops moved to the north and south of the settlement, encountering a few

more pockets of resistance where enemy soldiers had managed to reach prepared defensive posi-

tions. Air and naval gunfire support was called in as per procedures established on Attu, and only

one stronghold on the highest point of the island, hill 2070 in the north, proved more resilient due

to a multitude of hiding holes. Two distinct enemy positions were pounded with mortars throughout

the morning, then assaulted with more hand grenades and improvised explosive charges used in

great quantities.

Also in the morning, Japanese aircraft showed up from Beringa and were engaged by air cover

from the carrier force and the long range patrols of the Air Force. Allied pilots claimed 15 kills –

though the enemy still managed to set one of the landing force's transports on fire and heavily

damaged an escorting destroyer. The transport crew was lucky in that nobody was killed in a Jap-

anese suicide attack, performed by a “Betty” bomber which came on through concentrated AA fire

and slammed into the ship's side despite several hits, its engines penetrating into the aft cargo hold

and starting fires both on and below decks while simultaneously severing the water mains.The ship

was still burning the next day and had to be abandoned and scuttled shortly after noon, while the

damaged destroyer – one of the new Rudderow-class DEs – was able to limp home after emergency

repairs to a 50-foot-gash in her forward fireroom from an aerial torpedo hit, 14 killed and seven

wounded aboard.

The appearance of the Betties was a bit of a surprise; though they had been known to visit at

Beringa, none had been reported there lately, the local air contingent consisting largely of IJA

“Nick” twin-engine fighters and IJN Zero floatplanes. They attacked in the afternoon and might

have come directly from Paramushir. Some pilots also reported encountering non-float Zeros,

which led to the installation of pickets by Mosquito night fighters towards the direction of the

Kuriles. The Allied side had lost eight aircraft, six of which from the carriers; however the latter

number included a Wildcat that crashed in a deck landing. Three Allied aircraft were able to make

emergency landings on Mednyy after being hit by AA or in aerial combat. The helicopters em-

barked on the carriers also proved themselves again as they picked up several pilots who had had

to bail out over the sea.

By the end of the day, only stragglers were encountered on the island anymore, of which more

were expected. However, 102 dead enemies plus one prisoner were counted at this point, leaving

not much of the reported Japanese strength. The commandos suffered about 15 dead and 25

wounded, a bit more than hoped for. But the solemn truth was these numbers would pale once the

landings on Beringa commenced on the next day.

At 0430 hours on the 28th, the covering force with USS New York began preparatory bombard-

ment of the landing areas on Beringa, supported by pre-planned air attacks. Landing operations

commenced at 0700. The landing craft encountered accurate Japanese artillery fire; about 20 were

hit, inflicting heavy casualties even before the actual assault. The first wave of 3rd Division hit

Blue Beach north of Nikolskoye at 0900, shortly followed by 1st Division at 0910 on Red Beach

to the south, opposite the airfield. Several Japanese aircraft were observed to take off despite the

barrage, with others destroyed on the ground; those taking to the air were engaged by friendly

fighter combat patrols and shipboard AA.

Once ashore, heavy enemy fire continued as barbed wire obstacles were encountered; but bring-

ing LCGs and landing armour in the first wave paid off, and both divisions were able to establish

beachheads of about three kilometres width. 1st Division managed to move up to the perimeter of

the airfield 700 yards inland with an armoured battalion group through vicious machine gun fire,

though direct artillery hits again killed about 20 vehicles in the process. For the first time, some

Japanese armour was encountered, though only light Type 95 tanks. They were no match for the

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new Shermans and Hellcats, but it was very fortunate the infantry now had its own means to defend

against them on the platoon level with the Bazooka. Still, it was a nasty surprise even for the expe-

rienced troops of 1st Division who had never faced this threat before.

As soon as the defensive positions on the perimeter were taken out, the airfield turned out to be

deserted except for the wrecks of aircraft destroyed by aerial and naval bombardment. Still, mindful

of the Kiska experience, 1st Division advanced with all due caution under continued artillery fire

from higher ground in the southeast. Meanwhile the second wave had landed, bringing friendly

artillery ashore for counter battery fire. Flank elements of either division turned toward Nikolskoye,

but did not advance to the settlement which continued to be defended.

At nightfall, the airfield was secured, and units took up defensive positions about 1,500 yards

inland. They were expecting the usual Japanese night attacks and infiltration tactics after dark, but

hoped to encircle Nikolskoye on the next day, when 2nd Division was planned to land on Gold

Beach at the northern tip of the island with the aim of trapping the enemy units reported there

between both forces. Personnel from 1st Forward Observer/Security Squadron attached to 1st Di-

vision immediately made a preliminary assessment of the airfield. They estimated it would take

three days to clear the aircraft wrecks off the field, fill in the craters bombed into the ground and

probably put Marsden matting on the plain compacted earth airstrip. Of course those three days

would only start once the necessary equipment could be brought ashore, as the field was still im-

mediately behind the frontline and under artillery fire from the hills to the southwest.117

Another destroyer had been lightly damaged in an air attack, but suffered no casualties and would

stay in battle. But as feared, it was a bloody day overall with about 300 killed and thrice that number

wounded. Total Allied aircraft losses since the start of the operation were reported as 19 – 14 of

which carrier aircraft, indicative of their lesser performance and more inexperienced crews. This

was a full third of the complement the ships had sailed with, a rather stark rate. While they were

still shooting down two enemy planes for every loss, even with replacement aircraft flown in they

were losing pilots at a rate that would soon render squadrons ineffective.On the other hand, claims

of enemy aircraft killed in dogfights or by AA so far amounted to 36, with 21 more wrecks counted

on the ground – over three quarters of the estimated local enemy strength, and the Japanese had

lost use of their airfield. With the Japanese once more relegated to floatplanes and long-range sor-

ties like the Allied side, it was hoped the carriers could hold out until the Beringa airfield became

available as a base.118

A minor stir also arose on that day when a female Air Force ferry pilot was found to have flown

a replacement Wildcat out to the fleet. Since she could not have been carrier qualified, this was

considered a reckless endangerment of a valuable airplane in addition to a breach of regulations for

deployment of women. An investigation revealed that Leytenant Stepanova had managed to sneak

her flight by pretending to be a replacement naval aviator, assisted by the roster clerk on Kiska Air

Base. Eventually it turned out that the Women's Air Force Auxiliary Corps had not only been con-

ducting clandestine training for naval aviation missions by demarcating carrier decks on their ferry

routes and rostering a cadre for naval aircraft ferry work, but also engaged in unofficial air combat

training with each other as well as their male counterparts. A complete record of their activities

was found, conducted under official guise and oversight of WAFAC head Polkovnik Filianova. All

of a sudden, the Air Force was confronted with a fifth column of female pilots trained in combat.119

Luckily for them, a far worse surprise than a guerrilla of airborne suffragettes occurred at the

same time. At about 0140 hours on 29 June, the northern group of the covering force off Nikolskoye

117 Kurylenko, Y. L.: The Peril in the South. I Corps on Beringa and the Kuriles 1944/45 (Stoyanka 1953), p. 96-98. 118 von Sieben, 973-976. 119 Borodin, p. 49-50.

Part IV: 1944

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was jumped by a Japanese cruiser force despite radar pickets and airborne surveillance. Unbe-

knownst to Allied forces, those ships had picked up the garrison of Attu during a spell of severe

fog over the previous days. The island had ironically been decided to be given up in expectation of

an imminent Russian American landing after the preceding raids, the troops based there to reinforce

Beringa as control of the latter was far more crucial to protect the Japanese mainland against Allied

long-range attacks and an eventual advance. After being notified of the landing at Nikolskoye, the

force headed for the area of Gold Beach – not too surprising in fact because other than Nikolskoye

itself, this was the best landing ground on northern Beringa. A string of bad luck and procedural

breakdowns on the Allied side then led to the Second Battle of the Komandorskis.

A Russian American submarine picketing Attu had reported a fleeting contact in the fog eight

miles west of Kresta Point at 1400 hours the day before, stated as “two destroyers and three larger

ships of unknown type heading 300 degrees at high speed”. A Navy patrol plane spotted “three

cruisers, three destroyers and two transports” at 1845 southwest of Mednyy, but mistook them for

part of the Gold Beach landing force in the low sun. The crew even thought it strange to find them

so far south and hailed them on the radio, but when they got no reply they became afraid they were

possibly breaking a radio silence and attracting unwanted attention, shut up and only reported the

sighting after returning to base at 2237. Meanwhile another flying boat had picked up five radar

returns at 2130 halfway between Mednyy and Beringa, but they were actually returning from picket

duty west of Beringa and low on fuel with no time to investigate.

Finally a report was sent out to Naval Operations Command at 2255 which issued a warning at

0000 hours, but of possible Japanese activity south of Beringa. The commander of the covering

force responded by extending his light cruiser and destroyer screen to the south, which turned out

to be the wrong way. The enemy force rounding the Northwest Cape may also have been masked

for shipboard radar by the land behind it. A radar-equipped US destroyer actually first spotted them

visually at a range of about 6,000 yards and fired starshells over them. After identifying the ships

as hostile, she opened fire and reported several hits on one target, but also received one herself,

killing ten though otherwise causing only moderate damage.

Patrol cruiser Admiral Kedrov, protecting the transports at anchor off Blue Beach, immediately

changed course for the enemy, but was fired upon by as many as four Japanese ships and within

minutes received about two dozen hits which destroyed both her boiler rooms and mortally

wounded the captain. Kedrov's crew suffered about 70 killed and 110 wounded. The enemy then

turned upon Indianapolis and Salt Lake City who were only just going to general quarters. Both

managed to open effective fire, but were hit by numerous shells and at least three torpedoes each

over the course of about 25 minutes. Both were set on fire, most of Indianapolis' bridge crew killed

by gunfire and all power lost after the last torpedo hit, all of Salt Lake City's boiler rooms destroyed

and the ship listing to port. Both had to be abandoned about 0215 and sank between 0230 and 0250.

Two American destroyers also tried to join the battle, but neither observed nor received hits.

Worried about their own landing force, the attackers then broke off – quite luckily, with Allied

transports defended only by half a dozen destroyers a bit to the south – and retreated north. They

encountered another American destroyer on the way which got heavily damaged by gunfire but

managed to escape while Allied ships commenced rescue operations. However, Admiral Kedrov,

too, sank shortly past noon after she had to be abandoned when fires got out of control.120

The situation at land and in the air was not quite as it could be hoped that day either. The Gold

Beach landing force had been turned away due to the newly unsecured situation in the sector while

ships and aircraft were looking for the enemy force. The landed troops had had to fight off the

120 Admiralty, 28 and 29 June 1944.

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59

expected Japanese counterattacks over night. Both divisions temporarily had their lines penetrated,

but eventually managed to repulse the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on the Japanese. Despite the

events at sea, they resumed the movement to encircle Nikolskoye in the morning. General-Ley-

tenant Kurylenko of I Corps intended to bring the equipment for repair of the airfield and the heli-

copters of 1st Army Liaison Squadron ashore, hoping the latter would be able to spot the enemy

artillery in the hills so it could be effectively suppressed by counter battery fire and air attacks.

However, troops did not advance as far as planned for that day and were still stuck in open terrain

subject to enemy fire from commanding heights. Not much was left of Nikolskoye after two days

of naval and aerial bombardment, and 1st Division had closed on the swampy terrain north of the

settlement; this at least allowed bringing in the equipment to the airfield as planned, though it was

judged to be too dangerous for the helicopters. In the north, 3rd Division took Hill 200, but had not

fully cut off the Japanese positions at the Northwest Cape yet. They also took out an enemy strong-

hold on their right flank, but the move towards Nikolskoye was hindered by the same boggy terrain.

In the air, the new Mosquito patrols southwest of Beringa had confirmed enemy fighters coming

up from the Kuriles. Another seven aircraft were lost until dusk, including five from the carriers.121

To delay the forced retirement of Wrangel from the battle due to a lack of carrier pilots, Air Force

Chief Alexei Fedorovich Andreev verbally ordered that carrier qualified female pilots, easily iden-

tified from Filianova's files, be used to deliver aircraft to Wrangel. Once aboard, they were given

the opportunity to volunteer for combat, which almost all did; the few who did not were those who

Polkovnik Filianova said had too little experience. Filianova was reduced to 'acting lieutenant', and

all were referred to in reports by masculinised forms of their names.122

The outlook improved on 30 June, when submarine Okun spotted two heavy and two light Japa-

nese cruisers heading towards the Kuriles 60 miles off Cape Lopatka on the southern tip of Kam-

chatka in the morning. The boat was in an inconvenient position and only managed to fire at the

light cruiser bringing up the rear of the formation, but hit with three out of four torpedoes and sank

the target. The ships were correctly judged to have been the attackers of the previous night.123

Along with over flights of Attu finding no signs of more Japanese activity at sea – though the

evacuation of the garrison continued to escape the Allied side – this led to the Gold Beach force

being given the green light to proceed on 1 July.124

Gold Beach

The Gold Beach landing went down on 3 July, D+5 for the Beringa operation rather than D+1 as

planned. Due to the recent Japanese landings in that area, still not fully realised by the Allied side,

this was not the envisioned relatively easy reinforcement manoeuvre into the back of the Japanese

while they were concentrated upon Russian American troops to the south and west, but another

contested landing against well-emplaced defences and strong forces. The lack of two heavy cruisers

for fire support was keenly felt, though USS New York, Louisville and St. Louis did what they could

while the American Omahas and remaining Russian cruisers screened against any new surprises

from seaward. However, by nightfall 2nd Division had managed to reach the northern shore of

Lake Sarannoye, trapping part of the enemy force in an area of about five by five kilometres be-

tween them, 3rd Division in the west and 1st Airborne Regiment in the swamps to the south.

121 Kurylenko, p. 97-98. 122 Borodin, p. 50-64. 123 Admiralty, 30 June 1944. 124 von Sieben, 988-990.

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1st Airborne had been committed from the operational reserve to clear the swampy terrain inland

between the beachheads of 1st and 3rd Division the previous day after a tenuous linkup was finally

achieved along the western coast, so the divisions could focus on the advance east. It would usually

have been a job for the cavalry to establish contact on the flanks, but the ground was unconductive

to vehicle use. 1st Division had advanced to the feet of the hills about four kilometres inland, and

also taken the ruins of Nikolskoye. Not much organised resistance was met there, though the ex-

pected hideaways made themselves known with smaller ambushes and sniper fire.

3rd Division had cleared the Japanese positions at the Northwest Cape, though counterattacks

from the east had been relentless due to the enemy reinforcements there. The division had eventu-

ally made some gains along the northern coast of Beringa on D+4 by flanking the Japanese with

an armoured thrust along the beach, sometimes rolling through the actual ocean surf. They even

made about 15 prisoners – all of them injured or unconscious when taken – and found some docu-

ments on dead bodies that first indicated the recent enemy landing; a Japanese colonel was found

among the killed. Now they were closing in on the enemy positions at the North Cape.

Casualty rates were nothing like what had been seen previously; in the first three days of fighting,

Russian American forces had suffered nearly a thousand dead and 3,000 wounded. However, coun-

ter battery fire against the Japanese artillery in the hills to the south was made easier after some

helicopters from 1st Army Aviation Squadron were managed to be launched directly off the ships

they were carried on, acting as spotters as planned – though they proved vulnerable to small-arms

fire and the first had already been shot down on D+4. Enemy fire was still incoming on the airfield,

but at least after D+3 the perimeter was far enough that mortars and stray bullets from the frontline

did no longer reach there, so the aircraft wrecks there had been started to be cleared away.

The quality of the Japanese pilots coming over from Paramushir was also much lower than those

initially encountered from Beringa; therefore aircraft losses declined. Both were welcome news for

the carrier force, because even though reserve Wildcats had been fed into its aircraft establishment,

it was down a third of its original flight crews due to deaths, wounds and missing. It was planned

to be withdrawn to rebuild as soon as the Air Force could put a detachment onto Beringa.

1st Airborne Regiment achieved linkup between its I. and II. Battalion coming from Blue and

Red Beach respectively on D+5, but remained engaged in heavy fighting along the southwestern

shore of Lake Sarannoye. 1st Division had also been reinforced with I./1st Yeger Battalion to lead

the ascent into the hills to the east and south against continued stiff resistance, executing the tactics

developed on Kiska where the armoured groups advanced through the valleys with the leg infantry

securing the slopes on either side. Commanders had been happy at first sending armoured groups

ahead to break resistance, then clean up with infantry, but had quickly learned that tanks were best

covered by dismounted troops even in flat terrain. Neither would work in the steeper terrain farther

to the south, but General-Mayor Korichnev hoped to cut across the width of the island to the op-

posite shore with two brigades while the third was securing their flank south of the airfield.

While the port facilities at Nikolskoye had been always very basic and largely destroyed during

during preparatory bombardments, flank elements had by now also secured the coastline there suf-

ficiently to land supplies directly in the harbour. This greatly improved the strained logistics since

it had been found that with a full issue of automatic weapons and the greater mechanisation of the

divisions, resupply capacities were already overextended even with the additional American trans-

ports without which all troops could not have been carried at once. Most major craters were filled

in on the airfield over the course of the day, and engineers kept working throughout the night to

put down Marsden matting.125 The next morning 4th Fighter Squadron flew into Beringa, freshly

125 Kurylenko, p. 99.

Part IV: 1944

61

equipped with new P-51Bs, improving the air combat situation considerably and allowing the car-

rier force to retreat towards Kodiak.126

2nd and 3rd Division largely eliminated the pocket between them in the North on D+6, pushing

Japanese survivors into a small area of coastal defence positions on the shore and towards 1st Air-

borne Regiment in the swamps. Fighting in both places was nasty, and particularly miserable in the

boggy terrain around the minor lakes through which troops had to advance to the low hills in the

middle on which the enemy had hunkered down for his last stand there. In the east, 1st and 2nd

Division were advancing south and north of Lake Sarannoye respectively. 1st Division was in sight

of the eastern shore by nightfall and hoped to link up with 2nd the next day. Once the North was

cleared, the offensive was likely to be halted for regrouping, refreshments and resupply, because

1st and 3rd Division were severely depleted. Some frontline units had to be folded into another

since they were no longer combat effective from losses. Meanwhile, after a week of mopping up

stragglers on Mednyy, the commandos there were reasonably sure the island was secure, and it

became available as a staging ground for transports to and from Beringa.

Unfortunately with 2nd Division not as far down from Gold Beach as was planned had their

landing occurred on the scheduled date, General-Mayor Korichnev of 1st Division had overex-

tended his southern flank in his drive for the opposite coast of Beringa, held by only one brigade

while racing east with his other two. In the night towards D+7, the Japanese launched a strong and

determined attack from the hills into the direction of the airfield, supported by gunfire from ships

which had once more managed creeping up close to the coast in darkness, this time from the south

but again evading both radar and visual spotting. The flanking brigade had also been getting the

short end of supplies coming from Red Beach despite being closest to it; with demand outrunning

capacity, the bulk had been directed to the advancing brigades in the east with the highest con-

sumption. As an example, some troops facing the attack had only one hand grenade per man, some-

thing that had been previously learned the hard way to never be possibly in oversupply when

fighting the Japanese.

There were three distinct enemy thrusts of estimated battalion strength each. Luckily, I./1st Yeger

Battalion had occupied a ridge situated between two Japanese columns and fired into their own

flanks, repelling a counterattack but becoming cut off from friendly lines when the enemy charged

past them. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties themselves, but their furthest advance was

stopped only at the river just south of the airfield by an engineer unit hastily summoned for defence.

In the morning, they were pounded by Russian artillery and aircraft strafing them basically from

the runway pattern, and had to retreat. Air support had to be suspended however due to warnings

of an incoming raid of Zeros and Betties from Paramushir, probably coordinated with the night's

ground attack. 4th Fighter Squadron lost three P-51, but claimed three Zeros and Betties each in

return and deflected the attack with no damage done to the airfield. Fighting on the ground contin-

ued throughout the day.

The overall situation was a bit of a mess; though 1st and 2nd Division had linked up east of Lake

Sarannoye, Korichnev halted his troops there to redirect units, trying to deal with the threat to his

flank. I./1st Yeger was still cut off, but the helicopters came in handy again, flying in supplies and

flying out wounded despite heavy Japanese fire. 2nd and 3rd Division finished up the pocket be-

tween them during the day, and the only organised resistance in the Northwest remained on the

hills in the middle of the swamps, which were still being fought over at nightfall by 1st Airborne

Regiment. General-Leytenant Kurilenko of I Corps wanted to move 3rd Division south, despite

being in bad shape, to reinforce the flank of his corps.127

126 Bergmann, 991-993. 127 Kurylenko, p. 99-100.

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The Japanese ships had withdrawn before morning but were spotted by an American B-24 south

of Beringa, identified as a Nagara-class light cruiser and three destroyers. The bomber attacked the

cruiser, no doubt with a good deal of vengeance for Indianapolis and Salt Lake City, and reported

her heavily damaged after multiple bomb hits. More aircraft were called in and also attacked, but

achieved inconclusive results before having to break off at nightfall. The ships, correctly assumed

to be escorts of the transport group from the sighting reports of five days ago, where shadowed

over night by a Navy flying boat which however reported only three radar returns, the bombed

cruiser having sunk after dark. A task group headed by USS St. Louis was sent chasing after them,

but thought unlikely to catch up with them before they reached the Kuriles at current speed.128

The Americans were also preparing another B-24 sortie calculated to catch them at first light,

judged to be the best bet. Expected to meet fighters out of Paramushir and Shumshu, both Russian

and USAAF escorts were added. Indeed the formation of six B-24, 16 P-38 and 16 P-51 aircraft

found the Japanese ships in the morning, but was attacked by a large number of Zeros from Para-

mushir, by some estimates as many as 70. The Allied side lost six planes, though none of the

bombers which the fighters managed to successfully screen from the enemy, claiming at least 25

kills in return. The outcome was favoured by catching the ships further north than thought, about

two thirds the way to Paramushir, giving Allied pilots more and the Japanese correspondingly less

fuel reserves to burn than near Cape Lopatka as originally calculated.

This was explained when the group was surprisingly found to include five rather than three de-

stroyers and two transports that seemed to have joined during the night, likely the ones reported

the previous week and slowly travelling home while part of their escort had kept sneaking around

Beringa. In an initial bombing run by three B-24s, one transport and one destroyer were reported

hit and heavily damaged. A second wave followed up and managed to sink another destroyer which

had stopped by the stricken transport immediately; the transport itself was also reported as sinking.

Having expended their load, the bombers then returned home while their cover fought a rearguard

action against the Zeros. The Navy sent in flying boats afterwards to look for survivors, but none

of the pilots who had to bail out were found.129

With Japanese air assets busy off Kamchatka, the situation on Beringa got somewhat back under

control over the course of D+8 as 3rd Division moved south past the airfield to shore up I Corps'

flank. The Japanese had made some renewed gains during the night, but were pushed back towards

the hill by daylight to the point where contact with 1./1st Yeger was re-established. The frontline

remained fragmented though, with units prone to surprise by isolated Japanese counterattacks.130

A cavalry troop had three of its Hellcats killed by anti-tank guns and the surviving crews bayoneted

by charging enemy soldiers; a fourth, trying to manoeuvre out of the ambush, tipped over on a river

bank and drowned its crew. The troop was not accompanied by a dismount element since it was

meant to be a reconnaissance mission relying on speed, and the halftracks were thought to keep

them down. The incident contributed to expedite introduction of the M39 scout vehicle and the

Type 1944b cavalry organisation.131

By the end of the day, General Kurilenko had had enough and relieved Korichnev of command

of 1st Division, despite the latter's popularity for the way he had handled Kiska. While 1st Division

regrouped under fire, 2nd was unaffected by the trouble on the southern flank and, being relatively

fresh, advanced to the Northeast Cape, taking the Japanese positions there after heavy fighting.

Kurilenko intended to turn them south then and form a continuous front across the north of Beringa

128 von Sieben, 996-999. 129 Bergmann, 997-1003. 130 Kurylenko, p. 101. 131 Kentusksi, p. 100.

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with 1st Division in the centre. 1st Airborne Regiment finally squashed the last resistance in the

swamps too, and while the problem of Japanese stragglers and hideouts remained, it was hoped to

have the northern quarter of the island secured within the next few days.132

Afterwards there would be urgent need refresh the troops; after eight days of fighting, losses

stood at about 1,600 dead and 5,400 wounded. Even allowing that some of the latter had returned

to their units by now or would shortly do so after treatment in the field, this was two territorial

regiments' worth of replacements. Planners were thus faced with the possible need to call up older

classes rather than just those reaching military age for the first time since the start of the war to

refill reserves after that.133

The Mid-1944 Plans

Offensive operations on northern Beringa continued for several more days. General-Leytenant

Kurylenko had put his own deputy in command of 1st Division – which was not improving the

political impact – and the formation was shortening its lines from either side while 2nd and 3rd

Division were moving down from the north. The heaviest fighting by now was on the eastern coast

of Beringa where 2nd Division was trying to take an enemy stronghold, then advance to the next

river to the south before going to a temporarily defensive stance. 3rd Division was moving towards

Hill 1122 about six kilometres south of the airfield, possession of which would deny the Japanese

the best vantage point to direct artillery onto the base and command the area to all other sides, but

it was literally an uphill fight. By D+10, 1st Division's lines in the centre were almost oriented

north to south, making the front a definite zigzag, but Kurylenko still hoped to achieve a straight

cut across the island eventually.

Uncommonly bad early July weather weather was affecting operations on Beringa as well as the

already-strained logistics. Not only was the ammunition situation for frontline troops becoming

problematic, they also had to cut down daily meals to two. Cases of exhaustion and typical battle

sicknesses were increasing, particularly trench foot and dysentery. Hard work was going on to

develop Mednyy as a forward logistics base and opening additional landing sites to shorten supply

lines.134 Transfer orders had been sent out to all six territorial regiments, each to provide four com-

panies’ worth of replacement personnel for Beringa, mostly infantry. Fortunately about 400 men

had also just finished service schools on 30 June, including officers who had started training im-

mediately before the beginning of the war, both as volunteers and through the reserve cadre pro-

gramme. However, under current conditions the replacements would not be possible to sustain.

Due to the same concerns earlier planned reinforcements by 3rd Marines from Hawaii, 7th Guards

Cossack Regiment and a battalion of 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery were also held off. The Air

Force suggested air-dropping supplies due to the lack of airfield capacity, though unrefueled round

trips at this range from the nearest Aleutian bases would only allow small payloads.135 The only

consolation to I Corps troops was that the Japanese must be even worse off. As their fronts short-

ened, the divisions were going to a more conventional posture with two brigades in front and one

in the back rather than fighting in all directions. Kurylenko also wanted to form a more substantial

corps reserve, currently only consisting of 1st Airborne Regiment.

132 Kurylenko, p. 102. 133 von Sieben, 1002. 134 Kurylenko, p. 102-103. 135 von Sieben, 1009-1016.

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Still, on D+11 2nd Division took the Japanese stronghold on the east coast after fierce fighting.

Going on the opposite shore was very slow, with 3rd Division continuing a two-steps-forward-one-

step-back advance towards Hill 1122, but finally raising the Russian flag on its top on D+12. Op-

erations continued until noon of D+14 to secure some additional terrain below, allow 2nd Division

to advance to their planned position on the east coast and 1st to orient their lines in the centre

accordingly, plus shore up smaller jinks and dents in the frontline. Then I Corps went to a defensive

stance, its lines now running roughly diagonal across the northern quarter of the island. However,

the second week of the offensive saw another 700 killed and 2,200 wounded, bringing the total to

2,300 and 7,600 respectively. That amounted to about a 20 percent casualty rate among the de-

ployed ground forces, with far higher numbers in frontline than support units.136

This also meant another territorial regiment's worth of replacements just after the first wave em-

barked. It was hoped for the weather to clear up to improve conditions for shipping and air opera-

tions; there was currently a backlog of supplies afloat. However, measures had been taken to enable

better transport. The Junograd cabinet had been reluctant so far to induct the flying boats of Russian

American Airlines directly for the war effort, since they had been a reliable external revenue gen-

erator without using up too much Russian personnel resources, and the naval surveillance situation

was felt to be fully under control with the radar-equipped military aircraft – until the breakdown

over the Japanese cruiser raid. However, in light of the Komandorski situation even the finance

minister now agreed they should be committed, and the first civilian S-44 made a supply run into

Lake Sarannoye on D+16 with little problems despite the weather.137

The Canadians also offered delivery of some concrete-built “beach ships” that could be used as

sinkable piers in undeveloped landing sites.138 With a lead time of two to three months, orders were

placed quickly after a commission had recommended procurement in mid-August.139 The Ameri-

cans were very interested in building additional air bases on Beringa which could possibly be used

for long-range strikes on the Japanese Home Islands by B-29 bombers, and committed personnel

to that task as soon as northern Beringa was secured.140 The situation on the ground was rather

static now as both sides were exhausted, though the IJN kept up their own supply runs with sub-

marines and fast surface combatants to southern Beringa, which could not completely blocked with

the reduced Allied naval assets. The US Navy had announced to send replacements for the cruisers

lost off Nikolskoye – Salt Lake City's sister Pensacola and two more Omaha CLs – but they had

not yet arrived. All were also old ships, but with their engagement in the Central Pacific, the Amer-

icans had few to spare, too.141

In addition, the US agreed to rebuild the losses suffered by the Russian American Navy.142 The

latter had voiced interest in the new American Sumner-class destroyers before, since they would

make logical companions to their “patrol cruisers” – in fact being offspring of the latter's design

when given the chance to transcend treaty limitations back in the 30s. However, even replacing

Kedrov the Navy would only be able to operate nine instead of the current 18 old and worn Clem-

sons with the same crews due to higher manning requirements. Still, the Navy was adamant that

the latter were really no longer fit for combat, and their best use would be in conversion to fast

troop transports like the eight even older Russian destroyers before. It had also been seen in the

136 Kurylenko, p. 116-123. 137 von Sieben, 1023-1024. 138 Colins, p. 51. 139 von Sieben, 1075. 140 Tanski, p. 51. 141 von Sieben, 999-1024. 142 Tanski, p. 52.

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Komandorskis that sealift capabilities had become inadequate with the modernisation of land

forces, so it was felt that the Navy should be given preferential treatment in personnel allocation,

even for more large destroyers than could be run at current levels.

All personnel planning was conditional on what losses were needed to be replaced in the short

term. So far, total strength of the Russian American forces had increased by about 17,000 each year

since mobilisation, the limiting factor being available cadres rather than recruits; due to modest

casualties, it had even been possible to discharge older enlisted who were not deemed fit for the

leadership training programmes and replace them with freshly inducted 18-year-olds. With the

massive losses at Beringa, this was no longer tenable. However, by next year there would also be

a bulge of newly-minted officers who had volunteered en mass after the Japanese attack.

Incidentally, while the Americans had built entirely for their own vast needs in the Pacific Naval

Theatre so far, they were not quite satisfied with the Sumners themselves due to unfulfilled endur-

ance requirements. There were plans to refit a dozen of those currently building as fast minelayers

while already awaiting the stretched Gearing-class follow-on design. These subsequently became

the subject of talks about a possible handover to Russian America. In the course, the Navy finally

acknowledged that their “cruisers” were really destroyer leaders and included one of them in each

of the three destroyer squadrons in a preliminary draft for the 1945 OOB – the two Nakhimovs

with six of the planned Sumners each, and the older Kolchak with the nine Rudderow DEs. A

fourth command was introduced under the Naval Operations Command with Transport Fleet, ac-

tually the biggest with more than 40 percent of overall personnel at sea and comprising three sealift,

amphibious and fast transport squadrons each. Auxiliary Fleet, while losing those, also gained a

third auxiliary squadron due to the overall greater fleet.

The Navy also still wanted to form a Marine division, mostly by reshuffling personnel out of the

coastal artillery which was looking less important now that the Allies were on the offensive against

the Japanese. Trouble arose however when the service was found to have interpreted its priority in

personnel allocation as extending to transfer of Army officers into the Marines, something the Navy

had been known to incite individuals to earlier already.143 Inter-service rivalry flared up again as

the Army, mindful of the extent of its casualties on Beringa, flat-out refused any such intentions

and counter-attacked by once more questioning why the Navy should waste its resources by having

its own ground forces at all, backed up by the Air Force and Signals Corps who were growing tired

of the older service's antics.144 In the end, a ministerial decree forbade further transfers of trained

personnel between the services except upon special exemption.

The Navy therefore went back to the drawing board and reduced the marine division from 11,700

to 10,700 all ranks, comprising 2nd and 3rd Marine Regiment – 1st Marines retaining its duties

under the coastal regional commands – as well as an artillery regiment and anti-aircraft battalion

formed from coastal artillery personnel. Additional troops were needed for the division command,

quartermaster and armoured battalion, the latter planned to have two tank and LVT companies

each. The engineer battalion proposed earlier was deleted and an engineer company added to each

infantry regiment, though the Marines spitefully forewent redesignating it a brigade like the Army

had done in its divisional reorganisation. Further reductions in the Navy OOB were achieved by

concentrating most types of auxiliaries into one squadron each, inactivating 4th Minesweeper

Squadron and reducing the number of LSTs in each amphibious squadron from twelve to eight.

This resulted in an overall strength of 66,450, including 3,100 female auxiliaries.145

143 von Sieben, 1027-1043. 144 Tanski, p. 54. 145 von Sieben, 1043.

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66

The Army was primarily concerned with replacing its losses, but would also need to find slots

for an emerging formalised structure for the effort of recruiting Soviet POWs liberated in the Eu-

ropean theatre. On a suggestion from the Signals Corps which was finding it hard to channel the

growing stream after the July Normandy landings with its clandestine means, one support brigade

for each of 12th and 21st Allied Army Group was to be established. Each would have a military

police and two transport battalions, supported by signals and medical companies.146 Manning was

precarious until a slightly controversial administrative was applied: The area of the planned Euro-

pean Theatre Command was declared a rear combat zone comparable to the liberated Aleutians,

where women could serve in logistics, medical and signals units under Territorial Army Command.

As a result, as much as 25 percent of the support brigades would be female, allowing quartermaster

and military police units back home to keep their previous strength.

The Army wanted a general officer in nominal charge of the European forces which would in-

clude the Russian contingent on Iceland, Greenland and in 1st SSF, the new support brigades and

the two commando squadrons which had also emerged from Signals' POW operations. At this

point, the tentative European Theatre Command was projected to have a strength of 11,550 and be

headquartered in the UK. Other political manoeuvring included a push by 1st Guards Regiment to

have at least a part of its battalions deployed after having seen little action protecting the govern-

ment seat of Junograd since the start of the war.

The most in excitement the Guards experienced at this time was an alert after a fire in the Juno-

grad military central telegraph exchange led to a week-long partial communications blackout.147

This was found to have been started deliberately and suspiciously occurred during secret negotia-

tions about the future role of both Russian America and the USSR in the United Nations, making

an act of sabotage by Soviet agents as likely as by the Japanese – or even by domestic factions,

since the idea of in the UN on an equal footing with the USSR was also controversial in Junograd

itself since it did contravene the official claim to represent all of Russia.148

There had been earlier thoughts about establishing a female Guards battalion in the tradition of

the women's battalions formed after the Russian February Revolution, freeing male soldiers for

frontline deployment by taking over relatively safe rear area protection duties.149 Despite the in-

creasing number of female auxiliaries in Territorial Army support units, this had met with re-

sistance from conservative military leaders. In the mid-1944 situation however, at least a female

guards company was included into the draft OOB as a testbed unit. The overall strength of 124,250

would therefore see a sharp swelling to 9,600 women serving in the Army. The only other structural

novelty besides introduction of the Type 1944b cavalry organisation after the start of deliveries of

the M39 scout vehicle was the amalgamation of the three commando companies from the now-

disbanded Light Task Force into their own battalion on the 1st SSF model.150

The Air Force was already faced with the fait accompli of female combat service through the

WAFAC insurgency, but being a young service proved more open to change. It had stood up a new

combat wing each year so far and intended to do the same again, with increased strength also war-

ranting a new flight training squadron, and could use any trained pilot. The women discovered in

the Komandorskis had already been allowed to stay in frontline units after having distinguished

themselves in action; none were killed, but a few were injured – one Leytenant Tereshkova badly

enough that she never flew again, though she was able to resume duties eventually in a desk job.

146 Tanski, p. 52. 147 von Sieben, 1031-1044. 148 Tanski, p. 52. 149 von Sieben, 236-259. 150 von Sieben, 1041-1044.

Part IV: 1944

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Air Force Chief Andreev is alleged to have offered his resignation to the War Ministry when he

was no longer able to conceal his actions because the discrepancy between his earlier reports on

pilot availability, losses and continued action had become obvious, but it was ignored. Former

WAFAC head Filianova and a few others then flew from Nikolskoye for a short time, before re-

turning to the mainland, probably by the end of July 1944. Progressivity did not go quite as far as

to allow this to become a permanent condition though, and plans rather called for establishing an

all-female combat squadron in Home Defence Command, again comparatively un-dangerous duty

at this point. This turned out to be the new 22nd Fighter Squadron at Baranov, in addition to the

24th Transport Squadron that was activated at Ketchikan besides 20th Aircraft Transfer Squadron.

Neither was technically all-female though, as not enough women were available to fill all of the

maintenance personnel posts.151

The main change in the draft Air Force OOB however was the establishment of a new command

under the Air Combat Command to deal with span-of-leadership issues in the Aleutians and Ko-

mandorskis. There was debate about whether to approach this geographically or by concentrating

fighter and attack units respectively.152 There were points to support either, but the preliminary

plan foresaw an Aleutian Defence Command responsible for Holodnayabukhta, Umnak and Adak,

and a Western Command for Amchitka, Kiska and Shemya as well as the forward bases on Beringa.

The Air Force was about to take delivery of the long-anticipated C-54, and also hoped to receive

the new P-51D Mustang variant later in the year, both a major step up in transport and air combat

capabilities respectively. Overall personnel strength was set at 46,600, including 4,200 women.153

Meanwhile, aerial reconnaissance, interdiction and supply operations in the Komandorskis im-

proved when the weather finally cleared up by mid-July, but enemy air sorties from the Kuriles

also increased again. The Russian American Air Force had promoted plans for a major Allied strike

onto air and naval facilities on Paramushir and Shumshu earlier, and a low-level reconnaissance

mission by camera-equipped Mosquitoes had already been undertaken from Beringa shortly after

the airfield had become operable. Analysts identified a Japanese radar set at the IJN’s Musashi base

on the southwestern tip of the island in the images, a very exciting and slightly disconcerting find.

After that, designs for the proposed strike grew to the point of concentrating most or all of the

Russian Mosquitoes along with the American bombers for one day. However, events postponed

execution for some time to come.154

The Third Battle of the Komandorskis

The resumption of offensive operations on Beringa was eventually scheduled for 6 August, when

several important measures would be concluded. I Corps' balance was about to be restored with

incoming replacements; casualties had been comparatively low over the last two-and-a-half weeks

with only localised actions, about 170 killed and 500 wounded. General Kurylenko had moved the

commando companies from secure Mednyy after replacement troops from Territorial Army units

had arrived, and used them for raids and patrols behind enemy lines to keep the Japanese occupied.

American 77th Bombardment Squadron deployed their B-25s to the new base on 6 August, too.

Conditions had also improved at Nikolskoye, with fixed shelters for personnel and materiél com-

ing in. As a result, the air raid on Paramushir and Shumshu was also scheduled for the week after

151 Borodin, p. 64-103. 152 Bergmann, 1030-1038. 153 von Sieben, 1029-1039. 154 Bergmann, 1008-1018.

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that, 14 August. Also, as supplies were catching up with the situation and US capacity was becom-

ing available after construction of the new airfield finished, additional reinforcements could now

be planned for again. On 8 August, II./11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery and 7th Guards Cossack

received orders to embark for the Komandorskis. The convoy would be met by USS Pensacola and

the two Omaha CLs which were replacing the US Navy's losses off Beringa.155

When I Corps pushed south again across the front, it advanced more conventionally than in the

rush after the landings, the mechanised brigades largely held in reserve to exploit breakthroughs

where the terrain permitted. General Kurylenko was placing the lifes of his troops above speed and

proceeded cautiously; as a result, daily casualty rates were drastically lower than in the initial phase,

though higher than during the previous lull. Resistance was as stiff as before; the Japanese had used

the time to reinforce, too, with better-equipped enemies encountered in increasingly steep terrain.

On 9 August, some heavier Japanese tanks were encountered on the western shore, necessitating

the commitment of 3rd Division's armoured reserve. One was knocked out and the rest withdrew

when Russian-American Shermans engaged them, but not before shooting up some lighter vehi-

cles. The destroyed tank was subsequently identified as the new Type 1, never encountered before

by Allied troops. There was wide consent that unless those had been based in southern Beringa

from the start and the Japanese only brought them to the front now, there could not be too many of

them since the enemy had mostly used destroyers and cruisers to transport reinforcements.156

However, there was a bay on the southwestern coast that had been eyed by Russian American

planners earlier when a landing in the South of the island was considered, offering good anchorage

and some inland access via a valley carved out by a river. It was also known the Japanese had a

type of landing craft that could carry a medium tank and might have been used to sneak them along

the coast, since air coverage even of Beringa itself was still patchy; when weather allowed the Air

Force to fly, they were doing mostly fighter sweeps and close support of the ground troops in the

North, while the Navy was out looking for shipping in the Pacific.

The resourcefulness of the IJN in avoiding detection was proven again when in the night to 12

August the renewed naval sortie feared for some time materialised. Uncharacteristically, it did

come neither from the north nor the south under cover of Beringa's coast as had been done before,

but from the west – indicating that this time ships sailed close to the neutral Soviet coast of Kam-

chatka, because sentries to the south and southwest did not pick them up. However, coming from

the open sea they showed up on radar for allied ships off Nikolskoye quite clearly, and USS Lou-

isville intercepted them along with the three Omaha-class cruisers on station and five destroyers

shortly before midnight. At this point, up to ten contacts were counted.

The Americans opened radar-guided fire at 17,000 yards which sank at least one enemy ship.

However, the Japanese immediately returned surprisingly heavy and accurate fire which quickly

sank a US destroyer and heavily damaged another as well as USS Raleigh, the latter's number two

engine taken out by a single hit that penetrated the upper deck. Visual observation of enemy sil-

houettes under the waning half moon at closer range supported the notion that the opposing force

included battleships. The Americans therefore broke off the engagement and requested support by

aircraft as well as USS New York which was on station further south off the combat zone on the

Beringa coast for fire support of ground troops.

Before either arrived however, the enemy force closed to within ten nautical miles of Nikolskoye,

and at 0130 hours commenced shore bombardment of the airfield area. Nearly 1,000 hits were

counted over the course of about 90 minutes, heavily damaging the airstrip and destroying more

than half of the aircraft based there, along with killing about 40 personnel. Maybe worst of all, the

155 von Sieben, 1042-1044. 156 Kurylenko, p. 142-154.

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main fuel dump received a direct hit, resulting in heavy explosions and fires. With the airfield

effectively suppressed, what saved the day for the Allies was the new American base in the North

where 17 B-25s launched as soon as light conditions in the early arctic summer morning permitted.

They quickly found the Japanese force and attacked with bombs, reporting hits on two ships.

The enemy subsequently withdrew from the coast and retreated to the open sea on a westerly

course. New York did not manage to close, however a US destroyer kept in touch until a Russian

flying boat could take over. It reported composition as two Fuso-class battleships – one of them

making smoke from apparent bomb damage – a light cruiser and six destroyers. The Americans

mounted another attack later in the day as soon as they had turned their B-25s around, but found

the Japanese prepared and encountered heavy AA fire that thwarted runs on the battleships. Still,

the crews claimed to have sunk two of the destroyers and possibly the light cruiser.157

Meanwhile, urgent repair and recovery action was underway at Nikolskoye. The airstrip was

operable again the next morning, allowing replacement aircraft to be flown in, but the main prob-

lem was the loss of fuel stores. There was however a smaller cache that remained untouched, and

the Russian American Air Force contingent managed to assemble a strike package from the un-

damaged planes using fuel from this, US stocks and drained from grounded aircraft. They went out

after the retreating Japanese force and caught them off Cape Lopatka, as did the Americans again

in a different sortie. Neither reported conclusive results though as they were once more met with

heavy AA fire and also Zeros coming out of Paramushir.158

Worse, a separate enemy force was spotted, consisting of two heavy and four light cruisers es-

corting six transports, headed for Beringa. This supported the assumption that the bombardment

was in preparation for more reinforcements and a new Japanese counteroffensive.159 I Corps had

actually been making good progress over the last days, above five to six kilometres in a three-

pronged attack on either coast and down the centre along the channels of the terrain; Kurylenko

wanted to bottle up the enemy on the higher ground both sides from the middle thrust and clear

them out before going into the really steep parts to the South. Some more of the new Japanese tanks

had appeared, but only about half a dozen that were easily thrown back by Russian armour.160

The Russian American reinforcements also arrived at Beringa in the evening of 13 August, along

with the new American cruisers. The latter sailed on directly to meet with the Komandorski screen-

ing force and intercept the Japanese convoy. All parties congregated in the middle of the night, and

there was a somewhat confused battle at close ranges in total darkness due to heavy clouds. Three

American destroyers were sunk and another heavily damaged; both New York and St. Louis also

sustained some damage, but stayed in the fight until it broke up in all directions, at which point

they tried to re-establish formation and some of the Japanese got away.

Enemy losses were not immediately clear, though three ships were thought sunk on the other

side, too. At daybreak, Allied aircraft found the remainder of the convoy as it headed into the bay

that had been suspected of serving as the Japanese's main makeshift landing site. All six transports

were still afloat and escorted by one heavy and two of the light cruisers as well as some destroyers

which seemed to have joined over night, possibly from the retreating bombardment force. Aircraft

immediately attacked with bombs and guns, and over repeated sorties from their close-by bases

throughout the day managed to sink the heavy cruiser and three of the transports in the bay; the

other three transports beached themselves, but were destroyed while unloading on the shore. A

flying boat also found the other heavy cruiser back, apparently heavily damaged in the night battle

157 von Sieben, 1049-1050. 158 Bergmann, 1052-1058. 159 von Sieben, 1054. 160 Kurylenko, p. 154.

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and heading home at slow speed under escort by a similarly limping destroyer. That cruiser got

sunk in a separate air attack, too.

Attacks had to be broken off at dusk on 14 August – not least because fuel stores were almost

totally exhausted despite some having arrived with the Allied convoy, and both the Russian Air

Force and the Americans having started to fly in gasoline from the Aleutian bases – but were con-

sidered a decisive blow to the Japanese on a strategic level. Including their earlier losses, the Allies

had now sunk three of their heavy and possibly four light cruisers along with a dozen destroyers

and transports each, a significant part of their naval strength in the theatre and severely restricting

their capabilities to sustain their position.161

I Corps completed encirclement of the high ground on 15 August, though the Japanese had rec-

ognised the threat and a sizeable part of enemy troops in both pockets got away to the south. 1st

and 3rd Commando Companies, operating ahead of the divisions, reported heavy movement in that

direction and were ordered to pursue and harass the escapees. When I Corps began eliminating the

two pockets on the next day, it was found the enemy had been forced to leave his heavy equipment

behind; the troops encountered were mostly crews who had stayed with the latter to make a stand.

Several artillery positions were taken against the usual fanatical, but localised resistance. After-

wards about 900 Japanese dead were counted, again with very few prisoners to show, at compara-

tively low friendly losses of 80 dead and 250 wounded for the whole attack over four days.162 Due

to the near-complete depletion of aviation fuel stocks, air support was severely limited for the time

being, with remaining gasoline reserved for fighter patrols and emergency missions. The air attack

against Paramushir that was supposed to happen on the 14th had naturally been postponed again

due to the damage at Nikolskoye, but planners were determined that it would be not by long as

there was more interest to land a blow against Japanese bases than ever.163

In light of the current situation, the carrier force was also redeployed after having rebuilt in the

Gulf of Alaska, standing in for the Air Force units moved to the Komandorskis over the last month.

Its aircraft losses had been replaced, and though it was still short some pilots, it was felt to both be

needed to cover the approaches to Beringa and stand a better chance now in the current air envi-

ronment, with quality of enemy pilots down and them having to fly all the way from the Kuriles.164

In the night to 19 August the Japanese on Beringa launched another counteroffensive, but it was

rather ragged and ill-coordinated. There was a push by an estimated two battalions supported by

heavy artillery fire and half a dozen tanks on the western coast at dusk, but it was repulsed with all

enemy tanks destroyed and only light Russian casualties. The main thrust commenced from the

hills farther inland on the evening of the 19th, greater in strength but with less fire support and far

too late for the first attack to have a diversionary effect if that had been the enemy's intention. 3rd

Division's lines held, with friendly firepower clearly being overwhelming.

The Japanese attempted multiple frontal assaults again during the next night. Some small groups

managed to break through, but overall they enemy suffered terribly. In the morning, carrier aircraft

from HMS Nabob, USS Nassau and RAS Wrangel, freshly arrived back on station, commenced

close air support missions in relief of land-based planes to conserve fuel stocks for the ongoing

build-up. When the Japanese retreated, they left hundreds of bodies strewn across the terrain. They

were quiet during the rest of the day, then doggedly tried the same tactics again in the night, only

to be defeated once more. They retreated in the morning when Allied aircraft showed up again.165

161 von Sieben, 1056. 162 Kurylenko, p. 157-165. 163 Bergmann, 1055-1058. 164 von Sieben, 1054. 165 Kurylenko, p. 178-182.

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However, while the carrier planes were looking for targets, a bad surprise happened back at sea:

HMS Nabob caught a torpedo. A total of two were spotted running towards her and Wrangel.

Wrangel was actually closer, but managed to evade, while Nabob was not quite as lucky. The

torpedo struck her starboard side abaft the engine room below the waterline. She lost all power and

quickly took on water, listing to starboard and 15 feet down by the stern. A Canadian destroyer

took over 200 of her crew to lighten the ship while damage control parties worked to stem the

flooding and other destroyers from the carrier force chased after a possible submarine contact.

Nabob finally managed to get underway to Nikolskoye at three knots with a skeleton crew. 16 of

her company had been killed and about 40 wounded, with another 14 missing, closed up in the

flooded compartments. Emergency repairs commenced, but between the delays in her refit in Can-

ada, getting stuck on a sand bar on her subsequent trials run, the “mutiny” on her cruise to Kodiak

and now the torpedo, there were whispers that she was an “unlucky ship”. After making it to Una-

laska Naval Base, she was finally judged to not be worth the repair, beached and cannibalised for

spares for the rest of the carrier force. At least the offending submarine was reported sunk after a

two-day chase by Allied destroyers and carrier aircraft, out with a vengeance.166

The incident starkly showed that there was no reason to become complacent about the situation

in the Komandorskis, the naval threat still being there. Nabob's aircraft could of course operate

from Beringa itself, but a missing carrier was creating a gap in the plans to increase surveillance of

this very kind of enemy activity in the Pacific.167 At least the enemy on Beringa now retreated into

the hills without another attack. I Corps had lost about 60 dead in the original two-pronged offen-

sive to the south, but only a third that number in the follow-up when troops were better prepared.

The Japanese on the other hand had left behind literally thousands of bodies.

Still, there were complaints about the lack of canister ammunition for direct fire from the new

M3 105 mm infantry howitzers and Six-Pounder anti-tank guns. There were also questions about

the wisdom of replacing all of the Army's old spotting planes with helicopters, not least because

those needed a lot more fuel per hour –highlighted by the fuel crisis, though the Army had its own

stores. Helicopters were still being successfully used for spotting and the occasional supply and

medical evacuation runs, mostly to commandos operating ahead of friendly lines; but of the 20

with which 1st Army Aviation Squadron went to Beringa, four had been lost to enemy action al-

ready, with three additional losses to accidents.168

Sikorsky was working on serial production of the stronger R-5 after successful service testing;

the new type had more than twice the engine power of the R-4, a 50 percent greater top speed, and

could be fitted with two outboard stretchers to carry wounded, a significant improvement in that

role. Delivery was however expected to begin only at the start of next year.169 But meanwhile,

events had occurred in Europe which would also have an impact on future Russian American plans.

Operation Dragoon

After a renewed resting period in Italy, 1st SSF had been tagged for the Allied landings on the

French Riviera, codenamed Operation Dragoon. The date had been set on 15 August, and the unit

was tasked chiefly with taking the German gun positions on the Hyères Islands off the western

edge of the planned landing area east of Toulon the night before. They would subsequently be

166 Admiralty, 21 and 22 August 1944. 167 von Sieben, 1082. 168 Kurylenko, p. 165-183. 169 Sikorsky, p. 55.

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attached to 1st Airborne Task Force, the new inter-allied airborne formation now led by their re-

cently-promoted erstwhile commander General Frederick, and continue operations on the Côte

d'Azur. The Russian American contingent was now about 500 troops again after the last replace-

ments had arrived, not quite the original strength but the best that could be provided at this point

with the difficult recruiting at home.

The taking of the German batteries on the left flank of the landings was codenamed Kiska in

recognition of 1st SSF's crucial contribution; they transferred into rubber boats and were towed to

their target beaches by assault landing craft at 2200 hours on 14 August, scaling the cliffs to their

objectives immediately after landing. 1st Regiment was assigned to the island of Port-Cros and

quickly took its eastern side. The German garrison withdrew into an old fort that was impervious

to infantry attack; Allied troops called in naval gunfire support to pound the enemy into submission,

while German artillery was shelling them from the mainland in turn.

2nd and 3rd Regiment landed on larger Levant Island unopposed and overran their main target,

a reported heavy artillery battery overlooking the closest mainland landing site. However, the guns

turned out to be fakes – not the first time the Germans had fooled Allied intelligence like that. The

enemy garrison also retreated into local forts, but was either overwhelmed or surrendered over the

course of 15 August. Overall friendly losses were light, with eight killed.

4th Regiment under Russian-American Colonel Marston, with extra Russian personnel cross-

transferred from the other regiments, did not take part in Kiska but was attached by battalions to

the divisions of VI US Corps undertaking the main landings; their mission was to encourage the

large number of Wehrmacht Osttruppen from the USSR reported in the area by French and Russian

American intelligence to surrender. To the same end, platoons from No. 9 and 10 troop 10 Inter-

Allied Commando parachuted in on the fringes of 1st Airborne Task Force during the preparatory

airdrop in the night. Obviously, Russian American national interest was in winning over as much

of the Osttruppen as possible, them already having deserted the Bolshevists.

The plan worked in large part, with Russians and some Poles and other Eastern Europeans re-

ported to surrender in large numbers. I./4-1st SSF went in with 3rd US Infantry Division west of

St. Tropez against no more than sporadic small-arms fire, the main threat faced being mines; they

met up with the commandos, a brigade of the French Forces Interieurs and two American parachute

companies who had been dropped into the wrong place, and had taken St. Tropez by the early

afternoon with more than 1,500 prisoners, about half of them Osttruppen. II./4 was attached to 45th

Infantry Division and landed in the area between St. Tropez and Fréjus. Again, there was little

initial resistance other than mines, however that later hardened up; they took some coastal towns,

but did not progress far inland while engaged in considerable fighting. There were also less Eastern

European troops in this area.170

III./4 and 36th Infantry Division actually faced intense artillery fire east of Fréjus, even after

heavy air attacks and naval bombardment; the Germans also used remote-controlled Hs 293 mis-

siles against Allied ships, sinking an LST. One landing site had to be switched to evade the worst,

but this did not concern 1st SSF's troops as they went in on the right flank towards the direction of

Cannes, where an Ostbataillon was reported. While the attack bogged down on the left before

German fortifications outside the town of St. Raphaël, there were again mass surrenders here. In

general, the day saw light Allied casualties, certainly compared to the Normandy landings, and

Russian American soldiers prided themselves in having had more than just a little part in that.

While the German garrison of Port-Cros stayed holed up in their fortress on D+1 after shelling

by an American heavy cruiser had remained fruitless and other enemy strongholds on the mainland

170 Marston, p. 104-106.

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coast also held out, a small counterattack on the right flank was overrun by elements of 36th Infan-

try Division and 4-1st SSF moving up the coast towards Cannes.171 Signal Corps personnel were

already sorting through Eastern European POWs to recruit them for the Russian American cause,

particularly the support brigades intended to channel more of their kind west; a certain part of them

had been factored in for the staffing from the start in light of the tense manpower situation.172 A

picture emerged that day of three Russians posing next to each other, one in the American gear of

1st SSF, one in the British kit of No. 10 Commando, and one in Wehrmacht uniform.

However, while the screening indeed yielded some willing troops and NCOs, as expected Eastern

European officers were thin, most of these positions in the Osttruppen having been held by Ger-

mans.173 On the other hand, the term “Russian” was quite loosely interpreted by many POWs look-

ing for better living conditions. A few Germans from the Ostbattalione actually tried to get into the

programme, some Volksdeutsche from Eastern Europe, others even native Germans.174 At the same

time Junograd was coming to an agreement with Ottawa to recruit volunteers from Axis POWs

held in Canada to work as technical specialists in Russian American internment, supplementing

the unskilled labour imported to address the manpower shortage in the civilian economy;175 so after

due security checks, Signals in fact found a use for most of the applicants.

The garrison of Saint-Cros finally surrendered on D+2 in the afternoon following an air attack

and a British battleship putting some rounds into their fort. 1st SSF was attached to 1st Airborne

Task Force on 22 August as planned and moved towards Cannes on the Mediterranean coast with

the formation, replacing British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade which would return to Italy

shortly. After taking Cannes, they liberated Nice on 30 August. Meanwhile No. 9 and 10 Com-

mando Troops kept operating with French II and US VI Corps respectively in search of more

Osttruppen. Numbers dropped after the Germans went into full retreat up the Rhône Valley, but a

steady trickle kept getting received by the commandos and Signals personnel while preparations

were made for standing up the support brigades which would take over that task.176

1st SSF eventually ended up on the French-Italian border, now officially assigned to 1st Airborne

Task Force in the Castillon-Menton area of the Alpes Maritimes. They were doing mostly patrols

with the odd small-unit action against German stragglers of rear area troops, positively recuperative

duty compared to the Italian campaign. However, after several weeks with little to do and no new

mission in sight due to conventional warfare in full swing now on the continent, morale suffered.

There was also increasing talk about the unit to be disbanded. Not for the first time, since the

Canadians and Russian Americans had always struggled to find qualified personnel and replace

losses; but resources were now needed for line infantry, not specialist troops, with other commando

units facing the same problem. General Frederick's successor, Colonel Walker, was not able to

inspire the men in the same way either. Even some desertions occurred. Indeed 1st SSF would

never see another mission. However, this did not mean its soldiers would not keep on fighting in

the European Theatre of World War II, including the Russian Americans among them.177

171 von Sieben, 1057-1059. 172 Tanski, p. 52. 173 von Sieben, 1059-1075. 174 Tanski, p. 54. 175 Colins, p. 54. 176 von Sieben, 1065-1096. 177 Marston, p. 112-113.

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The Air Raids on Paramushir and Shumshu

Closer to home, plans for the long-intended air raid against the Northern Kuriles had been refined

throughout August 1944. The American were prepared to provide the B-24s of 404th Bombard-

ment Squadron based at Shemya and the B-25s of 77th Bombardment Squadron on Beringa, plus

P-38 escorts from four mixed fighter squadrons on Amchitka, Shemya and Beringa. The Russian

American Air Force had three-and-a-half squadrons of Mosquito bombers and two of fighter bomb-

ers outside Home Defence Command, which could be escorted by four P-51 squadrons. Of course

some fighters would have to stay behind for local defence, and some fighter bombers for support

of ground operations on Beringa; but the Americans would leave their P-40s in place, and the

carrier force would be back in the Komandorskis, pretty much covering those requirements.178

With those aircraft, three Army, one Navy and one auxiliary airfield on Paramushir would have

to be covered as well as two air bases on Shumshu. There were also the other naval installations,

but this much-postponed operation had always been meant to target the Japanese air capabilities

which were a nuisance to operations in the Komandorskis. Priority was assigned to the Navy base

at the southwestern tip of Paramushir, both because most of the opposition were IJN planes due to

their range, and the radar found there; but for an overall success, all airfields would have to be

suppressed, lest the enemy just shifts his aircraft around.

The Air Force therefore concentrated on destroying the radar site and trying to catch as many

fighters as possible on the ground in the first wave. This would be done with Mosquitoes, unes-

corted. PR Mosquitoes would follow for bomb damage assessment. The B-24s and B-25s, escorted

by P-38s and P-51s, would follow up. The USAAF wished to concentrate on the naval facilities,

especially air bases. Targets might be adjusted depending on reports from the first wave. The es-

corts would be staggered with some will set off late, to reach the bombers shortly before the first

escort group had to turn back. The timing is important, here.

Not all the available Mosquitoes could be gotten over the targets together because of base capac-

ity and fuel constraints, so a third attack wave of Mosquitoes and some P-51s was planned to take

off before the first wave returned. They would have targets assigned, but might be reassigned en

route depending on results from the first bomb damage photos and reports from the first two waves.

They would also be authorised to attack targets of opportunity. Aircraft movements, fuelling and

arming cycles required careful co-ordination.179

Various means of maskirovka were discussed, including the feeding of false information to a

known Soviet spy ring that was suspected of passing on information about Russian American op-

erations to the Japanese.180 The Navy promised flying boats as well as ships spread along the routes

the aircraft would take, to give a chance of rescuing any crews who ditched on the way home.

Recce aircraft would take a good look at everything bombed the next day.181

Fuel stocks at Nikolskoye would be rebuilt sufficiently by 29 August after the Japanese battleship

raid. Since there was a certain urgency to finally follow through with the operation before the

weather would turn to the worse again in the fall, it was eventually scheduled for the very next day,

30 August. The torpedoing of HMS Nabob on the 22nd led to a momentary reassessment of aircraft

available to support ground operations on Beringa, but the posting of her aircraft complement

ashore left no gap there. By now, troops were about halfway down the length of Beringa.

178 von Sieben, 1059. 179 Kravchuk, L. B.: The Air War over the Kuriles (Stoyanka 1974), p. 16-17. 180 Tanski, p. 54. 181 Bergmann, 1060.

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The advance was turning into the expected slog up and down mountain sides, with troops waiting

to be fired upon by individual Japanese soldiers or small groups from some hole, then usually

calling in indirect fire or air support before smoking them out with grenades and flame throwers.

This kind of warfare was known from Kiska and had been prepared for, though it was slow going.

At the same time a rumour was going around that Nabob's torpedoing had been a case of “friendly

fire”, based upon alleged Russian-origin items recovered in the reported sinking of the submarine

that attacked her. However, all of the Russian American submarines had been accounted for and

reported neither attacking a target nor being attacked in the relevant timeframe, and kapoks and

other naval items looked very much the same the world over. No USN boat was reported to have

operated in the Komandorski area at that time either. Of course there was also thought about

whether it might have been a Soviet submarine, particularly as Wrangel was first in the line of the

torpedoes; the implications were serious enough for a quiet investigation to be launched.

If it had in fact been a Soviet submarine, it would have to have almost definitely been a deliberate

act since the USSR was still officially neutral in the Pacific Theatre. In that case an attack on

Wrangel would have had a clear motive of reducing Russian American capabilities to regain and

possibly increase territory off her coast. A targeted attack would have been even more troubling in

view of suspicions that the “friendly fire” rumours may have been started by enemy agents; in that

case the Soviets would have deliberately shot at an official ally's ship to blame it on Russian Amer-

ica. Then again, even if this was a disinformation campaign, it might just make use of an oppor-

tunity, regardless of whose boat launched the torpedoes. In the end, the official position remained

that the carrier force was attacked by a Japanese submarine which was subsequently sunk.182

The operation against Paramushir and Shumshu was finally launched as planned with first aircraft

taking off at Beringa in the night to 30 August to arrive over their targets at first light. The first

wave was at least as successful as expected, with the Japanese obviously caught unaware: The radar

was hit and destroyed by Mosquito bombers coming in at low level, and the raid leader adjudged

the attrition of IJA and IJN fighters in the first pass to be enough to call off subsequent low-level

passes, dropping remaining bombs from above the small-calibre flak. A few fighters got off the

ground, but ineffectively: Mosquito fighter bombers radioed in claims for three Ki-43s which “got

in the way when we were leaving”. There were however a couple of losses to flak on the first pass,

and a fighter bomber was lost in an unapproved strafing run on Shumshu airfield.

The second wave was reporting limited fighter opposition, patchy and disorganised, suggesting

the claimed success of the first wave was not greatly exaggerated. Some of the P-38 and P-51 pilots

got complacent though and were surprised by the Ki-44 flown by a few good Japanese Army pilots.

Several fighters were lost in a dogfight, initial reports suggesting that one IJA pilot might have shot

down three or four Allied aircraft. Allied pilots had probably done too much fighting against Zeros

flown by new Japanese pilots with curtailed training, while the Ki-44 had not been seen over the

Russian American islands due to its short range.

However, the fighters did their job of protecting the bombers, which stayed above most of the

flak, and even allowing for the usual over-claiming the loss ratio was considered favourable. The

oil tanks at the Kataoka naval base on Shumshu were set on fire by the American bomber force,

and Kashiwabara port was also bombed with considerable damage to facilities, ships burning and

seaplanes destroyed in both harbours.

Rather surprisingly, the third wave did not lose a single aircraft, though several had minor dam-

age. They encountered a few Zeroes before reaching Paramushir, apparently an early warning

screen, and more fighters came up to engage them. Not many though, and they were easily dealt

182 von Sieben, 1078-1107.

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with once the Mustang pilots had been reminded that a Ki-44 could climb and dive pretty well, and

was not much slower than them. The Ki-43 was reported to be a difficult target due to its agility,

but Mustang pilots experienced at fighting Zeros held all the other cards against it.183

The Americans lost three of the 36 bombers they had sent on the attack, though some might have

succumbed to technical failure on the long flight to the Kuriles and back; two did not arrive at the

target while a fourth made it home but was a write-off due to the damage it suffered. Several others

returned with repairable damage. They also brought back some wounded crewmen and one dead

gunner. The Russian American Air Force lost three out of 88 Mosquitoes too, which indicated they

were a harder target than the B-24s and B-25s. A couple were basically “Swiss-cheesed”, but made

it back even if their crew was in bad shape and they had to be written off afterwards.

Of the 48 P-38s deployed, two did not return, three more were damaged beyond repair in crash

landings after limping home, and three others considered repairable. The Americans claimed to

have destroyed a total of 31 enemy fighters in dogfights and strafing, and another three by the

bombers' defensive weaponry. Also missing were three of 64 P-51s, with one more coming back

with serious bullet holes. In return, Russian American pilots were claiming another 33 kills.

This was actually a lot better than hoped for; a minimum 10 percent loss rate had been expected,

with some predictions going as high as a third of all aircraft deployed. But with absolutely no

casualties in the third wave, the actual tally turned out at about 6.4 percent. While the performance

of IJA fighters had been a surprise, very few planes seemed to have been lost to enemy AA, in part

when pilots could not resist strafing tempting line-ups on the ground. Rather different from the

expectations formed due to the observed decline in enemy pilot quality, most casualties therefore

were inflicted in air-to-air action.184

From the first looks at the immediately post-raid photos, the claimed total of fighters destroyed

was not far from the truth, though mostly on the ground and many from the initial Mosquito raid.

Other Japanese aircraft had also been hit on the ground, as well as some moored seaplanes, though

some others had flown off before the third wave arrived. One of the fuel tanks at Kataoka had not

been hit, though it was hoped that the fires blazing in the other two might yet set it alight. Fuel

stores had also been set alight at two air bases. It was unclear as yet how much damage had been

done to Kashiwabara, but smoke was seen rising.

The Air Force Aleutian Command issued orders for fighter patrols to be up at first light in case

of Japanese revenge raids. The Navy was looking for possible survivors from aircraft lost over sea,

though chances were not very good based upon earlier experience. No planes appeared to have

diverted into Soviet airspace, so that was not a problem to deal with. Subsequent recce flights

revealed the surviving oil tank at Kataoka had been saved by Japanese firefighters, so a follow-up

raid was mounted a week later.

In this, the main target was destroyed and a small tanker in the harbour that may have been a

floating replacement for the destroyed oil tanks set on fire. Two Mosquitoes were lost to flak, but

one managed to stay in the air long enough to ditch where a navy seaplane could pick up the crew,

both alive. The other went down on its bombing approach run, but for the effect this was expects

to have on Japanese naval operations, the losses were thought worthwhile. Progress had been made

elsewhere, too, and a strategic shift in the conduct of the war was beginning to approach.185

183 Kravchuk, p. 22-27. 184 von Sieben, 1096-1098. 185 Kravchuk, p. 27-46.

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The Retaking of Attu

During the operations in the Komandorskis and Northern Kuriles, the presumptive last Japanese-

occupied Aleutian island of Attu had gotten slightly out of focus. However, the lack of enemy

activity there was becoming ever more apparent even during routine operations in the area. The

only actual evidence of a Japanese garrison was now a regular intercepted radio signal thought to

be weather reports. The latest aerial pictures did not show any sign of a major force remaining;

vegetation was encroaching onto the dirt roads, and formerly well-trodden paths had disappeared.

Attu was debated as one of the possible fake targets in the diversion attempts preceding the raid on

Paramushir and Shumshu, but actual assets were not detailed to attack the island at any time, though

the Air Force suggested that if only a weather station remained there, it should be closed down as

soon as possible to deny the Japanese its information.186

Intentions solidified as I Corps was slowly but steadily pushing south on Beringa and minds

turned ahead to the possible next steps after that island was fully retaken. Though a vocal minority

in Junograd kept urging to invade the Kuriles before the USSR might, the bloodshed on northern

Beringa had cooled enthusiasm to repeat the same against islands at the end of even longer supply

lines and garrisoned by the Japanese for nearly seven decades.187 The prevailing opinion was that

this should only be attempted in a joint Allied operation with considerable American support.188

However, after the initial interest in airfields in the Komandorskis for long-range B-29 attacks on

the Japanese Home Islands, the US now found the newly secured bases in the Marianas sufficient

for those needs, and commitment to opening a northern attack route through the Kuriles waned.189

With September arrived, the window for major operations in the local theatre was closing fast.

While I Corps was still employed on Beringa, additional reinforcements seemed no longer war-

ranted by the situation. Instead of deploying there, 3rd Marine Regiment had returned to garrison

from Hawaii after familiarising with American LVTs following the last amphibious training cycle

for Army troops in May. The Marines were now in the process of standing up the armoured battal-

ion planned for their division, just having taken delivery of their first own LVT-4s; two companies

were supposed to be ready by the end of September. However, the acquisition of Sherman tanks

for the other two companies had not yet been authorised.

Moreover, they had not yet begun to transform coastal artillery units into the planned divisional

regiment, so would be lacking in fire support. They might be able to crash-train sufficient troops

for a provisional brigade to go to Attu before October came though, and while 3rd Marines were

untested in actual combat, they would be able to draw upon personnel from the companies of 1st

Marines which had gone there and to Mednyy with the Light Task Force. Obviously if there was

in fact nothing but a weather station left on the island that would be more than ample. If they met

substantial resistance however this might well drag out into winter, which had been avoided so far

despite the earlier plans for a winter landing on Mednyy. Also, the Air Force could spare little in

the way of air support, though Shemya was next door.

Still, independent operations with the new marine division had become somewhat of a fixation

with the Navy. On top of the previous inter-service rivalry, Kiska had served as a particular catalyst;

two out of three battlegroups in 1st Aleutian Task Force had been marines, yet the accolades went

to General Korichnev and the Army since they were in overall command. After having been saved

from the 1943 plans to put marine regiments under a fourth Army division by the drawdown on

186 Bergmann, 1064-1104. 187 von Sieben, 1098. 188 Tanski, p. 55. 189 Bergmann, 1102.

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Iceland which allowed 2nd Division to reform, they had declared that they would concentrate on

their core competency of amphibious warfare and short-time operations close to the sea.

The Navy had also fully bought into the idea of securing a post-war warm-water port through

participation in the Allied operations in the Central Pacific. Lately it had tried to get in on Allied

plans to retake the Philippines, but the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pa-

cific Area General MacArthur was notoriously wary about working with foreign troops. He had

already rejected the Australian offer of a corps for the Philippines, at best allowing their divisions

to be subordinated to his. While the Navy could not provide that level of command anyway, he was

not expected to be enthusiast about participation of troops who were not even English-speaking.

Plans for landing on Attu on the other hand had been there for almost a year, from the small raids

executed by the Light Task Force in May to a corps-level operation that was considered as an

alternative to the Komandorski campaign in the previous December, periodically updated. The

Navy therefore embraced the Attu mission with uncharacteristic eagerness. Since there were no

further large landing operations planned at Beringa, they would be able to make ample use of their

amphibious forces, including naval fire support. The first of the Canadian concrete ships would be

shortly received to act as floating docks, so that even more landing craft would be freed up from

delivering supplies ashore. The Navy even claimed they would make up for any shortfalls in air

support, intending to use their cannon-armed flying boats of which they had been testing a proto-

type for submarine hunting, with two more to be delivered in September.

The Marines eventually came up with a draft structure for a provisional brigade that would be

ready to land on Attu by 30 September. Besides 3rd Marines, the new LVT companies would be

formed into a provisional amphibious battalion that also included two commando companies, using

personnel from 1st Marines that had been part of the Light Task Force. A provisional anti-air bat-

talion would be the only organic artillery, since there were no other tactically mobile guns at this

point; the howitzers for their planned artillery regiment had not been authorised yet either, and the

coastal artillery's 15 cm M1928 cannon could only be transported in sections. 3rd Marines had their

105 mm M3 infantry howitzers and 4.2 inch M2 mortars of course, and naval gunfire support would

be available. Overall, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would have a strength of 4,400 all ranks, a

sizeable force to deal with the expected small Japanese garrison.190

However, events accelerated considerably when on 3 September the Signal Boat Detachment

Shemya decided to make use of the light and the good weather to have a closer look at Attu after

running supplies to the observation post on the northwest tip of Agattu. The small three boat flotilla

first sighted the southeast tip of Attu and made a run straight at Chichagof Inlet. It proved deserted

but for some dogs which the Japanese seemed to have abandoned. The buildings had been left

intact though there was some vandalism and damage. After the patrol radioed their findings in,

Signal Corps HQ ordered some small reinforcements by flying boat while simultaneously notifying

the regular armed forces.191

Word was sent to Unalaska Naval Base to load a company from III./1st Marines into a flight of

flying boats and dispatch them to Attu within 24 hours. One of the regular supply ships going to

and from the Komandorskis near Shemya was diverted it to support the crash operation, though the

Signal boats and some other small craft used for local supply runs to outposts in the Semichi Islands

were already doing a good job shuttling a provisional Russian-American security detachment from

Shemya Air Base to Chicagof Harbour. Signal's rapid reaction force arrived by flying boat in the

morning of 4 September, and the company of marines from Unalaska the same evening, increasing

Allied strength to about 350.

190 von Sieben, 1075-1110. 191 Tanski, p. 56.

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The small rag-tag force reconnoitred the deserted Japanese base and its immediate surroundings

in search of the source for the radio signals, but found nothing initially, certainly no enemy troops;

the only attack they suffered was from a polar bear, unusual in the Aleutians, but quickly killed.

3rd Marines would be needed for a thorough search of the island; they had already received orders

for immediate movement and were preparing for embarkation on ships quickly provided by the

Canadians. By 5 September Chicagof was reasonably secured with two full companies backed up

by a light AA platoon and some radiomen, cooks, medical personnel and ordnance experts from

Shemya; the latter had been requested after various booby traps were found in the old Japanese

dwellings. An additional Marine mortar and engineer platoon respectively would also arrive by

flying boat from Unalaska over the day.

The Signals detachment had meanwhile walked over to the perpetually nascent airfield south of

Holtz Bay. They found no living person but stumbled across some bunkers. Unfortunately the land-

ing strip proved to be not only cratered by previous Allied bombing efforts, but thoroughly mined

too, and would need considerable clearing before it could be used. The provisional garrison also

had some casualties to booby traps and a few unfortunate friendly-fire incidents as they checked

out the bunkers in the area, but the site was declared secure on 6 September, still with no enemy

troops spotted.192 Signals tried to bait the mystery radio station by sending a fake message announc-

ing an incoming submarine with supplies, using a Japanese code recovered earlier on Beringa;

however, the station simply went quiet and was never heard of again. Undeterred, Signals took

over for it, feeding the Japanese false weather information for the rest of the war.193

3rd Marines finally arrived on 7 September, the same day I Corps took the highest elevation on

Beringa, having pushed the Japanese into the southernmost third of the island. Attu was cautiously

secured in full over the next weeks, proving to have in fact been deserted by the enemy.194 At the

same time, negotiations were already going on with Canada to free up Russian American troops in

the Aleutians by relieving them with Canadian conscripts who could not be deployed outside North

America for domestic political reasons.195 Many of those troops would soon find themselves in a

different theatre of the war.

The European Question Revisited

Considerations about increasing the Russian American commitment to the European Theatre as an

alternative to an invasion of the Kuriles had been around for some time already. This was for largely

political reasons, as Junograd increasingly saw itself in an unfortunate competition with Moscow

in importance to the Allied cause. The American interest in major landing operations in the Kuriles

was negligible at this point as US forces concentrated on retaking the Philippines. They had just

landed on the Micronesian islands of Peleliu and Morotai in the Dutch East Indies to secure them

as air and naval bases, but would not go on to take the rest of the latter as intended earlier.

Once reasonably well established in the Philippines, they intended to strike north towards For-

mosa and the Ryukyu Islands as a jumpoff point to Japan proper. There might be a place for the

Russian American marines in US I Amphibious Corps in that push, but this was not expected to

happen before next year. The Australians, after also having been discouraged from participation in

the Philippines by General MacArthur, were still engaged on New Guinea and aiming at Borneo,

192 von Sieben, 1115-1120. 193 Tanski, p. 57. 194 von Sieben, 1125-1128. 195 Colins, p. 54-56.

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but not before well into next year, too. This was also a bit out of the way for Russian America,

though not quite as much as the next alternative in Burma.

The last was also a mainly British theatre of operations, and if forces should be deployed essen-

tially halfway around the world to work with Commonwealth troops, it might as well be done in

Europe where Junograd had more immediate interests. The first was found in the Allied “Germany

first” policy; the second in the Soviet POWs and forced labourers taken by Germany, recruitment

attempts of which had already proven successful in Operation Dragoon, with a huge additional

potential to increase the still-sparse Russian American population expected.

The planned support brigades for that task were already taking shape, and in light of the underuti-

lisation of 1st SSF there was thought about using its Russian American personnel along with No.

9 and 10 Commando Troops to furnish the POW processing force with a unified active arm that

might free POW camps if intelligence indicated the presence of Soviet prisoners. For additional

strength, redeployment of 1st Airborne Regiment was considered, which had been biding its time

as a reserve force of I Corps after the initial bloody fights in the swamps of northern Beringa.196

For a short time, even an idea of using commandos in Romania was entertained, to capitalize on

the chaotic situation after the royal coup d'etat against the pro-Axis government and invasion of

the Red Army for the recruitment effort.197 This was quickly discarded, though an interest in East-

ern Europe remained, in part out of the motivation to liberate countries there ahead of the Soviets.

Back in July after the success of 1st SSF in Italy and the Soviet push through Belorussia, a decision

had been made to stand up an Eastern European expatriate volunteer unit, mostly of Czechs who

went to Russian America after 1938 via the Vojcechovski line and had not yet naturalised, with a

cadre of immigrants already serving in the Russian American forces. It was thought that at least a

battalion could be managed, though some haggling was still going on between the Signal Corps

and the Army about who should have operational control of this unit.

Gloriously designated the 1st Battalion Hussite Legion in reference to the Czech Legions which

had fought on the White side in the Russian Civil War, a headquarters and two light infantry com-

panies – one with recruits who had seen prior service in their national forces and one for those of

no military experience whatsoever – were organised on the 1st SSF model in August, and one or

two more companies were planned for November depending upon recruitment. There had been no

final decision yet on speciality training; airborne capabilities had been suggested so they could

drop into Eastern Europe, and some commando-style training would also be convenient for this

kind of mission.198 The Air Force, having an excellent relationship with the RCAF, had already

proposed to send a wing to Europe for some time as a more significant combat force, not least

because it was strictly opposed to putting units under MacArthur's command in the Pacific.199

Timing was also playing a role. The war in the Pacific Theatre would likely not be over quickly;

the most optimistic estimates at this point put an invasion of mainland Japan at no earlier than 18

months in the future, with another twelve months minimum to complete defeat of the enemy. Pes-

simists were doubling those numbers. Germany however was fighting on three to four land fronts

depending upon how they were counted – two of them almost on its own borders now with the

liberation of most of France and Belgium as well as parts of Poland – and seemed to be quickly

losing air sovereignty over its own territory. The optimist prognosis there was that it might all be

over by Christmas, while pessimists added another year. In theory, forces deployed to Europe could

therefore still be used against Japan after defeat of Germany.

196 von Sieben, 1128-1130. 197 Bergmann, 1131-1133. 198 von Sieben, 1134. 199 Bergmann, 1076-1135.

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In the end, domestic political manoeuvring turned out to shape the future European commitment

more than all else. General-Mayor Korichnev had been planned to be given the future European

Theatre Command as a sop to his supporters after having been relieved of his command of 1st

Division on Beringa; the new command could therefore not be too austere. There also happened to

be a rather big overlap between the Korichnev supporters and the conservative group which still

advocated going to the Kuriles. However, any unit transferred to Europe would decrease the ability

to invade the Kuriles. So if more forces were put under Korichnev, his supporters could hardly

complain him being treated shabbily and demand to retake ancient Russian territory from the Jap-

anese with insufficient means at the same time.

The planning department in the Ministry of War was so taken with this approach that Korichnev's

future post was elevated to a three-star command overseeing both an Army and Air Force compo-

nent. The former would include the two support brigades, the North Atlantic contingent still based

on Iceland and Greenland, and an airborne brigade made up from 1st Airborne Regiment, the for-

mer Russian American 1st SSF and No. 10 Commando personnel and possibly 1st Battalion Huss-

ite Legion. The latter would be the new Air Force command previously planned to be stood up in

the Aleutian-Komandorski region, containing as many as three wings if the Air Force found it

possible. Overall strength in the European Theatre would be about 20-21,000 all ranks.200

Things took on a certain dynamic of their own from there. A deployment of the future marine

division to the Mediterranean was suggested, still not completely pacified as the Allies sought to

secure Greece behind the retreating Germans. Eventually though, its use on the Dutch-Belgian

coast where Allied forces where aiming to take the port of Antwerp and open the Scheldt River

was thought a better application.201 However, the division was still forming up, with 2nd Marine

Regiment tied down in Panama until November, when its guard duty would be taken over by Puerto

Rican troops.202 In view of the lobbying of the Guards for deployment, a plan to form 7th Guards

Cossack Regiment – also having seen little action on Beringa after it arrived there as reinforcements

to I Corps since the fighting had by then moved to the steep terrain of the South – into a guards

cavalry brigade with two battalions of 1st Guards was also developed.203

Both formations could be operationally put under First Canadian Army in exchange for the Ca-

nadian conscript units which would garrison the Aleutians, making it an obvious deal among Allies

easily explained to the domestic audience.204 Additionally, an idea occurred to check out whether

the Guards brigade could also become part of a full division with greater firepower in cooperation

with 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade Group, a formation under 21st Army Group that had

been stood up by the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile in the UK.205 The airborne brigade on

the other hand would likely be assigned to 1st Allied Airborne Army, and more specifically to UK

I Airborne Corps which already included a Polish paratroop brigade.206

Several important events occurred while all this was taking place. On 20 September, I Corps

troops reached the Beringa South Cape.207 While this did not mean the island was fully secured as

the usual Japanese stragglers and hideouts were sure to warrant continued operations, it did not

deter Junograd from declaring this the day Russian territory was cleansed from the invaders. In the

Netherlands, Allied operation Market Garden failed to secure the bridges across the Meuse and

200 von Sieben, 1130- 1136. 201 Tanski, p. 57-58. 202 von Sieben, 1142. 203 Kentukski, p. 114-115. 204 von Sieben, 1144. 205 Tuček, p. 58. 206 von Sieben, 1150. 207 Kurylenko, p. 237.

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Rhine for a quick advance into northern Germany that might have shortened the war in Europe

considerably; this increased the window of opportunity for Russian American forces to participate

in the fighting. For 1 October, a conference was called to decide on the further strategy, with par-

ticipation of the Allies in relevant parts.208

Dunkirk and the Scheldt

Various problems arose in the pursuit of plans for the European deployments. One was that troops

were American-equipped while First Canadian Army by and large had British gear and accordingly

used British ammunition. At a minimum it was thought necessary to deploy an additional quarter-

master battalion to take care of special Russian American logistic needs. The Guards Regiment

was currently a motorised formation with trucks; the deployed battalions were intended to be mech-

anised to keep up with 7th Guards Cossack Regiment. The plan for them was to move to Maine,

New Brunswick or Nova Scotia within four weeks of being given the order, receive halftracks from

new US production there, train with them for a month and join up with 7th Cossacks coming from

Beringa, then ship out to the UK or France.

There was also a desire to give the brigade some organic artillery support from 11th Stoyanka

Heavy Artillery, possibly their II. Battalion which had also gone to Beringa with the late reinforce-

ments; they were currently a 105 mm cannon unit, but could conceivably get some howitzers, either

new production or from the regiment's I. (Lehr) Battalion. The latter might be preferable since

training on a new artillery piece would be not quite as trivial as changing from trucks to halftracks,

and coming from Beringa they would have less time to do it. III. Battalion had 155 mm M1928

semi-mobile cannon and was not really a good fit for the task. A need for bilingual liaison personnel

was foreseen for any cooperation with Czechoslovakian forces, particularly if it came to an agree-

ment to form a joint division command; in that case personnel from 1st Battalion Hussite Legion,

even if only fresh out of basic training, might be used.209

Talks were started with the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile in London. The latter saw the

merit of a joint force proposal, many older officers having good ties to Russia from the time of the

Czech Legions. However, the USSR also had a strong influence due to the large Czechoslovakian

force on the Eastern Front. Many higher-ranking officials thus tried to play it safe. A “careful”

solution was proposed that would be easily explained to the Soviets with the point that it was im-

polite to haggle about British dispositions for Czechoslovakian troops in the field.

1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade Group had been built with the intent of expanding it to

a division if enough men became available. To the dissatisfaction of many, the force was currently

slated to take over the siege of Dunkirk which had been bypassed by 21st Army Group to deal with

the port of Antwerp, considered more important for Allied logistics – a task that seemed ill-suited

to an armoured formation. Through attachment of Russian American marine units by the British it

would however be elevated to division until both sides could form their own. In turn, the Cossacks

and Guards would be reinforced in the cavalry brigade by addition of Czech 1st Tank Battalion and

a motorised reconnaissance detachment, functionally a recce battalion; this would also improve the

brigade's firepower against the later German tanks against which the Hellcat tank destroyer had

been found lacking by the Americans, particularly if the promised equipment with the Sherman

Firefly was implemented.210

208 von Sieben, 1128-1137. 209 von Sieben, 1150. 210 Tuček, p. 59.

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The Air Force advised that it could deploy three wings in a pinch; but two would suffice to justify

the political aim of putting a general officer in charge of them, even if they would leave their ground

defence subunits behind. 5th and 10th Fighter Squadron, to be equipped with the new P-51D at that

point, were tagged for the move, along with 11th and 15th Attack Squadron flying Mosquito bomb-

ers and fighter bombers respectively. They would likely be operationally assigned to the British

2nd Tactical Air Force which already included many Canadian squadrons.211

At the 1 October strategy conference, the shift of focus from the Kuriles to Europe was not really

contentious any more. However, its designers suddenly found themselves nearly outmanoeuvred

by the former opposition which had clandestinely organised a majority that resolved to propose a

second Russian corps under First Canadian Army to the Allies, consisting of the Marine Division,

the putative Czech-Russian armoured division – which was not really being talked about at this

point – and an additional Allied formation, possibly 1st Polish Armoured Division. The Airborne

Brigade might or might not be part of this, plus corps troops from 1st or 2nd Quartermaster Regi-

ment, 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineers and 11th Stoyanka Heavy Engineers. Obviously Gen-

eral Korichnev would be corps commander, which would allow him to thumb his nose at General

Kurylenko who had relieved him of division command on Beringa. There was also the underhanded

impression the proponents thought this corps would make short work of the Dunkirk siege, then

march clean on to Prague, Warsaw and ultimately Moscow.

When this was offered to the Allies, the latter were surprised, to say the least. The Canadians

seemed sympathetic, as it would bolster their own army command. The Americans and British

were more reserved at the sudden Russian enthusiasm of getting in on the European endgame after

the previous stalling over a substantial contribution two years ago. Upsetting the political balance

in a working system might also have played a role; moreover, the Poles would likely have their

own reservations about their forces being under Russian command on both European fronts, remi-

niscent of Tsarist times. The latter had obviously been no consideration for the conservative. How-

ever, this was a substantial offer at a point when the Allies had obviously insufficient troops to

open both Dunkirk and Antwerp, and they mustered some friendly interest.212

In the end, the situation was saved by the originally planned European Theatre Command simply

being relabelled as II Corps command, though it would have little operational control of its admin-

istratively assigned forces other than the two support brigades.213 The purpose of the latter, being

the cornerstone of the whole Russian American engagement in Europe, was however cast in doubt

after the secret Moscow meeting between Churchill and Stalin on 4 October, also attended by the

head of the US mission and representatives of both Polish governments-in-exile. Junograd, having

been keyed on to the conference by quite innocent remarks from a visiting British naval liaison

mission headed by Admiral the Honourable Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-

Drax, was alarmed by intelligence reports that there had been not only discussion of division of

influence in post-war Eastern Europe and Poland specifically, but a Soviet demand that all their

citizens liberated by Western Allied forces be returned to them without exception.

Questioned on this, the British admitted to agreeing with this demand, but said it might be some-

what open to interpretation in the case of Russian America since it had not been at the table and

promised anything. Junograd suspected though that they just would have gone and forbidden to

transfer any more POWs if they had not started to be asked about the meeting in advance. It was

still a complication and might lead to trouble down the road for Russian units under Allied com-

mand. Moreover, it proved again that the Allies would consent to Soviet demands even if it was

211 Bergmann, 1140-1156. 212 von Sieben, 1159. 213 Tanski, p. 59.

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counter to Russian American interests because the USSR was a more important partner; Junograd

was watching with increasing irritation that despite still being the only Russian government offi-

cially recognised, Moscow was now being treated at least as another legitimate government by its

partners – something that had led to the rift with Germany earlier over the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

The official Junograd stance therefore remained that there was no such thing as a Soviet citizen,

just Russian citizens. Moreover, any agreements with the Soviets were considered null and void

anyway since theirs was an illegitimate government. On the other hand, the official Soviet stance

was quite similar in reverse, considering Russian America a rebellious part of the former Russian

Empire which had since turned into the USSR. It was therefore held that any Soviet/Russian citizen

encountered in the field would be repatriated to whatever part of the USSR/Russia he/she wanted

to in accordance with Allied guidelines.214 Still, there was considerable bad blood over the issue;

Junograd insisted upon access to any Russian-speaking prisoners to determine if they were its own,

and the US ambassador was publicly reminded by a guest at a diplomatic soiree that in Soviet eyes,

Russian Americans were all Soviet citizens, and asked if his government planned to hand troops

sent to Europe over to the Bolsheviks.215

Also on 4 October, a detachment from II./1st Yeger in Greenland was landed by a US Coast

Guard icebreaker to take a German weather station; it took the crew prisoner with hardly a shot

fired, while the USCG vessel captured a German ship that had been making a supply run. This

became a footnote though as the 1945 OOBs underwent a major redraft to prepare for the European

deployments. With the putative II Corps, overall Army strength rose to 136,800, including 9,600

female auxiliaries – and 11,600 marines, as it included the future marine division. This was palat-

able to the Navy since it would be under Allied operational command, just as would have been the

case in its Pacific plans – obviously thought preferable to being led by Russian American Army

generals. 1st Airborne Brigade would be formed out of 1st Airborne Regiment and two commando

battalions formed from personnel already in Europe, though 1st SSF's future was still undecided.

For the first time, a Territorial Army unit would be deployed as 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment

would serve as a replacement unit in the UK. The Marines formed their own replacement battalion

from the Navy training and replacement regiments. III./2nd Quartermaster Battalion would fulfil

the envisioned national logistics need, and II Corps would also have its own army aviation squadron

– planned to operate fixed-wing spotter planes besides helicopters due to the latter’s vulnerability

experienced on Beringa – and a newly-established 10th Signals Battalion. This unit would be

staffed partly by personnel from 1st Battalion Hussite Legion which would be gutted to serve liai-

son needs with the Czechs; it was not what most of those volunteers had thought of when they

signed up, but they found consolation in fulfilling a crucial mission for both their old and new

country. Overall, II Corps would have a strength of 34,400 compared to 57,100 in I Corps.

The Air Force OOB reverted to the previous organisation of a Home Defence and Western Com-

mand under the Air Combat Command, the originally planned third HQ taking over the European

contingent. That meant no changes in overall strength, though units where shifted among those

commands. Holodnayabukhta, current seat of Aleutian Command, would be pretty much closed

down save for a caretaker airbase group. The new Western Command HQ which would take over

all the Aleutian bases would be established on Amchitka; however the Canadian would probably

put some squadrons into Holodnayabukhta and Umnak, otherwise also reduced to staging airfields.

Numbers 9 and 10 would get reused for the two expeditionary wings.

Somewhat ambitious movement orders were devised for 3rd Marines that saw them getting from

Attu to Dunkirk in six weeks, requiring some priority in transport and no major hang-ups, but

214 von Sieben, 1178-1186. 215 Bergmann, 1193.

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thought workable. Canadian 13th Infantry Brigade shipped out from Vancouver on 7 October and

was scheduled to arrive at Attu on the 17th. 3rd Marines would leave there with the same ships on

the 21st and arrive at Vancouver on the 31st. They would embark on rail transport the following

day and arrive at Halifax on 9 November to ship out for Brest on the 10th, arriving there on the

20th. From there it would be road marching, with allied motor transport hopefully filling in for

their light organic assets; they were hoped be in position by 28 November.

2nd Marines would officially hand over duty on the Panama Canal to their Puerto Rican replace-

ments on 31 November and embark for Brest the following day, planned to arrive on 22 December.

Under the same conditions as above, they should be at Dunkirk by New Year's Eve (Western style).

Most of the planned divisional troops would only be ready to leave at this point, so that 1st Marine

Division would only become fully functional in theatre at the end of January. 7th Cossacks, 1st

Airborne Regiment and II./11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery would leave Beringa around the same

time as 3rd Marines from Attu. The paras were planned to be given two weeks of home leave since

they would have been away for four months when they sailed into Stoyanka at the end of October

and were caught in some of the heaviest initial fighting. The time would be used to refresh them

with some new personnel, too. They would then leave again for Vancouver on 15 November to

arrive on the 20th, then go so on, arriving in the UK on 9 December to meet with the new com-

mando battalions, depending upon how things were looking with 1st SSF by then.

The ships delivering the paras to Stoyanka would subsequently embark the two battalions from

1st Guards and possibly a battery from I./11th Stoyanka, and leave again for Vancouver on 3 No-

vember, about the time the rest of the future 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade sailed into Vancouver.

All units would meet up on the American East coast in mid-November, the exact location still to

be determined. There they would receive new equipment including halftracks for the Guards, and

possibly new guns for the artillery and .303 small arms. They would train together for a month,

then leave for France and were expected to be in position shortly after New Year. An advance

command for II Corps would head out to London by airplane. Corps troops would move out as

units and transport became available; they were not expected to be complete in the UK before 1st

Marine Division became operable, but everything was to be in place by February. The Air Force

estimated to be set up and ready by December already.

There was some subsequent tweaking to those plans. To speed up the cross-attachment of units

with 1st CSlABG, training with their new equipment for the Guards Brigade was in large parts

shifted to France; they would receive it on the American East Coast, but only spend about a week

to take over and embark it, then ship out to Brest in late November and link up with the Czechs in

mid-December. The Guards drivers would get some training with halftracks before moving out

from Junograd so they would hopefully be able to road march them in France without too many

issues. On the small arms issue, opinion was that at least 3rd Marines should get .303 weapons

since they would be under the British-equipped Czech formation; in turn, the Czech armour units

planned to be attached to the Guards Brigade were not rifle-heavy anyway, and .30-06 supply was

thought possible with Russian American logistics means in theatre. The final decision could be

made even after arrival in France though, since guns could be sourced from the UK.

3rd Marines sailed from Attu and 1st Airborne, 7th Cossacks and II./11th Stoyanka Heavy Artil-

lery from Beringa on 21 October as planned, initiating the biggest troop movement in Russian

American history so far. The advance party for II Corps HQ had arrived in London five days earlier

and was getting in touch with the partners in the joint formations. The full HQ was hoped to be up

and running by the time 3rd Marines disembarked at Brest in five weeks hence.216

216 von Sieben, 1171-1186.

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Deployment of II Corps

The first troops of the future II Corps HQ to arrive in London were an advance party including

some attached Air Force personnel. Some of the staff quickly travelled over to France and Belgium

and surveyed the Reims and Chievres locations suggested by Signal's scouts as depots for the fledg-

ling European Theatre Support Brigades.217 The Chievres airfield was already being used by the

Americans who had arrived there on 3 September, patched up the various holes in the two concrete

runways and taxiways left from thorough Allied air attacks, and declared it operational by 16 Sep-

tember; however, most buildings and other installations remained heavily damaged, in part demol-

ished by the Germans. A USAAF group of P-47 Thunderbolts was currently based there, but more

pertinent to Russian logistics needs, the Americans used it as a transit station for personnel return-

ing home, and had installed a POW camp nearby.

Deployments began in earnest on 20 November when 3rd Marines disembarked at Brest.218 One

day later, the Air Force contingent started arriving at Hunsdon RAF Airfield, the P-51s of 9th Wing

quickly moving on to Melsbroek north of Brussels while the Mosquitoes of 10th were transferred

to RAF Hartford Bridge with 418 Squadron RCAF.219 On 26 November, 1st Czechoslovakian Ar-

moured Brigade Group was officially redesignated a division group when the last stragglers from

3rd Marines arrived at Dunkirk and were put under Czech command.220 In the first days of Decem-

ber, two of the Air Force’s new C-54s delivered the first contingent of ex-Hussite Legion Czech

staff personnel from Stoyanka to Calais with a single stopover at Bluie West-8 airfield in Greenland

where II./1st Yeger Battalion was headquartered – an unprecedented feat for the Russian American

armed forces, albeit on a small scale. C-54s would subsequently prove instrumental in maintaining a regular fast transatlantic-trans-

continental link, with personnel going both ways.221 They were never officially assigned to the

European Command though as the Air Force quickly found it had little control over its own aircraft,

with RAF 2 TAF pleading operational necessity for issuing orders directly to units without con-

sulting General-mayor Kovalyev beforehand. 9th Wing got into action quickly, though mainly with

patrolling. After a few days at Melsbroek, they moved on to Sint-Denijs-Westrem alongside 302,

308 and 317 (Polish) Squadrons RAF.

10th Wing conducted a couple of minor raids on the Netherlands in early December, but was

mostly engaged in training in geography and communications protocols. In what Kovalyev consid-

ered a small victory, 418 Canadian Squadron was informally attached since it was co-located with

10th Wing, and its expertise as an intruder unit was thought to help increasing the value of the

Russian Mosquito squadrons to the Allied effort. The latter incurred their first loss to German flak

on 8 December during the first deep intruder raid, hitting German radar stations.222

Due to reservations about Allied control in conjunction with the uncertainty about the Soviet

POW issue, between flights to Russian America the C-54s were simply attached to a “liaison flight”

directly under General Kovalyev – not in his function as “group commander” in Commonwealth

parlance, but as Deputy Senior Officer Russian American Forces in Europe. Along with some C-

47s and Beechcraft already detached to London, this provided sufficient means of air transport in

217 Tanski, p. 59-60. 218 von Sieben, 1187-1200. 219 Kovalyev, M. G.: Conflict in Europe. Commander of the Air Force European Theatre Command 1944/45

(Stoyanka 1975), p. 19-20. 220 Tuček, p. 61. 221 von Sieben, 1208-1211. 222 Kovalyev, p. 29-34.

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87

theatre for national purposes. One of the first missions fulfilled by those aircraft was the shuttling

of former 1st SSF personnel from France to the UK.223

The official disbandment of 1st SSF at Menton on the French Riviera was an emotional affair

despite the misgivings about the unit during the last months of its existence. A parade was held,

after which the Canadian and Russian soldiers were ordered to fall out of formation and then hon-

oured by the American troops with a pass in review, eyes right, officers salute. The Russian per-

sonnel were subsequently distributed between 2nd and 3rd Commando Battalions formed around

9 and 10 Troops No. 10 Commando respectively.224

Some integration problems occurred despite forming discrete companies and having worked to-

gether earlier during Operation Dragoon; there was resentment because both battalions were to be

led by former 1st SSF officers, outranking the erstwhile commando troop leaders. But despite those

troubles, 1st Airborne Brigade was officially activated at Southampton on 12 December and oper-

ationally assigned to British I Airborne Corps the following week. Independently, II./2nd Quarter-

master Battalion also arrived in the UK along with elements from 10th Signals Battalion. II Corps

HQ was therefore expected to be fully operational before Western Christmas.

At the same time, more Russian American troops were arriving at Dunkirk. 1st Marine Armoured

Battalion was a bit unlucky and first had to wait off Brest for a day due to overcrowding in port.

There was also insufficient heavy load transport available for their LVTs, so they marched on their

own tracks, and some vehicles promptly broke down on the way. Like 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade,

parts of them were expected to finish training in theatre as it had been decided that due to lots of

tanks already being available at Dunkirk and training times involved for Sherman crews, they

would field four companies of LVT-4s rather than two plus two of tanks. The personnel of the latter

were to be re-schooled accordingly by the former.

However, the new companies also received a platoon of LVT(A)-4 “Amtanks” each.225 Yet some-

how, Amtracs with Russian American markings showed up with 3rd Marines at Dunkirk even be-

fore the battalion finally arrived on 15 December, though the regimental commander personally

denied ever seeing them upon inquiry.226 At this time, 2nd Marines had also left their previous

station in the Panama Canal Zone and was in transit across the Atlantic while 4th Stoyanka Infantry

was embarking for the voyage to the UK.227

Some days earlier, 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade had made a proper entrance with flying banners.

1st Czechoslovakian Tank Regiment and an armoured reconnaissance detachment were then as-

signed to it, and the reinforced formation moved on to the Russian American depot at Chievres for

joint training on 14 December.228 A battle school had been installed by the Signal Corps there,

using actual former Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel from the POW recruiting programme.229

Many of those were Ukrainians from the 30th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS who had shot

their German leadership cadre and defected to an FFI unit in the Confracourt Woods north of Dijon

back in August; they eventually wound up in the Russian American programme after the Allies

liberated the area, along with a trickle from the same division's I. and III./4th battalions who had

deserted into Switzerland and were smuggled out of internment by Signals. Overall, the programme

223 von Sieben, 1208-1211. 224 Marston, p. 121. 225 Korichnev, E. M.: Command without Power. Russian American II Corps in World War II (Stoyanka-London

1955), p. 21-27. 226 Tuček, p. 61. 227 von Sieben, 1208-1217. 228 Tuček, p. 61. 229 Tanski, p. 59-61.

Part IV: 1944

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had yielded some 5,000 former Osttruppen at this point, starting with about 100 from III./Grena-

dierregiment 194 which had fought at Monte Cassino.

The bulk was from about 20 battalions largely consisting of Russians, two of Georgians, one of

Armenians and one of Volga Tartars encountered by Allied forces all over France – some of which

had surrendered wholesale to Russian American forces in Operation Dragoon, others filtered out

piecemeal from POW camps by Signals personnel. Several hundred Azeri and Turkestani deserters

from the Wehrmacht’s 162nd Turkoman Division on the Ligurian Coast had also crossed the Ital-

ian-French border into 1st SSF's area of operations after some helpful pointers from the Signal

Corps, along with more from Russian Battalions 406, 412, 556 and 617.

About half of the erstwhile prisoners had been cleared for duty with the Russian American forces

so far and shipped off to the depots at Reims and Chievres for issue with new kit and some quick

retraining in new basic rules and regulations, then to reinforce the theatre support brigades for

processing of more of their kind.230 Their use as “German” training forces with much original

equipment was however bending the Geneva Convention rules quite a bit, which was why the

background of the Chievres battle school was kept quiet.231 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was sup-

posed to train there until the end of December before moving on to a calm sector on the Belgian

front of 21st Army Group. However, the Germans had other plans.232

The Ardennes

The start of the German offensive through the Ardennes on 16 December quickly had repercussions

for Russian American units. While 9th and 10th Air Force Wing were largely grounded by weather

conditions along with other Allied air support,233 1st Airborne Brigade was alerted for a possible

move to the continent even before official assignment to British I Airborne Corps on the 18th,

which would make it part of the Allied strategic reserve in the European Theatre. The brigade had

been originally planned to train house-to-house fighting in the bombed parts of Southampton for

some weeks like units from UK 6th Airborne Division had been doing there previously, but instead

found itself ordered to ports along with the British division on the 20th.

On the same day, command of the Ardennes sector was transferred from 12th to 21st Army Group

under Field Marshal Montgomery, which also got 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade involved.234 The

formation was ordered to move from Chievres to Namur, there to meet with UK XXX Corps which

was being sent south to protect the crossings of the Meuse River against the German advance. They

arrived there in the late evening of the 21 December and were ordered by an American officer in

charge of the area to reinforce the independent 29th US Infantry Regiment, two anti-air battalions

and a British reconnaissance force against an expected German armoured thrust at the Meuse

bridges downstream at Huy and Liège, while UK 29th Armoured Brigade from 11th Armoured

Division was directed upstream towards Dinant and Givet.

Accordingly they deployed one of the Guards battalions to Huy and Liège each, backed up by

the Czech tanks, which were in position at their assigned objectives by the evening of the 22nd.

7th Cossacks remained as a reserve at Namur, while the artillery was parcelled out by batteries or

platoons to all crossings. Defences were stiffened until the next day by American engineer units

230 Korichnev, Command, p. 44. 231 Tanski, p. 59. 232 Tuček, p. 61. 233 Kovalyev, p. 41. 234 Korichnev, Command, p. 49-59.

Part IV: 1944

89

which also prepared to blow the bridges if necessary – though charges were not actually attached

out of fear of premature sympathetic detonations from German flying bombs impacting in the area

– a couple French light infantry battalions which were badly equipped but provided valuable lan-

guage skills, a company or so of anti-tank guns, and a US artillery battalion which allowed the

guards’ guns to be concentrated in their sector north of Namur.235

Also on 23 December, the first elements from the rest of UK 11th Armoured Division showed

up; their commander, Brigadier Charles S. Kilburn, took charge of all troops in the area. 2nd House-

hold Cavalry Regiment in the south and 7th Cossacks in the north crossed the Meuse and pushed

reconnaissance as far as Marche and Rochefort, meeting American patrols from US VII Corps on

the northern shoulder of the “bulge” the German offensive had created, but no enemy – though the

British captured a jeep with Germans dressed as Americans at Dinant that night.

US 2nd Armored Division launched an attempt at cutting off the German spearhead from the

North on the 24th, bottling up some enemy units at Celles. 29th Armoured Brigade pushed across

the Meuse towards Foy-Notre Dame, knocking out at least three German tanks and various other

vehicles, plus making some prisoners. As the weather had cleared up by now, there was heavy air

support by American P-38 and British Typhoon fighters.236 1st Guards Brigade was held in reserve

at the Meuse, apparently because they were not trusted to interact properly with Allied air.237

For similar reasons, the Russian P-51s in Belgium had been ordered to provide air cover for

ground attack missions, leaving them little to do as the Luftwaffe was not coming out to play. The

Mosquitoes were sent on interdiction raids in the rear of the German offensive, trying to cut off

their supplies though not much had been spotted moving up to the front.238 The irritations about

air-ground cooperation led to urgent orders for 1st Air Force Forward Air Control/Security Squad-

ron to be deployed from Russian America, having been included in earlier plans but initially held

back because winter weather was seen as not allowing too much air activity anyway. Now they

were hurriedly packed into two C-54s and left Stoyanka for Chievres on 27 December.239

The previous day, UK 6th Airborne Division had arrived on the Meuse along with 1st Airborne

Brigade, replacing 11th Armoured Division save for 29th Armoured Brigade. Both Russian Amer-

ican brigades were in reserve at this point, but 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was released for oper-

ations after UK 53rd Infantry Division took over their sector north of Namur, with 6th Airborne

Division to the south.240 The guards were then moved forward across the river to deal with a threat

to the left flank of US 2nd Armored Division. They passed behind Combat Commands A and B of

the division and were then tasked with retaking Humain, where elements of German Panzerlehrdi-

vision had driven out a troop of US 4th Cavalry Group the day before; while the initial attack had

been thrown back, 4th Cavalry had failed to regain the village against German Panther tanks despite

reinforcement by a company of Shermans on 25 December.

On the morning of the 26th, the enemy had tried another move with about a company of Panthers

and a battalion of armoured infantry. A company of US 66th Armor Regiment with attached infan-

try and tank destroyer platoons had already repulsed two attacks to the west at Havrenne with the

help of heavy artillery support when 1st Guards Cavalry moved on Humain at circa 1300 hours.

Things were made easier by the fact the German battle plan had been captured. Two groups were

formed out of 7th Cossacks, a company from CZ 1st Tank Regiment and the Czech reconnaissance

235 Tuček, p. 62. 236 Korichnev, Command, p. 65-70. 237 Tuček, p. 62. 238 Kovalyev, p. 49-51. 239 von Sieben, 1232-1242. 240 Korichnev, Command, p. 72.

Part IV: 1944

90

detachment, which circled around the village to the east and west to cut it off while I./1st Guards

advanced from the north supported by the rest of 1st Tank Regiment, with II./1st Guards in reserve.

The town was isolated by 1615 along with the spearhead of the last German charge against 2nd

Armored of the day; the Hellcats and Cromwells proved entirely sufficient when catching the Pan-

thers in their own flank, and between them and the American Shermans, at least five were de-

stroyed, not counting other vehicles. However, they fared less well if meeting frontally, and the

main attack on Humain was momentarily halted by defensive fire, including from enemy tanks that

had retreated to the cover of stone walls. While the attack reached the village by 1800 after coura-

geous reorganisation under fire, it was already dark by then, and troops where withdrawn for more

heavy artillery shelling throughout the night.

Apparently to evade this, the German tried to break out to the South during the night, but ran into

the blocking force from 7th Cossacks. Fighting was somewhat confused due to darkness despite

illumination fired by brigade artillery and mortars, but at least four more Panthers and several Ger-

man halftracks were knocked out while Allied vehicles were mostly protected from defilade. In the

morning, the attack on the village was renewed, and pushed through by 0900 hours. The Czech

Fireflies proved instrumental in flushing out the remaining Panthers, though subsequent house-

clearing continued until after dark.

The enemy had by then turned out to belong to German 9th Panzerdivision, which had replaced

Panzerlehr in this area. As in some previous instances in Europe, German soldiers were shocked to

encounter Russians on the wrong front. The last German holdout in a chateau east of Humaine was

cleared on 27 December with the help of some Crocodile flamethrower tanks from UK 29th Ar-

moured Brigade. Now unthreatened by a flank attack, US 2nd Armored Division pushed south

towards the Lesse River while squeezing out the Celles pocket further west between themselves

and 29th Armoured. Many of the German troops there escaped on foot, but about 200 prisoners

were taken along with 80 vehicles of various types and twelve guns. An enemy column gathering

for a new thrust towards Humaine was spotted in the afternoon of 28 December in the next village

to the East, but attacked by three subsequent waves of fighter bombers and never advanced.

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade had lost three of its Hellcats and four M39 as well as four Czech

tanks including a Stuart from the recon detachment besides various other vehicles, maybe indica-

tive of their recent formation and relative combat inexperience. However, they also gave at least as

good as they took, and personnel casualties were quite light in comparison as most crews managed

to escape from hit vehicles. Only seven KIAs were reported, along with 82 wounded and eleven

missing, most of those suffered in the house-clearing at Humaine.241

2nd Armored Division was subsequently relieved by UK 53rd and US 83rd Infantry Divisions;

UK Guards Armoured Division had also arrived on the Meuse but was held in reserve. So was 1st

Airborne Brigade further south while UK 6th Airborne Division was carrying out offensive oper-

ations across the Meuse with 29th Armoured Brigade. 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade, which had for

all practical purposes been attached to US VII Corps for the Humain battle, reverted to UK XXX

Corps but continued to operate at the British-American boundary.

XXX Corps officially took over from US VII Corps in the Givet-Aye sector on 30 December. It

continued to protect the Meuse crossings from Givet to Huy with 6th Airborne south and Guards

Armoured Division north of Namur, holding a defensive position facing south on a general Dinant-

Wanlin-Aye line with 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division, and operating offensively south of the Lesse

River towards St. Hubert with elements of 6th Airborne supported by 29th Armoured Brigade. 1st

Guards Cavalry and Airborne Brigades were told to concentrate west of the Meuse, but north of

241 Tuček, p. 63-65.

Part IV: 1944

91

the Lesse in the Durnal-Dorinne area under command of 6th Airborne for possible counterattacks.

Two flights from 1st FO/S Squadron arrived with them the same day, the other two at Dunkirk.242

The extremely cold winter weather made parkas and ushankas from Russian American stocks

popular with both British and Americans in the Ardennes, some of which had been sent in ill-

equipped for those temperatures. Initially, the much better-suited Russian clothing was passed in-

formally, though clerks soon noticed that some soldiers had apparently managed to lose their com-

plete issue – sometimes twice – and army quartermasters had ordered replacements. There was a

proposal from the Ministry of War’s procurement department that all the extra kit should be sent,

but quartermasters on the spot made to pay for it out of their own pockets, plus a commission for

the Ministry. This served admirably to put the flow into official channels.243

Soon some personnel of 2nd Theatre Support Brigade at Chievres was quite exclusively occupied

with cutting off Russian American national insignia and sewing on UK and US ones, until they

were finally being delivered separately. Not all of this was out of economic interest; quartermasters

struck an unofficial deal with their American counterparts to push supplies to the two US-equipped

Russian brigades directly in return, because after ten days of fighting the logistics were found to

be not too trivial. Ammunition had been little problem so far, as 1st Airborne Brigade had been

largely in reserve and 1st Guards Cavalry used as a fire brigade with breaks in the back between

supporting Allied formations in need, their Czech parts being British-equipped anyway. Spares for

everything from radios to vehicle engines were making much more trouble since those would wear

even with normal use, and even more so in current weather conditions.

It was thought that in the long term it might be favourable to put the units under American com-

mand with the appropriate supply chain, though then it would be the Czechs who might get prob-

lems. The marines at Dunkirk were not afflicted to the same extent, since they not only had

switched to .303 calibre small arms but had few vehicles not also in the British inventory, and could

rely on supplies from a secured environment. On the plus side, morale in Chievres was very good,

not least among the recent ex-Wehrmacht recruits who had been put there as a not too-security

relevant posting and now found it a very rewarding position. Before 2nd Theatre Suppport Brigade

turned into a giant free-for-all clothing market however, transfers were begun to the incoming re-

placement units for the new troops to get some drill back; no more could be accommodated in the

support brigades anyway.244

Meanwhile, while the Germans were retreating in the Ardennes, having outrun their supply lines

and under heavy pressure of Allied reinforcements and air support, they had not spent all their

powder yet. Plans were being made for the new year to be started with a twin blow against Allied

airfields in Belgium and 6th Army Group in Alsace-Lorraine which had been weakened by the

redirection of forces and supplies to the Battle of the Bulge.

242 Korichnev, Command, p. 73-74. 243 Nikitin, p. 63. 244 von Sieben, 1254-1258.

Part IV: 1944

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Part V: 1945 in Europe

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Part V: 1945 in Europe

Operation Bodenplatte

While the better weather in the final days of December 1944 allowed massive Allied air operations

in support of ground operations in the Ardennes, so it did for the Germans. At first light on 1

January, they launched a wave of airstrikes against bases in Belgium in Operation Bodenplatte,

intending to cripple enemy air support capabilities. Fighter-bombers were used mostly, including

the new Me 262 jet planes already encountered by Allied bombers over Germany. Airfields in the

Brussels area were subjected to heavy strafing of parked aircraft.

Among the units hit was Russian American 9th Wing which lost about half of its Mustangs. Most

of them were on the ground when the Luftwaffe hit Sint Denijs-Westrem at sunrise. Those which

got airborne gave a good account of themselves, as did the Spitfires of Polish No. 131 Wing based

at the same airfield, but most never left the ground. A report from the Russian wing commander

stated nine out of 40 aircraft as currently airworthy, with maybe 15 more repairable. Three pilots

were lost, two while trying to take off, one shot down. Two others were also shot down but bailed

out. There were some casualties among ground personnel, but not enough to have a significant

impact on operational ability. The main restriction was shortage of aircraft, followed by airfield

damage. Several of the aircraft which took off were wrecked or badly damaged on landing.245

One good thing to come off the attack was that it served to remove the previous mutual suspicion

between Russian Americans and Poles at Sint Denijs-Westrem. Pilots of both nations took off

through exploding bombs to fight the Luftwaffe over their own airfield. There were combined

claims of over 20 German aircraft, though some proved to have been hit by anti-air artillery. Af-

terwards, all available personnel worked together to clear wreckage and fill in holes.246 10th Wing

was untouched by the strikes back in England, but lost two Mosquitoes in the afternoon. They had

been sent to attack Luftwaffe airfields and were intercepted by four jets. It was the worst day for

the Russian American Air Force so far, even considering the Komandorski campaign.247

Urgent replacement of aircraft was requested from the US, and the strikes also caused a re-eval-

uation of anti-air capabilities on the ground, including the decision to send wings to Europe without

their anti-air artillery groups. As a result, the anti-air battalion of 1st Marine Division would leave

its heavy guns behind and deploy as a pure 20/40 mm-equipped unit, due to reasons of both am-

munition commonality with Allied forces and being of more use against low-level fighter-bomber

attacks. However, while planners were worried about German “wonder weapons” like the Me 262,

the V1 flying bomb used against the Meuse bridges and the V2 rocket against which there was no

defence, the Germans had lost several hundred aircraft as well. The general opinion at General

Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces after tallying of friendly and

enemy casualties was that the Luftwaffe might suffer more from this operation in the long run,

since they would have much more trouble replacing aircraft and pilots in the overall strategic situ-

ation; 70 pilots were captured alone.248 Concurrently with Operation Bodenplatte, the Germans also launched another major ground of-

fensive further south in Alsace-Lorraine to take pressure off their forces in the Ardennes. The sit-

uation was uncomfortable for the Allies since US Seventh Army had sent a lot of reinforcements

north to contain the “bulge” there, and was understrength now that it was being attacked itself.

245 Bergmann, 1248. 246 Kovalyev, p. 63. 247 Bergmann, 1250. 248 von Sieben, 1247-1249.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

94

There were no immediate repercussions for Russian American forces though. UK XXX Corps

planned to extend its area of responsibility further to the east of the Meuse River for additional

relief of US VII Corps. They had made some contact with posts from 9th Panzer Division again;

Russian American 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade and 1st Airborne Brigade were still north of the

Lesse River, but would also be pushed farther east as UK 53rd relieved US 84th Division in the

March-Hotton area.249 There was some German shelling, but the main hazard was from extremely difficult ice and snow

conditions; the weather has deteriorated again, with low clouds and snow storms, so no air support

was possible. Russian American troops were no strangers to such conditions, but the British were

adding up accidents on icy roads. On 4 January, 158th Brigade of UK 53rd Division attacked in

the Hotton area and had their commander killed, not by enemy action but because his scout car

skidded and overturned. The next day, a battalion of 158th Brigade was counterattacked and a

company overrun by the Germans, and 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was again sent to help.

They were quickly able to stabilize the situation and push back the enemy. On 7 January, still

supported by the brigade, the division captured Grimblemont in the early afternoon, thus denying

the enemy use of the road from Marche-en-Famenne to La Roche-en-Ardenne. Over 100 prisoners

were made. On the 8th, 53rd Division was relieved by 51st (Highland) Division which had previ-

ously been in First US Army reserve and also took command of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade.250

On the 10th, 1st Airborne Brigade finally got a shot too as it relieved one of UK 6th Airborne

Division’s brigades on the front. 51st Division reached the outskirts of La Roche on 11 January;

patrols of 6th Airborne actually contacted US VII Corps troops in the St. Hubert area towards the

direction of Bastogne, which indicated that the Germans had withdrawn completely from that sec-

tor. However, they were still holding Champlon halfway between there and La Roche, since 6th

Airborne Armoured Recce Regiment found them there. 1st Airborne Brigade was moving that way,

but the Germans largely retreated ahead of it.

On the 13th, patrols of 6th Airborne Division first made contact with US 87th Infantry Division

in the Champlon area, and the following day contacts were made all along the Ourthe Coccidentale

tributary between UK XXX Corps and Third US Army. 1st Airborne Brigade, still on the left of

6th Airborne, had been involved in little fighting at this point. After the 15th, XXX Corps made no

more contact with the enemy, and on 18 January started moving back from the Ardennes to resume

planning for a crossing of the Rhine into Northern Germany; First US Army reverted to 12th Army

Group command. The two Russian American brigades had not been used too much, particularly

1st Airborne, but acquitted themselves well whenever they were. As they were not really worn,

there was some discussion whether to just leave them in place due to their American equipment

and fill in for US units which had gotten orders to go to Alsace-Lorraine due to the German attack

there – or, in fact, go south themselves.251

There was a little more to that last thought then just looking for employment of the troops. The

Czechoslovakian force at Dunkirk had been discontent with its posting, and while they would get

out of that duty if they managed to take the port thanks to the backup of Russian American 1st

Marine Division, obviously what they wanted to do more than everything else was driving towards

their homeland. Unfortunately 21st Army Group was not headed that way at all, and their integra-

tion with the Americans had been declined on the putative reason that they were British-equipped

– though other understandings between the major Allies could be sensed in the background again,

which might include leaving the liberation of Czechoslovakia to the Soviets and their own Czechs.

249 Korichnev, Command, p. 77-79. 250 Tuček, p. 63. 251 von Sieben, 1258-1272.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

95

However, 12th Army Group was in an excellent position to eventually end up at the Czech border,

with First, Third and Seventh US Army in particular. Transferring 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade

there with its Czech elements might get them a foot in the door. If and when Dunkirk got taken,

even earlier plans for a Czech-Russian armoured division might be revived, since cooperation with

the marines at Dunkirk was going well.

There were several obstacles of course. One was for the Dunkirk business to actually get finished;

1st Marine Artillery Regiment [-] landed at Brest on 17 January and joined 1st Czechoslovakian

Armoured Division Group on the 23rd. The French expanded their regiment there to four battalions

shortly afterwards, and the odds were not expected to get much better than that, so the attempt to

take the port was considered to be made in February. A successful operation would play into the

next challenge, overcoming any political objections against letting the Czechs go east. Even then

there would still be the problem of different equipment standards, though the Cromwell tanks of

their armoured units fired US ammunition and they already had some Shermans, too.

Planners believed however that commonality could be further improved by some simple equip-

ment swaps with the marines who were to stay in 21st Army Group anyway if they were to go up

the Dutch coast as envisioned prior to their deployment. For example, one of the incoming artillery

battalions could swap its 105 mm howitzers with the Czechs' 25-Pounders, and 2nd Marines' pre-

vious .30-06 calibre small arms issue was also stored locally.252

If all else failed, it was thought that the French could always be approached to take the Russian-

Czech force into their First Army which was also largely US-equipped, in a good position for

Czechoslovakia, and to which there were some connections from Operation Dragoon and in par-

ticular the ex-Soviet deserters from 30th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division who had fought with the

FFI. Some of those Ukrainians had actually gone straight to the Foreign Legion rather than signing

up with the Russian American forces and were still fighting on that front.

Overall, the idea of forming an informal alliance of smaller partners within the allied nations had

gotten some traction, both considering the European and Pacific Theatre. The intention of the Big

Three to meet in Yalta early in February lent a certain urgency to this; Junograd’s main aim was to

prevent the Soviet demand for a return of all their citizens to be adopted as official policy, but other

small Allies had their grievances, too. The Polish and Czechoslovakians in particular feared that

Roosevelt would just hand over their countries to Stalin in his effort to get a commitment to the

war against Japan.

A meeting with possible key partners was therefore planned in the UK shortly before the Yalta

Conference to hopefully form a joint position on various issues. It was scheduled to take place on

30 January at the out-of-the-way Dorset seaside town of Bournemouth, five days ahead of the Yalta

Conference. There were commitments by the Canadians, Czechs and Dutch to attend, and it was

hoped to get some more parties to join. As a step towards the plans for Czechoslovakia, 1st Guards

Cavalry and 1st Airborne Brigade had been borrowed to First US Army and ordered into Luxem-

bourg to fill in for US 28th and 101st Division troops which had moved to Alsace-Lorraine. The original frontline in the Ardennes before the German offensive had been restored at this

point, and the situation in Alsace-Lorraine was comparatively calm as US forces had successfully

fallen back from the Germans behind the Moder River. Obviously there would have to be a coun-

terattack eventually, and Russian American planners thought they might manage to get in on that

as a foothold for an eventual drive towards Czechoslovakia.253

252 Tuček, p. 64. 253 von Sieben, 1272-1288.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

96

The Reduction of Dunkirk

In the end, the Bournemouth talks with the other minor Allies about common policy turned out to

be rather disappointing. The Czechoslovakians had concluded that attempting to take the heavily-

fortified and still well-supplied port of Dunkirk with the available forces would be too costly. The

Russian American marines had run trials with their LVTs in the flooded areas southeast of the

town; but while they could navigate the water obstacles themselves easily enough, the Amtracs had

problems with the boggy ground on the edges, actually having a higher ground pressure than most

tanks, and tended to get stuck if not climbing out on the seashore beaches they were used to.

The Czechs therefore only intended to reduce the German perimeter some more, content with

proving themselves that way, and otherwise having their 1.5 battalions attached to 1st Guards Cav-

alry with the perspective of a drive towards their homeland with 12th Army Group, not least due

to replacement issues with possible casualities. They were actually considering re-equipment of

those with more American kit to resolve the anticipated logistic obstacles, possibly delivered

through Russian America. There had already been friendly cross-training between Allied troops at

Dunkirk over the last two months as the marines were eager to fit in with the Commonwealth way

of doing things with an eye to possible future assignments to First Canadian Army. For example,

the gunners had been trading procedures with the Russian American 105 mm howitzers and the

Czechs' 25-pounders, just in case it might be decided to re-equip for further logistics commonality.

On the other hand, there was considerable friction between the marines and the newly formed

French troops. The French 51st Infantry Regiment was made up largely of former FFI fighters from

the region, and the local resistance had a strong communist element rooted in the miners' union

which was very observant to Moscow. They had even held still under the early German occupation

while the Hitler-Stalin Pact was in effect, only calling for strikes and later armed resistance after

the German attack on the USSR. Those in the 51st were not approving of the Russian American

stance towards the Soviets, which the marines had made no attempt to keep to themselves.

At Bournemouth, the Dutch were not as enthusiast about proposals of landing on their coast as

thought either. For one, they had little shipping available in the European Theatre that could support

such an operation if it was not provided by the Americans and British, and they were quite dubious

about the whole reasoning behind making a Russian American mark in Europe. In their opinion

even if Junograd was in a losing competition with the Soviets about overall importance, the US

und UK would certainly never allow the latter to gain a foothold in North America – though that

did not consider the interest in recruting new citizens from ex-Soviet prisoners.

The consensus in the end was that Russian America’s best allies for Europe remained the Cana-

dians, and that while the Army brigades would serve national interests in the South German area,

it should be looked look to get 1st Marine Division assigned to First Canadian Army once it was

complete. This might yield possibilities to get at the Osttruppen used for coastal defense in the

Netherlands from the land side, which the Dutch thought to be much more reasonable.

1st Guards Cavalry and 1st Airborne Brigade were currently still held in reserve by 12th Army

Group. They had been using the time to work on some flaws that had emerged when they were

thrown into battle so quickly without the full planned working-up period after formation, but

wanted to get back into combat. There was reluctance by the Americans about employing them in

an axis towards Czechoslovakia, but also support from General Hodges of First US Army who

specifically praised 1st Guards Cavalry's performance in the Ardennes. However, the immediate

focus after the Bournemouth talks was Dunkirk.254

254 von Sieben, 1308-1311.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

97

The Germans had built a creditable system of fortifications improving on previous works and

protecting the port both to the sea and the land side. The flooded areas southwest of the city were

hiding the same sort of anti-invasion defenses as on the shoreline; Allied engineers were regularly

pulling out mines and shells fixed to poles under the surface between submerged farm buildings

there when patrolling in their boats. Moreover, the Germans were using the canals in the area as

concentric lines of defense, reinforced with obstacles and strongpoints.

The German garrison was made up from battlegroups of 49th, 97th, 226th, 346th and 711th In-

fantry Division, 26th and 1046th Fortress Battalion, a Waffen-SS detachment of about 2,000 troops

and assorted Navy and Air Force units; a little more than 10,000 all told, commanded by Vice

Admiral Friedrich Frisius who had taken his HQ near the beach of Malo les Bains where much of

Operation Dynamo went down in 1940. Frisius had the reputation of somewhat of a fanatic, and

the defenders certainly seemed neither low on spirit nor stocks, confirmed in regular limited as-

saults on the perimeter with which Czechoslovakian Major General Liska as overall Allied com-

mander had been keeping them busy.255

One such assault went down on 7 February. The main objective was to test the capabilities of

newly arrived Russian American 1st Marine Artillery Regiment [-] as they provided support for a

move by 2nd Marine Regiment and 2nd Czechoslovakian Tank Regiment to take a battery of two

155 mm guns on the shore west of Bray-Dunes along with the neighboring village of Zuydcoote

and sanatorium in the early morning. The attack was successful, but the German defense was also

impressive; accurate and powerful counterbattery fire eventually forced a relocation of the Marine

batteries, and the heavy exchange went on until dark. A single German 75 mm gun position at

Leffrinckoucke was also taken out by Russian American fire.256

With that day, Allied casualities at Dunkirk numbered about 150 killed, 420 wounded and three

dozen missing since the Czechs took over, most of them their own troops. It was obvious why

Liska did not want to go house-to-house fighting in the heavily fortified city with his small national

contingent, even if Allied forces would make up the majority of numbers. Rather, his plan was to

effectively cut the German-controlled area in two by an amphibious thrust across the flooded areas

towards the coast, there meeting with a second one from the East along the shoreline, pocketing

the gros of the German batteries and maybe at least chasing Frisius out of his beach resort.

The operation commenced in the afternoon of 13 February with heavy artillery fire from I./1st

Marine Artillery Battalion and 2nd Canadian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment on the western perim-

eter in preparation for the diversionary attack. The Russian Americans had also been allowed some

use of their own Mosquitos for once, and four attack waves on enemy artillery positions were flown

interspersed with the gun barrages, against substantial German AA fire.

At dusk, I./3rd Marines attacked on the coast with all companies, behaving like the full regiment,

with two battalions of French 51st Infantry to their right and support from 7th Royal Tank Regi-

ment. The intention was to make the enemy believe the aim was to take the 164 mm coastal battery

at Saint-Pol-sur-Mer, just like the battery near Bray-Dunes the week before. German resistance

was tough again, with fighting going on through the night. The marines advanced as far as Fort

Mardyck, though the ill-trained and lightly equipped French troops had it much tougher despite

considerable enthusiasm. They had to be taken back eventually, exposing the flank of the marines

in the morning; but this had been planned for as the main attack commenced at the same time.

The amphibious assault across the flooded areas by 3rd Marines had been well prepared with

embattled ingress points for the LVTs and the clearing of underwater obstacles, done as incon-

255 Tuček, p. 66. 256 von Sieben, 1315.

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98

spiciously as possible over the previous weeks, often at night. The mission of II./3rd Marine Bat-

talion, loaded into two companies of 1st Marine Armoured Battalion with a platoon of LVT(A)-4s

in support, was to land south of the Canal des Moëres and take the 155 mm battery at Fort Louis.

III./3rd was to land north of the canal with the other two Amtrac companies and take the two bat-

teries between Téteghem and Leffrinckoucke. II./1st Marine Artillery Battalion was in support.

Once the batteries were taken, I./2nd Marine Battalion, operationally assigned to 3rd Regiment,

was to be set across with storm boats from both regiments' and the Czechs' engineer companies

and push ahead to Malo-les-Bains, there to meet with the thrust of 2nd Marine Regiment [-], Czech-

oslovakian 2nd Tank Regiment and 1st Infantry Battalion along the coast from Bray-Dunes, with

II./2nd in reserve in the sanatorium area taken the week before and the Czech artillery battalion in

support. This part of the pincer would take the coastal batteries, the pocket thus created to be elim-

inated over the following days.

The first part went smoothly; the hoped-for early morning fog did not occur, but the crossings

commenced at 0400 anyway. The intended surprise was still reached, because no losses among the

LVTs occurred during the move. For egress, 1st Marine Armoured Battalion had taken a look at

the Normandy landings and slung bundles of weightened fascines to the front of the Amtracs in the

first line, hoping they would make for a better grip in the mud at the floodlands' edge.

That worked to some degree, because while a lot of the LVTs still got stuck on or shortly after

egress and had to dismount their troops right there, others managed to proceed onto firmer soil.

The German defenders seemed to have been somewhat unnerved by their sudden massed emer-

gence from the water, as most of the Amtracs had been kept well out of their sight before save for

some tests on the edges of the flooded areas, usually at night. The diversionary attack on the west-

ern perimeter probably did its part too; initial resistance was weaker than expected, though some

of the stuck LVTs were still destroyed by enemy artillery and anti-tank weapons.

III./3rd Battalion quickly took the southern battery in its sector, and by full daylight had reached

the northern one too, though it was defending itself with direct fire from three 155 mm guns, one

having been disabled by the air and artillery attacks. The situation was much the same with II./3rd

and the Fort Louis battery. Meanwhile the Czech-Russian thrust on the coast, after breaking

through the initial German line of defense, had the benefit of mostly rolling up enemy positions on

the coast and Canal de Furnes from the flank, though they were still encountering stiff resistance.

By noon the southern attack had reached all objectives of the first phase by taking the 155 mm

batteries, reducing German artillery fire to the single 210 mm gun south of Dunkirk and some

batteries on the far side of the port. Therefore I./2nd Battalion was brought up as planned and

advanced towards the coast, but was stopped at the Canal de Furnes. At the same time, the eastern

attack had also been held up by enemy reinforcements brought out of Dunkirk, mostly Waffen-SS,

leaving two of the coastal batteries east of Malo-les-Bains still in German hands.

Heavy fighting continued in this area for the rest of the day, and at nightfall the new frontline

was running north from the floodlands along the Route de Dunkerque and the parallel railroad to

Fort Louis, from there along the eastern railroad line to the Canal de Furnes, along the canal to the

Rosendael cemetery, and then north to the shoreline via the battery of two 155 mm guns at the

railroad still held by the enemy, the pieces having turned from the coast to face Allied troops.

That canal outside Malo les Bains proved a surprisingly tough nut to crack, considering it was a

mere mile from the coast and the Germans therefore had not much depth behind it; of course that

also meant they had a lot of defenders packed into that one square mile besieged from both the

south and east. Both the marines and the Czechs tried breaking through the enemy lines on 15 and

16 February, but were beaten back even while II./3rd Marines managed to cross the railroad north

of Fort Louis and take the 210 mm gun there.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

99

A big part of the problem were the extensive minefields along the canal, including the parallel

road and the Rosendael cemetery; in some places, mines were stacked three or four upon each

other. Clearing was complicated by both direct and indirect fire from within Malo which the French

still did not want to see shelled or bombed, so a lot of mortars were being fired at suspected mine-

fields in hope of blowing them up. Meanwhile it had been decided to mop up resistance in the

pocket south of the canal first, and I./2nd and III./3rd Marine Battalions were brought up from

reserve to try again with relatively unspent forces tomorrow. 7th RTR was also bringing over some

flamethrower-equipped Churchill tanks to deal with the pillboxes on the canal.

Casualities had not been quite as bad as feared over the last three days, but the marines still lost

more than 70 killed, nearly 150 wounded and a dozen missing. The Czechs reported about 20 KIA

and 40 WIA, while the French lost about two dozen KIA and more than 50 WIA in the diversionary

attack on the western perimeter. The British had come off lightly with half a dozen killed and

double that number wounded in 7th RTR. On the other side, nearly 700 Germans had been taken

prisoner, 80 percent of them wounded; in addition, at least 300 enemy bodies had been counted.

The Canal de Furnes was finally taken on the second attempt on 17 January. After the fresh

battalions were repulsed again during daylight, they attacked once more in the dark and this time

were able to cross the canal with surprisingly little difficulties the shelling of German positions

over the last three days had ground them down in the end, though the marines were stopped again

at the railroad and 155 mm battery halfway to the coast. But the eastern force eventually broke

through behind the battery, took that position and pushed the Germans back to Malo-les-Bains.

Troops were planned to advance to the limits of Malo and take the 120 mm battery on the coast

there, the last to the east of the port. Then the situation was to be reassessed; going into the built-

up area was still not intended, particularly as the forces were likely to need a resting period after

the intense fighting of the last four days. Next to the troops on the canal, II./3rd Marines already

had the highest losses in the fight for the 210 mm gun in the suburb of Coudekerque-Branche, but

that had been necessary to take out that last German artillery position that could fire directly at the

attacking troops.

They would however not cross the connection between the Canal de Moëres and Canal de

Bergues and the open space behind it into Dunkirk proper either. According to plans, the western

perimeter might be attacked again to reduce the pocket further in the future, but first of all 1st

Marine Division Command arrived the next day, just after the 120 mm battery at Malo-les-Bains

was taken and the operation concluded, leading into a period of reorganisation. The final tally of

Allied losses in the reduction amounted to 93 killed, 189 wounded and 18 missing.257

The newly consolidated Marine division was officially activated at Dunkirk on 20 February and

assigned to 21st Army Group. Though General Liska remained in overall command of the area, it

was pulled out of the immediate front line for a resting period of four weeks as soon as the rest of

its artillery arrived the following week, but retained a contingency mission to act as reserve in case

the Germans tried anything. Afterwards, it was planned to be assigned to First Canadian Army for

the long-anticipated drive into the Netherlands, though its actual deployment then was not clear

yet. Russian American planners still had an interest in the Dutch coast, but that would depend upon

how 21st Army Group's planned attack of the Ruhr area went in the meantime. 1st Marine Replace-

ment Battalion was subsequently also transferred to Dunkirk from the UK to simplify things.258

Meanwhile 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was back at the Chievres depot for the planned ameri-

canisation of equipment for its Czech elements, anticipating an assignment under 12th Army

Group. By now it had been agreed that 1st Czechoslovakian Tank Regiment – always having been

257 Tuček, p. 66-67. 258 von Sieben, 1332-1335.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

100

referred to as a battalion internally, and shedding the British designation completely with the reor-

ganisation – would receive 76-mm-armed Sherman tanks to achieve better commonality, though

the Czechs opted to retain the vehicles of the Firefly variant with the British 17-pounder gun they

already had. Their previous Cromwell tanks and some other British equipment were transferred to

newly-raised 3rd Czechoslovakian Tank Regiment at Dunkirk.

The new regiment and a second motor battalion of two line companies were formed under 1st

Czechoslovakian Armoured Division Group in part from Czech personnel liberated from the Ger-

mans similar to the Russian American POW programme, part previous Hussite Legion personnel

that had come from Russian America. They also took over some troops from the Czechoslovakian

recon detachment under 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade which had already grown halfway to battalion

strength at this point. Some officers were rotated between the older units, too, to help spread the

experience of actual tank warfare among troops bogged down by sieges. Coincidentally, this rota-

tion also served to remove some communist sympathisers from the Guards Cavalry Brigade to less

sensitive outfits.

After all was said and done, Czech strength at Dunkirk increased by about 1,000. Along with the

guns captured from the Germans, most being French models and intended to form a new French

artillery regiment once the personnel could be found, this was considered to be sufficient for the

new, smaller perimeter. The British subsequently also pulled out 7th RTR to go north with 1st

Marine Division.259

1st Airborne Brigade reverted to operational control of First Allied Airborne Army on 18 Febru-

ary after four weeks of rest in Luxembourg to become part of the strategic reserve once more, then

was attached to Ninth US Army on the 22nd for possible support of Operation Grenade, the cross-

ing of the Roer River. They moved to the Dutch-German border south of Venlo but were not used

in combat. Neither would they participate in Operation Varsity, the airborne assault in the crossing

of the Rhine by 21st Army Group on 24 March, the British and American side citing limited airlift

capabilities. While Junograd retained the impression that its Allies were continueing to drag their

feet about involving Russian American units into the drive into Germany, both its paras and ma-

rines would eventually make a crucial contribution to the country’s top war aim in Europe.260

Yalta and the Soviet Prisoner Issue

Just before the Dunkirk operation, the Crimean Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Sta-

lin had concluded at Yalta, anxiously anticipated by Junograd due to the American courting of the

Soviets to enter the war against Japan and the Soviet demand for repatriation of all prisoners of war

and forced labourers taken by the Germans regardless of their individual wishes. Stalin was now

prepared to join the war in the Pacific two or three months after the defeat of Germany. In turn he

brought up the earlier agreement with Churchill about the reciprocal return of POWs again.261

Eventually Stalin in fact agreed to join the war against Japan three months after the defeat of

Germany, in exchange for recognition of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, the recognition of

Mongolian independence from China, and the restoration of “the former rights of Russia violated

by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904”, concerning “the southern part of Sakhalin as well as

the islands adjacent to it; the commercial port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval

259 Tuček, p. 67. 260 Korichnev, Command, p. 173-195. 261 von Sieben, 1315.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

101

base; the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to

Dairen”. Most critically for Russian America, Moscow also laid claim to all of the Kuriles.262

Having already secured Churchill's consent in Moscow the October before, Stalin then linked the

POW question with Roosevelt's pet project of the United Nations Organisation by demanding for

Moscow to be recognised as the sole legitimate successor government of the Russian Empire at the

expense of Junograd, all Soviet prisoners and discplaced persons liberated by allied forces therefore

to be naturally returned to the USSR. Obviously Roosevelt was prepared to officially recognize

Moscow as a legitimate government, long the de-facto state of affairs after three years of fighting

on the same side of the war; else the USSR joining the UNO would have no basis at all. But Stalin’s

position amounted to withdrawing recognition from Junograd at the same time. Additionally, he

demanded that each Soviet republic get its own seat in the UNO.

Roosevelt was generally willing to grant Stalin all his aims in East Asia with no objections from

Churchill. He also seems to have at least considered exclusive recognition, but at this point Church-

ill, somewhat dissatisfied with the quality of Soviet promises for democracy in Eastern Europe and

possibly aware of the implications for future communist encroachment in Canada's neighborhood,

put his foot down and pointed out that Russian America had successfully fought the Japanese on

its own territory without the need to be liberated like the German-occupied countries.

This was somewhat surprising given his previous assent to Soviet demands in the POW issue. It

was not that the Western Allies had an overbearing desire to hand Soviet prisoners back to Moscow,

which was on the record as saying that the great Soviet forces had only fighting or dead troops.

There had been controversial debates all the way up to the British cabinet as military leaders de-

manded that if they should be required to send prisoners in their care to certain mistreatment and

likely death, they should be at least backed by an official government decision.

However, the Americans and British were worried about their own troops in German captivity

which might be “liberated” by the Soviets as they advanced into Germany from the east, and be

withheld from prompt repatriation if Stalin did not get his wish. The British cabinet actually voted

to agree to the Soviet demand – though being a bit cloudy on the definition of “Soviet citizens” –

shortly before the Yalta conference for chiefly this reason. However, Churchill’s suspicion about

their further actions had grown since the Moscow meeting, and he was probably also sensitised by

Canadian warnings on Junograd’s behalf.

There was a break in negotiations, which gave Churchill and Roosevelt's staff the chance to point

out the danger of Soviet claims to Russian America; the Monroe Doctrine was also invoked. Af-

terwards, Stalin was offered equal recognition with Junograd and the return of all former Soviet

prisoners in Europe upon his entry in the war against Japan if he consented to join the UNO. Stalin

however refused and even threatened to recant on his commitment to the Pacific War.

Roosevelt tried to save his UNO project by pointing out that there were after all two governments

who could lay claim to the former rights of Russia, and the world organisation would be the proper

venue to sort those out. But Stalin felt he could play for time with the allied POW issue sure to put

pressure onto the British and Americans after Soviet troops would gain power over large numbers

of western prisoners held in the eastern parts of German-controlled territory on their advance. Not

unreasonably, he reckoned that the public in the US and UK would demand the return of their

missing known to be alive as soon as possible after their liberation from German captivity, and care

little if Soviet citizens had to be forced to go back to the USSR in exchange.

There was some haggling, including extra UNO seats for some Soviet republics and the return of

all POWs not yet recruited by Russian America; but the negotiations ultimately deadlocked and

262 von Sieben, 1519.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

102

the whole connected issue was basically deferred to committee, to be decided at the next conference

of the Big Three shortly after the hoped-for German defeat. However, the Soviet commitment to

the Pacific War was upheld. For Junograd this meant being put on a timetable for any operations

in the Kuriles, with the window of opportunity closing three month after the conclusion of hostili-

ties in the European Theatre.

The POW/DP issue remained a separate challenge. Russian American troops in Europe had

started shipping new recruits from the German Osttruppen to the replacement units in England for

retraining; as far as outsiders were concerned, they were now simply considered Russian American

soldiers like all others. Some of particular intelligence or economic value were put directly on the

return flights of the trans-atlantic C-54 link, though this was a comparative trickle.

A new idea was putting a number into medical troops and have them accompany WIA transports

home by ship; every wounded recruit would also be sent “home” unless better reasons spoke against

it. However, the current chief interest was in maintaining troop strength in theatre, and so was that

of the Allies. The basic reasoning remained that every Soviet citizen was also a Russian citizen,

and since a lot of even the original troops were born outside Russian America anyway, there was

no practical difference between both groups; certainly none discernible to outsiders.263

There was no problem with housing capacities so far as those arriving in Russian America were

simply put into barracks of deployed units. Of course once forces would come home from the

European Theatre in bulk after the end of the war there, this might begin to look different, but was

still regarded as a very short term problem. With plenty of trees and land, a labour force without

houses or, initially, jobs offered its own obvious solution. However, some pointed out that insuffi-

cient attention had so far been paid to the many Soviet citizens held as POWs or forced to work as

civilians in Germany itself, hardly encountered at this point.

From intelligence reports, many of the DPs were female, and if there was anything Russian Amer-

ica needed more than young men, it was young women to offset the recruitment of predominantly

male POWs. There were doubtlessly also many Jewish former inhabitants of the Pale of Settlement

in the concentration camps described by the reports, who might no longer have homes to return to.

Questions were beginning to be asked about plans to liberate as many of these prisoners as possible

when Germany was eventually defeated, and offer them transport to Russian America.264

The logistics looked fairly daunting. The overall influx of military recruits in the second quarter

of the programme was not as high as during the French-Belgian campaign between 15 August and

15 November the previous year, where many coastal defense and rear security units staffed with

Osttruppen had been encountered by Allied forces; the German counteroffensives in the Ardennes

and Alsace-Lorraine brought mostly first-line formations to the front, followed by a somewhat

static period before the start of the Rhineland campaign in early February. With the beginning of

the latter, Osttruppen were met again – notably two SS construction regiments into which “unreli-

able” personnel from 30th Waffen-Grenadierdivision had been transferred by the Germans after

the mass defections in France mentioned earlier, encountered by First French Army when they

crossed the Westwall into the Karlsruhe area in mid-March.

Unlike the parties at Yalta, the French, Belgians and Dutch had so far expressed little opinion on

the Soviet prisoner issue; while those nations also had some military personnel and, above all,

civilian forced labourers held in East Germany which might come into the hand of the advancing

Soviet troops, they had so far been preoccupied with the liberation process of their own countries.

Moreover, the French felt snubbed by not having been invited to Yalta and were not eager to go

along with any agreements attempted there.

263 von Sieben, 1316-1372. 264 Bergmann, 1327.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

103

Attitudes varied towards the Osttruppen, some of which had behaved rather less considerate to-

wards the locals during the occupation than the Germans themselves, and in the course of anti-

partisan activities employed quite brutal means. In some places of France, re-established national

authorities wanted some of them tried for war crimes, in others were just glad to get rid of them.

In yet others, where Osttruppen had revolted against their German masters or even defected to the

resistance like in 30th SS Waffen-Grenadierdivision, the stance was obviously vastly different.265

The Signal Corps, in charge of the screening and vetting process, had handed some individuals

accused of atrocities over to national authorities while quietly recycling others who had been too

involved with the Germans for their own means if they were found useful; lesser implicated per-

sonnel had mostly been put onto the direct link to Russian America to be re-evaluated as to their

further use. The vast majority of the POWs however could not be charged with more than having

more or less willingly worn a German uniform and were processed into the replacement scheme.266

Planners were more worried about what would happen if Osttruppen which had been deployed

on the Eastern Front were encountered, as many had been used in anti-partisan warfare in the USSR

and Yugoslavia, reported to be a lot less gentle than even in France; stories of retribution against

civilians, mass executions and other atrocities abounded. Even disregarding the possible negative

propaganda impact of taking in thousands of enthusiast Nazi henchmen – already being spun that

way by the Soviets for the current programme – there were severe reservations to let people into

Russian America who had slaughtered other Russians under German occupation.

This particularly concerned the foreign units of the Waffen-SS. There was 14th Waffen-Grena-

dierdivision which used to be called “Galician”, but was “Ukrainian” now and based in Austria.

The 30th “White Ruthenian” Division was not identical to the earlier one of the same number which

was disbanded after the mass defections in France, but had been formed recently from the “White

Ruthenian” Waffen-Grenadierbrigade and was not anywhere near division strength; it was cur-

rently reported in Bavaria. Then there was XV Cossack Cavalry Corps, consisting of two divisions

recently transferred from the Wehrmacht to the SS and last deployed to Yugoslavia. Finally there

was General Andrey Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army which at this point included two infantry

divisions – one only being raised though – and reportedly a tank destroyer and a reserve brigade,

plus as much as four air squadrons. However, they were on the Eastern Front and thought to be

probably out of reach; and none of those major formations were a current issue yet.

By a report from 27 March, the POW programme had yielded a total of circa 15,000 so far. Of

those, about 11,000 had been processed, cleared by the Signal Corps, and transferred on: 5,000 to

Russian America, 2,100 to 1st and 2nd European Theatre Support Brigades, 1,700 to 4th Stoyanka

Infantry Regiment, 700 to Signals' battle school at Chievres, and 600 to 1st Marine Replacement

Battalion. Of those currently still being processed, 1,300 were planned to be sent to 4th Stoyanka

Infantry, 1,100 to a new 3rd Theatre Support Brigade, 300 to 1st Marine Replacement Battalion,

and the rest hopefully straight home. The two replacement formations on the Army and Marine

side respectively were now organising the influx into additional subunits which would eventually

be used to build new formations.

One near-term aim was to replace the current Russian American contingent on Iceland, planned

to be used in the Pacific Theatre. In particular, II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion

and the artillery units were intended to return home, the former having largely completed its road

construction projects, the latter to rebuild 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment which had sup-

ported about every newly raised formation with detachments in the last two years. That would bring

I Corps' corps troop back to near-eastablishment strength for any possible action against Japan.

265 von Sieben, 1368-1372. 266 Tanski, p. 69.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

104

Newly-formed IV./4th Stoyanka Infantry Battalion already sailed for Iceland from Liverpool on 27

March to relieve 2nd Kenai Artillery Group on 1 April. A full new regiment was planned to be

stood up there eventually, bringing the new recuits one step closer to their new home.

The necessity to stand up a third theatre support brigade for 6th Army Group was underlined by

the discovery of the two SS regiments by the French, which Russian American personnel were not

able to access as well as the POWs in the areas of 12th and 21st. There had been plans for this for

some time already, the main problem being the necessary “native” Russian American cadre; how-

ever, as new recruits were leaving the familiarisation training of 4th Stoyanka Infantry, they would

replace seasoned personnel in other units which then became available to form that cadre.

About half a dozen battalions or regiments of Osttruppen were reported to be left in the Nether-

lands, an ecclectic mix of Armenians, Georgians, Turkestanis, Volga Tartars and various other

North Caucasians. Denmark was thought another valuable mining field, with about eight Russian

and Caucasian battalions reported. Italy had been neglected a little after 1st SSF went away, in part

because a major part of the Osttruppen there were the Azeris and Turkestanis in 162nd Turkoman

Division which were not seen as the most desirable recruits. However, there were at least as much

independent Russian battalions there as in Denmark, too, which still were being handled by Signals

alone except for deserters who crossed into France. Better access might be achieved if a northern

link through Austria was opened, but that was correctly considered to be literally the last thing that

would happen in the European Theatre.

As operations proceeded in Germany proper, substantial numbers of civilian forced labourers

from the USSR were found for the first time by Allied troops, particularly in camps in the indus-

trialised areas on the Rhine. Many of those workers were in bad shape since they had had to do

hard labour while being held in rather dismal conditions, particularly those imprisoned in the SS-

run concentration camps that were now beginning to be discovered. Mass executions and death

marches had been occurring throughout the German camp system since February ahead of the Al-

lied advance, reinforcing the urgency to act quickly in recovering the living.

The civilian prisoners would however add a whole new level of strain to the whole system, as

there were much more than ex-Soviets troops having served with or simply being held by the Ger-

mans. Rough estimates calculated that for every ex-Soviet POW, 15 forced labourers could be

expected to be encountered. That could easily mean hundreds of thousands, a monstrous number

to house, feed and transport. Moreover, they could not be expected to be disappeared into the mil-

itary system to official unacknowledgement of the major Allies in the face of Soviet protests. A

possible solution presented itself in connection with the more detached French attitude and the

tightening relations with Australia. In freshly liberated France, the Soviet forced labourers were

largely seen as simply more victims of the war, likely agreed to be helped as long as it did not run

directly counter to national interests – particularly feeding the domestic population.267

Australia actually suggested to pick up large numbers of DPs from French North Africa on ships

returning from the heavy traffic in grain between Australia and Egypt, with distribution extending

out to feed North Africa and Italy; elements in Canberra were hoping to siphon off their share of

immigrants from Europe for economic development, preferably skilled workers, though not neces-

sarily Russians. Support went as far as offering not only the shipping, with health and security

checks in Egypt, but accommodation in Australia, as installations previously housing a division’s

worth of US troops were now sitting empty with the Allied Pacific campaign well progressed. In

fact it was suggested to disguise the programme as raising a Russian American division for move-

ment against Singapore and eventually Japan itself if necessary.268

267 von Sieben, 1348-1374. 268 Lewis, p. 69.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

105

While this scheme offered excellent possibilities, numerous details remained to be worked out –

chiefly in how to get liberated prisoners from Germany to North Africa. Planners also had only the

faintest idea of the numbers and the necessary shipping space that might be involved. However,

the opportunity was too great to let slip over concerns of realisation, and discrete inquiries with the

French government were started in early April.269

Operation Varyag

The need for an integrated repatriation plan was reinforced by the first major participation of Rus-

sian American units in the strategic Allied offensives on 21st Army Group’s front, as opposed to

the earlier emergency response in the Ardennes and isolated actions at Dunkirk. 1st Marine Divi-

sion had previously been thought to join British I Corps under First Canadian Army, but that corps

left the Canadians effective 1 April and took over administration of the Antwerp logistics area for

21st Army Group. Instead, the marines reported to Canadian I Corps which had just arrived from

Italy under great operational secrecy in the Nijmegen area on 29 March; it would have the left wing

in the planned drive into the Netherlands.

1st Marine Replacement Battalion did not go with the division, but stayed behind in the Dunkirk

area. After replacing about 300 dead, missing and wounded of the division, it had received double

that number of recruits from the POW programme since the start of March. Most of those would

be sent on to Russian America after a six-week retraining course to replace the troops detached

from 1st Marine Regiment to the Southwest Pacific Task Force, thereby getting them out of Europe;

more would follow. On 1 April, 14th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment was officially activated to take

some of the flow of ex-POWs already brought to Russian America. Others had been filled into the

Navy Training and Replacement Regiments which had previously provided the personnel for 1st

Marine Replacement Battalion, and some into the Air Force Training Wings.

1st Airborne Brigade was now preparing for Operation Amherst, an airdrop into the Northern

Netherlands scheduled for 7 April. This would be in preparation for Canadian II Corps' move to-

wards Groningen, objectives being bridges and road intersections in the Dutch province of Drenthe,

Groningen and parts of Friesland, as well as two airfields at Havelte and Norg and the German

headquarters for Drenthe at Westerbork. Their commandoes would have Dutch personnel attached

and were also supposed to make contact with the local resistance and support any kind of activity

that would further the Canadian advance.

2nd Theatre Support Brigade was to relocate from Chievres to Nijmegen as soon as the Canadians

moved out from there; 1st Theatre Support Brigade was intended to go into Germany proper from

Reims, though with the quick advance it had not been decided yet where precisely. 3rd Theatre

Support Brigade was planned to be stood up on 8 April in the UK with troops from 4th Stoyanka

Infantry, III./2nd Quartermaster Battalion and other II Corps units.

Meanwhile 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade, having completed American re-equipment with Sher-

mans for the Czechoslovakian elements, Priest self-propelled howitzers for the artillery and Garand

rifles for the infantry, had also left Chievres to join Third US Army at Mainz by 4 April. They

needed to hurry if they wanted to see any action on the planned thrust towards Czechoslovakia,

because Patton's tanks had already advanced far into Hesse and were heading towards Kassel, with

no resistance in strength offered anywhere.270

269 von Sieben, 1374. 270 von Sieben, 1366-1377.

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106

On 2 April, Canadian I Corps launched Operation Destroyer into the German-occupied Nether-

lands at 0600 local time. The objective was to clear the enemy out of an “island” between the Lower

Rhine and Waal rivers and the Pannerdersch Canal surrounded by flooded areas between Nijmegen

and Arnhem, gain control of the left Rhine bank and cross it west of Arnhem, then take the city

while II Canadian Corps was crossing the Ijssel to the north.

1st Marine Division was on the right wing with 7th RTR attached, and was ordered to cross the

Rhine to the right of the Pannerdersch Canal, advance to the Ijssel east of Arnhem to secure the

flank of the thrust, and make contact with Canadian II Corps. The crossing was largely unopposed;

they made some prisoners on the far bank, mostly engineers who had been busy preparing positions

for infantry that never arrived.

German resistance over the day was unorganised, with isolated fierce fighting, but against troops

of doubtful quality, a far cry from the Dunkirk force. By nightfall, the towns of Pannerden and

Zevenaar had been taken – the latter four miles behind the Rhine – though heavier fire was received

from the Didam area, where surprisingly stiff resistance was met the next day. However, 1st Marine

Division was on the Ijssel on the morning of 4 April with support from fighter-bombers, including

Russian American ones. The other divisions in Canadian I Corps also completed their objectives

by clearing the “island” west of the Pannerdensch Canal and were now on the bank of the Lower

Rhine opposite Arnhem. Casualities were light, and several hundred German prisoners taken.

Regardless, there was some rest before the next move, which would be to take Arnhem and then

advance to the Ijsselmeer. 2nd Theatre Support Brigade was ordered to move to Nijmegen except

for a rear guard that would stay at the Chievres railhead. The unit was expected to work the front

end of the repatriation programme in the area of 21st Army Group, planned to encompass the Neth-

erlands, Northwest Germany above Münster and Hannover, and eventually hopefully Denmark.

1st Theatre Support Brigade, allocated to 12th Army Group, was being tentatively aimed at Aa-

chen, currently the farthest extension of the rail network that was being expeditely rebuilt from the

previous thorough Allied bombing, sabotage by resistance groups and German demolition behind

the advancing front. But as the situation was fluid, it was thought the brigade’s units might go even

further west to the Rhine to transport liberated prisoners there. Many forced labourers were ex-

pected to be still stuck in the Ruhr pocket with its heavily industrialised areas, under siege by First,

Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies.271

Rail links were playing a critical role in the talks with the French government about moving those

prisoners to North Africa as a staging point for Australia and ultimately Russian America. Connec-

tions already existed all the way from Aachen and Brussels to the French Riviera, most even dou-

ble-tracked.272 Shipping from there across the Mediterranean presented a bigger problem. While

few ships would be needed even for rather large numbers of passengers to be carried on deck in

warm weather over the short distance, very little was available either that was not already tied up

in the Allied war effort and controlled by either the US or UK. The Russian American merchant

fleet was about the only Allied tonnage for which this was not true – though even it insured with

London when not assuming the War Risk domestically – but had few ships in the European Theatre.

One vessel quickly found was the tramp SS Grand Duke Michael, a three-island-type ship built

on the Clyde in 1921, currently on a part Voyage Charter to the British Ministry of War Transport

to Liverpool. She had just cleared the Western Approaches in ballast with an Allied convoy for

Sydney, Nova Scotia, but was quickly turned for Gibraltar and then Marseilles, where she was

expected in the last week of April. It was calculated she alone could take at least 2,000 people a

week on deck passages across the Mediterranean of two days each. This was however at the low 271 Korichnev, Command, p. 207-213. 272 von Sieben, 1381.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

107

end of the possible capacity of the link from North Africa to Australia, projected to manage be-

tween 250 and 1,000 per day. The wish for low attention by others was also impeded by Allied

military control of all French ports.273

Spain was considered as a possible bypass since relations with Junograd had been good since the

deployment of Russian American volunteers on the Nationalist side in the Civil War, and were

improving again with the downfall of Germany imminent, after the Germans had previously

worked against this after having declared war on Russian America. Spanish ships were plying reg-

ular routes from the mainland to the Canaries, Balearic Islands and Spanish Morocco, from where

it was a short journey to Algeria or French Morocco. However, restoration of rail links to Spain

had nowhere near the same priority as in other areas of France, since the southwest of the country

had been largely bypassed by Allied troops.274

The Spanish shipping lines were also not running with much of an excess in capacity and would

be charging a hefty primum for diversions to other ports. Unless they could find paying cargo from

Cassablanca or similar destinations back to either end of their run, the full cost of the side trip in

both directions plus a surcharge for delay imposed on their regular trade would have to be paid,

and probably an extra slice on top of that.275

While money was not considered a major problem, easier solutions were preferred. The Russian

American Air Force had looked at the feasibility of air transport, and regretfully concluded that it

could only be of marginal use – though there was the possibility of forward supply flights moving

DPs and POWs back to their bases for onward transport by other means. The Air Force European

Command was already co-operating with the Signal Corps in a small way in this matter.276

Mainly however the theatre support brigades were envisioned to take smaller individual groups

to nationally-run campsites near railheads in Belgium, Germany and France, while also slowly

emptying liberated camps of Soviet forced labourers. Those would then be put on trains returning

to the Mediterranean ports from bringing supplies as capacities both in rolling stock and allowed,

avoiding stays in the ports themselves at best they could since there were little Russian American-

forces there for control, other than small Signals detachments. The same would apply for the North

African side, though quartering there was considered less critical in case arrivals from Europe

should not be too synchronised with departure to Australia.

Obviously this meant that some of the liberated prisoners would have to stay in their current

camps for some time, though many of those were offering appalling conditions. The biggest fear

of planners was that they would just melt away into the country after the German guards were gone

and Allied frontline troops had passed through. Already there were reports of freed forced labourers

looting and taking general revenge on the German population. Food and medical supplies were

therefore to be moved forward with the same trucks that would bring back those going on the trains,

enticing the prisoners to stay and hopefully drawing some back in who had left the camps.

At this point planners were working with a possible total number of 200-300,000 liberated Soviet

prisoners who might be willing to come to Russian America. It was assumed that with the Grand

Duke Michael and passengers on ships going regularly from French ports to Algeria, and from

Spanish to Morocco, transport could be increased to 3,000 per week. At that capacity, up to two

years would be needed to get them all out of Europe. That would make reception easy, but put a

large proportion at risk from changing Allied politics.

273 Lewis, p. 70. 274 von Sieben, 1383-1386. 275 Lewis, p. 70. 276 Bergmann, 1380-1385.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

108

Additional French shipping was hard to come by. Most of what had not been destroyed in the

war had been seized by either the Germans, British or Americans, and what the former left in

France they had mostly scuttled prior to withdrawl. While some ships had been refloated already

and the rest was being looked over, refurbishment took its time, and there were of course more

pressing French needs than the Russian American scheme. On the plus side, there were already

plans for the return of ships from Allied confiscation and the reestablishment of regular lines, in-

cluding trans-atlantic to the United States, Mexico and the French Antilles, which might benefit

the operation due to Junograd’s good contacts in Latin America.

Eventually some vessels under control of French authorities were found that could be pressed

into service with proper financial investment. One was the Cap Pinède, a small cargo ship built in

1938; she had taken part in the Dunkirk evacuation, and after the French surrender arrived at Cassa-

blanca where she had been laid up ever since the Allied 1942 ceasefire agreement with Admiral

Darland. Another was the Fort de France, one of three Swedish-built banana transports also dating

from 1938. Ceded to the Italians in 1942, she beached herself near La Goulette with 700 Allied

POWs aboard when attacked by Allied aircraft in 1943, was subsequently towed free but only to

be scuttled by the Germans to block the port of Tunis somewhat later. Refloated after Allied take-

over and towed to Bizerte where she had since been under repair, she might be available by May.

Finally there was Haiti, an old packet built in 1914. She was operating out of Algiers until 1943

when she was chartered by the British Ministry of War Transport, but judged too worn out and

returned to the French who used her as floating admirality quarters for some time. However, she

had since again made voyages to Cassablanca, Dakar and Corsica. With all those ships combined,

weekly throughput would rise substantially to 7,000-8,000, the upper end of capacity for the Aus-

tralian link. This would mean six to ten months to move the projected numbers, a far more accepta-

ble timeframe.

First priority was however given to moving as many DPs as possible into France. To accommo-

date them, orders were changed for relief of the Russian American units on Iceland. V./4th

Stoyanka Infantry Battalion which arrived there on 15 April did not replace 3rd Kenai Artillery

Group as planned, but II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion – the latter not going to

Russian America but Europe, there to build three transit camps with a combined capacity of 50,000

at Maubeuge on the Belgian border, at Metz and Strasbourg. There was grumbling in the units that

they would not go home as planned, but the makeshift camps so far used by the theatre support

brigades to collect individual DPs were no bearable solution in mid-term. Conditions at the liber-

ated forced labourer sites remained marginal despite supplies and medical aid being brought in.

Each transit camp would be tended to by the rear elements of the theatre support brigades while

the forward-operating transport companies would move DPs there from the sites in Germany, by

rail if possible, by truck if necessary, using provisional accommodation at their bases only if una-

voidable. The new camps would serve as a buffer to house people for longer periods while waiting

to go on the Mediterranean pipeline. It was hoped that by the time they were filled to capacity, the

system would have a balanced in- and output.

By mid-April, the overall repatriation effort had been codenamed Operation Varyag after the

Russian term for the Viking rulers of the medieval Kievan Rus’. The civilian side was appropriately

designated “Longboat”, and the already-running military recruitment programme of formerly So-

viet POWs “Battleaxe”.277

277 von Sieben, 1386-1406.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

109

Operations Amherst and Dykebreak

In the night towards 8 April, 1st Airborne Brigade jumped into the Northern Netherlands in Oper-

ation Amherst. Although the weather was barely acceptable, British aircraft dropped the paratroop-

ers by platoons and companies with varying degrees of accuracy into the triangle formed by the

towns of Groningen, Coevorden and Zwolle. There was no German antiaircraft fire, but due to

certain deficiencies in training, it proved impossible to land the heavier equipment of 3rd Parachute

Battalion; the RAF delivered some of it on the next day, and the rest was subsequently moved to

its owners by land. The troops themselves suffered no major losses in the drop, though the com-

mander of 2nd Commando Battalion took a branch into an eye when he landed in a pine tree.

On the plus side of the heavy clouds, they were not detected by the Germans before they ap-

proached their objectives, and various bridges were quickly secured. The Steenwijk airfields saw

intense combat though, and 2nd Commando Battalion conducted running battles with German

troops in the Appelscha area in the province of Friesland. Canadian II Corps forces were immedi-

ately pushing north to link up with the Russian Americans. 18th Armoured Car Regiment met 1st

Parachute Battalion at Meppel on the 9th, and a motorised battalion from 1st Polish Armoured

Division joined hands with 2nd Battalion.

Other units remained isolated for now, but were merrily attacking German troops, destroying

communications and generally making life difficult for the enemy. There was some concern for

those farthest north since they were projected to be overrun after 72 hours, but General Crerar of

First Canadian Army saw no need yet to divert more Polish forces from the thrust towards Emmen.

In fact a platoon of 3rd Commando Battalion was saved from imminent annihilation by a superior

German force at the village of Spier they had taken by the timely arrival of Canadian 8th Recon-

naissance Regiment in the morning of the 11th in the best tradition of American Western movies.

By 12 April, most troops from 1st Airborne Brigade were back in the fold. There were still some

isolated groups, but their stocks were holding up. To this date, 12 KIAs, 14 WIAs and 65 missing

had been reported, though the latter number was hoped to shrink quickly as scattered units returned.

On the other hand, troops had made over 900 prisoners, and all the objectives of the operation had

been achieved. The Canadians reached Groningen on the 13th, and a push by 1st Armoured Car

Regiment across the Dolder Canal established contact with the last units on the 14th; as expected,

MIA numbers had gone down, though on the downside KIAs were up to 24 and WIAs to 29.278

Rather than settling down for some rest after a week of fighting, at this point 1st Airborne Brigade

troops had already been alerted for possible new deployment in an unexpected contingency. Two

days previously, Junograd had received word of Allied intelligence that a revolt by a Georgian

Ostbataillon was underway on the island of Texel off the Dutch coast. On the night of 5/6 April,

the about 800 troops of 882nd Infantry Battalion “Queen Tamara”, disagreeing with movement

orders to oppose the Canadians on the Dutch mainland and expecting an Allied landing soon, had

killed most of their German personnel in their sleep and tried to secure the island over the next day.

The Georgians did however not manage to take the coastal battery at Den Hoorn and another one

in the north of Texel. The German crews alerted their comrades on the mainland, and batteries at

the port of Den Helder and the next island to the north, Vlieland, subsequently started shelling the

towns of Den Burg and De Waal on Texel, killing at least 40 inhabitants. The Germans then landed

the 163rd Marine-Schützenregiment with tank support from Den Helder to regain control of the

island, forcing the Georgians to retreat north. The latter were assisted by the local Dutch under-

ground and resisted fiercely, but were outnumbered and outgunned.

278 Korichnev, Command, p. 220-227.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

110

On the night of 7/8 April, ten local Dutchmen and four Georgians stole the Texel lifeboat and

sailed her to Mundesley on the English coast, carrying letters to Allied commanders and the Rus-

sian American ambassador in London begging for help and supplies, and particularly bombardment

of the coastal batteries. They were briefly interrogated by British authorities, the Dutch separated

from the Georgians, and both groups brought to London on the night of the 10th. There the Geor-

gians were interrogated again by British military intelligence, and an overflight by an RAF recon-

naissance plane on the 11th confirmed fighting on Texel.

Then the whole ambiguity of the POW issue struck again, and the British debated what to do with

the four Georgians. But at least their letter to the Russian American ambassador was eventually

forwarded, and embassy staff was able to visit and lay claim to them on the 12th. They estimated

that their comrades might be able to hold out for a week or maybe ten more days, but would inev-

itably be overwhelmed eventually. The Allies were not willing to divert any ressources their way

though, since it meant to go out of their way for a rather small cause in the grand scheme of things.

Obviously it was not such a small cause for Junograd, but Russian American ressources were

much more limited, too. Supplies to the Georgians could certainly be dropped using the Air Force’s

European liaison flight which was still under national control. 7.92 and 9 mm ammunition for

German issue infantry weapons could be sourced from the regular Allied supply chain, and food

and medical supplies were no problem at all. On the other hand, while German fighters were not

much of a problem any more in the area, when it came to escort and particularly air support capa-

bilities, the limits of national control about Russian American assets were met again. Planners

wanted to drop some forward observers for liaison and coordination of attacks by fighter-bombers

onto the island to help the Georgians fend off the Germans, but were not sure the latter could be

pried loose from 2nd Tactical Air Force.279

Relieving the rebels with ground troops was also difficult. Even if 1st Airborne Brigade could be

used, there was no airlift capacity to jump the troops onto Texel except using the same liaison

aircraft – maybe a company at a time, which seemed more risky then helpful. Neither were landing

craft under Russian American control other than the Amtracs and small boats of 1st Marine Divi-

sion. However, this turned out to be a lesser problem than initially thought as the West Frisian

Islands were almost accessible by foot during low tide. There was the issue of the LVTs' behaviour

on muddy ground again of course, but the islands were just ten miles from the mainland, and the

sea behind their barrier was generally calm. There were actually two smaller islands or sand bars

between the coastal town of Harlingen and Vlieland, Texel's neighbour to the north housing one of

the German batteries shelling it.

The problem was getting there; almost everything west of the Dolder Canal was still controlled

by the Germans. Moreover, 1st Marine Division was currently engaged in battle at Apeldoorn un-

der Canadian I Corps, attacking from the south while Canadian 1st Division was coming from the

east. They were rolling up German defenses along the Apeldoorn Canal – something they were

very familiar with from Dunkirk – but would probably take a couple more days, and then would be

no closer to the North Sea coast then now.

Still, talks with the Canadians to release the marines after Apeldoorn was taken commenced im-

mediately. They were helped by Montgomery communicating a change in strategy on 13 April,

now concentrating on the advance to the Elbe while leaving the Western Netherlands south of the

Ijsselmeer where Canadian I Corps had been planned to go alone. At the behest of the Dutch gov-

ernment-in-exile, there were negotiations with the Germans for humanitarian aid to the population

concentrated in that area without exposing them to the dangers of combat in a war soon to end.

279 von Sieben, 1394-1397.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

111

With Canadian 1st Infantry Division back under I Corps after having previously been borrowed to

II Corps for operations in the area, the marines could clear the area north of Harderwijk, then cross

the Ijssel west of Zwolle and transfer to II Corps for operations on the North Sea Coast.

On 14 April, 1st Marine Division cut off Apeldoorn to the west against moderate resistance,

though the German retreat was covered by snipers and self-propelled guns. Canadian 1st Infantry

Division was on the Apeldoorn Canal from the east, and it was hoped the enemy could just be

squeezed out of the town to the north without the need for heavy house-to-house fighting. With

Arnhem cleared the same day, Canadian 5th Armoured and British 49th Infantry Division were

planned to push through to the Ijsselmeer and mop up resistance there.280

The Air Force was able to move more quickly. Like a large part of the Allied air forces in Europe

the Russian American fighters were rather redundant at this point, and even the Mosquitoes were

desperately looking for things to do; the fighting that was still going on did not provide enough

targets for the aircraft available. It was hoped that C-47s escorted by Mosquito FBs could be sent

to at least drop supplies and some liaison officers, and possibly bomb and strafe the Germans, too.

The British were willing to yield at least one of the Russian American squadrons, and a call for

volunteers to jump in for ground liaison went out to the Commando battalions and Forward Ob-

server/Security Platoons operating with 1st Airborne Brigade and 1st Marine Division. It was also

investigated whether some additional transport aircraft could be moved to Europe at short notice,

but it was clear this would probably take a week, too.

The first Mosquito raid went in the evening of 14 April following orders issued by Air Force

European Command in the expectation of release of the aircraft being approved, though the ap-

proval ended up being retrospective. Nobody complained much, apart from the British Mosquito

base commander who found out only after they were airborne. Following information from the

Georgian escapers, they bombed and strafed German gun batteries. None were lost, but some dam-

aged by ground fire. Ammunition and some captured German infantry weapons were dropped, too,

and the Georgians were told how to mark drop sites in a note written in Georgian, delivered in a

package wrapped in a Georgian flag and dropped with great care by one of the Mosquitoes.

On 15 April, full operational control of 10th Attack Wing was given for the duration of the Texel

operation, the first and only time since the reduction of Dunkirk. A full C-47 squadron was ex-

pected to be available in Europe four days from then. The call for volunteers had also yielded a

complete company to be dropped onto Texel, but planners limited themselves to a commando pla-

toon reinforced by a forward observer squad from the Air Force.281

The commandoes were told to go heavy on bazookas to alleviate the problem of German armour

support, and else bring only weapons firing German ammunition. Those had been meant to be

mostly RBZ M43 9 mm submachineguns – the company actually having been renamed Czeskogo

Rossii Zavoda in September 1944 to keep the Russian, Czech and English nomenclature consistent

– but a lot of booty guns were produced. The party was therefore also heavy on German ma-

chineguns and automatic rifles, though their most dangerous weapons would be their radio sets.

They were to be picked up at the freshly-taken Steenwijk airfield and dropped onto the island

along with some more supplies by a direct flight. In the northern Netherlands, the main thrust by

Canadian 3rd Infantry Division that had connected to the last Russian American paratroopers on

the fringes reached Leeuwarden on 15 April, and 1st Armoured Car Regiment pushed patrols to

Dokkum and Zoutkamp on the North Sea coast against hardly any resistance; by the following day,

the shore at Harlingen and the eastern end of the Ijsselmeer causeway was secured, providing

280 Korichnev, Command, p. 225-227. 281 Kovalyev, p. 70.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

112

friendly territory to fly over and a possible jumpoff point for an amphibious crossing to the West

Frisian Islands. It was considered to airland more troops from 1st Airborne Brigade once a firm

grip on the ground situation was achieved through the avance party and more airlift capacity be-

came available, particularly some heavy companies for more firepower.282

Also on the 15th, the Germans retreated from Apeldoorn as hoped, and 1st Marine Division

pushed north after them towards the Ijssel and Ijsselmeer; but they would take at least four more

days to even get to the North Sea. The operation would therefore continue to be led by the Air

Force under the codename “Tamara” until substantial ground forces arrived, since its European

Command had capacity to spare for that. The air portion would subsequently continue under that

designation, though the overall effort to secure Texel was named “Dykebreak”.283

The Fight for Texel

The unexpected death of US President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 had a profound impact on Rus-

sian American interaction with the United States and, by extension, the other Allied powers in

pursuit of the war effort. For all his unquestionable achievements, Roosevelt had been all to taken

with the Soviets in Junograd’s view, and shown unwarranted trust in Stalin's intentions for a future

world order – something he had realised lately was going to be disappointed. Time and again,

Russian America had been frustrated with her interests taking a back seat in the alliance to placate

the USSR which brought so much more to the table in military power, despite Junograd still being

the only officially recognised government of all of the former Russian Empire.

Roosevelt’s successor Truman was widely considered inexperienced in foreign affairs, but that

was not necessarily seen as a bad thing by Junograd as he might be more open to the Russian

American point of view. Roosevelt had been hung up on his UNO project in connection with the

prisoner repatriation issue, holding out for the Soviets to join; Truman was hoped to just go ahead

and call the long-expected founding conference without them. Faced with Washington having long

recognised Moscow as a legitimate government in all but official declaration – else the agreements

of the Big Three would not have held any meaning – this was considered a chance to get preferential

status by becoming part of the organisation without the Soviets.

There were however no quick repercussions for ongoing operations. The volunteer liaision pla-

toon from 1st Airborne Brigade jumped onto Texel without major injuries on 16 April and estab-

lished contact with both some very enthusiast Georgians and Russian American higher echelons.

The previous bombing of the shore batteries had given the Germans some pause, but they were still

pushing north along the island with superior numbers and firepower. The Georgians had retreated

to positions north of the village of De Koog and were trying to use the small canals as defensive

lines, but had suffered in excess of 150 casualities already. Fighting was very fierce, with many

farms burned down and civilians killed in what used to be a peaceful backwater of the war. With

forward observers now in place, it was hoped to stop or at least slow the German advance until

more ground troops could arrive.

1st Marine Division cleared the area between the Ijssel and Ijsselmeer north of Harderwijk on the

same day, making many prisoners who had been trapped between them and the Canadian-held

eastern bank of the river. On 17 April, it detached a regimental battlegroup of two infantry battal-

ions and 1st Marine Armoured Battalion to cross over and make their way to Harlingen, already

taken by Canadian 3rd Infantry Division. Most of the force arrived in the evening already, though

282 Korichnev, Command, p. 232. 283 von Sieben, 1402-1404.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

113

some LVTs broke down on the way again. From Harlingen, they could assault Vlieland to the north

of Texel with the receding tide, garrisoned by one German coastal battery of four Dutch 10.5 cm

guns in the west and one with three 15 cm guns in the east. The main worry was that though it was

only ten nautical miles across – much less at low water – that was still a bit far for friendly artillery

support, so troops might continue to depend all on air support.

Following an urgent request for medical treatment of the Georgian wounded on Texel, half of

2nd Army Aviation Squadron operating with the Marines was also moved to Harlingen, which

subsequently started flying in voluntary medical personnel and evacuate as many cases as possible

with their L-5 STOL planes and R-6 helicopters in the next days. The German advance had slowed

somewhat with the acknowledgement of outside interference. Still, the enemy kept pushing on

north, and the chief concern was to keep sufficient drop zones for aerial supply. A complete C-47

squadron was to be in theatre by the 19th, which could start dropping two parachute companies at

a time for direct reinforcements, possibly a full battalion on a day; but obviously there would best

be some friendly-held territory to land in.

The advance element of 1st Marine Division spent 18 April investigating the coast around Harl-

ingen and tide conditions in particular, aided by observation flights and hand-shot photos taken

from some 2nd Army Aviation Squadron aircraft as well as boat trips by the organic engineer

company. It turned out that at low water there were only three major tidal creeks to cross to get to

Vlieland, the largest no wider than three nautical miles. In fact crossing the same creek at an even

narrower point closer to the coast, one could move directly to Texel, the main problem being that

the tides moved very fast across the shallow littoral zone, with resulting strong currents.

That could be used to add speed to the approach to the targets, but of course the currents were

ultimately flowing around and between the islands, and it would need very precise calculation to

use water and exposed ground at appropriate time. The Amtrac crews took a few of their vehicles

out and opined that optimal conditions would be going through just a few feet of water where the

tracks still had a grip on the ground, but buoyancy had enough effect that they were unlikely to get

stuck in the prevalent sandy mud. However, at about eight feet tidal difference was only the overall

height of an LVT, and depths change rapidly. Moreover, this channeled the assault into predictable

narrow paths, and though the Germans had not originally planned for landings from the land side,

they were aware that the coast was in Allied hands now.

For this reason, it was prefer to go directly to Texel into a friendly-held landing zone. However,

the area where the low tide approach was reaching the island was a rather narrow zone in the north

which began just behind the current Georgian lines, and might be lost soon. The total distance to

be travelled by the LVTs would be 18.5 nautical miles, the last third hopefully on their tracks. It

still might take them three hours, so they would have to launch at receding half tide under possible

fire from the German batteries on the islands – though those on Texel itself had taken quite a bit of

damage from the Russian American air raids.

The rest of the LVTs arrived in the evening of the 18th while the rest of 1st Marine Division

transfered to Canadian II Corps and was now in the Heerenveen area, expected on the coast the

following day. Vessels found in the port of Harlingen were being explored, too, following an idea

to land one or two companies on the north tip of Texel to help holding the landing site ahead of the

Amtrac assault. The engineers' storm boats, while not meant for sea operations, might still suffice

for a short inshore trip with the receding tide, particularly if towed by a fishing trawler or similar.

Then on 19 April, the Germans promptly overran most of the intended landing zone on Texel.

By the 20th, the Georgians were pushed into a triangle of approximately two by three by four

kilometres in the Cocksdorp area at the northern tip of the island; this made even conventional

landings with requisitioned vessels dangerous due to German fire, a prospect not cherished by their

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114

local crews. Unfortunately there were not many to begin with, the Germans having seized much of

the Dutch fishing fleet for their purposes and scuttled some of the remaining vessels in the port of

Harlingen upon approach of the Canadians. However, in light of the urgency of the situation the

marines eventually assembled a motley fleet of smaller cutters, yachts, a ferry, the local lifeboat

and a few other ships, some of which were also able to take one or more LVTs in tow for added

seaworthiness of the latter, others taking the engineers' storm boats aboard to land.

This curious armada went out with the evening tide of 20 April, and though some craft were lost

enroute, they managed to put most of an Amtrac company, an infantry and a heavy mortar company

ashore during the night at an inshore sandbank on Texel's north tip previously marked by a small

beachmaster squad flown in with the observation aircraft and helicopters. The increase in firepower

was immediately noticeable, and on 21 April the Germans were pinned down sufficiently by 75

mm and 107 mm fire in concert with more frequent air attacks from closer Dutch bases that they

made no new gains on the shortened frontline.

Fire support thus already in place and with the gained experience in navigation, an opposed am-

phibious landing was staged against the originally selected beach zone, with some local vessels

acting as safety craft in the tidal creeks and deep water either side of the advance route. There were

still losses to treacherous littoral conditions and German artillery again, LVTs breaking down or

getting stuck; but the operation as a whole was largely successful, and by nightfall two full Marine

battalions were ashore at a beachhead in the flank of the German attack on the Cocksdorp area.

Faced with fresh well-equipped troops, the enemy subsequently fell back to straighten his lines,

and on 22 April the northern quarter of the island was again under friendly control while the im-

promptu fleet was shuttling in reinforcements piecemeal, taking out casualities on the return leg.

This was increasingly obviating the need for an additional airborne operation. A parachute battalion

was being kept ready to deploy at some hours' notice at Steenwijk just in case; but already, German

resistance was assuming the familiar lackluster pattern encountered in the Allied advance through

the Netherlands, some troops having surrendered straight away as the marines landed – though

again they were rather shocked to find themselves in Russian captivity.

After more precarious LVT trips back and forth to the mainland over another tidal cycle, 2nd

Marines were complete on Texel by 23 April, including their cannon company which gave them a

bit of much-needed artillery support. With this, they went on the offensive and were now pushing

the Germans south, taking the decommissioned airfield near the center of the island on the 24th,

while the Georgians were able to withdraw from combat after having suffered nearly 230 casuali-

ties in more than two weeks of continuous fighting, about half of them killed. Four killed, seven

wounded and one missing were also lost from the liaison platoon that had jumped in.

Until 25 April the Germans on Texel fell back quickly, but resistance hardened up around various

fortifications on the De Koog-Den Burg-Oudeschild line as the enemy landed some reinforcements

from the mainland. Artillery fire also increased as the marines were now in range of a battery of

six old French 194 mm railway guns which the Germans had installed for coastal defense west of

Den Helder.284 Still, many German soldiers kept surrendering to Russian American troops; most

were really sailors from navy replacement units which had been formed into the 16th Marine In-

fantry Division recently, and an encounter with real marines persuaded them that dying in a losing

war which might only last days at this point was not a sensible thing to aspire to. The Air Force

had supported that conviction through drops of leaflets, listing major cities of Germany in Allied

hands and the link-up between Eastern and Western fronts, calling on German troops to stop

fighting and save themselves, for the sake of their families and to rebuild their country.285 284 Korichnev, Command, p. 234-244. 285 Kovalyev, p. 71.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

115

The German North Texel battery was found to contain four 10.5 cm cannon in seaward casemates,

two Soviet 7.62 cm cannon in flanking bunkers, and a radar set that was however destroyed during

the fighting. According to the Georgians, the south battery contained two Dutch 12 cm and a 15

cm cannon with another radar set. There were also two navy anti-air batteries with four 10.5 guns

in steel turrets each and a non-operational coastal battery with six Polish 10.5 cm guns, plus various

bunkers with 8.8, 7.62, 5 and 3.7 cm guns. To the north, Vlieland housed two more navy AA

batteries of the same type as Texel.

Those batteries, of which at least some guns were still active despite the best efforts of the Air

Force, were now the biggest problem. The Vlieland positions were intended to become the target

of an airborne assault or another amphibious crossing by 3rd Marine Regiment; the division was

working on detailed plans based upon the information delivered by the Georgians. A battalion from

3rd Marines was transferred to the island on 25 April in preparation for a flanking attack across the

narrow strait towards Vlieland in the north while another was intended to follow the originally

mapped route from Harlingen.

The Amtrac crews had by now developed a certain routine of navigating the littorals at low tide,

though about half a dozen vehicles had been lost to a combination of mechanical breakdowns, the

boggy ground and being swamped by the rapidly changing currents, with a few more to enemy

action, mostly ashore. Safety vessels crewed by local Dutchmen had been able to recover most of

the occupants at sea, though there had been a fair share of drownings. But overall losses had been

light so far, with most due to German artillery.

On 26 April, 3rd Marine Regiment launched a two-pronged amphibious attack onto Vlieland and

proceeded rapidly to the German anti-aircraft batteries there. Though fighting around hardened

positions continued throughout the day, the shelling of Texel from the north stopped. There, 2nd

Marines took the German main base at Den Burg and the port of Oudenschild the same day, so that

they now controlled two thirds and the main harbour of Texel. This limited entry to the small har-

bour of 't Horntje on the south tip of the island for the Germans, and as the marines pushed on, it

also limited their capacity for evacuation. Marine engineers had taken to the old Texel airfield, but

the boat links to the mainland would very likely obviate the need for supply by aircraft soon.286

Requests for air drops on had almost ceased already since local boatmen were now willing to

bring in supplies to the small harbour of Cocksdorp in the north of the island, and a regular shuttle

was in place. The Air Force was therefore freeing up the newly available transport aircraft for

supporting Operation Varyag, flying in emergency medical supplies and food for liberated prison-

ers to forward locations and flying out anyone who those responsible on the ground wanted moved,

mostly medical evacuations. German air opposition was effectively non-existent now, and the main

limit to operations was the availability of landing grounds.287

Most enemy forces on Texel and Vlieland surrendered on 27 April with nowhere to go, though

the navy AA battery on the opposite side of the 't Horntje inlet was still active along with the

artillery at Den Helder on the mainland. That last battery on Texel gave up on the next day after a

few shells in direct fire onto its positions. Intermittent fire from the mainland continued afterwards,

but the island itself was secured, as was Vlieland. By 30 April main activities were processing of

casualities and prisoners as well as humanitarian aid to local civilians who had suffered quite a bit

during the fighting; over 100 Dutch were killed.

The other West Frisian Islands to the northeast of Vlieland also harboured one or two of the same

type of 10.5 cm navy AA batteries each but not much else according to the Georgians, certainly no

286 Korichnev, Command, p. 242-246. 287 Kovalyev, p. 71.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

116

major contingents of Osttruppen; they were thought to be best left alone until the general surrender

of German troops in the Netherlands which could be but days away now. Despite the artillery fire

from Den Helder, crossing over to the mainland from Texel was not really an option either; not

only was the port heavily fortified with a strong garrison, but this would run counter to the Allied

policy to spare the densely populated parts of Holland the effects of fighting in those last days.

The Texel Georgians were moved to Chievres to Signal's former battle school which had been

acting mostly as a replacement unit for the Guards Cavalry and Airborne brigades since the latter

left there for their current assignments. Along with many Chievres Ukrainians who had revolted

against their own German leadership in 30th SS Waffen-Grenadierdivision, they would go on to

join 1st Marine Replacement Battalion at Dunkirk, which would thereby grow into a regiment.288

To the Czechoslovakian Border

Meanwhile the war in Europe was tangibly drawing to a close. For Russian America, this also

meant a wary eye on the Soviet advance from the east as the recovery of POWs and forced labourers

under Operation Varyag began to pick up speed. Frustratingly, this was a race Junograd could

largely watch only from the sidelines and the Western side did not really intend to win; Eisenhower

was putting deconfliction with Soviet interest above securing territory for Western influence, in-

cluding leaving Berlin to them.289

Challenges in the war-ravaged countries of Europe were now as much humanitarian as military.

Even in areas already liberated from German occupation, conditions were frequently appalling as

Allied military authorities and reinstated national governments struggled to secure supply of the

population and install rule of law in the face of farspread human misery, millions of displaced

persons, an abundance of weapons, and scores being settled between purported resistance fighters

and collaborators, often leading to conflict of authority. Russian American troops had to operate in

this complex environment while pursueing the national interest in recruiting former Soviet prison-

ers for resettlement, getting into their share of conflict outside combat.

An incident reported from the area of Russian American 1st Airborne Brigade in the northern

Netherlands on 16 April concerned a truck column from 2nd Theatre Support Brigade with mostly

female drivers on a supply run that was held up in a place they were passing through by what turned

out to be an impromptu tribunal of the Dutch resistance against local ladies accused of having

entertained intimate relationships with the German occupiers. When those were getting their hair

shorn off for humiliation in the common punishment, the Russian American women took offence,

and an altercation ensued; nobody was injured, though there were allegedly some cutting remarks

about men who could not defend their country but bravely deal with defenceless women.

In the end, the soldiers put some of them on the trucks and drove off. The locals subsequently

complained at higher echelons about being occupied by foreigners again hardly that they had been

liberated from the Germans. The senior Russian American officer who wound up as the adressee

had the presence of mind to explain that the ladies in question had not really been saved from

justice but were being considered for deportation to Russian America as Nazi collaborators – a

somewhat wide interpretation of the inofficial encouragement to address the feared imbalance to-

wards male Varyag recruits, though the Dutch did not ask for the women to be handed back.290

288 Korichnev, Command, p. 247-250. 289 von Sieben, 1383-1386. 290 Korichnev, Command, p. 244.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

117

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade had reported to US XII Corps at Mainz on 4 April as ordered, but

the latter's front was already far to the east in Thuringia at this point; the Soviets were on the Oder

and Neisse Rivers, and had already crossed into Slovakia. Still, the brigade got orders to move up

as quickly as possible; there was word that the Czechoslovakians of the formation would be al-

lowed to be among the first to cross into their homeland, about which there was considerable en-

thusiasm among them. After progressing through Frankfurt am Main and Hesse, the brigade closed

with the frontline of XII Corps on 8 April near Suhl in Thuringia, about 50 miles from the Czech

border. Then it was promptly put in reserve as the corps prepared to take Coburg in northern Ba-

varia, then move on towards Bayreuth as it continued in the general direction of the border.

On 11 April, when XII Corps resumed its advance after regrouping, 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade

was deployed on its left wing with US 90th Infantry Division and intended to screen towards

Czechoslovakia. US 11th Armored Division was leading the advance towards Bayreuth on the right

with a screen from US 2nd Cavalry Group, with US 71st Infantry Division following and 26th

Infantry Division in the center. The corps’ orders were to cut to the border, then proceed southeast

towards Austria to block any German forces in the northeast from reaching the rumoured alpine

redoubt. There were no orders to actually enter Czechoslovakia yet; moreover, this part of the

border was dominated by heavily wooded heights, not exactly cavalry country.

Yet the troops of CZ 1st Tank Battalion within the Guards Cavalry Brigade were still hopeful

that they would get to raise their flag on home soil eventually. Meanwhile the Guards were working

well with their immediate neighbors of 90th Infantry Division, mostly southerners from Texas and

Oklahoma who however had some experience with Eastern European allies as they had met Polish

1st Armoured Division when they closed the Falaise Gap. There were no reports about organisa-

tional or doctrinal issues, and most importantly the logistics were working. Even 9 mm pistol am-

munition turned out to be somewhat interchangeable with the Americans; when the latter had taken

Zella in Thuringia, they had liberated the Walther factory there, and somehow many German P 38

pistols had ended up in unofficial possession of the troops.

Rather than combat, the main activity in the area was now processing masses of prisoners, many

of whom were just looking for some Allied troops to surrender to. There were also many other

groups to deal with – German refugees, fomer inmates of the infamous concentration camps who

had been marched away by their guards ahead of advancing Allied forces, liberated Allied POWs

and forced labourers, many of them fitting Russian American criteria for repatriation.

On 13 April the Guards reached the town of Sonnenberg, known for its toy industry though lately

much of it had been replaced by uniform factories. Quite typically for operations at this stage, they

merely took the first outlying house with a telephone, called the mayor to demand the town's sur-

render, fired a couple shells for emphasis, then rode into town while liberated Russian and Polish

girls from the factories were throwing dolls at them. After that, every vehicle had a teddy bear or

similiar riding along.

On 14 April, XII Corps took Bayreuth while 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was in the Hof area

with 90th Infantry Division, the latter taking that city on the following day. Finally on 18 April, at

least some of the Czechs in the brigade got to cross their homeland border. 2nd and 3rd Company

of CZ 1st Tank Battalion went out in the morning at 0800 local time, each reinforced by a mecha-

nised infantry platoon from the Guards. 3rd Company crossed the border near the village of Prex,

east of Hof, at 0915 against small arms fire and took some prisoners. 2nd Company crossed at

1115, and the force took the nearby town of Hranice. They thus merely liberated the most north-

western bit of Czechoslovakia, but national feelings were running understandably high.

Overall, German resistance in the border areas of the Sudetenland was much less than expected

and offered mostly by SS and local Volkssturm homeguard units. On 20 April, patrols were able to

Part V: 1945 in Europe

118

enter the city of Aš almost unopposed. A report from Hranice on the same day mentioned only

sporadic artillery fire. However, German resistance intensified to the southeast. Local Czechs –

and even some Germans – warned troops that the city of Eger (Cheb) would probably be held and

require force, so the brigade’s units were concentrating somewhat after a long hurried advance.

Since many Germans were suspicious of surrendering to Russians of any kind, the “America” in

“Russian America” was now stressed to the point of flying the Stars and Stripes over the brigade’s

vehicles, helping enemy troops to give up. There had always been shocked reactions by German

soldiers meeting Russian troops on the wrong front, but that had been nothing compared to those

now encountered who were desperately trying to avoid capture by the Soviets, and thought they

might have fled in the wrong direction.

Interrogation of German POWs showed that there were vast amounts of Osttruppen in the Reich

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Chief among them were Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army

troops, apparently concentrated in Central Bohemia after the March fights along the Oder River

and being re-armed and resupplied. Several Guards officers volunteered to try to establish contact,

however the proposal of travelling in German uniforms – with predictable results if discovered –

was deemed too dangerous. Czech troops were trying to use the telephone network to gather more

information. So far they had managed only local calls which reached mostly Germans, but still

provided results in persuading smaller remote garrisons to surrender. They were however working

on getting in contact with larger cities, primarily Pilsen and Prague.

US units were generally curbing their advance, preparing to secure the Bavarian border which so

far was the official demarcation line with the Soviets. The Americans wanted to eventually cross

into Czechoslovakia in force more to the south, due to better roads there. Still the Russian-Czech-

oslovakian side was bombarding higher echelons with suggestions for the next advances and re-

quests for orders. For now it was stressed that the Skoda works in Pilsen were the last big weapons

factory still in German hands, and taking them was crucial for a faster end of the war. What was

being left unsaid was that with the Soviets still bogged down in Silesia and Moravia, the Czecho-

slovakians of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade might be the first to reach Prague if allowed to, rather

than Czech troops fighting with the Soviets. In the meantime, the brigade dedicated itself to ag-

gressive patrols deeper inland. On 22 April, its position was roughly on the line Hazlov-Hohenberg-

Waldsassen-Tirschenreuth-Falkenberg, though spread relatively thin in the south.291

Higher Russian American echelons were also thinking about ways to give the brigade greater

operational flexibility to better pursue the joint Russian-Czech interests. One idea was to put a

Czechoslovakian officer in nominal command, who whould then basically act as a national military

leader in his own home country. Obviously this would need at least the backing of the London

government-in-exile, elements of which were however more friendly towards the Soviets and were

expected to at least delay such a decision. On the other hand it was thought that a greater appreci-

ation of Junograd’s positions was beginning to be detected at the highest American level after the

change in the presidency. General Patton of Third US Army was also considered to be sympathetic

on the grounds of the simple reason that it would annoy the Soviets.

The most inertia was expected at the SHAEF level, and for practical rather than political reasons;

Eisenhower understandably did not want national contingents to wander off in pursuit of their pri-

vate wars, unless it did not affect the overall effort like the Dunkirk and Texel operations. He also

wanted to avoid Western Allied and Soviet troops – much less Soviets and Russian Americans –

to rush headlong into each other for fear of unfortunate incidents, though obviously at one point

they would have to meet with both sides now moving onto the Elbe River.

291 Tuček, p. 70-71.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

119

Successive restraining lines had been enacted to prevent run-ins, mostly larger rivers that were

hard to miss and provided physical barriers. US XII Corps was currently still headed in a general

southeastern direction towards Austria, having taken the town of Weiden on 22 April. Allegedly

the ultimate eastern limit of advance would be the Chemnitz-Linz railway line, though Junograd

held that if there had to be a restraining line at all, the Elbe, Vltava and Enns Rivers would make a

lot more sense.292

On 23 April, 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade along with US 90th Infantry Division made a disturbing

find when a patrol of 3rd Squadron 7th Cossack Regiment discovered the concentration camp of

Flossenbürg at 0900 hours. After breaking down the gate unopposed, the troops encountered ap-

proximately 1,600 prisoners in a dismal state of health and nutrition, mostly of Soviet, Polish and

Hungarian nationality. Those survivors reported that the camp had originally held in excess of

10,000 forced to work in nearby quarries, but many had been executed ahead of the Allied advance

and the rest marched off by the guards on the previous day, except those too sick to walk.

Several hundred charred bodies were found in piles burned outside because according to the in-

mates, capacity of the camp’s crematorium had been insufficient for the mass killing. About 100

more were found dead in the infirmary and barracks as well as shot on roadsides outside the camp,

disposed of by the SS when they could not keep up with the march. The recent executions had

included the former head of German military intelligence, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and others

implicated in last year’s 20 July assassination attempt on Hitler. No guards were encountered.

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade could do little but request massive logistical and medical assistance

to treat and feed survivors, and dispose of the dead bodies. Approximately 70 additional inmates

died within 24 hours of liberation despite immediate care with available means. Most of the sub-

sequent work would fall on the shoulders of 90th Infantry Division while 1st Guards Cavalry also

requested priority evacuation for the Russian prisoners under Operation Varyag through national

channels, and searched for those marched off and their guards while continueing to screen due

southeast for XII Corps.293

It was eventually estimated that the Flossenbürg camp had held more than 16,000 prisoners. The

SS kept driving the bulk to the south without food and shooting the weak right until XII Corps

troops were on top of them, then just melted away. Several thousand bodies were found along the

route of the march; more survivors were encountered daily in the area north of Cham, having

crawled into woods and barns for shelter if they were not strong enough to keep walking. With

those discoveries, the mood towards German POWs and the general population took a swing to the

worse among Allied troops. SS personnel would sometimes be shot out of hand, to the point that

the Junograd War Ministry cautioned that retribution should not get out of control.294

Meanwhile on 24 April, 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade undertook what was labeled a reconnais-

sance in force towards Eger/Cheb to conform to the overall prohibition of major offensives across

the border. Not quite unintendedly, this developed into a tough battle for the city, held in force.

Immediately after it was secured, patrols were approached by two German officers which turned

out to be two officers of Vlasov’s 1st Division Russian Liberation Army in disguise.

Apparently the mood in the formation was rather mutinous given the impending defeat of Ger-

many, and there were thoughts to switch sides in hope to save the skin of the troops who would

certainly be claimed for trial as traitors by the Soviets if taken into Allied captivity, with undoubtful

outcomes. In recent days the ROA had already been trying to establish contact with the Czech

underground, then heard that the “Americans” in this area were actually Russian – which was

292 von Sieben, 1410-1412. 293 Tuček, p. 71. 294 von Sieben, 1416.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

120

something the German command seemed not to have told them. Vlasov’s troops were in a prime

position, de facto controlling an easy route between Pilsen and Prague that was bound to be crucial

in any advance. However, Vlasov himself was still hesitant.

At any rate, orders for XII Corps remained to take Passau and Linz, then move onto Salzburg and

Berchtesgarden rather than cross into Czechoslovakia. On 26 April, US 11th Armored Division

was first to enter Austria across the border east of the Danube at Passau. XII Corps then pushed on

towards Linz with US XX Corps on its right, the Czech border still being relatively calm despite

some movement of German units reported, notably of 2nd SS Panzer and 11th Panzer Division

towards Austria. 1st Guards Cavalry continued to operate north of the road to Pilsen, with 2nd US

Cavalry to their right and 90th Infantry Division moving along the border behind them. The bound-

ary with V Corps under First US Army had been moved slightly south so that the Czech salient it

had liberated some days ago was now out of its responsibility.

The corps' lines were quite extended now, all along the western border of Czechoslovakia. On 28

April, US 97th Infantry Division was assigned to reinforce there, and 11th Armored Division at the

southern point rested for 48 hours to have logistics catch up while the new formation was worked

in. When advance resumed, it was slowed by bad roads from rain and some late snow. First US

Army was planned to take over the Czech border as far as Regen eventually, and 1st Guards Cav-

alry Brigade was now moving south to the Cham area with US 90th Infantry Division, maintaining

the corps' left wing and clearing woods along the border from 2nd SS Panzer Division troops while

“reconnaissance” was going out as far as the Domazlice-Klatovy road on the Czech side.

In the course they liberated not only 200 American and British POWs, but also a stable of Li-

pizaner and Arabian horses that had been evacuated to a remount depot in the area from the Spanish

Riding School of Vienna and other noble places. Their German tenders were anxious to surrender

them to Western rather than Soviet troops and sent an emissary through their own lines to get an

officer for negotiations with their command, bringing the erstwhile private stallion of King Peter

of Yugoslavia as a mount for him. The parlay was successful, and 7th Cossack Regiment fought

its way through various enemy units not party to the agreement for ten miles, reached the depot on

29 April, then held it for a day against German counterattacks and made 100 prisoners of its own

on the side at the expense of one of theirs killed and wounded each.295

Relocation of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade south of the Cham-Pilsen road was welcomed in Ju-

nograd since it gave better access to the airport at Cham which the Americans had secured on 24

April and rapidly turned into a logistics hub for XII Corps, improving capabilities for bringing

troops in and displaced persons out. Planners were still trying to think of ways to increase the

leverage of the brigade for independent operations, including airlifting in one of the Czechoslo-

vakian motor battalions at Dunkirk – sans motor transport – once spare aircraft capacity from the

Texel operation became available. A mechanised anti-tank battery arrived by land-march on 1 May

already, ostentatively to replace combat losses.

The same day, as German radio was reporting the death of Hitler, US 4th Armored Division was

also assigned to US XII Corps, making it a huge command with two armour and four infantry

divisions plus two cavalry groups, easily twice the normal strength. This formidable force was still

meant to advance into Austria while letting Czechoslovakia largely lie aside. However, this situa-

tion was about to change.296

295 Tuček, p. 71-72. 296 von Sieben, 1416-1421.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

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The Vlasov Dilemma

On 2 May, the same day Berlin surrendered to the Soviets, XII Corps received orders to not cross

the Danube after all, but finally move into Czechoslovakia in force – though the advance towards

Linz would continue. US V Corps would operate to its left, but under Third rather than First US

Army's orders. 97th Infantry Division was going to the latter, which meant that 1st Guards Cavalry

Brigade would have the boundary with V Corps on the Viechtach-Klatovy-Rokycany axis towards

Prague. It was to screen for US 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Division, 2nd Cavalry Group to its

right with 5th and 26th Infantry Division while 11th Armored Division kept moving into Austria.

The restraining line was the Linz-Budweis-Tabor-Prague railroad, Prague itself not to be entered.

As for the enemy, 2nd SS Panzer Division had last been reported in the Czech-German-Austrian

border triangle, which made it a problem of XII Corps' right wing. 11th Panzer Division sent em-

issaries to 90th Infantry to negotiate its surrender as a formation the same day, so it would hopefully

be out of the picture soon. There were all sorts of dispersed German units and parts of same strewn

across eastern Czechoslovakia, most trying to avoid capture by the Soviets; some concern existed

about guerilla activity by the “Werewolf” organisation promoted by German propaganda, though

none had materialised yet. Vlasov's 1st Division was still reported in Northern Czechoslovakia.

The Czech contingent had been leading aggressive reconnaissance in the sector of 1st Guards

Cavalry Brigade, so that when the official “go” was received they were within striking distance of

Pilsen while Russian American units stayed behind for obvious demarcation reasons. When the US

forces were unleashed, the latter darted forward to join the former, and by morning of 3 May the

brigade was moving towards Pilsen with Cossack units continueing to screen on the flanks.

In the evening reports were received from Czech resistance that a revolt which had been brewing

up for some time had broken out in the city, fueled by rumours of Czechoslovakian units nearby.

The resistance had been advised to just let any Germans moving west pass as a lot of Wehrmacht

units were simply trying to dash for US lines, but as always there was the issue of hotheads on both

sides and of die-hard units. There were also reports of unrest spreading in Bohemia, sparked by

news of the Battle of Berlin and the advance of Allied troops.

With a shooting war in Pilsen between locals and Germans, Third US Army issued orders for a

general advance onto the city, but for the time being 1st Guards Brigade was the only formation

with realistic hope to reach it quickly. For the drive to Pilsen, it was relieved of its screening mis-

sion; though still a relatively small force, it was expected that German resistance would be concen-

trated along the main roads, and truces might be arranged with smaller garrisons as before. Sure

enough, the brigade reached Pilsen on the following day.

At the sight of Shermans rolling in, the last German troops quickly lost their fighting spirit. US

flags again proved helpful in getting the enemy to surrender, though the Germans were still often

surprised that the “Americans” were speaking Russian. No sooner however had troops relieved the

local resistance to an enthusiastic welcome than new reports were received that overnight a revolt

had started in Prague, too – slowly at first, but now there were news of a full-scale war and frantic

calls for help from the capital’s radio station which resistance fighters had secured.

With those reports, Prague was clarified by Third US Army as the next objective of the thrust

with US 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions, though the restraining line was set to the Vltava

running through the city’s center. On the right wing of XII Corps, 5th and 26th Infantry Division

were moving on Budweis with 2nd Cavalry Group to shore up the flank against the line towards

the Soviets. 11th Armored Division was before Linz, shelling the city in the usual way of negoti-

ating for surrender. As before, resistance was overall light and disorganised, though fierce in indi-

vidual spots. For example, on 4 May German cadets from an officer candidate school at Rokycany

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ambushed a patrol of 7th Cossacks probing towards Prague, resulting in some needless casualities

on either side. On the other hand, the same day 11th Panzer Division surrendered to XII Corps as

hoped for, marching into captivity in a nicely organised way with their own transport.297

The question remained how to deal with the feelers by Vlasov’s troops. The sentiment was that

it would be easier to bring over 1st ROA Division if it revolted against its leadership and fought

the Germans on its own volition, like the 30th SS Waffen-Grenadier defectors in France and the

Georgians on Texel. Rather than kill their command, they might just detain it, even having it con-

tinue to lead from “arrest” as long as it looked good from outside. Afterwards the generals might

be sentenced to a few years of honourable captivity in the Novoarkhangelsk Arsenal, with parole

possible for good conduct. It would beat a bullet in the neck or a rope in Moscow by a long way.

Besides 1st ROA Division in Czechoslovakia there was also the 2nd which, not even fully

formed, had surrendered to US VI Corps south of Stuttgart along with a host of Eastern forced

laborers who had joined it as it marched south. Some other formations were under Vlasov's nominal

command, including XV SS Cossack Cavalry Corps of two divisions in Croatia, and a “Russian

Brigade" of one Caucasian and two Russian regiments in Denmark, where Junograd was proposing

to land 1st Marine Division or 1st Airborne Brigade from the Netherlands.

It was unclear how much actual control Vlasov had over those troops at all. Incorporating them

into the Battleaxe part of Operation Varyag to increase Russian American troop strength was tempt-

ing to planners in Junograd not just because of the sheer manpower, but because they were fully

formed units already. But unlike most other Osttruppen who had been under German leadership

and could always excuse themselves with having being forced into Wehrmacht service, Vlasov was

tainted by his all-too willing collaboration with the Nazis. XV Cossacks Corps had also gained a

certain notoriety from anti-partisan operations in Yugoslavia, which Junograd was not sure it

should saddle itself with in light of the mounting atrocities now being discovered.

Both in the north and south, the main problem for any such plans remained Allied support. The

Russian American side had made it clear to the ROA contacts that its own situation was rather

precarious on this issue, and that it could not currently give Vlasov the assurances on favourable

terms he seemed to imagine, since it had no means of getting his troops anywhere from where they

would shortly have to give themselves up anyway.298

While 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade was concentrating at Pilsen for the next move, Signal Corps

personnel was sent to Vlasov with a secret proposal: 1st Division ROA would take and hold as

long a stretch of the main road as possible to allow the brigade to get through to Prague. They

found Vlasov had been toying with the idea of trying to go directly there in support of the Czech

resistance to prove he had turned against the Germans. This was discouraged however – if he turned

and held the road for Allied troops, it would be good enough and keep him capable of moving in

an orderly fashion to the west as soon as that stretch was fully in Allied hands. His force would be

officially unarmed on that march, its weapons handed over to Russian American troops. At the

same time they would disarm German retreating forces.

Once Vlasov’s assurance was received by phone or radio, 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade would

start towards Prague with the Czechs in the lead. It was fully expected that the ranks of the follow-

ing Guards and Cossacks would swell from ROA personnel “to replace losses and to bring the units

to full establishment” without formally going through the Battleaxe recruiting programme. How-

ever, it was also considered that the personnel of ROA accused of war crimes could be forced to

be extradited to the Allies.299

297 Tuček, p. 72. 298 von Sieben, 1426. 299 Tuček, p. 72.

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While there might be ways to get around it in some cases, II Russian American Corps as the

national European command had agreed on 2 May with the Allies to co-operate with identifying

and apprehending Osttruppen suspected of atrocities. In practice, this mostly meant senior officers

in notorious units and some lower-level sadists brutal enough to have achieved individual fame.

But there was also talk of a Soviet list that II Corps was advised to treat with great caution as it

quite likely included many “politicals” who might in fact be very welcome to Russian America.300

By 1 May, a total of 115,000 ex-Soviet military personnel had already been registered under the

Battleaxe programme, 27,000 of which Osttruppen, the rest mostly POWs liberated from camps in

Germany. 58,000 of those had expressed the wish to become Russian Americans, including 22,000

of the Osttruppen; however, about a thousand of the latter had been turned over to Allied authorities

due to war crime investigations under the earlier national screening process. Of the liberated POWs

in particular, many were judged unfit for service due to wounds, health and nutrition issues, and

transferred to the civilian Longboat part of Operation Varyag. Therefore only 22,000 recruits had

so far been eligible to serve in the Russian American armed forces, 17,000 of which Osttruppen.

There was also a considerable backlog in processing the sharply rising numbers for actual service.

About a thousand had been siphoned off by the Signal Corps for various intelligence purposes and

6,000 repatriated to Russian America, mostly sent to training units. Of those having stayed in Eu-

rope, at 3,200 the greatest number was still serving in the theatre support brigades which were in

turn dealing chiefly with the logistics of Operation Varyag, 3rd now fully stood up.

2,400 had been transferred to the new Iceland Regiment which was in the process of relieving

the previous units of the Russian Brigade Allied Forces Atlantic as newly-formed battalions arrived

on Iceland from training with 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment. 1,500 were still in the latter which

had now been ordered to move from the UK to the planned DP transit camp sites in France by

battalions to build them up; the regiment was also scheduled to receive 1,900 more from the former

construction regiments of the “unreliable” 30th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division encountered by the

French near Karlsruhe, likely to form additional units after construction and retraining was fin-

ished. Work on the first camp at Maubeuge by troops from II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer

Battalion, freshly arrived from Iceland, also started on 1 May, with those at Metz and Strasbourg

following suit in the next days.

900 more recruits were in 1st Marine Replacement Battalion at Dunkirk, which would shortly

turn into 4th Marine Regiment with the addition of the Texel Georgians and the personnel of the

former Signals Battle School at Chievres, then numbering 2,300. Finally, 300 already served as

replacements in both 1st Guards Cavalry and 1st Airborne Brigade, the latter now in fact considered

for reinforcement of US XVIII Airborne Corps by 1st Airborne Army for a possible move to the

Danish islands after continued Russian American lobbying. As a ceasefire for northwest Germany,

the Netherlands and Denmark was agreed upon on 4 May between 21st Army Group and the Dönitz

government that had taken over after Hitler’s death, any such movement now looked like it would

be for an unopposed occupation. Planners in Junograd, mainly interested in the Danish-based

Osttruppen, did not mind this though.

One problem that came with the rapid expansion of forces was insufficient leadership cadres

again, since most officers and many NCOs in the Ostbataillone were Germans. Some of the latter

had been quietly co-opted when they wanted to and were cleared by Signals on security and war

crimes, but the original cadre from the support brigades, 4th Stoyanka Infantry and 1st Marine

Replacement Battalion was spread very thin by now despite replacements being pumped in from

Russian America at best possible and trying to keep up with promotions and field commissions.

300 Korichnev, Command, p. 263.

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125

What there was of Osttruppen cadres had shown no excessive problems of integrating with the

benefit of having experienced both Soviet and German tactics and procedures. If anything, many

had been found somewhat timid in exerting authority, likely feeling – not quite unreasonably – that

they were on probation; though some seemed to think they were back in the Red or even the Tsarist

Army and had to be told certain things like punching subordinates in the face for being a little slow

were not acceptable anymore. In some cases, previously-held ranks were slightly adjusted either

way. Promising candidates of any rank had been generally put onto the direct link to Russian Amer-

ica to attend proper NCO and officer classes under the well-established reserve cadre program. The

first of those recruited very early in France had finished in March, mostly freeing up personnel at

home for deployment to Europe, and the step was slowly picking up analoguously to the swell of

the programme; but the cover remained tight.

Getting the ROA divisions on the other hand was expected to add relatively little strain compared

to the overall manpower increase since they had their own Russian leadership cadre. By the same

token however, integration into the Russian American armed forces might be more problematic. So far care had been taken of maintaining a balance of keeping combat buddies together and spread-

ing recruits through their new units to achieve a good mix of cohesion and integration, particularly

since the Germans had been in the habit of concentrating ethnicities in battalions. Planners wanted

Russian American soldiers, no Ukrainian or Azeri legions – though 4th Marine Regiment would

be a particular case due to the Texel Georgians and Chievres Battle School personnel with their

disproportionate number of Belorussian and Ukrainian veterans of 30th SS Waffen-Grenadier Di-

vision. With Vlasov’s formations, it would also be a challenge to re-equip them with Allied mate-

riél in bulk; they might remain thoroughly German-looking for some time, which would do nothing

to ease the political problems.301

The Thrust onto Prague

The situation in Prague left little room for hesistation though. The local resistance had initially

succeeded in securing the Gestapo headquarters, arresting the head of the collaborationist govern-

ment and establishing a national liberation committee at the city hall; German troops were attacked,

disarmed and others surrounded in about half of the city. However, in the evening of 4 May ar-

moured German forces moved in from around Prague, and heavy fighting ensued at barricades

thrown up by the resistance. In the morning there was an attempt to retake the radio building, but

it was repulsed by the Czechs; the last report was of German aircraft bombing the site. Faced with

a fleeting chance, both sides took it. On 5 May, Vlasov’s troops moved to secure the Pilsen-Prague

road, and 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade moved forward once more.

How fleeting that chance had been became obvious on the next day when in one of the frequent

reversals, Third US Army ordered XII Corps to not advance beyond the general Pilsen-Budweis

line, though advising units to be prepared for further movement east. This order was too late for

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade anyway, making some believe that Patton had relayed it deliberately

after the brigade had set out. By evening of that day, it had reached the outskirts of Prague.

Fighting in the city was heavy, including tanks, artillery and aircraft. Wehrmacht units had been

reinforced by Waffen-SS which was taking an even more aggressive approach. Combat on the

western bank of the Vltava concentrated in the old town, with some commanding terrain controlled

by the Germans leaving not many ways to cross the river. Over the course of 7 May brigade troops

301 von Sieben, 1422-1426.

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126

did however managed to reach the river itself. With the current official restraining line far to the

rear, small groups did cross after dark, but enemy observers and scattered troops left in place made

crossing in force problematic, especially with armour.

Due to the precarious political balance between pro-Western and pro-Soviet groups in the local

resistance, the Czechoslovakian troops of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade acted as the prime focus of

enthusiastic welcome by the population, while the Russian Americans were for now being just

described as “Americans”. The latter had already acquired a lot of soldiers supernumerary to the

establishments from Vlasov's troops on the way to Prague – which had to be hidden carefully as it

was taken that the Soviets had agents about. The rest of the ROA troops on the road to Pilsen were

getting nervous though as the Soviets kept advancing from the east. It was tried to reassure them

that they would have enough time to get to the American lines, but also thought it might be best to

let them go rather than disintegrate – even though that meant 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade might be

cut off temporarily if any German force managed to get hold of the road.

This would be particularly precarious since the Soviets were expected to reach Prague by 10 May

if not faster, appearing to be making extra efforts since the full entry of US XII Corps into Czech-

oslovakia. The preliminary plan was to keep the brigade’s troops on the western bank of the Vltava

while using Russian-speaking Czech officers for liaison with the Soviets so as to not provoke inci-

dents over inter-Russian feelings. Third US Army, which had been duely expressing anger over

alleged disobedience of orders – widely thought feigned as Patton had a history of similar instances

and well-known dislike of the Soviets – was also kept being asked to secure the line of communi-

cation to Prague, as retreat now would be too dangerous.

By the end of 7 May, the southwest and west of Prague were almost cleared of enemies apart

from pockets of resistance. The most serious situation was in the southeast where the city was

under assault of SS troops desperate to get west. Wehrmacht troops had however broken off their

attacks in places, and Czech liaison officers with the resistance reported that there were talks with

the command of the uprising to allow the Germans to pass through Prague with motorised transport

and personal weapons. Others, after usually checking thoroughly that the newly arrived troops were

not Soviet, gave up readily, while die-hards from the SS often put up a fight. News of the signing

of the German instrument of surrender at Reims, to take effect on the following day, helped many

decisions along, though it did nothing to reduce the press of German forces from the east.

Late in the evening, the brigade was asked to help arranging safe passage of an American convoy

about to start from Pilsen to Prague and then seek out the headquarters of Field Marshal Ferdinand

Schörner, made commander-in-chief of the Heer by Hitler’s will and thought to be in northern

Czechoslovakia. The mission, intending to present the instrument of surrender to Schörner, passed

through the city shortly after midnight. Some Hellcats of 7th Guards Cossack Regiment and Czech

troops in trucks were added to the meagre escort of Greyhound armoured cars, and the column

headed towards Bad Welschau (Velichovky) near the German border, finding Schörner’s HQ there

at noon on 8 May. After discharging its task, it returned safely to Prague despite some incidents of

false identification, where the presence of Czech soldiers proved helpful.

In Prague, the presence of “real” Americans had helped to convince the military commander of

the city, General Rudolf Toussaint, to surrender. The agreement entailed the previously discussed

provision that German troops would be allowed to pass unmolested as long as they left their heavy

weapons behind and refrained from hostile actions, and also entered into effect at noon on 8 May.

After signing, Toussaint surrendered personally, trying to avoid apprehension by local resistance;

the communist faction thereof in particular wanted to hang him from a lamp post after a quick trial

for atrocities commited mostly by SS. For this reason, they did not welcome the surrender and

unmolested passage agreed therein. The mood was thought critical enough that the Russian wife

Part V: 1945 in Europe

127

of General Karel Kutlvašr, commander of insurgent troops in Prague, was approached discretely

with an offer for an easy way out for the couple if needed, in order to secure Kutlvašr’s support.

After the official surrender, it was chiefly SS troops which continued to fight, as they did not

recognise Toussaint’s authority. In the course they still committed atrocities, though the most seri-

ous assault was stopped by direct fire of a Wehrmacht artillery train, manned mostly by Austrian

soldiers. Many troops were late in getting the order to cease fire, and reports about a massive Soviet

advance from the north and east made the Germans even more desperate. Over night however

fighting in and around the city rapidly wound down as the commander of SS troops, seeing the

facts, surrendered on the same terms as Toussaint. On the morning of 9 May, Prague was calm.

At this point the presence of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade there had been largely taken as a fait

accompli. Rather unwillingly, the Soviets now accepted that the demarcation line in Prague would

be the Vltava, and Third US Army had ordered American troops to control the corridor along the

main road; their advance was slowed down more by beer and surrendering Germans than by hostile

action. After these news, Vlasov’s troops had been greenlighted to retreat to the west.

Vlasov himself however refused an offer to escape made both by Germans and Americans rather

than entering Allied captivity, committed to play the political scapegoat for the Soviets so that his

men might survive. Russian-American liaison officers tried to convince him and other higher-rank-

ing officers that they had done what they could for their troops, bluntly telling them that if they

wanted to give themselves up, they should “just blow their brains out and be done with it”. Vlasov

though ordered General Sergey Bunyachenko of 1st Division ROA to escape instead – a powerful

gesture as Bunyachenko had been one of his strongest opponents in the previous days, stressing

the need to turn sides to survive and to attack the Germans as Vlasov himself was hesitating.

While ROA troops officially started to retreat west, Russian American units in 1st Guards Cav-

alry Brigade somehow kept growing, companies being at twice the established strength or more.

With that went a sudden depletion of spare uniforms, with some newly arrived soldiers wearing

only a Russian American greatcoat or similar. Requests for quick resupply of personal kit by airlift

went out, which coincided with considerations to fly personnel from 1st Czechoslovakian Ar-

moured Division Group to Prague as the fortress of Dunkirk formally surrendered to General Liška

on 9 May. This happened only after the official “ratification” of the German capitulation had oc-

curred in Berlin at the behest of the Soviets, which found the signing at Reims with only their

liaison officer to SHAEF in attendance unsatisfactory.302

The Russian American Air Force got notice of the flag rising ceremony time at Dunkirk with

long enough advance warning to stage an unannounced low overflight of a flight of Mosquitoes.

This was quite risky as tension was still high, but luckily Allied anti-air units had a good “target

recognition” day. Allegedly the perfect timing was possible thanks to a local RAF observer who

was persuaded by a Russian American liaison officer at some cost in spirits.

The Air Force quickly developed its own interest in Prague as troops which had secured the city’s

civilian airport found one almost intact Messerschmitt 262 jetfighter in flying condition. It had

been used to shell one of the roads to Prague from the ground, but whoever fired the guns had run

away when Shermans of CZ 1st Tank Battalion breached the airfield fence. Personnel from the

Russian American Air Force forward observer/security flight attached to 1st Guards Cavalry Bri-

gade immediately secured the aircraft. They subsequently found more of the type, though damaged;

but also spare parts, some mechanics and eventually even two Me 262 pilots willing to cooperate.

It was thought that another of the jets could be prepared for flight, and both were hurriedly painted

white with big Russian American roundels.

302 Tuček, p. 72-73.

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What was now needed was a suitable target airport to transfer them from Prague and American

cooperation for safe passage – thought to be easily gained in exchange for one of the aircraft – as

the USAAF had been maintaining aggressive combat air patrols over Western Bohemia over the

last days, hunting for remnants of enemy. In the evening of 8 May, some incidents with Soviet

fighters coming from the east had occurred already.303

Those fighters had been but the harbingers of the advancing Soviet forces who first arrived on

the northeast edge of Prague on 9 May, followed by more from the northwest, and Polish troops

fighting with the Soviets in the north. First contacts with 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade were very

cold, but without shooting. As planned, most of the talking was left to the Czechs. Further contrib-

uting to reducing exposure was the arrival of US 90th and 97th Infantry Division troops from the

west after securing the corridor to the city, which were taking over parts of the perimeter.

The approach of the Soviets did however lead to new fighting especially to the south of Prague

where there were still masses of German troops. Not everybody had gotten the news of surrender

yet, and rearguards often seemed willing to take as many Soviet soldiers with them as possible.

Some Germans, desperate to get away from them and bottlenecked by the bridges, just jumped into

the Vltava and tried to swim to the western bank, not always succeeding. More poignantly, there

were also the first “runners” from Soviets units, one a junior NCO – the other a regimental com-

missar. Naturally both were suspected to be plants by the 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade units they

approached, and passed to Signals for investigation.

In the city itself, the evening of 9 May was the first without fighting except for the occassional

holdout sniper, though those had been mostly cleared out from the western side of the river. With

that, regrettably some locals who had spent the last days in their cellars were emerging and wanted

to prove their zeal by committing acts of violence against German civilians and POWs. They usu-

ally backed off when confronted by soldiers; but in one case a Russian American patrol had to fire

in the air to protect prisoners from a lynch mob, and not all atrocities could be prevented, particu-

larly in the parts of city outside Western Allied control.304

Other than 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade, the first official day of peace in the European Theatre

saw Russian American 1st Marine Division involved in disarming and POW processing operations

by Canadian II Corps in the northern Netherlands. 1st Airborne Brigade, having received orders to

join US XVIII Airborne Corps on 6 May, was in the Bremen area on its way to the Danish border.

The three theatre support brigades were reforming around the fledgling DP transit camp sites in

France while operating across the borders to the north and east. Russian Brigade Allied Forces

Atlantic was still changing over units on Iceland, and 9th and 10th Air Force Wings were based in

Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. However, operations in Europe were far from over.305

Longboat and Battleaxe

Soviet troops were gradually reaching the corridor from Pilsen to Prague over the next days, but

did not try to interfere with the Western forces. After adjusting their advance, that corridor was

now the border between troops coming in from the north and from the southeast. The first detach-

ment of the Eastern Czechoslovakian Army arrived on 10 May, though the Soviets initially kept

them back from close contact with Western troops. The occurrence of “runners” also stopped for

303 Kovalyev, p. 72. 304 Tuček, p. 73. 305 von Sieben, 1432-1439.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

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now as NKVD units arrived, exercising not only tighter control on Soviet troops but also com-

mencing a wave of arrests in areas controlled by them. Those included some original White Russian

émigrés who had settled in Czechoslovakia, many of whom now quickly moved to Western-con-

trolled territory and were encouraged to relocate to Russian America.

The last large-scale action happened on 11 May when Third US Army units were involved in a

fight with the German rearguard pushed from the other side by Soviet troops. All that remained

now was a mass of disorganised retreating soldiers and civilians in the Pilsen-Pribram-Prague tri-

angle, with the Soviets trying to fill the area as soon as they were able to. By the following day,

contact between Eastern and Western Allies was achieved all along the frontline.

However, thorough deconfliction still allowed Russian American troops the largely unhindered

transfer of captured materiél and personnel from the Prague area. The two Me 262 jetfighters were

flown out on 12 May, along with some other aircraft appropriated for local use and piloted by either

members of the small ROA air force or German personnel who preferred working for the Western

side rather than face the threat of Soviet captivity. A third Me 262 that had been restored to flying

condition was claimed by the Czechoslovakians. Other parties also showed interest in weapons

technology to be found in the area, like the clandestine mission that arrived at the Pilsen Skoda

factory by aircraft from the UK on 10 May.306

The unceremonial inclusion of ROA soldiers into 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade reached rather

more drastic dimensions, mostly by local initiative. The first inkling of the real extent Junograd got

was when supply requests from units nowhere to be found in the official order of battle went up

the chain of command, like a 2nd and 3rd Guards Regiment and a 1st Guards Cavalry Support

Battalion. Confusion rose even further when requests for tank personnel still familiar with the

Czech TNH and spare parts for various more German vehicles were received, the latter including

for two companies of Panther tanks.307

An internal report from 11 May already referred to a 1st Guards Division (Provisional) with a 4th

Guards Independent Tank Regiment consisting of a heavy battalion with 16 Panthers and one Tiger,

a medium battalion with an ever-changing number of Panzer III and IV variants, a light battalion

with a likewise collection of TNH variants, and a mixed battalion of very diverse Soviet tanks

previously captured by the ROA. To outsiders, this rapidly swelling formation was still called a

brigade which came under the nominal command of 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Division

Group when General Liška with most of his HQ and part of its signals squadron were flown in

from Dunkirk by Russian American aircraft on 11 and 12 May.

The bulk of Liška’s own troops was landmarching to Prague, but would take a week to arrive; it

was hoped the newly-made Russian American units would just vanish into the division group, then

inconspicuously melt away from the area as they were replaced by Czech ones. The situation there

was generally more conductive to Russian American interests than in Germany since Czechoslo-

vakia would not have an occupation government, but its own national one. Of course execution of

this shell game still depended on the sympathy of that government with its sizeable pro-Soviet

communist faction. It would also be critical under which arrangement the Americans and Soviets

would withdraw, as the country was within the sphere of interest claimed by Stalin.308

On 13 May, Junograd finally issued a secret order to develop the new division into the regular

structure with a mechanised and two infantry brigades plus division troops, including an extra cav-

alry regiment of the older Type 1944 named 8th Cossacks that would eventually go to another

newly-formed division under II Corps. This was part of a plan to consolidate the captured ROA

306 Tuček, p. 73. 307 von Sieben, 1435-1439. 308 Tuček, p. 73.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

130

formations under the corps HQ for eventual deployment to the Pacific, both to get them out of

reach of the Soviets in Europe and to use them in the ongoing war with Japan, thereby turning II

Corps into an actual combat command of three complete divisions.

The infantry-heavy new additions would be supplemented by mechanised troops once they

reached Russian America. This was particularly due to political sensitivies making it unlikely that

the thinly-repainted ROA divisions would be supplied with the largely American standard equip-

ment in Europe, while deliveries to Russian America could always be asked in the name of re-

armament. To this end, orders were prepared to turn 3rd and 14th Stoyanka Infantry Regiments

from the Territorial Army Command into mechanised brigades, to be replaced in their territorial

function by 4th Stoyanka and the Iceland Regiment when those moved across the Atlantic, too. An

additional cavalry regiment would also need to be raised. As a result however, large parts of the

new divisions would remain equipped with German weapons for some time even while they were

being rapidly supplied with Russian American uniforms and personal kit.

The theatre support brigades were thought to form the corps and division quartermaster troops

for II Corps once Operation Varyag was finished. As of now however, the vast repatriation scheme

was only coming up to speed. On 14 May, the Maubeuge DP transit camp was completed for the

initially planned capacity of 16,000, with the sites at Metz and Strasbourg to be finished within the

week but already being used as work went on; Nissen huts were being filled as quickly as they

were set up. There were already thoughts to double the size of the camps, and also standing up a

fourth theatre support brigade for Italy.

It was now estimated that 1.2 to 1.8 million Soviet DPs might be accessed in Western-controlled

Europe. From experience so far, about 40 percent of those approached were willing to become

Russian Americans, translating to a possible 500,000 to 700,000 for the civilian Longboat part of

Operation Varyag – more than double the originally calculated numbers. Only 25,000 had actually

been gathered by the theatre support brigades and a mere 7,000 sent into the North African pipeline

in the three weeks before the establishment of the transit camps though, so the prospects remained

staggering. The chief worry in increasing capacities was about medical support; truck drivers were

quickly trained, clerks, cooks and bakers moderately so, but doctors would not grow overnight.

Unfortunately there had not been many among the Osttruppen either, those positions having mostly

been filled by Germans. It was thought of both offering the latter to be included in the transfer

programme and contracting local civilian doctors.

The most crucial part of the whole scheme however was getting the people onward from the

camps to the North African ports where they would be taken onto the ships to Australia. Talks were

ongoing with the Spanish government about routing part of the Longboat transfers through its ports.

With Germany gone from the picture, there were now no major problems other than getting the

human freight to the border of Spain; the railroads in the south of France had understandably not

had the same priority in rebuilding as the advancing Allied armies had largely passed this area by.

On the other hand, tracks into Germany kept growing back quickly, easing future movement to the

camp sites; already by 5 May, Stendal on the Elbe had been reconnected with Maubeuge via Han-

nover and Aachen, with a line going down all the way from Magdeburg to Bamberg and from there

to Strasbourg and Metz via Frankfurt. A branch was going from Bamberg to Nuremberg, with

Regensburg to be connected shortly afterwards.

There was somewhat of a luxury problem though in that many railroad cars carrying supplies for

Allied units had not been getting unloaded at the railheads because logistics officers in charge of

receiving them wanted to expedite forwarding of only the urgently necessary, keeping the rest in

dead storage. As many as 2,000 loaded cars were crowding German sidetracks, leading to a de-

crease in rolling stock and thus limiting Russian American possibilities to send back DPs on empty

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131

cars. However, this was thought to be a bit of a self-solving obstacle as the transport companies of

the theatre support brigades could be put to use getting DPs to the railheads, those being in working

condition aiding troops in loading supplies from the railroad cars onto the trucks, thus making room

for themselves. The trucks would then forward the supplies on the return leg while the trains de-

livered the people to the transit camps. It would certainly be faster for them than being trucked

across the width of western Germany.

This scheme worked dangerously effective as the Maubeuge camp was filled to capacity within

four days of its opening, even while sending a thousand on their way to North Africa every day

after the additional French ships had become available to cross the Mediterranean. Obviously there

was an upper useful limit for throughput of DPs which was set by the capacity of the onward link

to Australia; there was no inclination to build more transit camps in North Africa since they would

have little advantage over the French ones, though the Signal Corps had secured some disused

Allied military accommodations and civilian supply for a limited overflow. The Spanish route was

hoped to take a little off the strain, but additional options were also looked at, including airlift.309

While a C-47 would carry only 28, it could fly nonstop to Algiers from any of the camp sites in

the morning, arrive at noon, refuel while the crew rested for an hour or two, then be back in the

evening, undergo maintenance over night and do it all again the next day. 24th Transport Squadron,

which had taken the place of the original “liaison” flight of European Air Force Command not put

under Allied control in support of the Texel operation, could thus move an additional 2,000 per

week. The unit was now busy supporting the Battleaxe part of Operation Varyag in Czechoslo-

vakia, but it was seriously considered to retask it afterwards and maybe even move more airlift

assets to Europe for as long as preparations for further operations in the Pacific allowed.

A C-54 would carry 50 to North Africa and not even need to refuel before the return leg, but

those were considered to be better used on the direct transatlantic link to Russian America. Five of

the twelve in service were currently assigned to this route, which were managing a daily arrival

either way. As Allied command organisation in Europe was expected to slowly dissolve due to

some troops returning home and others slated to redeploy to the Pacific, it was thought possible to

increase that without triggering wishes of possession by others. Two C-54s were permanently set

aside for urgent short-term long-range flights, particularly to Australia, but the other five had been

mostly flying out to Beringa in support of I Corps routine operations. That could also be done by

C-47s though, and the transatlantic capacity – mostly used for priority transport on the Battleaxe

side of Operation Varyag so far – might be doubled to 100 passengers per day.310

Additional safe transatlantic routes were also investigated, of which there had been little so far.

A greatly appreciated offer for assistance came from the Canadian government which was looking

ahead to economic development on the North American continent after the war and recognising

the opportunities arising from an increase of its neighbour’s population. Rumours of a large post-

war boom in Russian America had already generated quite a bit of interest from both political and

business leaders on Canada’s West Coast.

In addition to the rail line from Terrace in British Columbia to Skaguay in Russian America

which had been under preparation since 1943 and the already-finished road along the Taku River

to Junograd, the future premier of British Columbia W. A. C. Bennet had presented an ambitious

plan outlining a total of three roads and a massive electric power grid connecting the Canadian

province with the Russian American Panhandle. The CPR Steamship Company and the Union

Steamship Company had expressed an interest in increasing the fleet of passenger and cargo coast-

ers servicing the coast, requesting a list of soon-to-be-surplussed ships that could be used for that

309 von Sieben, 1428-1453. 310 Bergmann, 1446.

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132

purpose. Canadian Pacific Airlines was likewise negotiating to purchase a number of new and sur-

plussed aircraft, and landing rights in Russian America.

Their particular interest was in improving the customs services between both countries, which

was considered to be quite inefficient and slowing trade. With the freeing up of the recently laid

submarine cables, it was felt that communications between authorities on either side should be

better. Several business associations in Vancouver were also lobbying for a free trade pact between

Russian America and Canada to be in place before one was negotiated between Russian America

and the US. The combined efforts eventually stirred some interest of the federal government. To

profit from the increased business opportunities presented by immigration to Russian America, it

was logical to facilitate this by enabling movement of DPs from Europe through Canada.

Transit across the Atlantic was not considered a problem as many ships which were running

supplies to Europe were returning in ballast, the threat of U-Boats was now over and the convoy

system had stopped, although some convoys were still enroute. The merchant lines had not yet

developed schedules and there might be an opportunity to contract some of the ships. However, it

was considered imperative by Ottawa that the DP movement effort was not seen as a roadblock to

getting the Canadian troops home from Europe. Therefore higher tier passenger ships could not be

requested if the troops were forced to take lesser vessels.

A plan was formulated to use some of the Commonwealth air training bases in the Canadian

Prairies as staging grounds. These were surrounded by settlers with Ukrainian backgrounds which

might be receptive to helping out the DPs. The idea was to land them in Montreal, then immediately

ship them by train to RCAF Station Winnipeg, a military base in Terrace and the recently closed

detainee camps, which would be able to hold about 5,000 people for extended periods. All of these

were close to food supplies and, having been in operation for some time, quite liveable.

At these locations the DPs could be temporarily settled and screened once again, since the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police was concerned about the Soviets using this scheme as a conduit to move

more spies into North America. It would also give a chance to educate the DPs about their new

lives, screen and treat for infectious diseases. On a more delicate note, Prime Minister Mackenzie

King expressed his desire to block any Jewish DPs from arriving, mindful of strong pre-war public

opinion in this matter. It was finally agreed that those of the Jewish faith would take the Australian

route whenever possible, and any arriving in Canada would not advertise too loudly.

As for the transport on to Russian America, rolling stock in Canada was tight, but some older

rail carriages could be sourced from the US. It was anticipated that 4,000 individuals could be

managed in the first month, with about a ten percent increase with each month after that to around

10,000 a month in transit and in camps at any time. The bottleneck was anticipated to be in West

Coast shipping due to the ongoing war effort in the Pacific, and as always there was the delicate

question of money. While the Canadian government was willing to help with the initial start costs,

and the British Columbia government and donations would cover food and transportation for a

couple of months, the long term costs would need to be settled. Some upfront capital would also

be needed to purchase or lease the necessary rolling stock.

Not quite on the fringes of this plan, a business venture was forming to promote the speedy com-

pletion of the rail line to Russian America. The idea was to have a workforce of both Canadians

and Russian Americans; there was still a manpower shortage in Canada as many of the troops had

yet to be released and shipped back from Europe. As this rail line was close to the aforementioned

camps in Terrace, it seemed wise to send eligible DPs there and use the installations as recruiting

centres for that effort. Similar considerations aimed at the proposed road and power projects.311

311 Colins, p. 73.

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133

On the Russian American side, it had by now been determined that there was no sense in further

increasing transit over the Mediterranean; after the first trips of each of the new French ships, it

was found that it would be lucky to move on more than 5,000 passengers per week via the Austral-

ian link of the 8,000 projected once the Spanish route becomes fully operational. While in the upper

range of the originally calculated capacity, this meant the inofficial North African transit camps

organised by Signals would swell quickly, too; but they were dispersed over various ports, locally

supplied, and at least taking some of the strain off the French sites.

Once the Canadian link reached full capacity however, and with additional aircraft on the trans-

atlantic route, total weekly throughput for Longboat would near 10,000. That way it would still

take a year to move even the new lower estimate of 500,000 DPs, but top priority was to get them

out of Germany and away from the risk of changing Allied policies. Taking slower ships across the

Atlantic was therefore not seen as a problem. Transfer onwards from Canadian was even less of a

concern, as Russian America provide its own ships; though of course to the extent they were not

needed for the upcoming Kurilean campaign, planned to start in early July. At any rate, the Cana-

dian proposal was gladly accepted, and preparations to implement it started immediately.312

The Cossack Problem

As favourable as the chaos in Czechoslovakia had turned out to be for the Russian American re-

cruiting plans, farther south in Austria a far more difficult situation had arisen. When UK V Corps

of Eight British Army had moved into Carinthia from Italy on 8 May, it found itself with hundreds

of thousands of refugees from Yugoslavia – both military and civilian – who were trying to escape

Tito's forces, both regular and partisans. The latter also seemed to think they ought to get Carinthia

and Venezia Giulia as spoils of war, as they were requisitioning buildings and putting up public

notices of the Yugoslavian government in competition with the British.

Those refugees by initial reports include at least “40,000 cossacks”, which were not limited to

the previously mentioned XV SS Cossack Cavalry Corps now retreating from Croatia. There was

also a separate host under Ataman Domanov which belonged neither to the Wehrmacht nor

Waffen-SS. Rather they had been resettled to Friul via Poland in 1944 complete with families from

Belorussia where they had served the Germans in anti-partisan warfare before the Soviet recon-

quest, being promised a new “Kosakia” after clearing out the local resistance in northern Italy; as

many as a third of their number were women and children. Later the same year they had made

overtures to the Allies for a change of sides when they felt mishandled by the Germans. Unfortu-

nately Russian America had had no ressources in Italy at that time to influence the prevailing opin-

ion that the military benefits would not be worth the political trouble with the Soviets; when the

Domanov Cossacks eventually carved themselves a little homeland out of the area at the expense

of the Italian population, those bridges were largely burned.

Other formations were bringing their kin too, including anti-Tito Yugoslavians of various stripes.

Also present was former Ukrainian 14th SS Waffen-Grenadierdivision, which had been renamed

1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army on 24 April in a mode similar to Vlasov’s ROA troops.

Most of those units were deeply tainted by their involvement with the Nazis and their anti-partisan

activities in particular, making them a political liability to include in Operation Varyag. The civil-

ians probably qualifed for the Longboat programme, but there was initially no way of access to

them beyond low-key operations of the Signal Corps since the area was not even the responsibility

312 von Sieben, 1457.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

134

of SHAEF; while US VI Corps had linked up from the north with US IV Corps coming from the

south at the Brenner Pass, most of Austria was at this point still unoccupied and interposed between

the troops in Germany and Italy.

On 14 May, with occupation well underway, the Allied Forces Headquarters responsible for the

Mediterranean Theatre gave instructions to Eighth Army for the Cossacks to be handed over to the

Soviets which had by then also arrived in Austria, and British V Corps started direct negotiations

with 57th Soviet Army to that effect. A major consideration in this was that British and other West-

ern Allied POWs thought to have come under the control of Soviet troops in their advance into

Austria would be exchanged directly.

By 16 May, things were coming to a head. Eighth British Army was completely swamped in

refugees and Axis POWs, and wanted to move most of those north into the American occupation

zone – which Junograd would have welcomed, except that this did not include the Cossacks. Rather

it was still debated to hand them over to the Soviets, which were in turn backing up the Yugosla-

vians in their territorial claims. The Americans had so far been reluctant to allow US troops in

Eighth Army into a possible armed confrontation with the Yugoslavians hardly that they had fin-

ished one war in Europe, but had hardened up over the last days and now seemed willing to use

force if necessary to push them out of the agreed Allied occupation zones.313

At this point General Korichnev of Russian American II Corps got in touch with Field Marshal

Alexander of AFHQ, wishing to make it clear that Junograd would object strongly to unarmed

civilians being tainted by association and held liable for any atrocities which the Cossacks might

have committed. He urged Alexander in the strongest terms to facilitate their movement west or

north, away from the Red Army and Tito's forces. It was understood that many of the women might

wish to remain with their menfolk, but they should at least be offered the opportunity to save them-

selves and their children. As for original White Russians émigrés present, there was to be no ques-

tion: they were not and mostly never have been citizens of the USSR, and there were no grounds

to “return” them to it. They had to be be allowed, preferably helped, to leave the danger area.314

On 17 May, possibly due to this intervention, AFHQ appealed to SHAEF to take over 50,000

Cossacks including 11,000 women, children and old men along the other Axis POWs. At the same

time Marshal Alexander expressed an urgent need to "clear the decks" in order to keep his lines of

communications operable, and ordered UK V Corps to hand over all Yugoslav refugees in its area

to Tito's forces following negotiations with the latter, which it started doing on the 18th. On the

other hand, he also asked for SHAEF to take over his front with the Soviets to free up his forces to

deal with Tito's troops if necessary. Eisenhower agreed and offered to move US XV Corps with

five divisions from Seventh US Army into southern Austria.

This was seen by the Russian American side as a chance to accomplish various things at once.

An urgent order was sent to 1st Guards Division in Czechoslovakia to immediately report on the

current composition and status of their units and prepare for a possible move south with the original

Russian American units and whatever of their new acquisitions was thought possible to deploy. At

the same time SHAEF was offered a contribution to the US reinforcements for Austria, which was

fully expect to be declined based upon Eisenhower's reluctance to have Russian American troops

face the Soviets. However, in that case it would be offered to reinforce Eighth British Army against

the Yugoslavs, citing Junograd’s national interest in the situation – thus not only getting access to

the Cossacks, but hopefully also moving at least part of former 1st ROA Division out of SHAEF's

area of responsibility, increasing obfuscation about its transformation.

313 von Sieben, 1435-1457. 314 Korichnev, Command, p. 285.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

135

By 19 May, SHAEF had announced to accept 150,000 POWs into the American occupation zone,

including 45,000 Cossacks which were now reported with an additional 11,000 camp followers.

On the same day, Tito consented that his troops would withdraw to the Yugoslavian border, so that

this particular crisis was defused and reinforcements for Eighth British Army looked no longer

necessary. The offer to move “1st Guards” into Austria to guard and supply the Cossacks was still

upheld though. Based upon its status report, on 20 May the formation was ordered to prepare for

deploying with the new 1st Guards Mechanised Brigade and 2nd Guards Infantry Brigade, 7th

Cossack Regiment and I./4th Guards Artillery Battalion within the next three days.315

General Korichnev sent his deputy with some staff from II Corps HQ to take command of this

mini-division. Some assets from 14th Transport Group of 3rd European Theatre Support Brigade

were attached to make up for any shortfalls in the support element. The force was to arrive in the

Kaprun area in southern Salzburg province to join US XV Corps no later than four days after leav-

ing Prague, and be prepared to move on into Carinthia if necessary. The rest of the newly-forming

units would be left under command of 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Division Group.316

There were some reservations about disturbing the formation of 1st Guards Division like that not

two weeks after it started. The process was already troubled, mostly due to former 1st ROA Divi-

sion's Grenadier Regiment 1602 which was slated to form the core of 3rd Guards Infantry Brigade;

the screening process of personnel had shown that most were former members of 29th SS Waffen-

Grenadierdivision which was itself formed from the notorious Kaminski Brigade. Not only had

that unit operated in anti-partisan warfare with the Dirlewanger penal SS unit in the USSR; the

29th had also been involved in massacres during the crackdown of the Warsaw Uprising and later

used again to quell revolts in Slovakia, though it was eventually disbanded for unreliability.

There were now also reports that 1st ROA Division troops had fired into the Buchenwald con-

centration camp immediately prior to liberation by US 6th Armored Division on 11 April. It was

being tried to follow those up and tie charges to individuals rather than units just as it had been

done previously, but it was already estimated that up to 3,000 personnel might have to be handed

over to Allied authorities for war crimes prosecution. That was a quarter of the division, a far larger

part than in previously encountered units. Great care was advised though as in this case not only

the Soviets might be offended if large numbers of troops involved in those atroctities were recruited

into the Russian American Army, but the Americans, Poles and Slovaks, too.

However, the situation in Austria remained fluid. The British were trying to reconcile their con-

tradictory policies regarding the Cossacks and Yugoslavs while negotiating with SHAEF, Tito's

troops and 57th Soviet Army at various levels of command, and it was felt that some Russian

American forces were urgently needed on the scene to excert influence. Any renditions of sus-

pected war criminals were delayed until the 1st Guards contingent for Austria had left Prague,

which was finally greenlighted on 22 May.317

2nd Guards Infantry Brigade had been formed by cleared ROA personnel from Grenadier Regi-

ments 1601 and 1603 with some transfer of Russian American cadre; in addition to new uniforms,

they had been supplied with a regimental issue of Garand rifles which had been provided for 1st

Airborne Brigade by the US but not used since the paras chose to stick to their trademark M1943

Johnson carbines. To make recent recruits look more Russian American, they had also been

equipped with locally-acquired ZK-383 submachineguns, the original pattern for the CRZ M43

SMG which had still been built in Czechoslovakia for the Waffen-SS during German occupation.

There was however the slightly conspicuous issue that 1st Guards Mechanised Brigade would bring

315 von Sieben, 1457-1460. 316 Korichnev, Command, p. 290. 317 von Sieben, 1460-1463.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

136

its new tank battalion. The sight of Panthers and Panzer IVs with freshly painted white stars on

them, crewed by Russians, was sure to elicit comment from Allied troops they would encounter.318

On 23 May, the detachment left Prague. It made good time and arrived at Bruck in the Lake Zell

area on the 26th where it encamped pending further orders. Some of the Cossacks were held at

Lienz, just 60 miles to the south – though the Glockner Group of the Austrian Alps was in between

and transit either way would be by the Großglockner Alpine Road, the highest paved road in Aus-

tria with a peak of 8,000 feet. A larger group was at Judenburg, 120 miles to the east through easier

terrain, and XV SS Cossack Corps was held in the Graz area another 40 miles on.319

At this point a Russian American diplomatic mission was already in the British zone, taking part

in a conference about proceedings. Junograd’s aim remained for all of the Cossacks to be trans-

ferred to the US zone, then sort through them as per standard procedure; at the very least this went

for the Domanov Cossacks. The British were however mindful of their own POWs in Soviet pos-

session and favouring an approach that would have units with a majority of pre-war Soviet citizens

summarily handed over to 57th Soviet Army due to their limited ressources.

There was one obvious problem with this in that there were many German officers in the formed

Cossack units, which would under no circumstances qualify for repatriation to the USSR; however,

the leadership of XV SS Cossack Corps under General Helmuth von Pannwitz – a Wehrmacht

officer, not transferred to the Waffen-SS when the corps was put under the latter's authority – for

instance had already determined that they would share whatever fate would be that of their men

and made no representations to a different effect.

The Russian American side pointed out that it would gladly take over guarding, supply and indi-

vidual screening in either the US or British zone, but the British thought the Soviets should also

take part in the screenings. While they would accept logistical support, they preferred an Allied

commission consisting of British, US, and both Russian American and Soviet representatives es-

tablishing the possible guilt and preferred destination of the Cossacks, and also supervising repat-

riation of Western Allied POWs from the Soviet Zone, so that nobody felt blindsided. Junograd

however feared that to become a rather protracted affair.

Meanwhile some of the former Axis troops in Austria had struck their own deals. By 18 May, 1st

Ukrainian Division had curiously vanished from the scene. A week later it resurfaced on the north-

ern Italian Adriatic Coast, where it “reported” to surprised British troops, declaring that the for-

mation had now joined the great Allied forces to “throw the vile Russians out of Europe”. Its lead-

ership had led some quiet negotiations which involved the commander of Polish forces in Italy,

General Wladislaw Anders – though it was suspected the Russian American Signal Corps had had

a hand in this, too – and was allowed by whomever to make its way south across the Alps in small

groups. This was not of immediate concern to Junograd however, as it was unclear if a division of

Ukrainian nationalists fit into the Battleaxe programme.

On 28 May, the Russian American mission suceeded in having the Domanov Cossacks trans-

ferred to the American zone, though they were not to go on anywhere from there pending a joint

decision on their final fate. Their number, including women and children, was now given as about

27,500; the camps were to come under the DP branch of the Allied Military Government, which

was welcomed by Junograd as it emphasised their civilian status, and co-operation with the DP

administration had been quite good so far. Relocation began on 30 May.

Things were not looking so good for XV SS Cossack Corps since the Russian Americans were

inhibited to argue on its behalf by worries about the political impact of its Yugoslavian record. It

would still have been preferred to screen troops individually, but eventually the British decided on

318 Tuček, p. 74. 319 Korichnev, Command, p. 297.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

137

summarily handing over the corps to the Soviets to safeguard return of Western Allied POWs in

the Soviet zone of Austria. This was to be done without use of force, but did not quite work as

planned. Junograd expressed concern at reports of violence and suicides by Cossacks who would

rather die than face the Soviets, but remained cautious due to the overall political sensitivity.

A global resolution of the DP and POW question was expected to be a topic at the planned next

conference of the Big Three, this time with Stalin being armed with large numbers of Western

Allied POWs “liberated” by Soviet forces. The conference had originally been planned for June in

Berlin but had been postponed into July. Berlin had turned out to be too thoroughly bombed to

offer an appropriate venue, and another place was being looked for. Stalin was also stalling in order

to create facts in the USSR’s area of occupation in Eastern Europe and establish a Soviet dominance

there that could not be reverted by negotiations. This did however play into Junograd’s hands which

was busy creating its own facts with Operation Varyag.320 Russian American II Corps was now in

the process of standing up a fourth theatre support brigade to deal with Soviet citizens in Austria

and Italy, though this would take another month since some speciality cadres had to be to trans-

ferred from Russian America, particularly medical personnel and military police.321

At this point, a total of 158,000 ex-Soviet military personnel had been registered under the Bat-

tleaxe programme, including 57,000 Osttruppen. 86,000 had expressed the wish to join the Russian

American armed forces – though 5,000 Osttruppen had been handed over to Allied authorities for

war crime investigations, a sharp rise from previous numbers. 35,000 had been judged unfit for

service and transferred to the civilian Longboat programme, 80 percent of them liberated from

various camps. Of the 46,000 remaining, 2,000 had been transferred to the Signals Corps, and

34,000 processed for service, including 31,000 Osttruppen.

The largest number was now serving in the emerging 1st Guards Division at 12,500. 7,300 more

were in 4th Stoyanka Infantry, 4th Marine and the Iceland Regiment, 5,300 in the three existing

theatre support brigades with another 1,700 planned for the fourth. 400 had been assigned to 1st

Airborne Brigade as replacements; a total of 7,000 had been repatriated to Russian America. So far

about 2,700 leadership cadre had been gained from the programme which more or less fit required

standards; another 1,800 eligible under the reserve cadre training program had been brought to

Russian America and would be available by the end of the year. Still it was estimated that about

additional 70,000 Soviet POWs and 20,000 Osttruppen were in reach, no longer including XV SS

Cossack Corps and 1st Ukrainian Division. The latter had been interned in Rimini as a “Polish”

formation, not to be handed over to the Soviets, its troops eventually released.

On the Longboat side of Varyag, all French DP camp sites were now operational and quickly

filled to capacity, though it was worked on doubling that despite the worries about logistics. By 28

May about 600,000 Soviet forced laborers had been accessed, with about 240,000 willing to be-

come Russian Americans. Of those, 50,000 were in the French camps; 20,000 more had been put

into the North African pipeline now that it had developed its full capacity including the Spanish

route, of which 4,000 were still in the informal transit camps on the southern side. The other 16,000

were already en route to Australia, though none had arrived there yet.

By early June, planners were more confident about administration and supply of the camps. Nu-

merous people among the DPs themselves were willing to work in that area while they were waiting

for their transport, including some with prior training as clerks, cooks, bakers and similar. A num-

ber had actually filled similiar functions in German camps, though some individuals turned out to

be unpopular with former co-residents due to the way they used certain privileges which came with

that. Some nurses had also been found, but no doctors, so medical care remained the chief problem.

320 von Sieben, 1467-1468. 321 Korichnev, Command, p. 298.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

138

As a way out, deals were struck with local French doctors and hospitals who would not only get

paid for visiting the camps for a number of hours per week respectively taking a potential overflow

of sick cases, but more importantly in return be supplied from the military logistics chain with

badly-needed drugs and other medical supplies which were in high demand in the civilian sector.322

Redeployment from Europe

With the German surrender, the first Russian American formations planned to redeploy to the Pa-

cific were 1st Marine Division, 1st Airborne Brigade and the Air Force wings. However, planners

were are also preparing for some forces to stay in Europe for quite a while longer, not just to wrap

up Operation Varyag but also since the Allies seemed to expect a contribution to the occupation of

Germany. There was no certainty on scope and area yet; occupation zones of the Big Three had

been agreed upon at Yalta, and the US and UK had subsequently ceded a part of theirs to France

each at de Gaulle’s insistence. There were arguments for all three Western zones to share some of

the responsibility for occupation in.

The Canadians remained Junograd’s most proven friends, but were not planning to play a major

role in the British zone in the north; rather they wanted to return the bulk of First Canadian Army

home, too. Only a single division was left to be in Germany some time. 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade

had of course formed close relations with Third US Army which was expected to take over occu-

pation duty in Bavaria; and Patton, for all his quirks, had been rather friendly towards Russian

American interests. Finally, the French had proven very helpful for Operation Varyag lately, if

only out of spite for not being included in the decisions of the Big Three. If most of the rest of

Russian American forces in Europe were to be based on their soil anyway, the rest might just as

well stick to their occupation zone in southwest Germany.

As far as Junograd was concerned, the theatre support brigades would continue to operate in all

three zones. They already included a large proportion of military police which were the best fit for

constabulatory tasks, but overall strength was still comparably small, and they had a different pri-

mary mission. It was thought that a combat brigade might have to be left in Germany at least, which

would have to be added to the future strength of II Corps before the latter was redeployed to the

Pacific. In light of the uncertainity in the POW question, it was in fact advocated to relocate the

corps’ major components emerging from the Battleaxe programme out of Germany as soon as

possible, even if it was just to France, too. II Corps HQ had had a forward command post in Paris

for some time to better liaise with the French government, and began moving the rest of its staff

and supporting units there from the UK in early June. Air Force European Command was taking

the rear guard in London and would move home directly from there except the cell which would

keep coordinating air transport operations in the European Theatre.

On 27 May already, an advance battlegroup of 1st Marine Armoured Battalion and two infantry

battalions from 1st Marine Division shipped out of Amsterdam for the return trip to Russian Amer-

ica to support the planned landings in the Kuriles. It was scheduled to arrive home by 26 June, well

ahead of Stalin's promised three-month deadline for a Soviet attack on Japan after the defeat of

Germany which would come up on 9 August. It was hoped that the troops could be given two or

three days of leave before they were sent on to the Kuriles, since the two infantry battalions were

from 3rd Marine Regiment which had been based in Panama prior to their European deployment

and not been home for 18 months; but schedules were tight.

322 von Sieben, 1457-1474.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

139

The rest of the division would follow until the point at which Canadian II Corps would be dis-

banded after all surrendered German troops had left the Netherlands. By 14 June, 3rd Marine Reg-

imental Group had crossed the Atlantic and was transiting Canada; other elements began to start

leaving Europe the next week, and all were expected to be back in the Pacific Theatre by early

August. 1st Airborne Brigade also sailed from Hamburg on 14 June as US XVIII Airborne Corps

was leaving Germany. The brigade was scheduled to arrive to Stoyanka after a month, but would

undergo some reorganisation as 3rd Commando Battalion was turned into a regular parachute bat-

talion; it was expected to be available for deployment by September again. The Iceland Regiment

was planned to arrive before that.323

The fighter, bomber and transport pilots of the small ROA air force which had been recruited in

Czechoslovakia under the Battleaxe programme would find themselves attached to 9th and 10th

Air Force Wings and 24th Transport Squadron respectively, forming the core of a new squadron

each as the units left Europe. Their aircraft other than a single Me 262 jetfighter of 3rd Reconnais-

sance Squadron ROA were rather uninteresting technologically and to be left behind, but the Fie-

seler Storch observation planes of the same squadron and their crews had already ended up as an

additional flight in 2nd Army Aviation Squadron, where they were quite an attraction.

German Ju 52 transports informally acquired in Czechoslovakia were also pressed into service of

24th Transport Squadron as ROA pilots and mechanics were quickly used to deal with the airlift

demands of the various ongoing operations. There were no plans to bring them home when the

time came, though Russian American forces maintained their reputation of appropriating Allied

equipment even by the common standards in Europe, too. A complaint from the USAAF contended

that two damaged C-47s which had been left at the edge of an airfield had disappeared, and blamed

it on 24th Squadron.324

After a preliminary analysis of the Me 262s in Russian American possession by a technical mis-

sion of the Air Force, it was also arranged for them to be shipped home for evaluation in more

detail. Additionally, the mission liaised with the Signal Corps in hope to find some of the engineers

who designed and built them. To get a better understanding of jet technology for possible future

procurement decisions, visits were arranged to the Royal Aircraft Establishment, De Havilland and

Hawker in the UK; the wish to visit an operational squadron equipped with the Gloster Meteor was

made, too.

With regard to the Me 262, the first impression was one of an excellent aircraft let down by

unreliable engines – largely due to low-quality steels as a result of German shortages of metals for

alloying – and armament designed for destroying bombers via large shells, at the expense of rate

of fire and muzzle velocity. The mission opined that if the engines were fixed and the guns replaced,

for example by the Hispano 20 mm, it would be preferrable to the Meteor. This was of course

providing that it was still being built and used in large enough numbers to make spare parts supply

and other support from the manufacturers reliable, which seemed very unlikely. The main value of

possessing a few was therefore seen in getting used to the characteristics of jets, and giving Russian

America something to compare to the new British and American types.325

Meanwhile Operation Varyag was continueing. By the monthly report from 29 June, the acces-

sible Osttruppen had been largely depleted the Battleaxe programme except those in Italy. There

was now a proportionally larger influx of ex-Soviet troops directly from German POW camps, who

were however far less willing to enter Russian American service overall; their vetting was also

more complicated. Overall 195,000 personnel had been registered and 103,000 expressed the wish

323 von Sieben, 1432-1468. 324 Kovalyev, p. 73-74. 325 Grushchev, 1449-1472.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

140

to join, including 49,000 Osttruppen. Of the latter however about every eighth man had had to be

turned over to Allied authorities due to credible suspicions of war crimes, though some of them

were cleared eventually. After transfer of 40,000 more recruits to the civilian Longboat programme

due to health and nutrition issues, a total of 57,000 remained eligible for service. Of those Signals

took 3,000, and 53,000 had been processed.

By now formation of 1st Guards Division was almost finished, and while it was officially still

referred to as such for secrecy reasons, it had internally been renamed 4th Guards Division in prep-

aration for turning II Corps into a combat command. Formation of 5th Division, mostly from for-

mer 2nd Division ROA personnel, was well underway in southwest Germany, with 25,000 Battle-

axe recruits between them; obviously they were still mostly German-equipped though, except for

1st Guards Brigade in Austria. 6th Division had only just begun standing up, and there were doubts

if there would be the necessary 12,500 additional recruits in the end due to the losses in the vetting

process. However, the Osttruppen in Italy had not been accessed yet; 4th European Theatre Support

Brigade would be ready in two weeks and then deploy there to handle them.

Under Longboat, about 1.2 million Soviet forced laborers had been accessed at this point, of

which about 500,000 were expected to be willing to become Russian Americans. Additional transit

camps had been built near the original locations in France after supply and particularly medical

care were largely secured, and the projected new total capacity of 100,000 was being rapidly ap-

proached. There also were the 27,000 Domanov Cossacks still encamped in Austria, their ultimate

fate not yet decided. Of the other DPs, 50,000 had already been put into the North African pipeline,

of which 15,000 were still in the informal transit camps on the southern side, 25,000 en route from

there to Australia, and the first 10,000 now arrived. With the Canadian link becoming operational,

it was intended to reduce the trans-Mediterranean throughput as the North African camps were

becoming problematic to operate in the current inofficial way as they grew in size; the first 1,000

were to be shipped across the Atlantic in the coming week, and their number would simply be

deducted from the other route.326

There were individual incidents of people seeking out a new life quite actively, too. Some Red

Army soldiers decided to continue heading west after the German surrender, including the crew of

a T-34/85 tank which was last seen being loaded onto a transporter belonging to a Russian Ameri-

can unit in Czechoslovakia.327 On the night of 12 July, a Soviet halftrack, a truck and two cars

slammed through a checkpoint at the demarcation line with Western troops near Pilsen. Before US

MPs who were occupied by an incident involving drunk Russian American and US troops could

stop them, this column also breached the gate of the local airport. The vehicles were found aban-

doned and returned to Soviets after an investigation, while the passengers disappeared. Tracks in-

dicated that they escaped approaching guards into fields south of Pilsen, one possibly injured, be-

fore they disappeared in the woods.

Soviet activity after the incident suggested that the runaways had been of a sensitive category.

Russian American forces denied any involvement and went as far as to let Soviet liaison officers

witness a thorough search of barracks in the area, roll call and even check of the vehicle inventory.

The Soviets also asked to be present at passenger checks for any outbound flights or traffic in the

next days and were promised full cooperation, including for the case that the injured runaway

showed up in a hospital.

Some low-level propaganda by local Communist sympathisers was directed against Russian

American troops, but also tensions between “Eastern” and “Western” elements of Czechoslovakian

forces returning to their homeland. The Westerners had scored major political points by getting to

326 von Sieben, 1489. 327 Pulyemyet, p. 74.

Part V: 1945 in Europe

141

Prague first with 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade, though. The Russian Americans generally tried to

stay out of domestic disagreements while trying to do what they could to maintain order in their

sector. When pogroms occurred against Germans in the borderlands, they were however hampered

by the fact that they were not occupation forces and could formally act only upon request of Czech

authorities. The latter had varied attitudes; in some regions the anti-German violence was encour-

aged, elsewhere it was prevented and yet elsewhere Czechoslovakian forces and local authorities

struggled against each other.

After a mid-June clash with Polish troops around Racibórz in the disputed territory around

Těšín/Cieszyn, the bulk of Czechoslovakian armoured forces was redeployed to the East. While

likelihood of shooting war was low, Czech authorities inquired if Russian American troops would

be willing to relinquish captured German tanks to them to build up a reserve army. In return for the

armour they offered better access to weapons development during the war at Skoda and other fac-

tories. While Russian liaison officers had previously managed to join Allied comissions visiting

various German production sites, this was accepted since the tanks were not intended for transport

home anyway and disbanding the ad hoc armour units would also provide an opportunity to ship

some ex-ROA troops to Russian America. Information gathered that way included some about

artillery pieces and the resumed development of automatic rifles based upon the German StG 44

and pre-war Holek self-loaders, but also about jet engine production.328

The majority of II Corps’ new troops would not see Russian America soon, however. The plan

remained to finish unit formation, then relocate them to France pending embarkation to cross the

Atlantic. There was the expectation they would yet see action in the Pacific, where the war was

still going on with undiminished fury.

328 Tuček, p. 75-76.

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Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

The Minor Allies Initiative

The suggestion for more cooperation between Russian America and minor allies in specific areas

of common interest which resulted in the Bournemouth conference of 30 January had actually orig-

inated from Australia. Both countries had been struggling to stay at the big table, their strategic

futures both seemed bound to the US, both shared a mutual long term focus on the Pacific region,

and both were being marginalised in the war against Japan. While the first three of these points

were beyond their direct control, the last might bear some thought. The US had played along with

Russian American plans against the Japanese up to the point they had served their strategic inter-

ests, but largely dropped them after the Komandorskis when the Kuriles moved into sight. Australia

had more or less had the same experience right up until it came to retaking American political

territory in the Philippines, whereafter she felt “not wanted on voyage”.

The US did not want the Australians to move with them up through the Philippines, and Canberra

did not have the resources to go around them towards Singapore. Junograd could not really push

any closer to Japan or entertain any ideas about Asian Russia for much the same reasons. Going to

Europe had been a way to get around the geopolitical strategic bottleneck, but at the end of the day

it was still a second best solution. The war in the Pacific was the real key to long-term positions in

Asia post-war and with respect to the US. Every ounce of credit won out there was thought worth

two in Europe, where it was diluted by so many other players.329

The Australian overture resonated with some thoughts that had been wheeling about in the back-

ground in Junograd for some time. They had not gained much traction so far due to the sheer geo-

graphic distance and a perceived cultural difference – though in reality the latter was probably not

so much bigger than with the Canadians, with whom Russian Americans got along spendidly. In-

stead, planners had been looking at the Chinese Theatre which looked invitingly free of direct

control by the major Allies, but was rather unattractive for other reasons.

Chiang Kai-shek had been playing the Americans against the Soviets for all they were worth, and

his government was corrupt and incompetent in equal parts. Trying to get in on that part of the

game might well lead to Junograd finding itself a chess piece rather than a player, too. Moreover,

the Chinese were not lacking so much for soldiers rather than for training and equipment, and

access to that theatre ws still only through India and Burma – though things were looking up there

– since the Japanese controlled the coast, quite out of the way for Russian America.

On the other hand, Allied plans in the Pacific Theatre still called for landings on the Bonins and

Ryukyus, Formosa, the South Chinese Coast and at Shanghai until June 1945, to be followed by

invasion of Japan proper in October. That was vastly more optimistic than earlier estimates about

progress of the war, and in fact the China landings were getting increasingly treated as corollary

due to the successes in the US island-hopping campaign. They were still on the table though, and

might present an opportunity more convenient to Russian America.

However, a large-scale commitment to China would remove most of its forces currently poised

for the Kuriles. Domestic political reasons aside, Junograd was not going to allow the Soviets to

possibly seize them because they had so far blocked them into their Pacific ports. As soon as they

controlled them, it was feared, nothing would be in their way to sail their growing fleet out of

Vladivostok right up to Russian America’s shores. Getting Allied support for a northern drive onto

Japan along those islands was therefore still considered the most immediate aim.

329 Lewis, p. 64.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

143

Unfortunately the global division of strategic responsibility by the Allied Combined Chiefs of

Staff plainly put the theatre in the American hemisphere, so support could not just be assumed even

if the Canadians were on board. A larger lobby of smaller partners who felt a little sidelined was

however thought helpful to make their interests heard. Russian America had of course excellent

relations with the Czechoslovakians at this point, but the latter did not have exactly many interests

in the Pacific. The Netherlands had though, and Junograd was still set to send the Marines up their

coast once the strategic initiative was regained in Northwest Europe.330

The Australians however considered the Dutch no great help at all for a campaign in their former

Pacific colonies. The Japanese had fostered a nationalist Javanese puppet government that had been

quite successful with a good measure of popular support, which the former colonial masters re-

tained only in the Eastern Islands, essentially the Christian areas. If the latter wanted back into Java

and Sumatra, they were expected to have to seriously fight for it; the Australian assessment was

that if a joint effort was to bring the Dutch back with it, a mass popular uprising would have to be

suppressed as well. The French on the other hand were considered worth talking too. New Zealand

was also thought to be interested in joining any discussions, but the real key for a comprehensive

approach to a joint Pacific area of interest without artificial boundaries was felt to be Canada, which

from the Australian perspective seemed often unaware she had a Pacific coast at all.

Shipping was determined the crucial factor as Australia had loaned most of hers to the US. How-

ever, this was so imbedded with the overall war effort that taking it back would have seriously

limited American movement, which was in nobody’s interest. Russian America on the other hand

commanded a sizeable transport fleet of its own, only used to capacity during the campaign season

in the northern summer. What it lacked was long-ranged air support, particularly carrier-based,

while the Australians could advance via Timor and Borneo under the umbrella of land-based air-

craft, and hope for British carrier support once in a good jumping-off position for Singapore.

Australia had also been offered a heavy bomber force of B-24s by the Americans under Lend-

Lease. There were mixed opinions about its use against what little infrastructure there was in the

Pacific islands, while all cities the Australian side of Japan were friendly; bombing Batavia or

Singapore would have been akin to blitzing Paris. Some thought it a waste of time, manpower and

resources for no return, but a powerful lobby in the Royal Australian Air Force was keen on taking

up the offer. This led to the idea of an exchange of complimentary units, a group of B-24s to be

based in the Aleutians or Komandorskis against targets in the Kuriles for half a year in return for

Russian American shipping to get the Australian campaign underway before monsoon season.331

The idea was welcomed by both the Russian American Navy and Air Force, the former having

previously sought employment in the Southwest Pacific to prove its autonomy, the latter eager to

have the gap created by the withdrawal of five American bomber squadrons the previous year

filled.332 Some things had to be smoothed over between the air forces of both countries though.

Already during the Russian American deployment to the UK, a certain confusion had arisen from

both using the acronym of RAAF in the English language. A good amount of ribbing had occurred,

including Russian crews painting kangaroos on their own red-blue-and-white aircraft roundels –

something that struck a raw nerve with the Australians as they were prevented from using a national

identifier by Imperial regulations.

A more serious incident was when a Lancaster bomber vanished after being accepted from the

factory by an “RAAF” transfer crew in January.333 Suspicion arose immediately the aircraft had

330 von Sieben, 1265-1267. 331 Lewis, p. 64-65. 332 Bergmann, 1274-1276. 333 Lewis, p. 64-68.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

144

been impressed into Russian service, even though it did not fit any official requirements. Despite

a thorough investigation by the Air Force to the point of borrowing a Polish security detachment

for a search at Chievres Airbase – which also annoyed the Americans who owned the site –, the

bomber never turned up again. Eventually the Russian American government quietly paid the Aus-

tralians for it to avoid any strains in further co-operation.334

Planners also thought that the increased inter-allied makeup might serve to deepen integration in

the North Pacific area of operations while at the same time giving Junograd a greater say in where

things should head. The senior Allied commander currently was Vice Admiral Fletcher of the US

Navy who was reporting to Admiral Nimitz’ Pacific Ocean Areas Command. Fletcher was running

Eleventh US Air Force including the Canadian attachments in addition to the Joint Allied Naval

Task Force North Pacific, the former JATF Aleutians which had long been operating off the Ko-

mandorskis and Kuriles too. There were of course Russian American liaison officers at Fletcher's

HQ and Eleventh Air Force, as the US had at Russian American four- and three-star commands,

and in the Air Force even down to squadron level to facilitate cooperation.

Ground operations had however been conducted pretty much under national command since Ju-

nograd had the only major force in the theatre, had been retaking Russian soil so far, and neither

side really wanted to be under command of the other. The US ground defense units came under

Fletcher's command, while the Canadian troops garrisoning Attu had been somewhat informally

attached to Russian American Army High Command under their senior national liaison officer.

The addition of the Australians was seen as a chance to get to a more integrated area command

where Junograd might be responsible for ground operations, the Americans for naval operations,

and the Australians and Canadians for air operations under the Commonwealth roof. Since navies

and air forces tended to support ground operations when all was said and done, this would put

Russian America in the driver seat. Given the global division of responsibility by the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, it was likely the Americans would still claim overall command, and at the very

least Russian American forces would be answering to Nimitz. The key however was seen in form-

ing a sufficient power base to make Russian American interests be heard at the strategic level.335

In the event, the Australians offered a wing of three forward-based B-24 squadrons with another

squadron on the Russian American mainland for support and sustainment. In return, they requested

amphibious transport cababilities including a regiment of marines to act as “door knockers” to

capture ports in landing operations planned on Timor, and at Balikpapan on Borneo six weeks later.

The main force would consist of two Australian brigades with armour, supported by a screen of

RAN cruisers and destroyers as well as minesweepers and two anti-submarine flotillas, plus RAAF

aircraft to establish air superiority and on-call close air support.336

The amphibious ships presented little problem to the Russian American side; the Canadian con-

crete ships had pretty much obviated the need for them to land supplies in the Komandorskis out-

side developed harbours. Of the Marines however two regiments were in Europe, and the third

tasked with guarding Navy facilities and serve as a quick reaction force in the Aleutians. A com-

plete battalion could be cobbled together from the latter for deployment, but a full regiment would

have to be filled up with Army troops. This was not really a problem either though, as most had

trained thoroughly for amphibious landings in the run-up to the Komandorski campaign.

III./1st Yeger Battalion readily presented itself, currently stationed at Beringa after having as-

saulted various beaches when they were part of the Light Task Force. However, they were partic-

ularly geared towards skiing and climbing mountains, so there was doubt if they were the right fit

334 Kovalyev, p. 64. 335 von Sieben, 1278. 336 Lewis, p. 65.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

145

for operations in tropical islands. All amphibious tractors were deployed to Europe too, except for

some vehicles for training. In a pinch, it would be possible to attach a platoon of half a dozen to a

provisional Marine battalion, and maybe even a pair of the LVT(A)-4 fire support vehicles substi-

tuted for the Sherman tanks originally planned for 1st Marine Armoured Battalion.

A delay into March with the planned assault at Dunkirk concluded with not too many casualties

might allow to fly out the personnel of one of 1st Marine Armoured Battalion's two Type B com-

panies, which had a platoon of Amtanks in addition to two with Amtracs. Another company issue

could be preordered to be delivered to the US West Coast or even Hawaii, and the complete unit

shipped from there in addition to whatever was generate from the training establishment at home.

During the resting period likely to follow Dunkirk, the parent battalion would be refilled from 1st

Marine Training and Replacement Battalion, which in turn would accept newcomers from the POW

recruiting programme to learn the marine business.

Use of a regular Army brigade from Beringa including a mechanised battalion group was con-

sidered as an alternative, though if the latter was to be re-equipped with LVTs, combined delivery

and training times would put operational readiness well into May – not to speak of hurting the

delicate sensibilities of the Navy once more. In turn, this would push the end of the planned three-

month deployment into August, when Russian American plans foresaw moving onto the Kuriles

with all available forces. Prudence also called for an early transfer to Australia to allow troops to

acclimatize and train with the forces they would work with in the coming campaign.

In the end, the 1st Task Force Southwest Pacific consisted of three rifle companies from 1st

Marine Regiment, a provisional mortar company drawn from the mortar platoons of the regiment,

and a provisional armoured company of eight LVT-4 and two LVT(A)-4, rounded out by another

three companies from III./1st Yeger which also supplied the headquarters company, with some

marine attachments. Additional Army units were assigned in the form of an engineer and military

police company each for a total of 1,800 ground troops.

They sailed for Brisbane on 29 January with a transport group from 1st Sealift and 9th Amphib-

ious Squadron, escorted by destroyer leader Admiral Kolchak, two of the new Sumner-class de-

stroyers, three DEs and some auxiliaries. This Russian Contingent Allied Forces Southwest Pacific

numbered about 6,450 overall with national administrative chain of command running through

Naval Operations Command to placate any sensibilities. The Navy had also wanted to take the

chance and embark three of the brand-new R-5 helicopters to test them in tropical conditions, but

delivery had been delayed into February.337 Two days earlier, an advance party of RAAF No. 82

Wing had departed Brisbane on an opposite course.338

The Negotiations about an Allied North Pacific Command Organisation

Negotiations about an Allied North Pacific command organisation integrating Russian American,

US and Commonwealth forces had been going on since February. Due to territorial ambitions in

the Kuriles, the Russian American chief interest remained to be in control of ground operations as

owner of the largest ground force in the area, while the Americans were envisioned to get overall

naval command under Admiral Fletcher. With the new Australian contribution to the bomber force

in theatre, the Commonwealth partners would then run air operations – possibly under a British

commander as neither the Canadians nor Australians had many officers with the requesite stars

available. The thorny question would of course be who might be in overall command.

337 von Sieben, 1280-1288. 338 Lewis, p. 65.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

146

The US had however put little importance on the North Pacific area since the retaking of the

Japanese-occupied islands in the Aleutians and the losses suffered in bombing raids against the

Kuriles the previous year. The road to eventual invasion of Japan was now seen firmly in the South

with the successful island-hopping campaign under MacArthur and bombers launching mainly

from the Marianas. Moreover the Roosevelt administration had been reluctant about the Russian

American designs for the Kuriles for the exact reasons of not antagonising the Soviets which Ju-

nograd had been deploring so much. Moscow had made it clear the islands were in its sphere of

interest, to the worry of Russian American planners concerned with pre-empting a Soviet move

should Stalin make good on its promise to join the war against Japan after the fall of Germany.

A particular controversy with the Americans had arisen in mid-March when they wanted to trans-

fer additional vessels beyond the existing Lend-Lease scheme to the USSR for the promised attack

and had the nerve to ask Junograd whether they could use the naval base of Holodnayabukhta to

hand them over and train the Soviet crews. Unfortunately this too had gotten tied with the negoti-

ations about the future North Pacific command structure, which was among the reasons there had

been no results yet.

Coincidentally, if the US had reduced their commitment to the North Pacific due to the more

intense action in the South, so had the Japanese. Intelligence estimates about the Northern Kuriles

were based upon signals interception, aerial photography and observations by Russian American

and US Navy vessels operating off the islands, as well as some eyes on the ground run by the Signal

Corps, reported that air and sea assets had been relocated from the Kuriles, though considerable

ground forces remained.

The Japanese 91st Division was headquartered on Paramushiro; together with 42nd Division on

Shimushiro, 129th Independent Mixed Brigade on Urup and 41st Independent Mixed Regiment on

Matua, it was part of the “North Kuril Fortress” which was under 27th Army. There were two

additional artillery units of indeterminate size reported on Shumshu, along with a tank regiment,

since a number of both Type 97 mediums and Type 95 light tanks had been photographed by air-

craft, with a company or so detached to Paramushiro. The two brigades of 91st Division also ap-

peared to have detached about a battalion each to the smaller islands of Onekotan and Shiashkotan

to the south, with smaller sub-units on the half-dozen islets making up the rest of the group.

An IJA air regiment was still operating from airfields on Shumshu and Paramushir the Japanese

had somewhat rebuilt from the previous year’s massive raid, though their activity was much re-

duced; Ki-43s were still seen, but the Ki-44s that used to be about had not been spotted for some

time. Likewise, the IJN was showing less aircraft than before. No Betties and less Zeros had been

seen on its bases since last year, though its single-engine dive and torpedo bombers were still

around, as well as the occasional flying boat. There were reports of some Nakajima “Gekko” night-

fighters, though none had actually been photographed. It was estimated that about half of the orig-

inal naval aviation units had been redeployed to the Southwest Pacific.

The former Northeast Area Fleet headquartered at Kataoka had apparently been disbanded in

autumn last year when most surviving units were redeployed to the Philippines, and very little

combatants were seen now. It was unclear whether there were much navy ground units left at all.

There were certainly coastal defense positions, at least nine fortified sites and 20 lesser positions

on Shumshu alone, with less at Paramushiro; but the Japanese remained good at camoflage. Over-

all, the Shumshu-Paramushiro garrison was estimated at about 25,000 troops.

On the Soviet side, this was the area of the Red Army's Far Eastern Front. The majority of its

troops – 1st and 2nd Red Banner Army, 15th, 25th and 35th Army – were on the Chinese border,

with 16th Army on North Sakhalin and in the Amur region. The 9th and 10th Air Army were also

reported on that front. Kamchatka was currently a “defence zone” that reports were not too sure

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

147

about regarding the army garrison, though quite a bit was known about the naval base at Petropav-

lovsk. It was mainly a submarine base, with some motor torpedo boats, subhunters, minesweepers

and other auxiliaries also seen in port, plus a naval infantry battalion. In addition, there was a bat-

tery of four 130 mm guns at Cape Lopatka on the south tip of the peninsula opposite Shumshu.

By 17 March, contingency plans for the Kuriles had been updated to adjust for the trans-Pacific

swap of forces with the Australians. 2nd and 3rd Division were tagged to deploy in case the Soviets

landed on Shumshu and/or Paramushir to block their advance at Onekotan. Conversion of the old

four-stack destroyers to APDs would be complete by the end of the month, providing 24 fast trans-

ports each able to carry an infantry company with four light vehicles pre-loaded into their LCVPs

there from Beringa within 24 hours after being given the order. This initial force would consist of

1st Krasivayaberga Infantry Brigade reinforced by 1st Commando Battalion and 3rd Forward Ob-

server/Security Squadron, about 3,500 men carried by 5th through 7th Fast Transport Squadron

and escorted by 1st Destroyer Squadron for protection and gunfire support.

Their mission would be to secure Onekotan against the Japanese battalion group from 91st Divi-

sion estimated to be based there. Problems would be minesweeping capabilities and air support.

From 1 April on, the Wrangel CVE Task Group was forward-deployed with an attached mine-

sweeper squadron southwest of the Komandorskis so they would arrive with the transport group if

ordered; but while the Air Force and the Australians could reach to Onekotan, air support would

still be patchy without the Americans – particularly if they withheld their fighters in VF-66 on

Wrangel.339 This might leave forces with only a dozen dated Wildcats directly on the scene, though

the Air Force was confident Wrangel could be filled to capacity if the “emergency reserve” of pilots

was revived and given carrier re-qualification, referring to the women who had fought at Beringa

and were now mostly serving under the Home Defence Command.340

The main force would be 2nd Division reinforced by 4th Northern Mechanised Brigade, 6th

Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment and 2nd FO/S Squadron for a total of 20,300 troops. 2nd Sealift Squad-

ron would carry the infantry brigades, 3rd the artillery and most other divisional troops; 8th and

9th Amphibious Squadrons the armour and logistics units. Some would have to make the trip in

LCTs across the open sea, but towing those behind the larger transports had worked reasonably

well in the Beringa landings and the recent Pacific crossing to Australia, albeit unloaded on the

latter occasion. Escort would be provided by 2nd Destroyer Squadron.

Mission of the main force would be to hold Onekotan against possible Japanese or Soviet coun-

terattacks, and hopefully expand to nearby Makanrushi, Kharimkotan, Ekarma, Chirinkotan and

Shiashkotan as bases for further operations. Once secured, 1st Division and the rest of I Corps

could be moved there and probably some airfields established to advance as the situation allowed.

The Komandorskis would then be garrisoned by a brigade made up of battalions from the territorial

regiments, acting as replacement units for I Corps at the same time; the Americans already had two

battalions each of their 201st Infantry Regiment and 206th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) Regiment

based on Beringa to protect the airfields in the north.341

At the same time, the Russian American Air Force and the newly arrived Australian B-24 force

had already started preparing for mining operations in the Kuriles to block the Japanese ports and

disrupt shipping there, hopefully starving the garrisons. The US had indicated willingness to supply

air-dropped 500 and 1,000 pound mines with magnetic and accoustic triggers, and train Russian

American crews in their use at facilities on Tinian, in late February. While those facilities were

designed for B-29s, two Mosquitos were sent to the Marianas in early March on a circuitous trip

339 von Sieben, 1337-1365. 340 Bergmann, 1359. 341 von Sieben, 1358-1365.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

148

through many remote islands for several crews to make practice runs under American supervision

and in turn become trainers for 6th Attack Squadron on Kiska.

The US offer had also included mines suitable for delivery by submarine, and the Russian Amer-

ican Navy had been keen to co-operate in target planning as it had been busy surveying the coasts

of Paramushir and other northern Kurile islands for its own purposes for some time. Co-ordination

of minelaying operations between the services was a little unsure at first, until the Air Force pointed

out that this capability would also serve to disrupt Soviet moves against the islands when the time

came, without direct confrontation. Afterwards the Army – and Signal Corps – were also involved

in the targeting process to ensure no beaches were blocked which they might want to eventually

land on, while mines started to end up at sites that would have made for convenient landings from

Kamchatka. Actual operations started in improved weather conditions in mid-April alongside a

squadron from No. 82 Wing RAAF.342

The Australians became natural partners because many of their aircrews were already experi-

enced in “gardening” both in the European and Pacific theatres and had their own instructors which

contributed to training. Mining against Japanese shipping in particular had shown to be very effec-

tive, costing few aircraft and aircrew for the damage inflicted on enemy logistics. On the other side

of the force swap with Australia, the Russian Contingent Allied Forces Southwest Pacific had ar-

rived at Brisbane on 21 February. Despite having taken three weeks to go from late Northern winter

to late Southern summer, there were still some acclimatisation problems, including for the ships

the force had sailed on. The Brisbane shipyards tasked with running maintenance found that a lot

of ventilation on the vessels has been “adapted” for northern climes, being neglected, partially or

fully blocked up, or some cases ripped out.

The delay resulting from necessary repairs did however give troops more time to adapt to local

temperatures; their own “overhaul” was largely limited to being issued items of tropical clothing

by the Australians, though the shorts provided some comic relief to the northerners and some severe

sunburn casualties followed. Units then began passing through the Jungle Training Establishments

on the Atherton Tablelands, both for the slightly kinder climate and to introduce them to the Aus-

tralian units with which they would be working closest – 2/9th Armoured Regiment, 2/9th Cavalry

Commando Regiment and 24th Infantry Brigade from the 9th Infantry Division. Troops staying in

Brisbane soon found their own way to “work up” in the Australian climate by lots of swimming,

running and general physical exercise in nothing but trunks on the beach among the admiring looks

of local ladies, though interaction with the locals resulted in various cases of veneral disease.343

Some small reinforcements for the Southwest Pacific Task Force arrived on 13 March with an-

other ship delivering more LVT-4 and LVT(A)-4s with freshly-trained crews to bring the Amtrac

component up to a full company, the training unit at home being restocked by new deliveries and

some seasoned personnel returning from Europe; plus the first flight of five R-5 helicopters from

4th Naval Aviation Squadron, to be tested in tropical conditions.344

Shortly thereafter the combined Russian-Australian force embarked with the intention to conduct

a series of landing exercises on the coast of Queensland, before moving on to Darwin to refresh

themselves before making their assault on Timor. However, commanders on the spot in conjunction

with General Blamey as theatre military commander decided to divert from this plan after covert

reconnaissance confirmed intelligence that the Aru Archipelago, previously Japanese-held, had

been unoccupied for a number of weeks already. Instead of moving to Shoalwater Bay, the entire

force, along with a coastal convoy who tagged along for protection, made straight up the inner

342 Bergmann, 1339-1400. 343 Lewis, p. 68. 344 von Sieben, 1343.

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passage, rounded Cape York and for its “exercise” assaulted the island of Wamar on 8 April in

Operation Banger, taking the principal town of Dobo and the remains of its airstrip.

Despite the lack of opposition, a total of six men were killed and nine injured, two and four of

which respectively Russian Americans. Most of the losses occurred when an Amtrac went under,

taking four men down with it, though the vehicle was subsequently recovered. Two more men

drowned transferring to other landing craft, and the remainder of the casualties were various crush

injuries, falls and two snake bites. The Amtrac incident was judged due to the crew's lacking expe-

rience, as most of the company were crash-transferred out of training for the deployment; but the

whole operation was done in a day and looked to have escaped Japanese notice for the moment.

By 9 April the force had moved on to Darwin as per the original itinerary, except for an Australian

company of infantry, two troops of Bofors guns, some engineers and an RAAF ground force left

behind, along with a considerable quantity of drummed fuel and other supplies to extend the range

of air cover from Horn Island. While the Wamar landing had shown the need for additional training,

the assault on Timor, codenamed “Spud”, was still scheduled for 24 April, and troops wasted no

more time to remedy recognised shortcomings in preparation for the operation.345

Operation Spud

The full Russian-Australian force assembled for the campaign aimed at Borneo, known as “Sea-

slug” overall, could not match those in other operations in the theatre in size, but was still impres-

sive considering the individual strength and other commitments of both countries. Troops were

largely carried by the Russian American transport group with its own escorts, under overall com-

mand of Australian-led Task Force 74 with the flag in heavy cruiser HMAS Australia. Other RAN

ships were light cruisers Hobart and Adelaide, five N-class destroyers, destroyers Vendetta and

Warramunga, destroyer escort Swan and 19 Bathurst-class corvettes mostly detailed to minesweep-

ing duties. Air support came from RAAF 1st Tactical Air Force with several additional units at-

tached, the total including No. 77 Wing with Beaufighters, No. 78 and 81 Wings with P-40s, No.

80 Wing with Spitfires, and No. 85 Wing with B-24s. No. 61 and 62 Airfield Construction Wings

were also brought along to improve forward basing of aircraft as operations progressed.

Facing this force was Japanese 19th Army under Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitano with 48th

Division on Timor and 49th in the Lesser Sunda Islands. Allied intelligence suggested that 49th

Division had been subject to a great deal of both wastage and “stripping”. All indications suggested

that while the infantry component might remain at something close to establishment, it was scat-

tered across a number of islands in not more than battalion strength. The division had otherwise

been reduced to little more than a shell.

A number of minor Japanese garrisons had withdrawn to Timor and been absorbed into the 48th

Division. As a result that division was at, or better than, 75 percent strength in most respects, and

as such was the most powerful Japanese formation in the area. That said, as witnessed by at least

three identified hospital units present on Timor, sickness rates were high and general health low,

particularly among these reinforcements. To some extent Timor had become a recovery posting for

troops suffering the natural consequences of three years in the tropics, limited access to anti-ma-

larials and generally inadequate hygiene.

48th Division commander Lieutenant General Kunitano Yamada was however assessed as a com-

petent, active and versatile commander. The 47th Infantry and 48th Recconnaissance Regiment

345 Lewis, p. 70-71.

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150

appeared to be his two most reliable units, while two Formosan infantry regiments were an un-

known quantity – it was believed that they would fight and probably fight hard, but wether they

were up to the usual Japanese military standards or level of fanaticism remained to be seen. Sources

and photographic reconnaissance indicated that Yamada was holding the Formosans to the north,

presumably in anticipation of any assault being directed towards Dili. Kupang was held by the 47th

Regiment with a Mountain Artillery Battalion, minor detachments and some 160 Army Air Force

personnel. The 48th Regiment was largely motorised and appeared to be his mobile reserve. Pres-

ently it was concentrated in three groups of approximately squadron size down the length of the

island, at Kefamenanu and Atambua between Dili and Kupang, and Villa Salazar in the North.

The total number of air force ground crew on Timor was estimated at between 200 and 500, the

true number probably closer to 300 than 400. Presently there was no permanent air presence, alt-

hough there were normally upwards of a dozen air movements per day across the island’s airfields.

The recent retraction of Japanese power in defence of the Home Islands had drawn the bulk of

Japanese aircraft northwards, leaving the Lesser Sunda and Timor areas uncovered. However,

stores and ground crew remained in place to allow aircraft to be shifted back again rapidly. On the

naval side, nothing larger than a corvette had been seen east of Bali for two months.346

The recent Japanese reinforcements to Timor had cast some doubt onto the choice to land at

Kupang on the eastern tip of Timor, which had earlier been reported to be garrisoned by just a weak

battalion. The Allied plan for the landing called for a direct assault onto the port rather than at the

Paha River where the Japanese had gone ashore in 1942, and might expect a repeat. While enemy

troops were likely to be scattered around the area to man coast defence positions, it was now ex-

pected that at least two battalions of the 47th Regiment would be encountered at the port. The

strategy had therefore become to defeat Yamada’s best troops first in an initial decisive blow,

counting on surprise and heavy fire support.

Operations commenced in the night towards 24 April with Australian 2/11th Commando Squad-

ron landing on the island of Semau and Russian American 7/1st Yeger Company on the opposite

side of Kupang Bay at Point Sulamu under cover of darkness, both reinforced by an engineer pla-

toon each and a marine mortar platoon in the latter case, to secure Japanese coast defence sites on

the flanks of the main force. While some of those had been identified from aerial reconnaissance,

it was thought that many were probably too well camouflaged and would have to be dealt with by

forces on the ground, either through direct action or by calling in naval gunfire and air support.

The advance forces managed to land undetected by small boat from destroyers and advanced

towards the known Japanese batteries. Inevitably, forward elements soon encountered small groups

of Japanese soldiers manning other positions which opened disorganised fire. However, overall

plans held up until at first light shortly past 0430 hours, RAAF Beaufighters began to arrive from

Darwin to strafe, bomb and rocket enemy defenses before the cruisers and destroyers of the Allied

force moved in to open preparatory fire for the landing. An attack by B-24s was subsequently

directed against the Penfui airfield. The extensive training between all troops involved now paid

off as aircraft in some cases attacked targets within 100 yards of commandoes laying demolition

charges to enemy installations.

The late-arrived Russian helicopters, at least two of which were launched from shipboard, proved

of particular value as they provided the force with on-scene aerial spotting capabilities beyond the

single Supermarine Walrus from HMAS Hobart, Australia having lost her aircraft installations in

her refit after the kamikaze damage she suffered in the Lingayen Gulf earlier that year. For this

operation, she had instead been fitted with an impromptu landing platform in the position of her

346 Lewis, p. 64-71.

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151

removed “X” turret, embarking several RAAF observers to ride along with the Russian American

Navy pilots for liaison. However, the helicopters also showed their vulnerability again as one was

lost to Japanese fire.

While the Australian commandoes managed to reach their objectives – notably without a single

casualty – 7/1st Yeger Company encountered two well-entrenched Japanese companies and had to

go over to the defence, aided by air and naval gunfire support. Several enemy positions at Point

Sulamu therefore remained active along with others at the port when the main element of 1st South-

west Pacific Battlegroup began to move in on landing craft under cover of the Inshore Flotilla

consisting of HMAS Adelaide and Vendetta, four Russian American LCGs and two minesweeping

groups. Out of 43 landing craft, two were set on fire and exploded when ammunition on board

cooked off, two more sank, and one was left adrift after losing power. Vendetta also received an

unfortunate hit that disabled power for her 4” gun mounts, putting her out of the fight. In addition,

two minesweepers were damaged.

Nonetheless at 0530 hours, the assault of three marine and two yeger companies, again reinforced

by engineers and light mortars, hit the port of Kupang as a second wave of Beaufighters arrived as

planned. Never much developed as a harbour and most of the old town having been destroyed by

previous Allied bombing, the landing did not differ much from earlier operations in the desolate

Aleutians and Komandorskis except for climate conditions. Due to beach obstacles, the Amtracs

could not get ashore and had to discharge troops into shallow water; an additional seven landing

craft were knocked out on the beach. Despite this and the losses at sea, the force secured a beach-

head within 40 minutes and set about clearing obstacles for the follow-on waves. Enemy troops did

however still hold defensive positions to either side of the harbour as well as several strong points

at Point Sulamu, delivering heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire into the flanks of the

advance element.

At this point the second assault echelon of Australian 24th Brigade and 2/9th Armoured Regiment

was well underway, pre-established battalion groups with an even mix of infantry platoons and

Matilda II tanks packed into Russian American LSTs. They began landing in the harbour area at

0630, immediately joining the battle ashore and pushing about 300 yards beyond the initial beach-

head, rapidly overcoming several Japanese positions with the help of their tanks. Then however

they were met by a Japanese counterattack from hastily-summoned reinforcements of the 47th In-

fantry Regiment while unloading was still going on.

The situation was confused, and fighting ebbed and flowed indecisively for about one hour, de-

laying the landing of the Allied follow-on echelon with most of the artillery. Matters were compli-

cated by Allied aircraft having to return to Darwin with their ammunition expended and the next

wave not yet arrived. In their absence, the Australians tanks proved instrumental in defeating two

successive Japanese thrusts, again in concert with naval artillery. By 0930, the Allied force had

consolidated its grip on Kupang, beating off the counterattacks and securing positions on the flanks,

though the enemy strongpoints at Point Sulamu still remained active.

A new round of Japanese counterattacks began at 1100 along the shore from the north after the

enemy had redeployed his troops that had earlier been sent to attack the Yegers at Point Sulamu,

just as artillery and other supporting units were finally being ferried through the bay towards

Kupang. That, too, was fought off with freshly fueled and loaded aircraft now once more available

to support ground troops. Artillery was set up in time to be employed against the day’s final attempt

of the Japanese to throw the Allies back into the sea that began at 1400.

By sundown, the beachhead had been extended to a width of nearly 3,000 yards, and forward

positions by armoured groups were up to 2,000 yards inland. Several small battles were fought

with isolated Japanese forces during the night though, and enemy snipers remained active within

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

152

the perimeter. Overall, the day’s casualties had been mostly on the Russian American side, having

suffered 94 dead and missing, and 199 wounded – in part explained by the losses on the incoming

landing craft. By comparison, the Australians came off lightly with 15 dead and 48 wounded. On

the Japanese side, 234 dead and 140 wounded were counted by Allied troops, in addition to more

than 450 patients and medical staff found at a local hospital. Ten artillery pieces had also been

captured, and five warehouses taken.

Full battle resumed the next morning against continued strong resistance of enemy troops who

had been reinforced overnight by a squadron of the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment from

Kefamenanu. This unit had brought eight light tanks, of which it however lost all but one in the

fighting. Still, the Allied objective of securing the Penfui airfield on D+1, originally planned to

take a fighter within six days after the landing, was not reached as the Japanese destroyed all

bridges over the various rivers blocking approach for the tanks. Important progress was made else-

where though, as the Russian American troops at Point Sulamu were reinforced and the last enemy

positions there eliminated over the day.

The situation remained in the balance for two more days as the Japanese brought in some more

motorised reinforcements and the Allies looked for a way to break through to the airfield. Eventu-

ally, contrary to original plans and despite its losses in the landing, the Russian American contin-

gent was used again on 28 April when volunteers were asked for to conduct an Amtrac thrust across

the rivers to take. With an obvious sentiment of the score not yet being settled, more troops than

could actually be fit into the surviving vehicles answered the call. At nearly two companies in

strength, the move critically unhinged the Japanese defenses along the Kupang-Kefamenanu road,

though it failed to cut the enemy’s line of retreat as envisioned. Thereafter, the Japanese withdrew

into the interior of Timor. Work on the airfield began immediately, while the Russian American

task force did not see action again for the rest of the operation.347

Concentration on Japan

The end of the war in Europe and the considerable influx of manpower from former Soviet troops

under the Battleaxe programme prompted early considerations for a new order of battle for the

Russian American armed forces with a view to operations against Japan, only two months after the

planned 1945 structure had been fully implemented; in practice, the “yearly” wartime OOBs had

only lasted ten to eleven months each. The next variation would hardly be enacted in time for the

long-planned landings in the Kuriles now that Stalin’s promise to enter the war against Japan three

months after the fall of Germany had set the deadline to 9 August. However, it might come about

in time for the Allied invasion of Japan codenamed “Downfall”, which was at this point envisioned

for November. The primary aim of the Army therefore was to turn the European-based headquar-

ters of II Corps into an actual combat command and eventually relocate it to the Pacific Theatre.

The Navy, having acquired the new Sumner-class destroyers, was looking at newer, bigger re-

placements for its other combatants. The chief worry were the Skumbrii-class submarines; though

they were only about ten years old, they had been hard-used since the start of the war, and were

really too small for operations beyond the Kuriles. With crew manpower not as limited as it used

to be and the US having started to cancel new builds in anticipation of the end of the war, talks had

been begun about delivery of at least four Tench-class boats which were sitting semi-finished on

their slipways.

347 von Sieben, 1414-1419.

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The Navy's other big source of discontent was the limited capacity of its carrier Wrangel. It

wanted a bigger, faster vessel with its own fixed-wing aircraft component – though the Air Force,

which was still owning the Wildcat fighters flying off Wrangel, would have to agree to that. More-

over, no fitting ship was currently in sight for a replacement anytime soon. The optimal solution

was seen in the British 1942 Design Light Fleet Carriers of which six had been commissioned at

this point, with eight more fitting out and two more awaiting launch. Their complement was 50

percent larger than in a Bogue-class, but they had double the aircraft capacity, could operate all

current types, and were seven knots faster, able to operate with the fleet. They were also only built

for a lifetime of three years, but that was considered ample for the rest of the war.

Unfortunately all were of course planned to enter service with the Royal Navy, and were still

taking two and a half years to build. Australia had put in for one of them a year ago, and the question

was still being deliberated; Russian America would be in line behind even if some ship or other

from the current construction run should become available. The other option, the American Inde-

pendence-class, was reportedly unsatisfactory due to being converted from light cruiser hulls; it

had very restricted aircraft storage and narrow flight decks while again 50 percent higher manning

requirements over the British type. The follow-on Sapian-class seemed to be better, but needed yet

more crew, and only two were under construction. All else was entirely too big for the Russian

American capabilities.

Furthermore, the Navy was planning to increase its amphibious capabilities even more, and pos-

sibly reactivate 4th Minesweeper Squadron to be prepared for landing operations in the Kuriles and

Japan. In Europe, 1st Marine Division was already being formed into a triangular structure which

would look mostly like the Army pattern, except for the lack of a medical battalion and its Amtracs,

likely to re-inforced in step with the greater infantry strength. The marine contingent in the South-

west Pacific Task Force might be used for that after its return from the Australian campaign.348

The Air Force was focussing on three issues: First, its role in Europe, which was expected to be

limited to transport and liaison in support of possible occupation troops and Operation Varyag.

Second, finishing the Pacific war, where its role would depend on overall plans, and whether the

Navy succeeded with their carrier plans. The remaining duration of the war was dependant on

whether the Japanese would sue for peace now that they were alone after the German surrender. If

they insisted on fighting to the end, it was feared the war could take another year to 18 months; this

might lead to the Air Force operating from bases on Japanese territory, which was expected to

require extremely good ground security.

The third issue was the post war size, shape and equipment of the Air Force. Examining the Me

262 and possibly other German jet aircraft like the Arado 234 was hoped to inform thinking on

future fighters, as well as appraisals of the Gloster Meteor, Lockheed P-80 and the new de Havil-

land Vampire, as soon as a look at them could be obtained. No post-war role was foreseen for

bigger bombers, as Russian America’s allies had plenty; there was no enthusiasm to deal with the

attached crewing requirements and other logistical issues.

The Air Force had stood up an additional combat wing and some ancilliary units so far every

year; even if some personnel was transferred to the Navy for carrier aviation, it expected being able

to afford both a combat and transport wing this time, the latter particularly in light of the continue-

ing commitment to Europe. The immediate main priority however were plans for the Kurile oper-

ation. Reconnaissance reported very low aerial activity from Paramushir.349 Air Force Western

Command had tried provoking Japanese fighters to come out to fight, but they had been uncharac-

teristically reluctant, a great change from their former aggressiveness. It was speculated that they

348 von Sieben, 1443. 349 Bergmann, 1444-1461.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

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were hampered by shortages fuel or skilled pilots, aircraft had been moved south to fight the Amer-

icans, they might be husbanding their strength to face an invasion – or a combination of any or all

of those factors.350

The chief concern for the Kuriles was still the difficulty of sustaining operations at that distance

from the Air Force’s land bases. Planners remained convinced that more carrier-based aircraft were

needed, whether Russian American or Allied, and preferably better aircraft than the Wildcat –

though that type would be committed if it had to. New carrier fighters were already been looked

at, for both the rest of the war and the post-war era. The Grumman Hellcat and Vought Corsair

were the only suitable types which could be acquired quickly, with the Hellcat preferred because

its carrier landing performance was thought better and it was very similiar to the Wildcat from

which it had been developed.

The Grumman Bearcat or the new British Hawker Sea Fury were possibilities for the slightly

longer term. The Bearcat could probably operate even off Wrangel due to its light weight and high

power output; however, the first USN squadron was only just about to become operational. The

Sea Fury seemed the most capable design, but was also some time away from service and a lot

heavier, so may be the choice if and when we get one of the British carriers, probably post-war.

Obviously, the requirement was affected by what the aircraft had to fly off, and when it would

arrive. The Air Force suggested that if no light fleet carrier could be obtained, there were vast

numbers of escort carriers around, many larger than Wrangel; with the end of the war in Europe,

some must be spare and might do as a temporary expedient, as the British were managing to fly

Corsairs off the Ruler class.351

The best Russian America was likely to get before the war ended with Japan might be a Com-

mencement Bay-class CVE, which type still had not the speed for fleet operations, but was at least

a purpose-built carrier rather than a conversion from merchant hulls, and a bit larger than the Bogue

class; it could carry ten more aircraft – including Corsairs and Hellcats – with a crew similiar to

the British light carriers. A lot of the original US order of 33 were currently being cancelled with

only six commissioned and 17 more building, so one might be acquired off the slipway like the

Tench submarines. Whatever the outcome, the Navy also wanted to keep using Wrangel as a train-

ing carrier and probably as a general training ship, since the ancient cruiser Almaz which had filled

this role until now was falling apart at age 42. That would mean a training squadron with the current

Wildcats, and probably one or two combat squadrons with Grumman Avenger bombers and the

new fighter.

An added complication was that the next OOB would have to fit the planned Allied command

organisation for the North Pacific Area. II Corps was being kept out of this so far by Junograd as

it did not need the attention; since the Army was getting most of the windfall from the Battleaxe

programme, its next structure would also be most dependent on how the programme wound up. By

late May, a solution for the division of responsibility between the Allies was very close.

The US had finally accepted the proposal for Russian America to be in command of ground

forces, the Americans of naval forces and the Commonwealth of air forces, but was adamant it

should be in overall control. In turn Junograd made this condition to a firm US committment of

support for the campaign in the Kuriles, particularly substantial aircraft carrier support. After this

had been achieved, negotiations were now merely about the precise way in which overall American

command will be effected. The most likely was that Admiral Fletcher would take the post, possibly

while retaining naval command at the same time and being promoted to four-star rank in the course.

350 Kravchuk, p. 74. 351 Bergmann, 1444-1461.

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Regarding carrier support, for a time there had actually been thought of sending USS Bon Homme

Richard which had been working up at Hawaii for deployment; however, with Enterprise damaged

by a kamikaze off Okinawa on 14 May and currently sailing towards Seattle for repairs, the USN

felt that a fleet carrier could not be spared. The stand-in was now likely to be Carrier Division 22

which also had its flagship Sangamon damaged by a kamikaze on 4 May and headed for repairs in

the US; Wrangel would fill up the division in theatre while USS Nassau would be recalled after a

year on station with Joint Allied Naval Task Force North Pacific.

Therefore three Sangamon-class CVEs would be available, which were a bit larger than the

Bogues; they had actual, if small, air groups rather than the usual composite squadron, consisting

of a squadron of 18 Hellcats and one of twelve Avengers. There might even be a Night Escort

Carrier Air Group which would have twelve radar-equipped F6F-3 or 5N in the Hellcat squadron,

increasing night fighter capacity which would otherwise be limited to Russian American Mosqui-

toes operating from Beringa. The Navy would certainly not get a more capable carrier of it own in

time for the campaign, though talks about that were now focussing on CVE-114. Originally named

Mosser Bay, then Willamette, now Rendova, she had been launched immediately before the end of

1944, but her fitting out had recently been suspended due to the anticipated end of the war.

However, after Russian America expressed interest, work was restarted, and she would be fin-

ished in middle to late June. There would have to be the usual shakedown phase after commission

of course, both crew and air group then potentially flying Hellcats and Avengers having to train

with the new equipment. The carrier would therefore not be combat-ready before late September.

This was too late for the Kuriles campaign which was planned to begin no later than 8 July to safely

pre-empt the Soviets, but probably in time for the landings in the Japanese Home Islands and

planned for early November – though it was unknown at this point what, if any, role Russian Amer-

ican forces might play in this. At any rate, the Navy was already debating names for the new carrier.

Since Wrangel has been an overall lucky ship so far – she had certainly been lucky in the incident

that claimed HMS Nabob – another admiral and imperial Russian American governor was thought

a good choice. The favourite was Stepan Vasilievich Voyevodski who had ruled the colony from

1854 to 1859. 352

Three USN Sangamon CVEs in support for the Kuriles were also enough to put the fears of the

Air Force to rest. It was convinced that the Japanese air forces on Paramushir were weaker than

last year, and those further south would be operating at long range. Planners were confident that

Paramushir could be suppress fairly well with land based aircraft, freeing the carrier force for sup-

port of the land troops and defence of the fleet. A final debate with senior carrier pilots established

that hey were prepared to fight the Japanese in Wildcats, but of course would prefer something

better. They would be very happy to get the Hellcat, but were uncertain about the Corsair, because

of what they had heard about landing characteristics. They also would have sold their mothers for

Bearcats, but with the type only having entered operational service with the first USN squadron

only at this time, the Hellcat was all but sure to be the next carrier fighter.353

352 von Sieben, 1447-1469. 353 Bergmann, 1465.

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Allied Forces North Pacific Area

By early June, the new draft OOBs began to come out. The Army assumed two identical field corps

of three divisions plus corps troops each. The latter were now planned to include a smaller army

aviation squadron with helicopters and spotting planes, as well as a commando battalion and a

military police battalion organic to the corps. The MP units would be taken from those formed for

the European Theatre support brigades and deploy with their corps, so it no longer needed attach-

ments from Territorial Army Command.

5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer and 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment, formerly un-

der I Corps, became army troops and were planned to be regenerated to their original strength as

deployed units were returning from Europe and the North Atlantic; the same went for 1st Northern

Yeger Regiment and 1st Airborne Brigade, with 3rd Commando Battalion forming the cell for a

third parachute battalion. The constituent units of 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade would stay tied up

in what was being renumbered as 4th Guards Division to keep the systematic straight.

Most of the theatre support brigades would form the corps and division quartermaster troops in

II Corps; as the original personnel was heavily female, so would be the new 3rd Quartermaster

Regiment, since the Army wanted to keep women out of the divisions despite the inroads into

service occupations they had been making otherwise. For example, after having evaluated their

female company in III. Battalion, the 1st Guards Regiment planned to form a full IV. Battalion of

women to make up for their units which had gone in the field with 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade, III.

Battalion acting as a replacement unit for the latter. Due to the overall increase of female personnel,

there were now also a few women in military police.

As a major innovation, brigades in the divisions were now consecutively numbered from 1st to

9th in I Corps and 10th to 18th in II Corps, including the redesignation of 1st Guards Cavalry as

12th Guards Mechanised Brigade. This was in part for ease of administration, but also in part be-

cause II Corps was largely being formed from units which had no geographical relation to the

Russian American okrugs. The artillery regiments of 5th and 6th Division were initially labeled the

15th and 16th Stoyanka, but their cavalry just named 8th and 9th Cossacks. A little later, the artil-

lery was reorganised into brigades including the anti-air battalions, assuming the number of their

division and thus solving the designation problems. The Iceland Regiment would go to Central

Command of the Territorial Army after coming to Russian America. The projected overall increase

in troop strength was hefty at 43,300, of which 8,400 cadre and 1,000 women, resulting in an un-

precedented establishment of 167,550 overall.

For the Navy, there were few new squadrons rather than the existing ones being beefed up; pro-

vision was made for the planned new aircraft carrier Voyevodski to form a division with Wrangel,

and it was hoped to get all Skumbrii-class submarines replaced by Tenchs; the four which were in

the process of delivery were scheduled to be operational at the same time as Voyevodski. Auxiliary

Fleet would relegate Almaz to a moored HQ ship, but reactivate 4th Minesweeper Squadron.

As part of the more expeditionary outlook, minesweepeer and landing craft squadrons would now

get their own tenders. The Navy had not been too happy with its mixed LST/LCT amphibious

squadrons. It had been thought that the LSTs would tow the smaller LCTs on longer oceanic trips

or carry them on deck while the latter could act as floating landing bridges for the former; but while

the LCTs of the Southwest Pacific Task Force were successfully transferred like that by the larger

transports, it had caused technical as well as organisational problems in the mixed squadrons. With

a further increase of both types, they were therefore now separated into distinctive units. The Navy

had also been looking at the American Land Ship Medium the LCT had evolved into, offering

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

157

much better oceangoing capabilities. However, they also had much higher crewing requirements

for about the same load carried, so no decision has been made to acquire them yet.

The most obvious change was the standing up of three carrier aviation squadrons flying Hellcats,

Avengers and Wildcats for training respectively, with them and the flying boats getting organised

into one Air Force-style wing each. As a result, Commander Naval Aviation would be elevated to

flag rank, doubtlessly a very desired side effect. The helicopters remained in an independent squad-

ron. Ashore there was no change except the reinforcement of 1st Marine Division, mostly through

the Battleaxe programme. With a fourth artillery and a distinct engineer battalion, its organisation

now approached that of an Army division except having three straight infantry regiments and the

armoured battalion – planned to be reinforced to four Amtrac and two Amtank companies – and

still relying on medical capabilities of ships floating offshore. Total increase was 11,950 personnel,

of which 2,700 cadre and 600 female auxiliaries for a total strength of 78,400.354

Compared to previous years, not so much new equipment was coming into the Air Force, mostly

different marks of the same types. The latest variants of the Mosquito, the NF Mk 30, PR Mk 34

and B Mk 35, were looked at, as well as replacing the C-47 and -47A with the longer-ranged -47B,

built for the India-China route over "the Hump" of the Himalaya. The US was working on new

lightweight variants of the P-51 for even longer range, but they were still a way off from introduc-

tion. Most significant was the planned replacement of the 76.5 mm M37 anti-aircraft gun for better

performance and commonality with Allied troops. However, this was a joint Army-Air Force pro-

ject, and both services had been trying to decide between the British QF 3.7" and American 90 mm

M1 for some time. Considerable thought had gone into how to organise Air Force AA units for the

more expeditionary nature of the upcoming campaign towards Japan. Currently they were tied to

the airbases and the wings stationed there, but with units likely to move around like they did in

Europe, that relationship might be better untied like it had been done there.

The latter did not apply to Home Defence Command of course, but with the rest of Air Combat

Command likely to come under the Commonwealth-led Allied Air Forces North Pacific, there was

a case for applying much of the European experience. It was thought that type rather than regional

commands might be appropriate now, so there would be a fighter and attack command each – or

rather “divisions” to reduce the confusion of using “command” at each level.

The first draft of the new Air Force OOB followed this idea of task-oriented air divisions. Home

Defence and Training Command mostly just changed their names to 1st and 5th Air Division re-

spectively, though there were plans for another female fighter squadron to back up 7th Wing's

Mosquito nightfighters out of Kodiak, as assets in the Aleutians were likely to go west. However,

2nd, 3rd and 4th Air Division were now to be purely anti-air, attack and transport respectively.

“Anti-air” included both fighter and ground units as the latter were divorced from the expeditionary

wings; the same applied to their airbase groups which now found themselves with the auxiliary

airfields in a separate 6th Air Division (Ground), though this was largely administrative.

Obviously the divisions would be able to cross-attach units if necessary, and there was a certain

amount of dual capabilities in 2nd and 3rd anyway as both the P-51s in the former and the Mosquito

FBs in the latter could act as fighter-bombers. Considering that the Air Force would probably trans-

fer three squadrons' worth of flight crews to the Navy for carrier aviation, growth was otherwise

limited to another transport squadron and one combat wing, which was planned as a Mosquito

fighter-bomber unit due to the new offensive orientation and the dual-use possibilities.

The idea of a dedicated test and evaluation squadron for the new jet fighters specifically was also

toyed with; in addition to the three Me 262s which were currently shipping across the Atlantic, the

354 von Sieben, 1469-1479.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

158

British had by now indicated a Meteor might be supplied to check out, and it was hoped to even-

tually be able to compare with their new Vampire and the American P-80, too. However, for now

any jets would be operated by 6th Wing under 5th Air Division (Training) where some of the most

experienced pilots were posted as instructors. There would also be a fourth forward observer/secu-

rity squadron, all now directly under Air Combat Command since they would likely work with

both fighters and attack aircraft. Overall increase was 6,150 personnel, of which 1,250 cadre and

1,600 women, for a total strength of 52,650.355

Meanwhile, the final Allied command organisation had been hammered down. Allied Forces

North Atlantic Area would now consist of Allied Ground Forces North Atlantic Area with Russian

American I Corps, 1st Marine Division, army troops, US Army Russian America Defense Com-

mand and 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade assigned; Allied Naval Forces North Atlantic Area with

three task forces including most of the earlier assigned units, but reinforced by USN Carrier Divi-

sion 22 and the new additions to the Russian American Navy; and Allied Air Forces North Atlantic

Area with the future Russian American 2nd Air Division (Anti-Air), Eleventh US Air Force and

the new Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force containing the Australian and Canadian units.

On the way, many national and service sensibilities had had to be placated. For example, the

Russian American Army was adamant that the ground forces would be a four-star command, and

in the end the post also included being deputy to Admiral Fletcher since the latter would retain

command of the naval forces, too. In effect there nearly were two co-commanders for the ground

and naval forces. With the Sangamon CVEs coming up, in addition to the cruiser task force the US

also wanted to lead the carrier task force, which had been run by the Canadians in the former JATF

North Atlantic since the time they had Nabob. After some back and forth, and since the transport

fleet was growing so much, the carriers and cruisers were combined into Task Force 90, the trans-

ports split into a fast and an amphibious task force numbered 91 and 92 respectively, and the Ca-

nadians given command of the latter.

The air forces were similarly complicated as the Commonwealth side wanted to sensibly concen-

trate all bombers with the Australian wing, but the Americans were reluctant to give up 28th Bom-

bardment Group from already rather small Eleventh US Air Force. It was suggested to put the

Russian American fighter units under their command in compensation, but the Russian American

Air Force unsurprisingly protested when its attack units were also posted to 4 ATAF and the anti-

air artillery groups from planned 2nd Air Division under Army command since the USAAF did

not use such units, leaving them with no command of their own.

In the end, Russian American 2nd and 4th Transport Wings were assigned to Eleventh US Air

Force which was also being reinforced by USAAF 10th Troop Carrier Group for additional airlift

capacities, already planned in preparation for the previous year's abortive airborne operation

against the Komandorskis. Air transport was thus concentrated under American command while

future 2nd Air Division remained a cohesive formation including one of the Mosquito fighter-

bomber wings, and all other bombers were under Fourth Tactical Air Force.

Some Russian American forces were assigned to the Allied command even though elements of

them would only return from Europe after operations in the Kuriles had commenced. The South-

west Pacific Task Force also set sail for home on 9 June. Home defence formations like Territorial

Army Command and future 1st Air Division were not under Allied control. There were also some

othernational caveats; Allied ground units as well as the Canadian air squadrons were only to be

used for defensive purposes due to domestic political sensibilities. Preparations for the Kurile of-

fensive, now codenamed “Keychain”, were on track as plans were now being fine-tuned.356

355 Bergmann, 1469-1471. 356 von Sieben, 1475-1479.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

159

The Keychain Preparations

The plans for Operation Keychain included a multitude of individual landings on the various Kurile

Islands, to be executed as opportunities and necessities presented themselves in the course of

events. In any case however the entry was to be made in the Northern Kuriles where intelligence

on the enemy situation was best, while knowledge on things further south was spotty. Japanese

42nd Division, headquartered on Shimushiro, was indeed considered pretty much a black hole,

though this was not of immediate concern. Attention was focused on the most northern islands of

Shumshu and Paramushir which were closest to the USSR mainland and thus most at risk to be

taken by Soviet forces when Stalin joined the war against Japan.

As feared, the Soviets were already reacting to Russian American plans as Allied Forces North

Pacific Area command was seeking deconfliction with them. Obviously were dead set against the

operation and protested that this was their sphere of influence, but after they had dragged their feet

on engaging the Japanese for years while Allied airmen were shot down in the Kuriles, the new US

administration was not as accommodating towards them as before. It was pointed out that they had

a lot of Chinese border to make good on their Yalta promise to get in against the Japanese forces

three months after the German surrender, and that specific targets had never been mentioned.

The Soviets had started reorganising their Far Eastern Front for offensive operations, but were

not anywhere near as far along as Russian America; their plans foresaw a massive increase of forces

with a target date of early August. Junograd’s chief worry was that they would leak information on

AFNPA's plans to the Japanese so they would give Russian American forces a hot reception with

mutual heavy losses, leaving easy pickings for Soviet troops afterwards. It was therefore insisting

that no operational details and particularly dates and times were passed to the Soviet side.

The invasion of the Northern Kuriles was codenamed “Fencegate”. Rather than assaulting heavily

garrisoned and fortified Shumshu and Paramushir directly, plans called for landings on smaller

Onekotan and Shiashkotan just to the south. Onekotan, being the largest, closest to Paramushiro

and having more open terrain, would see the main effort by 3rd Division, reinforced by 6th Mech-

anised Brigade; 2nd Division, minus that brigade but reinforced by 3rd Marine Regimental Group,

would land on Shiashkotan. Smaller Marine and Yeger groups would take the neighbouring islets

of Kharimkotan, Makanrushi and Ekarma.

The US was sending some very welcome additions to the naval forces, namely two transport

divisions and dock landing ships USS Belle Grove, Casa Grande, Oak Hill and Rushmore. This

was particularly helpful as Russian America’s own amphibious squadrons had not yet reached the

strength planned for in the just-released Navy draft OOB. For naval gunfire support, USN Battle-

ship Division 5 would also be available, though without the old acquaintance USS New York which

was currently underway to regun at Pearl Harbor; but Texas and Arkansas were already steaming

up from Leyte.

Landing site on Onekotan was Blue Beach on the central eastern coast. One infantry brigade was

planned to clear the northern and southern part each while the mechanised brigades would remain

in the center with artillery and divisional troops, but be prepared to support the advance, dis-

mounted if necessary. Ultimate purpose was to construct an airfield in the flat area on the northern

tip which could support land-based aircraft in subsequent operations against Paramushir and Shum-

shu. If necessary, a road to enable seaborne supply from the landing sites was to be built.

Shiashkotan landing sites were Gold Beach on the northwestern coast and Red Beach on the

western side of the island’s “spine”, each by an infantry brigade spearheaded by an amphibious

Marine battalion group clearing the northern and southern part of the island respectively. Other 2nd

Division troops would only be landed if necessary and otherwise stay afloat for possible redirection

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

160

to Onekotan. Another Marine battalion group would land on the eastern side of Ekarma. A Yeger

battalion each would land on the eastern side of Kharimkotan and the southern side of Makanrushi

to clear both islands. Those small island forces would each be landed by a single task group centred

around the Russian American fast transport squadrons, while the Onekotan and Shiashkotan forces

would be supported by three groups each, taken from Task Forces 90, 91 and 92 of Allied Naval

Forces North Pacific Area.

By 16 June, forces for Operation Fencegate were nearing readiness. I Corps had been training

amphibious landings, air-ground coordination and fighting in mountainous terrain on Beringa for

months and was currently undergoing some minor organisational changes planned under the Army

draft OOB, mostly the establishment of artillery brigades; the first battalions of the latter had com-

pleted transition to the M7 Priest and were now designated "Self-Propelled". Modifications enacted

for the European Theater had also been fitted to the Hellcats of the cavalry regiments. Combat

troops were long fully equipped with the M1 rifle and M43 machinegun. They would embark for

the Kuriles three days prior to the landings.

3rd Marine Regimental Group was still transiting Canada from Europe. As they were to train

with the American dock landing ships at Unalaska, there would not be much leave for them now

after touching Russian American soil. Their embarkation date was two days earlier than I Corps.

The Southwest Pacific Task Force was scheduled to arrive at Beringa on 28 June. Their Marine

contingent would then be formed into IV./1st Marine Battalion; since the landings on the smaller

islands were planned to occur several days after Onekotan and Shiashkotan, they would have some

more time after I Corps sailed. The same was true for III./1st Yeger Battalion which would join its

mother regiment’s I. Battalion. The latter's arctic patrol duty would be taken over by II. Battalion

which had left Greenland on 3 June, in turn relieved by a battalion from the Iceland Regiment. The

rest of Russian Brigade Allied Forces Atlantic would head home in early July.

9th and 10th Air Force Wing would also leave Europe shortly, most of their ground echelon as

well as 1st Forward Observer/Security Squadron being already on the way by ship. A provisional

implementation of the Air Force draft OOB was underway insofar as necessary for the integration

into Allied Air Forces North Pacific. 5th Fighter Training Squadron was undergoing transfer to the

Navy and would be flying off Wrangel, though the new naval aviation wings would only be stood

up once the new carrier arrived, still scheduled for late September. However, Voyevodski was near-

ing completion and expected to be ready for takeover in the last week of the month. While the

Navy's amphibious squadrons would not have assumed their planned new organisation by the time

of Fencegate either, 10th and 11th were currently being stood up and would be ready with the

available LCTs and LCGs, though without their own tenders. The LST squadrons would have three

divisions of three rather than the planned four vessels, also without tenders.

Since pretty much all of the Russian American naval ressources were committed to Fencegate,

coverage elsewhere would be light; mostly submarines which were operating away from the area

for reasons of deconfliction, flying boats aided by Canadian patrol aircraft and Air Force Home

Defence Command (future 1st Air Division), and vessels from 4th Minesweeper Squadron as it

was reactivated, plus Homeguard air and naval units.357

The Air Force had initially complained about not being kept fully in the picture regarding Army

plans in the Kuriles. There seemed to be an attitude in some staff quarters that it did not need to

know anything except what the Army wanted from it, like keeping Paramushir out of the picture

and provide air support from Wrangel, as and when demanded. Inter-service coordination was

eventually sorted out within the framework of AFNPA.

357 von Sieben, 1481-1484.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

161

The intense phase of aerial minelaying operations in the Northern Kuriles was by then complete.

This had not been without sacrifices; the Australians had lost a B-24 with all hands, cause unknown.

The Russian American Air Force had had to write off two Mosquitoes after hard landings, one due

to a mechanical failure, one from damage sustained in an encounter with Japanese fighters, with

one crewman killed and one injured. The tempo was by now reduced to “topping-up” missions and

occasional new mining if suitable new locations are identified. The majority of the crews and air-

craft were thus available for normal duties, though some further incidents happened. For example,

in the night towards 19 June top-up of mines around Paramushir and Shumshu went wrong, and

potential invasion beaches were mined. Luckily, there were precise plots of the drops.

The Air Force also pointed out the Japanese airfield on Matua to the south. The dive-bombers

assumed to be based there presented a threat to the fleet, and it might also be used for supporting

attacks by aircraft from further south. It was within range of B-24s, but escorting them adequately

would be difficult. However, it was not thought prudent to leave it untouched while landing on

Onetokan. It was conveniently located for attack from the sea, being on the eastern coast; the US

Navy has shelled it, but not recently. In the end, RAAF B-24s were still tasked with suppressing

the airfield, attacking at first light. Some M28 and M29 cluster bombs were obtained from the US

and would be dropped to hinder repairs. The long-term difficulty in using the airfield for friendly

forces afterwards was thought worthwhile.358

On 19 June, 3rd Marine Regimental Group sailed out of Vancouver; one of the ships was to put

in a stop at Novoarkhangelsk on the 21st, the others at Kodiak on the 22nd for 48 hours of liberty

each as the best compromise for the troops being able to see some family again. All would rejoin

at Unalaska on the 26th for a week of training with the amphibious squadrons and the American

LSDs before leaving for the Kuriles.

On 24 June, Voyevodski completed fitting out at Tacoma and was officially commissioned into

the Russian American Navy the next day, but had a mixed Russian-American skeleton crew for the

moment as her full complement would only become only available over the next weeks. She would

also take three months to shake herself down and was scheduled to be combat-ready by 30 Sep-

tember. However, at the same time USN Carrier Division 22 arrived in theater, and Allied Naval

Forces North Atlantic bid goodbye to USS Nassau. She was taking the American contingent of VF-

66 from Wrangel with her, and 5th Naval Fighter Training Squadron was also officially activated

on 25 June. One of the Sangamon CVEs had indeed brought a Night Escort Carrier Air Group with

radar-equipped Hellcats and Avengers, increasing capability for all-weather operations.

The replacement of the Skumbrii-class submarines was also taking shape. Three of the half-fin-

ished Tench boats mentioned earlier – Turbot, Ulua and Wahoo – would be commissioned in Oc-

tober, and Junograd was negotiating about three more. The new tenders for the amphibious and

minesweeper squadrons should enter service at about the same time, so that the planned Navy OOB

should be implemented by January next year, in time for the planned second wave of Allied land-

ings in the Japanese Home Islands codenamed Operation Coronet.

It looked now like the initial landings under Operation Olympic in November would be an almost

exclusively American affair except for support by the British Pacific Fleet, a British long-range

bomber force and the Australian First Tactical Air Force. Coronet, currently scheduled for 1 March

1946, looked more open; there was talk of a Commonwealth corps to participate, and the French

were thinking of a similar contribution. At this point Junograd also hoped to have II Corps fully

stood up, equipped, trained and brought over from Europe, so planners were entertaining the

thought of forming an Allied army to take part in the landings.

358 Bergmann, 1430-1496.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

162

Meanwhile intelligence indicated that the Soviets had ordered 16th Soviet Army and 10th Air

Army to prepare for an invasion in the Kuriles and ultimately Hokkaido of their own. Specific

formations mentioned were a 87th Rifle Corps to be formed within a Coastal Group of Forces with

342nd and 345th Rifle Division, an artillery regiment and various other corps troops; the Kam-

chatka Defense Area with 101st Rifle Division, one rifle and artillery regiment each and several

battalions of either branch; the 128th Air Division with one fighter, bomber and fighter-bomber

regiment each; and Petropavlovsk Naval Base with one submarine and two patrol craft divisions,

various minesweepers and other auxiliaries, three coastal artillery battalions and an anti-aircraft

command. However, it was assessed that they were at a very early stage of planning, had currently

no major forces in reach except for 101st Rifle Division and some independent regiments and bat-

talions on Kamchatka, and lacked substantial means of naval transportation since Junograd had

vetoed the handover of American vessels and landing craft earlier that year.

By 29 June, date for Operation Fencegate had been confirmed as 8 July, with the smaller islands

to follow two or three days later. I Corps would embark on 5 July; 3rd Marine Regimental Group

was currently training with the American LSDs at Unalaska and would leave there in four days.

The Americans were also sending amphibious force command ship USS Estes, which had just fin-

ished refit at San Francisco and would embark staff from Allied Naval Forces North Pacific at

Novoarkhangelsk on 1 July. USS Texas and Arkansas would arrive in theater the same day.

The former Southwest Pacific Task Force had arrived at Beringa on schedule and was waiting

for III./1st Yeger Battalion which would also sail from Nome on 1 July after being relieved by II.

Battalion from Greenland. Its Marine contingent was currently forming into IV./1st Battalion with

an already-established HQ company and a somewhat provisional weapons company almagamated

from the previous mortar and Amtrac companies. They would only have ten days to pull themselves

together before leaving for the Kuriles, but save for some elements of the HQ company all subunits

had worked together in the Task Force, and Marine officers from the latter's joint staff including

the deputy commander were put in charge of the new battalion. The Navy side was ready to go, as

was the Air Force with 9th and 10th Wing returned from Europe.

By 6 July, all forces for Onekotan and Shiashkotan were afloat. The plans remained largely un-

changed; there was a contingency for 9th Mechanised Brigade to land on the northwestern coast of

Onekotan near the planned airfield site if the situation was favourable, designated Green Beach.

The Americans would bring in engineers to support construction once the site was secured. Based

upon experience in the Aleutians, it was reckoned the airfield would take three to four weeks to

become fully operational depending upon how much the enemy managed to interfere, though it

would be available as an emergency landing site earlier.

Russian American 2nd Air Division and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force were tasked with su-

pressing the Japanese bases on Shumshu and Paramushir, while Eleventh US Air Force would play

strategic defence for the moment, particularly for the two bases on Beringa and their auxiliary

airfields which had been built there over the last month; it might be called upon if the enemy sent

up aircraft from farther south in the Kuriles though, and their transport squadrons would fly in

critical supplies once the Onekotan airfield was up. 2nd Air Division units were planned to move

there first. Defence of the fleet and direct air support of the landing forces would be handled by

Carrier Division 22.

USS Texas would provide fire support for the Onekotan landing with her 14" guns, along with

the eight-inchers of USS Pensacola and the two CLs from USN Cruiser Division 5. The other three

Omaha-class cruisers would support the Shiashkotan landings with USS Arkansas' 12" guns. Rus-

sian American 1st Submarine Squadron and 1st Naval Patrol Squadron were tasked with the far

screen of the force to prevent surprises like off Beringa the previous year. Not too much resistance

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

163

was expected as the IJN has been thoroughly withered down in the Southwest Pacific and there

was no evidence of the Onekotan and Shiaskotan garrisons having been reinforced above their

estimated battalion strength each, so superiority should be overwhelming.

However, planners remained cautious due to the Japanese record of unpredictability, not least

because of suspicions that the Soviets might have leaked any information about Fencegate they had

gotten. The flow had been restricted as well as possible by Junograd, and the Signal Corps had

been busy feeding them false data through known channels; but it had to be presume that they had

at least as good a picture of Russian American preparations as vice versa.359

Operation Fencegate

The first wave of the landings in Operation Fencegate hit the beaches on 8 July at 0430 hours.

Typically foggy morning conditions hindered air and long-range naval gun fire support, though it

also kept away any Japanese aircraft that might have launched after the preceding bombardment of

Shumshu and Paramushir, and served to conceal approaching landing craft. On Onekotan, the 3rd

Division still encountered accurate fire by light artillery pieces and anti-tank guns which sank at

least two LCMs – one unfortunately carrying half a weapons company with its mortars – despite

their small numbers. Landed troops suffered initial casualities from enemy machinegun positions,

but were able to deflect several direct counterattacks even with a lack in supporting firepower.

On Shiashkotan, the enemy seemed initially surprised, and the marine landing teams encountered

only disorganised defence. That soon hardened up though, and unfortunately 3rd Marines some-

what misapplied their recent experience from the European Theater as the attack bogged down with

uncoordinated advances on enemy positions, repeatedly repulsed with several Amtracs lost. On the

other hand, so were Japanese counterattacks when the second wave landed at 0600. With the rein-

forcements, troops breached the enemy defences and moved up into higher terrain.

On Onekotan, additional tanks landed in the second wave quickly broke Japanese resistance, and

by afternoon the weather improved, allowing air and naval gun fire support. Enemy aircraft also

made an appearance at this point, reported as half a dozen Zeroes and Kates each. Seven or eight

were shot down by fleet defences though one unfortunately managed to kamikaze into a vessel off

Onekotan; there were conflicting reports whether it had been a destroyer escort or minesweeper, or

whether the latter struck a mine during operations. The total number of ships hit by air attacks was

given as three, but two stayed afloat at any rate. No enemy vessels were encountered, though some

were reported destroyed by Allied air attacks in port at Kataoka.

By nightfall, troops had secured the triangular lowland zone on Onekotan to a depth of five kilo-

metres as well as the “spine” of Shiashkotan, though the Red Beach force there had been thrown

back from an attempt to take the northern volcano summit. Artillery was being set up ashore to

support operations on the following day; it was hoped that both islands would be entirely taken

then, though combing out the usual die-hard resisters was expected to take longer. Total casualities

were reported as at least 60 killed and 130 wounded or missing.360

Japanese fighter opposition to air attacks on Paramushir and Shumshu was light and easily dealt

with. The Allied side had superior numbers in all engagements, and pilots were using the ad-

vantages their aircraft gave them. AA was heavy though, resulting in a couple of losses and several

more aircraft out of action in the following days. The Australians fared better in their raid on Matua,

where Japanese aircraft were preparing to take off as the bombers arrived – probably to attack the

359 von Sieben, 1485-1493. 360 Kurylenko, p. 396-398.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

164

Allied fleet – and were hit very hard. No fighter opposition and only light AA was encountered,

resulting in no losses and only light damage to a couple of aircraft.361

On D+1, troops continued to move into the higher terrain of Onekotan and Shiashkotan, sup-

ported by heavy shore-based artillery. While Shiashkotan was basically entirely occupied by the

end of the day, the ends of Onekotan had not yet been reached – though mostly due to the terrain

rather than Japanese resistance which seemed to have mostly spent itself the previous day. Unusu-

ally, there were several surrenders by individual soldiers, though not enough to speak of a general

change in enemy moral; most kept fighting to the death. The main focus was now on preventing

Japanese reinforcements from Paramushir. To this end, the naval bases in the north were bom-

barded again during the day, including by long-range naval gunfire.362

Enemy air activity was relegated to defensive operations at this point. The fighting in the air was

the easiest it had been over the course of the war. The skilled Japanese pilots encountered the

previous year had not shown up this time, either because the unskilled kamikazes – generally

agreed to be mostly too inexperienced for anything else – were all that was left, or the enemy was

husbanding good pilots, probably transferred south during winter to face the US. However, some

Soviet aircraft were encountered by the Allied screen on the far side of the Kuriles.

Pilots had been warned that the Soviets were using mostly lend-lease planes in this area, and that

they should be prepared to meet American types. Since most of it had gone over Russian American

territory, there was a rather good grasp of transferred equipment. For example it was known that

both the fighter and fighter-bomber regiment in Soviet 128th Air Division were using the P-63,

while the bomber regiment operated A-20s, though not exclusively. The 2nd Mine-Torpedo Divi-

sion of the Pacific Fleet Aviation Command was also reported to fly the A-20G and H as well as

older DB-3s in the area, though the aircraft encountered on 9 July were reported as Il-4s with naval

markings. Both sides kept their cool and no incident occurred.363

The landings on the smaller islands of Ekarma, Makanrushi and Kharimkotan went down on 10

July. Little opposition was encountered, mainly some Japanese lookouts, though not all of the ter-

rain was covered that day. Troops were also still digging out enemies on Onekotan and Shiashkotan

despite all of them being now occupied. 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment was landed at Green Beach

the same day to ensure the planned airfield site being secured quickly, and engineers were being

brought ashore by nightfall. Since there had not been much enemy interference from Paramushir

and Shumshu so far, it was hoped to have the airfield up in three weeks with American assistance.364

The USAAF would also be the first occupants. A scratch P-40 squadron made up from the re-

maining P-40s of 343rd Fighter Group was to be formed and flown in with a skeleton administra-

tion already in place. P-40s had been selected because the USAAF wanted to get its fighters in-

volved. Provisional plans were to fly in some Russian American P-51s from 11th Fighter Squadron

next. The first priority was guarding against incursions from the south and lowering the pressure

on the carrier fighters. Fighter-bombers and bombers would follow when there was room. Junograd

would have been happy for the RCAF to deploy its Kittyhawks too, but for the moment they were

planned to remain in the Aleutians for domestic Canadian political reasons. Still it was hoped to

get all air units in the Kuriles under 4 ATAF as soon as possible.365

The fleet had mostly taken to bombarding the northern islands in preparation for future landings

there; there was return fire from Japanese positions at Shumshu's northern tip, but it was outranged

361 Kravchuk, p. 75. 362 Kurylenko, p. 400. 363 Kravchuk, p. 75-76. 364 Kurylenko, p. 401. 365 Kravchuk, p. 76.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

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by the US battleships while the cruisers were shelling other targets. Enemy air activitiy was now

limited to irregular sorties of not more than four planes which sometimes managed to zip in quickly

and try kamikaze attacks; Task Groups 90.1 and 90.2 completely swatted such an attempt on 10

July off Shumshu even before friendly fighters showed up. At the end of that day, Allied losses

stood at 86 killed, 170 wounded and six missing.

On 11 July there was continued sporadic fighting with Japanese holdouts on the occupied islands,

but Operation Fencegate could be considered an overall success. Despite some hickups in execu-

tion, most of it had gone according to plans and the enemy was overwhelmed by the far superior

number of forces at moderate cost of friendly losses. The Japanese had obviously had no means to

reinforce their battalions from Paramushir and Shumsu, particularly given Allied air superiority.366

A Russian American flying boat was shot down by Ki-45 fighters coming up from the Southern

Kurils on this day, but they ran into alerted American Hellcats when they approached Shiashkotan,

which made rather short work of them. USAAF P-38s were now conducting all fighter patrols

between the Komandorskis and Kamchatka along the edge of Soviet air space down to Shumshu;

it had been agreed that it would reduce the risk of incidents. The Americans encountered some

Soviet P-63s from Kamchatka in international airspace north of the current area of operations on

12 July, but after both sides identified each other, they disengaged without trouble. It was not clear

if this really indicated stepped-up activities by the USSR; the Western Allies had drastically more

aircraft in the area now, including on the far side of the Kuriles where they had rarely strayed

before, so it might just be a case of finding more Soviet routine patrols. Obviously they might also

be reacting to the increased Allied presence though.367

No overt action by the Soviets had occured in the Kuriles so far. It was believed that any move

was likely to come from Petropavlovsk on the east coast of Kamchatka. Since the handover of

landing craft, patrol frigates and aditional minesweepers to the USSR had been blocked, it was

assessed that the Soviets could transport at best a brigade of troops with no heavy equipment with

the locally available vessels, though obviously additional ships could be sent up from Vladivostok

through the First Kurile Strait; the 130 mm battery at Cape Lopatka could also easily reach to

Shumshu and cover most of it. However, if the Soviets went to those lengths, they might as well

dispatch troops from the mainland.368

There was still some shooting on 13 July, but the incidents were becoming ever less. A number

of the sealift ships which had delivered Allied troops were now headed for the mainland and

planned to embark the provisional brigade intended to take over Beringa at Stoyanka on the 21st –

one battalion each from 2nd and 3rd Northern, 3rd Kenai and 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regi-

ment, 15th and 18th Mechanized Brigade –, deliver them to their destination on the 24th, then take

on 1st Division and the remaining I Corps troops for deployment to the Kuriles. Onekotan would

become a rather heavily armed camp before the jump-off to Shumshu and Paramushir, envisioned

for 29 July at the earliest, but depending upon progress in construction of the airfield. On 14 July,

no new enemy hideouts were encountered for the first time, and Onekotan and Shiashkotan were

considered secure.369

366 Kurylenko, p. 401-405. 367 Kravchuk, p. 76. 368 von Sieben, 1504. 369 Kurylenko, p. 405-408.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

166

The Island-hopping Plans

With Onekotan and Shiashkotan secured, Russian American forces were now in a position to block

any potential advance down the Kurile Chain by the Soviets if they should try to land on Shumshu

and Paramushir, and conversely to go north themselves. Contingency planning had now shifted to

countering any Soviet operations against Shumshu across the First Kurile Strait by landing on Para-

mushir, codenamed “Mailbox”. However, the main intention remained to wait for the Onekotan

airfield to become operable, then land on Shumshu first to block the USSR completely under code-

name “Doormat”. In any case, the next step was not likely to be so easy.

Shumshu presented an exceptionally hard target. It was strongly garrisoned for its size with at

least 8,000 troops, including a tank regiment. Most terrain that was not hilly was swamps, and the

Japanese had built extensive fortifications, most of which underground. The Western Allies had

mined most obvious landing sites to prevent the USSR from pre-empting them. Enemy centers of

gravity were Kataoka Naval Base with Imaizaki Airfield on the western coast towards Paramushir

– only one nautical mile across the water –, Myoshino Army-Navy Airfield near the center, and

the coastal batteries at Cape Kokutan on the northern tip, seven miles from Kamchatka.

The outer minefields extended from the cape about two thirds down both sides of the islands,

largely following the 300-feet line about three nautical miles offshore but open to the south, so that

one could operate inside them. Additional fields in shallower water up to 50 feet were running to

the same extent on the eastern coast but only halfway down the western where we intend to land.

The port of Kataoka and strait towards Paramushiro were also heavily mined to preclude exchange

of forces, though Japanese sweeping activity had been observed there.

The concentration of troops on Shumshu ruled out dividing forces between both islands for sim-

ultaneous operations. A landing of two divisions from I Corps reinforced by marine battalion land-

ing teams was planned on the lower portion of the western coast, with the third held in reserve. A

contingency was a landing at the southeast cape, for a thrust towards Myoshino Airfield, to be

secured in advance by an airdrop from 1st Commando Battalion; then to link up with the main

effort and isolate Kataoka from the rest of the island.

Paramushir represented its own challenges with about the same estimated Japanese garrison

strength, spread over a larger but also distinctly more mountainous island with similarly numerous

coastal defence positions. The HQ of Japanese 91st Division and North Eastern Fleet were based

at Kashibawara on the northeastern coast opposite Kataoka, which had both a port and army air-

field. Kitanodai Airfield was a bit to the south on the same coast, Kakumabestu Airfield on the

southwest coast, and Suribachi Auxiliary Airfield in the center of the south coast. Musashi Navy

Airfield was located on the southermost tip, closest to Onekotan.

The coasts were also thoroughly mined except for the southern part around Musashi and Suribashi

which would be the landing sites. The plan would be essentially the same as for Doormat with two

divisions landing and one in reserve, quickly securing the southern airfields to base Allied aircraft

on to support further operations. If this happened as a contingency to Soviet landings on Shumshu,

the Second Kurile Strait would act as a buffer, narrow as it was. 1st Yeger Regiment would stay to

garrison Onekotan and Shirikotan. The smaller islands of Atlasov and Antsiferov would probably

be left alone until Shumshu and/or Paramushiro were fully secured, though marines might be

landed there if the situation allowed.

To the south, Matua was currently planned to be taken by 1st Marine Division in mid- to late

August after it had completely transferred from Europe, codenamed “Staircase”. The main objec-

tive was of course the airfield used by the squadron of 553rd IJN Air Group reported there, though

the unit might have ceased to exist as a fighting force after the initial bombing by the Australians

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

167

and some apparently remaining dive bombers being shot down over the last days in attempts to

attack the Fencegate forces. The island was defended by the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment,

reinforced by at least one tank company which made planners make provisions for including an

Army tank battalion or cavalry regiment in the assault plans.

It was thought that as much as a battalion's worth of the Japanese troops might be spread over the

neighbouring islands of Raykoke, Rasshua, Ushishir and Ryponkicha, though the two latter might

also be controlled by 42nd Division from Shimushir. All initial landings would be on Matua itself

though. There was not much space for finesse; two regiments would land either side of the south-

east cape, with an additional battalion securing any enemy positions on the islet of Toporskovyy

and the rest of the third regiment in reserve. The Japanese were certain to be prepared for that,

maybe even reinforce before troops got there, and hard fighting was expected over a small area.

“Fireplace” was the designation for a landing on Shimushir, not thought likely to occur before

the end of the year for several reasons. The island was held by Japanese 42nd Division, about which

not a lot was known at this point. It was believed that one brigade of the type reported on Shumshu

and Paramushir was based in the north and another in the south, with possible detachments to

neighbouring Ketoy and maybe Ushishir and Ryponkicha. This made taking Shimushir an opera-

tion on the level of Doormat/Mailbox with the requisite level of forces. However, it was uncertain

whether the latter would be finished before the end of campaign season in October, as I Corps was

expected to be tied down at least as long as on Beringa to secure Shumshu and Paramushir.

Even if operations concluded there quickly, troops were sure to need some rest, and Fireplace

would definitely extend into winter. Also, Shumshu and Paramushir would need to be garrisoned

against the Soviet threat. The same would be true if the arrival of II Corps was waited for, which

was only planned to begin leaving Europe in early August and would not complete transfer before

late November. Obviously if Doormat and Mailbox did not come about, the situation would change;

however, planners would have liked to have better intelligence on Shimushir before committing to

Fireplace. The good news was that once Matua was secured, the place could be bombed all winter.

The final plan, codenamed “Basement”, was being treated as a contingency if a division became

available before the end of campaign season for use against Urup – either because Doormat/Mail-

box concluded early but most of I Corps was needed to hold off the Soviets, or of a partial transfer

from II Corps that could be expected by mid-October. The island was much larger than Shimushir,

but also more lightly garrisoned due to its southern position, and there was a better handle on enemy

units. Strength was believed to be similiar to Matua, with 129th Independent Mixed Brigade also

reported as reinforced by at least one tank company and anti-air battery each. The local airfield was

thought for staging and supply purposes only however, and not a permament base for combat air-

craft, though that might change as operations progressed. Some of the forces might also be detached

to neighbouring Broutona and the Chyornie Islands.

Plans were not finished yet, but it was held that an Army division reinforced by 1st Airborne

Brigade – available for operations again in September after its current reorganisation – and one or

two marine regiments after conclusion of Staircase would be a sufficient force to take Urup, unless

the Japanese substantially reinforced. Land-based air support from Matua might be problematic

with Shimushir in the way, but by the end of September Voyevodski would increase capabilities of

Carrier Division 22 with 5th Naval Fighter and 6th Naval Attack Squadron, flying Hellcats and

Avengers respectively rather than Wrangel's current single squadron of old Wildcats.

All of these operations obviously depended upon continued Allied help. The US was having

doubts about going to Paramushir if the Soviets landed on Shumshu, but pledged support if Russian

America went the intended route in the absence of Soviet interference by first taking Shumshu,

then Paramushir, since it did not really matter for the air and naval side with Japanese capabilities

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

168

as reduced as they were. Washington pointed out though that while it would be Junograd’s ground

troops, going south and leaving the north to wither on the vine would be easier on them as the

Central and Southern Kuriles were less garrisoned and fortified.370 This corresponded to the US

main interest in the Japanese Home Islands, but was also advocated by some domestic parties.371

However, Junograd’s entire strategic – rather than nationalistic – reason for Operation Keychain

was keeping the Soviets barred into the Sea of Okhotsk post-war. Leaving Shumshu and particu-

larly Paramushir to them would leave the whole blocking chain dangling in the water, which meant

that if the USSR ever tried to attack Russian America in force, it would have to be fought for

control of the North Pacific rather than access to it. The experience with the Japanese indicated that

the latter was far preferrable to the former with Junograd’s limited national ressources. Having an

incomplete chain would probably be the worst of both worlds as both substantial ground forces to

garrison the Kuriles and a substantial fleet in the North Pacific would be needed; particularly as

the Soviets were likely to concentrate their forces on going east before spreading them over the

Central Pacific, the opposite of what the Japanese had done.

Of course planners like to think that Russian America would never be alone and have the US by

its side in any case, but American politics under Roosevelt had made them at least cautious. It was

therefore with some apprehension that Junograd looked forward to the upcoming next meeting of

the Big Three, now scheduled for 17 July in Potsdam. On 13 July, the Americans and British spe-

cifically requested a Russian American delegation to be present in West Berlin for consultations,

with the Kurile situation and Operation Varyag in Europe expected to be major points.372

The Potsdam Conference

Initial talks with American and British representatives in Berlin on the eve of the Potsdam Confer-

ence’s official opening covered a range of topics likely to play a role in the negotiations between

the Big Three. The USSR was displeased with Allied operations in the Kuriles and claimed this as

its natural sphere of interest; but overall the Russian American delegation felt the US and UK

would support Junograd here, since for once the Soviets had been late in coming to the table while

Russian Americans had been spending blood against Japan. In fact the delegation indicated Juno-

grad might contribute a corps for the second round of landings in the Japanese Home Islands under

Operation Coronet, but met with no more than friendly interest. General MacArthur as Supreme

Commander Southwest Pacific Area had been argueing against any non-American participation,

and even the British were scaling down their plans for a Commonwealth corps to take part.

The Americans had also long rejected the idea of a Soviet occupation zone in Japan; again by

current plans, even the Commonwealth would only have a minor presence under overall American

command, mostly re-occupying British possessions outside Japan itself. Similiarly, the Soviets

were expected to get the southern part of Sakhalin, occupy the northern part of Korea and get their

wish of Mongolia being recognised as an independent state by China. As far as the Americans were

concerned, that would be ample reward if Stalin should make good on his promise at Yalta to

finally go to war with Japan three months after the German defeat.

An interesting point was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. Moscow had formally announced

to not extend it in April, a year ahead of its expiration as stipulated in the text, but it would still be

in force until 13 April next year – which would be even after Coronet in March. The question was

370 von Sieben, 1505-1511. 371 Bergmann, 1509. 372 von Sieben, 1485-1510.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

169

whether the Soviets would break their pledge to their allies or the Japanese. The Russian American

delegation privately believed it would be the latter as they stood to gain more from it, but preferred

to leave it at voicing doubts to the Americans and British, pointing to the obvious disregard Mos-

cow was exhibiting for previous Allied agreements in Eastern Europe.

A pressing issue for the Russian American side was what the Allied position would be if the

USSR tried to encroach upon the Kuriles by force, but the Americans and British were rather dis-

missive about this possibility. They knew just as well that the Soviets did not currently have suffi-

cient means in theatre for a substantial effort, though the Russian Americans warned that might

change and the current alliances were not likely to survive the war for long – certainly not when it

came to Junograd’s relationship with Moscow. The British conceded that, but the Americans put a

certain trust in a stable global post-war order.

President Truman, while more distrustful of Stalin, was still committed to Roosevelt's project of

a United Nations Organisation and hoped to get the Soviets in on it at Potsdam after talks had

broken down at Yalta due to Stalin's demand for sole recognition of the USSR. Working-level

negotiations had indicated a mounting, though conditional Soviet willingness to participate on the

basis of equal recognition with Russian America; the Soviets stood to gain more than to lose from

it with developments in the Pacific working against them, though they were still making demands

for an elevated position vis-a-vis Junograd.

This included the USSR being a permanent member in the proposed security council but not

Russian America, and each of the former’s republics having a seat in the general assembly versus

the latter’s one. Obviously the Russian American side was not enthusiast about this and would have

preferred Moscow to stay out of the UNO and not be officially recognized at all; but with the

USSR’s gains in real-world power, it was considered better to have it tied into an international

organisation, though the Russian Americans were of course opposed to it being given any prefer-

ential treatment. At any rate, the Americans and British assured their continued commitment to

support of Junograd even against Moscow.

The mood was not so helpful on the ongoing Russian American recruitment programme in Eu-

rope. The US and UK governments were under pressure to come to a repatriation agreement with

the Soviets as the latter had predictably started holding back on British and American POWs they

had “liberated” in Eastern Europe and Germany, and families were beginning to ask why their men

who had been reported alive in captivity were not home two months after cessation of hostilities.

The Allies had been proposing joint commissions to determine the wishes of each POW and DP

where he or she wanted to go, similiar to what the British had put forth in Austria, to accomodate

both Russian American interests and their own qualms of delivering Soviet personnel to a govern-

ment which was on the record as stating that the great Soviet forces had only fighting or dead

troops. Moscow was aware of its strong position though and strictly demanded that every Soviet

national under the power of Western Allied forces be returned.

The Americans and British assured that they were working on definitions of what constituted a

Soviet national, and the commission approach might work for coherent groups in the public light

like the Domanov Cossacks who were still encamped in Austria, but cautioned that a blanket agree-

ment was likely to come about at Potsdam. Their best advice to Junograd was to get out whomever

possible, because they might soon be forced to turn over any Soviet national in the occupied areas,

even if they were in the care of Russian American troops.

The Russian American side did not press the point of non-occupied areas like Czechoslovakia

and France as it was reasonably sure of support by the respective national government. Neither did

it elaborate about formerly Soviet troops in II Corps, as from Junograd’s point of view it was rather

clear that they were soldiers like all others and undistinguishable from “native” Russian Americans

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

170

in that respect; but the warning was understood. The main worry was Italy where 4th European

Theatre Support Brigade had only arrived on 15 July to tend to ex-Soviet POWs there. This was

not officially an occupied country due to its government's late change of sides in the war, but its

situation was somewhat ambivalent and it had not a lot of room to stand up to Allied policy.

Talks also covered continued participation in the occupation, and there was no mention of dis-

tinction between groups of Russian American troops on that point. Still it was thought that the bulk

of II Corps should be moved into France as soon as possible, a process already begun. 1st Guards

Brigade was still in the US zone of Austria to care for the Domanov Cossacks, but were unprob-

lematic as they are largely “native” troops. Future engagement was definitely seen in the south with

either the Americans or French, likely brigade-sized. If the establishment of 6th Division was not

completed due to a shortage of personnel if few POWs could be recuited in Italy, there would

certainly be a brigade to go around – though in that case 1st Guards were prefered to stay in Europe

due to their uncritical makeup.

4th and 5th Division would redeploy to the Pacific to be filled up with the two mechanised bri-

gades already stood up at home; the third division in II Corps might then be 1st Marine Division,

the Navy by now feeling adequately recognised in the new framework of Allied Forces North Pa-

cific Area to offer less of the earlier difficulties. The problem of re-equipping the new formations

were largely solved at this point as Allied troops were leaving behind vast amounts of materiél as

they returned home or transferred to the Pacific Theater. An agreement had already been struck

with the Canadians who did not intend to pay for shipping their vehicles back and were handing

over large numbers without too many questions.

The Russian American delegation, restricted to Soviet-surrounded West Berlin for obvious secu-

rity reasons, was largely kept out of the subsequent Potsdam negotiations during the first ten days,

other than a request to put off operations against Shumshu and Paramushir to allow a negotiated

settlement of the issue with Stalin. Given that Junograd was highly dependent upon Allied assets,

this was obviously more of a rather strong suggestion, accompanied by hints that the situation

might soon develop favourably.

Two major events happened on 26 July. First, the Americans, British and Chinese issued a joint

declaration defining the terms for Japanese surrender. This largerly reiterated the Cairo Declaration

of 1943 which had stated that Japan would be expelled from all territories “she has taken by vio-

lence and greed”, particularly all islands occupied since 1914, with specific mention of a free Korea

and the return of all territories taken from China. It had also stated that the Allies were not fighting

Japan for their own territorial expansion; however, the Potsdam communiqué clarified that Japa-

nese sovereignty should be limited to the Home Islands “and such minor islands as we determine”.

The Russian American delegation in West Berlin had been privately signalled by the Americans

and British that the Kurile Islands north of the 1855 line of division between Russia and Japan

should return to Junograd, with the Southern Kuriles possibly also becoming a Russian American

responsibility during a post-war occupation period. The 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg in which the

Northern Kuriles had also fallen to Japan would thus be rescinded, since the Japanese had breached

it by taking southern Sakhalin in 1904. Since the latter was foreseen to be given to the Soviets, the

Northern Kuriles would Russian America’s compensation.

Inter-allied negotiations with Moscow about this issue were still going on, however. The urgency

to get Stalin in against the Japanese was no longer the same as under Roosevelt, since the momen-

tum was now clearly against the enemy. Soviet landings in the Home Islands had been strictly ruled

out at this point because the Western Allies quite openly wanted to avoid the USSR getting a foot-

hold there; moreover, the Americans were now decided to take and occupy those largely by them-

selves. General MacArthur insisted that even the planned Commonwealth Corps should include no

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

171

more than three divisions, among them no Indian units “due to linguistic and logistical complica-

tions”, that they should be American-equipped and -trained, be under command of a US army and

only be in reserve during the initial landings.

The Russian American delegation was deliberating a new pitch to the British to form a joint

Allied army – possibly including the French – for an invasion of Hokkaido the next year, either

concurrent or subsequently to Coronet in Honshu. However, this did not seem a very promising

proposition given the American stance, though that might change if the Invasion of Japan as a

whole ran into difficulties. The other big issue of 26 July also was the announcement of the British

election results. Attlee had won in a landslide over Churchill, much to everbody's surprise,

promptly taking over for the British at Potsdam. This was not considered fortunate by the Russian

Americans since Attlee was a socialist and thought to harbor greater sympathies for the USSR in

the mold of Roosevelt.

29 July would have been the first date envisioned to move against Shumshu or Paramushir, which

would have involved 1st Division landing directly from Beringa. Instead, the troops were now

being set up on Onekotan, pending results of the Potsdam negotiations on the Kurile question. This

made the island a bit crowded and put additional stress on the logistics chain, but improved reaction

time in case of a Soviet move.373 The USAAF was now providing air cover with P-40s from On-

ekotan. Russian American 11th Fighter Squadron flew in on 30 July with its P-51s. The new airfield

was almost ready for another squadron, planned to be Mosquito bombers on 5 August.

The Japanese defenders of Paramushir and Shumshu were almost completely passive at this point,

not even shooting at recconnaissance aircraft – either to conserve ammunition or to avoid giving

away their positions. Matua had been revisited and found completely inactive at present. Repair

work had been observed after the first raids, but no sign of any since the Australian bombing. There

was some speculation as to whether this was because the Japanese could not, they had given up

trying, or they feared invasion and did not want to hand the Allies an intact runway.374

There had also been less air activity from Kamchatka recently, though several Soviet minesweep-

ing trawlers had been spotted off Cape Lopatka – but not straying into the mined Japanese waters.

Allied naval forces had also chased several submarine contacts to inconclusive results; the USSR

had been warned to stay away from AFNPA’s area of operations to avoid inter-allied incidents, but

Admiral Fletcher had still ordered not to engage unidentified submarines north of the minefields

with weapons if they were not headed towards major fleet units. If Stalin stuck to his commitment

of opening hostilities with Japan three months after German defeat, there was now a ten-day win-

dow until 8 August to secure Shumshu and Paramushir, but Junograd was holding off for the time

being. However, at Potsdam the POW question was being treated with more urgency than the Ku-

riles due to the domestic pressure the British and Americans were under, carefully followed by the

Russian American delegation.

By the latest monthly report on Operation Varyag, 4th European Theater Support Brigade in Italy

had worked quickly, and overall the backlog in processing personnel under the Battleaxe pro-

gramme had vanished. Of 233,000 ex-Soviet military personnel overall, 125,000 had expressed the

wish to become Russian Americans. 9,000 Osttruppen had been turned over to Allied authorities

for war crime investigations; after 46,000 were judged unfit for service and transferred to the civil-

ian Longboat programme, 70,000 recuits remained of which 4,000 had been transferred to the Sig-

nal Corps. 1st Marine Division had by now completely left Europe, and along with the Iceland

Regiment and Osttruppen replacements in 1st Airborne Brigade, European recruits were beginning

to come to Russian America with regular units.

373 von Sieben, 1514-1518. 374 Kravchuk, p. 76.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

172

At this point it looked like planned manning levels for II Corps including 6th Division would be

narrowly reached, though there was still a shortage on cadres. The number taken over under Bat-

tleaxe stood at 5,000; by March 1946, another 3,200 were projected to have made it through the

reserve cadre program, plus a regular domestic increase of 3,000. This would allow to raise overall

troop strength by 51,000 over the 1945 OOB, though it still left planners short 10,500 of the envi-

sioned two-corps Army plus marines. In view of possible losses in the Kuriles and, eventually, the

Japanese Home Islands, restoring previous replacement capacities through an additional territorial

regiment was considered a viable alternative to completing establishment of 6th Division.

Under Longboat, about 1.8 million Soviet forced laborers had been accessed, of which about

700,000 were expected to be willing to become Russian Americans. 100,000 were in the French

transit camps, plus the 27,000 Domanov Cossacks in Austria and 23,000 in the informal transit

camps in North Africa. 25,000 were on the Australian link with another 30,000 already arrived;

5,000 are on the Canadian link. That were 210,000 hoped to be safe even if Junograd was told to

hand over all Soviet citizens in occupied Germany the next day, though the case of the Domanov

Cossacks was not really clear. Each week of the coming month would yield another 8,000 as spaces

freed up in the transit camps, plus the 70,000 troops. However, with the Allied warnings it was

considered unlikely that all of the projected 700,000 DPs could be brought home.

Not included in the Varyag numbers was 1st Ukrainian (ex 14th SS) Division which was still

languishing in Northern Italy, though there had been contacts; but neither did that formation seem

to be under threat of repatriation to the USSR as the Allies had so far been honouring the agreement

under which they changed sides. This made Junograd somewhat hopeful for the Domanov Cos-

sacks whose fate was still up in the air.

4 August brought a curious question about Russian American population numbers and what the

delegation knew of the individual Soviet Republics'. This was for the UNO negotiations and Sta-

lin’s demand to get more than one seat; the Western position was that the republics ought to be at

least the size of Russian America to be admitted. At the current recorded Russian American popu-

lation of 3.3 million (not including Operation Varyag), this would pertain to Ukraine, Belorussia,

Georgia, Kazakhstan and Usbekistan. An opinion emerged in the delegation that there might actu-

ally be something positive about this as Russian America was housing some Ukrainian, Georgian

and other nationalist groups on the promise of actual self-administration in a post-Communist Rus-

sia – whenever that should come about – which presented no problems to Junograd as it was on the

other side of the world, but had been useful in political attacks on Moscow. The thinking in West

Berlin went that a whole new venue for the same might be gotten in the UNO.375

The Chinese Option

Prompted by additional information about Moscow’s claims in China during the previous Yalta

Conference related in talks with the Americans and British in Berlin, the Russian American dele-

gation also made contact with the Chinese on 4 August to discuss mutual interests. The Yalta Pro-

tocol already included the restoration of former imperial Russian rights in China, including the

commercial port of Dairen, the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base, the Chinese-Eastern Railroad

and the South Manchurian Railroad which provided an outlet to Dairen.The parties had acknowl-

edged that this would require concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek and Russian American Minister

President Arkhangelski. Notes on these subjects were put in by the Soviet delegation, and the

375 von Sieben, 1518-1521.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

173

American and British delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later. For its part,

the Soviet Union expressed it readiness to a pact of friendship and alliance in order to render assis-

tance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese.

It was now learned that the Soviet notes had contained rather detailed demands including not only

restoration of the lease on Port Arthur, but also all of the Kuriles, the internationalisation of Dairen

to safeguard the USSR’s pre-eminent interest, plus operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and

Manchurian Railroad to Dairen by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. While the Kurile question

seemed to develop favourably at Potsdam, the Soviets’ designs on Port Arthur would largely in-

validate the purpose of locking them into the Sea of Okhotsk behind the Kuriles. The Chinese did

not like the restoring of imperial Russian rights very much, but were being armwrestled to accept

this by the Americans as per the Yalta Agreement. The British did not make much of a difference

as Attlee, lacking Churchill's experience, was rather going along with Truman – which at least

meant that nothing of his feared greater sympathy towards Moscow was being seen so far.

The Russian American delegation was therefore deliberating on a course taking into account the

complete package of Soviet demands. The preferred outcome would naturally be for Moscow to

get neither the Kuriles nor Port Arthur. This would mean supporting the Chinese, but in view of

the relative weight Junograd was bringing to the table, this result was considered unlikely and

counter-productive to pursue; if Russian America unilaterally renounced claims to Port Arthur,

appealing to the principle of national self-determination on behalf of China, it was almost certain

the Soviets would gladly take the basing rights by their own, making Junograd look weak.

If Russian America however insisted on being given equal consideration for the old rights, she

might succeed despite the Yalta clause having been negotiated with the Soviets; the wording cor-

rectly referred to former Russian rights after all, and their own notes called for an internationalisa-

tion of Dairen. Basing rights there would give Junograd the warm water port its Navy had been

dreaming of, and allow to stay on the Soviets’ toes – though it would be a tense situation sitting

practically side-by-side. It would also invalidate possession of the Kuriles, and in fact make it better

for Russian America to spend as little ressources as possible on garrisoning those.

One proposed approach therefore was reneging on claims in the Kuriles south of the current po-

sition of Russian American troops, but naturally maintaining those to Shumshu and Paramushir to

keep watch on Petropavlovsk on the one hand; but support internationalisation of Dairen in ex-

change for basing rights in the area, though not joint control of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and

Manchurian Railroad on the other; if Russian Americans had to sail there, so could the Soviets.

Nobody in the delegation was really enthusiast about this. It would mean surrendering more his-

torical Russian territory to the USSR, and Dairen was vulnerable to be taken by a Soviet offensive

if they should enter hostilities with Japan as promised. The example of Danzig, taken first bei the

Germans and then the Soviets, was not exactly encouraging for the free port model; in fact Moscow

was trying to get the handover of the latter to Poland retroactively legalised in Potsdam at the

moment. The Americans would probably like it if their UNO got to administrate the area and Ju-

nograd made the Kurile question easier for them though, and basing troops there as part of a Pots-

dam agreement would establish Russian America’s status as an equal power.

The response to this proposal was however even more wary in Junograd itself. China was con-

sidered weak at present, but having great potential. If she revived and sought to re-establish her

borders, Russian America would find it hard to argue against self-determination, backed by a pow-

erful army. And if push came to shove, the Kuriles would be easier to hold than anywhere on the

Asian mainland. Those concerns were also echoed within the delegation. The positives and nega-

tives of various possible end states were evaluated to determine what would yield the most gains

at the least cost while appreciating the risks and likelihoods involved.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

174

There was a quite clear picture on what would be involved in holding the Kuriles, since that was

what had been planned for so far. It was assessed that they would have to be garrisoned against the

Soviets at least to the same level as the Japanese were doing now, which would mean two fully

active divisions north of the 1855 line. The Southern Kuriles would add another division for a full

corps, which so far had been thought necessary only for a period of occupation until they returned

to a future peaceful Japan. Conversely, the current conquests plus Shumshu and Paramushir would

require only one division, which corresponded to the Russian American pre-war active Army

forces. The population had of course grown a bit since then, and it was hoped to continue this trend

with Operation Varyag and future population development; but it was not thought possible to keep

up the war footing indeterminately without serious economic repercussions.

All of the above was based upon the assumption that Russian America would have to defend her

interests largely on her own. If there were guarantees and substantial commitments by her allies to

safeguard them, things might look different; but everybody had prevaricated on commitments to

allies so much since 1939 that this might be hard to sell at home even if it was obtained. The

delegation was probing the Americans and British in this respect anyway, while separately talking

with the Australians and Canadians on the side.

After slow proceedings in the first two weeks from the Russian American point of view, things

were now moving quickly towards the finish line at Potsdam, linked closely to events in Asia. On

5 August, the USSR unilaterally abrogated its neutrality pact with the Japanese. On 6 August the

American statement on the dropping of an atomic bomb onto the city of Hiroshima clarified the

means of “prompt and utter destruction” threatened to Japan in the declaration of 26 July. There

was some hope this new weapon would speed up the course of the war, though preparations for

Operation Downfall to invade the Home Islands were continueing as before. By the same token,

decisions about the Kuriles could be excepected quickly now that Stalin seemed intent on making

good on his promise to engage Japan. The Russian American delegation had talked to the Ameri-

cans and British plus Canadian representatives about solid guarantees for Junograd’s post-war in-

terests and found credible will to accommodate them, probably because everybody wants to bring

negotiations to a close without endangering what had already been achieved.

The UNO part had been concluded, with all current members of the wartime United Nations

invited to a founding conference scheduled in San Francisco for 17 October; the formula for recog-

nition of governments within the former Russian Empire would be that the USSR, Ukraine, Belo-

russia, Georgia and Russian America would be admitted as members without any prejudice as to

de-facto rule. Moscow had wanted seats for the other Caucasian and Central Asian republics too,

but was rejected with arguments amounting to that those had never been real nations, just old Mon-

gol fiefdoms. Even Georgia was contentious, but eventually included to woo Stalin into agreement.

In return the Soviets did not press the point of the Baltic States they had taken too much. However,

the USSR would be the only one to sit permanently on the planned security council; the difference

in real-world power worked against Junograd there again, but this had been expected all along.

The question of Russian possessions in East Asia was still under negotiation however. It looked

like the Soviets would get their wishes regarding Kamchatka, Port Arthur and Dairen, including

the joint Chinese-Soviet railroad companies. After talking with Junograd, the Russian American

delegation decided not to push for rights in China due to the precarious position of the area now

that Stalin seemed set on attacking the Japanese, but rather negotiate separately with the Chinese

depending upon how the situation developed.

It was assessed that the wartime alliance between Chiang Kai-shek and the communists in China

was likely to not survive peace for long, which might make Beijing succeptible for an alliance with

Junograd in return for the latter being a thorn in the North Pacific side of the communists' Soviet

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

175

sponsors. The internationalisation of Dairen might give Russian America some opportunities in

China anyway, so the delegation recommended reaching out to the Chinese without mentioning

Russian rights prior to the end of the war. This would not be done in Berlin though so as not to

interfere with the negotiations in the Kurile question.

Work on a memorandum of understanding about post-war cooperation with the Americans and

Canadians was underway. The parties quickly agreed that it would be for the benefit of all if Rus-

sian America became a full member of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence for North America,

where most cooperative measures had been discussed already anyway despite Junograd having

only observer status so far. It was hoped to tie down various other things in time to accompany the

Potsdam Agreement within the next days, serving as a base for an eventual formal treaty.

There was considerable American interest in bases along the great circle route to Japan which

happened to run largely by the Aleutians and Kuriles, so positions were really not too diverse. The

Russian American intention was for the US to commit actual troops as far forward as possible, in

the Komandorskis and the Kuriles themselves – not necessarily for first-line defense, but to assure

American support if those should get attacked by the Soviets. The Canadians were maintaining

their limitation to defence of the North American continent for domestic reasons, but seemed open

to keep some troops at least in mainland Russian America post-war, which ultimately served the

same purpose and freed up Junograd’s own forces for forward defence.

On the greater scene, most of the emerging Potsdam Agreement was dealing with administration

of Germany and re-arrangements in Eastern Europe, unsurprisingly including substantial Soviet

annexations. The POW/DP issue would be dealt with in a separate agreement but done concur-

rently. The Russian American delegation was warned again that this would take effect quite

quickly, including the French zones of occupation. All Allied military personnel would be repatri-

ated as soon as possible without prejudice, with which the Russian American side had little problem

now since the Battleaxe programme has grassed off about any wiling recruit. Relocation of relevant

II Corps troops into France was in the final lap except for the recent additions in Italy, which were

not even fully formed yet. Needless to say, this was pursued with utmost urgency. It had also been

agreed in principle to keep a combat and a support brigade in the American zone as Russian Amer-

ica’s contribution to the occupation of Germany.

The outlook for the civilian Longboat programme was less satisfactory. As it stood, there would

not even be consideration of the wishes of individual DPs, but every Soviet citizen found in the

occupied areas after the agreement took effect was to be summarily handed over to the Soviets. Of

course the latter had also laid claim to those already in the Frech transit camps; but Paris, snubbed

again by not having been invited to Potsdam as one of the major Allied powers and Siviet reluc-

tance to give France her own zone of occupation, was demanding negotiations separate from the

upcoming agreement of the Big Three.376

It was feared that even the Domanov Cossacks might become victims of the repatriations, though

Russian America was trying to get the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency to take

responsibility for them. One thing that had been assured though was that “Soviet citizens” would

only refer to those having lived within the pre-1939 borders of the USSR. Subsequently a lot of

Balts, Finnish, Poles and Romanians emerged among those waiting for transport to France in Ger-

man transit camps. Not a few of those helping compatriots to prove their definitely non-Soviet

nationality later turned out to have been among the thousands of personnel the Signal Corps had

skimmed off the Battleaxe programme.377

376 von Sieben, 1521-1525. 377 Tanski, p. 77.

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176

The Soviet Attack on Japan

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and American hints at more of the fearsome new weapon being

available had Russian American planners also thinking that this, finally, might give the Japanese

an excuse for surrendering without feeling dishonoured, which was considered the only thing keep-

ing them still fighting. Just in case, preparations to land occupation forces at very short notice were

suggested. The Air Force ordered the production of leaflets to be dropped ahead of any landings

the day of the bombing, and proposed to contact Japanese forces in the Kuriles by radio, hailing on

their frequencies with native Japanese speakers. It was proposed to use the threat of Soviet occu-

pation as a stick, and a kinder occupation by Russian America as a carrot, perhaps allowing civil-

ians to remain, with appropriate conditions. Surrendered garrisons might even be induced to resist

Soviet invasion with Russian American help.378

A problem seen by others with the carrot-and-stick approach was that it would probably not have

the same basis with Japanese troops as it had had with Germans who would stampede to the west

in the last weeks of battle to escape the Soviets. Unlike on the Western Front of the European

Theatre, in the Pacific fighting had had racial undertones on both sides, with the Japanese exhibit-

ing fanatical and atrocious behavior, neither expecting nor trying to get quarter. As a result there

had not been many living prisoners to treat properly – less than 1,000 in Russian American captivity

–, hence not much examples of decent conditions the Japanese could expect after surrender. The

USSR having remained neutral so far, the Japanese had little recent base for comparisons. At best

they might consider both Russian armies equally merciless; though by all reports Russian America

would come out well ahead of the Chinese.

An idea that occurred was simply handing over a large number of POWs with a suggestion of

surrender to various Japanese garrisons. “Large” being relative due to aforementioned reasons, that

would probably not make much of a difference if they had to be fought again, but it might if their

comrades saw them returning better-fed and -clothed than themselves, based upon what Allied

forces had seen on Onekotan and Shiashkotan. There had been some indications of weakening

enemy moral lately, like the higher relative numbers of individual surrender during Operation

Fencegate, but no evidence of an impending breakdown before use of the atomic bomb; a move

like this was thought to possibly help developments along.

Of the ground forces assigned to Operation Keychain, I Corps was still crowding on Onekotan

and Shiashkotan, preparing to move onto Shumshu and Paramushir under Doormat/Mailbox at 48

hours' notice. 1st Marine Division completed relocation to Beringa on 6 August, with one regimen-

tal group also forward-deployed to Onekotan. The division’s other units had been undergoing re-

equipment with small arms after losing their British issue from Europe, but were largely finished

now and currently preparing for the landing on Matua under Staircase, planned to occur between

one and three weeks from now if given the green light.

1st Airborne Brigade was in garrison at Stoyanka; reorganisation of 3rd Commando Battalion

into 3rd Parachute Battalion would last another three weeks, though its other units were available

for deployment at short notice. They had mostly been training for reinforcement of Doormat/Mail-

box with a contingency for Urup under Basement. 1st Yeger Regiment was on Shiashkotan and the

adjacent smaller islands with two battalions which were planned to keep the Fencegate objectives

garrisoned when I Corps moved onto Shumshu and Paramushir.

There was transport to move two full divisions and three light battalions by sea at once, plus

airlift for another two battalions. There had however not much plans been made for the case that

378 Bergmann, 1528.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

177

Japanese garrisons should suddently start to surrender all over the Kuriles, due to prior experience

in the Aleutians and Komandorskis. It was judged that unopposed variations of two, possibly three

of Doormat, Mailbox, Basement, Staircase and Fireplace on Shimushir could be executed simulta-

neously, with definitely just two of Doormat, Mailbox and Fireplace. However, there were suffi-

cient forces to do it all in turn.

Meanwhile the Potsdam negotiations were down to the Kurile question. The British-American

stance remained that the Soviets were amply rewarded with all else they would get, and while there

was talk about them occupying, but not annexing the islands south of the 1855 line, the enthusiasm

for that on the Western side was not great after recent experiences with Eastern Europe. The Rus-

sian American delegation was approaching a tangible result with the Americans and Canadians for

the memorandum of understanding on post-war cooperation. Participation in the Permanent Joint

Board of Defence for North America was already agreed upon, and while there was still some

internal discussion on the side of the partners, a guarantee for the integrity of Russian American

territory was expected in return for a commitment to hold peace with the USSR – which the dele-

gation was also discussing internally with Junograd.

Regarding the question of basing rights, at least one US base on Shemya and Beringa each cou-

pled with the requirement to care for their air and ground defenses themselves was foreseen, which

seemed uncontroversial. In addition the Russian American side wanted to have another US base in

the Northern Kuriles, for which there was at least interest on the other side, though discussions

were going on. The Canadians could imagine keeping some troops in Ketchikan or elsewhere in

the Russian American Panhandle, which was close to their own borders and satisfied Junograd’s

basic request of involvement.

Time remained critical since on 8 August, shortly past 1500 hours Berlin time, the USSR an-

nounced that it had declared war on Japan effective the following day. Since that was just prior to

midnight Trans-Baikal Time, reports of Soviet operations against the Japanese in Manchuria and

on Sakhalin came in a mere hour later. Much to Russian American relief, there were no signs of

any movements from Kamchatka though, so the Kuriles did not seem to be an immediate target. It

was also widely expected that the Americans would soon drop another atomic bomb, since Truman

had hinted as much in his statement of two days ago.

However, in the absence of any indication of Japanese surrender, there was still expectation for

the war to carry on into next year, with the British continueing the plans for a Commonwealth

Corps to participate in Operation Downfall. It was intended to be formed in the US along American

lines with American equipment, and train for six months before deployment. General Brooke of

the Imperial General Staff proposed on this day that the corps would include a British, Australian

and Canadian division each, plus two New Zealand brigades; Lieutenant General Keightley of UK

V Corps in Austria has been named as possible commander. The Russian American view on that

was, somewhat acidly, that he had more experience in handing over Cossacks to the Soviets than

fighting the Japanese.

The Russian American delegation was also told to expect the signing of agreements at Potsdam

for the next day to prepare for the impact on Operation Varyag. For the past ten days, the direct

trans-atlantic air link had worked with additional capacity exclusively dedicated to the Longboat

programme, flying an extra 1,500 DPs given priority for various reasons to Russian America. Ship-

ping passages to the Carribean and South America had been found for some others to make room

in the transit camps for new arrivals before the door closed, though their number was similiarly

low since commercial lines were only just beginning to resume service. Overall another 10,000

over the last Longboat report were projected to be safe by the time of the signing.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

178

On the Battleaxe side, recent recruits from Italy were being movied into France just to be sure.

There was capacity to accomodate them in quarters previous used by 5th Division which had just

begun shipping home via Canada. The bulk of 4th Division was still in Czechoslovakia where it

was considered largely safe; 1st Guards Brigade was in Austria, 9th Infantry Brigade had gone on

to France from there, and the rest was still mostly hidden in 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Divi-

sion Group which was undergoing its own post-war reorganisation with ample confusion.

9 August started off with news of another atomic bombing, this time of the city of Nagasaki. That

certainly served to set the stage for the signing of the agreements at Potsdam, accompanied by

renewed calls upon Japan to surrender, now shared by Attlee and Stalin. Truman had wanted the

latter to sign onto the declaration of 26 July, but the disagreements about the Kurile question had

carried over to the affirmation of the Cairo Declaration that entailed.

As indicated earlier, the POW/DP question was settled in separate bilateral agreements with the

USSR, identical for the British and American side. As of now, there was no such agreement with

the French, though the Soviets had opened negotiations with them as well as the Dutch, Belgians,

Finnish, Norwegians and Czechoslovakians, and even the governments of Sweden and Switzerland

where some Osttruppen have fled. Needless to say, the Russian American side was making coun-

terrepresentations with all of the above, and for now the French zones of occupation seemed still

safe. Unfortunately for Junograd’s purposes, the new communist puppet governments of Eastern

Europe also demanded the return of their citizens, which might present problems for any “Poles”

and “Romanians” in Russian American care.

On the positive side, the Russian Anmerican delegation signed the memorandum with the Amer-

icans and Canadians on this day, too. Thereby the three governments expressed their intention to

deepen mutual relations in the spirit of friendship and joint security by continueing to develop lines

of communication and commerce between them; pledging mutual support in the case of an armed

attack on any of them; admitting Russian America to the Permanent Joint Board of Defense for

North America as a full member to facilitate cooperation in procurement and operations of their

armed forces; and planning for the joint defense of their common seaboard, including by basing

troops on the territory of each other under unified commands within the framework of appropriate

agreements concerning the status of those forces. The parties resolved to enter into a binding agree-

ment about these aims during the United Nations conference at San Francisco in October.379

The bombing of Nagasaki also reinforced notions in Junograd that the Japanese had to see now

that the game was up. Preparations were made for movement of the ground forces in the Kuriles,

whether to Paramushir and Shumshu or south. The Air Force had moved more ground crew to

Onekotan to support additional fighters and transports if required, and had taken advantage of the

pause in operations to build up stocks of fuel and munitions at the airfield there.380

However, Allied assessments of the situation were disparate. Opinion ranged from that any inva-

sion in the Japanese Home Islands would now be done to either accept capitulation or take posses-

sion of a pile of rubble, to that the new bombs would rather be needed to blast a trail for the landing

forces across the islands due to the way the enemy was seeking death in battle. Latest intelligence

estimates still assumed as much as 600,000 Japanese troops on Kyushu alone and up to 6,000 com-

bat aircraft which might be used in kamikaze attacks along with various other suicidal means.

Overall, the Berlin delegation related the impression that the Americans were quickly coming to

rely on their atomic weapons to win the war one way or other.

This would not help much in the Kuriles though as Russian American did not want to take pos-

session of scorched earth, even with the effect of nuclear radiation connected with the use of the

379 von Sieben, 1529-1531. 380 Kravchuk, p. 77.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

179

new bombs not really being understood at the time. The approach of enticing local garrisons to

capitulate on their own by sending them some Japanese POWs therefore gained additional support,

particularly as the latter could now also tell their comrades of the havoc wreaked on their country,

which they might not have heard of in the Northern Kuriles.

Fortunately there was still no sign the USSR might move against Shumshu and Paramushir, so

there was thought to be some room to test this. The planned window for execution of Staircase on

Matua was three more weeks away, after which all troops including 1st Marine Division and 1st

Airborne Brigade would be fully available in theater. After that however campaign season would

come rapidly to a close, and any move to effect anything in the current year would have to be made

then, so the period to wait for Japanese capitulation was limited.

There were no details of the Soviet offensive farther south on the mainland, though it was clear

there was a strategic pincer movement against the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo with 1st

Far Eastern Front pushing west from the Vladivostok area – cutting off enemy forces in Korea in

the process – and Trans-Baikal Front pushing east from the Mongolian border. 2nd Far Eastern

Front was advancing from the north across the Amur. Most information on this was coming from

the Chinese who are aiding operations along with Mongolian troops.

Junograd had a better grip on events on Sakhalin through direct signals intelligence and other

sources; 56th Rifle Corps of Sixteenth Soviet Army with 79th Rifle Division, 2nd and 5th Rifle

Brigade plus 214th Armored Brigade was fighting Japanese 88th Division, but seemed to have a

hard time despite numerical superiority – possibly because the operation was rushed forward in

response to Allied operations in the Kuriles. It was known that 87th Rifle Corps, previously stated

in intelligence reports as earmarked for landings against Japanese territory, had been brought out

from 1st Far Eastern Front reserve in the Ussuri Krai on the Chinese border north of Vladivostok

and might be supporting operations along with 13th Naval Infantry Brigade from Vladivostok and

Sixteenth Army's 113th Independent Rifle Brigade at Sovetskaya Gavan, mentioned under the

same circumstances.

On 11 August the Russian American delegation left Berlin, with a part going on an inspection

tour of remaining Russian American forces and DP camp sites in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Aus-

tria and France. A first stop at Nuremberg included information by Allied legal and intelligence

personnel on preparations for the Nazi war crimes trials planned to start in November, but also a

visit to a DP collection point run by 3rd European Theatre Support Brigade in the city. No repatri-

ations to the USSR had taken place so far, but Soviet liaison officers were reported to have already

begun prowling the camps with representatives from the American Military Government, causing

feat and anguish among those who wanted to come to Russian America.

The Russian American side for its part was trying to make sure that its own liaison officers were

also present at any time. Here in Bavaria, the sympathy of General Patton as the military governor

was resonably sure, but already DPs were being denied to move west unless cleared by the Amer-

icans. Some hope was put in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which

had largely taken over supply of the camps and was opposed to the use of force in repatriations.

The inspection tour came to a sudden end on 13 August when it was ambushed at a roadblock on

the outskirts of Prague, manned by troops in Czechoslovakian uniforms. Of the small convoy of

20, seven were killed and six wounded before the attackers were killed by return fire of the Russian

American escort. Czechoslovakian authorities subsequently claimed the uniformed assailants had

not actually been their soldiers, and suspicion arose immediately that this had been a Soviet plot.381

An investigation by local Russian American forces found that information had mis-stated the group

381 von Sieben, 1533-1534.

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180

as arriving by aircraft rather than by car, preventing early protection measures on the spot, and that

road signs were tampered with, leading the delegation away from a hastily established escort on

the main road to Prague. It was also indicated that a purported Soviet operation of this scope would

have to have had some cooperation rather high up in the Czech government.

Despite promises of cooperation, the investigation eventually ran into a blind alley. Some of the

attackers were identified, but two third never were, and it seemed that at some level in the Czech-

oslovakian command, someone was actively working on obstructing all leads. The delegation was

guarded by a Russian American Cossack squadron for the remainder of its stay in Prague and re-

turned to Junograd directly by aircraft on 15 August, the same day Emperor Hirohito made his

announcement of surrender on Japanese radio.382

Capitulation in the Kuriles

The emperor's speech was actually a little circumspect on how and when Japan should surrender,

and the low quality of the recording and use of court language made it difficult to interpret, but the

acceptance of the 26 July Potsdam Declaration seemed clear. This was considered a timely help in

securing quick capitulations of Japanese garrisons in the Kuriles, as the plan to use POWs as facil-

tators had hit a rather ironic problem: many straight did not want to go back. Only about 400 were

available at all to be transported to the Kuriles within a week. But moving quickly was of the

essence as the Soviets were making progress with their operations on Kamchatka by now.

On 14 and 15 August they had conducted amphibious landings by 113th Independent Rifle Bri-

gade and naval infantry units at Toro and Esutoru on the west coast. Those were now cutting across

the island to meet 56th Rifle Corps, which finally penetrated the Japanese main defensive belt in

the Koton fortified region along the Poronai River, about the only real axis of advance to the south

available. On the 16th, elements of the 79th Rifle Division and 113th Independent Rifle Brigade

linked up in the Nairo area on the southeastern coast. Another landing by the 13th Naval Infantry

Brigade from Vladivostok occurred on the 17th at Maoka on the southwestern coast, close to the

Japanese provincial capital of Toyohara. It was assessed that Soviet forces might secure southern

Sakhalin within the next days, which would give them a basis for air operations in support of attacks

on Japanese territory further south and east.383

Leaflet drop on Shumshu and Paramushir had already gone ahead, with revised leaflets to follow

as soon as they could be brought to forward bases from the mainland. Radio broadcasts using POWs

were underway, as were attempts to hail the garrisons on their own frequencies. The Signal Corps

had also finally found some Japanese prisoners brave or foolhardy enough to return; at least one

was missing a leg, and another was captured unconscious with his head wound still visible, so they

probably thought that they would not be blamed for being captured.

The response of Japanese garrisons to landings was considered unpredictable now. Radio inter-

cepts reported more activity than usual, much of it in plain language, demanding clarification from

headquarters. One garrison commander even asked for orders on what to do if enemies landed in

an unencrypted message. Headquarters were probably overwhelmed with decrypts and in confu-

sion, and there was no sign of clear replies to the requests. For the time being, any hostile action

was refrained from by the Allied side, and Russian American 2nd Air Division issued orders to all

aircraft to shoot only in defence of themselves or other allied forces until further notice.384

382 Tuček, p. 77-78. 383 von Sieben, 1536-1538. 384 Bergmann, 1537.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

181

There was a keen sense of the urgency to pre-empt the Soviets in the Kuriles throughout the

troops. Volunteers were stepping up, asking to be either airdropped or landed by ship to accept the

surrender of Japanese garrisons, willing to take the risk that they would fight. On 17 August, in

light of Soviet advances and that the Japanese had not responded to calls for capitulation by radio

and leaflet drops so far, forces in the theater were authorized to conduct attempts to make personal

contact to suggest surrender negotiations under a flag of truce after appropriate announcement

through the previous channels.385

The Army had a few Japanese speakers lined up to be landed on Shumshu by the Navy with

armed escorts on 18 August; motoring ashore in a boat under a white flag was seen as less likely

to provoke firing than parachuting, but they would be given air cover and provided with naval fire

support if needed. There would also be larger landing forces offshore to rescue the initial group, or

land and occupy, as appropriate. The Signal Corps was making its own arrangements.

The main worry of the truce delegation was the typical dense fog of the day which made it diffi-

cult for both sides to recognise anything under any flag, white or not; the envoys crept in on an

unarmed cutter with siren wailing and firing flares every minute as previously announced by radio,

hoping to hit the harbor of Kataoka rather than some unnotified beach defence position. As it turned

out, they were only a little off and rather encouraged when directed to the correct place by flares

fired from ashore in reply. There they were properly received by a Japanese detail and taken to 91st

Division commander Lieutenant General Tsutsumi, to whom they repeated the proposal of a hon-

orable capitulation in the current circumstances in person, somewhat aided by the latest reports that

there has been contact between the highest Japanese and American levels and a Japanese delegation

was expected to leave for Manila the following day to meet General MacArthur.

General Tsutsumi turned out to have been in receipt of the imperial surrender announcement of

15 August himself, which removed the worry that command of the isolated garrison might have

been in complete ignorance of developments and disregarded Allied broadcasting of the same as

just propaganda. He inquired about some details the proposal, such as his forces not being referred

to as prisoners and the officers being allowed to keep their sidearms and live with their families if

on post, then asked to be given 48 hours to check back with his higher command and decide.

In light of quick developments elsewhere, eventually 24 hours were agreed, and the Russian

American delegation to return tomorrow. There was however confidence that Tsutsumi would ac-

cept from his bearing and the fact that the group was received by him personally in the first place;

though the group saw little of other Japanese troops, it did not get the impression of a garrison

cheerfully waiting to repel an enemy attack either, and thought that Allied blockading operations

must have had a substantial impact on enemy moral and overall preparedness.386

Meanwhile, there is still no sign of a Soviet move onto the Kuriles, none of the usual trawlers

having been reported snooping around the First Kurile Strait for some time, and the American air

patrols encountering much less Soviet activity. However, the Soviets kept making rapid progress

on Sakhalin now. Moving from Maoka along the railroad towards Toyohara and the southern port

of Odomari, they captured the towns of Tomamai and Otakai on 18 August and advanced to Fu-

tomata, cutting off the southwestern tip of the island while 56th Rifle Corps was still moving down

its length from the north. There was also a report of an air assault onto an airfield at Konotoro

somewhat up north on the western coast, which was interesting and a bit disconcerting for Junograd

since it had not been known that there were any airborne units available for the operation. Those

later turned out to have been quickly-trained naval infantry units.387

385 von Sieben, 1538. 386 Kurylenko, p. 439-441. 387 von Sieben, 1540-1541.

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On the morning of 19 August, General Tsutsumi accepted the Allied terms, and the surrender of

all Japanese forces on Paramushir and Shumshu took effect at midnight. The following day, Rus-

sian American 1st Division began moving to the latter and 2nd Division to the former to secure the

islands and disarm enemy troops. At the same time, 3rd Marine Regimental Group, minus Amtrac

battalion, embarked on APDs and sailed for Matua, escorted by battleship/cruiser Task Group 90.1

and meeting with carrier TG 90.3 already there. They were to attempt the same approach with

Japanese 41st Independent Mixed Regiment, citing Tsutsumi's example.

In case of success, 1st Airborne Brigade and Eleventh US Air Force received warning orders to

fly into the local airfield, first to be secured by the marines after landing, with available units to

reinforce the occupation force and prepare for further movement south. Engineers were also sent

along, because it was feared the runway might not be immediately usable. If repairs were needed,

they were to attempt to enlist the aid of the Japanese garrison. Airfields on the islands to the south

were all expected to be fit for use.

Russian American 3rd Division and the rest of 1st Marine Division received orders for Shimushir

(Japanese 42nd Division) and Urup (129th Independent Mixed Brigade) respectively, expected to

arrive between the 22nd and 29th as the bulk of the marines needed to be transported from Beringa.

If Urup should look in need to be expedited due to a Soviet threat from Sakhalin, a capitulation of

the garrison could be proposed by a naval force and implemented by an air landing from Matua.388

On Sakhalin, another Soviet landing by naval infantry at the southern port of Odomari was re-

ported the same day while elements of 13th Naval Infantry Brigade were moving on nearby Rudaka

overland from the direction of Maoka, and others continueing towards the provincial seat of Toyo-

hara. 56th Rifle Corps, including 113th Independent Rifle Brigade, was still advancing from the

north on the Japanese airbase at Ochiai. 355th Rifle Division of 87th Rifle Corps was also men-

tioned in signals as having arrived on the island and taken the port of Honto on the southwestern

tip now nearly isolated by 13th Naval Infantry Brigade's move east; that made formations from

both 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Front engaged on Sakhalin. It was assessed that the island would be

completely secured shortly, if the Japanese did not even likewise surrender to Soviet troops before.

That would allow the latter to move onto the Kuriles from there, so securing the surrender of as

many garrisons as possible to Russian America was now paramount.389

Air patrols were concentrated on watching for Soviet movements, though top cover for the occu-

pying forces was also still being provided. Long-range aircraft, mostly RAAF B-24s, and Russian

American Navy flying boats, were patrolling west of the Kuriles, south as far as Hokkaido, plus

some Mosquitoes from Onekotan, and Mosquitoes and USAAF P-38s off the coast of Kamchatka.

Strict orders had however been given not to risk intruding into Soviet air space. A flying boat was

intercepted by Japanese fighters on 19 August, but they merely had a look, then flew away.390

The first troops landing on Paramushir and Shumshu on 20 August encountered no problems.

Japanese units at Kataoka and Kasibavara surrendered in an orderly fashion. There were some

individual cases of suicide by leaders and men who could not take the dishonour of defeat, but

overall the enemy is cooperating without incident according to the stipulations of the surrender

agreement. This turned out to be rather lucky given developments of the preceding week; General

Tsutsumi related that the situation was very unclear following the imperial radio announcement of

surrender – to which he was alerted the evening before by cable – since the Imperial General Head-

quarter issued an order “to continue current tasks until further ordered but stop offensive opera-

tions” on the same day as the broadcast. It was only on 18 August after the Russian American

388 Kurylenko, p. 443. 389 von Sieben, 1543. 390 Kravchuk, p. 78.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

183

delegation had met with him that this was clarified to suspending all operational tasks and stopping

all hostilities, concurrent with the US-Japanese contacts that had by now resulted in the Japanese

delegation to Manila.

Tsutsumi also stated that while Allied blockading operations had been efficient, they had not put

a dent into actual enemy combat readiness, since troops had started out with 90 days of stocks – a

lesson learnt from the Southwest Pacific were Allied operations all but shut down supply of garri-

sons. They were low on rations at this point though, requiring Allied forces to bring in considerable

supplies of their own to feed surrendered troops. The full garrison of Paramushir and Shumshu had

been 23,000 before the attack, of which mostly the two battalions detached to Onekotan and Shi-

askotan and almost all of the air units were destroyed; just about a dozen aircraft were left, most

only because they are inoperable. Russian American Air Force Forward Observer/Security person-

nel were among the first to go over the islands, but found mostly individual examples of Zeros and

Kates, conforming to Tsutsumi's statements.

Otherwise, his troops were surprisingly untouched despite all the Allied efforts of aerial and naval

bombardment. Obviously they had a lot more time there to build fortifications than in the Aleutians

and Komandorskis, and the occupation forces found some very impressive underground installa-

tions completely hidden from view which had never been known of before. Curiously the Japanese

had laid no sea mines of their own, and only very little land mines, though there was a proper maze

of real and fake coastal defence positions interconnected by trenches and tunnels with dispersed

supply dumps, with a secondary defensive line inland on Paramushir. Conversely, Allied intelli-

gence about troops had been roughly correct. Overall, it was considered a good thing that forces

had not have to go up against all this in opposed landings.

The political development in the background was very noticeable for the Allied force which ar-

rived off Matua on 20 August, too, receiving a prompt reply to a radio message, unlike the initial

fruitless attempts at Paramushir and Shumshu. A party was ashore to meet with Colonel Ueda of

the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment by noon, and troops began landing by evening. As per plans,

they first occupied the airfield, though it was in fact pretty unusable from Allied bombing attacks.

Repairs were to start as soon as the whole island is secured and all enemy forces accounted for.391

Operations further south and west were complicated by the Kuriles being the operations area of

Allied Forces North Pacific Area per inter-allied agreements confirmed at Potsdam, while the Sea

of Okhotsk was a joint operations area with Soviet forces, so all due caution was to be exerted.

Unfortunately from Junograd’s point of view, what went for Japanese capitulations to Russian

America also went for the Soviets, and by 20 August surrender negotiations were also underway

on Sakhalin. The town and airfield of Ochiai had been seized by another air assault the previous

night while the port of Odomari was still being fought over. In Manchuria, the Soviet pincer had

by now largely closed as troops had reached Mukden, Changchun and Qiquihar. After amphibious

landings on the Korean coast two days earlier, Soviet forces could now be expected to turn south

if their supply lines held up.

By 21 August, ships returning from running Russian American 1st and 2nd Division to Para-

mushir and Shumshu started embarking 3rd Division at Onekotan, and first elements were expected

off Shimushir the following day. Others vessels were going on directly to Beringa to pick up the

rest of 1st Marine Division there on 23 August, planned to arrive at Urup on the 27th. Further

shuttling between Onekotan, Paramushir and Shumshu was mostly left to small landing craft.392

391 Kurylenko, p. 445. 392 von Sieben, 1545.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

184

The Soviet Move onto Hokkaido

Two more Soviet air assaults occurred on 21 August, one of them on the provincial seat of Toyo-

hara on Sakhalin. This was however completely eclipsed by the second operation against the port

of Rumoi on the western coast of Hokkaido in the Japanese Home Islands – a blatant move that

was initially not even believed in Junograd due to its implications for inter-allied relations.

The US had previously been mostly suspicious about Soviet intentions for Manchuria and Korea.

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued General Order Number 1 on 15 August stipulating that

Japanese troops in Korea should surrender to US forces south of the 38th parallel, to Soviet forces

north of it, Truman informed Stalin, Attlee and Chiang Kai-shek at the same time that the United

States intended to “use its naval and air power to expedite the surrender of Japanese forces in the

coastal area of the Asiatic mainland in order to discourage continuation of local hostilities” regard-

less of boundaries. To this end he had already issued a directive to the US Navy to make advance

arrangements to occupy Dairen and a port in Korea immediately following the surrender of Japan

“if the port should not at that time have been taken over by the forces of the Soviet government”

immediately after returning from Potsdam on the 11th.

Stalin replied that he generally agreed with General Order Number 1, but promptly came back

with the old demand for a Soviet occupation zone in Japan proper – rejected by the Americans

before – whereby all enemy troops on Japanese soil north of a line from Rumoi to Kushiro on the

east coast of Hokkaido should surrender to his forces, plus a Soviet sector of Tokyo. He stated that

national public opinion would be seriously offended if the USSR failed to occupy some part of the

enemy homeland after the history of 1904 to 1922. The geography in this was a little vague as it

could mean to include all of the Kuriles, but certainly the islands south of the 1855 line.

Truman told Stalin off by saying that arrangements had already been made for the surrender of

all forces in Japan proper to General MacArthur, and citing decisions at Potsdam, including the

memorandum of understanding between the US, Canada and Ruzssian America that stated the in-

tention of American bases in the Kuriles. However, in the interest of not making Stalin repudiate

the General Order overall, he agreed to making the Chinese Liaotung Peninsula part of the Soviet

mainland occupation zone; by 18 August the Americans had concluded that while they could put

some ships into Dairen, they were never going to beat the Soviets to seizing the area anyway.

On 20 August Stalin sent an offended telegram complaining that he did not expect such an answer

to a good ally, humiliating to the USSR; if the Americans should get bases in the Kuriles, certainly

the Soviets should get some piece of Japan to regain access to the Pacific. He repeated his demand

for northern Hokkaido, though there was no mention of Tokyo anymore. At the same time, a US

naval liaison officer in Vladivostok warned Washington that a reliable source had indicated the

Soviets were preparing to land forces on Hokkaido. The Americans were preparing a strongly-

worded reply when the news hit the following day.

With Sakhalin secured, the Soviets had a good chance to follow the initial air assault on Rumoi

up with actual occupation of Hokkaido, even having only sealift for one division at a time. By the

best Allied intelligence, there were at least two, maybe three Japanese divisions plus at least one

independent mixed regiment or brigade, some coastal defenses and various militia-type units based

there under Northern District Army. There was an air division too, but forces in the Northern Dis-

trict were concurrent with Fifth Area Army which was also responsible for the Kuriles and southern

Sakhalinsk, and only a handful of squadrons were actually on Hokkaido. The island was weakly

garrisoned as the vast majority of forces has been concentrated on Honshu and Kyushu in expec-

tation of Allied landings from the south, and even what troops were there were mostly oriented

towards the Pacific.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

185

By 22 August it was apparent that the Soviets were serious about the Hokkaido operation. In the

morning, the paratroops at Rumoi – believed to be 3rd Airborne Rifle Regiment from 1st Guards

Airborne Division of the Trans-Baikal Front – were reinforced by 264th Rifle Division, 87th Rifle

Corps, transported by a convoy escorted by cruisers Kalinin and Kaganovich out of Vladivostok.

There were now also reports of a second landing at Wakkanai on the northern tip of Hokkaido by

the same corps' 355th Rifle Division, mentioned to have been on Sakhalin earlier, supported by

aircraft from captured Japanese bases there; a general surrender of Japanese troops on Sakhalin

went into effect the same day.

The political fallout was considerable. There had been no official US reply yet, but all sorts of

reactions were being discussed; the most likely was to land in Korea quickly and prevent the Sovi-

ets from taking all of it. A US advance detail also was to go to Tokyo within the next days to make

preparations for an expedited deployment of occupation forces; US 11th Airborne Division had

recently been transported to Okinawa to be ready for this, and might be available to drop onto

Hokkaido and stop the Soviets. US 1st Cavalry Division was also currently preparing to ship out

from Luzon, and more forces could possibly sent from Okinawa and the Philippines – but would

take time to arrive even in southern Japan, which would still have to be occupied, too.

The closest Western Allied troops to Hokkaido itself were the elements of Russian American 3rd

Division which received a prompt surrender by Japanese 42nd Division on Shimushir on 22 August

and started landing troops directly. 1st Marine Division would only start embarking for Urup the

following day, but could possibly be redirected to Hokkaido if there was a decision to counter the

Soviet move; 1st Airborne Brigade would conclude its reorganisation at the end of the coming

week, but could rush deployment if necessary.393

The Russian American Air Force ordered all non-essential air transport to cease, and transport

and liaison aircraft to be moved so that they were available for parachute drops or flying in to

Japanese airfields. Bombers could also be used for transport of small numbers of men. It was be-

lieved that some airfields in the Kuriles where contact had been made with the local Japanese com-

mands could now be flown straight into. However, violent storm conditions in the Tartar and Per-

ouse Strait on 23 August were likely to hamper further Soviet sea and air operations.394

Conditions on the political level were no less stormy. Truman had told Stalin rather stiffly that

there must have been a misunderstanding because nobody would like it if inter-allied agreements

unraveled. He repeated that all of the Japanese Home Islands were to be occupied by US troops,

and any territorial questions were a matter for proper peace treaty negotiations with Japan. Mac-

Arthur demanded of his Japanese contacts that their forces should only surrender to Americans,

which put them in a bind; they pointed out they had already ordered all troops to cease any kind of

operations and surrender to “allied forces”, and whether those orders should really be rescinded.

Regardless, preparations for deployment of troops to previously Japanese-held territories were

being accelerated to beat the Soviets to the punch wherever possible. Outside the Home Islands

this mostly concerned Tenth US Army, where III Amphibious Corps received warning orders for

northern China with 1st, 4th and 6th Marine Division – less 4th Marine Regiment, already em-

barked with Allied Task Group 38.4 to sail into Tokyo Bay within the next 48 hours and secure the

port of Yokosuka; and XXIV Corps for southern Korea with 7th, 77th and 96th Infantry Division.

MacArthur intended to go to Tokyo the day after the arrival of TG 38.4, probably on 26 August.

11th Airborne Division was to begin flying to Yokohama on the 24th, where it was initially or-

dered to secure the airfield where it would land and a perimeter around it. Based upon its recent

airlift from Luzon to Okinawa which had involved 600 aircraft, it was estimated it would take a

393 von Sieben, 1546-1548. 394 Bergmann, 1549.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

186

week to get the full division there; but it was hoped a regimental group could be sent on to the air

base of Chitose on Hokkaido on the 26th to receive the surrender of Fifth Area Army command at

nearby Sapporo as the first important step of containing the Soviets. The rest of the division would

be moved in over the following week as the situation allowed, to be relieved at Yokohama by 27th

Infantry Division, also airlifted from Okinawa.

Naval Task Groups 38.3 (carriers USS Ticonderoga and Randolph, light cruisers Monterey and

Bataan, battleships South Dakota and North Carolina) and 38.5 (HMS Indefatigable and King

George) had also been ordered to Hokkaido and were supposed to land a shore detachment at Ku-

shiro, the counterpoint of the demarcation line the Soviets had proposed earlier. They might arrive

concurrently with the 11th Airborne lead element at Chitose – unless either ran into the same

weather currently impeding the Soviets – but would need reinforcements ashore if the situation

could not be resolved politically.

Also on 23 August, Junograd was officially asked to help with any quickly available troops. As

the Matua airfield was expected to be operable within the next two days, 1st Airborne Brigade

received orders to fly 1st and 2nd Parachute Battalion plus 4th Airborne Support Battalion to Am-

chitka on the 24th, Matua on the 25th, and hopefully Kushiro on Hokkauido on the 26th. 3rd Par-

achute Battalion was intended to follow until the 31st, but 1st Commando Battalion of I Corps and

two flights of 1st Air Force Forward Observer/Security Squadron would fly out separately from

Paramushir to arrive with the brigade's first wave, in flying boats if necessary. They latter also were

to take some personnel from the local US contingent with them to establish liaison with Allied

forces on Hokkaido.

3rd Division at Shimushir was further ordered to not disembark or, if already done, re-embark

most of 9th Mechanised Brigade, 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment and the self-propelled battalion

of 3rd Artillery Brigade with detachments of support troops, having experienced absolutely no

problems with the surrendered Japanese garrisons so far. If they sailed on 24 August, they could

also be at Kushiro on the 26th. Unfortunately from Junograd’s view, once troops were ashore they

would transfer from Pacific Ocean Areas to Southwest Pacific Area command and report to Major

General Joseph Swing of US 11th Airborne Division. 1st Marine Division was embarking at

Beringa the same day and still planned to arrive at Urup on the 27 August, but was warned that it

might go on from there or not even stop. However, securing the lower Kuriles against the Soviets

was still thought essential, probably even more so now.

Japanese garrisons in the Kurils had apparently been instructed at this point to contact Allied

forces by radio in order to speed up the surrender process. Small units would therefore probably be

enough to cover most of the islands as so far garrisons were cooperative if ordered to. In fact the

Japanese were rather disciplined in this, while reports about Soviet troops firing at negotiation

parties under flags of truce had been emerging since Sakhalin. Though wartime propaganda had

depicted Western Allied forces as no different from the Soviets in atrocious behavior, at least Jap-

anese command was now seeing the difference. On Matua, the commander of Russian American

3rd Marine Regiment actually told the Japanese that if they undertook to resist any Soviet attack,

they could keep their weapons – though there were legal doubts if POWs could do this.

There was not much of a choice over troop strength to land on the lower Kuriles anyway as

Russian American forces were getting stretched very thin already; this kind of advances had never

been planned for this year rather than next, when II Corps would have been available. Planners did

not want to move parts of 1st and 2nd Division off Paramushir and Shumshu since these islands

were still considered under threat from Kamchatka, so were left with very little disposable forces.

I. and III./1st Yeger Battalions were ordered to leave behind one company each on Onekotan and

Shiashkotan, prepare to board APDs returned from Matua on 24 August and head south ahead of

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

187

1st Marine Division. They could reach all of the lower Kuriles the same day, but would merely be

able to take capitulations and act as a tripwire to any Soviet landings until reinforced by the marines

after three to four days. However, they would have backup by the American battleship/cruiser task

groups and Carrier Division 22 which were also sailing south; it was hoped that the US presence

would be the best deterrent.

As for Hokkaido, the clear intent was to stop the Soviets from advancing as soon as possible. So

far they had not moved out of their beachheads at Rumoi and Wakkanai, probably because the

weather was affecting unloading of their ships. With any luck, Western Allied troops would confine

them to the northwestern tip of the island, though time was of the essence. Nobody really wanted

to believe that they would fight after being confronted, but Russian American troops for their part

were preparing for that.395

The Kurile Race

By 24 August, forces for south of Matua were largely underway, though movement was compli-

cated. 1st Airborne Brigade in particular had to go through a variety of staging bases due to limi-

tations of range and airfield capacities; the 30 aircraft carrying 1st Parachute Battalion was on Attu

by evening after a stop at Umnak, 2nd Parachute Battalion at Shemya via Holodnayabukhta, and

brigade command with the cannon and heavy mortar companies at Amchitka via Naknek. On the

25th, they went from there to different bases on Paramushir, then staged through Matua – declared

operable two days earlier – for Hokkaido on the 26th. 1st Commando Battalion went ahead of the

brigade with the attached forward observer/security flight. After some exchange of information

with Southwest Pacific Area their destination would now not be Kushiro, but an IJN airfield at

Nakashibetsu, about 80 kilometres to the north. Since refueling there was not expected, the return

leg would tax the range of the C-47s anyway, but it was hoped they would be able to divert to

Japanese bases in the Southern Kuriles in an emergency by 26 August.396

While not involving the massive numbers of operations in Europe like Market-Garden or Varsity

the airlift was very notable for the available means, particularly considering the distances involved.

2,100 troops and their equipment – including more than 90 jeeps and some motorbikes – had to go

about 2,700 nautical miles from Stoyanka to Nakashibetsu in three days. 72 C-47s from US 10th

Troop Carrier Group transported the entirety of 1st and 2nd Parachute Battalion; two C-54s flown

up from the US on regular supply runs, three Russian American ones and twelve C-47s from Rus-

sian American 28th Transport Squadron the HQ and HQ company, minus the staff's vehicles; six

C-54s – four pulled from the trans-altlantic link per orders of Air Force High Command from 22

August – and four C-47s from Russian American 8th Wing the cannon company; and 24 C-47s

from 4th Wing plus eight from 8th the mortar company.

The theatre was so stripped of air transport that the balance of 1st Commando Battalion had in

fact to be loaded into six S-44 flying boats because even 10th Troop Carrier Group could provide

only seven operable C-47s in addition to their other tasks. Total aircraft used amounted to 127 C-

47s, eleven C-54s and six S-44, an impressive fleet. Even more impressive that none were lost,

though some had to divert enroute due to technical problems or losing their formation due to

weather conditions. But some managed to close up again over various stages of the trip, and only

a dozen did not arrive with their planned wave.397

395 von Sieben, 1550-1558. 396 von Sieben, 1558. 397 Bergmann, 1562.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

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Meanwhile the plan was for 1st Marine Division to put a regimental group with one Amtrac and

two artillery battalions each on both Urup and Iturup by 28 August while the spearheading Yegers

went on to Shikotan, the last stepping stone to Hokkaido. There was debate about which air units

to deploy to the new bases, with a threat still seen from Kamchatka but also mindful that TGs 38.3

and 38.5 were heading for Hokkaido with copious carrier aviation. However, while weather con-

ditions in the Tartar and Perouse Strait had calmed down somewhat, there was now a proper ty-

phoon brewing in the Pacific off Japan, posing a possible threat to the plans of all sides. An advance

party of US 11th Airborne Division flew into Atsugi Airfield outside Yokohama on 24 August

despite the weather; the airlift from Okinawa was supposed to start in earnest on the following day,

concurrently with the arrival of TG 38.4 in Tokyo Bay, and it was still hoped deployment to Chitose

could begin on the 26th while TGs 38.3 and 38.5 arrived off Kushiro.

Also on 24 August at 1900 hours, I./1st Yeger Battalion [-] arrived at Urup with TG 90.2 and

immediately received the surrender of the Japanese garrison after landing near the IJA staging

airfield on the island's northern tip. The American ships landed a small battalion of 400 sailors and

marines, too, and with backup from USS Arkansas, Cruiser Division 3 and Carrier Division 22, and

troops were certain of holding on no matter what happened until 1st Marine Division arrived on

the 27th. III./1st Yegers reached Iturup in the early morning of 25 August with TG 90.1, received

another prompt surrender and secured Tenneru army airfield on the central southern coast there.

Shortly afterwards they got an unplanned test of availability when one C-47 of the squadron carry-

ing 1st Commando Battalion to Hokkaido developed engine problems enroute and had to touch

down there; crew and passengers were glad to find friendly forces on the ground, though the Japa-

nese would probably have capitulated to this detachment of two dozen just the same.

The rest of the flight continued with no complications, being handed off from their original fighter

escort to Hellcats from Carrier Division 22 and then again to aircraft from TG 38.3 as they ap-

proached Hokkaido; as of this day, American and British carrier aviation were conducting flights

over the Japanese Home Islands to patrol airfields, locate shipping movements and find and supply

prisoner of war camps. 1st Commando therefore had the reassurance of air cover when it conducted

a drop onto Nakashibetsu Airfield at noon, though again it turned out that the combat approach was

in fact unnecessary as troops all but had a white flag stuck in their faces before they could even

wrap up their parachutes. Communication was spotty due to distances involved, but an all-clear

message was eventually relayed through a chain of Allied aircraft and ships, and the bulk of 1st

Airborne Brigade was to fly into the base on the following day as planned.398

On the southern side of Japan however, by 25 August not just one, but two typhoons were moving

into the way from Okinawa to Yokohama, and flights had to be suspended. That meant no onward

movements to Hokkaido for an indeterminate period while the typhoons lasted. While TG 39.4

began landing 4th US Marine Regiment and seagoing detachments at Yokosuka, the only other

Allied force in the area was the advance detail of about 150 that was now in Tokyo to prepare the

arrival of the fleet and MacArthur in the next days. Russian American planners were worried about

the impact on supply lines for the two brigades scheduled to land on Hokkaido; TGs 38.3 and 38.5

were not really prepared for this kind of logistics, and it was quite a way down the Kurile Chain

with the original plans for this year aimed no further than Urup.

Unfortunately the Soviets were now also beginning to move out of their beachheads; one Amer-

ican carrier reconnaissance flight found columns of troops moving east near Asahikawa, 50 kilo-

metres inland from Rumoi, and was promptly shot at. The crews were not sure about identity and

intentions, and at any rate did not return fire under current orders, but thought those were Soviet.399

398 Kurylenko, p. 458-459. 399 von Sieben, 1559.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

189

However, the bulk of 1st Airborne Brigade arrived at Nakashibetsu on 26 August as scheduled.

In the absence of US 11th Airborne Division, they were reporting to Commander Task Group 38.3,

Vice Admiral Frederick Sherman USN, just returned from leave and promotion. He smartly left

operations ashore to commanders in the field, and 1st Airborne's intentions were to assume block-

ing positions against the Soviet advance in the mountain range northwest of the airfield, with 1st

Parachute Battalion to the left holding the road junction at Teshikaga backed up by the cannon

company, and 2nd Parachute Battalion to the right at the Konpoku Pass. 1st Commando Battalion

was to organise enough local transport to act as a mobile reserve.

TGs 38.3 and 38.5 also landed a small provisional American-British brigade of ca. 1,500 sailors

and marines to secure the port, town and airfield of Kushiro. Japanese 101st Independent Mixed

Brigade capitulated to these troops soon after. It was planned to send some officers to Chitose on

the next to take the capitulation of Fifth Area Army at Sapporo ahead of possible Soviet moves, in

carrier aircraft if necessary. Russian American 9th Mechanised Brigade Group was to bring a small

mixed helicopter/spotting plane detachment, which might serve the same purpose.

There were delays, though. Russian American 3rd Division had already landed its armoured ele-

ments among the first on Shimushir and therefore needed to re-embark them after orders for Hok-

kaido came. It had been thought that 9th Mechanised would still make it until 26 August since it

was now considered landing it in Nemuro Bay to link up with 1st Airborne Brigade, a bit quicker

either way. However, the disturbance of 3rd Division's original well-laid plans to marshal units

ashore was underestimated, and the brigade group would arrive only on the morning of the 27th.

On the US side, there were still no flights possible from Okinawa to Yokohama, and the deploy-

ment of 11th Airborne Division was being further pushed back. The Americans were thinking about

flying their entire 201st Infantry Regiment to Hokkaido from the north, currently based on Beringa

with one battalion deployed to Shumshu for airfield security; but that too would take some days.

Rather unplannedly, operations on Hokkaido were therefore momentarily run through Nimitz' Cen-

tral Pacific Area command, to the displeasure of MacArthur.

Meanwhile the Soviet forces out of the Rumoi and Wakkanai beachheads had linked up in the

Shibetsu area, and some were spotted on the road to Monbetsu on the north coast. The US aircraft

that found them subsequently got into a tense situation with Soviet fighters, though no shots were

actually fired. There was now a somewhat better intelligence picture now of the Soviet forces in-

volved. The 87th Rifle Corps had been confirmed to be in overall command, with the 264th Rifle

Division from Rumoi and the 355th from Wakkanai. Its third division, 342nd Rifle, plus 215th

Artillery Brigade were now reported as crossing over from Sakhalin, just arrived there after having

suffered a breakdown delaying their convoy from Vladivostok.

There was some indication that 214th Separate Tank Brigade from Sixteenth Army, previously

engaged on Sakhalin, was also planned to be sent to Hokkaido. It was now believed that the air

assault on Rumoi had not been executed by 3rd Airborne Rifle Regiment but two independent

parachute battalions. Air support was coming chiefly from 255th Air Division, comprising the

191st and 365th Attack and 610th and 718th Fighter Regiments; 15th and 16th Naval Air Divisions

might also be involved.

Also on 26 August, Allied forces on Iturup in the Southern Kuriles were alerted in the morning

to the presence of two Soviet minesweeping trawlers in Rubetzu Bay which had crept in under the

usual thick fog, on the opposite coast from Tenneru airfield but only ten kilometres across. Using

local Japanese transport, a company from III./1st Yegers with some officers from the American

landing force attached arrived in time to confront a Soviet landing party of about equal strength,

which resulted in a rather arkward situation. Eventually a small bi-national group was sent over

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

190

under a flag of truce, which stated to the new arrivals that they were in the operations area of US

Pacific Ocean Areas Command and the Japanese garrison had already surrendered, so their pres-

ence was neither needed nor warranted, with a helpful pointer to American battleship/cruiser Task

Group 90.1 on the other side of the island added.

The Soviet officer in charge merely said that he would relay that information, and the standoff

continued for some time after the exchange while another yeger company arrived. Eventually some

aircraft from Carrier Division 22 showed up after the fog began to lift, and soon thereafter the

Soviets returned to their vessels without a further word and left. Carrier aircraft were keeping an

eye at them, and TG 90.1 sent two destroyers around the island to stay in touch. They failed to pick

up the visitors before the aircraft lost them in the dark and usual morning fog, but flights the fol-

lowing day found no indication they had landed elsewhere on Iturup either while 2nd Marine Reg-

imental Group arrived as planned. Still, the destroyers were trying to find the trawlers back and

determine whether they were sailing for one of the neighbouring islands. 4th Marines were still

being expected at Iturup on the 28th, improving Western Allied position against further Soviet

attempts at landing in the Southern Kuriles.400

British Task Group 38.5 was folded into 38.3 under overall command of Admiral Shepard and

reinforced by some additional ships on 27 August, including USS Wasp which kept operating air-

craft despite having had her bow stoved in 30 feet during the typhoon two days earlier. This was

to make up for some British, Australian and New Zealand ships which had been detached to rep-

resent their nations at the official surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay within the next days, though

HMS Indefatigable and some escorts remained off Hokkaido. Junograd had no ships to spare for

the same purpose in the current situation, though a Russian American delegation would attend.

There were still no flights possible from Okinawa, though it was hoped that they could resume

the following day as the second of the typhoons had now reached Shikoku and was expected to

weaken and move out of the way. First units of 11th Airborne Division were tentatively expected

to arrive on Hokkaido on 29 August; the Americans had also ordered 201st Infantry Regiment to

prepare for an airlift, and were sending more transport aircraft over from the US via the Aleutians,

mostly long-ranged C-46 and C-54.401

Russian American 1st Airborne Brigade spread out between the Konpoku Pass ascent and the

Notsuke-Teshikaga road on 27 August, the only element in Teshikaga itself by now a company

from 1st Commando which had gotten itself some local transport – in large part commandeered

bicycles. The rest of the brigade was on foot and marched up to 35 kilometres, expected to reach

intended positions the following day. The brigade’s jeeps were still being flown in, and most were

prime movers for the howitzers and heavy mortars; so even less motor transport was at hand than

would usually have been available if this had been an operation involving gliders for the heavier

troops. The overall situation was to improve however as 9th Mechanised Brigade Group landed,

bringing a truck company with it. Another commando company went out to meet it on the coast in

the morning, and disembarkation went smoothly, unlike the confused turnaround at Shimushir.

9th Mechanised intended to move through 1st Airborne's positions the following day, one battal-

ion group to go over the Konpoku Pass to Shari and then on along the coastal road towards Abashiri,

another through Teshikaga and the Bihoro Pass with the bulk of 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment;

the third will stay in reserve at Teshikaga in case the Soviets advanced more to the south. So far

the latter were making the best progress along the coast; 355th Rifle Division was reported on the

Yubetsu River near Lake Saroma while 264th Rifle was stuck in more mountaineous terrain inland

where the Yubetsu branches off from the Ishikari River. They had not crossed their self-declared

400 Kurylenko, p. 460-462. 401 von Sieben, 1561.

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191

demarcation line as they had been reported no further south than Fukagawa and kept moving east

rather than towards Sapporo.402

Attempts were ongoing to defuse the situation politically at the Council of Foreign Ministers in

London, which had been supposed to deal with European questions as per the Potsdam Agreement

but became preoccupied with the situation in Asia as soon as it met. However, there were no results

so far in the face of facts created on the ground by the Soviets. They had reached the end of their

supply lines to Manchuria and northern Korea, but airlanded troops at Port Arthur and Dairen and

occupied Pyongyang by 24 August after the earlier amphibious landings on the eastern coast.

However, their commitment on the mainland had also largely stripped them of reserves. Some

formations in 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Front were still available for operations on Hokkaido and in

the Kuriles, but despite their landing operations, their lack of sealift capacity remained the chief

weakness of the Soviets. They had a number of transports including lend-lease ships that were

mostly sailed directly from the US under a Soviet flag to make use of their neutrality pact with the

Japanese while it lasted, but in the Kuriles part of the forces encountered by the Western Allied

had been carried by minesweepers and other auxiliaries – hardly a sign of plentiful shipping space,

particularly dedicated landing craft. They were also now being headed off in Korea, as US XXIV

Corps was to begin arriving there with 7th Infantry Division on 29 August; US III Amphibious

Corps was to start embarking for China on 1 September, with 1st Marine Division ordered to Tien-

tsin and 6th to Tsingtao, while 2nd and 4th are designated as area reserve.403

The Abashiri Incident

1st Airborne Brigade assumed its intended blocking positions on 28 August. 1st Parachute Battal-

ion [+] with four line companies, the cannon company and a heavy mortar platoon at Teshikaga

was holding the northern, western and northwestern roads out of town with one company each

supported by cannon, one in reserve and the mortar platoon emplaced on the high ground along the

western shore of Lake Mashu. The intention was to push out two companies on the next day to

block the northwestern roads more forward on either side of Lake Kussharo; those lakes – actually

volcano craters – were situated on commanding terrain with pass roads running by their shorelines.

2nd Parachute Battalion [-] with two line companies and the rest of the mortar company was hold-

ing the Konpoku Pass between Mounts Shari and Unabetsu.

As planned, 9th Mechanised Brigade Group moved through this positions in the morning, and

I./4th Northern Mechanised Battalion Group was deployed in a line from Mount Shari to the town

of the same name on the coast with one tank and two infantry companies, supported by their weap-

ons company and a Priest battery from I./4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Battalion. Most of the rest

went through Teshikaga and spread between Lakes Mashu and Kussharo with II./4th Battalion

Group forward and 3rd Armor Battalion Group in the rear; 6th Stoyanka Cavalry had patrols out

ahead to the downslopes either side beyond Lake Kussharo and to Lake Tofutsu on the coast.

So far there had been no contact with the Soviets, but that was likely to change when units ad-

vanced onto the Abashiri River. Lead elements of Soviet troops were reported just to the west of

that near Lakes Notoro and Abashiri, believed to be a rifle regiment of 355th Division, while an-

other had reached Kitami further inland. There was no very good idea of what would happen when

both sides met, but Russian American troops were under orders to stop the Soviet advance as soon

as possible, by force if necessary. No Soviet armor had been reported so far, and 9th Mechanised

402 Kurylenko, p. 461. 403 von Sieben, 1561-1568.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

192

had a good chance of holding against a rifle regiment on the coastal plain, though there were wor-

ries about Soviet reinforcements and particularly artillery – especially as units were at the end of a

very long supply line and might burn through ammunition stocks quickly if it came to fighting.

However, USS Wasp put most of her air group ashore the same day to relieve her shortened flight

deck, including three dozen Corsairs of VBF-86 at the Nakashibetsu airfield which was protected

by 9th Mechanised's reinforced anti-aircraft battery and supervised by one of the Russian American

Air Force forward observer/security platoons. USS North Carolina was also sailing through the

Nemuro Strait with three Cleveland-class cruisers and would be in position on the next day to

deliver naval gunfire support as far inland as the north shore of Lake Kussharo. There was hope it

would not come to this though as American-Soviet talks in the background aimed at having every-

body stop at the Abashiri River before it came to fighting between notional allies.

The Western position was also slowly strengthening as the Americans began airlifting US 201st

Infantry Regiment into Hokkaido using a group's worth of C-46s and C-54s from their Air

Transport Command, nearly doubling the number of transport aircraft in the North Pacific Theatre.

The regiment was however going to Kushiro to close the gap between the US/UK landing force

and 1st Airborne Brigade along the western mountain range. The rest of 1st Airborne's vehicles

and some supplies were delivered by C-54s, and Russian American 8th Wing was now detailed for

an air link to Nakashibetsu. Flights from Okinawa to Yokohama also resumed on 28 August, and

an advance element of US 11th Airborne Division was expected at Chitose the next day; its com-

mander General Swing would take charge of ground operations on Hokkaido thereafter.

Some of the incoming planes also finally took a US detachment to Sapporo to receive the official

capitulation of Japanese Fifth Area Army, too. It was confirmed the Soviets had not advanced south

below a general Rumoi-Fukagawa-Biei line. There were in fact only two Japanese divisions on

Hokkaido, of which the 42nd had already surrendered to the Soviets after some initial fighting in

the northwestern area – mostly because the latter had been so keyed on to secure their landings that

first attempts to make contact had failed. 7th Division was in the southeast and remained untouched

by either side. There were also some IJA coastal defence sites on the northern tip of the Nemuro

Peninsula and at Abashiri which had not been approached yet. At the insistence of the Americans,

the latter garrison was instructed to surrender only to 9th Mechanised Brigade group rather than

the Soviets, and 6th Stoyanka Cavalry's most forward squadron on the coast – only 20 kilometres

away at this point – was to try and get there still in the evening of the day if possible.

1/6th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron arrived at Abashiri after a dash in the dusk at 2100 hours, where

it found a Japanese garrison of an infantry battalion and a coastal battery which readily surrendered.

The chief worry was however securing the bridges over the Abashiri River downstream from the

lake of the same name. This was quickly done with the ones near the port itself, but when a troop

went down for the bridge of the southwestern road at the river bend near the lake, it found the near

bank already occupied by Soviet troops – though as it was by now dark, the first clue was some

machinegun fire aimed at the lead vehicles advancing on the road.

While not clear about the opposition at this point, the troop returned fire and maneuvered to close,

encountering no more than automatic small arms fire. However, within a few minutes enemy artil-

lery was incoming, and troops had to withdraw about two kilometres towards the town, suffering

no casualties. Shelling of the zone before them went on for some time but eventually gave way to

intermittent starshells. With no artillery of their own, they had to wait until I./4th Northern Mech-

anised Battalion Group arrived in the morning of 29 August while US Corsairs out of Nakashibetsu

also showed up overhead.

The latter reported troops moving on the road on the far side of Lake Abashiri and all along the

river to the south, but were under orders to not attack unless in defence of units on the ground.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

193

They even adhered to that after some were chased away from the far side with anti-aircraft fire. A

Soviet column moved across the bridge at the river bend, but went south along the road on the

eastern bank until they ran into I./4th Northern's tank company with supporting infantry on the

shore of the lake, which stopped them with a few rounds. The Soviets diverted into the wooded

area east of the river, and there was some exchange of artillery while dismounted infantry blocked

off lateral moves. By this time troops were ordered through 9th Mechanised Brigade Group to hold

off, but not advance on the Soviets, and both sides dug in. Fighting subsequently died down; the

Russian Americans had suffered about a dozen casualties, though mostly wounded.

Meanwhile another standoff had developed upstream at Bihoro, were II./4th Northern was facing

off with more Soviet troops on the western side of the river, but no shots were fired there. 2/6th

Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron was also holding the next bridge upstream when the Soviets showed

up, but they retreated after the Russian Americans fired some flares to make their presence known.

3rd Armour Battalion Group moved down from Lake Kussharo during the day to be able of quick

reinforcement for either of the lead groups and prevent crossings of the Abashiri between both.

Before noon, 1st Airborne Brigade began moving 2nd Parachute Battalion down from the

Konpoku Pass to secure the costal town of Shari against a possible Soviet landing into 9th Mecha-

nised’s flank, though USS North Carolina and her escorts arrived off shore there, too. 1st Com-

mando Battalion was also sent through Teshikaga on trucks along the pass road towards Mount

Oakan to secure the southwestern flank. It was intended to link up with US 201st Infantry Regi-

ment, the first battalion of which had begun marching north into the mountains from Kushiro in

the morning while more of its units were being flown in, within the next 48 hours. At this point 3rd

Parachute Battalion was also expected, having launched from Stoyanka the same day. Until that,

the greatest concern was for the left flank of 9th Mechanized further up the Abashiri, though

friendly aircraft were patrolling that way.

While MacArthur arrived in Tokyo, the advance element of 11th Airborne Division landed at

Chitose as planned, too, and General Swing was to officially take command of the Hokkaido forces

on 30 August. For now orders remained to move to contact with, but not attack the Soviets, hold

position against them while trying to avoid fighting, and use force only in self-defence.

Meanwhile in the Kuriles, Russian American 4th Marine Regimental Group had arrived at Iturup

the previous day. However, when 1st Yegers arrived at Kunashir with TGs 90.2, 91.3 and 91.4 on

the 29th, they found five Soviet ships in Furukamappu Bay, including the mine trawlers encoun-

tered at Iturup three days ago, two transports and an escort. When hailed, they stated that the islands

of Kunashir and Shikotan were under Soviet occupation and that other troops were to stay away,

clearly turning the tables. Detached destroyers confirmed another three Soviet vessels at Shikotan

some hours later. USS North Dakota’s group also reported encountering a Soviet transport under

escort heading east off the Shiretoko Peninsula, not responding to signals.

It was estimated that a minimum of three battalions had been landed on Kunashir and Shikotan

with at least one more on the way. While the Soviet ships were vastly outgunned against the Amer-

ican battleship/cruiser group, it was decided to not risk a landing and fighting on the islands; in-

stead, Russian American parties were put ashore on the Habomai Group to the south throughout

the day, collecting capitulations of small Japanese detachments there while the US ships kept sitting

on the Soviets. They were also to try and intercept the incoming ships, though how exactly they

were to block them without initiating hostilities as per the current orders was not clear. In light of

the new development it was considered to land one or both of the Yeger battalions on Hokkaido

and attach them to 1st Airborne Brigade for added security on the seashore.404

404 Kurylenko, p. 462-463.

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194

Nobody was happy with events of 29 August. The new American command on Hokkaido made

itself unpopular with the Russian American side quickly when it suggested that the affair at

Abashiri could have been handled better by troops on the scene. Officially, this was treated as an

inter-Russian incident to avoid making it an issue between the Big Three from which nobody could

step back. At the same time, it was thought to have shown the Soviets that they could not just roll

over Allied troops in the northeast; at the high-level talks, the Abashiri River was agreed upon as

a deconfliction line on on the 30th. General Swing personally went up to Fukagawa in a small

convoy flying the biggest US flag available to establish a direct link with the Soviet command

While there were still an estimated two Soviet companies wedged between the river bend and the

mouth of Lake Abashiri on the western side, there was no fighting since this day.405

Meanwhile the intelligence picture solidified. From signals interception and US high-altitude

overflights it was believed that 9th Mechanised Brigade Group was facing a rifle regiment of 355th

Division at Abashiri, with one battalion on its right from the coast to the lake, another on the left

from the lake to Bihoro exclusively, and a third behind the lake. Another regiment had the sector

upstream, one battalion facing II./4th Northern Battalion Group at Bihoro, another the 6th Stoyanka

Cavalry detachment further south; 9th Mechanised moved the whole unit minus 1st Squadron there

on 30 August, the latter still holding the perimeter towards the port of Abashiri in the north.

The third battalion of that regiment was believed to be further back at Kitami, and the third regi-

ment of 355th Rifle division north of that on the Tokoro River. 264th Division Was thought to have

on regiment facing south between Rumoi and Fukagawa, another south of Asahikawa, and the third

having moved east along the Ishikari and Tokoro River to link up with 355th at Kitami. Units along

the Soviet’s southern demarcation line were now being relieved by the just-arrived 342nd Rifle

Division, freeing up 264th for the southeast corner of their occupied territory. 214th Tank and 215th

Artillery Brigade were also reported to have crossed over from Sakhalin.

US 11th Airborne Division began flying into Chitose in earnest the same day and was expected

to be complete within the week, but the situation in the south seemed not critical. US 201st Infantry

Regiment was planned to finish deployment on 31 August, when lead elements were also expected

to link up with 1st Commando Battalion in the Mount Oakan-Meakan area. 3rd Parachute Battalion

would arrive in Nakashibetsu at the same time. III./1st Yeger was landed north of the Notsuke

Peninsula and would secure the coastline east of the mountain range against possible Soviet landing

attempts from Kunashir; I./1st Yeger was staying on the Habomais.

Two of the Soviet ships snooped around the chain during the day, but the American battleship in

their wake seems to have been a convincing indication that they would not achieve anything there.

The two vessels previously reported in the Nemuro Strait went to Shikotan instead; some games

were played with right-of-way rules at sea, but they persisted and were eventually allowed to land

under the “hold, but do not attack” orders rather than risking collisions or trading fire, the island

already being Soviet-occupied. It was believed that the troops on Kunashir and Shikotan were from

113th Independent Rifle Brigade, earlier reported on Sakhalin.

One worry largely resolved was about logistics, as substantial supplies were now coming in both

by sea through Kushiro and over the air link along the Kuriles. 9th Mechanised Brigade Group in

particular had brought only enough fuel to go to the Abashiri River and back to its landing sites if

things went wrong, but was now beginning to receive supplies in position. The bigger problem was

now actually transport ashore, as little had been brought in with ships and obviously almost none

by air. There were therefore plans to deploy a battalion from 1st Quartermaster Regiment to Hok-

kaido to support the growing Allied forces in the northeast.406

405 von Sieben, 1564. 406 Kurylenko, p. 464.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

195

The Challenge at the Close

During the night towards 31 August, TG 38.3 ships off Kushiro detected radar returns southwest

of the port heading east towards the coast. An alerted outpost of US 2/201st Infantry Battalion

freshly moved into position on the coastal road the previous day reported an airdrop from C-47s

beyond the ridgeline at dawn, first believed by them to be new arrivals from US 11th Airborne

Division. The division stated however that all of their reinforcements were flying into Chitose and

none by airdrop, and inquired with 1st Airborne Brigade whether this was 3rd Parachute Battalion.

The latter was also flying into Nakashibetsu and only later in the day, though.

A patrol sent south along the coastal road promptly ran into a roadblock by Soviet paratroopers

outside the next village who told it to retreat. By noon, aerial reconnaissance reported an armoured

column moving towards the village on the mountain road from inland, and more Soviet troops all

the way back to the next valley north of Obihiro. Obviously while all eyes had been on the Abashiri

River, they had flanked around to the south through the mountains and cut Western troops off in

the northeastern corner of Hokkaido. It was thought that 214th Tank Brigade had moved down

from Wakkanai more quickly than expected and linked up with airdrops ahead; from the night's

radar readings, it was likely there had been two more at critical road junctions on the way.

General Swing was livid because he considered this a breach of the agreement for both sides to

stop at the Abashiri. Technically all this had however happened south of the Abashiri's springs, and

west of its furthest eastern extent, but was a rather liberal interpretation of the Soviets’ self-declared

Rumoi-Kushiro demarcation line. Naturally it caused some hasty reorganisation on the Western

side; 9th Mechanised Brigade Group sent 6th Stoyanka Cavalry [-] up the Senpoku Pass, which

passed through 1st Commando Battalion between Mounts Oakan and Meakan in the afternoon, and

through US 1/201st Infantry Battalion which had just linked up with 1st Commando in the evening;

it was expected on the coast in the morning, minus a squadron left behind at the pass junction held

by 1st Commando to scout to the southwest. II./4th Northern Infantry Battalion Group was moved

upstream from Bihoro to take over 6th Stoyanka's positions around the village of Tsubetsu, and 3rd

Armour filled into the Bihoro sector. That used up 9th Mechanised's reserves, though.

Fortunately 201st Infantry Regiment did largely conclude its deployment on this day except for

some parts difficult to airlift, and with the HQ and 3rd Squadron of 6th Stoyanka attached they

were thought to have a good chance of fending off the Soviets if they tried to come up that narrow

coastal road with tanks. 3rd Parachute Battalion was intended to relieve 1st Commando on the

Senpoku Pass over the next day, bringing a bit more firepower. 1st Parachute would stay at

Teshikaga, but returned its additionally attached company to 2nd for security on the coastal flank

of 9th Mechanised. On 1 September 2/6th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron scouted along the south-

western pass from Mount Meakan and promptly came upon Soviet T-26s at the next junction 20

kilometres down the road; both sides immediately stopped and did not engage.

During the night, TG 38.3 moved the American battalions of its landing force at Kushiro along

the coast to occupy the small ports of Otsu and Tokachi in the south and prevent their being taken;

11th Airborne Division also redirected new arrivals from its currently incoming regiment, 187th

Glider Infantry, to the IJN airfield at Obihiro, just south of the Soviet axis of advance, after rem-

nants of 7th IJA Division in the area had reported no Soviets there through the former Fifth Area

Army HQ, confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. None were encountered either, though aircraft re-

ported Soviet troops moving along the roads towards the coast further up in the valley; but 87th

Rifle Corps was still sticking generally to the Rumoi-Kushiro line.407

407 Kurylenko, p. 465-468.

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196

Meanwhile the Big Three continued intense talks to come to a mutually acceptable resolution of

the situation in connection with exchanges about the content of the Japanese instrument of surren-

der in time for the official signing ceremony, planned to be held on USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay

the next day. There was a rather broad approach, involving both American and Soviet basing rights

in northern Japanese territory as well as some areas in occupied Germany containing critical lines

of communication for the Soviet and Western zones. Hokkaido remained the most critical issue;

the Americans plan was to eventually put US IX Corps with 81st and 98th Infantry Divisions in as

an occupation force, but for now even buildup of 11th Airborne Division was still underway.

In view of the lack of forces, on 1 September Russian American 3rd Division was ordered to

leave behind a brigade group at Shimushir and transfer the rest of its troops to Hokkaido, to arrive

on 4 September and division command to assume operational control of all Russian American units

on the island. The convoy would also pick up an additional marine light howitzer battalion from

Urup to address the critical shortage of land artillery on Hokkaido; 1st Marine Division command

had set up on Iturup with the majority of division troops with an eye on Soviet-occupied Kunashir.

2nd Air Division had begun to deploy anti-air artillery groups throughout the chain, and units from

11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment were to begin moving forward from Beringa as soon as

shipping capacity freed up.

An agreement was finally reached on 1 September at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Soviet troops were to withdraw behind the Abashiri River and, more importantly, the borders of

the Kato and Ashoro districts in the south “immediately”. An Allied Council for Japan comprising

two American, Soviet, British and Chinese representatives each would be set up at the beginning

of next year, charged with supervising the work of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

as head of the occupation forces, who should also be its chairman. The council would be under the

Far Eastern Advisory Commission, to be renamed Far Eastern Commission.

Until the time the council was installed, Soviet troops would leave Hokkaido completely except

as stipulated by special provisions of the agreement, and take over occupation of the islands off

northern Hokkaido but below the 1855 line, including Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, the Habomais

and, on the western side, Rebun, Rishiri, Yagishiri and Teuri. Those provisions referred to two

enclaves at the ports of Rumoi and Kushiro and the right to move freely between both to support

the occupation forces on the islands. In return, an area around the German villages of Werleshausen

and Neuseesen on the border between Hesse and Thuringia containing two miles of a railway line

linking the US occupation zone to its exclave at Bremen would transfer to the American side.

This meant that Russian American forces would have to hand over Iturup and the Habomais to

the USSR. Junograd was not happy about that, but had had no say in the matter as they were not

its to dispose of under previous agreements. It still complained because this put a further hole into

the strategic aim of the Kuriles Campaign to block the Soviets into the Sea of Okhotsk. However,

the Americans related that Moscow had actually demanded landing rights besides them in the Aleu-

tians on the pretext that if the US had bases in the Kuriles to support trans-pacific air links to Japan,

surely the USSR should have some to fly the other way to Seattle, and Junograd probably would

have liked that even less – which was hard to argue with.

The overriding motive had been to get the Soviets out of the Japanese Home Islands, precisely

because nobody was convinced they would ever leave from where they had once dug in. The lower

Kuriles were of sufficently low strategic interest for the Americans to throw them away, though

sentiment in Junograd very much disagreed with this. The small footholds on Hokkaido – a bit of

the port of Kushiro south of the Kushiro River and what of the port of Rumoi was not blocking the

roads and railway lines on the coast there – were thought easily contained. There would be road

and rail links between both ports, detailed in supplementary protocols to the London Agreement.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

197

The agreement also included a guaranteed air corridor for the Western powers from Urup to Hok-

kaido that was running between Kunashir and Shikotan and the Habomais, where the smallest dis-

tance between future Soviet-controlled shores was only 20 nautical miles. Since the USSR claimed

twelve miles of territorial waters, it had been thought appropariate to write down the rights to in-

nocent passage and overflight.

This outcome would certainly have repercussions for Junograd’s own negotiations about the

planned trilateral agreement with the Americans and Canadians that was to be signed during the

UNO founding conference in San Francisco in October, based upon the Berlin Memorandum of

Understanding. With the Soviets sitting on both ends of the upper Kurile chain at Kamchatka and

Iturup, solid American commitments would be needed to guarantee territorial integrity. US bases

on either end at Shumshu and Urup would be preferred, in addition to one each in the Komandorskis

and Aleutians; talks were ongoing.

However, from the Russian American point of view results could have been worse given what

the Soviets had captured on Hokkaido. The Western Allied response had foiled the USSR’s own

strategic aim of securing a port on the Pacific coast, and it was left with a lot of mostly rocky terrain

populated by an estimated 700,000 – not really worthwhile to fight over with the Americans other

than using it for negotiations to reach at least some of the original objectives, which admittedly

Moscow had done rather successfully.

For all his opposition to having non-US troops intrude into his future realm, MacArthur had

proved instrumental in making the USSR back off from drawing out the negotiations for better

results. Allegedly he threatened the Soviet liaison officer at his HQ, General Derevianko, that if

there was no solution by the time of the signing ceremony on USS Missouri, the only Russian on

her deck would be from the other side of the Bering Strait, and the only power still officially at war

with a Japan full of American troops with atom bombs after the next day would be the USSR.

After that, the official signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender went down in Tokyo Bay

on 2 September without any hitch. Unlike in the capitulation of Germany, representatives from all

Allied nations in the Pacific Theater posted to MacArthur's headquarters got to put their signature

onto the document. Protocol had thoughtfully separated General Derevianko from Russian Amer-

ican Admiral Nemzov of First Komandorskis fame by China, Britain, Australia and Canada in the

lineup after both had avoided each other quite adeptly in Manila earlier.408

Russian American 3rd Division command and 8th Infantry Brigade arrived on Hokkaido on 4

September as planned. The Soviets withdrew from the two square kilometres they had occupied on

the western side of the Abashiri river bend the same morning, ending the week-long tense standoff

there. There was no movement south of Kushiro yet, but it was expected some of the Soviet troops

would march directly to Kushiro once all details of their establishment there are cleared. US 11th

Airborne Division had fully assembled a regimental group of 187th Glider Infantry at Obihiro and

made contact with the landing forces at Otsu and Tokachi, so the Soviet thrust to the coast is con-

tained in any case – as far as light infantry could stand up to armour.

Both Russian American 3rd Division [-] and US 11th Airborne Division completed movement of

troops to Hokkaido and were assigned to US IX Corps under Major General Charles W. Ryder on

6 September; 3rd Division also took over national Russian American command and had 1st Air-

borne Brigade and 1st Yeger Regiment [-] attached. Among the first orders of General Ryder was

to pull back 6th Stoyanka Cavalry [-] from the coastal road at Kushiro in preparation for the move

of the Bolshevist detachment to the port within the next days, as nobody wanted any more Abachiri

Incidents. However, the unit remained in support of US 201st Infantry Regiment along with newly-

408 von Sieben, 1568-1575.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

198

arrived I./1st Marine Artillery Battalion, and Russian American troops were also trusted enough to

be asked asked for some interpreters to help out with liaison.

On 8 September, the Soviet detachment – about half of 214th Tank Brigade with two companies

of brand-new T-34/85s – marched into Kushiro. They would have an area on the eastern bank of

the Kushiro River, limited by Harutori Lake in the east and the railway line in the north; Higashi-

kushiro Station was their designated railhead for movements between there and Rumoi. The rest

of the brigade had withdrawn from the coast, and TG 38.3 re-embarked its landing force in the next

days as more US troops were coming in; lead elements of 81st Infantry Division arrived on 13

September.409

The Russian American forces were expected to stay on Hokkaido until IX Corps had its own

divisions complete, which might take two or three months. 3rd Division would certainly leave if

and when Soviet 87th Rifle Corps did and take over Urup from the Marines in addition to Shi-

mushir. By previous plans, Russian American I Corps would stay in the Kuriles until further notice;

at a minimum one division would hold the south on Urup and Shimushir and another the north on

Shumshu and Paramushir, small detachments spread throughout the rest of the chain. With the war

officially at an end, the third division might be partially deactivated if the situation allowed.410

409 Kurylenko, p. 475-484. 410 von Sieben, 1578.

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Fig. 8: Location of Russian American, US and Soviet ground forces in the Okhotsk Theatre

on 1 September 1945.

Part VI: 1945 in the Pacific

200

Fig. 9: Situation on northeastern Hokkaido on 1 September 1945.

Part VII: After the War

201

Part VII: After the War

The Drawdown Plans

The end of the war still left lots of unfinished business for Russian America. In Europe, the Long-

boat programme was going on despite the Potsdam repatriation agreements between the Big Three.

Contrary to initial fears, in fact it continued to run at near-full capacity, mostly because the focus

had shifted to the French occupation zone where the new Allied policy was obstructed by the lack

of a French-Soviet agreement. Moving DPs from there – in large part staged from further east,

particularly as the threat of repatriation to the USSR loomed – had been hampered by the fact that

rail links to France were largely US-controlled. However, trucks proved sufficient over the rela-

tively short distance to the transit camps at Maubeuge, Metz and Strasbourg; particularly as they

were less employed in the American and British zones.

Still, the European Theatre support brigades had managed to bring about 10,000 “Balts, Poles

and Romanians” even from the latter, plus 10,000 others with the all-out effort during the Potsdam

negotiations, and about 25,000 from the French zone. On the other hand, repatriations to the USSR

by US and British forces had also started, and there had been some ugly scenes with DPs who

resisted, and altercations with Russian American soldiers who witnessed this. The worst of this

happened with the Domanov Cossacks in Austria, to the point where UNRRA stepped in at Juno-

grad’s behest and achieved a suspension after a number killed themselves rather than be deported;

about 20,000 remained by early September, their fate still unresolved. To the credit of Allied troop,

they did not like that the new policy meant using force on unwilling DPs; there was a growing

unease with the American and British occupation governments too, but unfortunately they could

be expected to stick to it while repatriations of their own POWs from Soviet care were going on.

Overall, of the 700,000 DPs expected to be willing to become Russian Americans, 100,000 were

still in the French transit camps at any time, and 20,000 in the informal transit camps in North

Africa; the latter number had lowered somewhat as the overflow had been directed onto the Cana-

dian route from France, and some capacity to cross from North Africa to South America had been

found as shipping was slowly returning to peacetime conditions. 25,000 were on the Australian

link with another 50,000 already arrived and the first now moving on to Russian America; 10,000

were on the Canadian link, half of which had already moved through the Terrace transit camps.

With the peak effort in late July/early August, about 220,000 were thus safe. It was estimated that

a total of 300,000 might be achieved with those in the French zone and hopefully at least some of

the Domanov Cossacks. As many as 2,000 were now arriving in Russian America per week from

both the Atlantic and Pacific side, even though the landing C-54s had been pulled off the air link

to support deployment to Hokkaido; only two were currently still flying the Atlantic, but their

capacity was now almost inconsequential with the shipping going on. The stream was expected to

double and maybe even quadruple in the near future as Pacific shipping also returned to normal

and the Australians discharged the vast numbers they had been accommodating. The program was

projected to conclude the following summer.

In contrast, the military Battleaxe programme was almost wrapped up already with little problems

encountered. 5th Division was continueing to ship from France; its last troops left there in the

second week of September and arrived in Russian America by mid-October. 4th Division followed

beginning in the third week of Septembera and was expected home by the end of November, fol-

lowing Allied agreement to withdraw all troops from Czechoslovakia until year's end. Formation

of 6th Division was broken off. II Corps would be designated as a reaction force with 4th and 5th

Division plus 1st Marine Division on the mainland, but mostly deactivated until next year; one

Part VII: After the War

202

marine brigade group would likely stay active. The only troops to remain in Europe were 1st Guards

Mechanised Brigade Group and 3rd Theatre Support Brigade on occupation duty in Germany. Ob-

viously all this was dependent upon the Soviets not making any more moves in force though.

Planners were beginning to look over future requirements in the Kuriles to plan for a drawdown

of mobilised troops in the coming year. Division commands of II Corps might take over regional

administration on the mainland like tit had been done under I Corps before the war; it was hoped

this would allow to deactivate almost all of the Territorial and about half of the regular Army, a lot

of the Navy's amphibious and auxiliary units, some Air Force wings, and of course the training and

replacement units. Army troops brigades and regiments were also largely planned to return to the

mainland and deactivate most of their battalions.

The Navy had been more relaxed over control of the Marines after finding a new self-esteem in

operations under Allied Forces North Pacific Command – which was intended to stay for the near

future, pending provisions of the trilateral agreement with the Americans and Canadians – and new

seagoing units. 1st Marine Regiment would keep the mission of guarding the ports; the coastal

artillery regiments would deactivate some of their current units, but with the Kuriles retaken, the

arm might actually expand post-war. The Navy also would have to run new bases there.

Lend-Lease materiél was evaluated to decide on what to keep; the latter would of course lead to

financial obligations, but prices were expected to drop sharply as so much equipment was becom-

ing surplus to requirements. Strike Fleet would remain fully active under current plans, but the fast

transport squadrons with their old run-down converted four-stackers and pre-WW I destroyers were

to be deactivated soon. Other transports, landing craft, minesweepers and auxiliaries would follow

depending upon requirements of bringing troops home and demining. Carrier Voyevodski had

missed the war as she completed shakedown at the end of September, but still replaced Wrangel

when the latter took over training duties. One squadron in each naval aviation wing was also be

deactivated, as were most of the battalions in the training and replacement regiments.411

For the Air Force, tentative plans were based upon the expectation that it would have at least two

combat wings in the Kuriles, one each on Beringa, on Kodiak, at Nome and in the Aleutians for a

total of six compared to currently ten, but maybe more depending upon how allied post-war com-

mitments turned out. Junograd’s intention was still to have two US bases in the Kuriles, one on

Beringa and one in the Aleutians, protected by their own ground forces, while air defence of the

Panhandle was currently a subject in the talks about joint operations with the Canadians. There

would be a reorganisation of wings back from the expeditionary structure assumed under the last

OOB, so their current and future number might not be comparable. One transport wing might be

deactivated as airlift requirements reduced with the overall drawdown; this would certainly involve

20th Aircraft Transfer Squadron. The training wings would obviously reduce just like their Navy

counterparts, and most of the numerous staging airfields were expect to be put into caretaker status.

For all services, the question of the scope of further use of female auxiliaries arose.412

A first draft for the drawdown of the Army already appeared on 8 September. It largely followed

the thoughts above, but made allowance for Longboat running until summer 1946 by maintaining

a second theatre support brigade in Europe. It was also considered a good idea to leave 2nd Com-

mando Battalion there, though like 1st it would be reduced to just one active company. However,

a bit over 56 percent of the current strength would be discharged, though the 78,850 remaining

were still two and a half times the pre-war size. This reduced both military expenses and put more

than 100,000 back into the civilian economy, more than were originally mobilised in 1942 – which

really showed the Army's growth over the war, most of it in the last months due to Battleaxe.

411 von Sieben, 1575-1578. 412 Bergmann, 1578.

Part VII: After the War

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The first draft of the Navy drawdown saw Wrangel assume reserve status like her predecessor

Almaz following the end of Voyevodski's shakedown this month and a subsequent yard period;

correspondingly, so would 4th Naval Fighter Training Squadron. The auxiliary squadrons would

return to a mixed makeup as one was deactivated. Like with the Army, provisions were made for

the continuation of Longboat by keeping a second sealift squadron active. The bulk of Transport

Fleet and Coastal Command would deactivate; however, as the Navy was taking over the port of

Kataoka on Shumshu, there was actually necessity of standing up a fourth battalion of 1st Marine

Regiment and a fourth coastal artillery regiment, which would even be fully active while the others

resumed their semi-present peacetime status.

The Navy was also thinking about how to fortify the Kuriles against the Soviets; obviously it

would be able to build upon the Japanese installations, but there was also an idea to acquire heavy

gun turrets from US ships which might come up for decommissioning now on the cheap. However,

defence of the chain would obviously be an inter-service mission, and all three might have to sub-

stantially reorganise their assigned forces in the mid-term; given the rather static setting, artillery

might be largely unified under either the Army or Navy. Comparison with war levels was not

straightforward due to the assignment of 1st Marine Division to the Army, but overall about 45

percent of Navy personnel were to be discharged, another nearly 30,000 soon-to-be veterans leav-

ing a peacetime strength of 35,250.413

The Air Force would discharge the least personnel, both proportionally and absolutely; its high

technical requirements and geographic responsibilities needed a lot of the wartime growth to be

maintained at a peacetime strength of 33,200. Even though some pre-war airbases like Baranov

and Yakutat wewre to be deactivated due to reduced necessity with longer aircraft ranges in addi-

tion to many staging airfields for the lend-lease routes, and Shemya was planned to be transferred

completely to the Americans, new bases were to be run in the Kuriles. Most of the deactivated

airfields would likely become civilian-operated as commercial flying rebounded post-war; the

trend in aviation was going to land-based aircraft with better performance rather than floatplanes

and flying boats, and those runways would come in handy to develop the country further. This also

meant that they would stay available for military emergency use.

As stated earlier, wings were changing back from an expeditionary to a defensive structure with

different groups and squadrons under the same command at a base. Four were slated for inactiva-

tion, but they would mostly consist only of ground units at joint military-civilian airports while the

squadrons went elsewhere. The only different cases were 1st Wing at Baranov and 8th (Transport)

Wing at Ketchikan; 7th Wing at Yakutat might become an inactive caretaker unit while 6th on

Kodiak took over the training mission, sharing a contingency defence mission with 2nd Naval

Aviation Wing, homeported on the same island. 2nd Air Division's previous ground-bases anti-

aircraft artillery wings now became standard wings in the Kuriles, though distribution was prelim-

inary; with bigger aircraft ranges, there might be bigger wings concentrated on fewer bases. It was

intended to cut 3rd and 6th Air Division HQs completely to save command personnel in the new

situation; combat wings will be distributed between home and island defence, with the boundary

beyond Adak. Command of auxiliary airfields returned to 4th (Transport) Division.

There were also plans for a unified combat squadron model of 18 aircraft for both the Air Force

and Navy, though in the former case this largely meant a different method of counting reserve

aircraft; there had been differences even within the Air Forces previously, since the transport wings

held their spares at wing level while the mixed combat wings held them in the squadrons. Some

new aircraft variants were still on the horizon, like the “lightweight” P-51H and radar-equipped

413 von Sieben, 1579-1581.

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Mosquito TR Mk 33 torpedo bomber, but with the drawdown and the advent of jet aircraft, it was

unsure if and when they would see introduction.414

Overall reduction was just 37 percent or less than 20,000, untypically even lower for the female

auxiliaries because the Air Force had integrated women more than the other services. However, the

late standing-up of the female squadrons meant that they came up first for inactivation, which ob-

viously included the now-redundant 20th Aircraft Transfer Squadron, but also 22nd Fighter and

24th Transport. This caused some hard feelings among the women. To make amends, the Air Force

authorised the appointment of female instructors, it having been found recently that there had been

no provision in regulations for that after a female pilot had applied for and been accepted on an

instructor training course. Flight training was not expected to have spare capacity, even with a

reduced Air Force establishment. Rather than domestic training, the amount done in Canada was

reduced, though not ended as the connection was deemed to valuable.

Some female liaison pilots would also have to continue in service for the time being as there were

no male pilots currently qualified on all light transport types, and there was no intention of wasting

training time or fuel on qualifying pilots merely to get women out of the service. Female liaison

pilots would therefore retire with their aircraft, but not before. Complaints were still expect, but

the Air Force could now point out that pilots were not dismissing merely because they were women,

but because their units were now redundant or the aircraft they were flying were being retired.

Administration was now more female than male anyway, and as the results in the offices were

thought positive, there was no intention of reverting to all-male clerks. 415

Deactivations were planned to be staggered so as not to unleash a single solid wave of veterans

onto the work market; with the additional simultaneous influx from Longboat, integration was con-

sidered to be challenging anyway. Regarding the economy and employment, there was thought to

be much pent-up demand, both in Russian America and in some allied nations. Russian American

fish canneries, for example, had been running below capacity, but there were a lot of hungry people

in Europe. Demand had already picked up, with the chief constraint the companies’ ability to pay.

The timber industry was in a similar position.

Some of the women discharged from the armed forces or having taken the places of men in the

civilian sector would certainly go back to being housewives. Another aspect was that most of the

South Americans hired during the war to make up for lack of domestic workpower were on short-

term contracts. If recruiting was stopped, their numbers would diminish, and if work permits were

not renewed when contracts ran out, they would go down even faster. This would be hard on the

workers, but they would be going home with money in their pockets and provide openings for a lot

of soldiers. Some unemployment was therefore expeced, but not at disastrous levels.416

Preparing for the Future

In the mid-term, the need for a thorough evaluation and reorganisation of the armed forces from

the infantry squad up was seen; so many lessons had been learnt during the war and so much new

technology had arrived, which had just been tried to shoehorn into the existing structures. It had

generally worked, but it was unclear what was sustainable with domestic personal, financial and

industry ressources. On top of that, all this needed to fit into the allied organisation that was hoped

to keep in some form to guarantee the neighbours’ commitment to Russian American security.

414 Bergmann, 1582-1583. 415 Borodin, p. 158. 416 Nikitin, p. 79.

Part VII: After the War

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Ketchikan was in the focus of joint air defence of the Panhandle in talks with the Canadians, who

would withdraw their units from the Aleutians to the mainland shortly. The Americans would also

redeploy 28th Bombardment Group to the US until October, as well as most of their troop carrier

squadrons save one, which was to be based in Stoyanka; Eleventh US Air Force would assume a

new designation reflecting the drawdown. 343rd Fighter Group would stay though, its squadrons

spread over Shemya, Beringa, and two bases in the north and south of the Kuriles, each protected

by an infantry and anti-aircraft battalion respectively, satisfying Junograd’s requirements for an

American presence. The Australians were also packing up.417

On Hokkaido, US 201st Infantry Regiment would likely not return to Russian America as it was

an activated unit of the National Guard. By 27 September, US 98th Infantry Division had begun to

arrive, though buildup of the 81st was still going on. US IX Corps was planned to be complete by

late November, by which time it was intended intend to have withdrawn Russian American 3rd

Division Group. The deadline to hand over Iturup and the Habomais to Soviet forces being the end

of the year, it had been begun to repatriate their Japanese garrisons; intelligence indicated that the

Soviets were deporting Japanese from Sakhalin and Hokkaido to the USSR contrary to the Geneva

Convention, and there was no inclination to give them more if it could be helped. The US and

USSR were working on a detailed timetable for the exchange of control. Junograd did not have

much input in this other than being asked how quick the troops concerned could be moved.

From a logistics point of view, it was actually preferred to hand over Iturup as quickly as possible

so Russian American 1st Marine Division could be brought home before the ice went south. There

was talk of the marines being intermediately relieved by US troops which would then pass on

control to Soviet forces, an approach favoured by all involved due to its lesser potential for more

inter-Russian incidents. This might fall to 201st Infantry Regiment, which meant that the Russian

American marine artillery battalion currently supporting the latter on Hokkaido could pack up at

the same time as the rest of the division. Late October thus looked likely as a start date for rede-

ployment of 3rd Division to Urup when US 81st had completed movement and repatriation of

Japanese personnel in the Southern Kuriles would be largely concluded. In the Northern Kuriles,

the Japanese might have to stay until spring; engineers were going over existing accomodiation

and extending and improving where necessary.418

Ultimately Russian American structures were still geared towards landing in Vladivostok and

marching on Moscow, something most in Junograd had recognised as an unlikely contingency now

though few were saying so aloud. They were particularly unsuited to defending islands. It was clear

that service cooperation should be rather high on the list of changes; the forces could not just keep

working alongside each other rather than together except on an ad-hoc basis.

In addition to hard decisions about concentrating capabilities in one service, there might need to

be some new branches altogether – not just due to new equipment, but because some areas had

been neglected due to the low Russian American population base. An example were chemical

troops which had not existed so far except for gas officers at unit headquarters who were supposed

to somehow organise detection and decontamination, since little importance had been put on chem-

ical weapons due to concerns about their effectiveness in local climate. But with the still somewhat

unclear effects of the new atomic bombs and the emerging reports of biological weapons trials by

the Germans and Japanese, it could not be afforded to keep this level of preparation for unconven-

tional means in coming conflicts.

Ironically, much equipment that was only now becoming abundantly available would go directly

into reserve depots. That went from Garands and M2 carbines replacing what was left of the M1917

417 von Sieben, 1582. 418 Kurylenko, p. 484-487.

Part VII: After the War

206

and Johnson rifles, but also the M43 submachineguns, to hardly-used Shermans in 12th and 15th

Mechanised Brigade which were initially equipped with the remaining Rams. Then there were

unresolved procurement issues which survived even the end of the war – the three services still had

not agreed on a new heavy anti-aircraft gun for example, and it was now to become a case for allied

standardisation under the upcoming tripartite agreement.419

As for domestic arms production, CRZ had stopped the M43 submachinegun line since the

weapon was planned to be replaced by the M2 carbine; production of the M43 machinegun contin-

ued at low capacity to replace the remaining M42s in the force, but would eventually switch to the

somewhat delayed M45 which eliminated the option to switch between belt and magazine feed and

would overall be better suited as a general purpose machinegun along the lines of the German MG

34/42, hoped to make the M1919 in the ground forces redundant. The company had resumed de-

velopment of their own automatic rifles and carbines, halted earlier to concentrate on MGs and

SMGs, but had not presented a definite result yet.420

CRZ also continued low-rate assembly of the Hispano Mk V autocannon for the planned new

variants of the Mosquito, but had stopped production of the Oerlikon and Bofors anti-aircraft guns.

Production of the 105 mm M39/44 howitzer was going on to rework some remaining guns in the

original caliber to fire American ammunition and equip 4th and 5th Division, but would cease soon

after the 105 mm M35 cannon and 15 cm 5mm M37 howitzer; the company was preparing for a

possible additional run of the M1928 15 cm gun to equip new coastal artillery units after that.

It was also suggesting a more powerful successor to the Six-Pounder anti-tank gun, allied nations

having long introduced weapons in 76 mm caliber, but development having continued towards

even heavier guns. Being closely linked to tank development, plus the new recoilless guns showing

some promise of good effect in a lighter package, a decision on this was to be made as part of the

post-war evaluation. Per lessons already applied for vehicles, the Hellcat tank destroyer was still

being fitted with turret roofs for overhead protection, and production of the mortar and anti-air

variants of the M39 cavalry vehicle continued for 4th and 5th Division; the Americans had can-

celled the 90-mm-armed M18 variant though, and further upgrades would also become part of the

mid-term evaluation process.421

The Air Force had not yet identified a possible successor to the Mosquito, but was interested in

three jet fighters: the Gloster Meteor, Lockheed P-80, and the new de Havilland Vampire. They

were seen as possible replacements the single-engined fighters, though there were concerns about

the range. An informal conference to discuss future procurement was held in early October. Those

attending were informed about the evaluation of the Me 262, the brief experience of fighting it that

Russian American fighters in Europe had, and what had been managed to glean about the Arado

234, Heinkel 162 and the new British and American jet fighters. Mention was made of rumoured

developments elsewhere; in particular, participants were reminded that it must be assumed the So-

viets also had plenty of German jets and German engineers. France was also known to have ob-

tained some of those, and there was a rumour that the Swedes were working on a jet already.

There was also discussion about relationships with allies, their condition and how Russian Amer-

ican needs fit in with theirs. It was agreed by all that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets

built jet bombers, and jet fighters would need to be obtained. There was a consensus around the

unfeasibility of going it alone, and the need to import aircraft – or at least designs and major parts

of aircraft – from abroad. It was further agreed that although it would be prudent to stay abreast, as

far as possible, with what is going on around the world, and cultivate good relations with as many

419 von Sieben, 1586. 420 Pulyemyet, p. 80. 421 von Sieben, 1588.

Part VII: After the War

207

potential suppliers as possible, it would be wise to try to build a long-term relationship with one

country. There was a lack of unanimity on which country, however.

Some favoured the US, as the largest and most industrially advanced of Russian American allies.

Others suggested that the British might be of more help, as they appeared to be more advanced in

building jet engines. But the most popular candidate was Canada, despite its relative industrial

weakness. As one officer said, “the British have run out of money and the Americans hardly notice

we exist, but the Canadians take us seriously.” It was also thought that Russian American needs

coincided with theirs more closely than with any other possible collaborators. It was therefore

agreed that a report would be prepared for the War Ministry recommending to approach Canada

with regard to cooperation in the procurement of aircraft, and meanwhile put out the Air Force’s

own feelers to friends in the RCAF. A representative of the Ministry procurement office was pre-

sent, and stated that he believed the office would endorse this view, though it would necessarily

entail cooperation on purchases from third parties, namely the US and UK.422

Meanwhile de Havilland Kenai would continue to assemble new Mosquitos for some time to

replace older marks. The Horsa glider line had already been stopped though, as had Sikorsky

Stoyanka's flying boat production; the latter was however bringing the existing S-44A and few

cannon-armed S-44B up to the common C standard with new engines, twin 20 mm nose turret and

some other improvements. Production of the R-5 helicopter was ongoing to replace older R-4s and

R-6s in the Army and Navy, and there were orders from the US and UK though they would be

largely built in local plants. Sikorsky was also developing a more powerful version that would seat

four instead of the current two and was to lead to an entirely new model.

On the naval side, it was reconised that the actions of the small boat forces had been among the

most underreported of the war. That went not only for the Signalboats which had been operating

very hush-hush by their nature, but also the port protection squadrons which were part of the port

battalions under the Navy's Coastal Command and never got mentioned in the reports of the Naval

Operations Command. Yet they had been going out daily with their Canadian Fairmile motor

launches and subsequent evolutions, operating as minesweepers, subchasers, rescue boats and gen-

eral motor gun and torpedo patrollers. Then there were the naval Homeguard units which had done

much the same, only with hand-me-downs from the regular forces and armed private cutters, yachts

and trawlers; some yacht clubs had turned wholesale into Homeguard units.

It was proposed to spend some time in the drawdown planning on what should become of the

Homeguard in general. The effort of those patriotic citizens whom the regulars would not have had

been nothing short of admirable, and it was thought the experience should not let go totally to waste

in case this organisation was ever needed again. If nothing else, it might get some use out of older

equipment now being retired from active service. Regarding women in the forces, it was proposed

to do away with the auxiliary corps; with their serving not just as staffers, signallers and nurses but

truck drivers, mechanics, pilots and even in the Guard and military police, it had been an increasing

bureaucratic pain to distinguish them from male soldiers doing the same jobs. Even now there was

a good deal of confusion and double-reporting, and it was thought easier to just consider them

troops with restrictions to serve in certain occupations.423

A War Recovery Commission was established to convert excess war materiél for peacetime us-

age. It was also responsible for collecting, stowing and disposing of weapons and such, both Rus-

sian American and captured.424 A number of civil uses for radars was quickly found, particularly

controlling air traffic. There were also approaches from civilians wishing to buy war surplus

422 Grushchev, 1589-1594. 423 von Sieben, 1584-1588. 424 Tanski, p. 80.

Part VII: After the War

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transport aircraft, in order to set up air transport businesses. In fact there were more requests than

it was expected to have surplus aircraft, and some potential buyers were already looking abroad, to

Canada and the USA. A big increase in civil air transport and a corresponding increase in the need

for control of the traffic around airports was clearly on the horizon.425

Meanwhile the return of forces continued. The last troops of 5th Division had landed in Canada

by 27 September and were making their way towards Russian America to complete their move

from Europe on 10 October; 4th Division had begun relocating from Czechoslovakia to France for

embarkation, to begin on 4 October. US 201st Infantry Regiment had been ordered to relieve 4th

Marine Regimental Group on Iturup by 11 October; the Russian American marine artillery battal-

ion would leave Hokkaido with that unit and stay embarked while the Iturup garrison boarded there.

The ships would then go on directly to Stoyanka where they were expected on 24 October.

They would be overtaken by 1st Airborne Brigade and 1st Yeger Regiment which would start

leaving Hokkaido on the 18th using aircraft on the Japan-US great circle route. The remainder of

3rd Division Group would begin redeployment to Urup on 25 October, relieving 2nd Marine Reg-

imental Group; the latter would return to garrison at Kodiak about 11 November. All troops were

expected to be home by late November. An official victory celebration with parades of returning

troops was planned; earlier the joyous mood at the Japanese surrender had been muted by the Soviet

move on Hokkaido, since operations had to continue just like before.

Eventually it was decided that there would be an official celebration of the war's end in Junograd

on Sunday, 21 October, however the big parade has been pushed back a week to include more

returning units and would be held in Stoyanka on the 28th. Otherwise the bulk of participants would

have been from 5th Division – which would have been ironic given that they were formed only

months ago and consisted of 60 percent Osttruppen who had spent most of the war fighting first

for the Soviets, then the Germans. While this would make them feel very welcome to their new

home, it was thought not too representative of the troops' wartime effort. The new date meant just

three days of rehearsals for the marines, paras, yegers and commandos returning from the front,

but worse weather was risked with every week into winter. It was also tried to shuffle replacements

around so that long-serving veterans from I Corps and the marines would have the chance to get

somewhat of the public gratitude.

The date would be shortly after the signing of the tripartite agreement during the UNO founding

conference, and the closest Russian American allies were asked to participate to signify not just

the joint effort, but the lasting alliance. The latter was by now turning out to transcend immediate

military issues, as the part about developing lines of commerce and communication between the

parties put into the Berlin Memorandum was developing into rather precise agreements about pro-

gressing with the road and rail links between Canada and Russian America, and reducing the ob-

stacle of customs controls at the border as suggested earlier. This was another irony as the language

about prosperity of the North American continent had been mostly included in Berlin to start the

text off on a peaceful note and make it not look too much like being directed against the Soviets.

Finally, the Longboat programme was still going on. Five months after its start, about 25,000

DPs had arrived in Russian America so far. A total of 90,000 were either on their way to, stopped

over in or moving on from Australia. 15,000 were on the Canadian link and another 6,000 on the

South American route. The North African transit camps continued to empty slowly, with 17,000

still reported there. The French camps were still at full capacity of 100,000, but a decrease was in

the cards soon as only about 30,000 were estimated to remain in the French occupation zone of

Germany which would be transferred within the next month or so.

425 Bergmann, 1591.

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If the situation did not change in the other zones, supply would dry up afterwards except individ-

ual cases which were still managed to bring out. Junograd was working on the British and Ameri-

cans to discontinue forced repatriations, and it was thought that some success was being seen; after

the Soviet move on Hokkaido the lengths to which occupation authorities would go to fulfill the

Potsdam agreements had shortened considerably, and repatriation of the remaining Domanov Cos-

sacks in Austria remained suspended. On the other hand the French and several other Europeans

were now close to their own agreements with the USSR; but only France really mattered, and it

was thought that provisions would reflect the representations Junograd had made.426

Pacts and Parades

By 11 October, negotiations for the trilateral agreement with the US and Canada had nearly con-

cluded. The original Berlin Memorandum statement of “Admitting Russian America to the Perma-

nent Joint Board of Defense for North America as a full member to facilitate cooperation in pro-

curement and operations of their armed forces” had been enlarged to include the expressed inten-

tion of the parties to strive for standardisation of equipment and therefore identify and consult over

procurement decisions that could be taken jointly. However, that was not to mean such decisions

could only be made by all three; the language made it clear it could also be done by two of the

partners or indeed not entered at all if one was seeing particular requirements for its national needs,

as both Junograd and the Canadians did not want to end up just purchasing whatever the US with

its vastly disporoportionate weight was seeing fit.

There was now agreement with the Canadians over joint defence of the common western sea-

board whereby a joint ground and air forces command respectively would be established, one led

by a Russian and one by a Canadian officer with deputies from the respective other nation at any

time, nationalities alternating at two-year intervals; there would also be a US liaison element in

each, providing for possible integration of American forces if necessary. It would not be big com-

mands in peacetime, but additional forces would be assigned as the situation warranted. At the

roots, the Canadians would keep basing air units at Ketchikan, while Russian American coastal

artillery or anti-aircraft troops might be based south of the border, depending upon how post-war

reorganisation shook out. Further west, the Americans would retain their presence at Elmendrov,

Shemya and Beringa and also base units at Imaizaki Airfield on Shumshu and on Urup. The latter

two would be joint use, but the agreement stipulated the Americans would provide local defence.

A supplementary basing agreement was being developed from the wartime precedents, defining

rights and duties of Canadian and US troops based on the Russian American side and vice versa.

All provisions would be mutual. The only thing still being debated was what command would be

on top of it all since AFNPA had now been inactivated; the current position was that it would

simply be reactivated in wartime, though some adjustments were still under negotiation to reflect

the tighter tripartite nature if it was divorced from the previous global effort.

As mentioned earlier, the economic side had taken on a surprisingly large shape and in fact con-

sumed most of the negotiating time due to the details involved. It had now been agreed that Russian

America would become a party to all free trade agreements Canada and the US had bilaterally

enacted since 1935, with some specific exceptions and additions. As with military cooperation,

there was expressed intent to explore additional areas of commerce not yet covered, though again

that might be done by just two of the partners. Finally, there was now rather specific language on

426 von Sieben, 1584-1588.

Part VII: After the War

210

further development of lines of communication between Canada and Russian America, including

commitments by the US out of strategic military and commercial interest. This involved a compli-

cated division of cost for individual road and rail links buried in various annexes.

The resulting North American Cooperation Treaty was eventually signed by the attending heads

of the three nations in San Francisco when the UNO conference began there on 17 October, to be

ratified by the appropriate national parliamentary bodies. The Russian American foreign office

then immediately shifted the focus of attention to the draft of a declaration about Junograd’s con-

tinued exclusive mandate for all citizens of the former Russian Empire to accompany the country’s

official accession to the UNO, expecting the Soviets to do the same.427

In the meantime 4th Marine Regimental Group had left Iturup for Stoyanka on 12 October after

relief by US 201st Infantry Regiment, and on the 18th 1st Airborne Brigade and 1st Yeger Regi-

ment started withdrawal from Hokkaido. Most of 1st Marine Division command dropped off at

Urup en route and stayed for a week until 2nd Marines there was also relieved by 3rd Division,

then returned home with them; 3rd Marines would stay at Matua for the time being be relieved by

Army troops at an as-yet unspecified point, too. One battalion would end up at Kataoka as the Navy

took over the former IJN base there. Redeployment of 3rd Division to Urup would conclude in

mid-November, the same time 4th Division finished movement from Europe.428

The official victory celebration by the Cabinet, State Council and Duma on 21 October in Juno-

grad was a dignified event, though troops only provided the background rather than the main at-

traction, coming from Panhandle garrisons and therefore largely no actual combat veterans. How-

ever, the Homeguard got some recognition on this occasion. In contrast, the next weekend's parade

in Stoyanka rightfully focussed on the frontline forces. The bulk was formed by 5th Division and

about half of 4th Division while the rest of the latter’s troops was still enroute from France. How-

ever, a brigade's worth of troops was actually from 1st and 2nd Division, having been exchanged

between I and II Corps over the previous weeks, mostly with recent recruits from Europe – both to

give the former some public appreciation, and to mix in the latter better throughout the Army.

1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Yeger and 4th Marine Regiment, having arrived just shortly before,

were also wedged in. If some of the recently arrived troops did not quite manage proper formations,

the cheering crowds did not mind it. 3rd Division was getting a bit of the short end for its troubles

of going up against the Soviets and still being deployed to Hokkaido, but there were color details

from all major formations. US and Canadian contingents also participated, including in the air

display. It was an impressive event, though the real festivities only started in the evening when the

participants, including the Allied contingents, were turned lose upon the city at large and found it

hard to buy their own drinks.

Work continued, of course. Command of Russian American occupation troops in Europe was

planned to be co-located with Third US Army HQ at Bad Tölz on the German-Austrian border; 1st

Guards Mechanised Brigade was to move there from Kaprun sometime in the next weeks, the fate

of the remaining Domanov Cossacks no longer in Junograd’s hands, but reasonably sure not to be

forced handover to the Soviets anymore. The Russian Americans were the only other allied troops

in the US zone of occupation, while the British in the north had the Canadians, but also Belgian

and Polish contingents with their own areas of responsibility. It was not yet clear if and where

troops would have an area to themselves, or just support the Americans throughout their zone.

The main attention remained on the simmering DP problem. UNRRA Director General Lehman

kept lobbying to suspend the use of force in repatriations, helped by increasing bad publicity about

incidents, including suicides by those trying to avoid handover to the Soviets at all cost. The latter

427 von Sieben, 1596-1598. 428 Kurylenko, p. 498.

Part VII: After the War

211

had also been not too faithful on implementing the Potsdam agreement when it came to prompt

return and giving US and UK liaison officers access to Allied POWs in Soviet-controlled territory,

like refusing permission to fly in transport aircraft for their collection.

The Dutch also found themselves in vast disagreement about numbers of their deported nationals

with the Soviets soon after making an analogue agreement with them; they estimated 340,000 had

been originally taken by the Germans, of which a little less than 200,000 had been repatriated from

the Western zones, few remaining now. The Soviets claimed that they had liberated about 28,000,

which made for a rather large discrepancy even if a good proportion of dead and individual “trek-

kers” trying to go home on their own were assumed. In fact the USSR just continued to make many

forced laborers work for it.

Warned by those experiences, French-Soviet negotiations were stalled over similar, but even

greater disagreements; the French estimated about a million of their 2.3 million DPs had not turned

up yet while the Soviets pretended to know only of a quarter that number liberated by them. The

French wanted to have their own people looking for them which the Soviets refused; the London

Agreement on Allied Control Institutions in Germany of November 1944 made provision for the

establishment of mutual liaison missions in the four zones, but nothing concrete had been enacted

yet. The fact that Russian America was still running transit camps in France did not make resolution

any easier, which suited Junograd fine for the moment.

The Longboat programme was also going on; with Pacific shipping returning to peacetime oper-

ations, 6,000 DPs were now arriving in Russian America per week, with a total of 50,000 after six

months. Weekly numbers were expected to hit 8,000 in the coming month, which meant the system

was finally in continuous flow without new buildups in France, North Africa, Australia or Canada

with a total of 290,000 in or having gone through it – though stopovers in transit camps would

continue as earlier arrivals were moved on first.

The French occupation zone in Germany had been drained at this point. It was estimated that

about 100,000 of those in the British and American zones willing to come to Russian America had

been forcibly repatriated to the USSR by now, but another 300,000 were still left. There was a

continued trickle of DPs from outside official camps, but this was mostly in the hands of the Signal

Corps, as Junograd could not use official means to get them to France without stepping on some

allied toes. There were also some more DPs in Austria and Italy.

Junograd continued to work with UNRRA on having the use of force suspended like in the case

of the Domanov Cossacks – an additional 20,000 –, and there was some hope this would be

achieved by the conclusion of the ongoing UNO conference, as the official installation of the World

Organisation would give the agency additional authority. However, it was a race as deportations

were going on. On 5 November Eisenhower finally suspended the use of force in repatriations from

the US zone of occupation on his own authority and asked Washington for definite guidance. This

did not resolve the situation, but at least put a stop to deportations.429

In fact the issue would continue long beyond the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco on

18 December, accompanied by the respective declarations of an exclusive mandate for citizens of

the former Russian Empire by the USSR and Russian America. However, six weeks later Mont-

gomery followed Eisenhower by prohibiting the use of force in repatriations in the British zone.

The fate of the remaining DPs, largely in the care of UNRRA, remained a bone of contention.

Forcible repatriations from Italy took place as late as May 1947 to safeguard the return of Western

Allied POWs from Soviet power. Only then did the last DPs arrive in Russian America as the

emerging Cold War blanketed all other considerations.

429 von Sieben, 1598-1603.

212

Conclusion

The Second World War had a defining impact on Russian America. Like in other countries that

had previously been part of a bigger empire, the experience served to foster a distinct national

feeling – the touch of the earlier Great War to the Commonwealth nations of Canada and Australia

being other examples. Similarly, developments of the war years had lead to widespread realisation

that returning to the mother country on Russian American conditions was not likely to become a

possibility in the foreseeable time; while the ultimate aim was not given up, the overall stance

changed from the offensive to the defensive, acknowledging the vastly greater power of the USSR.

On the flip side, this lead to tighter relations with the neighbour nations of the North American

continent. Though there had been misgivings particularly about the US repeatedly putting its global

interests over those of Junograd, it was realised that the world situation required tighter cooperation

with the proven allies despite the traditional Russian distrust of foreign powers.

A very manifest result of the war was the massive population growth from the influx of Operation

Varyag. While many countries – not least the USSR – had suffered devastating losses of human

life, Russian America grew by 30 percent from three to an estimated 3.9 million between 1942 and

1947. Though there were some problems of integration and adjustment to peacetime, this contrib-

uted to strengthening post-war economic development, helped by the easing of restrictions and

buildup of lines of commerce for cross-border trade per the North American Cooperation Treaty.

Wartime production had also laid the foundation for new areas of domestic industry or increased

capabilities, including aircraft companies Sikorsky Stoyanka and de Havilland Kenai, arms manu-

facturer CRZ, and shipbuilding in general.

Both the political and economic impact would also lay very early seeds for an eventual change

of the domestic Russian American system. The country ended the war much like it had entered it,

as a de-facto military dictatorship with no written constitution and but the slightest trappings of

democracy, reserved entirely for the decision of minor internal matters. In time, a growing and

economically empowered population as well as external pressure to distinguish itself from the au-

thoritarian system of the USSR would give cause for change; however, inertia and fear of Soviet-

sponsored communist subversion in a permissive society counteracted this development, which

would be neither quick nor easy.

Those fears were exacerbated by Junograd having lost its pre-war status as the only legitimate

Russian government. In fact the USSR, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, had

gained considerable status over Russian America, relegated to a second-rate power. With both

states members of the UNO, a certain basis of mutual recognition had also been established despite

strenuous official statements to the contrary. This did not keep either side from continueing to

pursue seditious activity against the other, though. Both continued to claim an executive mandate

for the citizens of the former Russian Empire, too.

Militarily, the results of the war brought their own challenges. The strategy to block the Soviets

into the Sea of Okhotsk by taking the Kuriles had been largely spoiled by Stalin’s move on Hok-

kaido and the negotiated swap for the islands south of the 1855 line; predictably, Soviet occupation

of those amounted to annexation, though the use of this small segment of the chain for access to

the Pacific was dubious due to the threat from Western forces on both ends. However, Russian

America saw itself forced to spend considerable ressources on garrisoning the Northern Kuriles,

made practical only through the US commitment to share the burden and guarantee territorial in-

tegrity through the basing of American troops, too. The strategic value of the islands for the near

future remained their position along the great circle route from the North American continent to

Japan and East Asia, providing bases even as aircraft ranges kept growing.

213

Military interdependence was probably the greatest leap over traditional Russian habits. While

US and Canadian forces were now permanently based on Russian American soil in peacetime,

Russian American troops took responsibility in the defence of the common seaboard with Canada,

and the occupation of Germany. The engagement in Europe, entered unwillingly to score political

points in competition with the USSR, thus outlasted the war – mainly because it had yielded one

of the biggest successes in the shape of Operation Varyag. The formalised alliance with the US as

the initial only nuclear power served to re-assure Junograd considerably vis-à-vis the Soviet threat,

though the early enthusiasm about the atomic bomb did not lead to a complete neglect of national

defence capabilities.

As the Cold War between East and West dawned, it was soon clear that the nuclear age would

see its own share of conventional armed conflict. Russian America would enter into this world of

global bi-polar confrontation firmly embedded in the Western camp and contribute her part to the

battles fought both in and outside the military arena; the challenges to this young state on the edge

of the Arctic were far from over.

214

Appendix A: 1940 Russian American Order of Battle

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Junograd)

- Army HQ

- Signals Regiment Army High Command

- 1st Army Aviation Squadron

- 1st - 5th Military Police Battalion

- 1st - 5th Medical Battalion

- 1st Guards Regiment (Junograd)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment (Nome)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment

- 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Armour Regiment

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment

- 12th Stoyanka Anti-Air Regiment

- 13th Stoyanka Engineer Regiment

1st Infantry Division *** (Stoyanka)

- 1st Infantry Division Command

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion

- 10th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment

1st Infantry Brigade **

- 1st Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 1st Stoyanka Infantry Regiment

- 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment

2nd Infantry Brigade **

- 2nd Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 3rd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment

- 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment

2nd Infantry Division *** (Kenai)

- 2nd Infantry Division Command

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion

- 3rd Matanuska-Susitna Artillery Regiment

215

3rd Infantry Brigade **

- 3rd Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 1st Kenai Infantry Regiment

- 1st Ketchikan Infantry Regiment

4th Infantry Brigade **

- 4th Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Regiment

- 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment

3rd Infantry Division *** (Krasivayaberga)

- 3rd Infantry Division Command

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion

- 4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Regiment

5th Infantry Brigade **

- 5th Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 1st Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment

- 2nd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment

6th Infantry Brigade **

- 6th Infantry Brigade HQ Company

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment

- 4th Northern Infantry Regiment

1st Cavalry Division *** (Stoyanka)

- 1st Cavalry Division Command

- 1st Quartermaster Squadron

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment

1st Cavalry Brigade **

- 1st Cavalry Brigade HQ Squadron

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

2nd Cavalry Brigade **

- 2nd Cavalry Brigade HQ Squadron

- 7th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

- 8th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

216

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 22,500/46,600)

- Navy High Command HQ (300)

- Navy High Command Support Battalion (800)

Naval Operations Command *** (10,600/16,900)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (200)

- Naval Operations Command Support Battalion (800)

Commander of Capital Combatants ** (2,900/4,000)

- BB General Alekseyev (1,400)

- Training Vessel Almaz (400)

- 1st Cruiser Squadron (2 x Kolchak, 1 x Nakhimov class, 1,100)

- 1st Gunboat Squadron (reserve; 4 x Khrabryy class, 2 x Grozny class, 1,100)

Commander of Destroyers ** (2,600/2,600)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (6 x Novik class, 900)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (3 x Clemson class plus Avtroil, Maklai and Tserigo,

900)

- 3rd Destroyer Squadron (6 x Derzky class, 800)

Commander of Submarine Warfare (500/1,000)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (8 x Skumbrii class, 1 x submarine tender, 500)

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (reserve; will get converted fish trawlers in wartime,

500)

Commander of Auxiliaries ** (3,000/3,000)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (3 x fleet oiler, 3 x replenishment ship, 1,500)

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (4 x icebreaker, 1 x repair ship, 1 x salvage ship, 3 x

fleet tug, 1,500)

Commander of Transport Fleet ** (0/4,500)

- 1st Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 1,500)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (reserve, 6 x transport, 1,500)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 1,500)

Commander of Naval Aviation (600/800)

- 1st Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 4th Naval Aviation Squadron (reserve; 12 x Canadian Vickers Vedette, 200)

217

Coastal Command *** (Novoarkhangelsk; 10,800/28,600)

- Coastal Command HQ (200)

- Coastal Command Support Battalion (reserve; 800)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Regiment (1,200/3,400)

- Baranov Port Regiment (1,200/3,400)

- Kodiak Port Regiment (1,200/3,400)

- Unalaska Port Regiment (1,200/3,400)

Coastal Artillery Brigade ** (3,600/7,000)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment (Novoarkhangelsk)

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment (Kodiak)

Naval Infantry Brigade ** (2,200/7,000)

- 1st Marine Regiment (Novoarkhangelsk)

- 2nd Marine Regiment (Kodiak)

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command ** (Stoyanka)

- Air Force HQ

- Signals Group Air Force HQ

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group (Junograd)

1st Wing (Baranov)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 4th Fighter Squadron (20 x Hawk)

- 6th Attack Squadron (20 x Douglas Model 8)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka)

- Stoyanka Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x Hawk)

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x DC-3)

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga)

- Krasivayaberga Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group (reserve)

- 1st Training Squadron (20 x Tiger Moth)

- 2nd Transport Squadron (1 x Bellanca Pacemaker, 2 x Fairchild FC-2, 3 x Fokker Super

Universal, 6 x Northrop Delta)

218

Appendix B: 1942 Russian American Order of Battle

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Stoyanka; 30,700/110,800, including 5,900/21,600 cadre and

1,100/2,700 female auxiliaries)

- Army HQ (400/400)

- Signals Regiment Army High Command (semi-present; 1,100/2,800)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment (semi-present, Nome; 900/2,300)

- 1st Guards Regiment (semi-present; Junograd, 1,300/3,100)

- 7th Guards Cossack Regiment (one squadron active in Junograd, 300/1,800)

- School Command (600/1,800)

I Russian American Army Corps *** (Stoyanka; 20,700/56,600)

- Corps HQ (reserve, co-located with Army High Command; 0/200)

- 1st Army Aviation Company (200/200)

- 1st Signals Battalion (reserve, co-located with Signals School in peacetime; 0/900)

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment (reserve, formerly 10th Stoyanka Artillery, co-located with

Quartermaster School in peacetime; 0/3,200)

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment (semi-present, co-located with Engineer

School in peacetime; 1,100/2,800)

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment (semi-present, co-located with Artillery School

in peacetime; 1,000/2,500)

1st Division ** (Stoyanka; 15,600/15,600)

- 1st Division Command (700/700)

- 1st Stoyanka Infantry Lehrregiment (3,100/3,100)

- 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (3,100/3,100)

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Lehrregiment (1,800/1,800)

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment (2,500/2,500)

- 1st Anti-Air Lehrbataillon (800/800)

- 1st Armour Lehrbataillon (600/600)

- 1st Engineer Battalion (900/900)

- 1st Medical Battalion (900/900)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200/1,200)

2nd Division (Reserve) ** (Kenai; 1,400/15,600)

- 2nd Division Command (semi-present; 500/700)

- 1st Kenai + 1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Regiment (0/6,200)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment (0/1,800)

- 3rd Matanuska-Susitna Artillery Regiment (0/2,500)

- 2nd Anti-Air Battalion (0/800)

- 2nd Armour Battalion (0/600)

- 2nd Engineer Battalion (0/900)

219

- 2nd Medical Battalion (semi-present; 300/900)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

3rd Division (Reserve) ** (Krasivayaberga; 1,400/15,600)

- 3rd Division Command (semi-present; 500/700)

- 1st + 2nd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (0/6,200)

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (0/1,800)

- 4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Regiment (0/2,500)

- 3rd Anti-Air Battalion (0/800)

- 3rd Armour Battalion (0/600)

- 3rd Engineer Battalion (0/900)

- 3rd Medical Battalion (semi-present; 300/900)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

Territorial Army Command *** (Stoyanka; 5,400/42,000)

- Territorial Army Command HQ (reserve, co-located with Army High Command; 0/200)

- Central Military Court and Prison (200/400)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 800/13,000)

- Central Command HQ (reserve, co-located with 1st Division HQ; 0/200)

- 1st + 2nd Military Police Battalion (one reserve; 800/1,600)

- 2nd Quartermaster Regiment (reserve; 0/3,200)

- 3rd + 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (reserve; 0/6,200)

- 5th Signals Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

- Central Military Hospital (reserve; 0/900)

Southern Command ** (Kenai; 400/7,100)

- Southern Command HQ (reserve, co-located with 2nd Division HQ; 0/200)

- 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Regiment (reserve; 0/3,100)

- 4th Military Police Battalion (semi-present; 400/800)

- 5th Quartermaster Battalion (reserve; 0/1,200)

- 6th Signals Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

- Southern Military Hospital (reserve; 0/900)

Northern Command ** (Krasivayaberga; 400/7,100)

- Northern Command HQ (reserve, co-located with 3rd Division HQ; 0/200)

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (0/3,100)

- 5th Military Police Battalion (semi-present; 400/800)

- 6th Quartermaster Battalion (reserve; 0/1,200)

- 7th Signals Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

- Northern Military Hospital (reserve; 0/900)

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 1,800/7,100)

- Western Command HQ (semi-present; 100/200)

- 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment (reserve; 0/3,100)

220

- 6th Military Police Battalion (semi-present; 400/800)

- 7th Quartermaster Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- 8th Signals Battalion (semi-present; 400/900)

- Eastern Military Hospital (semi-present; 300/900)

Western Command ** (Kuskokwim; 1,800/7,100)

- Western Command HQ (semi-present; 100/200)

- 3rd Northern Infantry Regiment (reserve; 0/3,100)

- 7th Military Police Battalion (semi-present; 400/800)

- 8th Quartermaster Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- 9th Signals Battalion (semi-present; 400/900)

- Western Military Hospital (semi-present; 300/900)

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 22,800/49,400, including 5,000/10,700 cadre

and 500/1,200 female auxiliaries)

- Navy High Command HQ (300/300)

- Navy High Command Signals Battalion (900/900)

- Navy School (500/1,000)

Naval Operations Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhan-

gelsk; 9,000/17,000)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (reserve; 0/200)

- Naval Operations Command Signals Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

Strike Fleet ** (7,000/7,000)

- Flagship BB General Alekseyev (1,400/1,400)

- 1st Cruiser Squadron (2 x Kolchak class, 2 x Nakhimov class, 1,400/1,400)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (9 x Clemson class, 1,400/1,400)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (6 x Derzky class plus Avtroil, Maklai and Tserigo,

1,300/1,300)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (8 x Skumbrii class, 1 x submarine tender, 500/500)

Auxiliary Fleet ** (1,400/7,900)

- Government yacht and training vessel Almaz (reserve; 0/400)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (2 x fleet oiler, 2 x replenishment ship, 1 x repair ship, 1 x

icebreaker, 1 x fleet tug, 1,400/1,400)

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (reserve; 3 x icebreaker, 1 x fleet oiler, 1 x replenishment

ship, 1 x salvage ship, 2 x fleet tug, 1,400/1,400)

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (reserve; will get converted fish trawlers in wartime,

0/500)

221

- 1st Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 0/1,400)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 0/1,400)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 0/1,400)

Naval Aviation Command (600/1,000)

- HQ Squadron Naval Aviation Command (200/200)

- 1st Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200/200)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200/200)

- 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron (reserve; 9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200/200)

Coastal Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhangelsk;

12,100/30,400)

- Coastal Command HQ (reserve; 0/200)

- Coastal Command Signals Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command ** (co-located with Coastal Command;

3,500/8,400)

- Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- 1st Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (semi-present; 1,100/2,900)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Battalion (700/800)

- 4th Coastal Artillery Battalion (reserve; 0/600)

- 1st Marine Battalion (900/900)

- 2nd Marine Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

- 3rd Marine Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

Kodiak Navy Command ** (4,900/13,300)

- Kodiak Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Kodiak Port Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- Stoyanka Port Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- Baranov Port Battalion (reserve; 0/1,200)

- 2nd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (semi-present; 2,000/2,900)

- 3rd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (reserve; 0/2,900)

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Battalion (700/800)

- 5th Coastal Artillery Battalion (reserve, Baranov; 0/600)

- 4th Marine Battalion (900/900)

- 5th Marine Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

- 6th Marine Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

Unalaska Navy Command ** (3,600/7,600)

- Unalaska Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Unalaska Port Battalion (semi-present; 600/1,200)

- 4th Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (semi-present; 1,100/2,900)

- 3rd Coastal Artillery Battalion (Unalaska; 700/800)

222

- 6th Coastal Artillery Battalion (Umnak; 200/700)

- 7th Marine Battalion (900/900)

- 8th Marine Battalion (reserve; 0/900)

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command *** (Stoyanka; 16,700/26,900, including 4,900/7,900 cadre and

400/500 female auxiliaries)

- Air Force HQ (200/200)

- Signals Group Air Force HQ (900/900)

- Air Force School (300/500)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 6,000/9,100)

- Central Command HQ (co-located with Air Force HQ; 100/200)

1st Wing (Baranov; 1,600/1,900)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 4th Fighter Squadron (20 x Hawk)

- 6th Attack Squadron (20 x Douglas Model 8)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka; 1,400/1,900)

- Stoyanka Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x DC-3)

- 2nd Transport Squadron (reserve; 1 x Bellanca Pacemaker, 2 x Fairchild FC-2, 3 x Fokker

Super Universal, 6 x Northrop Delta)

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga; 1,100/1,900)

- Krasivayaberga Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group (reserve)

- 1st Training Squadron (20 x Tiger Moth)

- 13th Transport Squadron (12 x DC-3)

- 5th Training Wing (Stoyanka; 1,600/2,400)

- 5th Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present, Kenai; 500/800)

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 3,000/8,000)

- Eastern Command HQ (100/200)

223

3rd Wing (Junograd; 500/1,600)

- Junograd Air Base Group (reserve)

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

6th Wing (reserve, Yakutat; 0/1,900)

- Yakutat Air Base Group

- 6th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 8th Fighter Squadron (20 x Hawk)

- 10th Attack Squadron (20 x Douglas Model 8)

8th Wing (Ketchikan; 1,600/1,900)

- Ketchikan Air Base Group

- 8th Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38E)

- 14th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

- 11th Training Wing (Junograd; 800/2,400)

Western Command ** (Kodiak; 6,300/8,300)

- Western Command HQ (100/200)

7th Wing (Kodiak; 1,600/1,900)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 7th Fighter Squadron (20 x Hawk)

- 9th Attack Squadron (20 x Douglas Model 8)

9th Wing (Holodnayabukhta; 1,600/1,900)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 12th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38E)

- 15th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

10th Wing (Umnak; 1,600/1,900)

- Umnak Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group (semi-present)

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38E)

- 16th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

- 12th Training Wing (1,600/2,400)

224

Appendix C: Revised Rank Tables effective 1 January 1943

Army, Air Force, Marine and Coastal Artillery Ranks

Enlisted E-1 branch-specific base rank

E-2 Efreitor (typically after twelve months of conscripted service)

Non-Commissioned Officers E-3 Mladshiy Kapral (old-pattern conscripted brevet assistant squad leader or technician)

E-4 Starshiy Kapral (squad leader with completed NCO school)

E-5 Mladshiy Serzhant (assistant platoon leader or company quartermaster sergeant)

E-6 Serzhant (completed platoon leader course, can act as such or company sergeant)

E-7 Starshiy Serzhant (sergeant major)

Warrant Officers E-8 Mladshiy Praporshchik (completed platoon leader course en route to reserve officer rank, can

act as such)

E-9 Starshiy Praporshchik (command sergeant major, professional technician or enlisted pilot)

Junior Officers O-1 Mladshiy Leytenant (completed officer school, platoon leader or pilot)

O-2 Starshiy Leytenant (company XO or junior battalion/regimental staff officer)

O-3 Kapitan (company commander, squadron XO in cavalry or Air Force, senior battalion/regi-

mental or junior division or regional command staff officer)

Senior Officers O-4 Mayor (squadron commander in cavalry or Air Force, battalion XO or senior regimental/di-

vision/regional command staff officer)

O-5 Podpolkovnik (battalion/group commander or regimental XO, division/regional command

chief of staff)

O-6 Polkovnik (regimental/wing commander, division/regional command XO, corps or Air Force

Chief of Staff)

Flag Officers O-7 General-mayor (division or regional commander, corps XO, Army Chief of Staff, Deputy

Chief of the Air Force, Inspector of the Naval Infantry or Coastal Artillery, department head in

War Ministry)

O-8 General-leytenant (corps commander, Chief of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of the Army,

War Ministry Chief of Staff)

O-9 General (Chief of the Army, State Secretary for the Army or Air Force, deputy minister)

O-10 General-feldmarshal (minister, minister president)

225

Navy Ranks

Enlisted E-1 Matros 2. Stati

E-2 Matros 1. Stati (typically after twelve months of conscripted service)

Non-Commissioned Officers E-3 Kvartiermeyster (old-pattern conscripted technician)

E-4 Bozmanmat (completed NCO school)

E-5 Mladshiy Bozman (chief petty officer, can act as department head on small auxiliaries)

E-6 Bozman (senior chief petty officer)

E-7 Starshiy Bozman (master chief petty officer)

Warrant Officers E-8 Mladshiy Michman (en route to reserve officer rank, can act as department head on small

auxiliaries)

E-9 Starshiy Michman (command master chief petty officer, professional technician)

Junior Officers O-1 Mladshiy Leytenant (completed officer school, small auxiliary department head)

O-2 Leytenant (small auxiliary or aircraft XO, destroyer, submarine or medium auxiliary depart-

ment head, junior staff officer in minor squadron)

O-3 Starshiy Leytenant (small auxiliary or aircraft commander, destroyer or submarine XO,

cruiser or large auxiliary department head, senior staff officer in minor or junior in major

squadron or fleet/regional command)

Senior Officers O-4 Kapitan-leytenant (destroyer, submarine or medium auxiliary commander, battleship depart-

ment head, minor squadron XO, senior staff officer in fleet/regional command)

O-5 Kapitan 2. Ranga (cruiser, large auxiliary or minor squadron commander, battleship, major

squadron or naval aviation XO, fleet/regional command chief of staff)

O-6 Kapitan 1. Ranga (battleship, major squadron or naval aviation commander, Deputy Com-

mander Strike Fleet or Auxiliary Fleet, deputy regional commander, Navy Operations or

Coastal Command Chief of Staff)

Flag Officers O-7 Kontr-admiral (Commander Strike Fleet or Auxiliary Fleet, regional commander, Navy

Chief of Staff, department head in War Ministry)

O-8 Vitse-admiral (Navy Operations or Coastal Commander, Deputy Chief of the Navy, War

Ministry Chief of Staff)

O-9 Admiral (Chief of the Navy, State Secretary for the Navy, deputy minister)

O-10 General-admiral (minister, minister president)

226

Appendix D: 1943 Russian American Order of Battle

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Stoyanka; 116,500, including 22,600 cadre and 3,600 female aux-

iliaries)

- Army HQ (400)

- Signals Regiment Army High Command (2,800)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment (Nome; 2,300)

- 1st Guards Regiment (Junograd; 2,950)

- 1st Airborne Regiment (2,950)

- 7th Guards Cossack Regiment (one squadron in Junograd; 1,650)

- School Command (2,100)

I Russian American Army Corps *** (Stoyanka; 54,250)

- Corps HQ (200)

- 1st Army Aviation Company (200)

- 1st Signals Battalion (900)

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment (3,200)

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment (2,800)

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment (2,400)

1st Division ** (Stoyanka; 14,850)

- 1st Division Command (650)

- 1st Stoyanka Infantry Lehrregiment (2,950)

- 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Lehrregiment (1,650)

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 1st Anti-Air Lehrbataillon (750)

- 1st Armour Lehrbataillon (650)

- 1st Engineer Battalion (900)

- 1st Medical Battalion (900)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

2nd Division ** (Kenai; 14,850)

- 2nd Division Command (650)

- 1st Kenai + 1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Regiment (5,900)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment (1,650)

- 3rd Matanuska-Susitna Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 2nd Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 2nd Armour Battalion (650)

- 2nd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 2nd Medical Battalion (900)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

227

3rd Division ** (Nome; 14,850)

- 3rd Division Command (650)

- 1st + 2nd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (5,900)

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (1,650)

- 4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 3rd Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 3rd Armour Battalion (650)

- 3rd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 3rd Medical Battalion (900)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

Territorial Army Command *** (Stoyanka; 47,100)

- Territorial Army Command HQ (co-located with Army High Command; 200)

- Central Military Court and Prison (800)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 12,600)

- Central Command HQ (200)

- 1st + 2nd Military Police Battalion (1,500)

- 2nd Quartermaster Regiment (3,200)

- 3rd + 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (5,900)

- 5th Signals Battalion (900)

- Central Military Hospital (900)

Southern Command ** (Kenai; 9,850)

- Southern Command HQ (200)

- 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 3rd Kenai Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 4th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 5th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 6th Signals Battalion (900)

- Southern Military Hospital (900)

Northern Command ** (Krasivayaberga; 6,900)

- Northern Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 5th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 6th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 7th Signals Battalion (900)

- Northern Military Hospital (900)

228

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 9,850)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 2nd + 4th Northern Infantry Regiment (5,900)

- 6th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 7th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 8th Signals Battalion (900)

- Eastern Military Hospital (900)

Western Command ** (Kuskokwim; 6,900)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Northern Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 7th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 8th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 9th Signals Battalion (900)

- Western Military Hospital (900)

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 56,200, including 11,800 cadre and 2,200 fe-

male auxiliaries)

- Navy High Command HQ (300)

- Navy High Command Signals Battalion (900)

- Navy School (1,200)

Naval Operations Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhan-

gelsk; 17,700)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (reserve; 200)

- Naval Operations Command Signals Battalion (reserve; 900)

Strike Fleet ** (6,900)

- Flagship BB General Alekseyev (1,400)

- 1st Cruiser Squadron (2 x Kolchak class, 2 x Nakhimov class, 1,400)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (9 x Clemson class, 1,400)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (6 x Derzky class plus Avtroil, Maklai and Tserigo, 1,300)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (6 x Skumbrii class, 1 x submarine tender, 400)

Auxiliary Fleet ** (8,900)

- Government yacht and training vessel Almaz (400)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (2 x fleet oiler, 2 x replenishment ship, 1 x repair ship, 1 x

icebreaker, 1 x fleet tug, 1,400)

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (reserve; 3 x icebreaker, 1 x fleet oiler, 1 x replenishment

ship, 1 x salvage ship, 2 x fleet tug, 1,400)

229

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 2nd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 3rd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 1st Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

Naval Aviation Command (800)

- HQ Squadron Naval Aviation Command (200)

- 1st Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

Coastal Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhangelsk;

36,100)

- Coastal Command HQ (200)

- Coastal Command Signals Battalion (900)

Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command ** (co-located with Coastal Command; 9,900)

- Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command HQ (200)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Battalion (1,200)

- 1st Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- 1st Marine Regiment (3,000)

Kodiak Navy Command ** (15,200)

- Kodiak Navy Command HQ (200)

- Kodiak Port Battalion (1,200)

- Stoyanka Port Battalion (1,200)

- Baranov Port Battalion (1,200)

- 2nd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- 2nd Marine Regiment (3,000)

Unalaska Navy Command ** (9,900)

- Unalaska Navy Command HQ (200)

- Unalaska Port Battalion (1,200)

- 4th Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- 3rd Marine Regiment (3,000)

230

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command *** (Stoyanka; 36,000, including 10,300 cadre and 1,500 female

auxiliaries)

- Air Force HQ (300)

- Signals Group Air Force HQ (900)

- Air Force School (800)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 15,100)

- Central Command HQ (co-located with Air Force HQ; 300)

1st Wing (Baranov; 1,900)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 4th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 6th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka; 1,900)

- Elmendrov Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 2nd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga; 1,900)

- Laddski Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 1st Training Squadron (20 x Tiger Moth)

- 13th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

13th Wing (Nome; 1,900)

- Nome Air Base Group

- 13th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 8th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 10th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

- 5th Training Wing (Stoyanka; 2,400)

- 5th Anti-Air Artillery Group (Kenai; 800)

- Cordova Air Base Group (800)

- Galenya Air Base Group (800)

- Kuskokwim Air Base Group (800)

- Makkrazky Air Base Group (800)

- Naknek Air Base Group (800)

231

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 7,800)

- Eastern Command HQ (300)

3rd Wing (Junograd; 1,600)

- Junograd Air Base Group

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group

6th Wing (Yakutat; 1,600)

- Yakutat Air Base Group

- 6th Anti-Air Artillery Group

8th Wing (Ketchikan; 1,900)

- Ketchikan Air Base Group

- 8th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 11th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38E)

- 14th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

- 11th Training Wing (Junograd; 2,400)

Western Command ** (Kodiak; 11,100)

- Western Command HQ (300)

7th Wing (Kodiak; 1,900)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 7th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-70)

- 9th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

9th Wing (Holodnayabukhta; 1,900)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 12th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-70)

- 15th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

10th Wing (Umnak; 1,900)

- Umnak Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38E)

- 16th Attack Squadron (20 x A-20C)

232

14th Wing (Adak; 1900)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 17th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 18th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

- 12th Training Wing (Kodiak; 2,400)

- Amchitka Air Base Group (800)

233

Appendix E: The Aleutian Task Forces in 1943

1st Aleutian Task Force (Ground) (13,800)

- 1st Division Command [-] (500)

- 1st US/CAN Special Service Force (1,800)

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment [-] (1,800)

- 4/1st Anti-Air Battery (150)

- 1st Engineer Battalion [-] (700)

- 1st Medical Battalion [-] (700)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion [-] (850)

- 1+2/2nd Military Police Companies (300)

1st Stoyanka Infantry Battlegroup (2,300)

- HQ Company 1st Stoyanka Infantry

- II.+III./1st Stoyanka Infantry Battalion

- 13/1st Stoyanka Infantry Company (Cannon)

- 1/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 6/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Weapons)

1st Marine Battlegroup (2,350)

- HQ Company 1st Marines

- II.+III/1st Marine Battalion

- 13/1st Marine Company (Cannon)

- 2/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 4/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Heavy)

2nd Marine Battlegroup (2,350)

- HQ Company 2nd Marines

- II.+III/2nd Marine Battalion

- 13/2nd Marine Company (Cannon)

- 3/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 5/5th Stoyanka Cavalry Squadron (Heavy)

2nd Aleutian Task Force (Ground) (6,700)

- HQ Squadron 5th Stoyanka Cavalry (300)

- 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- I./1st Yeger Battalion (700)

- 1st Armour Battalion (650)

- IV./9th Stoyanka Artillery Battalion (450)

- 1st Anti-Air Battalion [-] (600)

234

- 4/1st Engineer Company (200)

- 4/1st Medical Company (200)

- 3+4/1st Quartermaster Companies (350)

- 2/1st Signals Company (150)

- 3/2nd Military Police Company (150)

Aleutian Joint Naval Task Force

Landing Force (RA)

- 1st + 2nd RA Sealift Squadron

- 1st + 2nd RA Minesweeper Squadron

- RA Cruiser Division 1

- 1st RA Destroyer Squadron

- 1st RA Auxiliary Squadron

Covering Force (US)

- USS Idaho

- USS Pennsylvania

- USS Tennessee

- USS Indianapolis

- USS Louisville

- USS Salt Lake City

- USS St. Louis

- 3 x Omaha-class light cruisers

- US Destroyer Squadron 6

Screening Force (CAN)

- HMCS Prince Robert

- RA Cruiser Division 2

- 2 x CAN Tribal-class destroyers

- 5 x CAN River-class frigates

- 3rd RA Naval Aviation Squadron

RA Air Force Central Command

7th Wing (Kodiak)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 7th Fighter Squadron (Mosquito NF Mk XII)

9th Wing (Holodnayabukhta)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 12th Fighter Squadron (Mosquito NF Mk XII)

- 18th Attack Squadron (Mosquito B Mk VII)

235

10th Wing (Umnak)

- Umnak Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 16th Attack Squadron (A-20C)

- 17th Fighter Squadron (P-51A)

14th Wing (Adak)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (P-38G)

- 15th Attack Squadron (A-20C)

15th Wing (Amchitka)

- Amchitka Air Base Group

- 9th Attack Squadron (A-20C)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (P-38G)

11th US Air Force

28th Bombardment Group (Adak)

- 21st Bombardment Squadron (B-24D)

- 36th Bombardment Squadron (B-24D)

- 73rd US Bombardment Squadron (B-25C)

- 77th Bombardment Squadron (B-25C)

- 404th Bombardment Squadron (B-24D)

- 406th Bombardment Squadron (B-25C)

- 635th Bombardment Squadron (A-24B)

Note: Detachments of squadrons are operating from Umnak and Amchitka

343rd Fighter Group (Adak)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (P-40K, P-38G)

- 18th Fighter Squadron (P-40K, P-38G)

- 54th Fighter Squadron (P-38G)

- 344th Fighter Squadron (P-40K)

- No. 14 Fighter Squadron RCAF (P-40D)

- No. 111 Fighter Squadron RCAF (P-40K)

Note: Detachments of Squadrons are operating from Amchitka

236

Appendix F: Russian Contingent Allied Forces Atlantic in 1943

Russian Contingent Allied Forces Iceland (12,800)

- HQ 2nd Division (Reykjavik; 100)

- II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion (Melgerdhi, two companies in Akureyri; 900)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (Reykjavik; 1,200)

1st Kenai Infantry Battlegroup (Búdhareyri; 2,900)

- HQ Company 1st Kenai Infantry

- I.+II./1st Kenai Infantry Battalion (one in Seydhisfjördhur)

- 13/1st Kenai Infantry Company (Cannon)

- 3/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 3/2nd Engineer Company

- 4/2nd Medical Company [+]

- 4/4th Military Police Company

1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Battlegroup (Akureyri; 3,100)

- HQ Company 1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry

- II.+III./1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Battalion (one in Melgerdhi)

- 13/1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Company (Cannon)

- 2/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 5/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Heavy)

- 2/2nd Engineer Company

- 3/2nd Medical Company [+]

- 3/4th Military Police Company

2nd Kenai Artillery Group (Akureyri; 500)

- HQ Battery 2nd Anti-Air Artillery

- 10/3rd Kenai Artillery Battery

- 1/2nd Anti-Air Artillery Battery

- 4/2nd Anti-Air Battery [-] (Melgerdhi)

2nd Kenai Cavalry Battlegroup (Bordheyri; 3,300)

- HQ Squadron 2nd Kenai Cavalry

- I./1st Matanuska-Susitna Infantry Battalion (Blonduós)

- III./1st Kenai Infantry Battalion (Bogarnes)

- 1/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Light)

- 4/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Heavy)

- 4/2nd Kenai Cavalry Squadron (Weapons)

- 1/2nd Engineer Company

- 2/2nd Medical Company [+]

- 2/4th Military Police Company

237

3rd Kenai Artillery Group (Búdhareyri; 800)

- HQ Battery IV./3rd Kenai Artillery

- 11 + 12/3rd Kenai Artillery Batteries (one in Seydhisfjördhur)

- 2 + 3/2nd Anti-Air Artillery Batteries [+] (one in Seydhisfjördhur)

Russian Contingent Allied Forces Greenland - II./1st Northern Yeger Battalion (BLUIE WEST 8; 700)

238

Appendix G: 1944 Russian American Order of Battle

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Stoyanka; 116,800, including 22,550 cadre and 4,000 female aux-

iliaries)

- Army HQ (400)

- Signals Regiment Army High Command (2,800)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment (Nome; 1,600)

- 1st Guards Regiment (Junograd; 2,950)

- 1st Airborne Regiment (2,700)

- 7th Guards Cossack Regiment (one extra squadron in Junograd; 1,350)

- School Command (2,100)

Russian Contingent 1st Special Service Force (Italy; 600)

Russian Contingent No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando (UK; 200)

- No. 9 Troop (100)

- No. 10 Troop (100)

Russian Contingent Allied Forces Atlantic (Iceland; 3,750)

- HQ RUSCON AFLANT (400)

- II./1st Northern Yeger Battalion [-] (Greenland; 550)

- 2nd Kenai Artillery Group (800)

- 3rd Kenai Artillery Group (1,100)

- II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion (900)

I Russian American Army Corps *** (Stoyanka; 57,400)

- 1st Corps HQ (200)

- 1st Army Aviation Company (200)

- 1st Signals Battalion (900)

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment (3,200)

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment [-] (1,900)

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment [-] (1,950)

1st Division ** (Stoyanka; 16,350)

- 1st Division Command (650)

- 1st + 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Brigade (6,100)

- 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Lehrregiment (1,150)

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 1st Anti-Air Lehrbataillon (750)

- 1st Engineer Battalion (900)

- 1st Medical Battalion (750)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

239

2nd Division ** (Kenai; 16,350)

- 4th Division Command (650)

- 1st Kenai Infantry Brigade (3,050)

- 1st Matanuska-Susitna Brigade (3,050)

- 4th Kenai Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment (1,150)

- 3rd Matanuska-Susitna Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 4th Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 2nd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 2nd Medical Battalion (750)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

3rd Division ** (Nome; 16,350)

- 3rd Division Command (650)

- 1st + 2nd Krasivayaberga Infantry Brigade (6,100)

- 4th Northern Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (1,150)

- 4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 3rd Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 3rd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 3rd Medical Battalion (750)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

Territorial Army Command *** (Stoyanka; 40,950)

- Territorial Army Command HQ (co-located with Army High Command; 200)

- Central Military Court and Prison (800)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 12,350)

- Central Command HQ (200)

- 1st + 2nd Military Police Battalion [-] (1,250)

- 2nd Quartermaster Regiment (3,200)

- 3rd + 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (5,900)

- 5th Signals Battalion (900)

- Central Military Hospital (900)

Southern Command ** (Kenai; 6,900)

- Southern Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Kenai Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 4th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 5th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 6th Signals Battalion (900)

- Southern Military Hospital (900)

Northern Command ** (Krasivayaberga; 6,900)

- Northern Command HQ (200)

240

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 5th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 6th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 7th Signals Battalion (900)

- Northern Military Hospital (900)

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 6,900)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 6th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 7th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 8th Signals Battalion (900)

- Eastern Military Hospital (900)

Western Command ** (Kuskokwim; 6,900)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Northern Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 7th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 8th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 9th Signals Battalion (900)

- Western Military Hospital (900)

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 58,700, including 12,300 cadre and 2,200 fe-

male auxiliaries)

- Navy High Command HQ (300)

- Navy High Command Signals Battalion (900)

- Navy School (1,300)

Naval Operations Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhan-

gelsk; 20,500)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (200)

- Naval Operations Command Signals Battalion (900)

Strike Fleet ** (6,650)

- Future Aircraft Carrier (Bogue class, 650)

- 1st Cruiser Squadron (2 x Kolchak class, 2 x Nakhimov class, 1,400)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (9 x Clemson class, 1,400)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (9 x Clemson class, 1,400)

241

- 3rd Destroyer Squadron (6 x Rudderow class, 1,300)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (6 x Skumbrii class, 2 x Mackerel class, 1 x submarine

tender, 500)

Auxiliary Fleet ** (11,800)

- Government yacht and training vessel Almaz (400)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (2 x fleet oiler, 2 x replenishment ship, 1 x repair ship, 1 x

icebreaker, 1 x fleet tug, 1,400)

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (reserve; 3 x icebreaker, 1 x fleet oiler, 1 x replenishment

ship, 1 x salvage ship, 2 x fleet tug, 1,400)

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 2nd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 3rd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 4th Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 1st Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 4th Amphibious Squadron (12 x LST Mk 2, 16 x LCT Mk 6, 1,400)

- 5th Fast Transport Squadron (5 x Derzky class plus Avtroil, Maklai and Tserigo,

1,000)

Naval Aviation Command (950)

- HQ Squadron Naval Aviation Command (200)

- 1st Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 4th Naval Aviation Squadron (20 x Sikorsky R-4B, 150)

Coastal Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhangelsk;

35,700)

- Coastal Command HQ (200)

- Coastal Command Signals Battalion (900)

- 2nd Marine Regiment (Hawaii, 2,950)

- 3rd Marine Regiment (Panama, 2,950)

Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command ** (co-located with Coastal Command; 7,800)

- Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command HQ (200)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Battalion (1,200)

- 1st Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- I./1st Marine Battalion (900)

Kodiak Navy Command ** (13,100)

- Kodiak Navy Command HQ (200)

- Kodiak Port Battalion (1,200)

242

- Stoyanka Port Battalion (1,200)

- Baranov Port Battalion (1,200)

- 2nd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- II./1st Marine Battalion (900)

Unalaska Navy Command ** (7,800)

- Unalaska Navy Command HQ (200)

- Unalaska Port Battalion (1,200)

- 4th Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment (2,600)

- III./1st Marine Battalion (900)

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command **** (Stoyanka; 45,000, including 12,500 cadre and 3,600 female

auxiliaries)

- Air Force HQ (300)

- Signals Group Air Force HQ (900)

Air Combat Command *** (Stoyanka; 19,400)

- Air Combat Command HQ (co-located with Air Force HQ; 200)

- Signals Group Air Combat Command (900)

Aleutian Command ** (Holodnayabukhta; 9,700)

- Aleutian Command HQ (200)

- 1st - 3rd Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (300)

9th Wing (Holodnayabukhta; 1,900)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 12th Fighter Squadron (20 x Mosquito NF Mk XII)

- 15th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

10th Wing (Umnak; 1,900)

- Umnak Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38G, planned to be replaced by P-51B)

- 16th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

243

14th Wing (Adak; 1900)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 17th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 18th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

15th Wing (Amchitka; 1,900)

- Amchitka Air Base Group

- 15th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 9th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (10 x Mosquito B Mk VII, 10 x PR Mk

VIII)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-38G, planned to be replaced by P-51B)

- Kiska Air Base Group (800)

- Shemya Air Base Group (800)

Home Defence Command ** (Kodiak; 8,600)

- Home Defence Command HQ (200)

1st Wing (Baranov; 1,900)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 4th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 6th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

3rd Wing (Junograd; 1,600)

- Junograd Air Base Group

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group

7th Wing (Kodiak; 1,900)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 7th Fighter Squadron (20 x Mosquito NF Mk XII)

- 14th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

13th Wing (Nome; 1,900)

- Nome Air Base Group

- 13th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 8th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51A)

- 10th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk VII)

- 5th Anti-Air Artillery Group (Kenai; 800)

244

Air Force Auxiliary Command *** (Junograd; 24,400)

- Air Force Auxiliary Command HQ (200)

- Signals Group Air Force Auxiliary Command (900)

Transport Command ** (Stoyanka; 10,600)

- Transport Command HQ (200)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka; 1,900)

- Elmendrov Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 2nd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

- 21st Transport Squadron (12 x C-54)

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga; 1,900)

- Laddski Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

- 13th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

8th Wing (Ketchikan; 1,900)

- Ketchikan Air Base Group

- 8th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 20th Aircraft Transfer Squadron

Auxiliary Air Base Command (4,700)

- Cordova Air Base Group (800)

- Galenya Air Base Group [-] (500)

- Kuskokwim Air Base Group (800)

- Lavrentia Air Base Group (800)

- Makkrazky Air Base Group [-] (500)

- Naknek Air Base Group (800)

- Severoputi Air Base Group [-] (500)

Training Command ** (Junograd; 12,700)

- Training Command HQ (200)

- Air Force School (1,000)

6th Wing (Yakutat; 1,900)

- Yakutat Air Base Group

- 6th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 1st Training Squadron (20 x Tiger Moth)

- 19th Training Squadron (10 x P-36, 10 x A-20C)

245

- 5th Training Wing (Stoyanka; 2,400)

- 11th Training Wing (Junograd; 2,400)

- 12th Training Wing (Kodiak; 2,400)

- 16th Training Wing (Kenai; 2,400)

246

Appendix H: Russian American Type 1944a Division

Total strength: 623 officers, 2,262 non-commissioned officers, 13,475 enlisted men = 16,360

Division HQ (42/23/42//107)

- Command Department (3/1/3//7; 3 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 t truck)

- Operations Department (7/2/7//16; 7 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Intelligence Department (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 ton truck)

- Signals Department (4/2/4//10; 4 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 ton truck)

- Personnel Department (5/2/5//12; 5 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Quartermaster Department (10/9/10//29; 10 x jeep, 4 x 0.4 t truck)

- Medical Department (5/4/5//14; 5 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Court Martial (4/2/4//10; 4 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 ton truck)

HQ Company (7/33/177//217)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Division Band (1/8/33//42; 2 x 3 t truck)

- Motorcycle Platoon (0/5/41//46; 1 x jeep, 18 x motorcycle, 9 x motorcycle combination)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//26; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x

motorcycle)

- Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//30; 4 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 12 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3 t tanker

truck)

2 x Signals Company (one wire, one wireless; 5/24/135//164)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- 4 x Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 4 x 1.5 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

247

Anti-Air Battalion (25/101/624//750)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Battery (6/25/140//171)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Anti-Air Platoon (0/5/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Topography Platoon (1/4/29/34; 3 x 0.75 t truck, 3 x jeep, 5 x motorcycle, 3 x

motorcycle combination)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 3 x M3 halftrack, 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 5

x 3 t truck, 2 x 3 t tanker truck)

3 x Heavy Anti-Air Battery (4/18/120//142)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 2 x Heavy Gun Platoon (1/3/27//31; 3 x 76.5 mm M37 AA gun, 6 x M3 halftrack,

1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Light Gun Platoon (0/5/21//26; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Fire Control Platoon (1/3/30//34; 3 x searchlight, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x mo-

torcycle)

Medium Anti-Air Battery (3/21/120//144)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 1 x Medium Gun Platoon (1/4/25//30; 4 x 40 mm Bofors Modell 36 AA gun, 8 x

1.5 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 2 x NCO-led Medium Gun Platoon (0/5/25//30; 4 x 40 mm Bofors Modell 36 AA

gun, 8 x 1.5 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Fire Control Platoon (1/3/30//34; 3 x searchlight, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x mo-

torcycle)

248

Engineer Battalion (22/121/748//891)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Company (6/24/144//174)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Engineer Reconnaissance Platoon (0/4/33/37; 7 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 12 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3

t tanker truck)

3 x Engineer Company (3/24/150//177)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/8//12; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/8//10; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- 1 x Engineer Platoon (1/3/33//37; 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 2 x NCO-led Engineer Platoon (0/4/33//37; 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcy-

cle)

- Heavy Engineer Platoon (1/6/30//37; 1 x jeep, 15 x 3 t truck)

Bridging Company (3/24/150//177)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (0/4/8//12; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/8//10; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- 1 x Pontoon Platoon (1/3/33//37; 1 x jeep, 15 x 3 t truck)

- 2 x NCO-led Pontoon Platoon (0/4/33//37; 1 x jeep, 15 x 3 t truck)

- Boat Platoon (1/6/30//37; 1 x jeep, 15 x 3 t truck)

249

Medical Battalion (81/104/542//727)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Company (26/34/115//175)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15, 4 x truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker

truck)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Hospital Platoon (18/10/18//49; 4 x 3 t truck, 9 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Veterinary Platoon (5/10/24//42; 6 x 3 t truck, 3 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 12 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3

t tanker truck)

3 x Medical Company (17/23/141//181)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/2/8//10; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

- 3 x Medical Platoon (5/5/32//42; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 4 x 3 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x

motorcycle)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 15 x 3 t truck, 2 x 3

t tanker truck)

Quartermaster Battalion (28/214/969//1,211)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Company (6/25/143//174)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Mail Platoon (0/5/32//37; 5 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 4 x motorcycle combination,

8 x 0.75 t truck, 2 x 3 t truck)

250

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t, 12 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3 t

tanker truck)

3 x Transport Company (one fuel; 3/24/147//174)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6//8; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- 2 x Transport Platoon (1/4/32//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 16 x 3 t truck)

- 2 x NCO-led Transport Platoon (0/5/32//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 16 x 3 t

truck)

2 x Maintenance Company (3/38/125//166)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 2 x Maintenance Platoon (1/8/28//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 16 x 3 t truck)

- 2 x NCO-led Maintenance Platoon (0/9/28//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 16 x 3 t

truck)

Baker Company (3/40/131//174)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6//8; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- 1 x Baker Platoon (1/8/28//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 8 x 3 t truck)

- 2 x NCO-led Baker Platoon (0/9/28//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 8 x 3 t truck)

- Butcher Platoon (1/8/28//37; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 8 x 3 t truck)

251

2 x Infantry Brigade (95/374/2,577//3,046)

Brigade HQ (11/5/13//29)

- Command Squad (CO, XO, intelligence officer, artillery officer, signals officer, engineer of-

ficer, brig SMAJ, signals sgt, 6 x clerk; 6 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 t truck)

- Adjutant Squad (adjutant, pay officer, 2 x NCO, 4 x clerk; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Quartermaster Squad (QM officer, chemical officer, surgeon, 1 x NCO, 3 x clerk; 3 x jeep, 1 x

0.4 t truck)

HQ Company (4/28/146//178)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

3 x cook, 4 x truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x truck driver/mechanic;

2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- Brigade Band (band leader, assistant band leader, 2 x musician/medic NCO, 8 x musi-

cian/medic; 1 x 1.5 t truck)

Motorcycle Platoon (0/5/41//46)

- Platoon HQ (NCO plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x Motorcycle Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, machinegunner, as-

sistant machinegunner, 6 x rifleman; 4 x motorcycle, 2 x motorcycle combina-

tion)

Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle mes-

senger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader, driver/me-

chanic; 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//31)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle mes-

senger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader, assistant

loader, driver/mechanic; 1 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

Signals Platoon (1/4/29//35)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle mes-

senger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone operator, 4 x

driver/mechanic; 4 x 0.75 t truck)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO, 4 x driver/mechanic; 4

x 0.75 t truck)

252

Cannon Company (4/16/81//101)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x telephone operator, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1

x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 4 x truck

driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

3 x Cannon Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, telephone operator, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x

motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- 2 x gun section (section leader, assistant section leader, gunner, assistant gunner,

loader, assistant loader, telephone operator, 2 x driver/mechanic; 1 x 105 mm M3

howitzer, 2 x 0.75 t truck)

Heavy Mortar Company (4/16/81//101)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x telephone operator, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1

x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 4 x truck

driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

3 x Mortar Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, telephone operator, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x

motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- 4 x mortar squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner,

driver/mechanic; 1 x 107 mm M2 mortar, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

3 x Infantry Battalion (24/103/752//879)

- Battalion HQ (CO, XO, adjutant, intelligence officer, bat SMAJ, 4 x clerk; 4 x jeep)

HQ Company (6/25/161//192)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x mo-

torcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x

QM clerk, 3 x cook, 4 x truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t

tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2 x surgeon, 2 x medical sgt, 12 x medic, 1 x driver/mechanic; 4

x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone opera-

tor, 4 x driver/mechanic; 4 x 0.75 t truck)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO, 4 x driver/me-

chanic; 4 x 0.75 t truck)

253

Scout Platoon (0/5/29/34)

- Platoon HQ (NCO plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x mo-

torcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 3 x Scout Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x scout; 1 x jeep,

1 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- Sniper Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x sniper; 2 x jeep)

Engineer Platoon (1/4/42//47)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 4 x driver/mechanic; 1 x jeep, 3 x 3 t

truck)

- 3 x Engineer Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engineer)

- Engineer Reconnaissance Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x

engineer; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle combination)

Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 3 x driver/mechanic; 1 x jeep, 2 x 3 t

tanker truck)

- 3 x Transport Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x truck

driver/mechanic; 4 x 3 t truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x truck

driver/mechanic; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

3 x Rifle Company (3/19/148//170)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x mo-

torcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 4 x

truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

1 x Rifle Platoon (1/3/33//37)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 2 x scout, 2 x anti-tank soldier)

- 3 x Rifle Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, machinegunner, as-

sistant machinegunner, 6 x rifleman)

2 x Rifle Platoon with NCO leader (0/4/33//37)

Weapons Platoon (1/4/36//41)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 4 x scout)

- Machinegun Section (section leader, assistant section leader, 3 x ma-

chinegunner, 3 x assistant machinegunner, 9 x ammo bearer; 3 x 7.62 mm

M1919A4 machinegun)

- Mortar Section (section leader, assistant section leader, 3 x mortar gunner,

3 x assistant mortar gunner, 9 x ammo bearer; 3 x 60 mm M2 mortar)

254

Weapons Company (5/20/143//168)

- HQ Squad (CO, XO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x

motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 4 x

truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//26)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader,

driver/mechanic; 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//30)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader, assis-

tant loader, driver/mechanic; 1 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 1 x 0.75 t

truck)

2 x Mortar Platoon (1/4/42//47)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 2 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 2 x 3 t truck, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x Mortar Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, mortar gunner,

loader, 6 x ammo bearer; 1 x 81 mm M1 mortar)

Mechanised Brigade (90/360/2,152//2,602)

Brigade HQ (11/5/13//29)

- Command Squad (CO, XO, intelligence officer, artillery officer, signals officer, engineer of-

ficer, brig SMAJ, signals sgt, 6 x clerk; 6 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 t truck)

- Adjutant Squad (adjutant, pay officer, 2 x NCO, 4 x clerk; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Quartermaster Squad (QM officer, chemical officer, surgeon, 1 x NCO, 3 x clerk; 3 x jeep, 1 x

0.4 t truck)

HQ Company (4/28/146//178)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

3 x cook, 4 x truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x truck driver/mechanic;

2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- Brigade Band (band leader, assistant band leader, 2 x musician/medic NCO, 8 x musi-

cian/medic; 1 x 1.5 t truck)

255

- Motorcycle Platoon (0/5/41//46; 1 x jeep, 18 x motorcycle, 8 x motorcycle com-

bination)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//31; 4 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck

1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//35; 8 x 0.75 t truck 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

Heavy Mortar Company (4/16/81//101)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x telephone operator, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1

x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 4 x truck

driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 4 x 3 t truck)

3 x Mortar Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, telephone operator, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x

motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- 4 x mortar squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner,

driver/mechanic; 1 x 107 mm M2 mortar, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

2 x Mechanised Infantry Battalion (24/103/707//834)

- Battalion HQ (CO, XO, adjutant, intelligence officer, bat SMAJ, 4 x clerk, 2 x

driver/mechanic; 2 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun, 2 x jeep)

HQ Company (6/25/157//188)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x driver, machinegunner; 1 x M3A1

halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x

QM clerk, 3 x cook, 4 x truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t

tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2 x surgeon, 2 x medical sgt, 10 x medic, 3 x driver/mechanic; 2

x M3A1 halftrack, 2 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle

messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone opera-

tor, 4 x driver/mechanic; 4 x 0.75 t truck)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO, 4 x driver/me-

chanic; 4 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 7.62 mm M1919A4 machinegun)

256

Scout Platoon (0/5/29/34)

- Platoon HQ (NCO plt leader, RTO, medic, 1 x driver/mechanic, 2 x mo-

torcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 3 x Scout Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x scout; 1 x jeep,

1 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- Sniper Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x sniper; 2 x jeep)

Engineer Platoon (1/4/42//47)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 3 x Engineer Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, driver, ma-

chinegunner, 6 x engineer; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 7.62 mm M1919A4

machinegun)

- Engineer Reconnaissance Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x

engineer; 3 x jeep)

Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 3 x driver/mechanic; 1 x jeep, 2 x 3 t

tanker truck)

- 3 x Transport Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x truck

driver/mechanic; 4 x 3 t truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x truck

driver/mechanic; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

3 x Rifle Company (3/20/145//168)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x driver, machinegunner; 1 x M3A1

halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 3 x

truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 2 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x driver/me-

chanic; 2 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 7.62 mm M1919A4 machinegun, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

1 x Rifle Platoon (1/3/33//37)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 3 x Rifle Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, driver, machinegun-

ner, automatic rifleman, 6 x rifleman; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 7.62 mm

M1919A4 machinegun)

- 2 x Rifle Platoon with NCO leader (0/4/33//37)

Mortar Platoon (1/3/28//32)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 3 x Mortar Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, driver, ma-

chinegunner, mortar gunner, assistant mortar gunner, 2 x ammo bearer; 1

x M21 halftrack w/ 81 mm M1 mortar)

257

Weapons Company (5/22/108//135)

- HQ Squad (CO, XO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x driver, machinegunner; 1 x M3A1

halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, 3 x

truck driver/mechanic; 1 x 0.75 t, 2 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x driver/me-

chanic; 2 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 7.62 mm M1919A4 machinegun, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, gunner, loader, driver/mechanic; 1 x T10

halftrack w/ 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun)

Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, RTO, gunner, loader, driver/mechanic; 1 x

T48 halftrack w/ 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun)

2 x Cannon Platoon (1/4/23//28)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver, machinegunner, 2 x anti-tank

soldier; 1 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

- 3 x Cannon Squad (squad leader, RTO, gunner, loader, driver/mechanic;

1 x T38 halftrack w/ 105 mm M3 howitzer)

- Ammunition Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 2 x ma-

chinegunner, 2 x driver/mechanic; 2 x M3A1 halftrack w/ 12.7 mm M2

machinegun)

Armor Battalion (23/105/498//626)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep)

HQ Company (7/24/166//196)

- HQ Squad (2/1/8//11; 2 x M4 tank, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x M3A1 halftrack, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcy-

cle)

- Scout Platoon (0/4/31//35; 4 x M2 halftrack)

- Engineer Platoon (1/4/38//43; 4 x M3 halftrack, 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle

combination, 1 x 3 t truck)

258

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x M32 ARV, 2 x M3A1 halftrack, 1

x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 8 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3 t tanker truck)

4 x Armor Company (3/20/82//105)

- HQ Squad (2/1/8//11; 2 x M4A1E4 tank, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6//8; 1 x M32 ARV, 2 x M3A1 halftrack, 2 x 0.75 t

truck)

- 1 x Tank Platoon (1/4/20//25; 5 x M4A1E4 tank)

- 2 x NCO-led Tank Platoon (0/5/20//25; 5 x M4A1E4 tank)

Artillery Regiment (98/356/1,819//2,273)

Regimental HQ (9/5/11//25)

- Command Squad (4/2/4//10; 4 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 t truck)

- Adjutant Squad (2/2/4//8; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.4 t truck)

- Quartermaster Squad (3/1/3//7; 3 x jeep, 1 x 0.4 t truck)

HQ Battery (4/23/156//183)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6//8; 2 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck)

- Regimental Band (0/4/8//12; 1 x 1.5 t truck)

- Motorcycle Platoon (0/5/41//46; 1 x jeep, 18 x motorcycle, 8 x motorcycle com-

bination)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//28; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x

jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//32; 4 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 4 x 0.75 t truck,

1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

Observation Battery (5/36/115//156)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 4 x Observer Platoon (1/8/25/34; 4 x 1.5 t truck, 5 x jeep, 4 x motorcycle combi-

nation)

259

2 x Light Howitzer Battalion (20/73/369//462)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Battery (7/24/140//171)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t

truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Topography Platoon (1/4/29/34; 3 x 0.75 t truck, 3 x jeep, 5 x motorcycle,

3 x motorcycle combination)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 7 x 3 t truck,

2 x 3 t tanker truck)

3 x Light Howitzer Battery (3/16/75//94)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 2 x Howitzer Platoon (1/6/30//37; 3 x 100 mm M39 howitzer, 6 x 1.5 ton

truck)

Medium Howitzer Battalion (20/73/441//534)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Battery (7/24/140//171)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t

truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Topography Platoon (1/4/29/34; 3 x 0.75 t truck, 3 x jeep, 5 x motorcycle,

3 x motorcycle combination)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 7 x 3 t truck,

2 x 3 t tanker truck)

260

3 x Medium Howitzer Battery (3/16/99//118)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 2 x Howitzer Platoon (1/6/42//49; 3 x 149 mm K4 howitzer, 6 x M3

halftrack)

Cannon Battalion (20/73/369//462)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9; 4 x jeep, 1 x motorcycle combination)

HQ Battery (7/24/140//171)

- HQ Squad (1/1/5//7; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

- Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27; 4 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 4 x 0.75 t

truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Signals Platoon (1/4/29//34; 8 x 0.75 t truck, 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Topography Platoon (1/4/29/34; 3 x 0.75 t truck, 3 x jeep, 5 x motorcycle,

3 x motorcycle combination)

- Quartermaster Platoon (1/5/32//38; 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck, 7 x 3 t truck,

2 x 3 t tanker truck)

3 x Cannon Battery (3/16/75//94)

- HQ Squad (1/1/7//9; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- 2 x Cannon Platoon (1/6/30//37; 3 x 105 mm M35 cannon, 6 x M3

halftrack)

Cavalry Regiment (30/164/978//1,172)

- Regimental HQ (4/1/6//11; 2 x M39 scout vehicle, 2 x jeep)

HQ Squadron (6/31/188//225)

- HQ Squad (2/1/8//9; 1 x M18 tank destroyer, 1 x M39 scout vehicle, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (0/4/11//15; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Medical Squad (2/2/13//17; 4 x 0.75 t ambulance, 1 x 3 t truck)

261

- Rifle Troop (0/5/35//40; 10 x jeep, 2 x 7.62 mm M1919A4 machinegun, 2 x 60

mm M2 mortar)

- Anti-Air Troop (0/5/22//27; 1 x M3A1 halftrack, 3 x T10 halftrack w/ 20 mm

Oerlikon AA gun)

- Signals Troop (1/4/25//30; 5 x M39 utility vehicle)

- Engineer Troop (0/5/42//47; 4 x M39 utility vehicle, 3 x jeep)

- Quartermaster Troop (1/5/32//38; 4 x M3A1 halftrack, 1 x jeep, 2 x 0.75 t truck,

8 x 3 t truck, 4 x 3 t tanker truck)

4 x Cavalry Squadron (5/33/196//234)

- HQ Squad (2/1/6//9; 1 x M18 tank destroyer, 1 x M39 scout vehicle, 1 x jeep)

- QM Squad (0/3/8//11; 1 x 0.75 t, 3 x 3 t truck, 1 x 3 t tanker truck)

- Maintenance Squad (0/2/6//8; 2 x M3A1 halftrack, 1 x 0.75 t truck)

- 3 x Cavalry Troop (1/6/42//49; 3 x M18 tank destroyer, 4 x M39 scout vehicle, 1

x 60 mm M2 mortar)

- Mortar Troop (0/4/28//32; 3 x M39 utility vehicle, 3 x M39 utility vehicle w/ 81

mm M1 mortar)

- Anti-Air Troop (0/5/22//27; 1 x M3A1 halftrack, 3 x T10 halftrack w/ 20 mm

Oerlikon AA gun)

262

Appendix I: The Aleutian Task Forces in 1944

1st Aleutian Task Force (Airborne) (5,500)

- 1st US/CAN/RA Special Service Force (2,800)

- 1st RA Airborne Regiment (2,600)

- 1st RA Air Force Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (100)

2nd Aleutian Task Force (Ground) (6,850)

- 3rd Marine Regiment (2,950)

- I./1st Yeger Battalion (700)

- III./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion (900)

- 3 + 4/1st Medical Company (350)

- III./1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 2/1st Signals Company (Amchitka; 150)

- 2nd Military Police Battalion [-] (600)

Aleutian Joint Naval Task Force

Landing Force (RA)

- 1st RA Sealift Squadron

- 1st RA Minesweeper Squadron

- RA Cruiser Division 1

- 1st RA Destroyer Squadron

- 1st RA Auxiliary Squadron

Covering Force (US)

- USS Indianapolis

- USS Louisville

- USS Salt Lake City

- USS St. Louis

- 3 x Omaha-class light cruisers

- US Destroyer Squadron 1

- US Destroyer Division 11

Carrier Force (CAN) - USS Nassau

- HMS Nabob

- HMCS Prince Robert

- RA Cruiser Division 2

- 2 x CAN Tribal-class destroyers

- 5 x CAN River-class frigates

- 3rd + 4th RA Naval Aviation Squadron

263

RA Air Force Aleutian Command

- Kiska Air Base Group

- Shemya Air Base Group

9th Wing (Holodnayabukhta)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 12th Fighter Squadron (Mosquito NF Mk XII)

- 15th Attack Squadron (Shemya; Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

10th Wing (Umnak)

- Umnak Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (P-38G)

- 16th Attack Squadron (Shemya; Mosquito B Mk VII)

14th Wing (Adak)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 17th Fighter Squadron (P-51A)

- 18th Attack Squadron (Mosquito B Mk VII)

15th Wing (Amchitka)

- Amchitka Air Base Group

- 15th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 9th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (Mosquito B Mk VII, PR Mk VIII)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (P-38G)

11th US Air Force

10th Troop Carrier Group (Elmendrov)

- 2nd + 3rd RA Transport Squadron (C-47)

- 42nd Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47)

- 54th Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47)

- 307th Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47)

- 308th Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47)

28th Bombardment Group (Adak)

- 77th Bombardment Squadron (Kiska, Shemya; B-25C)

- 404th Bombardment Squadron (Amchitka, Shemya; B-24D)

343rd Fighter Group (Adak)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (Adak; P-40K, P-38G)

- 18th Fighter Squadron (Amchitka; P-40K, P-38G)

- 54th Fighter Squadron (Kiska, Shemya; P-38G)

- 344th Fighter Squadron (Kiska, Shemya; P-40K)

264

Appendix J: The Light Task Force

1st Aleutian Task Force (Light) (4,200)

- 1st Airborne Regiment (2,550)

- I./1st Yeger Battalion (750)

- 3, 6 + 9/1st Marine Companies (500)

- 1st Air Force Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (100)

- Detachment, 4th Amphibious Squadron (300)

Attached: (1,450)

- 2nd Military Police Battalion [-] (600)

- 2/1st Signals Company (Amchitka; 150)

- 2 + 4/1st Quartermaster Companies (300)

- 4/1st Engineer Company (200)

- 4/1st Medical Company [+] (200)

265

Appendix K: 1945 Russian American Order of Battle + Homeguard

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Stoyanka; 136,800, including 23,100 cadre, 9,600 female auxilia-

ries and 11,600 Marines)

- Army HQ (400)

- Signals Regiment Army High Command (2,800)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment [-] (Nome; 1,600)

- 1st Guards Regiment [-] (HQ, HQ and cannon company, III. Battalion, 1/7th Guards Cossacks

Squadron; 1,450)

- 1st Commando Battalion (300)

- School Command (2,100)

I Russian American Army Corps *** (Beringa; 56,800)

- I Corps HQ (200)

- 1st Army Aviation Squadron (200)

- 1st Signals Battalion (900)

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment (3,200)

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment [-] (1,900)

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment [-] (1,500)

1st Division ** (16,350)

- 1st Division Command (650)

- 1st + 2nd Stoyanka Infantry Brigade (6,100)

- 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Lehrregiment (1,150)

- 9th Stoyanka Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 1st Anti-Air Lehrbataillon (750)

- 1st Engineer Battalion (900)

- 1st Medical Battalion (750)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

2nd Division ** (16,350)

- 4th Division Command (650)

- 1st Kenai Infantry Brigade (3,050)

- 1st Matanuska-Susitna Brigade (3,050)

- 4th Kenai Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment (1,150)

- 3rd Matanuska-Susitna Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 4th Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 2nd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 2nd Medical Battalion (750)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

266

3rd Division ** (16,350)

- 3rd Division Command (650)

- 1st + 2nd Krasivayaberga Infantry Brigade (6,100)

- 4th Northern Mechanised Brigade (2,600)

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (1,150)

- 4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 3rd Anti-Air Battalion (750)

- 3rd Engineer Battalion (900)

- 3rd Medical Battalion (750)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

II Russian American Army Corps *** (London; 34,400)

- II Corps HQ (200)

- 2nd Army Aviation Squadron (200)

- 10th Signals Battalion (900)

- III./2nd Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

- 1st Marine Replacement Battalion (900)

- 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (2,950)

1st Marine Division ** (France; 10,700)

- Division Command (500)

- 2nd + 3rd Marine Regiment (6,100)

- 1st Marine Artillery Regiment (1,800)

- 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Battalion (600)

- 1st Marine Armoured Battalion (600)

- 1st Marine Quartermaster Battalion (900)

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade (Belgium; 3,800)

- 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade Command (550)

- 7th Guards Cossack Regiment (1,100)

- I.+II./1st Guards Battalions (1,700)

- II./11th Stoyanka Artillery Battalion (450)

1st Airborne Brigade (UK; 3,150)

- 1st Airborne Regiment (2,550)

- 2nd Commando Battalion (300)

- 3rd Commando Battalion (300)

Russian Brigade Allied Forces Atlantic (Iceland; 3,750)

- Russian Brigade AFLANT Command (400)

- II./1st Northern Yeger Battalion [-] (Greenland; 550)

- 2nd Kenai Artillery Group (800)

- 3rd Kenai Artillery Group (1,100)

- II./5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Battalion (900)

267

1st European Theatre Support Brigade (France; 3,400)

- 1st European Theatre Support Brigade Command (550)

- 7th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 9th Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

- 11th Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

2nd European Theatre Support Brigade (Belgium; 3,400)

- 2nd European Theatre Support Brigade Command (550)

- 8th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 10th Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

- 12th Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

Territorial Army Command *** (Stoyanka; 36,950)

- Territorial Army Command HQ (co-located with Army High Command; 200)

- Central Military Court and Prison (800)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 8,350)

- Central Command HQ (200)

- 1st + 2nd Military Police Battalion [-] (1,250)

- 2nd Quartermaster Regiment [-] (2,150)

- 3rd Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 5th Signals Battalion (900)

- Central Military Hospital (900)

Southern Command ** (Kenai; 6,900)

- Southern Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Kenai Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 3rd Military Police Battalion (750)

- 5th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 6th Signals Battalion (900)

- Southern Military Hospital (900)

Northern Command ** (Krasivayaberga; 6,900)

- Northern Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 4th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 6th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 7th Signals Battalion (900)

- Northern Military Hospital (900)

268

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 6,900)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 5th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 7th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 8th Signals Battalion (900)

- Eastern Military Hospital (900)

Western Command ** (Kuskokwim; 6,900)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 3rd Northern Infantry Regiment (2,950)

- 6th Military Police Battalion (750)

- 8th Quartermaster Battalion (1,200)

- 9th Signals Battalion (900)

- Western Military Hospital (900)

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 55,750, including 11,750 cadre and 3,100 fe-

male auxiliaries)

- Navy High Command HQ (300)

- Navy High Command Signals Battalion (900)

- Navy School (1,500)

Naval Operations Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhan-

gelsk; 25,500)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (200)

- Naval Operations Command Signals Battalion (900)

Strike Fleet ** (7,750)

- CVE Admiral Wrangel (650)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (1 x Nakhimov class, 6 x Sumner class, 2,200)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (1 x Nakhimov Class, 6 x Sumner class, 2,200)

- 3rd Destroyer Squadron (1 x Kolchak Class, 9 x Rudderow class, 2,200)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (6 x Skumbrii class, 2 x Mackerel class, 1 x submarine

tender, 500)

Auxiliary Fleet ** (5,300)

- Government yacht and training vessel Almaz (400)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (4 x fleet oiler, 1 x fleet tug, 1,000)

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (4 x icebreaker, 2 x repair ship, 1 x salvage ship, 1 x fleet

tug, 1,400)

269

- 3rd Auxiliary Squadron (4 x replenishment ship, 1 x fleet tug, 1,000)

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 2nd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 3rd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 500)

- 4th Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, inactive)

Transport Fleet ** (10,400)

- Transport Fleet HQ (200)

- 1st Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400)

- 4th Amphibious Squadron (8 x LST Mk 2, 16 x LCT Mk 6, 1,000)

- 8th Amphibious Squadron (8 x LST Mk 2, 16 x LCT Mk 6, 1,000)

- 9th Amphibious Squadron (8 x LST Mk 2, 16 x LCT Mk 6, 1,000)

- 5th Fast Transport Squadron (5 x Derzky class plus Avtroil, Maklai and Tserigo,

1,000)

- 6th Fast Transport Squadron (8 x Clemson class, 1,000)

- 7th Fast Transport Squadron (8 x Clemson class, 1,000)

Naval Aviation Command (950)

- HQ Squadron Naval Aviation Command (200)

- 1st Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 3rd Naval Aviation Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44, 200)

- 4th Naval Aviation Squadron (20 x Sikorsky R-4C, 150)

Coastal Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhangelsk;

27,550)

- Coastal Command HQ (200)

- Coastal Command Signals Battalion (900)

Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command ** (co-located with Coastal Command; 7,050)

- Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command HQ (200)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Battalion (1,200)

- 1st Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment (1,900)

- I./1st Marine Battalion (850)

Kodiak Navy Command ** (12,350)

- Kodiak Navy Command HQ (200)

- Kodiak Port Battalion (1,200)

- Stoyanka Port Battalion (1,200)

- Baranov Port Battalion (1,200)

- 2nd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

270

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment (1,900)

- II./1st Marine Battalion (850)

Unalaska Navy Command ** (7,050)

- Unalaska Navy Command HQ (200)

- Unalaska Port Battalion (1,200)

- 4th Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (2,900)

- 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment (1,900)

- III./1st Marine Battalion (850)

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command **** (Stoyanka; 46,500, including 12,800 cadre and 4,200 female

auxiliaries)

- Air Force HQ (300)

- Signals Group Air Force HQ (900)

Air Combat Command *** (Stoyanka; 21,900)

- Air Combat Command HQ (co-located with Air Force HQ; 200)

- Signals Group Air Combat Command (900)

Western Command ** (Amchitka; 9,600)

- Western Command HQ (200)

- 2nd + 3rd Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (200)

14th Wing (Adak; 1,900)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 17th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51B)

- 18th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk XVI)

15th Wing (Amchitka; 1,900)

- Amchitka Air Base Group

- 15th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 9th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (10 x Mosquito B Mk XVI, 10 x PR

Mk XVI)

- 23rd Fighter Squadron (20 x Mosquito NF Mk XIX)

271

17th Wing (Shemya; 1,900)

- Shemya Air Base Group

- 17th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 4th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51B)

- 14th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

18th Wing (Kiska; 1,900)

- Kiska Air Base Group

- 18th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 6th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk XVI)

- 12th Fighter Squadron (20 x Mosquito NF Mk XIX)

- Beringa Air Base Group (800)

- Umnak Air Base Group (800)

Home Defence Command ** (Kodiak; 8,800)

- Home Defence Command HQ (200)

1st Wing (Baranov; 1,700)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 22nd Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

3rd Wing (Junograd; 1,600)

- Junograd Air Base Group

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group

7th Wing (Kodiak; 1,800)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 7th Fighter Squadron (20 x Mosquito NF Mk XIX)

13th Wing (Nome; 1,900)

- Nome Air Base Group

- 13th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 8th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

- 16th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk XVI)

- 5th Anti-Air Artillery Group (Kenai; 800)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group (800)

272

European Command (London; 2,400)

- European Command HQ (100)

- 1st Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (100)

9th Wing (Belgium; 1,000)

- 9th Wing Operations Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

10th Wing (UK; 1,200)

- 10th Wing Operations Group

- 10th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk XVI)

- 15th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

Air Force Auxiliary Command *** (Junograd; 24,600)

- Air Force Auxiliary Command HQ (200)

- Signals Group Air Force Auxiliary Command (900)

Transport Command ** (Stoyanka; 10,600)

- Transport Command HQ (200)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka; 1,900)

- Elmendrov Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 2nd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

- 21st Transport Squadron (12 x C-54)

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga; 1,900)

- Laddski Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

- 13th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

8th Wing (Ketchikan; 1,900)

- Ketchikan Air Base Group

- 8th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 20th Aircraft Transfer Squadron

- 24th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47)

273

Auxiliary Air Base Command (4,700)

- Cordova Air Base Group (800)

- Galenya Air Base Group [-] (500)

- Kuskokwim Air Base Group (800)

- Lavrentia Air Base Group (800)

- Makkrazky Air Base Group [-] (500)

- Naknek Air Base Group (800)

- Severoputi Air Base Group [-] (500)

Training Command ** (Junograd; 12,900)

- Training Command HQ (200)

- Air Force School (1,000)

6th Wing (Yakutat; 2,100)

- Yakutat Air Base Group

- 6th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 1st Training Squadron (20 x Tiger Moth)

- 19th Training Squadron (10 x Mosquito T Mk III, 10 x A-20C)

- 25th Training Squadron (10 x P-51A, 10 x P-51B)

- 5th Training Wing (Stoyanka; 2,400)

- 11th Training Wing (Junograd; 2,400)

- 12th Training Wing (Kodiak; 2,400)

- 16th Training Wing (Kenai; 2,400)

HOMEGUARD

Under Territorial Army Central Command (total strength ca. 12,800)

1st + 2nd Matanuska-Susitna Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company (includes one cannon platoon with M1A1 Pack howitzer)

- 3 x Homeguard Company

3rd Matanuska-Susitna Homeguard Battalion (Naval) - HQ Company

- 2 x Boat Company

- Coastal Artillery Battery (BL 6” Mk XIX gun)

1st - 6th Stoyanka Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company

- 3 x Homeguard Company

- Weapons Company (includes one tank platoon with TNHP)

274

7th Stoyanka Homeguard Battalion (Naval)

- HQ Company

- 2 x Boat Company

- Coastal Artillery Battery (BL 6” Mk XIX gun)

8th Stoyanka Homeguard Battalion (Air)

- HQ Company

- Maintenance Company

- 2 x Aircraft Company (one with Douglas Model 8, one with Avro 504/552 and Pitcairn

PCA-2, plus private aircraft)

9th Stoyanka Homeguard Battalion (Naval)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Boat Company

Under Territorial Army Northern Command (total strength ca. 4,300)

- 1st Nome Homeguard Company

- 2nd Nome Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with Fokker Super Uni-

versal plus private aircraft)

- North Yukon Homeguard Company

- Yukon-Denali Homeguard Company

1st + 2nd Krasivayaberga Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company

- 3 x Homeguard Company

- Weapons Company (includes one tank platoon with Vickers Six-Ton)

3rd Krasivayaberga Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company (includes one cannon platoon with M1A1 Pack Howitzer and one tank pla-

toon with Vickers Six-Ton)

- 3 x Homeguard Company

4th Krasivayaberga Homeguard Battalion (Air)

- HQ Company

- Maintenance Company

- 2 x Aircraft Company (one with Northrop Delta, one with Douglas Model 8, plus private

aircraft)

Under Territorial Army Southern Command (total strength ca. 2,500)

- 1st Valdez-Cordova Homeguard Company

- 2nd Valdez-Cordova Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with private

aircraft)

- Yakutat Homeguard Company

275

1st Kenai Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company

- 3 x Homeguard Company

- Weapons Company (includes one tank platoon with Vickers Six-Ton)

2nd Kenai Homeguard Battalion (Naval)

- HQ Company

- 2 x Boat Company

- Coastal Artillery Battery (BL 6” Mk XIX gun)

- Aircraft Company (Douglas Model 8 plus private aircraft)

Under Territorial Army Eastern Command (total strength ca. 2,800)

- 1st Novoarkhangelsk Homeguard Company

- 2nd Novoarkhangelsk Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with Vickers

Vedette)

- Skaguay-Dtehshuh Homeguard Company

- Wrangel Homeguard Company

Junograd Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company (includes one aircraft platoon with private aircraft)

- 3 x Homeguard Company

- Weapons Company

Ketchikan Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company (includes one cannon platoon with M1A1 Pack Howitzer and one aircraft

platoon with private aircraft)

- 2 x Homeguard Company

- Boat Company

Under Territorial Army Western Command (total strength ca. 1,900)

- Aleutian-Peninsula Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with Vickers

Vedette)

- 1st Kuskokwim Homeguard Company

- 2nd Kuskokwim Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with private air-

craft)

- Nushagak-Naknek Homeguard Company (Naval; includes one aircraft platoon with private air-

craft)

- 1st Romanzof Homeguard Company

- 2nd Romanzof Homeguard Company (Naval)

- West Aleutian Homeguard Company (Naval)

276

Kodiak Homeguard Battalion

- HQ Company (includes one cannon platoon with M1A1 Pack Howitzer and one aircraft

platoon with Vickers Vedette)

- Homeguard Company

- Boat Company

- Total homeguard battalions: 15

- Total homeguard battalions (naval): 4

- Total homeguard battalions (air): 2

- Total homeguard companies: 50

- Total boat companies: 18 (including six aircraft platoons)

- Total weapons companies: 10 (including nine tank platoons, plus one tank and five cannon pla-

toons)

- Total aircraft companies: 5 (plus three battalion aircraft platoons and two maintenance compa-

nies)

- Total coastal artillery batteries: 3

Total strength: ca. 24,400

277

Appendix L: The Russian American-Czechoslovakian Battlegroups

1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Division Group

- 1st CSlADG Command

- 1st Russian American Marine Armoured Battalion

- 109th British Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment

- 125th British Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

- 2nd Canadian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment

- 7th British Royal Tank Regiment

1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade

- HQ Company

- Anti-Air Battery

- Anti-Tank Battery

- Engineer Battalion

- Motorised Infantry Battalion

- Tank Regiment

- Field Artillery Regiment

2nd + 3rd Russian American Marine Regiment

- HQ Company

- Engineer Company

- Cannon Company

- Mortar Company

- 3 x Infantry Battalion

110th (later 51st) French Infantry Regiment

- HQ Company

- Weapons Company

- 2 x (later 4 x) Infantry Battalion

1st Russian American Marine Artillery Regiment

- HQ Company

- Observation Battery

- 2 x Howitzer Battalion

1st Russian American Guards Cavalry Brigade

- 1st RAGCB Command

- 7th Russian American Guards Cossack Regiment

- 1st Czechoslovakian Tank Regiment

- 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Detachment

- I. + II./1st Russian American Guards Battalions

- II./11th Stoyanka Artillery Battalion

278

Appendix M: Russian American 1st Airborne Brigade in Europe

1st Airborne Brigade (120/493/2,520//3,133)

Brigade HQ (11/5/13//29)

- Command Squad (CO, XO, intelligence officer, artillery officer, signals officer, engineer of-

ficer, reg SMAJ, signals sgt, 6 x clerk; 7 x jeep)

- Adjutant Squad (adjutant, pay officer, 2 x NCO, 4 x clerk; 3 x jeep)

- Quartermaster Squad (QM officer, chemical officer, surgeon, 1 x NCO, 3 x clerk; 4 x jeep)

HQ Company 1st Airborne Regiment (4/23/98//125)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

3 x cook, driver/mechanic; 4 x jeep)

- Maintenance Squad (armorer sgt, mechanic sgt, 3 x armorer, 3 x driver/mechanic; 4 x

jeep)

- Regimental Band (band leader, assistant band leader, 2 x musician/medic NCO, 8 x mu-

sician/medic; 3 x jeep)

Anti-Air Platoon (1/4/21//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle messen-

ger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader, driver/me-

chanic; 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon AA gun, 1 x jeep)

Anti-Tank Platoon (1/4/25//30)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle messen-

ger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, loader, assistant

loader, driver/mechanic; 1 x 57 mm Six-Pounder AT gun, 1 x jeep)

Signals Platoon (1/4/25//30)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x motorcycle messen-

ger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone operator, 2 x

driver/mechanic; 4 x jeep)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO, 2 x driver/mechanic; 4

x jeep)

279

2 x Parachute Battalion (21/100/717//838)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4; 4 x jeep)

HQ Company (5/20/116//141)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

3 x cook, 1 x driver/mechanic; 4 x jeep)

- Medical Squad (2 x surgeon, 2 x medical sgt, 12 x medic)

Signals Platoon (1/4/21//26)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone operator)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO)

Scout Platoon (0/5/31/36)

- Platoon HQ (NCO plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Scout Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x scout)

- Sniper Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x sniper)

Engineer Platoon (1/4/39//44)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Engineer Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engineer)

- Engineer Reconnaissance Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engi-

neer)

3 x Rifle Company (3/19/144//166)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x messenger)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk)

1 x Rifle Platoon (1/3/33//37)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 2 x scout, 2 x anti-tank soldier)

- 3 x Rifle Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, machinegunner, assistant

machinegunner, 6 x rifleman)

2 x NCO-led Rifle Platoon (0/4/33//37)

Weapons Platoon (1/4/36//41)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 2 x scout, 2 x anti-tank soldier)

- Machinegun Section (section leader, assistant section leader, 3 x machinegunner,

3 x assistant machinegunner, 9 x ammo bearer; 3 x 7.62 mm M1919A4 ma-

chinegun)

- Mortar Section (section leader, assistant section leader, 3 x mortar gunner, 3 x

assistant mortar gunner, 9 x ammo bearer; 3 x 60 mm M2 mortar)

280

Weapons Company (3/22/165//190)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x messenger)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk)

Machinegun Platoon (1/4/39//44)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 4 x gun squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, machinegunner, loader, 6 x

ammo bearer; 1 x 12.7 mm M2 machinegun)

NCO-led Machinegun Platoon (0/5/39//44)

Mortar Platoon (1/4/39//44)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 4 x Mortar Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, mortar gunner, loader, 6

x ammo bearer; 1 x 81 mm M1 mortar)

NCO-led Mortar Platoon (0/5/39//44)

Airborne Support Battalion (29/167/497//693)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4//9)

HQ Company (5/20/116//141)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

3 x cook, 1 x driver/mechanic; 4 x 0.4 t truck)

- Medical Squad (2 x surgeon, 2 x medical sgt, 12 x medic)

Signals Platoon (1/4/21//26)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- Telephone Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x telephone operator)

- Radio Section (sect leader, assistant sect leader, 8 x RTO)

Scout Platoon (0/5/31/36)

- Platoon HQ (NCO plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Scout Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x scout)

- Sniper Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 6 x sniper)

Engineer Platoon (1/4/39//44)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Engineer Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engineer)

- Engineer Reconnaissance Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engi-

neer)

281

Infantry Gun Company (4/16/69//89)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x telephone operator, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1

x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, driver/me-

chanic; 4 x jeep)

3 x Infantry Gun Platoon (1/4/19//24)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, telephone operator, medic; 1 x jeep)

- 2 x gun section (section leader, assistant section leader, gunner, assistant gunner,

loader, assistant loader, telephone operator, 2 x driver/mechanic; 1 x 105 mm M3

howitzer, 2 x jeep)

Heavy Mortar Company (4/16/78//98)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 2 x telephone operator, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 1

x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk, driver/me-

chanic; 4 x jeep)

3 x Mortar Platoon (1/4/22//27)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, telephone operator, medic, driver/mechanic, 2 x

motorcycle messenger; 1 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle, 1 x motorcycle combination)

- 4 x mortar squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner,

driver/mechanic; 1 x 107 mm M2 mortar, 2 x jeep)

Glider Company (9/92/69//170)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x messenger)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk)

4 x Glider Platoon (2/22/15//39; 12 x Horsa glider)

Parachute Training Company (3/22/161//186)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 2 x RTO, 3 x messenger)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk)

2 x Parachute Training Platoon (1/4/38//43)

2 x NCO-led Parachute Training Platoon (0/5/38//43)

282

2 x Commando Battalion (17/49/239//305)

- Battalion HQ (4/1/4; 4 x jeep)

HQ Company (4/15/76//95)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy sgt, 4 x RTO, 3 x motorcycle messenger; 2 x jeep, 2 x motorcycle,

1 x motorcycle combination)

- QM Squad (coy SMAJ, QM sgt, medical NCO, cook NCO, 2 x coy clerk, 2 x QM clerk,

1 x cook, 1 x driver/mechanic; 4 x jeep)

- Medical Squad (1 x surgeon, 1 x medical sgt, 6 x medic)

Engineer Platoon (1/6/27//34)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Engineer Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 8 x engineer)

Mortar Platoon (1/3/30//34)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, messenger)

- 3 x Mortar Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, mortar gunner, loader, 6

x ammo bearer; 1 x 81 mm M1 mortar)

3 x Commando Company (3/11/53//67)

- HQ Squad (CO, coy SMAJ, medical NCO, 2 x RTO, 2 x messenger)

- Mortar Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, 2 x mortar gunner, 2 x assistant mor-

tar gunner, 6 x ammo bearer; 2 x 60 mm M2 mortar)

2 x Commando Platoon (1/4/20//25)

- Platoon HQ (plt leader, RTO, medic, 2 x anti-tank soldier)

- 2 x Commando Squad (squad leader, assistant squad leader, machinegunner, as-

sistant machinegunner, automatic rifleman, 2 x sniper, 3 x rifleman)

283

Appendix N: Russian Contingent Allied Forces Southwest Pacific

Russian Contingent Allied Forces Southwest Pacific (6,500)

Transport Group (2,100)

- 3 x transport (12 x LCM, 24 x LCVP; 700)

- 8 x LST Mk 2 (1,000)

- 12 x LCT Mk 6 (150)

- 4 x LCG (250)

Escort Group (2,550)

- DL Admiral Kolchak (350)

- 2 x Sumner class DD (700)

- 3 x Rudderow class DE (700)

- 1 x oiler, fleet tug, replenishment and repair ship each (800)

1st Southwest Pacific Battlegroup (Ground) (1,800)

- HQ and HQ Company III./1st Yeger Battalion [+] (200)

- 7-9/1st Yeger Companies (500)

- 3, 7 + 11/1st Marine Companies (500)

- 13/1st Provisional Marine Mortar Company (12 x 81 mm M2 mortar; 150)

- 14/1st Provisional Marine Armoured Company (14 x LVT-4, 6 x LVT(A)-4; 150)

- 4/1st Engineer Company (200)

- 4/2nd Military Police Company (150)

284

Appendix O: Russian American Forces in Europe on 7 May 1945

II Russian American Army Corps *** (London; 43,550)

- II Corps HQ (200)

- 2nd Army Aviation Squadron (200)

- 10th Signals Battalion (900)

- III./2nd Quartermaster Battalion (1,050)

Note: One each flight of 5 x L-5B and 5 x R-6A from 2nd Army Aviation Squadron were attached

to 1st Marine Division and 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade.

1st Marine Division ** (assigned to II Canadian Corps – Harlingen, NL; 14,200)

- Division Command (500)

- 2nd - 4th Marine Regiment (9,150)

- 1st Marine Artillery Regiment (2,250)

- 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Battalion (600)

- 1st Marine Armoured Battalion (600)

- 1st Marine Quartermaster Battalion (900)

Note: 4th Marine Regiment and IV./1st Marine Artillery Battalion were being formed at

Dunkirk, the former from 1st Marine Replacement Battalion, 822nd Georgian Infantry Bat-

talion and Signals Battle School personnel, the latter training on 105 mm howitzers put in

storage there when 1st Marine Artillery Regiment transitioned to 25-pounders.

1st Guards Cavalry Brigade (attached to XII US Corps – Prague, CZ; 3,800)

- 1st Guards Cavalry Brigade Command (550)

- 7th Guards Cossack Regiment (1,100)

- I.+II./1st Guards Battalion (1,700)

- II./11th Stoyanka Artillery Battalion (450)

1st Airborne Brigade (attached to XVIII US Airborne Corps, en route from Friesland to

Danish border; 3,150)

- 1st Airborne Regiment (2,550)

- 2nd Commando Battalion (300)

- 3rd Commando Battalion (300)

Russian Brigade Allied Forces Atlantic (Iceland; 4,150)

- Russian Brigade AFLANT Command (550)

- II./1st Northern Yeger Battalion [-] (Greenland; 550)

- The Iceland Regiment (3,050)

1st European Theatre Support Brigade (Metz, FR; 5,300)

- 1st European Theatre Support Brigade Command (400)

- I./4th Stoyanka Infantry Battalion (850)

- 5th Construction Group (1,200)

- 7th Quartermaster Group (1,050)

- 9th Transport Group (attached to Ninth US Army; 900)

- 11th Transport Group (attached to First US Army; 900)

285

2nd European Theatre Support Brigade (Maubeuge, FR; 5,300)

- 2nd European Theatre Support Brigade Command (400)

- II./4th Stoyanka Infantry Battalion (850)

- 6th Construction Group (1,200)

- 8th Quartermaster Group (1,050)

- 10th Transport Group (attached to First Canadian Army; 900)

- 12th Transport Group (attached to Second British Army; 900)

3rd European Theatre Support Brigade (Strasbourg, FR; 5,300)

- 3rd European Theatre Support Brigade Command (400)

- III./4th Stoyanka Infantry Battalion (850)

- 7th Construction Group (1,200)

- 9th Quartermaster Group (1,050)

- 13th Transport Group (attached to First French Army; 900)

- 14th Transport Group (attached to Third US Army; 900)

Note: Construction groups were being formed to build DP camps with one HQ, heavy engi-

neer and five construction companies of Osttruppen each. Quartermaster groups were

tasked with running the camps and consisted of one HQ, medical [-], MP, maintenance and

two transport (one fuel) companies each. Transport groups were moving DPs and POWs to

the rear and military and humanitarian supplies forward and had one HQ, MP and three

transport companies plus a reinforced medical platoon each.

European Command Russian American Air Force (London; 2,600)

- European Command HQ (100)

- 1st Forward Observer/Security Squadron (100)

- 24th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47A; 200)

Note: Two flights of 1st FO/S Squadron were attached to 1st Marine Division, one to 1st Guards

Cavalry Brigade. 24th Transport Squadron was officially designated a liaison squadron subordi-

nated to Commander Air Force and Deputy Senior Officer Russian American Forces in Europe,

not under Allied command. C-54s from 21st Transport Squadron on the transatlantic route were

attached to this unit for the duration of their stay in the European Theatre.

9th Wing (St. Denijs Westrem, BEL; 1,000)

- 9th Wing Operations Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

- 11th Fighter Squadron (20 x P-51D)

10th Wing (Steenwijk, NL; 1,200)

- 10th Wing Operations Group

- 10th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito B Mk XVI)

- 15th Attack Squadron (20 x Mosquito FB Mk XXI)

286

Appendix P: The Berlin Memorandum of 9 August 1945

The Governments of the United States of America, Canada and Russian America, in the interest

of safeguarding peace and prosperity on the North American continent as well as integrity of their

territories against any powers that would threaten it, hereby express their intention to deepen mu-

tual relations in the spirit of friendship and joint security by

1. Continueing to develop lines of communication and commerce between them;

2. Pledging mutual support in the case of an armed attack on any of them;

3. Admitting Russian America to the Permanent Joint Board of Defense for North America as a

full member to facilitate co-operation in procurement and operations of their armed forces;

4. Planning for the joint defense of their common seaboard, including by basing troops on the ter-

ritory of each other under unified commands within the framework of appropriate agreements

concerning the status of those forces; in particular

a) for Canada and Russian America, concerning the area south of the border of the Yukon Ter-

ritory, extending from the Strait of Juan de Fuca to Icy Bay;

b) for the United States, concerning bases including but not limited to those established under

the 1942 U.S.-Russian American Basing Agreement, understanding that they will provide for

the defense of at least one in the Aleutian, Komandorski and Northern Kurile Islands each.

The Governments resolve to enter into a binding agreement about these aims during the United

Nations conference at San Francisco in October this year.

Berlin, August 9, 1945.

287

Appendix Q: Allied Forces North Pacific Area

ALLIED FORCES NORTH PACIFIC AREA (Admiral Fletcher)

Allied Ground Forces North Pacific Area **** (RA)

- 1st Airborne Brigade

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment

- Signals Regiment Army High Command

- 1st - 4th Air Force Forward Air Control/Security Squadron

I Russian American Army Corps ***

- 1st + 3rd Army Aviation Squadron

- 1st Commando Battalion

- 7th Military Police Battalion

- 1st Signals Battalion

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment

1st Division ** - 1st + 2nd Infantry Brigade

- 3rd Mechanised Brigade

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Lehrregiment

- 1st Artillery Brigade

- 1st Engineer Battalion

- 1st Medical Battalion

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion

2nd Division ** - 4th + 5th Infantry Brigade

- 6th Mechanised Brigade

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment

- 2nd Artillery Brigade

- 2nd Engineer Battalion

- 2nd Medical Battalion

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion

3rd Division ** - 7th + 8th Infantry Brigade

- 9th Mechanised Brigade

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

- 3rd Artillery Brigade

- 3rd Engineer Battalion

- 3rd Medical Battalion

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion

288

1st Marine Division ** - 2nd - 4th Marine Regiment

- 1st Marine Artillery Regiment

- 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Battalion

- 1st Marine Armoured Battalion

- 1st Marine Engineer Battlion

- 1st Marine Quartermaster Battalion

US Army Russian America Defence Command **

- 4th Infantry Regiment

- 37th Infantry Regiment

- 201st Infantry Regiment

- 75th Coast Artillery Regiment

- 205th Coast Artillery Regiment

- 206th Coast Artillery Regiment

- 1/151st Engineer Battalion

13th Canadian Infantry Brigade * - 1st Battalion The Brockville Rifles

- 1st Battalion The Edmonton Fusiliers

- 2nd Battalion The Canadian Scottish Regiment

Allied Naval Forces North Pacific Area **** (US)

Task Force 90 *** (US)

USN Cruiser Division 3 - USS Concord

- USS Richmond

- USS Trenton

USN Cruiser Division 5 - USS Detroit

- USS Pensacola

- USS Raleigh

USN Carrier Division 22 - USS Suwannee

- USS Chenango

- USS Santee

- RAS Wrangel

USN Destroyer Squadron 49 - Destroyer Division 97

- Destroyer Division 98

289

USN Destroyer Squadron 57 - Destroyer Division 113

- Destroyer Division 114

RuN 1st Submarine Squadron

RuN 1st Naval Aviation Wing - 1st Naval Patrol Squadron (S-44)

- 2nd Naval Patrol Squadron (S-44)

- 3rd Naval Patrol Squadron (S-44)

RuN 2nd Naval Aviation Wing - 5th Naval Fighter Training Squadron (FM-2)

- 6th Naval Fighter Squadron (F6F-5)

- 7th Naval Attack Squadron (TBM-3)

RuN 4th Naval Helicopter Squadron

Task Force 91 ** (RA)

- RuN 1st Sealift Squadron

- RuN 2nd Sealift Squadron

- RuN 3rd Sealift Squadron

- RuN 5th Fast Transport Squadron

- RuN 6th Fast Transport Squadron

- RuN 7th Fast Transport Squadron

RuN 1st Destroyer Squadron - RAS Nakhimov

- Destroyer Division 11

- Destroyer Division 12

RuN 2nd Destroyer Squadron - RAS Novitsky

- Destroyer Division 21

- Destroyer Division 22

Task Force 92 ** (CAN)

- RuN 1st Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 2nd Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 3rd Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 4th Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 4th Amphibious Squadron

290

- RuN 8th Amphibious Squadron

- RuN 9th Amphibious Squadron

- RuN 10th Amphibious Squadron

- RuN 11th Amphibious Squadron

- RuN 12th Amphibious Squadron

Canadian Pacific Squadron - HMCS Prince Robert

- HMCS Haida

- HMCS Huron

- HMCS Prince Rupert

- HMCS Swansea

- HMCS Waskesiu

RuN 3rd Destroyer Squadron - RAS Kolchak

- Destroyer Division 31

- Destroyer Division 32

Allied Air Forces North Pacific Area *** (CW)

RuAF 2nd Air Division (Anti-Air) **

9th Wing (P-51D)

- 5th Fighter Squadron

- 11th Fighter Squadron

14th Wing (P-51D)

- 4th Fighter Squadron

- 17th Fighter Squadron

17th Wing (Mosquito FB Mk 26)

- 14th Attack Squadron

- 15th Attack Squadron

18th Wing (Mosquito NF Mk 30)

- 12th Night Fighter Squadron

- 23rd Night Fighter Squadron

20st Wing - 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 15th Anti-Air Artillery Group

291

21st Wing - 17th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 18th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 19th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 20th Anti-Air Artillery Group

Allied Fourth Tactical Air Force **

RuAF 10th Wing (Mosquito B Mk 35)

- 10th Attack Squadron

- 18th Attack Squadron

RuAF 15th Wing (Mosquito B Mk 35, PR Mk 34)

- 6th Attack Squadron

- 9th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron

RuAF 19th Wing (Mosquito FB Mk 26)

- 25th Attack Squadron

- 26th Attack Squadron

RCAF Wing Umnak - No. 8 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Ventura GR Mk V)

- No. 111 Fighter Squadron (Kittyhawk Mk IV)

RCAF Wing Holodnayabukhta - No. 135 Fighter Squadron (Kittyhawk Mk IV)

- No. 149 Torpedo Bomber Squadron (Ventura GR Mk V)

RAAF No. 82 Wing - No. 21 Bomber Squadron (B-24J)

- No. 23 Bomber Squadron (B-24J)

- No. 24 Bomber Squadron (B-24J)

USAAF 28th Bombardment Group - 77th Bombardment Squadron (B-25C)

- 404th Bombardment Squadron (B-24J)

Eleventh US Air Force **

USAAF 343rd Fighter Group (P-40N, P-38L)

- 11th Fighter Squadron

- 18th Fighter Squadron

- 54th Fighter Squadron

- 344th Fighter Squadron

292

USAAF 10th Troop Carrier Group (C-47)

- 42nd Troop Carrier Squadron

- 54th Troop Carrier Squadron

- 307th Troop Carrier Squadron

- 308th Troop Carrier Squadron

RuAF 2nd Wing (C-47)

- 2nd Transport Squadron

- 28th Transport Squadron

RuAF 4th Wing (C-47)

- 3rd Transport Squadron

- 13th Transport Squadron

293

Appendix R: Allied Order of Battle for Operation FENCEGATE

Onekotan Force

Task Group 90.1 - USS Texas

- USN Cruiser Division 5

- USN Destroyer Division 113

Task Group 91.1 - RuN 1st Destroyer Squadron

- RuN 1st + 2nd Sealift Squadron

- 3rd Division Command

- 7th + 8th Infantry Brigade

- 3rd Artillery Brigade [-]

- 3rd Engineer Battalion

- 3rd Medical Battalion

Task Group 92.1 - RuN 1st Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 3rd Destroyer Squadron

- RuN 4th, 8th + 9th Amphibious Squadron

- 6th + 9th Mechanised Brigade

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment

- I./4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Battalion (SP)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion

Shiashkotan Force

Task Group 90.2 - USS Arkansas

- USN Cruiser Division 3

- USN Destroyer Division 114

Task Group 91.2 - RuN 2nd Destroyer Squadron

- RuN 3rd Sealift Squadron

- two unnamed USN transport divisions

- 2nd Division Command

- 4th + 5th Infantry Brigade

- 2nd Artillery Brigade

- 2nd Engineer Battalion

- 2nd Medical Battalion

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion

294

Task Group 92.2 - Canadian Pacific Squadron

- RuN 2nd Minesweeper Squadron

- RuN 10th + 11th Amphibious Squadron

- USS Belle Grove, Casa Grande, Oak Hill and Rushmore

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment

- 3rd Marine Regimental Group

Kharimkotan Force

Task Group 91.3 - RuN 5th Fast Transport Squadron

- Minesweeper Division 31

- I./1st Yeger Battalion

Makanrushi Force

Task Group 91.4 - RuN 6th Fast Transport Squadron

- Minesweeper Division 32

- III./1st Yeger Battalion

Ekarma Force

Task Group 91.5 - RuN 7th Fast Transport Squadron

- Minesweeper Division 33

- IV./1st Marine Battalion Group

Covering Force

Task Group 90.3 - USN Carrier Division 22

- USN Destroyer Squadron 49

- RuN Auxiliary Squadron

295

Appendix S: Allied Order of Battle on Hokkaido on 31 August 1945

US/UK Task Group 38.3 ***

- USS Randolph (flagship)

- USS Cabot

- USS Oakland

- HMS Indefatigable

- HMS Teazer

- HMS Tenacious

- HMS Termagant

- HMS Terpischore

- HMS Troubridge

Carrier Division 5 - USS Monterey

- USS Wasp

Carrier Division 6 - USS Ticonderoga

- USS Bataan

Battleship Division 6 - USS North Carolina

- USS South Dakota

Cruiser Division 17 - USS Astoria

- USS Pasadena

- USS Springfield

- USS Wilkes-Barre

Cruiser Division 18 - USS Duluth

- USS Topeka

Destroyer Squadron 48 - Destroyer Division 95

- Destroyer Division 96

Destroyer Squadron 60 - Destroyer Division 119

- Destroyer Division 120

296

Destroyer Squadron 62 - Destroyer Division 123

- Destroyer Division 124

US 11th Airborne Division ** (Sapporo; total strength with attached units ca. 18,000)

- HQ Company [-]

- 221st Airborne Medical Company

- 408th Airborne Quartermaster Company

- 511th Airborne Signal Company

- 711th Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company [-]

US 511th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team (3,200, Chitose)

- HQ Company

- Service Company

- A/127th Parachute Engineer Company

1 - 3/511th Parachute Infantry Battalion (Chitose, Sapporo)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Infantry Parachute Company

457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (Chitose, less one battery in Sapporo)

- HQ Battery

- 3 x Pack Howitzer Battery

- Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Tank Battery

152nd Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion [-] (Sapporo, less one battery in Chitose)

- Automatic Weapons Battery

- Machinegun Battery

RA 9th Mechanised Brigade Group (4,800; Abashiri)

- HQ Company [+]

- 9th Mechanised Cannon Company

- 9th Mechanised Heavy Mortar Company

- 1/3rd Anti-Aircraft Battery [+]

- 2/3rd Transport Company [+]

- 3/3rd Medical Company

- 4/3rd Engineer Company [+]

- 4/3rd Maintenance Company

I. + II./4th Northern Mechanised Infantry Battalion (Abashiri, Tsubetsu)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Mechanised Infantry Company

- Weapons Company

297

3rd Armour Battalion [-] (Bihoro)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Tank Company

6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment [-] (Senpoku Pass, less one squadron at Abashiri)

- HQ Squadron

- 3 x Cavalry Squadron

I./4th Krasivayaberga Artillery Battalion (Self-Propelled) (Bihoro, less one bat-

tery at Abashiri)

- HQ Battery

- 3 x Self-Propelled Artillery Battery

RA 1st Airborne Brigade (3,200, Nakashibetsu)

- HQ Company

- 1/4th Airborne Cannon Company

- 2/4th Airborne Heavy Mortar Company

1st - 3rd Parachute Battalion (Teshikaga, Shari, Nakashibetsu)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Parachute Company

- Weapons Company

1st Commando Battalion (Senpoku Pass)

- 3 x Commando Company

US 201st Infantry Regiment (2,900; Kushiro)

- HQ Company

- Anti-Tank Company [-]

- Service Company [-]

1 - 3/201st Infantry Battalion - HQ Company

- 3 x Rifle Company

- Weapons Company

RA 1st Yeger Regiment [-] (1,500; Nemuro)

- HQ Company

I. + III./1st Yeger Battalion [-] (companies spread over Nemuro Strait shore and

Habomai Islands)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Yeger Company

298

US/UK TG 38.3 Landing Force (1,700; Kushiro)

- HQ Company (US)

- Service Company (US)

- Artillery Battery (US)

1st + 2nd Battalion (US)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Infantry Company

- Machinegun Company

3rd Battalion (UK)

- HQ Company

- 3 x Infantry Company

299

Appendix T: 1946 Russian American Order of Battle

ARMY

Army High Command **** (Stoyanka; 78,850/180,550, including 14,900/33,700 cadre and

4,100/11,600 female auxiliaries)

- Army HQ (400/400)

- Signals Regiment Army High Command (1,100/2,800)

- 1st Commando Battalion (Beringa; 100/300)

- 1st Guards Regiment (Junograd; one active, one inactive battalion plus 1/7th Guards Cossack

Squadron; 1,400/2,300)

- 1st Northern Yeger Regiment (Nome; 900/2,400)

- 5th Krasivayaberga Heavy Engineer Regiment (1,100/2,800)

- 11th Stoyanka Heavy Artillery Regiment (1,000/2,500)

- 1st Airborne Brigade (1,200/3,300)

- School Command (1,300/3,000)

Russian American Army European Command ** (11,950/12,150)

- Russian American European Command HQ (200/200)

- 1st Guards Mechanised Brigade (4,450/4,450)

- 2nd Commando Battalion (semi-active, 100/300)

- 3rd + 4th European Theatre Support Brigade (7,200/7,200)

I Russian American Army Corps *** (Beringa; 43,100/54,400)

- I Corps HQ (200)

- 1st Army Aviation Squadron (100/150)

- 3rd Army Aviation Squadron (100/150)

- 7th Military Police Battalion (600/750)

- 1st Signals Battalion (700/900)

- 1st Quartermaster Regiment (2,000/3,200)

1st Division ** (Paramushir, Shumshu; 16,350/16,350)

- 1st Division Command (650/650)

- 1st + 2nd Infantry Brigade (6,100/6,100)

- 3rd Mechanised Brigade (2,600/2,600)

- 5th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (1,150/1,150)

- 1st Artillery Brigade (3,000/3,000)

- 1st Engineer Battalion (900/900)

- 1st Medical Battalion (750/750)

- 1st Quartermaster Battalion (1,200/1,200)

300

2nd Division ** (Beringa; semi-active, 6,800/16,450)

- 4th Division Command (0/650)

- 4th + 5th Infantry Brigade (0/6,100)

- 6th Mechanised Brigade (2,600/2,600)

- 2nd Kenai Cavalry Regiment (700/1,150)

- 2nd Artillery Brigade (1,700/3,000)

- 2nd Engineer Battalion (550/900)

- 2nd Medical Battalion (550/750)

- 2nd Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

3rd Division ** (Urup, Shimushir; 16,450/16,450)

- 3rd Division Command (650/650)

- 7th + 8th Infantry Brigade (6,100/6,100)

- 9th Mechanised Brigade (2,600/2,600)

- 6th Stoyanka Cavalry Regiment (1,150/1,150)

- 3rd Artillery Brigade (3,000/3,000)

- 3rd Engineer Battalion (900/900)

- 3rd Medical Battalion (750/750)

- 3rd Quartermaster Battalion (1,200/1,200)

II Russian American Army Corps (Reserve) *** (Stoyanka; 8,350/53,200)

- II Corps HQ (co-located with Army High Command; 0/200)

- 2nd Army Aviation Squadron (150/150)

- 4th Army Aviation Squadron (0/150)

- 8th Military Police Battalion (0/750)

- 10th Signals Battalion (0/900)

- 3rd Quartermaster Regiment (0/3,200)

1st Marine Division ** (Kenai; semi-active, 5,400/15,150)

- Division Command (500/650)

- 2nd Marine Regiment (3,050/3,050)

- 3rd Marine Regiment (0/3,050)

- 4th Marine Regiment (0/3,050)

- 1st Marine Artillery Regiment (450/2,250)

- 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Battalion (200/750)

- 1st Marine Armoured Battalion (400/900)

- 1st Marine Engineer Battalion (200/900)

- 1st Marine Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

4th Division (Reserve) ** (Stoyanka; 1,400/16,350)

- 4th Division Command (500/650)

- 10th + 11th Infantry Brigade (0/6,100)

- 12th Mechanised Brigade (0/2,600)

- 8th Cossack Regiment (0/1,150)

- 4th Artillery Brigade (0/3,000)

301

- 4th Engineer Battalion (0/900)

- 4th Medical Battalion (300/750)

- 4th Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

5th Division (Reserve) ** (Krasivayaberga; 1,400/16,350)

- 5th Division Command (500/650)

- 13th + 14th Infantry Brigade (0/6,100)

- 15th Mechanised Brigade (0/2,600)

- 9th Cossack Regiment (0/1,150)

- 5th Artillery Brigade (0/3,000)

- 5th Engineer Battalion (0/900)

- 5th Medical Battalion (300/750)

- 9th Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

Territorial Army Command *** (Stoyanka; 4,150/41,200)

- Territorial Army Command HQ (co-located with Army High Command; 0/200)

- Central Military Court and Prison (300/800)

Central Command ** (Stoyanka; 750/12,600)

- Central Command HQ (co-located with 4th Division HQ; 0/200)

- 4th Stoyanka Infantry Regiment (0/2,950)

- The Iceland Regiment (0/2,950)

- 1st + 2nd Military Police Battalions (one reserve; 750/1,500)

- 2nd Quartermaster Regiment (0/3,200)

- 5th Signals Battalion (0/900)

- Central Military Hospital (0/900)

Southern Command ** (Kenai; 700/6,900)

- Southern Command HQ (co-located with 1st Marine Division HQ; 0/200)

- 3rd Kenai Infantry Regiment (0/2,950)

- 3rd Military Police Battalion (400/750)

- 5th Quartermaster Battalion (0/1,200)

- 6th Signals Battalion (0/900)

- Southern Military Hospital (300/900)

Northern Command ** (Krasivayaberga; 400/6,900)

- Northern Command HQ (co-located with 5th Division HQ; 0/200)

- 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry Regiment (0/2,950)

- 4th Military Police Battalion (400/750)

- 6th Quartermaster Battalion (0/1,200)

- 7th Signals Battalion (0/900)

- Northern Military Hospital (0/900)

302

Eastern Command ** (Junograd; 1,800/6,900)

- Western Command HQ (100/200)

- 2nd Northern Infantry Regiment (0/2,950)

- 5th Military Police Battalion (400/750)

- 7th Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

- 8th Signals Battalion (400/900)

- Eastern Military Hospital (300/900)

Western Command ** (Kuskokwim; 1,800/6,900)

- Western Command HQ (100/200)

- 3rd Northern Infantry Regiment (0/2,950)

- 6th Military Police Battalion (400/750)

- 8th Quartermaster Battalion (600/1,200)

- 9th Signals Battalion (400/900)

- Western Military Hospital (300/900)

NAVY

Navy High Command **** (Novoarkhangelsk; 35,250/64,100, including 7,950/13,650 cadre

and 1,400/3,800 female auxiliaries)

- Navy High Command HQ (300/300)

- Navy High Command Signals Battalion (900/900)

- Navy School (800/1,500)

Naval Operations Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhan-

gelsk; 19,750/29,700)

- Naval Operations Command HQ (100/200)

- Naval Operations Command Signals Battalion (0/900)

Strike Fleet ** (8,100/8,750)

- Carrier Division 1 (semi-active; Wrangel, Voyevodski, 750/1,400)

- 1st Destroyer Squadron (1 x Nakhimov class, 6 x Sumner class, 2,200/2,200)

- 2nd Destroyer Squadron (1 x Nakhimov Class, 6 x Sumner class, 2,200/2,200)

- 3rd Destroyer Squadron (1 x Kolchak Class, 9 x Rudderow class, 2,200/2,200)

- 1st Submarine Squadron (6 x Tench class, 2 x Mackerel class, 1 x submarine ten-

der, 750/750)

Auxiliary Fleet ** (4,000/6,600)

- Auxiliary Fleet HQ (100/200)

- 1st Auxiliary Squadron (3 x fleet oiler, 1 x repair ship, 1 x icebreaker, 1 x fleet tug,

1,200/1,200)

303

- 2nd Auxiliary Squadron (reserve; 2 x icebreaker, 1 x fleet oiler, 1 x replenishment

ship, 1 x salvage ship, 1 x fleet tug, 0/1,000)

- 3rd Auxiliary Squadron (3 x replenishment ship, 1 x repair ship, 1 x icebreaker, 1 x

fleet tug, 1,200/1,200)

- 1st Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 1 x minesweeper tender, 750/750)

- 2nd Minesweeper Squadron (12 x Isles class, 1 x minesweeper tender, 750/750)

- 3rd Minesweeper Squadron (reserve; 12 x Isles class, 1 x minesweeper tender,

0/750)

- 4th Minesweeper Squadron (reserve; 12 x Isles class, 1 x minesweeper tender,

0/750)

Transport Fleet ** (4,800/10,100)

- Transport Fleet HQ (100/200)

- 1st Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400/1,400)

- 2nd Sealift Squadron (6 x transport, 1,400/1,400)

- 3rd Sealift Squadron (reserve; 6 x transport, 0/1,400)

- 4th Amphibious Squadron (12 x LST Mk 2, 1,400/1,400)

- 8th Amphibious Squadron (reserve; 12 x LST Mk 2, 0/1,400)

- 9th Amphibious Squadron (reserve; 12 x LST Mk 2, 0/1,400)

- 10th Amphibious Squadron (24 x LCT Mk 6, 1 x LCT tender, 500)

- 11th Amphibious Squadron (reserve; 24 x LCT Mk 6, 1 x LCT tender, 0/500)

- 12th Amphibious Squadron (reserve; 24 x LCT Mk 6, 1 x LCT tender, 0/500)

Naval Aviation Command ** (2,750/3,150)

- HQ Squadron Naval Aviation Command (200)

- 4th Naval Helicopter Squadron (18 x Sikorsky R-5A, 150)

- 1st Naval Aviation Wing (1,200/1,400)

- 1st Naval Aviation Wing Operations Group

- 1st Naval Patrol Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44)

- 2nd Naval Patrol Squadron (9 x Sikorsky S-44)

- 3rd Naval Patrol Squadron (reserve; 9 x Sikorsky S-44)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Wing (1,200/1,400)

- 2nd Naval Aviation Wing Operations Group

- 4th Naval Fighter Training Squadron (reserve; 18 x FM-2)

- 5th Naval Fighter Squadron (18 x F6F-5)

- 6th Naval Attack Squadron (18 x TBM-3)

Coastal Command *** (co-located with Navy High Command, Novoarkhangelsk;

13,500/31,700)

- Coastal Command HQ (100/200)

- Coastal Command Signals Battalion (0/900)

304

Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command ** (co-located with Coastal Command;

3,350/7,050)

- Novoarkhangelsk Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Novoarkhangelsk Port Battalion (600/1,200)

- 1st Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (1,100/2,900)

- 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment (700/1,900)

- I./1st Marine Battalion (850/850)

Kodiak Navy Command ** (3,350/9,450)

- Kodiak Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Kodiak Port Battalion (600/1,200)

- Stoyanka Port Battalion (reserve; 0/1,200)

- Baranov Port Battalion (reserve; 0/1,200)

- 2nd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (1,100/2,900)

- 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment (700/1,900)

- II./1st Marine Battalion (850/850)

Kataoka Navy Command ** (3,350/7,050)

- Kataoka Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Kataoka Port Battalion (600/1,200)

- 3rd Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (1,100/2,900)

- 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment (1,900/1,900)

- III./1st Marine Battalion (850/850)

Unalaska Navy Command ** (3,350/7,050)

- Unalaska Navy Command HQ (100/200)

- Unalaska Port Battalion (600/1,200)

- 4th Navy Training and Replacement Regiment (1,100/2,900)

- 4th Coastal Artillery Regiment (700/1,900)

- IV./1st Marine Battalion (850/850)

AIR FORCE

Air Force High Command **** (Stoyanka; 33,200/51,000, including 8,650/12,400 cadre and

4,600/5,800 female auxiliaries)

- Air Force HQ (300/300)

- Signals Group Air Force HQ (900/900)

Air Combat Command *** (Stoyanka; 18,450/24,550)

- Air Combat Command HQ (co-located with Air Force High Command; 100/200)

- Signals Group Air Combat Command (reserve, 0/900)

- 1st - 4th Forward Air Control/Security Squadron (two reserve, 200/400)

305

1st Air Division (Home Defence) ** (Stoyanka; 6,550/11,450)

- 1st Air Division HQ (100/200)

1st Wing (reserve; Baranov, 0/1,650)

- Baranov Air Base Group

- 1st Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 22nd Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

3rd Wing (reserve; Junograd, 0/1,650)

- Junograd Air Base Group

- 3rd Anti-Air Artillery Group

6th Wing (reserve; Yakutat, 0/1,650)

- Yakutat Air Base Group

- 6th Anti-Air Artillery Group

9th Wing (Adak; 1,850/1,850)

- Adak Air Base Group

- 9th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 4th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

- 25th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito FB Mk 26)

13th Wing (Nome; 1,850/1,850)

- Nome Air Base Group

- 13th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 8th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

- 10th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito B Mk 35)

17th Wing (Holodnayabukhta; 1,850/1,850)

- Holodnayabukhta Air Base Group

- 17th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 7th Fighter Squadron (18 x Mosquito NF Mk 30)

- 26th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito FB Mk 26)

- 5th Anti-Air Artillery Group (reserve; Kenai, 0/750)

2nd Air Division (Island Defence) ** (Beringa; 11,600/11,600)

- 2nd Air Division HQ (200/200)

10th Wing (Amchitka; 1,850/1,850)

- Amchitka Air Base Group

- 10th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 5th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

- 18th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito B Mk 35)

306

14th Wing (Beringa; 2,100/2,100)

- Beringa Air Base Group

- 14th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 9th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (12 x B Mk 35, 12 x PR Mk 34)

- 23rd Night Fighter Squadron (18 x Mosquito NF Mk 30)

15th Wing (Paramushir; 1,900/1,900)

- Paramushir Air Base Group

- 15th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 6th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito B Mk 35)

- 12th Night Fighter Squadron (18 x Mosquito NF Mk 30)

18th Wing (Urup; 1,850/1,850)

- Urup Air Base Group

- 18th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 16th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito B Mk 35)

- 27th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

19th Wing (Shumshu; 1,850/1850)

- Shumshu Air Base Group

- 19th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 11th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

- 14th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito FB Mk 26)

20th Wing (Matua; 1,850/1,850)

- Matua Air Base Group

- 20th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 17th Fighter Squadron (18 x P-51D)

- 15th Attack Squadron (18 x Mosquito FB Mk 26)

Air Force Auxiliary Command *** (Stoyanka; 13,550/25,250)

- Air Force Auxiliary Command HQ (co-located with Air Force High Command; 100/200)

- Signals Group Air Force Auxiliary Command (reserve, 0/900)

4th Air Division (Transport) ** (Stoyanka; 6,500/11,050)

- 4th Air Division HQ (100/200)

2nd Wing (Stoyanka; 1950/1,950)

- Elmendrov Air Base Group

- 2nd Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 21st Transport Squadron (12 x C-54)

- 28th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47B)

307

4th Wing (Krasivayaberga; 1,950/1,950)

- Laddski Air Base Group

- 4th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 3rd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47A)

- 13th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47A)

8th Wing (reserve; Ketchikan, 0/1,950)

- Ketchikan Air Base Group

- 8th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 2nd Transport Squadron (12 x C-47A)

- 24th Transport Squadron (12 x C-47A)

Auxiliary Base Command (2,500/2,500)

- Galenya Air Base Group (500/500)

- Kuskokwim Air Base Group (500/500)

- Lavrentia Air Base Group (500/500)

- Makkrazky Air Base Group (500/500)

- Naknek Air Base Group (500/500)

Reserve Base Command (0/2,500)

- Cordova Air Base Group (0/500)

- Kiska Air Base Group (0/500)

- Severoputi Air Base Group (0/500)

- Umnak Air Base Group (0/500)

- Yakutat Air Base Group (0/500)

5th Air Division (Training) ** (Kodiak; 6,050/13,100)

- 5th Air Division HQ (100/200)

- Air Force School (800/1,200)

7th Wing (Kodiak; 1,950/2,100)

- Kodiak Air Base Group

- 7th Anti-Air Artillery Group

- 1st Training Squadron (18 x Tiger Moth)

- 19th Training Squadron (12 x P-51B, 12 x Mosquito T Mk III)

- 25th Training Squadron (reserve; 12 x P-51B, 12 x Mosquito T Mk III)

- 5th Training Wing (Stoyanka; 800/2,400)

- 11th Training Wing (Junograd; 800/2,400)

- 12th Training Wing (Kodiak; 800/2,400)

- 16th Training Wing (Kenai; 800/2,400)

308

Abbreviations

1st CSlABG First Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade Group

1st CSlADG First Czechoslovakian Armoured Division Group

1st SSF First Special Service Force

7th RTR Seventh Royal Tank Regiment

AA Anti-Aircraft

AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters (in the Mediterranean Theatre)

AFNPA Allied Forces North Pacific Area

ATAF Allied Tactical Air Force

ATF (G) Aleutian Task Force (Ground)

ATF (ABN) Aleutian Task Force (Airborne)

APD Auxiliary Personnel Destroyer (high speed transport)

CRZ Czeskogo Rossii Závoda (Czech-Russian Enterprises)

CL Cruiser Light

CVE Cruiser Aviation Escort (escort aircraft carrier)

DE Destroyer Escort

DP Displaced Person

FO/S Forward Observer/Security

HQ Headquarters

IJA Imperial Japanese Army

IJN Imperial Japanese Navy

JATF Joint Allied Task Force

KIA Killed in Action

LCG Landing Craft Gun

LCM Landing Craft Mechanised

LCT Landing Craft Tank

LCVP Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel

LSD Landing Ship Dock

LST Landing Ship Tank

LVT Landing Vehicle Tracked

MP Military Police

NCO Non-commissioned officer

309

OOB Order of Battle

POW Prisoner of War

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAF Royal Air Force

RAN Royal Australian Navy

RBZ Russkaya-Boheme Závod (Russian-Bohemian Enterprise)

RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

RCN Royal Canadian Navy

ROA Russkaya osvoboditel'naya armiya (Russian Liberation Army)

RN Royal Navy

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces

SS Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)

TF Task Force

TG Task Group

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

USAAF United States Army Air Force

USCG United States Coast Guard

USMC United Stated Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

VBF Aviation Squadron Bombing Fighting

VC Aviation Squadron Composite

VF Aviation Squadron Fighting

WIA Wounded in Action

XO Executive Officer

310

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