Developmental Psychology1982, Vol. 18, No. 2, 199-214

Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0012-1649/82/1802-0199S00.75

Antecedents of Self-Regulation:A Developmental Perspective

Claire B. KpppGraduate School of Education, University of California, Los Angeles

The emerging ability to comply with caregivers' dictates and to monitor one'sown behavior accordingly signifies a major growth of early childhood. However,scant attention has been paid to the developmental course of self-initiated reg-ulation of behavior. This article summarizes the literature devoted to early formsof control and highlights the different philosophical orientations in the literature.Then, focusing on the period from early infancy to the beginning of the preschoolyears, the author proposes an ontogenetic perspective tracing the kinds of mod-ulation or control the child is capable of along the way. The developmentalsequence of monitoring behaviors that is proposed calls attention to contributionsmade by the growth of cognitive skills. The role of mediators (e.g., caregivers)is also discussed.

During the second year of life, childrenincreasingly demonstrate signs of selfhoodand autonomy. This growing sense of iden-tity, coupled with the ability to recall thedictates of caregivers, leads to a new dimen-sion in behavior. Children begin to appraisethe requirements of social and nonsocial sit-uations and to monitor their own behavioraccordingly. Slowly and precariously theymove toward self-regulation, an achievementthat Flavell (1977) descibes as being "oneof the really central and significant cogni-tive-developmental hallmarks of the earlychildhood period" (p. 64).

Self-regulation, studied extensively witholder children and adults (see Kanfer &Karoly, 1972; Mischel & Patterson, 1979),merits consideration by students of earlydevelopment. It has implications for under-standing the nature of transitions from sen-

This article is an adapted and expanded version of apaper presented at the biennial meeting of the Societyfor Research in Child Development, San Francisco,March 1979. This work is supported by Contract No.300-77-0306, from the U.S. Office of Education, Bureauof Education for the Handicapped.

Appreciation is extended to Joanne Krakow and BrianVaughn for their continuing interest and commentsabout the ideas expressed in this article, to DeborahStipek, John Weisz, and anonymous reviewers forthoughtful critiques of earlier drafts of the manuscript,and to E. H. Kopp for editorial advice.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Glaire B.Kopp, Graduate School of Education, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, California 90024.

sorimotor levels of functioning to those or-ganized around reflective thought, task-oriented behaviors, and social interactions.However, the topic has received only spo-radic attention in the literature devoted tolate infancy and early childhood, and littlehas been written about precursors or ante-cendents.

This article has two goals: (a) to examinebriefly the literature about young children,pinpointing themes and issues of interest,and (b) to cast the antecedents of self-reg-ulation into a developmental perspective.Encompassing a major portion of this article,this theoretical and speculative discussionhighlights cognitive phenomena that occurprior to the emergence of self-regulation anddescribes the kinds of monitoring behaviorsthe child is capable of along the way. It ishoped that this formulation will provide anorganizational framework for further re-search.

Self-Regulation and the Young Child

Self-regulation, a complex construct, hasbeen variously defined as the ability to com-ply with a request, to initiate and cease ac-tivities according to situational demands, tomodulate the intensity, frequency, and du-ration of verbal and motor acts in social andeducational settings, to postpone acting upona desired object or goal, and to generate so-cially approved behavior in the absence of

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external monitors (Block & Block, 1979;Fenichel, 1945; Greenacre, 1950; Luria,1959, I960, 1961; Masters & Binger, 1978;Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971; Mischel,1973; Mischel & Patterson, 1979; Parke,1974; Block & Block, Note 1; Mischel &Mischel, Note 2). Notwithstanding thesedifferences in emphases (and ideology), it isgenerally agreed that self-regulation de-mands awareness of socially approved be-haviors and thus represents a significant as-pect of the socialization of children.

Theoretical perspectives addressing theearly development of self-regulation areshown in Table 1. Primary features of eachview are presented along with the approxi-mate ages relevant behaviors are presumedto appear; mediators and influences upon

self-regulation are also noted. The materialsummarized in Table 1 suggests that a com-ponent of voluntary control over behavioremerges in the latter part of the first yearand takes the form of infant compliance toa caregiver's request. The second and thirdyears are emphasized for the onset of othercontrol behaviors that implicitly or explicitlyrelate to the child's adoption of family andsocial standards. It is evident, however, thatthe constructs that have been proposed areeither very narrow or very broad in scope,that they do not intersect with one another,and that the ages of interest represent onlya portion of the infancy period.

Examination of the mediating factorsidentified in Table 1 shows that with increas-ing age, there is a shift in emphasis from

Table 1Views of Early Forms of Self-Initiated Regulation

Topic Features Developmental trends Mediators

Control and systemorganization"

Compliance11

Impulse control'

Self-regulation"1

Self-regulation"

Modulation of state ofarousal, activationof early behaviors

Responsivity towarning signals

Growth of ego,balance betweenaction andverbalization

Interiorization ofsocial conduct,motor inhibition

Adoption ofcontingency rulesthat guide behaviorirrespective ofsituational pressures

Developmental agendafor late prenatalperiod to 3 mo.

Emergence 9-12 mo.

Emergence in thesecond year of life

Reaction in the secondyear to adultcommands, auto-regulation to thechild's own overtspeech at 3-4 yrs., tocovert speech(semantic meaning)at 6 yrs.

Preschool period onward

Neurophysiologicalmaturation, parentinteractions and routines(feeding, sleeping, etc.)

Bias toward social behavior;quality of mother-childrelationship

Maturational factors (e.g.,growth of language),availability of means fortension reduction,caregiver sensitivity tochild's needs and attributes

Communicative and socialinteractions, growth oflanguage and the directivefunction of speech

Cognitive processes (e.g.,attentional strategies,plans, diversionary tactics);social class factors

* Als, 1978. b Stayton, Hogan, & Ainsworth, 1971." Fenichel, 1945; Greenacre, 1950; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman,1975; Malone, 1978; Rexford, 1978. "Luria, 1960, 1961; Vygotsky, 1962. ' Mischel, 1973, 1979; Mischel &Patterson, 1979; Mischel & Mischel, Note 2.

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external sources of control to internal childfactors. Both the psychodynamically ori-ented and the Russian views underscorethese external sources as origins of control;however, the former stress affective-moti-vational origins embedded in the infant-par-ent relationship, whereas the latter highlightverbal communications inherent in parent-child interactions. Both theoretical ap-proaches share the view that the progressionfrom external to internal regulation is alsoinfluenced by maturational and experientialprocesses, although the specification of pro-cesses is largely uncharted.

Table 1 also shows that the conceptual-ization of self-regulation offered by Mischeland associates (Mischel & Patterson, 1979;Mischel & Mischel, Note 2) places strongemphasis on cognitive mediators that arisefrom within the child. Since Mischel hasbeen primarily concerned with tracing thegrowth and organization of self-regulationafter the preschool years (Mischel & Mis-chel, Note 2), neither origins nor specificsocial influences have received much atten-tion.

Overall, the picture that emerges from theperspectives outlined in Table 1 is of childrenbeing socialized by others, and from this in-teractional process the capacity for self-reg-ulation, in part, emerges. Language and cog-nition also play a role after a certain pointin development is reached. What is unclearis how these processes and influences cometogether. What is also unclear is the role ofearly cognition and its impact on the child'sbeing able to think in terms of self-initiatedmonitoring of behavior.

The questions and issues that have arisenbecause of gaps in the literature haveprompted this attempt to cast the growth ofearly self-initiated control into a develop-mental framework* Congruent with others,this formulation emphasizes cognitive con-trols in the guidance of behavior (Klein,1951, 1954; Mischel, 1973; Santostefano,1980); however, the thesis is extended to veryyoung children by suggesting that a funda-mental level of cognition has to be obtainedbefore the child can internalize caregiverexpectations for self-initiated controls. Given

this, external influences become increasinglyrelevant.

An Ontogenetic Perspective

Several philosophical and organizationalperspectives underlie the conceptualizationto be presented in subsequent paragraphs.First, the scope of self-regulation is limitedto behaviors manifested by pre-school-agedchildren (e.g., compliance, delay, self-mon-itoring in the absence of adults). This doesnot imply that preschoolers have attained anoptimal level of maturity in self-regulatoryprocesses but rather that they have reacheda point where they are at least capable ofmanifesting a set of recognizable behaviorsencompassed by self-regulation constructs.This significant achievement is thereforetaken as a developmental end point. Ac-cordingly the goal is to trace the youngerchild's progression to this level of func-tioning.

Second, the antecedents of self-regulationare described in terms of discontinuous de-velopmental phases, each successive one sig-nifying a qualitative change indicating higherlevels of behavior. This approach is conso-nant with current perspectives that viewmuch of early development as the emergenceof new abilities or the reorganization of pre-vious ones (Emde, Gaensbauer, & Harmon,1976; Flavell, 1972; McCall, 1979; Piaget,1952, 1954).- The term phase rather thanstage was selected to suggest gradual tran-sitions rather than sharp bounderies.

Third, a specific terminology for eachphase is used to call attention to distinguish-ing characteristics. Described more fully be-low, the phases consist of neurophysiologicalmodulation, sensorimotor modulation, con-trol, self-control, and self-regulation. Thefirst signifies neurophysiological and reflex-ive adaptations to the environment, the sec-ond denotes sensorimotor adaptations in re-sponse to perceptual or motivational cues.The third, fourth, and fifth phases representinstances in which children use their cog-nitive abilities to intentionally control theirown behavior with an awareness of caregiverwishes and expectations. However, as shownin Table 2, important features distinguish

202 CLAIRE B. KOPP

Table 2Phases of Control

Phases Approximate ages Features Cognitive requisites

Neurophysiological Birth to 2-3 mo.modulation

Sensorimotor 3 mo.-9 mo.+modulation

Control 12 mo.-18 mo.+

Self-control 24 mo.+

Self-regulation 36 mo.+

Modulation of arousal, activationof organized patterns ofbehavior

Change ongoing behavior inresponse to events and stimuliin environment

Awareness of social demands ofa situation and initiate,maintain, cease physical acts,communication, etc.accordingly; compliance, self-initiated monitoring

As above; delay upon request;behave according to socialexpectations in the absence ofexternal monitors

As above; flexibility of controlprocesses that meet changingsituational demands

Intentionality, goal-directedbehavior, consciousawareness of action, memoryof existential self

Representational thinking andrecall memory, symbolicthinking, continuing sense ofidentity

Strategy production, consciousintrospection, etc.

each of these from one another; they arediscussed more fully below. The emphasisof this presentation is primarily focused uponthe phases from neurophysiological modu-lation to self-control. As appropriate, care-giving practices or motivational considera-tions, are discussed throughout.

Developmental Phases

1. Neurophysiological Modulation (Birthto 2-3 Months)

Long before the young child is capable ofself-regulation, there is a form of control inwhich arousal states are modulated and re-flex movements are exhibited as organizedpatterns of functional behavior (e.g., thehand-to-mouth movement that the neonateutilizes for thumb-finger sucking). To rec-ognize this type of control, it is proposed thatthe first phase be called neurophysiologi-cal modulation, signifying activation ofneurophysiological mechanisms (Als, 1978;Brazelton, 1962, 1978) and reflex operations(Peiper, 1963; Piaget, 1952, 1954, 1970).

The term neurophysiological modulationsubsumes processes that safeguard the im-mature organism from intrusive or strongstimulation. For example, incomplete neu-

rodevelopment in the central nervous systemis presumed to restrict processing of manykinds of stimuli; thus protection is conferredby means of a "passive stimulus barrier"(Benjamin, 1965). Young infants also em-ploy more active types of stimulus modula-tors such as species-typical adaptive re-sponses (e.g., non-nutritive sucking) thatreduce their arousal levels and body move-ments (Kessen & Mandler, 1961).

Wide variations exist in the capacity toself-soothe, or be soothed in response to ex-ternal stimuli. Some infants have exceed-ingly low thresholds, become highly arousedand are quieted with difficulty. This vari-ability has been attributed to overall integ-rity of the organism (Als, 1978; Brazelton,1978; Howard, Parmelee, Kopp, & Littman,1976; Parmelee, 1975) and to caregiver style(Sander, Stechler, Burns, & Julia, 1972).The long-term implications of these individ-ual differences are not known.

In addition to individual variability, thereare hints that neurophysiological modulationmay be periodically unsettled because ofdevelopmental phenomena that emerge sub-sequent to maturational changes. For ex-ample, improved state control leads to in-creased sensitivity to visual and auditory

ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-REGULATION 203

stimuli. However, the infant has to developways of handling more input (e.g., shuttingout stimuli when the system becomes over-loaded). In the interim, behavioral disrup-tions may occur that take the form of oblig-atory attention in which infants seem gluedto a visual stimulus, or of a marked increasein fussiness that signals overload (Brazelton,1962; Stechler & Latz, 1966; Tennes, Emde,Kisley, & Metcalf, 1972).

In this first phase the caregiver's role isviewed as an assisting one, a perspectiveshared by Als (1978). Although precariousstates of arousal primarily give way becauseof maturational forces, state control is con-siderably aided by caregivers' social inter-actions and routines. Interactions help in-fants focus on salient features of theenvironment when they are alert and awake;routines provide an external buttress for en-dogenous control of sleep and wakefulness(Als, 1978).

By 3 months of age, infants show theemergence of clearly defined cycles of wake-fulness that are relatively congruent withsocial definitions of day and night. Thisgrowth is accompanied by other matura-tional changes reflected by electroencepha-logram patterns and habituation (Cohen &Salapatek, 1975; Emde et al., 1976). All ofthese changes signal the beginning of a newdevelopmental period for infancy and, con-comitantly, the mechanisms by which be-havior will be modulated.

2. Sensorimotor Modulation (3 to 9-12Months)

Sensorimotor modulation signifies thechild's ability to engage in a voluntary motoract (e.g., reach and grasp) and change theact in response to events that arise. Modu-lation cannot occur until component aspects(e.g., the reaching part of prehension) of asequence are coordinated and performednonreflexively (Bruner, 1970; Kopp, 1979).Modulation does not involve consciousness,prior intention, or awareness of the meaningof a situation. This singular limitation is whythe term modulation rather than control isused.

There is no doubt that by midpoint of thefirst year, infants actively use their sensori-

motor repertoire and modulate attention(Cohen & Salapatek, 1975; Haith, 1966;Salapatek, 1975), social exchanges (Brazel-ton, Koslowski, & Main 1974; Stern, 1977),and some aspects of prehension (Halverson,1931). A nice illustration of modulation isfound in Ratner and Bruner's (1978) de-scription of a 7-month-old's responses that"came at particular junctures" in a socialgame played with the caregiver.

However, modulated responses are tiedeither to an immediately preceding inter-action or to motivational and perceptual setsthat arise as a function of stimuli charac-teristics: "At eight months the infants weresimply attracted to the mother's activity anddrawn to take up the object" (Hubley &Trevarthen, 1979, p. 71). Thus pleasure, in-terest, and desire emanate from people andobjects and elicit infant behavior rather thancognitively derived intent, meaning, or con-sequence. There is action but not consciousreflecton about the act (Collins & Hagen,1979).

That perception is a stimulus to activityhas long been a tenet of psychology (Lewin,cited in Vygotsky 1933/1976; Piaget, 1952,1954; Vygotsky, 1933/1976), as has beenthe thesis that it is difficult to separate mo-tivation from perceptual processes in theyoung child (Piaget, 1952, 1954; Vygotsky,1933/1976). Considering motivation as adeterminant of behavior is hardly novel; thedevelopmental literature is replete with ar-guments of similar kind advanced by White(1959), Hunt (1963), Lewis and Goldberg(1969), Yarrow, Rubenstein, and Pedersen(1975), and others.

In all probability, the ability to modulateSensorimotor acts reflects individual differ-ences related to biological predispositions(e.g., tempo and activity level) as well as toconditions external to the child, such as care-giver sensitivity and salience of objects in thecaregiving environment (Ainsworth & Bell,1974; Escalona, 1968; Lewis & Goldberg,1969; Yarrow et al., 1975). Caregiver re-sponsivity would seem to be especially im-portant for apathetic or highly inactive in-fants who need prodding to activate andsustain activities (Escalona, 1963). Becauseof the infant's dependence on percepts, theabsence of objects or limited caregiver sen-

204 CLAIRE B. KOPP

sitivity could lead to infant behaviors thatare inappropriate for a given situation.

As an example, consider the apathetic,bland, uncoordinated behavior bf infantsreared by adequate but insensitive caregivers(Provence & Lipton, 1962). Although theinfants could, if repeatedly encouraged, ini-tiate a smiling interaction, reach out for aperson, or touch a toy, most of the time theydid nothing. Because of their depressed state,the infants' awareness of situational de-mands was erratic, and their actions wereoften unrelated to events that occurrednearby. Thus sensorimotor modulation Wasproblematic.

In sum, sensorimotor modulations helpprovide a basis for later achievements in con-trol by helping infants economically orga-nize their object and social world. Moreover,modulations help infants become aware oftheir own actions in holding, reaching, play-ing, and so forth. When infants differentiatetheir own actions from those of others, thepotential for control emerges.

3. Control (9-12 to 18+ Months)

The third phase, called control, charac-terizes the emerging ability of children toshow awareness of social or task demandsthat have been defined by caregivers, and toinitiate, maintain, modulate, or cease phys-ical acts, communication, and emotional sig-nals accordingly. As such, control representsan important transition period along thepath to self-regulation.

Indeed, the first manifestations of behav-iors that bear resemblance to self-regulationconstructs appear early in this phase. Theyare compliance to commands and self-initi-ated monitoring of behavior. Compliance,recognized as a landmark in development(Gesell & Amatruda, 1945) and describedby Luria (1959), was also studied by Stay-ton, Hogan, and Ainsworth (1971), who re-lated it to the quality of the mother-childrelationship. The rationale underlying themotive to obey parents has been debatedextensively (Freud, 1915/1963; Sears, 1960)but is beyond the scope of this article. What-ever its basis, compliance as the signal her-alding the onset of control is a behavior tiedto the here and now of a parent command(e.g., "Don't touch," "No!").

The term control rather than regulate ispurposely used to describe these initial formsof monitoring. This approach follows dic-tionary definitions of control and regulatein which the former is defined as "com-mand" or "hold in check," whereas the latteris characterized by "control by rule. . . sub-ject to restrictions . . . adapt to require-ments" (Oxford Dictionary, 1964). In thepsychological sense, control is seen as beingless flexible and adaptive than regulation.This point is discussed further in later para-graphs.

Control is viewed as a derivative ofthe dramatic qualitative and quantitativechanges in cognitive processing abilities thatoccur during the last part of the first yearof life and extend into the second. These havebeen variously designated as a shift from apurely sensorimotor type of functioning toadaptive responsiveness (Werner, 1957), theemergence of problem solving (Piaget, 1952,1954), and the appearance of hypothesistesting (Kagan, 1971, 1972).

In the following paragraphs, cognitivephenomena linked to this period are high-lighted. This is followed by additional dis-cussion of characteristics of control.

Cognitive phenomena. Current theoret-ical formulations suggest that at least oneand possibly two distinct periods of cognitivegrowth occur between 9 and 18 months oflife (Kagan, 1971; McCall, Eichorn, & Ho-garty, 1977; Piaget, 1952, 1954). Numerousempiric data attest to the first group of qual-itative and quantitative changes includingrefined recognition of the invariant form ofobjects (Ruff, 1978), improved spatial dis-crimination (Millar & Schaffer, 1972), cross-modal recognition memory (Gottfried, Rose,& Bridger, 1978), and the emergence of el-ementary forms of categorization (Ricciuti,1965). Other studies also corroborate chang-ing abilities including increased awarenessof familiar and unknown individuals (Schaf-fer, 1971, 1974), and exploration and use ofthe inherent properties of various toys andobjects (Uzgiris, 1967). Learned aversionsemerge at this age (Bronson, 1978), as doesthe ability to take another's perspective byimitating social behaviors (McCall, Note 3),or by being involved in complementary acts(Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979). Early stagesof object permanence are clearly observed

ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-REGULATION 205

(Gorman & Escalona, 1969; Kopp, Sigman,& Parmelee, 1974; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975),as is the use of tools in controlled problem-solving tasks (Kopp et al, 1974; Uzgiris &Hunt, 1975).

The terms used to characterize infant skillat this age include intentionality, goal-di-rectedness, use of means, and beginningsigns of conscious awareness (Collins &Hagen, 1979; McCall, 1979; Piaget, 1952,1954). McCall noted, however, that the in-fant's world is still known only by action;moreover, images are short term and requirethe presence of stimuli (Fraiberg, 1969;Qratch, 1975).

A second cognitive growth spurt (presum-ably occurring between 12 and 18 months)has less documentation than the aforemen-tioned. Piaget (1952, 1954) suggested it wasmanifested by trial and error exploration.Alternatively Nelson (1979) indicated thatgrowth might be characterized by the inte-gration of cognitive, social, and communi-cative abilities. In any event, data indicatethat some capacities such as memory areexpanded. In object-permanence situations,children visually follow displacements whilecontinuously monitoring the object's exis-tence (Kopp et al., 1974). A similar phe-nomenon is observed in caregiver interac-tions; children move away from closeproximity to their caregivers, provided theycan visually check the caregiver's locationperiodically.

The shifts noted for the first form of cog-nitive reorganization are paralleled by strik-ing qualitative and quantitative changes inlocomotor abilities. The upright position isassumed, and walking begins. These changeshave profound significance for children be-cause they allow new planes of visual aware-ness, expanded spatial locales for explora-tion, and increased awareness of bodyfunctioning (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman,1975).

One immediate consequence of this par-allel cognitive and motor growth is thechild's increasing differentiation of self fromothers and differentiation of self from ob-jects. As children move freely they differ-entiate where they have been and plan wherethey are going. They notice the effects oftheir activities on their environment. Slowlythey construct a memory of the existential

self (Lewis & Brooks, 1978), but they do nothave a sense of continuing identity. This kindof sense of identity is attained from repre-sentational thinking (Lewis & Brooks, 1978),a developmental skill that emerges at about18 months (Piaget, 1952, 1954).

Features of control. Control, character-ized by compliance and self-initiated inhi-bition of a previously prohibited behavior,subsumes intent, appraisal of differentialfeatures of the environment, and an elemen-tary awareness of what is acceptable and notacceptable to caregivers. This awareness andelementary categorizing is, however, highlydependent on the presence of key signalsbecause the child does not have the capacityto recall events. The cognitive capacity forreflection also does not exist; thus there islittle appreciation of the reasons that makeone set of behaviors more appropriate thananother for any given situation.

Self-initiated inhibition is a more complexand interesting form of control than com-pliance. First, by definition it means thatchildren take an active role in guiding theirown behavior. Second, it involves an ap-proach to a desired object, recognition thatthe object was previously associated with aprohibition and, finally, inhibition of the pro-hibited act. Thus, this ability requires thatthe child sequentially organize an inputcode, a memory match, and then provideself-instruction. An example of this sequencewas provided by a 13-month-old who wasobserved to reach for a plant, shake her head,say "no," and withdraw her hand (Krakow,Note 4). Inferentially at least, observationsmade of infants at play; while demonstratingempathy, and during acts of sharing (Muel-ler & Lucas, 1975; Rheingold, Hay, & West,1976) suggest that by 15-16 months of age,children are capable of producing patternsof situationally appropriate self-initiated be-havioral controls. N

The origins of self-initiated monitoringmay stem from reciprocal patterns of com-munication and interaction that evolve be-tween infants and their caregivers when theformer are about 1 year of age (Hubley &Trevarthen, 1979; Ratner & Bruner, 1978).In reciprocal interactions, first one and thenthe other partner assumes an active initiat-ing role. These kinds of episodes appear todirect the infants' attention to caregiver acts

206 CLAIRE B. KOPP

and consequences, and then to their own(Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979).

Intuitively, it seems reasonable to expectthat the more opportunities infants have tonotice the effects of their own acts in socialinteractions, the more they will attend totheir own acts when alone. Accordingly,when attention to behavior is combined withawareness of prohibition experiences and themotivation to accede to caregiver's wishes,self-initiated monitoring should be the re-sult.

Limitations in control arise as a functionof memory constraints (e.g., the need to havesignals that help the child reconstruct anawareness of appropriate behaviors) as wellas from pleasurable input that competes withawareness of "correct" behavior. This formof competition often stems from burgeoninglocomotive skills. Movement—walking, run-ning, climbing—becomes an end in itself andis practiced repeatedly (Freud & Bur-lingham, 1944; Mittlemann, 1954). Childrenoften become so mesmerized by their interestin locomotion that their physical activitiesseem mindless, innervated solely by pleasureseeking. In these situations control is fragileand signals of caregiver prohibitions areoverlooked.

Delight in movement appears to be a nor-mal developmental phenomenon, probablyreaching a peak around 2 years of age andthen tapering off. In the long term, whatmakes locomotor activity potentially vulner-able is an inability to apply cognitive"brakes" such that gross motor activitiescompete with other kinds of behavior de-manded in social or task-oriented situations.At this point, movement may seem to beobligatory in the sense that visual fixationwas at a younger age (Stechler & Latz,1966). From the psychoanalytic perspective,one could say there is difficulty with impulsecontrol (Rexford, 1978).

It is likely that caregiver sensitivity to achild's preferred style of interacting with theworld of objects and people is a crucial fa-cilitator or deterrent to growth of control.Given a child with very high energy levelsand great enthusiasm for movement, the factthat caregivers repeatedly call attention toexpectations for acceptable forms of childbehavior should be helpful. Similarly, verbal

communications that specify acts for thechild to do or that focus child activity intospecific channels of play (Schaffer & Crook,1978) should also foster control.

Thus far the theme of self, in terms of thechild having awareness of a continuing iden-tity, has not been part of the discussion ofcontrol because it has not been germane.Although children increasingly appreciatethe meaning of an independent existence andbody parts that move on command, thisawareness is not fully internalized until thereis a way to represent it symbolically. Simi-larly, children cannot freely appreciate thelink between self and the meaning of self-generated behavioral control until parentprohibitions and acceptances can also be rep-resented mentally. This is the focus of thenext section.

The Emergence of Self-Control and theProgression to Self-Regulation (24+Months)

The phase immediately preceding self-regulation is defined as self-control. Its dis-tinguishing features include compliance, andemergent abilities to delay an act on requestand to behave according to caregiver andsocial expectations in the absence of externalmonitors. These and similar behaviors havebeen described, implicitly or explicitly, byGolden, Montare, and Bridger (1977), Mah-ler et al. (1975), Luria (1960, 1961), andMalone(1978).

Self-control differs from control by virtueof the appearance of representational think-ing and evocative (recall) memory. Linkedto one another, both appear at approxi-mately 18 months of age (Piaget, 1952,1954). With representational thought, thechild uses a symbol to stand for an object;with recall memory the child evokes and sus-tains the image oif the absent object. Rep-resentational thought and recall memory arethe necessary cognitive mechanisms that al-low children to formulate an integrated un-derstanding of their own continuing, inde-pendent identity and therefore to associatetheir own acts with caregivers' dictates aboutacceptable and nonacceptable forms of be-havior. Consequently, the child's pattern ofmotor and verbal acts begins to reflect

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knowledge of social rules as well as the de-mand characteristics of particular situations,even in the absence of caregivers. Self-con-trol, however, implies more than awareness;the term signifies self-initiated modificationof behavior as a result of remembered in-formation. Self-control also signifies a majorshift to an internally generated monitoringsystem.

What sets self-control apart from self-reg-ulation is a difference in degree, not in kind.Self-control and self-regulation are linkedconceptually because both depend on thedevelopment and use of representationalthinking and recall memory. However, theterm self-control means that the child haslimited flexibility in adapting acts to meetnew situational demands and a limited ca-pacity for delay and waiting. In contrast,self-regulation is considered to be adaptiveto changes. It is a distinctly more matureform of control and presumably implicatesthe use of reflection and strategies involvingintrospection, consciousness, or metacogni-tion (Flavell, 1977; Pope & Singer, 1978).

The cognitive phenomena that foster de-velopment of self-control are discussed in thefollowing paragraphs. Then .features of self-control are described and speculations of-fered about possible influences.

Cognitive phenomena. Studies of play,imitation, object permanence tasks, and useof language provide support for the emer-gence of representational thinking and recallmemory. Transitions in children's play withinanimate objects have been well docu-mented (Bruner, 1972; Fenson, Kagan,Kearsley, & Zelazo, 1976; Inhelder, Lezine,Sinclair, & Stambak, 1972; Piaget, 1962;Uzgiris, 1967; Zelazo & Kearsley, Note 5).Moreover, representation and recall memorycan be inferred when particualr kinds of pre-tend behaviors are observed (e.g., the childmakes believe an absent entity is present;Fein, 1975).

Similarly, deferred imitation (Piaget,1962)—the ability to reproduce accuratelyan event or sequence seen earlier—is con-sidered by McCall to involve the perceptionof an act over time and context (McCall,Parke, & Kavanaugh, 1977). These authors'data suggest that the conclusive appearanceof deferred imitation is observed near the

end of the second year of life. Furthermore,studies of object permanence performancealso provide evidence of recall memory. Chil-dren at around 18 months of age systemat-ically and sequentially search several placesfor an object hidden using invisible displace-ments (Corman & Escalona, 1969; Kopp etal., 1974; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975).

Evidence from social transactions, thoughnot plentiful, also documents the emergenceof representational thought and recall mem-ory. For example, Bronson (1974) noted thatthe incidence of toddlers' "visual checks" totheir mothers declined appreciably between12 and 24 months. In a similar vein, Mahleret al. (1975) reported that persistent "shad-owing" of the mother observed at 15-16months diminished a few months later. Bothinstances suggest that children do not needcontinued assurance of maternal presencewhen the ability to maintain her image is intheir repertoire.

The most extensive series of studies ofchildren in the second year of life are foundin the literature on language development(see Bloom & Lahey, 1978; Brown, 1973;Menyuk, 1971; Nelson, 1973, 1979). Here,too, there is excellent documentation of rep-resentational thought. For example, childrenuse words about classes of objects that haveperceptual and functional similarity. More-over, words are applied to different contexts;in so doing, children often attempt to applya word to a situation or event that is notquite appropriate. Gestural communicationalso expands dramatically and is used to con-vey intent, desires, refusals, and sharing(Bretherton & Bates, 1979).

Finally, a sense of self begins to becomemore solidified at this age (Bertenthal &Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979).In the early stages of representational think-ing, a sense of identity is reflected by chil-dren classifying their own body parts andtheir own possessions. Identity is also re-flected by the emergence of self-conscious-like behavior as children view their mirrorimages (Amsterdam & Greenberg, 1977).This suggests that self-consciousness is anaffective response to being the focus of one'sown or another's attention.

By implication, one could argue that self-consciousness appears in the repertoire when

208 CLAIRE B. KOPP

children can begin to recall positive and neg-ative feelings associated with their own ac-tions as well as others' behavior towardthem. A sense of identity is also reflected bythe child's struggles for autonomy. "Me doit" or "I do it" are phrases heard repeatedly.Autonomy is coupled with ambivalence aboutdependence and is also linked to the begin-nings of positive self-evaluation (Sroufe,1979).

The most common description of the childapproaching the second half of the secondyear denotes a child in transition, movingfrom the sensorimotor mode to symbolicfunctioning (Piaget, 1952, 1954), from beinga child bound by action and concrete resultsto being one who will be concerned with ab-stract knowledge, time dimensions, others,and the self (Flavell, 1977). However, it isalso recognized that the 2-year-old is limitedin information processing skills (Case, 1978)as well as in memory (Myers & Perlmutter,1978). Memory is best under situationswhere meaningful, realistic semantic cuesare present and called to the child's attentionbecause the child's ability to generate strat-egies is limited (Myers & Perlmutter, 1978).

Although research on the 2- to 3-year-oldchild is relatively sparse compared with thatdevoted to early infancy, sufficient data existto show that the 3-year-old is a knowledge-able child who begins to use strategies forremembering (Brown, 1975), but childrenof this age do not generate a broad array ofstrategies on their own (Bern, 1967), nor dothey provide rules for scientific reasoning(Siegler, 1978). Moreover, they cannot pre-dict the consequences of an act, check andmonitor their own actions, or modify theirbehavior as might be appropriate (Brown& DeLoache, 1978).

Translated into Piagetian terminology,these young children are preoperational(Piaget, 1952) in the sense that their think-ing behavior is "interior," but they find itdifficult to "manipulate" an idea and thinkof it from different perspectives. Clearly,alternatives cannot be pursued if thinking isbound by the overriding salience of a singleviewpoint. The implications for self-controlwill be readily apparent.

Features of self-control and beginning

self-regulation. As noted earlier, the phaseof self-control emerges when the child showsevidence of the ability to comply with re-quests, to delay specific activities due eitherto self-instruction or another's demand, andto monitor his or her own behavior accordingto caregiver expectations but in the absenceof the caregiver. Monitoring implicates theability to inhibit motor and language actsthat are inappropriate to a particular settingor situation.

The child who manifests self-control isaware of a network of conventions that gov-ern behavior when eating, playing, dressing,going to the store, or being left on one's ownfor a short while. Observations of childrenaround 2 years of age indicate that they un-derstand routines of caregivers, are knowl-edgeable about where they are expected toplay and what objects can be played with,and about what they are supposed to do ina store, a playground, or in the homes offriends or relatives.

However, one has only to spend a shorttime observing young children to appreciatethe very real limitations of their self-control.Given a strong stimulus, for example, a de-sired ball rolling in the street, or the desireto explore an interesting place or to exerciseautonomy, they become heedless of safety,rules, or exhortations. In addition, compli-ance at this age seems more firmly tied tolevels of pleasure than to reasoned logic orneed. The command, "Stop playing and putyour toys away" is often ignored, but whencoupled with a favored activity, the com-mand is readily acceded to.

Problems with self-control also arise in thecontext of delay. In instances where childrenare requested to wait, many appear to bestimulus bound and thus cannot producediversionary strategies. Mothers report, forexample, that when 2-year-olds are con-fronted with an unexpected delay (e.g., goingout), children seize upon one single behaviorsuch as whining or following upon mother'sheels, and use it repeatedly. This behaviorhas parallels in the child's inability to per-ceive more than a single salient dimensionin conservation tasks (Piaget, 1970).

These constraints are balanced by majorgrowth in the child's awareness of self and

ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-REGULATION 209

its role in control. Manifested in subtle ways,the self as an independent controller appears,for example, in family routines where ayoung child proudly announces a self-initi-ated toy cleanup. An alternative form is ob-served in compliance situations where a childuses his or her body to erect an invisiblebarrier against the person issuing .the com-mand. The scenario involves a caregiver'srequest and the child's response of turningaround (i.e., the back of the body faces thecaregiver) and then doing something otherthan the requested act. This use of the bodyas a social tool, albeit a noninteractive andnoncompliant one, can only occur when thechild has a fairly well-formulated sense ofphysical body and psychic identity. Self-awareness also arises in other control situ-ations. A plea for help from a caregiver oc-curs frequently when children are faced withonerous demands. Similarly, the self emergeswhen children transgress and reflect theirawareness of their transgression with facialexpressions, tears, and denial.

In keeping with the dominant theme ofthis conceptualization, the preceding focusedextensively on cognitive mediators of self-control. At this point, however, the pointsof view expressed by the Russian and thepsychodynamic theorists (see Table 1) arediscussed again. These positions warrant acloser examination because they bear onother factors that may influence the devel-opmental course of self-control or foster in-dividual differences at a given point in time.Language is an example of a process thathas been presumed to be influential in bothrealms.

From a developmental perspective, Vy-gotsky (1962) and Luria (I960, 1961) sug-gested that speech could not be used as aninner mode of mental organization or forself-regulation until the child was about 4years of age. At first, Luria (1960, 1961)suggested that the child's speech was re-stricted and closely linked to nonverbal com-munication because of its limited meaningand its tie to specific acts. Later, with be-ginning internalization of parent commands,the child could use overt speech to monitorbehavior. At best, however, this was onlypartially successful. It was not until speech

itself was internalized that it played an ef-fective role in self-regulation. Luria's labo-ratory data, although focused on a relativelynarrow aspect of the child's repertoire, cor-roborated this developmental view of thedirective function of speech.

In contrast, psychodynamic perspectivessuggest that language is one of several im-portant determinants of individual differ-ences in control, specifically impulse control.Poorly developed linguistic functions, minorneurological abnormalities, maturationalimbalances, as well as caregiver insensitivityhave been identified as causal factors in dis-torted impulse control (Mahler et al, 1975;Malone, 1978; Rexford, 1978). Spoken lan-guage appears to be a critical feature evenin its beginning stages.

Preliminary observations in my laboratoryare more congruent with Luria's develop-mental position than with psychoanalyticview of individual differences. Specifically,the data I and my colleagues have collectedthus far suggest that even advanced verbaldevelopment does not affect the early op-eration of self-control. Two-year-old chil-dren who have language production skillsconsonant with those of 3-year-olds showself-control abilities and limitations moresimilar to their chronological a'ge peers thanto the older children.

If additional findings corroborate theseinitial observations, then it may be due tothe fact that early language is tied to thesalience of here and now (Luria, 1959) oris highly figurative and depends extensivelyon symbolic material (Furth, 1970). And,as Furth stated, "The understanding of asymbol can not exceed the available level ofoperative understanding" (p. 247). Thus un-til language transcends its figurative depen-dency, it may not influence self-control inany substantive way. Fortunately, the issueof language and control lends itself to ad-ditional theorizing and research.

Another theoretical and research issuethat bears on control has to do with the roleof the caregiver. Earlier I noted that theo-rists attributed early forms of control to ex-ternal sources acting upon the child. Simi-larly, research with older individuals that isembedded in social learning theory and be-

210 CLAIRE B. KOPP

havioral tenets attests to the importance ofmodels, parents, and others in the growth ofself-regulation (Bandura, 1971; Kanfer &Karoly, 1972; Meichenbaum & Goodman,1971). Intuitively it would seem that care-givers and other social influences have a con-tinuing and major role in the overall pro-gression to self-regulation. But it is arguedthat the influence is a facilitating rather thana causative one.

Although only a few studies exist, findingsindicate that caregivers (and other socialforces) are important mediators of individ-ual differences in self-control. For example,Lytton (1976) found parents; use of lan-guage and their general approach to care-giving related to 2-year-olds' complianceskills. In a study of somewhat younger chil-dren, compliance was negatively associatedwith maternal warmth and positively relatedto punishment that followed noncompliance(Bailey, 1978). A study of pre-school-agedfemales suggested that intrusive, controlling,and critical mothers had daughters whomanifested less control than their peers(Ross, 1978). Finally, parent expectationsalong with use of verbal techniques werepresumed to be influential factors in the abil-ity of young children to delay their own be-havior in a laboratory task (Golden et al.,1977).

Stressful events are also associated withchanges in level of control. Divorce is a po-tent example. When recently divorced moth-ers decreased their demands for child inde-pendence and offered less communicationand reasoning, child control was impaired(Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, Note 6). Find-ings from this study prompt questions re-lated to the level and kind of family disrup-tion that change parent control techniquesand to how much self-control the child canstill exhibit while disruptions occur. Overall,these intriguing data plead for replication,additional specification of processes, andeven a unifying conceptual model that willpermit a more systematic study of caregiverinfluences on child control.

Although there are gaps in our knowledgeabout specific influences of language andcaregivers, many young children do in factmove beyond self-control. When self-control

becomes more adaptive and flexible, thetransition to self-regulation occurs. Self-reg-ulation in contrast to self-control involves theability to use numerous contingency rules toguide behavior, to maintain appropriatemonitoring for appreciable lengths of timeand in any number of situations, and to learnto produce a series of approximations tostandards of expectations. The shift fromself-control to self-regulation, though prob-ably quite subtle and gradual, parallels thegrowth of cognitive skills that is also gradualin the early preschool period.

By whatever means children use to con-solidate processes involved in self-regulationinto their behavioral repertoires, self-regu-lation, once achieved, can be utilized in verychallenging as well as more mundane situ-ations. An example was provided by Holmes(1976), who described a 5-year-old suddenlyhospitalized because of a debilitating con-dition. Numerous strategies were producedby the child to maintain her composure inthe face of stressful and intrusive treatments.During one painful injection she said, "letme get control." This remarkable sizing upof one's needs truly indicates internalizationof social expectations for behavior.

Conclusion

This account of the antecedents of self-regulation is speculative, although theoryand research have been extensively used tostrengthen its underpinnings. The formula-tion clearly owes much to Piaget and to othertheorists who argue for qualitative views ofdevelopment. As such, it also shares the ad-vantages and shortcomings associated withdiscontinuous developmental perspectives.

If the antecedents of self-regulation arelargely accepted as outlined above, thengoals of future research will be to describethe phases more fully, to specify cognitiveconstituents with greater detail, and to iden-tify external influences with additional pre-cision.

Reference Notes

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Received June 16, 1981

Manuscripts Accepted for PublicationFantasy Play of Toddlers and Preschoolers. Tiffany Field (Department of Pediatrics and Psychology,

Mailman Center for Child Development, P.O. Box 016820 (D-820), University of Miami, Miami,Florida 33101), Louis De Stefano, and John H. Koewler III.

Lexical Access in Children and Adults. Frank M. Cirrin (Department of Speech Pathology & Audiology,Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho 83209).

Processing of Multiple Codes in Memory by 5- and 10-Year-Olds. Sadie A. Grimmett (Institute forChild Study, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401).

Rules in Children's Moral Judgments: Integration of Intent, Damage, and Rational Information. ManuelLeon (Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024).

A Multi-Method Comparison of Popular and Unpopular Children. Barbara Vosk, Rex Forehand (De-partment of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602), James B. Parker, and KathyRickard.

Preferences for Familiar or Novel Toys: Effects of Familiarization in 1-Year-Olds. Michael A. Hunter(Psychology Department, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, V8W 2Y2),Hildy S. Ross, and Elinor W. Ames.

Auditory Frequency Discrimination in Infancy. Lynne Werner Olsho (Virginia Commonwealth Uni-versity, 901 West Franklin Street, Richmond, Virginia 23284), Ron Kakai, Robin Turpin, and VincentSperduto.

The Relationship Between Cognitive Style and Cognitive Development: A 2-Year-Longitudinal Study.David M. Brodzinsky (Department of Psychology, Douglass College, Rutgers University, New Bruns-wick, New Jersey 08903).

Joint Bookreading as a Multiple Vocabulary Acquisition Device. Anat Ninio (Department of Psychology,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel 91905).

The Role of Vision in Maternal Attachment: Giving 2-Year-Olds a Photograph of Their Mother DuringSeparation. Richard H. Passman (Department of Psychology, The University of Wisconsin, P.O. Box413, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201) and Kathleen P. Longeway.

Chronic Malnutrition and Child Behavior: Effects of Early Calorie Supplementation on Social-EmotionalFunctioning at School Age. David E. Barrett (The Children's Hospital Medical Center, 333 LongwoodAvenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02115), Marian Radke-Yarrow, and Robert Klein.

Determinants of Young Children's Search Strategies in a Large-Scale Environment. Linda J. Anooshian(Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 715 Stadium Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78284), SusanR. Hartman, and Joy S. Scharf.

Dimensions and Types of Social Status: A Cross-Age Perspective. John D. Coie (Department of Psy-chology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706), Kenneth A. Dodge, and Heide Coppotelli.