Annex 9 - IFAD

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD

Annex 9

Country Synopses

Submitted by

ITAD Ltd

15 July 2004

Country synopses

Armenia Bangladesh Bolivia Burkina Faso Chile Egypt Eritrea Ghana Guatemala Guinea India Jordan Macedonia Mongolia Mozambique Nepal Pakistan Peru Rwanda Senegal Tanzania

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Armenia

Armenia Country Synopsis page 1

Armenia Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 Prior to 1998, Armenia was reportedly one of the wealthiest republics in the former Soviet Union. Since then the country has faced economic collapse, in which the agricultural sector has provided an important safety net in terms of food security and partial employment for people who have lost their livelihoods in other sectors. IFAD’s strategy for development has been to finance three projects in 1995, 1997 and 2001, respectively. These are the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, the North-West Agricultural Services Project (NWASP), and the Agricultural Services Project (ASP). The objectives has been broadly to reduce poverty through agricultural growth, with a focus on the poorest rural areas of the country plus additional targeted poverty reduction measures for poor groups (i.e. those that have not benefited from agricultural growth).

1.2 The emerging market orientation of many farmers and the revival of other sectors of the economy, has led to a shift in focus for the Armenia COSOP: from IFAD’s present emphasis on food security only, to an approach that also includes market-oriented agricultural production. It is intended that future IFAD investments will initially focus on consolidating support for participatory irrigation management (PIM) and rural financial services. In addition, a so-called vertical integrated commodity systems approach (VICSA) will be used. This is an approach aimed at assessing and identifying weaknesses in the whole chain from the market to the producer (for specific commodities). The idea is that this will provide a possible entry point for future investments in extension and marketing linkages. The Fund will continue to target very poor subsistence-oriented farm families, mostly located in the mountainous areas.

Overall rating of COSOP: 4 1.3 Relevance. The COSOP explicitly states that it is consistent with IFAD's strategic framework and mandate, as well as the sub-regional strategy for CEN – though the CEN is more a product from lessons learnt of the early projects in the sub-region, rather than the other way round. In particular the Armenia COSOP is in line the IFAD's strategic framework in terms of: i) enhancing the capacity of the poor and their organizations (water user associa tions (WUAs), village credit associations, etc); ii) increasing access of the poor to productive natural resources and technology (irrigation water and improved on-farm water management, etc); iii) and, improving the access of the poor to financial services and markets (the Vertical Integrated Commodity Systems Approach concept).

1.4 The COSOP provides a clear and useful background to the country context, making reference to supporting evidence - though it is less strong on drawing out how key economic factors might affect (even destabilise) IFAD interventions. There is a useful description to the agricultural sector, although it is more limited in terms of analysis, and establishing key implications for IFAD. The poverty analysis makes good use of data and evidence on the characteristics of poverty, covering rural-urban disparities, different measurements of poverty in the Armenian context, gender dimensions, and underlying causes. Governance and institutional issues are analysed in the SWOT, although these are not expressly distilled in the main COSOP.

1.5 Linkages are made to the PRSP and a national Strategy for Sustainable Agricultural Development (SSAD), though not specifically the MDGs. The COSOP was the product of a good level of consultative, with a formulation workshop held with government, NGOs,



private sector, beneficiary organisations and international donors. Another workshop with some of the stakeholders was used to validate and endorse the findings and conclusions. This implies a reasonable level of local ownership. There is also some assessment of the gender dimension of poverty, but elsewhere there is limited treatment of gender issues (some discussion under policy dialogue and portfolio management). Environmental impacts are not particularly addressed, such as the risks and potential longer terms impacts on irrigation and credit for inputs on farming systems and the natural resource base – although admittedly this is not a requirement at the COSOP stage.1 Empowerment and equity issues are also not especially addressed, except in terms of general references to WUAs, village credit, etc.

1.6 Some important strategies and interventions of agencies such as the World Bank and USAID are identified, although it is not totally clear as to the level of current engagement and whether these represent realistic opportunities. There is a fairly comprehensive identification of IFAD's niche in Armenia, which is particularly strong as having evolved in response to both past project experience and a changing country context.

1.7 Effectiveness. Even though only one project is likely to be funded in the life of this COSOP, there is a clear criteria on which to identify future interventions (with consideration of both the agricultural and poverty analysis). There is a reasonable statement of objectives, although some of the phrases used are rather generic and unspecific (such as, "food security improved"). The logical framework shows a clear understanding of the intervention pathway, although the output, purpose/outcome and impact level indicators are unusable in their current form (e.g. "crop yields improved"). And while there is a useful analysis of poverty issues (as noted earlier), the discussion on targeting is rather limited.

1.8 The section on new interventions is particularly well thought out, building on the existing portfolio, and showing linkages between the three projects as they evolve together. There is also a good rationale for investments, taking into account IFAD resource constraints, the existing portfolio of work, IFAD's current role in Armenia, and institutional aspects - although not much in the COSOP refers to innovations.2 The identification of specific NGO and private sector partners is clearly based on in-country experience, rather than just an intention to work with others (Appendix V in particular provides a very useful summary). Areas for poor policy dialogue are identified, although it is unclear the extent of current engagement and the realistic potential to influence policy. Opportunities for improving the portfolio are not particularly assessed, with performance said to be satisfactory and largely attributable to the close follow-up and direct supervision by IFAD. Opportunities for scaling up are only really implicitly considered, as the ASP aims to replicate the successes of the NWASP nationally. Sustainability issues, either in terms of natural resources or post-project benefits and impacts, are given little attention.

1.9 Efficiency. The COSOP mentions the PRSP but does not explain the nature of IFAD's involvement in the process. The COSOP contains a useful assessment of successes and issues to address in the portfolio, based on substantial evidence from the External Review and a Project Completion Report. A more succinct conclusion of key lessons for future interventions would have also been helpful. Opportunities for leveraging additional funds, acting as a catalyst, monitoring and evaluation at the programme or strategy level, and communication and dissemination are not assessed.

1 IFAD procedures require environmental screening and a scoping note at the project formulation stage, when there is more detail of the particular intervention. 2 The drive for innovation is a more recent IFAD phenomenon. In transitional economies such as Armenia, most of the activities (WUAs, rural finance, etc) in the early stages of support are innovative to the country context, since nobody has done it before.

PNCountry portfolio history (1): Armenia

Type Board approval

date

Signing date

Cooperating Institution

Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

IRRIGIrrigation Rehabilitation Project433 Apr-95 Jun-95 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Oct-95 Jun-009 16

AGRICNorth-west Agricultural Services Project1038 Dec-97 Dec-97 IFAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Apr-98 Jul-010 18

Ongoing

IRRIGAgricultural Services Project1177 Apr-01 Apr-01 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Sep-01 Sep-050 21

Design

Agricultural Services and Market Link Project1307 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

1 April 2004 Page 18 of 21

PNCountry portfolio history (2):Armenia

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)

no. of HH beneficiaries

USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

IRRIGIrrigation Rehabilitation Project433 8,000 57,150 14% 75% 11% 277,000 1,108,000206 52 4.0

AGRICNorth-west Agricultural Services Project1038 12,961 15,165 85% 0% 15% 84,000 335,000181 45 4.0

Ongoing

IRRIGAgricultural Services Project1177 15,513 19,971 78% 0% 22% 33,000 165,000605 121 5.0

Design

Agricultural Services and Market Link Project1307

36,474 92,286 40% 47% 14%Totals




2 Summary of findings: North-west Agricultural Services Project (NWASP)

2.1 Objectives. The project objective is to improve living conditions of the target population, expressed by higher levels of agricultural production, income and food security.

Table: Overall 12-point project assessment Ratings:

4 = High; 3 = Substantial; 2 = Modest; 1 = Negligible IEE

Rating Identification 1. - Relevance: The extent to which the project fits country development

priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is: 3

Design 2. - Targeting: The extent to which the design targeted the right people with

appropriate activities was: 2

3. - Complexity: The extent to which the design was implementable, without major change, was:

3

4. - Riskiness: The quality of the assessment of risks and mitigations in the design was:

1

2.2 Relevance. The project was designed before the present COSOP (November 2003). Indeed the present COSOP develops lessons from NWASP. There is no particular reference to a regional strategy, with the latest such strategy produced in March 2002. Instead much of the discussion in the NWASP project documentation relates to IFAD's corporate strategy, although not the present Strategic Framework 2002-2006.

2.3 The appraisal produced broad figures of poverty, with some understanding of underlying causes such as the coping strategies of farming families. The main targeting focus is spatially, on selected regions with the lowest rural income rather than specific socio-economic groups. Gender analysis and targeting is limited, even though the region has a strong division of labour by gender issues.

2.4 Effectiveness. There is a clear and logical rationale for the project, which is particularly apparent in the descriptions of each component. The objectives of the project are described in broad terms, and the distinction between 'immediate objectives' (purpose/outcome level) and 'results' (outputs) in the logical framework is not always clear. Indicators are described in very broad terms and not particularly measurable in the form as presented (e.g. "seed output, sales", "quantities of seed certified and distributed"), with no targets, baseline, time period, etc. Risks are presented in broad terms and largely associated with the rapidly changing macro-economic and institutional framework in Armenia. Risks associated with actual project implication are given little attention, while mitigating measures are only described in general terms (such as, "manage in a flexible manner").

2.5 Analysis of the governance and institutional environment, is mostly restricted to a highly descriptive summary of key institutional structures - rather than roles, weaknesses, strengths, capacity, other constraints, etc. The project does however have a strong focus on institutional building. Some lessons from previous projects are explored, though mostly in general terms, and there is no particular analysis of how other people in a similar situation have escaped poverty. Environmental impact is said to be neutral, and while the arguments appear reasonable, there little substantive evidence. The economic analysis of project activities over a 20-year horizon shows an economic rate of return (ERR) of 30%. It provides a reasonable



analysis and cites that the high figures are due to: i) the present low productivity level from a lack of inputs; ii) the marginal product of additional inputs is high; iii) and, large investments that have already been made in irrigation infrastructure.

2.6 In terms of sustainability, the project has a strong commitment to using existing institutions, providing institutional support, using established arrangements with other donors/NGOs, encouraging beneficiary participation, and building on past experience. The potential for replicability and measures to promote scaling-up are not explicitly addressed. A number of innovations are stated, although with little explanation is it difficult to assess the extent of their innovation (i.e. the use of the private sector for project implementation and NGOs for beneficiary participation may be innovative for IFAD projects in Armenia, but not within a wider context).

2.7 Efficiency. Project management (roles, responsibilities, relationships) are clearly defined and build on existing interventions and known institutions. Capacity and commitment of project management is not particularly considered, though there is some identification of current needs (like the fact that Village Associations are not yet functioning as fully fledged financial intermediaries). There is also a description of specific partnerships (like Save the Children), but otherwise there is no in-depth analysis of partnerships per se.

2.8 NWASP was supervised directly by IFAD, and the Supervision Report provides a very comprehensive assessment of progress and recommendations of next steps. While there has undoubtedly been action since the Supervisory Report (i.e. as outlined in the Completion Evaluation Report), it is difficult to determine: The PSR in particular does not easily relate to the list of recommendations in the Supervisory report, and it is difficult to make a comparison using either the PSR's ratings or the text summaries (i.e. project-specific performance indicators are not recorded).

Summary of evidence about outcomes 2.9 Based on the Completion Evaluation conducted in December 2001, NWASP was considered to be very effective at completing most of the components and outputs detailed in the logical framework – with irrigation, credit and seed component targets even exceeded. Furthermore the project was implemented ahead of schedule and, at least a year before scheduled closure, some 90% of project activities and disbursements were completed. This has been partially attributed to good management, although also other factors may have been influential such as: an over-estimation of costs at appraisal; exchange rate fluctuations; greater than expected contributions in-kind from beneficiaries; and for loans, a very conservative loan screening criteria (though one that may have excluded potential beneficiaries).

2.10 Some 36,000 households directly benefited from some or all of the project activities, roughly 250% of the 9,500 households the project was expected to reach. However, the targeting of women was considered to be less successful. For example, 30% of ACBA loans were supposed to be directed towards women, yet the replacement of social development programmes with economic development projects meant that women took up only 10% of these loans.

2.11 In terms of physical assets progress is considered to be good. For irrigation and water management, some 322km of canals, pipes and associated structures were installed and 19,688 ha of previously irrigated land put back into full production. For the Rural Credit component, some 7,466 loans were extended (to the value of USD 5.4m) of which 698 loans, or USD 0.5 million, were to women. There were also increases in the social infrastructure,



with 61 social development projects completed, plus 186 village associations, 58 water user associations (WUAs) and 55 civic action groups established.

2.12 In terms of food production, a survey found significant changes in agricultural production levels of households that participated in NWASP from the control group households. For example a typical beneficiary household might experience a 66% plus increase in outputs for cereals and potatoes. For food security, there was actually a fall in the 3-month supply of food for both beneficiary and control groups, though this was largely due to on-going drought conditions. The drop however was only 3% for beneficiary households, while it was 20% for the control group. Also the percentage of households reported to be skipping a meal has dropped from the baseline of 19%, to 10% for beneficiary households and 17% for the control groups. Environmental impact was seen as minimal before implementation and not especially addressed in the completion evaluation.

2.13 In terms of increases in income, the findings are said to be difficult to interpret. The survey found little difference between beneficiary and control group households in average total income between August 1998 and March 2001 - though at the time of the survey, farmers were experiencing drought conditions

2.14 For other positive evidence of sustainable poverty impact, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions - in part due to the short time span of the surveys, as well as the drought conditions experienced at the time. The Completion Evaluation Report states for example that there were some impacts on cropping patterns, areas planted and yields (such as cultivation and increases in land parcel size) but little substantive evidence is presented.

2.15 In terms of sustainable institutional reform and strengthening, the on-going benefits to communities are said to depend on the energy and enthusiasm of the Civic Action Groups to mobilize resources for further projects to assist communities. For the Village Associations that have been established (under the rural credit programme) there is every reason to expect current levels of lending in Lori and Aragatzotn to continue (due to sound financial management and successful on-lending). For WUAs, there needs to be a strong commitment from government, especially as there are difficulties raising the funds from water charges to pay for bulk water supply and fund operation and maintenance.

Table: Evidence of outcomes and impact Ratings: 4 = High; 3 = Substantial; 2 = Modest; 1 = Negligible; 0 = No treatment

IEE Rating

Delivery of components/outputs 4 Number of beneficiaries by gender compared with no anticipated at appraisal 3 Increases in physical and financial assets 4 Increases in access to and use of social infrastructure 3 Sustainable changes to empowerment and social capital 2 Sustainable increases in food security 3 Sustainable changes to environment and common pool resources 0 Sustainable increases in income 2 Other positive evidence of sustainable poverty impact 2 Gender dimensions of above findings 2 Evidence of sustainable public or private institutional reform or strengthening 3 Evidence on attribution to the project 4 Evidence on innovation 0 Evidence on replication 0 Unexpected benefits or dis-benefits 0



3 Summary of findings: Agricultural Services Project (ASP)

3.1 Objectives. The rationale for the project is based on the policies and current country situation described above. As demonstrated by the baseline and repeater surveys carried out under NWASP, the provision of external resources for rural and agricultural development is expected both to accelerate growth and to improve the rural population's living standards. In the absence of the project, this process would need to be based on domestic resources, very modest farm surpluses and limited budget funding. Without external assistance, the time span involved in such a development process would be lengthened and avoidable privation would occur.

3.2 The overall goal of the project is to help bring about a sustainable improvement in the living conditions of the poorest project-area households in terms of higher levels of agricultural production, income and food security. This will be achieved through: (i) functional maintenance and management of irrigation infrastructure systems, with increased involvement of WUCCs and federations; (ii) development of tertiary infrastructure to bring additional areas under irrigation; (iii) provision of loans by ACBA to village association (VA) members to help improve agricultural production and for off-farm activities; (iv) establishment of financially sound small and medium enterprises (SMEs) providing employment opportunities in poorer villages; (v) provision of micro finance services to poor women to enable them to engage in profitable economic activities; (vi) enhanced community infrastructure; and (vii) improved support services for seed production, certification and distribution involving the private sector.

Table: Overall 12-point project assessment

Ratings: 4 = High; 3 = Substantial; 2 = Modest; 1 = Negligible

IEE Rating

Identification 1. - Relevance: The extent to which the project fits country development





4


2

3.3 Relevance. The ASP is congruent with the COSOP for Armenia, although it predates the present country strategy (November 2003). The ASP builds on the previous project (the NWASP) and retains strong the strategic emphasis of promoting agricultural growth as it has a direct and immediate bearing on the poverty situation. Furthermore, while the strategy continues to promote growth through improved supply systems, there also increasing attention paid to demand for (and support to) marketing operations. ASP is also consistent with the sub-regional (CEN) strategy, although it again predates this document – which is more of a product of lessons learnt than the other way around.

3.4 During appraisal a fairly comprehensive poverty analysis took place, developing from work undertaken under NWASP. Beneficiary participation is an important element of the implementation stage, and includes some refining of activities and subsequent operations. Given this approach, targeting is designed to vary with project interventions, and the project



design documentation therefore only provides aggregate figures. Criteria is provided for targeting by each component, although the design lacks specificity on the means and mechanisms that might be used for targeting particular socio-economic groups. There is some gender analysis at appraisal, but little appears to have been transformed into the actual design.

3.5 Effectiveness. The intervention logic of the project is straightforward and consistent, and has clearly gained from experience gathered during the preceding project on which it is based (NWASP). The objective and output levels of the logical framework are well defined, and largely measurable, although the indicators vary in quality (for example, some have baselines and targets and others do not). Risks are not extensively considered, but it argued that they are somewhat limited because the project design is based on the experience of NWASP.

3.6 There is little explicit analysis of institutional configurations and trends, although much of this may be implicit, as the project so closely develops the lessons and experience from NWASP. There is no particular analysis of how other people in a similar situation have escaped poverty, although again, ASP aims to extend the success of NWASP nationally. Environmental impacts are not considered to be great, yet the discussion of possible impacts are very general and contain no supporting evidence, such as from NWASP project. The economic rate of return (ERR) was measured as 25%. Issues of sustainability and replication are not particularly addressed in the project design, although the project itself attempts to replicate the success of NWASP. The project is seen as innovative because it uses civil society organisations as implementing agencies, and, emphasises policy dialogue to create an enabling environment for water-user efficiency. It is not clear the extent to which these claims are truly innovative - and whether this refers to just IFAD operations, Armenia, or to a much wider context.

3.7 Efficiency. The TRC indicates a good level of dialogue during project design, although the final design only provides a brief description of project management. This may be because much of the design is implicit, relying heavily on existing personnel and experience. Having said this however, issues of capacity and commitment (which may ultimately affect project performance) are not well considered. Indeed this would appear to be important, especially given the greater use (and innovation) of using NGOs, CSOs and grassroots organisations as implementers. The appraisal highlights a list of potential partners, but despite the key importance of NGOs, CSOs, etc, there is little analysis of their roles and responsibilities (although it is stated that all implementers all will sign an Implementers Agreement).

3.8 The UNOPS Supervisory Report (December 2002) provides a fairly comprehensive account of progress, component-by-component. There is however a lack of synthesis and prioritisation, with no executive summary. There is some evidence of actions in subsequent PSRs (August 2003), although the comparison (in terms of detail, format and content) is problematic.

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) Other Research and Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002

TAG No.

Recipient Programme Division Approval Date

Grant Amount

Countries

536 CIHEAM Methodologies & Approached for Effective Introduction of PIM

PN 26-Apr-01 1,600,000 Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Armenia



Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000), 1994-2002 TAG No.

Recipient Programme Division Approval Date

Grant Amount

Countries

417 WORKSHOP

Three day Workshop on Start-up and Implementation in Eastern Europe and CIS Countries

PN 01-Oct-98 60,000

Bosnia & Herzegovina, Algeria, Georgia, Romania, Albania, Armenia, Malta

451 PPA/PIM

Co-financing of Preparatory Activities for the Programme for Regional Action on Participatory Natural Resources Management (PIM) in the Middle East and North Africa

PN 19-May -99 60,000 Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Armenia

528Q AM Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, Project Completion Report

PN 20-Jul-01 22,000 Armenia

4 Key Issues

4.1 Gender and targeting. The analysis and targeting of gender issues is mostly limited at the project design and appraisal stage, even though the region has a strong division of labour by gender issues. Poverty analysis in NWASP was mostly by spatial location, and the targeting of specific socio-economic groups was given less attention. The subsequent project, ASP, is much more comprehensive in its approach to poverty analysis, and its approach to beneficiary participation in design and implementation may overcome some of the targeting issues.3

4.2 Supervision and monitoring. The NWASP was directly (IFAD) supervised, and the quality of the report is good. More generally, the PSRs however do not easily relate to the progress reported in Supervision Missions, and it is difficult to make comparisons using the PSR's ratings or the text summaries. Project-specific performance indicators, and other such evidence, are not systematically recorded in the PSRs.

4.3 Risk Analysis. In general, risks have not been well identified, and mitigating measures less so. In the NWASP for example, the risks were mainly identified with regards to external events, with little attention to other aspects of implementation. 4

3 Admittedly, the extent of targeting required at design stage is open to some debate. For example, extensive targeting at the micro level may result in a better design, but is costly and may be subject to changes during the first phases of implementation. Furthermore, in many situations a highly targeted approach may be inappropriate, but even in these cases, it would be monitor those who are not being reached – and feed this into subsequent design changes. 4 This may in part be due to the fairly extensive knowledge that CPMs have of the implementation capacity, alongside the gradual evolvement of project designs.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis - Bangladesh

Bangladesh Country Synopsis page 1

Bangladesh Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy

1.1 Promoting self-managing community organizations that will not only create and sustain viable institutions but also empower the rural poor, with a focus on the poorest and women in remote areas such as baors, in seasonally flooded charlands and on tribal groups in CHT. It will focus on improving the access of the poor to rural credit, increasing the access of the poor to resources, including government owned properties, and sensitizing communities to the needs of the poorest - the hard-core poor. The agricultural sector is the most important means of improving livelihoods and the strategy will emphasize the development of inland fisheries and livestock, as they require little land, are labour rather than capital intensive, require little investment in training, and provide high value products.

1.2 The COSOP provides a good analysis of the incidence and distribution of poverty in terms of geographic distribution, gender, and ethnicity together with an analysis of the causes of poverty. IFAD's role in Bangladesh is presented as the continuation of a search for innovative approaches with an increasing emphasis on self governing, rather than NGO dominated community organizations. The poor in remote areas such as the CHT or areas with difficult access such as the baors and charlands are specifically targeted. Although there is no logframe, the objectives are clearly stated and link to overcoming identified constraints and opportunities. Proposed project interventions provide mechanisms to implement the strategy by blending a thematic approach with targeting specific geographically defined pockets of poverty. The lessons of IFAD experience in Bangladesh and that of the UN SAPAP have been identified. There is also an analysis of the involvement of NGOs in rural finance initiatives and these lessons have been incorporated in the strategy. There is little explicit analysis of the capacity of government agencies and NGOs though there are references to weak extension services and poor public sector performance.

Overall Rating of COSOP: 4

PICountry portfolio history (1): Bangladesh

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

IRRIGPabna Irrigation and Rural Development Project9 Dec-78 Mar-79 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated May-79 Jun-9211 12

PGMLOFertilizer Sector Programme31 Dec-79 Jan-80 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-80 Mar-854 3

CREDISmall Farmer Agricultural Credit Project41 Sep-80 Sep-80 AsDB IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-81 Jun-851 15

RURALSouthwest Rural Development Project73 Sep-81 Oct-81 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed May-82 Jun-905 31

RURALNorth West Rural Development Project110 Dec-82 Apr-83 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Oct-83 Jun-9118 25

IRRIGSmall Scale Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Project137 Dec-83 Jan-84 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jun-84 Dec-926 21

CREDIGrameen Bank Project161 Dec-84 Mar-85 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-85 Dec-8914 26

CREDIMarginal and Small Farm Systems Development Crop Intensification Project194 Dec-86 Jan-87 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Aug-87 Dec-958 30

FISHOxbow Lakes Small-Scale Fishermen Project237 Dec-88 Apr-89 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-89 Jun-9717 28

CREDIGrameen Bank Phase III Project239 Apr-89 Sep-89 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-90 Jun-9319 25

LIVSTSmallholder Livestock Development Project280 Apr-91 Jul-91 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-91 Jun-9913 22

RURALSpecial Assistance Project for Cyclone Affected Rural Households287 Sep-91 Nov-91 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-92 Dec-999 11

AGRICNetrakona Integrated Agricultural Production and Water Management Project343 Dec-93 Feb-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jul-94 Dec-009 21

CREDIEmployment-Generation Project for the Rural Poor431 Apr-95 Jun-95 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-95 Dec-018 19

IRRIGSmall-scale Water Resources Development Sector Project480 Dec-95 Dec-95 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Jun-96 Jun-021 25

Ongoing

AGRICAgricultural Diversification and Intensification Project1029 Apr-97 May-97 IFAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-97 Jun-044 27

RURALThird Rural Infrastructure Development Project1062 Dec-97 Dec-97 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Jul-98 Dec-042 27

RURALAquaculture Development Project1074 Apr-98 May-98 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-98 Jun-053 28

RURALSmallholder Agricultural Improvement Project1076 Apr-99 Jun-99 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-00 Mar-067 38

FLMSunamganj Community-Based Resource Management Project1165 Sep-01 Nov-01 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-03 Mar-149 60

CREDIMicrofinance and Technical Support Project1235 Apr-03 May-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-03 Dec-104 23

DesignMicrofinance for Marginal and Small Farmers Project1284 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):Bangladesh

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

IRRIGPabna Irrigation and Rural Development Project9 30,000 85,000 35% 45% 20% 167,000 835,000509 102 5.0

PGMLOFertilizer Sector Programme31 21,381 32,474 66% 0% 34% 1,300,000 6,500,00025 5 5.0

CREDISmall Farmer Agricultural Credit Project41 17,810 25,310 70% 0% 30% 73,000 653,000347 39 8.9

RURALSouthwest Rural Development Project73 14,823 22,323 66% 0% 34% 247,000 1,235,00090 18 5.0

RURALNorth West Rural Development Project110 3,181 44,031 7% 79% 14% 132,600 663,000332 66 5.0

IRRIGSmall Scale Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Project137 6,664 9,864 68% 0% 32% 30,000 250,000329 39 8.3

CREDIGrameen Bank Project161 23,600 51,098 46% 32% 22% 1,000,000 3,000,00051 17 3.0

CREDIMarginal and Small Farm Systems Development Crop Intensification Project194 5,610 12,570 45% 46% 9% 22,700 130,000554 97 5.7

FISHOxbow Lakes Small-Scale Fishermen Project237 7,163 11,123 64% 28% 7% 6,800 43,5201,636 256 6.4

CREDIGrameen Bank Phase III Project239 8,000 105,740 8% 92% 0% 500,000 2,500,000211 42 5.0

LIVSTSmallholder Livestock Development Project280 10,827 15,080 72% 21% 7% 260,000 1,300,00058 12 5.0

RURALSpecial Assistance Project for Cyclone Affected Rural Households287 15,422 20,728 74% 20% 6% 69,000 146,000300 142 2.1

AGRICNetrakona Integrated Agricultural Production and Water Management Project343 8,863 13,724 65% 12% 24% 90,550 500,000152 27 5.5

CREDIEmployment-Generation Project for the Rural Poor431 14,847 21,903 68% 0% 32% 45,140 270,840485 81 6.0

IRRIGSmall-scale Water Resources Development Sector Project480 10,400 65,967 16% 59% 25% 140,000 750,000471 88 5.4

Ongoing

AGRICAgricultural Diversification and Intensification Project1029 18,920 32,362 58% 16% 26% 86,000 430,000376 75 5.0

RURALThird Rural Infrastructure Development Project1062 11,744 178,770 7% 70% 23% 2,800,000 14,000,00064 13 5.0

RURALAquaculture Development Project1074 19,988 23,770 84% 5% 11% 120,000 600,000198 40 5.0

RURALSmallholder Agricultural Improvement Project1076 18,622 25,727 72% 7% 21% 82,000 410,000314 63 5.0

FLMSunamganj Community-Based Resource Management Project1165 21,973 34,285 64% 22% 14% 135,000 675,000254 51 5.0

CREDIMicrofinance and Technical Support Project1235 16,298 20,167 81% 0% 19% 276,000 1,380,00073 15 5.0

Design

Microfinance for Marginal and Small Farmers Project1284

1 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):Bangladesh

306,136 852,016 36% 45% 19%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Aquaculture Development Project: Project ID 1074

Table: Overall project assessment Criteria IEE

Rating Comment

Identification Relevance. The extent to which the project fits country development priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is:

3

Design Targeting: The extent to which the design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

4

Complexity: The extent to which the design was implementable without major change was:

3 Delays in implementation led to MTR rescheduling

Riskiness: The quality of the assessment of risks and mitigations in the design was:

3 Risk correctly identified but were realized during implementation, in particular PIU and DOF ability to motivate communities, and delays in implementation

2.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the 1996 IFAD strategy to alleviate poverty and hunger through a spectrum of initiatives. The analysis of poverty is used to identify the target group as the landless, functionally landless and small farmers, with those engaged in fishing and aquaculture as the core target group. Women are a specific group within this wider target population.

2.2 Effectiveness. The objectives of the project are clearly stated in with a supporting logframe providing definition of outputs and indicators, though these are not very specific. The logic of the project design is consistent with a clear linkage between objectives, constraints and opportunities and project components. Lessons from previous IFAD experience are identified. Environmental impact has been assessed through an ISS and the project provides for screening of project financed development of water bodies. Project benefits are described and the ERR estimated at 12%. The sustainability of the project and its replicability are implicit in the development of viable SHGs. As the project is based on the experience of OLFSP and other donor projects it is not highly innovative.

2.3 Efficiency. Improvements to project design were suggested by TRC and these appear to have been incorporated. Management roles and responsibilities are defined but there is little analysis of the capacity or strengths and weaknesses of the various agencies involved. There is provision for an M&E cell but data collection is the responsibility of line agencies so difficulties in co-ordinating these are to be expected. WFP is an identified partner but the way in which Food for Work programmes will be implemented are lacking. Similarly, the expected contribution of beneficiaries is not discussed. Supervision was satisfactory with reports highlighting delays in implementation due to staffing and policy problems. This led to the project being classed as a problem project followed by an effective MTR which resulted in re-scheduling of some activities, changes in staffing and an improvement in project performance.

2.4 Outcomes. Implementation was very slow during the first two years of the project but following rescheduling of some activities there was significant improvement with achievement of between 40 – 50 % of physical targets. Increases in stocking rates and



improved water quality reflected in increased yields of fish, which resulted in improved incomes, though precise data are not available. Many poor women have gained access to re-excavated ponds and 78% of membership of 648 project groups are female. The formation of beneficiary groups with NGO assistance and initial saving by groups is an indication of greater beneficiary confidence and their influence on construction reflects a greater sense of empowerment. The construction of feeder and approach roads has provided easier access to markets schools and clinics and there have been improvements in marketing facilities.

2.5 Issues With the increasing emphasis in IFAD on beneficiary participation in project design and implementation the ability of line agencies to motivate communities and implement participatory programmes is an important issue. Partnerships with NGOs can help to address this issue, but it must remain a risk in all projects.

2.6 Other issues affecting implementation of projects in Bangladesh relate to release of government owned land or resources and a lack of flexibility in altering project design due to rigid budget requirements.



3 Summary of findings: Small-Scale Water resources Development Sector Project : Project ID 480

Table: Overall project assessment Criteria IEE

Rating Comment


4 Very relevant given the importance of the water sector in Bangladesh


3


3


2

3.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with IFAD's 1996 Strategic Framework and relates specifically to the water sector, of prime importance in Bangladesh. There is no specific analysis of the distribution of poverty but landlessness and small holding size are identified as the main causes. The identification of the target group responds to this and includes the landless, near landless, destitute women, fisher folk and marginal farmers. Women are specifically targeted with at least 50% of LCS members to be women.

3.2 Effectiveness. The project logic is consistent, linking project objectives and components with identified constraints and opportunities. Lessons learnt from previous IFAD experience have been incorporated in project design. Environmental concerns are satisfactorily addressed through project provision for IEE or EIA, mitigation measures and monitoring during implementation. The rate of return has been estimated at 12.3%. There is only a brief discussion of sustainability or replicability (two paragraphs in the Appraisal Report). Although many project initiatives are based on previously tested approaches, the emphasis on beneficiary selection and control of water bodies to be improved under the project is a significant innovation in a sector previously dominated by top-down technically driven irrigation and flood control projects.

3.3 Efficiency. TRC was largely supportive of the project design and PT participated in appraisal. Implementation arrangements are clearly defined, and although the capacity of water sector institutions is discussed there is little analysis of other involved government agencies. The need for co-ordination has been identified as an important lesson from earlier projects and provision is made for co-ordinating committees at national, district and than a level, together with a Project Technical Committee, but this appears to be overly complex. M&E is the responsibility of the PMO but indicators are to be defined and agreed with all implementing agencies which could delay start-up of monitoring. Regular supervision by AsDB and its consultants identified constraints and made recommendations for action, but action taken against these recommendations was not recorded. More specific action and some changes in physical targets were agreed at MTR. The PCR and independent evaluation both noted satisfactory achievement of physical infrastructure, but identified problems with beneficiary participation in identification and design of water bodies to be improved, even though WMCAs were formed at all sub-projects. About 30% of members were women. There have been incremental increases in cereal and fish production. It is difficult to assess the impact of training programmes, though there are indication of improved institutional approaches and gains in the technical knowledge of beneficiaries.



3.4 Outcomes. Physical achievements were considerable with 248 of 280 sub-projects completed. WMCAs formed at all sub-projects and beneficiaries contributed over 95% of expected contributions. About 30% of WMCA members are women and one third of management committees were women. Completion of the sub-projects meant about 181,000 households benefited from improved water control structures resulting in incremental yields of 75,000 mt of cereals, 81,000 mt of non-cereals and about 930 mt of fish. This meant improved food security and an increase in family incomes. The project successfully introduced beneficiary selection and control of water bodies in a sector that is dominated by top-down technical design and construction. This was not only innovative but contributed to the empowerment of communities in dealing with bureaucracy.

4 Issues 4.1 An important issue is that of sustainability. Both the PCR and the independent evaluation report noted the need for continuing support to WMCAs to ensure sustainability.

4.2 No data were available but there are indications of improved institutional support and improved technical knowledge of the beneficiaries. There is, therefore, a need to develop clear indicators of the impact of training programmes which were substantial in this project

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Bangladesh


Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs)

TAG No. Recipient Programme Division

Approval Date App Year

Grant Amount Countries

502L BD Smallholder Livestock Development Project PI 17/11/2000 2000 22 000 Bangladesh

528I BD Netrakona Integrated Agric. Production and Water Management

PI 23/05/2001 2001 22 000 Bangladesh

502N BD-Suppl Smallholder Livestock Development Project PI 13/08/2001 2001 468.57 Bangladesh

576J BD Employment Generation Project fro the Rural Poor, Completion Report

PI 04/06/2002 2002 22 000 Bangladesh

600 RESULTS Testing of the Microcredit Campaign Poverty Targeting Tools

PT 08/08/2002 2002 95 000 India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Bangladesh

678 IFDC

Mitigating Poverty and Environmental Degradation through Nutrient Management for Paddy Production in South and Southeast Asia

PT 29/09/2003 2003 60 000 Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam

Tag Nos. 502L, 528I, 502N, 576J are all SOF grants. Tag Nos. 600, 678 are research grants. In addition, SOFs were approved for loans: 391BD; 443BD; 457BD; 505BD; 567BD; and 609BD. Additional research grants: IRRI424; ICLARM 350; ICLARM 531

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Bolivia

Bolivia Country Synopsis page 1

Bolivia Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 A Strategic Programming Mission went to Bolivia in 1979 to propose a strategy and plan to reduce rural and food insecurity levels. The mission recommended focusing on the western region and IFAD financed three large scale agricultural development projects contributing about 60% of funds. A second mission visited the country in 1985 coinciding with the government’s New Economic Policy. At the request of the government IFAD geographic coverage was expanded to include the Eastern Lowland region. A further five projects were funded following the 1985 mission. The Chaco High Valley project was approved under the COSOP in 2000 but has only become effective in September 2003.

1.2 IFAD strategy focuses on fostering partic ipatory planning as the core element of administrative decentralisation processes and enabling the rural poor to increase their incomes in economically, environmentally and institutionally sustainable ways. Whilst the new strategy continues emphasis on organisation of the poor and their participation in the market economy there has been the recognition that agriculture should not be considered as the exclusive means of achieving rural development but that all income generating activities should be included. The new approach focuses on the obstacles faced by the rural poor in taking advantage of market opportunities. It is also recognised that the rural poor are part of the private sector, respond to market information and can contribute to economic growth. There is a new emphasis on gender with a commitment to identify mechanisms with a positive bias towards women.

1.3 The COSOP was prepared in 1998 before the current structure was approved by the Board. The document however contains all the main sections required with the only omissions under the new format being a logframe and SWOT analysis for the partners in development in the annexes. The COSOP pre-dates the strategic framework but it is strongly linked to the financial assets and market objective and has relevance to equitable access and gender. The COSOP is also consistent with the subsequent regional strategy in its emphasis on markets and organizations of the poor. The potential catalytic role of IFAD is not discussed although there may well be currently emerging opportunities under the CDF initiative. The strategic niche and comparative advantage of IFAD is not outlined in any detail.

1.4 The strategy is strong on governance and institutional analysis and there are clearly explained links with government programmes. The identification of partnerships is well described and opportunities for strategic linkages and engagement in policy dialogue are thorough. The COSOP predates the logframe requirement and objectives are couched in rather broad aims. There is no indication of an approach to monitoring and evaluation of strategy progress. The treatment of gender issues is good although there is less detail on equity and empowerment issues. There is a good review of lessons from previous experience and a strong rationale for proposed new initiatives. The strategy is weaker on making clear links with the way in which priority needs of the poor have been identified and the strategy proposed. There is implicit information on replication, building on previous lessons, but this could be clearer. More emphasis could have been put in the way the non lending programme supports the country portfolio.

2 Country Portfolio Issues August 2003

2.1 Bolivia’s rural population, who are mainly indigenous, remains very poor. There is still a large number who lack access to education, have no land titles and are excluded from services



including credit and investment opportunities. The key risk associated with IFAD strategy is identified as potential macroeconomic instability. Two main assumptions for success are that the Government will consolidate favourable environmental policies and continue the land titling process particularly for the Amazonian Indigenous People. IFAD has approved debt relief for Bolivia (SDR 6.56 million) under the HIPC initiative.

2.2 No significant delays between approval and effectiveness are noted, IFAD grants a Special Operations Facility to assist fulfilment of effectiveness conditions. Projects have suffered from changes introduced by recent governments to institutions dealing with rural development which has led to implementation delays. PRODESIB was paralysed for almost two years with a reorientation mission starting operations again in 2003. PROSAT is also being reoriented and operations will resume after the mission is completed and subject to agreement with Government.

2.3 Bolivia is a pilot country for donor coordination and policy dialogue for IFAD and other international development organizations under the Comprehensive Development Framework. During the appraisal for the Chaco and High Valleys project IFAD participated in discussions with IDB, World Bank and GTZ.

PLCountry portfolio history (1): Bolivia

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALOmasuyos-Los Andes Rural Development Project16 Jun-79 Sep-79 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Mar-80 Jun-8610 29

RURALChuquisaca North Agricultural Development Project86 Dec-81 Jun-82 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-83 Dec-9227 31

RURALCotagaita-San Juan del Oro Agricultural Development Project149 Apr-84 Jan-85 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-85 Mar-9639 46

RURALChuquisaca South Rural Development Project218 Dec-87 May-88 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-89 Jun-9823 48

STLLMConsolidation and Development of Smallholder Settlements in the Department of Santa Cruz Project

266 Oct-90 Jan-91 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-91 Dec-9715 35

CREDICamelid Producers Development Project in the Andean High Plateau354 Apr-94 Jun-94 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-95 Dec-038 53

Ongoing

RSRCHSustainable Development Project by Beni Indigenous People373 Dec-94 Feb-95 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-96 Jun-0410 88

RURALSmall Farmers Technical Assistance Services Project (PROSAT)1031 Apr-97 Aug-97 CAF Cooperating Institution initiated Apr-98 Dec-0314 38

RSRCHManagement of Natural Resources in the Chaco and High Valley Regions Project1145 Sep-00 Oct-01 CAF IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Aug-03 Sep-0855 98

Design

Production and Marketing of Southamerican Camelids1298 IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Totals


PLCountry portfolio history (2):Bolivia

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALOmasuyos-Los Andes Rural Development Project16 2,571 5,099 50% 40% 10% 6,000 30,000850 170 5.0

RURALChuquisaca North Agricultural Development Project86 13,800 21,010 66% 2% 32% 6,000 31,2003,502 673 5.2

RURALCotagaita-San Juan del Oro Agricultural Development Project149 12,000 21,700 55% 36% 9% 5,500 27,5003,945 789 5.0

RURALChuquisaca South Rural Development Project218 5,500 9,950 55% 32% 13% 4,260 21,3002,336 467 5.0

STLLMConsolidation and Development of Smallholder Settlements in the Department of Santa Cruz Project

266 12,000 17,418 69% 20% 11% 5,000 30,0003,484 581 6.0

CREDICamelid Producers Development Project in the Andean High Plateau354 7,580 11,295 67% 26% 6% 15,000 75,000753 151 5.0

Ongoing

RSRCHSustainable Development Project by Beni Indigenous People373 6,260 7,898 79% 12% 9% 2,600 16,9003,038 467 6.5

RURALSmall Farmers Technical Assistance Services Project (PROSAT)1031 8,099 28,273 29% 53% 18% 28,000 140,0001,010 202 5.0

RSRCHManagement of Natural Resources in the Chaco and High Valley Regions Project1145 12,042 14,958 81% 0% 19% 15,424 64,780970 231 4.2

DesignProduction and Marketing of Southamerican Camelids1298

79,852 137,601 58% 26% 16%Totals

1 April 2004



3 Summary of findings: Sustainable Development Project by Beni Indigenous Peoples (PRODESIB)

Timeline Date Activity 89/90 GIM; projects and programmes review committee (PPRC) rec look at possibilities for

support Amazonian indigenous peoples in Peru and Bolivia; pre-identification mission 1991 Review of pre-identification report; PPRC rec PL project in Beni Department and

establish grant for a regional programme for indigenous populations; GIM 1 1992 Regional TAG approved TAG-234 AIP; GIM 2 1993 TRC reviewed mission report rec links to the TAG and an environmental assessment

to be done prior to preparation; EA mission 1994 TRC review of EA report rec further preparation work; PT and PL joint post

preparation mission; TRC review of report and appraisal mission; RRP December approval

Feb 95 Agreement Oct 96 Effectiveness 3.1 Objectives. Promote sustainable self-development of Indigenous Peoples in Beni, through capacity-building measures at grass-roots level (six ethnic groups). The project will: (i) assist in providing land security to indigenous peoples; (ii) bolster indigenous knowledge with technical assistance and financial resources; (iii) provide training, education and the systematic cataloguing of indigenous experiences; (iv) support the execution of a set of self-managed, productive micro-projects proposed by indigenous organisations to increase incomes; (v) strengthen and consolidate indigenous culture; and (vi) promote enhanced participation of women in productive activities. There are three major components: land; organisational strengthening; micro initiatives fund.

Table: Overall project assessment Ratings: 4= High; 3= Substantial; 2= Modest; 1= Negligible

IEE Rating

Comments

Identification - Relevance: The extent to which the project fits country development priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is:

4 The project pre dates the COSOP, regional strategy and IFAD strategic framework but is congruent with all; well related to GoB priorities

Design - Targeting: The extent to which the design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

3 Poverty Analysis is not done as a formal heading; description of how people are poor rather than why although some could be imputed from social services levels available and the consequences of some of the land reform policies are outlined; Appraisal states that a detailed participatory process was conducted with communities to identify needs and demands thorough list presented but it is not clear with whom (representativeness) or how the process was carried out; RRP Apx II provides good analysis of situation of indigenous peoples and needs for their development; project incorporates lessons in terms of allowing for differentiated strategy depending on sub area characteristics (natural; social; legal; institutional); A long appendix (2) to appraisal report on indigenous women with project strategies outlined; stated that the project would have particular influence on the environment and women



Ratings: 4= High; 3= Substantial; 2= Modest; 1= Negligible

IEE Rating

Comments

have particular influence on the environment and women (RRP 108)

- Complexity: The extent to which the design was implementable, without major change, was:

X Hard to assess given the difficulties encountered in implementation due to outside factors

- Riskiness: The quality of the assessment of risks and mitigations in the design was:

2 Risks are not clearly stated although there are several that lurk in the text; A joint workshop with beneficiaries govt and IFAD proposed early on might help in detailing what could go wrong and what to do but it is not certain. There is no assessment of risk probability and differential impact level

3.2 Effectiveness. The project pre dates the requirement for a logframe and has an overall objective to support sustainable self development of indigenous peoples in Beni department through capacity building activities. The project is described in terms of activities rather than outputs or purpose. Some activities could be stated as outputs (eg land security). There is a list of potential indicators given in the RRP which need to be refined further. Clearer links between cause, effect, necessity and sufficiency would improve the presentation of the project logic.

3.3 PL undertook review of IFAD projects (Helms 94) which looks at four previous projects in Bolivia which had direct effect on highland Indians. The report IFAD learning by comparing impact in land, participation, organization, traditional technology, culture in all relevant projects in region and shows improvement over ten year period. These lessons are summarised in project proposal and have informed project design. Reference is also made to IFAD experience with the TAG regional programme in support of indigenous people in the Amazon region. A detailed review of the situation and priorities of indigenous peoples in the Amazon region is provided in appendix 2 and actions by other indigenous groups are identified especially around land rights and title. There is little detail on how or in what way people have escaped poverty. An environmental assessment was carried out in 1993 but there is no reference to findings in the proposal. No rates of return are calculated but a set of benefit cost calculations are presented.

3.4 There is little discussion of sustainability issues although the importance of environmental sustainability is stressed. Replicability is not covered, this project represents a new experience for IFAD and working with indigenous peoples.

3.5 Efficiency. There is a detailed account of the legislative framework in Bolivia relevant to project. Land security and legal questions are addressed. A list of key indigenous institutions with assessment of strengths against stated criteria is presented together with other organizations that are relevant to indigenous peoples. The means of coordination is unclear. The project will focus on Beni and those that work in the area with a stated intention to use local institutions, advisers, and/or trainers.

3.6 Arrangements for project management are outlined, including some means of ensuring beneficiaries will be involved. There will be a totally independent PEU and 3 decentralised management units that will be autonomous and have no relationship to existing structures. Roles and responsibilit ies are well defined but the analysis of government institutions is not as strong as that for the indigenous peoples. Relevant initiatives and other organisations with potential for synergy/ collaboration are listed. Some particular activities are allocated to appropriate organizations but it is unclear if this has been agreed or just explored. There would be a full time monitoring specialist at the PEU responsible for developing indicators in



first 6 months of project. This would need better definitions of objectives/outputs. Beneficiary participation in the process is unclear.

3.7 There is good congruence between issues raised in the MTR, supervision report (2000) and the summaries in the PSRs. The supervision report links to progress against previous recommendations and the PSRs also map progress which is slow and problematic. The content of the reports focus on activity level rather than progress towards achievement of outputs, which need to be better defined.

3.8 Outcomes. The difficulties in implementation, largely due to institutional and governance issues, has meant that the project has had little active time. At the time of the MTR (1999) it was reported that the project had actually been functional for about 12 months. Subsequently there were further institutional problems with change in director and institutional setting. The project was suspended in 2001 and eventually restarted in September 2003. There is no evidence available on which to define outcomes at present.

3.9 Issues

Credit. How has this worked out in the project? Reservations from the Helms report?

Participation. Mechanisms – which work best in practice? Differences between areas? Representativeness of local institutions? Gender issues?

Land. Cultural relationship of people and economic pressures effect? Interaction of land titling with social dynamics? Impact of land titling on peoples’ lives?

Risks. Definition? Project regarded as high risk – impact and probability? How have these worked in practice? Risk management strategy?

Institutional Issues. Is complete autonomy realistic for project management? Does this threaten government structures and complicate processes? Sustainability issues? Any ways of managing/mitigating this institutional insecurity in project design.

Partnerships. How has this worked in practice? Dynamics of relationships at local level and above?

M and E. Delays? What is now in place? Beneficiary participation? Has there been refinement of objectives/targets/outputs during implementation?

4 Summary of findings: Small Farmers Technical Assistance Services Project (PROSAT)

Timeline Date Activity March 96 Formulation mission Oct 96 Appraisal mission April 97 EB Approval Aug 97 Loan agreement April 98 Loan effectiveness 4.1 Objectives. The overall goal is to create conditions for the establishment of a sustainable private market for technical assistance services, strengthening both demand and supply. This



include: (i) fostering the development of a demand-driven approach to the provision of technical assistance to poor rural peasants; (ii) strengthening participatory mechanisms for productive small-farmer investments; and (iii) enhancing the capacity of private-sector individuals and organisations to provide the required technical assistance services. There are three main components:

§ Strengthening of human resources

§ Support to production

§ Strengthening of private technical assistance services


IEE Rating

Comments


4 pre dates the COSOP; consistent with existing strategy in strengthening rural communities and identify own technical assistance needs; project also pre dates regional strategy but is consistent with its aims in terms of the participatory approach and empowerment of beneficiaries; good fit with current government priorities


3 Summary of rural poverty causes; states that beneficiaries were consulted via interviews and workshops and requests incorporated in design but not enough details to understand process and product; project area includes some of the poorest municipalities in Bolivia; over 90% are indigenous people; criteria established for selection of target group; WB project in the 94 poorest municipalities project will target rural women; eligibility criteria for financing will include gender sensitive indicators; training module includes gender and ethnic perspectives in technical assistance; good gender annex in appraisal; targets 28,000 families


X Hard to assess given institutional implementation problems


2 This section is weak and does not address all the risks from the logframe; the proposals for mitigation are rather vague; there is no impact and probability analysis

4.2 Effectiveness. The logframe provides a reasonable basis on which to build during implementation. The gap from purpose to goal is quite large and is not compensated by the list of assumptions. The goal statement is rather complex. The indicators relate well to the component objectives with targets set for quantity although there is little on qualitative aspects and they are strongly based on activities. Targets are set for the number of women to be involved.

4.3 Lessons from previous experience are listed the key ones being: importance of beneficiary participation in design and implementation; need for decentralised implementation; importance of private market development. There are no details on previous



poverty reduction impact. The environmental impact section is weak with apparent reliance on technical assistance and training in NR management to ensure no negative effects. There are no environmental indicators in the logframe. Traditional economic and financial analysis not possible for this type of demand led project. Calculations completed for eight representative production models and states that the IRR will be higher for each model with the project than without it.

4.4 Sustainability issues are not addressed. The project is designed to provide the technical assistance component of a WB funded project. It will start in 20 municipalities out of the total 94 covered by the WB project thus opportunities for scaling up are built in.

4.5 Efficiency. Some good points made in the PT memo 1996 not all of which have been addressed which is illustrated in the risk section. The project will be implemented through a decentralised system, linking to one of the previous lessons identified, so there are two executing agencies. The arrangements for management are detailed in appendix VI to RRP with roles and responsibilities defined, including the relationship of the beneficiaries with the project. There is no detail on linkages with other partners or stakeholders. Procedures for monitoring and evaluation are also outlined in Appendix VI but it is confined to responsibilities.

4.6 There is no MTR available. The supervision report of August 2003 (5 years of execution) completely reflects the preceding PSR. The report assesses compliance with previous recommendations, many of which have not been completed. The monitoring and evaluation system is still not in place and there have been a series of institutional crises in implementation.

4.7 Outcomes. There is insufficient information available to comment on outcomes. There are contracts for technical assistance for 760 initiatives in existence in spite of the problems in project implementation. However there is little detail on how activities relate to the achievement of objectives/outputs or what changes are being made in the lives of beneficiaries.

4.8 Issues

Payment for Technical Services. How is this launched with poor communities? Is it really sustainable in the longer term? Or do some sort of bartering/ reciprocal forms of social capital develop instead of an exchange of money?

Training. How can training modules developed at the preparation stage of the project be said to be responding to a range of locally identified needs? Participation in design process? Flexibility of modules? Process of identifying needs?

Poverty Differentials. Complications of dealing with heterogeneous target groups?

Mechanisms . Complexities of addressing supply and demand simultaneously?

Risks. Impact and probability? High risk project? More investigation at time of design needed on this aspect?

Institutional relationships . Experience in practice of collaborating with WB? Two executing agencies? Other partners/stakeholders?

Monitoring and Evaluation. Progress? Beneficiary participation in evaluation of activities and impact?



5 Summary of findings: Management of Natural Resources in the Chaco and High Valley Regions Project

Timeline Date Activity Aug 00 Appraisal Sept 00 EB approval Oct 01 Loan agreement Sept 03 Effectiveness 5.1 Objectives. The project's purpose is to reduce rural poverty and desertification, thereby allowing beneficiary groups to significantly improve their economic standing. Achievement of this objective will be reached when the asset value of landholdings in the project area increases by 120% and family incomes increase by 33%. Expected results from the project include improved natural resources and enhanced capacity of small farmers to manage them rationally and in a sustainable manner; and access to rural non-financial services. The project will support farmers' organizations willing to participate in rehabilitating their natural resources by strengthening their organizational capabilities and by mobilizing them through systematic training programmes, as well as through competitions between and within communities. Improving natural resource management, providing rural services to increase the asset value of those resources as well as production and productivity, will contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of poor rural men and women, including the indigenous groups in the project area.

5.2 Gender strategies. The project's gender strategies aim at reducing gender inequalities that affect rural women's access to decision-making processes in family productive activities, as well as in local/community/municipal rural development initiatives and programmes by enhancing their access to project activities and services, and by promoting the conditions to improve their income-generating capacities.


IEE Rating Comments


4 Explicitly linked to COSOP: fostering participatory planning; increasing incomes in environmentally sustainable manner predates the regional strategy but congruent: building capacity of the poor; improved, sustainable management of natural resources; participatory approaches; beneficiary participation in design process unclear


3 specific section on poverty causes in project brief; beneficiary participation an essential

component of implementation as the initiatives depend on participatory analysis; Two key target groups - those with better quality landholdings and those with few assets and degraded landholdings; number and roles of women in the project area presented; special fund to ensure participation of women; proactive stance to




IEE Rating Comments

participation of women; proactive stance to be taken; gender an important consideration in evaluation process; pre -investment fund to finance initiatives of rural women taking needs into account; an excellent gender analysis in appraisal Annex V - table 8 summarises strategy; long list of indicators presented - Table 9 - unfortunately mainly at activity level but work has had some influence on logframe; but it is unclear how participatory the analysis process was


X The project has hardly begun activities so it is too early to tell; it is however replicating a previously successful approach


2 Risk analysis section weak and does not relate to those in the logframe - which for some reason contains assumptions at the activity level; no comparative impact and probability analysis

5.3 Effectiveness. The logframe contains three sections presented as objectives: high level; development objective; project objective. The latter two are very similar, the development objective is probably better as the purpose with the project objective re-worded at output level. There are two outputs which are relatively clear although may be better subdivided. The long list of activities against output 1 illustrates this point. There is some attempt to introduce numbers, time and gender dimensions into indicators but they would need further refinement and development in the monitoring and evaluation process. There are some interesting suggestions in Appendix VI to the RRP. The internal logic of the project is convincing but it is better expressed in the text than in the logframe.

5.4 The project uses a contest/award system from previous experience in Bolivia and Peru. There is a good review of these experiences which combine shorter term benefits in increased production with longer term increased value in assets through improved management of natural resources. Although successes are implicit in the description of lessons from previous experience there is no clear indication of the dimensions of actual impact on poverty reduction. Environmental analysis in the RRP is weak although there is a very detailed annex to the appraisal document and an ESSN was completed in 1999. The RRP states that measures will be taken to mitigate possible negative environmental impacts but no details on how this would be done. There is an indictor for ground cover in the logframe. The IRR is estimated at 15%; capital opportunity cost estimated 12%.

5.5 Sustainability is not mentioned in the RRP but there are some implicit effects from the way in which the project is based on previous experience and the involvement of beneficiaries. Opportunities for replication are not identified but implicit in that the project itself is replicating previous work and thus apparent potential is being recognised. The approach is innovative for this area and it is stated that another innovative feature is the project design and implementation under the CDF.

5.6 Efficiency. A very clear and thorough analysis provided in PT office memo which recognises the quality of the institutional analysis and treatment of gender issues but expresses some reservations. Some of these have been responded to in appraisal (inserting section on lessons learned for example) whereas others have been ignored - the recommended



deletion of the rehabilitation of pre-Inca terraces for example (RRP 47) and the "unrealistic" targets remain.

5.7 A very good institutional assessment is given in Annex I to the appraisal document which contains SWOT analyses of relevant institutions, more of this could be made in the RRP. The project management arrangements are explained but the roles and contributions of other partners are not identified. The principles on which the M and E system is built are presented and admirable but there are no details about the system itself. An M & E specialist is to be on the staff of the project Autonomous Implementing Unit. The annex listed on M&E to appraisal document is missing.

5.8 There are no supervision or evaluation reports. The PSR for July 2003 states that project start up is expected only in September 2003.

5.9 Issues

CDF. What practical differences have been made in project design/process?

PT/quality assurance . How are decisions made about what to comply with and what to ignore.


Other Research and Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1995-2003 TAG No. Recipient Programme Approval

date

Grant Amount

US$ Countries

302 IICA

Programme for Strengthening Regional Capacity for Evaluation and Rural Poverty Alleviation Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean

12-Apr-95 790 000

Latin America and the Caribbean

310 RIMISP Research Methodological Network IFAD-Supported Project in Latin America

14-Sep-95 650 000 Regional

310A RIMISP Programa RED FIDAMERICA - Phase II 10-Sep-98 800 000

Regional

324 GIA

Institution for Rural Development Training in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay

17-Apr-96 800 000

Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay

389 IICA Rural Micro-Enterprise Support Programme in Latin America and the Caribbean

04-Dec-97 700 000 Regional

415 FINCA Regional Capacity-Building Programme on Microcredit Systems


459 MERCOSUR Institutional and Policy Support Programme to Alleviate Poverty in the MERCOSUR area

08-Sep-99 800 000 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay

468 DESCO

Programme for Strengthening the Regional capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation of Rural Poverty Alleviation Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (PREVAL)

09-Dec-99 1 550 000

Regional

469 IICA Regional Programme for the Development of South American Camelids - Phase III

09-Dec-99 500 000 Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Peru HQ in La Paz



470 PROCASUR Regional Rural Development Training Programme 09-Dec-99 800 000


496 PROCASUR

Programa Regional Destinado a Consolidar las Estrategias de Incorporacion de los aspectos de Genero en los Proyectos Financiados por el FIDA en America Latina y Caribe

03-May -00 850 000

Cross-regional

583 RIMISP FIDAMERICA Network - Phase III 23-Apr-02 913 000

Regional

584 IICA

Rural Microenterprise Support Programme in Latin America and the Caribbean (PROMER) - Phase II

23-Apr-02 587 000

Regional

657 CAF Support of Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon Basin (PRAIA), Phase II

10-Apr-03 800 000 Regional HQ in La Paz

658 MERCOSUR Programme to Reduce Rural Poverty in the Mercosur Area 10-Apr-03 800 000

Regional

Small Technical Assistance Grants (USD 100,000 or below)

373 MERCOSUR Implementation Workshop, November 1997

26-Aug-97 100 000

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay

394 CCD/LAC Preparatory Activities towards the Regional Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean

31-Dec-97 85 000 Switzerland

645 LAC Forum

Forum of Rural Finance for L America and Caribbean

29-Nov-02 93 000

Bolivia Mexico Guatemala Panama Peru Ecuador Haiti Nicaragua El Salvador

Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants

411 CIP

Integrated Management of Potato Late Blight Disease: refining and Implementing local strategies through Farmer Field Schools

10-Sep-98 1 050 000

Bangladesh China Ehtiopia Uganda Bolivia Peru

652 CIP

Integrating and Scaling up and Replicating technologies for resource poor potato growers

1-Apr-03 800 000

Uganda Ethiopia Bolivia Peru China Bangladesh

Country Specific Technical Assistance Grants No country specific grants to Bolivia in time period

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso Country Synopsis page 1

Burkina Faso Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 For the future, a medium term strategy for IFAD is recommended which contributes to increased food production and rural revenues by (a) emphasising activities related to environmental protection, soil and water conservation and the fight against desertification; (b) opening up non-agricultural economic activities; (c) giving priority to the special needs and capacities of rural women; and (d) ensuring the participatory identification, implementation and maintenance of needed rural infrastructures and institutions. The strategy would be placed within a framework of increased assistance and put highest priority on the sustainability of development efforts.

1.2 On this basis, it is recommended for IFAD to contribute to increased production and revenues by maintaining the emphasis on activities related to environmental protection, soil and water conservation and fight against desertification while at the same time opening up non-agricultural economic activities. Although IFAD would continue working with poor rural populations in general, it would put special emphasis on the needs and capacities of rural women. Whenever a need for rural services and/or infrastructures is identified, IFAD should be ready to respond to it, albeit exclusively within a framework of participatory identification, implementation and maintenance of the respective structures and institutions.

1.3 The COSOP gives relatively little guidance to programme staff designing new work. The presentation of aims is influenced by the work in soil and water conservation which is seen as successful. The area of greatest poverty is identified as the Central Plateau but new work is initiated in the South West because there are so few other development interventions in the area.

PACountry portfolio history (1): Burkina Faso

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALRural Development Project in the Eastern ORD65 Apr-81 Jul-81 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-82 Mar-9210 49

AGRICHauts Bassins/Volta Noire Agricultural Development Project102 Sep-82 Feb-83 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jun-83 Dec-8720 18

AGRICSpecial Programme for Soil and Water Conservation - Phase II369 Dec-94 Jan-95 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced May-96 Jun-037 66

AGRICSpecial Programme for Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry in the Central Plateau

443 Dec-87 Feb-88 BOAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-88 Jun-9512 34

Ongoing

RURALSouth West Rural Development Project512 Sep-96 Jan-97 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-98 Dec-0419 50

RURALRural Microenterprise Support Project1103 Apr-99 May-99 BOAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-00 Sep-072 60

RURALCommunity-Based Rural Development Project1132 May-00 Nov-01 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated May-02 Jun-0780 25

Not EffectiveAGRICCommunity Investment Programme for Agricultural Fertility1220 Sep-03 Oct-03 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced 4

Design

Sustainable Rural Development Programme in Central/North Regions1247 Cooperating Institution initiated

DroppedSwamps Development and Irrigation Programme1246 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals


PACountry portfolio history (2):Burkina Faso

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALRural Development Project in the Eastern ORD65 10,304 25,104 41% 52% 7% 8,000 40,0003,138 628 5.0

AGRICHauts Bassins/Volta Noire Agricultural Development Project102 4,126 16,088 26% 56% 19% 86,000 817,000187 20 9.5

AGRICSpecial Programme for Soil and Water Conservation - Phase II369 17,500 24,440 72% 7% 21% 44,000 440,000555 56 10.0

AGRICSpecial Programme for Soil and Water Conservation and Agroforestry in the Central Plateau

443 8,418 12,338 68% 0% 32% 13,400 134,000921 92 10.0

Ongoing

RURALSouth West Rural Development Project512 14,816 25,259 59% 18% 23% 10,000 80,0002,526 316 8.0

RURALRural Microenterprise Support Project1103 9,376 12,887 73% 0% 27% 3,000 30,0004,296 430 10.0

RURALCommunity-Based Rural Development Project1132 11,440 110,990 10% 72% 18% 210,000 1,050,000529 106 5.0

Not Effective

AGRICCommunity Investment Programme for Agricultural Fertility1220 12,067 26,866 45% 32% 24% 12,000 150,0002,239 179 12.5

Design

Sustainable Rural Development Programme in Central/North Regions1247

DroppedSwamps Development and Irrigation Programme1246

88,047 253,972 35% 46% 19%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Burkina Faso - South West Rural Development Project - 512 (PDRSO)

2.1 Relevance. The design of water provision was not in line with the beneficiaries understanding and water meters had to be removed from sources. The design of pastoral water points seems to have missed the real needs of herders and has had to be redesigned. The Mid-term Review is very critical the project approach not being in line with real needs of the population but it is not completely clear what the weaknesses are.

2.2 There are some apparent contradictions in the design on the questions around marketing of products. This is described as not being a problem but difficulties in marketing poor products is seen as a risk.

2.3 Effectiveness. Targeting by geographical approach seems weak and there are comments in the supervision and MTR which suggest poor understanding or reactions to the divisions and differences that exist within communities. Nevertheless the Gestion de Terroir approach is apparently well appreciated within communities. The development of valley bottoms has run into difficulties of ownership which is similar to the problems of trying to work on pastoral water development. The approach therefore seems to be too directly based on activities and not adequately founded in the aspirations and constraints of the people who carry out those activities.

2.4 Efficiency. Efficiency looks poor at this stage since the project has had to incur start up costs and has had relatively little impact. It would be expected that the ratios would improve as the project gets functioning at full speed. The ambition to reach 200K people seems difficult to achieve at the rate of working. The MTR records slow progress but worse than this the first supervision since the MTR records no (or very little) change since the MTR.

2.5 Outcomes. Progress has been slow with many delays in start up. Road building has left many villages still isolated and more road building may need to be added to future work. Work on bunding in fields has reached only a small proportion (15%) of the target and composting has been adopted by a very small number of farmers. Credit work does seem to be reaching women preferentially but again numbers are low.

Table: Overall project assessment Ratings:

4 = High; 3 = Substantial; 2 = Modest; 1 = Negligible

IEE Rating

Identification 1. - Relevance: The extent to which the

project fits country development priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is:

3 The fit is excellent in theory in the simplest terms of working with poor producers on production and other identified problems. Weaknesses in identifying work with herders.

Design 2. - Targeting: The extent to which the

design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

4 The intentions at design are entirely in line with the analysis and understanding of necessary interventions.




2 A typical over-ambitious do-everything project which included a number of errors in


2 The problems of working in valley bottoms without adequate appreciation of tenure problems and road building without consideration of environmental risks.

3 Summary of findings: Burkina Faso - Rural Microenterprise Support Project - 1103 (PAMER)

3.1 This project is difficult to assess because it has only just started operations after losing about 18 months in start up. There have only been two supervision reports on which to base the desk study.

3.2 Relevance. The design of the project benefits from similar credit and micro-enterprise work in other countries both in and outside the region. The geographical focus was worked out against different criteria in a transparent way. The poverty analysis is good and clear. The focus on women appears in design and in the implementation methods.

3.3 The design of the project should allow beneficiaries to choose their own activities and this should guarantee the appropriateness of all activities. Nevertheless the second supervision report warns of a poor focus on the real needs of beneficiaries. The report says that greater efforts need to be made to allow beneficiaries to make their own plans. This sounds like the project staff being too keen to promote similar initiatives in lots of different places and pushing too hard or too fast to get the work started.

3.4 Effectiveness. The fact that the project does not deal directly with agr icultural production is not dealt with explicitly so there is no worked through theory of action which seems strange and which makes it slightly difficult to assess the project impact. Once the project was fully functioning (and the project director released from custody!) progress has been apparently good. Sites for banks have been identified although they had not been built at the time of the last supervision.

3.5 Efficiency. So little has been achieved compared with the initial plan that it would be meaningless to assess the efficiency at this stage. This type of project has been seen to be efficient in other settings because input costs are relatively low per beneficiary. Only the earliest contacts have been established between the project groups and established sources of credit.

3.6 Outcomes. The training work carried out seems good and imaginative and beneficiaries have been on study visits to other projects and some of these are in other countries. There is no record of the appreciation of this training by the beneficiaries. Access to services has hardly been addressed in project work.

Table: overall project assessment Ratings:


IEE Rating





4 The project is well designed benefiting from almost identical work in other projects.



4 Geographical targeting is followed by focus on specific types of support and the individual projects are identified by the beneficiaries.


4 The project avoids the temptation to do everything and is focused on a narrow band of credit and enterprise support functions.


4 Excellent analysis of risks in the RRP

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) 303D PAN Programme d'Action National PA 13-Apr-95 3,453.01 Burkina

Faso 303E NAP Formulation of National Action

Programme Under Convention to Combat Desertification

PA 13-Apr-95 35,000.00 Burkina Faso

303F PAN Convention Internationale sur la lutte contre la désertification

PA 13-Apr-95 200,000 Burkina Faso

679 IPGRI Enhancing Farmer Livelihood through Improving on-farm Management of Plant genetic Resources: Developing and Innovative Conceptual, Methodological and Operational Framework

PT 29-Sep-03 100,000 Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger

487 IITA Applied and Adaptive Research on Cowpea in Semi-Arid Zones of West Africa

PA 03-May-00 1,600,000 Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria

303C FREE UNIV.

Study of Incentives in Natural Resources Management

PA 13-Apr-95 37,113.00 Burkina Faso, Niger

562 RADORT

Programme for Sustainable Vegetable Production and Marketing in West Africa

PA 06-Dec-01 1,250,000 Cote-d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Togo

3.7 The most important use of TAG money that involves Burkina Faso is the cowpea research project which is part of a regional strategy to support work on “orphan” crops. Cowpea is an important crop in many parts of Burkina but the research is not directly feeding into project work in Burkina yet.



4 Key Issues 4.1 The project issues of greatest concern are the targeting of work in PDRSO and the potential for difficulties within communities. The road building needs to be assessed both in terms of the possible environmental impacts and the potential needs to extend the work. The links between settled farming communities and herders may need special attention.

4.2 The impact of credit and rural enterprise on the overall well-being of beneficiaries of the PAMER also needs to be examined. This should shed light on the overall impact of work that does not focus on production.

4.3 Burkina Faso is in the midst of major review and revision of the laws governing land tenure and IFAD may have an important role in this work. It will be important to assess progress in decentralisation and land tenure initiatives and the roles that IFAD has been playing and may be able to play.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Chile

Chile Country Synopsis page 1

Chile Country Synopsis

1 Summary Country Strategy 1.1 There is no COSOP for Chile. A strategic opportunities mission took place in 1990 and this was followed up by a General Identification Mission in 1991 which identified three potential projects. The RRP for project 427 states that IFAD strategy for Chile would support the modernization of research, extension, credit and marketing services to facilitate the reconversion of small scale agriculture through more profitable production and marketing activities.

1.2 This would incorporate four areas of action:

Support, improve and strengthen production and marketing links between the modern and peasant agriculture sectors

Improvement in irrigation, water availability, resource conservation and on farm water management in peasant sector

Technical and financial support to small farmer oriented credit and extension programmes to improve and broaden their coverage, including marketing of agricultural produce

Technical and financial support to small farmer and peasant organizations

Country Portfolio Printout from the PPMS

PLCountry portfolio history (1): Chile

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

AGRICAgricultural Development Project for Peasant Communities and Smallholders of the Fourth Region

427 Dec-94 Dec-95 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-96 Dec-0353 44

Totals

02 April 2004

PLCountry portfolio history (2):Chile

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

AGRICAgricultural Development Project for Peasant Communities and Smallholders of the Fourth Region

427 12,235 34,492 35% 0% 65% 6,276 31,3805,496 1,099 5.0

12,235 34,492 35% 0% 65%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Agricultural Development Project for Peasant Communities and Smallholders of the Fourth Region. Project ID 427 Loan Number I 374

Timeline Date Activity 1990 Mission visit and report on Strategies for Rural Development in Chile 1991 General Identification Mission – 3 project proposals Aug 1992 Preparation mission – feasibility assessment Nov92-Jan93 Appraisal Mission – design project July/Aug 94 Post Appraisal mission – finalise design Dec 94 RRP approval Aug/Sept 95 Post evaluation ex ante – changes due to government changes Dec 95 Agreement Oct 96 Effectiveness 2.1 Objectives.

a) Providing financial resources and technical support for the implementation of small-scale irrigation works on farms; b) Improving the agricultural income of small farmers through comprehensive extension, credit, training, and marketing support services; c) Establishing an effective system for recovery, improvement and rational management of renewable resources at farm and regional level promoting the participation of the peasant sector in the process of modern and economic development of the region, creating conditions to establish links between farmers and the export sector and packing processing facilities; d) Supporting the Governments on going policies of decentralisation, and promoting adequate linkages between government and NGOs. Table: Overall project assessment


IEE Rating

Comments


3 Idea developed through close consultation with govt; there is no COSOP but project consistent with IFAD’s strategic opportunities analysis carried out in 1990 and with mandate and vision; not clear how well beneficiary actual needs have been identified, there is reference to consultations with range of organizations and small scale farmers and producers in area of project (appraisal para 5) but little detail on process or actual findings; the project predates the regional strategy but is consistent with aims: markets, services, rural finance; effective and sustainable management of NR


3 targeting is based on geographical focus, criteria for eligibility established; region has a very high percentage of female headed households but there is little gender analysis although the project planned to address these issues in implementation;


2 The project had ambitious objectives and dealt with financial, technical, environmental and institutional issues; the targets appear to have been unrealistic




IEE Rating

Comments

was: issues; the targets appear to have been unrealistic given the level of achievement after three years (MTR);


2 An apparent under estimation of the likely institutional and technological problems that would be encountered; some technical reservations expressed by PT at design stage which do not seem to have been addressed in planning

2.2 Effectiveness. There is no logframe and some of the objectives as stated are rather broad based and would be difficult to measure particularly those relating to creating conditions. There are no indicators against outputs but there are some environmental targets listed in the RRP para 29 and a stated aim to increase beneficiaries' annual incomes from $1,691 to $3,220 (a 90% increase for 6,276 farming families) in RRP 43. The activities described are consistent with project objectives.

2.3 Erosion through deforestation and overgrazing is identified as a problems in the area and the project aims to address these problems through activities. There is a detailed environmental description in appraisal documents.

2.4 The ERR estimated as 15.7% in the base case (RRP 46) and there are details for all the seven farm models given in appraisal document.

2.5 Sustainability is not specifically addressed although is implicit for environmental issues in the project plan. There is little detail on how the irrigation systems will be sustainable nor how communities will manage the technology in practice. Replicability and opportunities for scaling up are not addressed. Applicability is addressed through the analysis of farming systems but acceptability, in terms of participatory assessment of beneficiaries needs and priorities is not covered.

2.6 Efficiency. Comments from PT (August 93) raise concerns - some apparently for the second time - about sustainability and feasibility of irrigation systems proposed and the implications of goat production (forage; environment; cheese quality) - that do not appear to have been addressed in final document.

2.7 Institutional analysis is not addressed in the RRP. The appraisal document contains some descriptions of mandates/programmes for key institutions but there is no analysis of relationships and trends and little on the institutions of the poor. The project is to be supported through two other projects financed by the WB and IADB but it is unclear how this will work on the ground.

2.8 It was planned that an M and E unit would be established which would conduct baseline survey and design and support monitoring to be carried out by beneficiaries themselves. The base line study was planned for first 6 months but only completed at the end of first three years and monitoring system still not in place by end of fourth year (MTR 1999 3.46 and 3.47 supervision report 2000). The MTR rightly raises attribution issues as a consequence of the delay.

2.9 The supervision reports (99 and 00/1) appear to be thorough as far as they go. There is an emphasis on figures (money) and numbers (people/hectares etc). Activities are reported on without any comment on what achievements mean for progress towards objectives. At this level of supervision it would appear more appropriate to review output and purpose progress,



even without a logframe. The projects themselves presumably report on activities? The problems arising from the lack of a monitoring and evaluation system are consistently pointed out with recommendations for action.

2.10 The Jan 2001 supervision report (12 months after the MTR) only refers once to MTR (para 1.12 admin and finance); there is list of recommendations from the previous supervision mission (October 99 - this did overlap for a couple of days with the MTR and adapted work to fit) with summary of responses but it has not referred to all the recommendations of the MTR nor monitored actions specifically related to the report.

2.11 Scores for all the PSR available are identical with scores of one for everything except project management which got a 2. This may be because of the descriptors used but it means that the forms do not accurately reflect what is happening in the project based on comments from supervision missions and the MTR. The m and e system may be problem free but it also does not exist at project level (supervision report 00) and physical targets, extracted from the various documents, were well behind schedule at time of MTR.

2.12 The MTR appears to be a very thorough piece of work. The team reviewed the original project design, extracted initial targets for the end of the first three years and by tabulating planned against actual achievement illustrate how far behind they are. Each component is reviewed against what was in the design, what has actually been achieved with what seems to be a fair evaluation of performance a to date. A series of recommendations are supplied for the second phase which follow on from the previous analysis and judgments.

2.13 Outcomes. There is insufficient information available to comment on outcomes. Clearly there have been many on going activities, which apparently had positive feedback from clients (see MTR and supervision reports), but in the absence of a monitoring and evaluation system drawing conclusions on actual outcomes is not possible.

2.14 However the project appears to have found favour in Chile as a letter from the Ministry of Agriculture to IFAD (March 2001) refers to three evaluations, all of which have supported continuation for a second phase of four years, by building on strengths and correcting existing problems. The government are to continue the project (but from own resources and not taking further loan funds) and make reference to IFAD's contribution towards numerous rural families overcoming poverty.

3 Key Issues Use of technical advice from PMD – how are final decisions made? In hindsight was project over ambitious?

How did the support from WB and IADB work out in practice?

Relationship of the PSRs with supervision/review reports – how easy to complete and reconcile given the structures

Will there be a project completion review of follow up given that the Government are now taking over financing?

How can IFAD assess the outcomes of the first four years? Should it wait and offer to collaborate with government of a joint review later in the second phase?



How could lessons from the experience in Chile be identified and shared? (Perhaps learned already?)

What have been the main strengths and weaknesses of the project?

Use of TAGs and NGO/ECP in support of country portfolio/strategy?

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGS)

Other Research and Training Assistance Grants, 1995-2003

No. Recipient Programme Approval date Amt US$ Comments

302 IICA


12-Apr-95 790 000





Regional

324 GIA


17-Apr-96 800 000






459 MERCOSUR Institutional and Policy Support Programme to Alleviate Poverty in the MERCOSUR area

08-Sep-99 800 000 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay

468 DESCO


09-Dec-99 1 550 000

Regional


09-Dec-99 500 000 Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Peru



496 PROCASUR

Programa Regional Destinado a Consolidar las Estrategias de Incorporacion de los aspectos de Genero en los Proyectos Financiados por el FIDA en America Latina y Caribe PROGENDER

03-May -00 850 000

Regional


Regional



584 IICA


23-Apr-02 587 000

Regional


10-Apr-03 800 000 Regional


Regional

Small Technical Assistance Grants (USD100 000 or below),

373 MERCOSUR Implementation Workshop, November 1997

26-Aug-97 100 000 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay



Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants

659 ICARDA

Improve Marketing of Small-ruminant Products and Income Generation in Dry Areas of Latin America

10-Apr-03 1 000 000

Chile, Brazil, Mexico (Under PT)

Country Specific Technical Assistance Grants


379 CCD

Co-financing a Regional Training Course, CCD/Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Action Plan

20-Oct-97 30 000 Chile

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Egypt

Egypt Country Synopsis page 1

Egypt Country Synopsis


1.1 The COSOP proposes a major focus on the newlands and similar lands in the north-west coast (NWC) area of Egypt. These are areas in which the Government invests considerable resources in reclaiming large areas of land for distribution to poor and disadvantaged groups (the unemployed, landless, small farmers, etc). Under this land-reclamation programme however, investment is primarily in hardware (irrigation and drainage, electricity, etc) with little in social services (health, education) and the provision of agricultural services (technology, rural finance, etc). Plus, with most donors electing to provide the bulk of their resources to sectors other than agriculture, IFAD is one of the lead donors in agricultural and rural development in the country, and is beginning to establish a niche in the newland areas.

1.2 The COSOP states that IFAD projects will continue to focus on post-settlement and agricultural support services to help optimise the returns of government investment in the newlands. Key elements of IFAD interventions will include: technology transfer, encouraging farmer or beneficiary organisations, off-farm income generation, rural finance, marketing, participation and community empowerment, more attention to women beneficiaries and better targeting (of small farmers, the unemployed, women and members of the Bedouin communities). Apart from projects to consolidate and expand activities in the newlands, significant NWC dryland areas have become degraded and with opportunities for IFAD to assist with natural resource management initiatives.

Overall rating of COSOP: 3 1.3 Relevance. The COSOP (April 2002) is consistent with IFAD's Strategic Framework (December 2001) and the NENA Regional Strategy (April 2002), although it does not make explicit reference to either document. Instead the main strategic linkages discussed in the COSOP relate mostly to the national strategies for poverty alleviation. IFAD’s mandate and organisational strategy is more implicitly reflected across the document as a whole. For example there is a clear focus on the delivery of agricultural support services in the newlands, and this fits particularly well with the regional strategy and its thrust towards the empowerment and diversification of incomes of the rural poor. Also, the NWC dryland areas are specifically identified in the COSOP, and this reflects the approach of the regional strategy towards natural resource management.

1.4 The COSOP was the result of extensive discussions with a broad range of stakeholders, from Egyptian policy-makers though to multilateral and bilateral donors. The document gives a good account of IFAD's role and comparative advantages in Egypt, based primarily on past successes in previous newlands projects. This niche role is however less clearly developed (in the documentation) from the analysis of economic, poverty, institutional and gender issues. For example, the country context analysis provides a fairly descriptive account of the economy, as does the discussion of the agricultural sector - although the latter does provide a more specific discussion of agricultural issues in relation to the newlands. The analysis of institutional and governance issues is limited and mostly an overall summary of the key agencies, supplemented by a preliminary institutional analysis in the Annex. Poverty is described in aggregate terms, with limited assessment of the underlying causes, while the importance of gender is clearly recognised by the COSOP (based on identif ied past failures).



This is something that is now being addressed regionally under the NENA Division’s 'Gender Mainstreaming' support. Empowerment and equity issues are not directly addressed.

1.5 Effectiveness. The objective of the COSOP is clear, with specifies groups and areas to be targeted - although the discussion of targeting the poor lacks some detail. Several of the outputs of the logical framework are broad in their definition, the indicators do not easily relate to all the outputs, and are particularly general in relation to the goal level. This however may be more of a reflection of the difficulty of using a logical framework for a country strategy as compared to its more orthodox use in project design.

1.6 The COSOP is particularly good at setting out the key innovations of IFAD interventions in the Egyptian (and especially newlands) context, and some of the opportunities for policy dialogue. A range of donors are identified for strategic alliances, including how these alliances might function, alt hough there is limited consideration of other types of partnerships (such as NGOs and the private sector). The integration of all IFAD activities in Egypt is not directly addressed though apparent from the spatial focus on the newland and NWC dryland areas. There is a clear identification of specific areas for improving future management of the programme. Sustainability issues (environmental, institutional and financial) are given little attention generally, and there is no clear identification of opportunities for scaling up.

1.7 Efficiency. Key lessons from past IFAD experience in Egypt and the newlands context are clearly identified. The opportunities for leveraging additional funds (or acting as a catalyst) are not extensively explored, while arrangements for monitoring, evaluation, communication and dissemination are not explicitly addressed in the COSOP.

1.8 From the Country Issues Sheet a number of key issues have been highlighted about the Egypt portfolio, including:

• Serious difficulties during implementation as a result of the unavailability of counterpart

funding • The administration of co-financed projects with the World Bank are handled by two

separate departments (one for IFAD, one for the World Bank) • Considerable delays between amendments to loans and the effectiveness of such

amendments. • IFAD-supported projects tend to be area-based, and although sector-specific, they require

the involvement of many government ministries. The nature of Egyptian bureaucracy is such that ministries and bodies have overlapping responsibilities and shared decision-making.

• Projects tend to be Government projects supported by IFAD, and not donor projects. They are not only subject to conditions of Loan and Grant Agreement covenants, but also to regulations on the administration of government funding.

PNCountry portfolio history (1): Egypt

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

STLLMWest Beheira Settlement Project54 Dec-80 Dec-80 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Aug-81 Jun-920 34

AGRICMinya Agricultural Development Project114 Dec-82 Dec-82 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-83 Jun-990 32

AGRICFayoum Agricultural Development Project157 Sep-84 Nov-84 World Bank: IBRD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Dec-85 Jun-938 56

AGRICNewlands Agricultural Services Project306 Apr-92 Dec-92 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Dec-93 Dec-0034 54

Ongoing

RSRCHAgricultural Production Intensification Project355 Apr-94 Jun-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-95 Jun-0410 29

CREDIEast Delta Newlands Agricultural Services Project1014 Dec-96 Mar-98 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-99 Mar-0568 43

RURALSohag Rural Development Project1050 Sep-98 Dec-98 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jun-01 Jun-0713 131

STLLMWest Noubaria Rural Development Project1204 Apr-02 May-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-03 Jun-105 45

Not EffectiveAGRICSecond Matruh Resource Management Project1225 Dec-02 Mar-03 World Bank: IBRD Cooperating Institution initiated 14

Totals

02 April 2004

PNCountry portfolio history (2):Egypt

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

STLLMWest Beheira Settlement Project54 28,196 37,996 74% 0% 26% 1,680 10,40022,617 3,653 6.2

AGRICMinya Agricultural Development Project114 23,938 46,738 51% 0% 49% 115,500 577,500405 81 5.0

AGRICFayoum Agricultural Development Project157 10,200 40,000 26% 0% 75% 31,000 158,1001,290 253 5.1

AGRICNewlands Agricultural Services Project306 22,130 41,630 53% 0% 47% 35,550 170,0001,171 245 4.8

Ongoing

RSRCHAgricultural Production Intensification Project355 20,200 39,200 52% 0% 48% 519,000 2,595,00076 15 5.0

CREDIEast Delta Newlands Agricultural Services Project1014 25,000 91,459 27% 17% 56% 25,500 127,5003,587 717 5.0

RURALSohag Rural Development Project1050 24,997 93,753 27% 30% 43% 210,000 1,050,000446 89 5.0

STLLMWest Noubaria Rural Development Project1204 18,485 54,751 34% 1% 66% 27,000 135,0002,028 406 5.0

Not Effective

AGRICSecond Matruh Resource Management Project1225 12,702 44,836 28% 39% 33% 13,000 65,0003,449 690 5.0

185,848 490,363 38% 12% 50%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: East Delta Newlands Agricultural Services Project

2.1 Objectives: To provide services to facilitate the settlement and the increase of farm incomes on newly developed lands in the East Delta, (thereby laying the foundation for the development of a viable rural economy in this area) and to realize the potential and maximize the returns to the Egyptian economy of the investments sunk in the reclamation of the East Delta Newlands.




priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficia ry needs is: 3




2


2

2.2 Relevance. The EDNASP (RRP, December 1996) predates the current COSOP (April 2002), although it is said to be consistent with the IFAD country strategy at the time. Indeed the project continues to remain congruent with the present COSOP, especially as it is focussed on the newlands (reclaimed areas of land). The project also predates the current regional strategy, though the key regional thrusts about the empowerment and income diversification of the rural poor are strong tenets of the EDNASP (i.e. its components on community development, agricultural developing and credit institutional support).

2.3 The appraisal provides an analysis of the different socio-economic groups (graduates, smallholders, and cooperative members), with a Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) of the beneficiaries conducted during project preparation. The RRA is used as the basis for targeting, and despite gender analysis being less evident, the project identifies specific benefits that will accrue to women. The level of participation and influence of beneficiaries on the project design is less apparent (especially from the documentation), and the process of land reclamation is a largely government-driven activity.

2.4 Effectiveness. The project documentation provides a clear rationale and logic for IFAD intervention. The objective statement is clear, although could be made more specific and measurable. The outputs (as described in the logical framework) are very broad and unspecif ic, and this is also reflected in the indicators: with the majority of indicators lacking specific quantitative and qualitative elements, baselines and targets. Past projects are described, with only a short description of lessons from past experiences.

2.5 The project was categorised as Category A and a full environmental assessment was conducted, although its findings overall were that the environmental impacts were largely positive. The economic rate of return (ERR), measuring only crop production benefit, is estimated at 30%. This appears surprisingly high, but is justified as reasonable given that the



project aims to reap the benefits from the already considerable investment (sunk costs) in the reclamation of the East Delta newlands. Sustainability is mostly addressed by implication, and is particularly focused on financial sustainability through agricultural credit, Water User Associations (WUAs), etc. There is no specific discussion on replicability or innovation.

2.6 Efficiency. The TRC was largely supportive of the project design, though it highlights a number of pertinent issues - some of which were still not adequately addressed in the final project design (e.g. gender analysis and long term management issues). The project sets out a clear management structure, with assigned responsibilities, including outline Terms of Reference for principle staff in the Project Management Unit (PMU). There is however, no specific assessment of commitment, capacity and incentives of the project management - despite the potential significance for actual implementation. Also in terms of implementation, the discussion of partners is limited, with some appraisal of accounting procedures between implementing agencies (the MALR and PBDAC) as well as funding agencies (IFAD and IDA).

2.7 An Implementation Review Mission was undertaken by the World Bank (January/ February 2003), and provides details of technical and implementation issues. The documentation is fairly descriptive, and the overall findings are not well summarised (i.e. there is no summary of the main points or priorities for action, plus responsibilities). The project faced long delays in start-up including weak project management, although this is now being addressed. The latest Implementation Review Mission (October 2003) shows good progress. The PSRs highlight similar issues (July 2002, July 2003), but the format does not allow the easy crosschecking of progress between PSRs and with Supervision missions.

2.8 Despite the weakly defined indicators (as noted earlier), the project design is much more specific in its description of the actual monitoring and evaluation system, including key roles, responsibilities, Terms of Reference and some activities. The implication of this approach is that much of the indicator design will occur during implementation.

Summary of evidence about outcomes: EDNASP 2.9 The EDASP was considered a ‘failing project’ until more recently. This was largely attributed to government bureaucracy and delays in irrigation, drainage and reclamation. The project start-up was delayed by almost two years, partly due to the long approval process in Egypt but also weak project management (with problems in procurement and disbursement). The government has responded to complaints with changes to the Executive Director and staff of the Project Management Unit (PMU). The Implementation Review Mission (IRM, or equivalent to a Mid-term Review) undertaken by the World Bank in October 2003, identifies the infrastructure works and especially drainage as the most serious hindrance to project implementation and impact.

2.10 The main conclusions of the IRM on the delivery of components and outputs can be summarised as follows:

• Good progress in increasing cultivated areas (increase of 100% in summer 2003 from previous year

• The community development unit (CDU) is making progress, including an increase of Water User Associations (WUAs) by 44%, plus the setting up of a model pilot village

• Crop yields show increases close to appraisal targets • The M&E unit has made progress in improving the quality of reports, plus an

environmental monitoring study was undertaken • Environmental campaigns organised, and an information centre to be opened at main

CDU



2.11 In terms of increases in physical and financial assets, there are a number of bottlenecks, with slow progress in irrigation and drainage infrastructure (IRM, p3-7):

• Some progress on procurement and contracting for pumping stations (South Husainia; Mataria El Salam; North Ismailia)

• Work on-going on drains but should be completed by June 2004 • Contractor starting to initiate work on Um Khalaf Scheme (irrigation and land

reclamation) • Drinking water treatment progress is slow, with a contract having just been signed for

South Hussainiya Water Treatment Plant (p7-10). 2.12 In terms of increases in access to and use of social infrastructure, the IRM (p12-14) provides little detail, and states most achievements in very general terms. This includes work by the CDU on the model pilot village and the concept of "green and clean". The formation of WUAs provides the most tangible result, with 170 of the target 171 for June 2003 having been reached.

2.13 In terms of longer-term impacts and benefits, this is not really addressed by the IRM – largely because of the slow progress of implementation. The Country Portfolio Review (April 2003) states that the agricultural research and extension Unit has made good progress, in cooperation with CDU. It states that 30% of the project area is now cropped, with most crops (except wheat) above the appraisal estimates. Also there has been a significant increase in the number of livestock, particularly cattle.


IEE Rating


3 Summary of findings: West Noubaria Rural Development Project 3.1 Objectives: The overall project goal is to enhance the livelihoods of the target population through increased and sustainable economic activity and greater social self-reliance. The overall goal will be achieved through: (a) attainment of social cohesion and a sense of community in the villages; (b) reliable and equitable access to the support services essential to economic and social well-being; (c) diversified and profitable farming based on more



efficient water use; (d) establishment of self-sustaining arrangements for the provision of accessible and effective credit services; and (e) a diversified and strengthened local economy contributing to nationwide economic advancement.








2


2

3.2 Relevance. The WNRDP is congruent with the Egypt COSOP (April 2002); a country strategy which places a high level of importance on the newland areas. The project documentation however (and the RRP especially) makes little reference to the COSOP, and does not specify how the project will develop the strategic priorities. There is no reference made to the regional strategy, although the project components (such as community development; extension and marketing support; credit facilitation and enterprise development) clearly address regional priorities (i.e. empowerment of the rural poor; income diversification for the rural poor; gender).

3.3 The project design documentation provides a good summary of the projects beneficiaries, including some reasons as to why they are poor. The target population is however presented in aggregate terms (although disaggregated at appraisal) and there is limited evidence of socio-economic analysis. Gender is identified as a key lesson to learn from past IFAD projects in Egypt, and yet, there is limited gender analysis within the project design process - although admittedly the project does attempt to target women through the community development component (e.g. housing, sewerage, etc). As a newly reclaimed area, beneficiaries could not be consulted during the early design stages and therefore the appraisal made use of beneficiaries from the project for which NWRDP is the follow-on. This consultation helped to highlight the need to improve sewerage in the area, as well as influencing the project’s community development component.

3.4 Effectiveness. There is a clear rationale for intervention (with a clear justification for each component). The logical framework however does not contain an objective (purpose level) statement, and is imprecise as a summary of the development pathway. Indeed, not all of the outputs listed are deliverable by the project and the indicators are mainly unspecific (making little use of targets, baselines or time-bound indicators).

3.5 The project builds on lessons from past projects, although these are only outlined in very general terms. For example, a key lesson highlighted was the need to better address gender issues, and yet it is not clear what the lessons are and how it might be resolved. Environmental impacts are seen as inconsequentia l (due to low salinity, treatment of sewerage, etc). This was detailed at the appraisal stage, although little supporting evidence is used to substantiate the arguments presented. The overall economic rate of return is estimated as 20.1%.



3.6 The project design makes limited reference to sustainability issues, except implicitly and even then in mostly financial terms (i.e. rural credit, water user fees). Replicability is not explicitly addressed, although clearly this project is a builds on develops approaches undertaken through other IFAD interventions in Egypt. The project is seen as innovative, especially as it is one of the first projects to work with the Italian Debt Swap initiative.

3.7 Efficiency. The TRC highlights particularly issues concerning sustainability, gender and the environment (natural resource management), and although addressed to some extent by the project design, this is not always substantiated with evidence. A detailed structure and description of the project management is presented at appraisal, and this includes the proposed composition of the Project Coordinating Unit, roles and key tasks. The project design however fails to really address assess the current capacity, commitment and realism of the proposed approach to project management. The role and responsibility of partners is also not particularly considered.

3.8 In the project design documentation, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is reasonably well detailed, although it is difficult to assess the feasibility of the actual design in this context. However, on the basis that the logical framework lacks clarity, plus the excessive use of jargon (e.g. "monitoring will be action-orientated to facilitate decision-making"), then there are some key weaknesses in the M&E design.

3.9 Supervision has been undertaken by UNOPS, with a Supervisory Report produced in October 2003. While the report is detailed in terms of considering each component, it is at times descriptive and fails to adequately draw out key priorities and concerns; there is for example, no executive summary. The latest PSR (July 2003) predates the Supervisory Report, so it is difficult to assess progress; also the PSR rates all the progress indicators (ratings) as ‘1’ or problem free'. And yet, the Supervisory Report (held only a few months later) highlights some important problems - such as with the performance of the monitoring and evaluation system.

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) The Egypt portfolio makes extensive use of TAGs although in relation to the country’s size and loan programme, this is seen as relatively small (perhaps only 3-4% of loans). Most TAGs however relate to regional issues, and agricultural research, rather than directly related to IFAD projects. For example, of the small-TAGs, the following are related to regional concerns:

• TAG 317: a regional lesson learning exercise • TAG 404 and 405: a regional workshop • TAG 463: relates to marine resources, not part of IFAD’s current loan portfolio • TAG 429H: is a regional initiative

The most closely related to IFAD operations were:

• TAG 509: was part of developing a new COSOP • TAG 452: directly related to IFAD’s work, although a regional initiative • TAG 528N: possibly used for a project completion report



Table of Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries

309 FAO Programme for the Establishment of a Regional Animal Surveillance and Control Network (RADISCON) in North Africa, the Middle East and the Arab Peninsula

PT 14-Sep-95 1,250,000 Algeria, Bahrain, Tchad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Palestinia, N.A., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen

352 AOAD Control of the Date Palm Red Weevil, Stem Borer and Grubs in the Near East and South Asia

PT 05-Dec-96 1,000,000 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar

364 CEDARE Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilization of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System

PT 30-Apr-97 700,000 Oman, Egypt, Libya, Tchad, Sudan

489 ACSAD Camel Applied Research & Development Network (CARDN) - Phase II

PT 03-May -00 1,200,000 Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia

578 ICARDA Enhancing Food Security in the Nile Valley and Red Sea Region: Technology Generation and Dissemination for Sustainable Production of Cereals and Cool-season Food Legumes

PT 23-Apr-02 1,169,000 Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen

690 ICARDA Community-based Optimization of the Management of Scarce Water Resources in Agriculture in West Asia and North Africa

PT 18-Dec-03 1,000,000 Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia

Other Research and Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries

296 NENAMTA Programme for the Establishment of the Near-East and North Africa Management Training in Agriculture

PN 06-Dec-94 3,000,000 Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, Syria

334 ACSAD AOAD/ACSAD/ICARDA: Backstopping Support to IFAD Projects in NENA

PN 11-Sep-96 1,500,000 Egypt

353 NENARACA Improving Access of the Rural Poor to Financial Services in the Near East-North Africa

PN 05-Dec-96 566,000 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria



494 WOMEN-NENA Programme of Action to Assist IFAD Projects to reach rural women in Near East and North African Countries

PN 03-May -00 944,000 Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine

536 CIHEAM Methodologies & Approached for Effective Introduction of PIM

PN 26-Apr-01 1,600,000 Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Armenia

579 FAO Marine Resources Management Programme in the Red Sea

PN 23-Apr-02 1,000,000 Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan

Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000), 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries

317 UNDETERMIN PN Fourth Project Implementation Workshop PN 15-Apr-96 50,000 Egypt

404 CEDARE Financing a Regional Workshop on Preparation and Financing of National Action Programmes to Combat Desertification, Cairo 7-9 July 1998

PN 10-Jun-98 35,000 Egypt

405 CEDARE Grant to Finance a Regional Workshop on Preparation and Financing of National Action Programmes to Combat Desertification

PN 10-Jun-98 35,000 Egypt

451 PPA/PIM Co-financing of Preparatory Activities for the Programme for Regional Action on Participatory Natural Resources Management (PIM) in the Middle East and North Africa

PN 19-May -99 60,000 Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Armenia

463 FAO Marine Resources and Environmental Surveys in the Red Sea, Northwest Arabian Sea and the Gulfs

PN 23-Nov 68,000 Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Sudan

509 EGYPT Country Portfolio Implementation Review and Strategy Workshop

PN 17-Oct-00 20,000 Egypt

528N EGYPT Newlands Agric. Services Project PN 28-Jun-01 22,000 Egypt 429H NENARACA Micro initiatives in Rural Finance for the

Poor - Restructuring Agricultural Development Banks

PN 18-Apr-01 30,000 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon



4 Key Issues 4.1 Gender (and targeting) is consistently highlighted as a weakness of past projects and interventions in Egypt. In the projects assessed, there continues to be limited gender analysis, although the projects themselves contain components that aim to benefit women (often without specific targeting). A new regional initiative is attempting to address ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ issues across the regional portfolio

4.2 Sustainability is often ill defined, and the tendency is to concentrate on financial sustainability in the projects assessed (i.e. for rural credit, water user fees, etc). Other aspects to sustainability are given more superficial treatment, such as exit strategies and the longevity of institutional structures post-project.

4.3 Risk Mitigation. In some cases risks have been identified, but it is often with limited analysis and limited attention to mitigating measures.

4.4 Monitoring and evaluation. The examples of logical frameworks reviewed are generally weak, with a tendency to view monitoring and evaluation as part of the implementation phase. Indicators are generally poorly designed, although these may be refined during implementation. The use of the logical framework for the COSOP does not seem appropriate.

4.5 Management and Supervision. Supervisory reports vary considerably in both format and content, depending on the Cooperating Institution. The examples assessed tend to be detailed, though sometimes overly descriptive and without executive summaries that synthesise the major concerns and priority actions. It is also not easy to compare the information, recommendations and next steps contained in Supervisory Reports with those in the PSRs. PSRs provide a broad overview, though their structure does not readily assist management decisions. In one example there was a clear tendency to be over optimistic in the PSR, as compared with a recent Supervisory Report.

4.6 Project Management. Both projects reviews provide outlines of the project management, but there is a general lack of consideration of the realities of working in the Egyptian context (such as an analysis of risks, capacity constraints, incentives, etc).

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Eritrea

Eritrea Country Synopsis page 1

Eritrea Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 The March 1998 COSOP (not Board approved) gives a succinct, clear and accessible account of the country situation, past lessons and future strategy.

1.2 The strategy (ExecSum para.4 and elaborated in the text) is to reduce smallholder agriculture risk; integrate livestock and cropping; support farmer financing mechanisms; mobilise remittances; support capacity building.

1.3 The analyses of agriculture, poverty and institutions are concise and clear. There is a clear account of IFAD’s geographical (para.33) and sectoral (paras.35 to 41) focus. Opportunities and the IFAD focus are summarised (para.33) as follows: 'IFAD support should be directed to those areas where there clearly exists a potential for expanding agricultural production, such as in the Eastern and Western Lowlands.'

1.4 Overall, this early COSOP is clear and accessible. An external reader (consultants, government agencies, public) would know what IFAD sees as its niche in Eritrea; what it aims to do; roughly where; what it will avoid; and the contextual limitations.

Overall Rating of the COSOP: 4

PFCountry portfolio history (1): Eritrea

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Ongoing

IRRIGEastern Lowlands Wadi Development Project365 Dec-94 Jan-95 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-95 Dec-048 4

AGRICGash Barka Livestock and Agricultural Development Project1097 Apr-02 Jul-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-03 Mar-0912 31

Totals

02 April 2004

PFCountry portfolio history (2):Eritrea

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Ongoing

IRRIGEastern Lowlands Wadi Development Project365 12,681 20,110 63% 26% 11% 7,500 45,0002,681 447 6.0

AGRICGash Barka Livestock and Agricultural Development Project1097 10,000 16,140 62% 21% 17% 27,500 110,000587 147 4.0

22,681 36,250 63% 24% 13%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Eastern Lowlands Wadi Development Project

2.1 This was IFAD’s first project in Eritrea. It is a $20.1m project (IFAD loan c.$12.7m) to build large headwork schemes in three wadis; strengthen the Ministry’s livestock and crop extension service; build roads and improve drinking water supply.

2.2 There was no COSOP or regional strategy at Board approval in December 1994. It was identified following the FAO agriculture sector review during 1994, and an IFAD General Identification Mission.

2.3 Targeting of the project is well described, although it is not clear from the design if there had been discussion with the beneficiaries. No targets or mechanisms for women's involvement are given.

2.4 There is no logframe, but the definition of objectives and components in the text is clear and logical. No performance indicators are given apart from notional areas to be irrigated.1 Comments on the positive environmental impact of the project are thoughtful. The ERR estimation is thorough, but naturally, contingent on design and successful project performance.

2.5 Sustainability is barely treated as a design feature. There is an assumption that o&m by the local public will be successful “…on the basis of their own organisations which are rooted in nearly a century of independent operation…” (RRP para.33). Other than this historic generalisation, no firm evidence or measures to increase the likelihood of the project structures being maintained is offered. The project is deliberately (and probably wisely) non-innovative: RRP para.57 notes the simplicity of the design as an important risk-reduction factor for the first project in a new country.

2.6 There were apparently tough TRC discussions in June 1994, notably on country-risk and the absence of full country study. It is not clear from available documentation how the significant issues raised at TRC were followed up.

2.7 The definition of management structures and roles is clear, but the appraisal of actual implementation capacities appears very weak for a new country. This apparent critical weakness was born out in the major subsequent implementation problems: expected force-account construction of major head works proved impracticable, leading to international tender at considerably higher cost and hence reduced volume of works, command area, and benefits.

2.8 Supervision reports (WB) are clear despite difficult circumstances, major changes and disruption (organisational, war and flood). However the WB supervisions do not address all components, and the CPM had to intervene to make ad hoc arrangements to ensure other components were supervised and supported.

2.9 Outcomes. Despite being a simple design, and making allowance for disruptions caused by war and flood damage, project performance has been very weak. Two factors appear critical. First, the implementation arrangements for the major construction works were poorly appraised, leading to a switch from direct-labour to ICT. This led to major delay, increased cost, and hence reduced volume of works. Only two of the major headworks were completed. Second, the vital direct support to beneficiaries in the command areas got underway very late. In part, this was due to disruption of the Ministry of Agriculture's staffing availability during and after the war. A Command Area

1 Some performance indicators are given in Annex 1



Development Programme was finalised in 2002, followed by an Irrigation management programme and a January 2004 government agreement on Water User Associations.

Table: Overall project Assessment Ratings:

4=High; 3=Substantial; 2=Modest; 1=Negligible IEE Rating

Identification 1 Relevance: The extent to which the project fits country development


Design 2 Targeting: The extent to which the design targeted the right people

with appropriate activities was: 3

3 Complexity: The extent to which the design was implementable, without major change was:

1

4 Riskiness: The quality of the assessment of risks and mitigations in the design was:

1

3 Summary of findings: Project 2 - Gash Barka Livestock and Agricultural Development Project

3.1 Gash Barka was approved by the Board in April 2002, and became effective in February 2003. It is a $16.1m project (IFAD loan c.$10m) to provide an investment menu to village groups in 16,400 households in Gash Barka, including rangeland development, exclusion areas, water points, water structures and irrigation, and crop research. Primary health will be improved for the whole population of Gash Barka Zoba.

3.2 The project objectives fit the objectives in the 1998 COSOP as drafted. However a significant tacit objective of the project is to test a participatory local government investment planning mechanism, with the zoba offering menus of small-scale activities for local choice. Success would thus contribute to operationalising the government's decentralisation policies.

3.3 The design was based on a thorough Social, Economic and Production Systems survey, including extensive field research with beneficiary input. Gash Barka was selected in part because it is considered to be the best prospect in the Eastern and Western Lowlands, although this is not clearly stated in the documentation. Further, although capacities in the zoba and sub-zoba administrations are stated to be low, they are apparently relatively good by comparison with other zobas. The existence of many female-headed households is mentioned.

3.4 The purpose of the project is described in the text and the logframe, but the definition of outputs and other elements of the logframe is not rigorous and the text in the RRP and in the Logframe are not entirely consistent. The presentation of objectives and outputs in the logframe is weak and adds no value to the text sections. The critical difference between stating what the project will achieve (outputs), the benefits this is expected to bring (purpose), and the use of indicators and targets to specify quantity, quality and time is poorly internalised and presented. There are far too many indicators and many are impractical.

3.5 The design makes no direct reference to lessons from the Eastern Lowlands Wadi Project, and the decision to switch approach for the second Eritrea loan from a major capital scheme to a small-scale household approach is not described. The economic analysis in the AR looks reasonable (11% base



return), although with such a large amount of the budget going into project and process costs (c. 55% of the IFAD loan - AR Table 7), this must be treated with some caution. There is no justification of why such heavy process costs are necessary for such basic activities (drinking water supply, livestock training etc.)

3.6 Although there is no explicit treatment of sustainability or replicability in the documentation, AR Appendix 5 includes some estimate of future government recurrent cost implications and the requirement for tri-partite (community/project/sub-zoba) o&m agreements is described. The design is certainly innovative for IFAD in Eritrea (as only the second project) and appears to have been influenced by a UNCDF project in a neighbouring zoba. The documentation suggests extensive TRC discussion, and PT staff provided useful support in field preparation.

3.7 The management and implementation design is interesting. RRP Appendix V Para.2 specifies the post (and, implicitly, the individual) who will be Project Co-ordinator (although without explicit mention of the current post-holder’s capacity. Subsequent discussion revealed that the formulation of management responsibility was thorough and was indeed based on backing a local champion. This approach to implementation, particularly in a difficult environment, is valid, but risky. Bluntly, what if the champion goes under a truck? Precisely this, very sadly, occurred in Gash Barka. There was some contingency planning for such an eventuality in that the loan agreement includes a job specification for the Co-ordinator. Despite this, however, the replacement proved not to be of the same calibre as his predecessor, and the project has faced greater start-up problems than anticipated. These are compounded by the fact that the government is not paying sufficient staff incentives to recruit/transfer good people into a difficult area. The implementation design also includes some major implementation assumptions. For example, the head of the Rural Development Unit is to be sent on a 2 year Masters Course to upgrade skills. The assumptions that s/he will return and that Government will re-assign qualified people in the interim are not explicitly treated.








2


2



Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002

TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval

Date Grant

Amount Countries 1/

308 ICIPE

Development of Sericulture and Apiculture Technologies for Enhancing the Income Generation Potential of Smallholders in Africa PT 14-Sep-95 1 300 000

Kenya, Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

309 FAO

Programme for the Establishment of a Regional Animal Surveillance and Control Network (RADISCON) in North Africa, the Middle East and the Arab Peninsula

PT 14-Sep-95 1 250 000

Algeria, Bahrain, Tchad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Palestinia, N.A., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen

386 ICIPE

Participatory Development of Environmentally-Friendly Pest Management Vegetable Cultivation by Smallholders in Sub-Sahara Africa PT 04-Dec-97 600 000

Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Tanzania

Other Research and Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002

579 FAO Marine Resources Management Programme in the Red Sea PN 23-Apr-02 1 000 000

Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan



4 Key Issues 4.1 The early COSOP is clear and consistent, without extraneous tables and alternative presentations.

4.2 The design of Eastern Lowlands was unsatisfactory. The central weakness was that it was not based on a rigorous and realistic assessment of implementation capacity: of direct-labour construction or of Ministry of Agriculture training and extension capacity. In the absence of compensating arrangements, performance has been poor throughout.

4.3 Gash Barka is an innovative concept for Eritrea, in part designed to operationalise decentralised service provision. The management structure was careful, in that a new and relatively complex intervention was to be managed by a particularly capable and motivated individual. The fall-back provisions in case he was not available have been less effective. Further, careful implementation appraisal would have indicated the minimum incentive package required to attract capable staff (always the key factor in getting strong staff to work in remote places) and this could have been explicitly dealt with at negotiations.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Ghana

Ghana Country Synopsis page 1

Ghana Country Synopsis

1 Summary of Strategy 1.1 All IFAD-initiated projects in Ghana will continue to focus on the following: (i) foodcrops both for subsistence and for sale; (ii) smallholders as a target group, including support for rural women; (iii) participatory group development; (iv) NGOs as partners and implementing agencies; (v) small-scale credit for on and off-farm activities; (vi) village-level rural infrastructure; and (vii) sustainability of activities funded. IFAD’s operations in the future will continue to emphasise the area of the Northern, the Upper East, and the Upper West of the Northern Savannah, where the highest incidence of poverty in the country is present. (paragraph 36).

Overall rating of COSOP: 2 1.2 The document is relatively weak and probably much weaker than the strategic thinking that went on to produce it. There are structural weaknesses like the absence of references for quoted material. There are content weaknesses like the absence of mention of HIV/AIDS. The biggest problem with the document is that it raises the issue of geographic spread without resolving it and appears to contradict itself in terms of geographic focus. This leaves the reader uncertain whether or not projects outside the northern areas should be considered which is a great failing in a strategy statement. The suggestions that all families are universally poor in villages in the north may be simply an unfortunate choice of words but appears to mean that the author believes that there are no distinctions in poverty or impoverishment. If this were acted upon it would seriously weaken project design. Otherwise the document covers the necessary points well and provides some focus for project design.

1.3 The strategy is relatively weakly expressed by the use of seven statements which allow a wide range of activities. Although paragraph 36 suggests that work should concentrate in the northern parts of the country this focus is called into question elsewhere in the document where it is suggested that the decision to be narrow or broad in geographic approach has not yet been taken.

PACountry portfolio history (1): Ghana

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

AGRICVolta Region Agricultural Development Project34 May-80 Jun-80 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jan-81 Jun-884 31

PGMLOSmallholder Rehabilitation and Development Programme198 Dec-86 Apr-87 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-88 Jun-9520 39

CREDISmallholder Credit, Input Supply and Marketing Project247 Dec-89 Jul-90 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-91 Sep-9832 31

AGRICUpper-East Region Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project457 Oct-90 Jan-91 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-91 Jun-9716 20

RURALRural Enterprises Project466 Dec-93 Jun-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-95 Jun-0229 31

Ongoing

AGRICUpper West Agricultural Development Project477 Sep-95 Nov-95 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-96 Dec-038 18

RURALVillage Infrastructure Programme1002 Dec-96 Feb-97 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Apr-98 Jun-0411 57

AGRICRoot and Tuber Improvement Programme1053 Dec-97 Feb-98 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-99 Jun-0410 48

AGRICUpper-East Region Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project - Phase II1124 Apr-99 Jun-99 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-00 Mar-058 28

CREDIRural Financial Services Project1134 May-00 Oct-01 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-02 Mar-0877 13

RURALNorthern Region Poverty Reduction Programme1183 Dec-01 Feb-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-04 Mar-1061 51

RSRCHRural Enterprises Project - Phase II1187 Sep-02 Feb-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-03 Jun-1122 18

Design

Root and Tuber Improvement Programme - Phase II1312 IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Totals


PACountry portfolio history (2):Ghana

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

AGRICVolta Region Agricultural Development Project34 11,516 48,816 24% 60% 16% 60,000 360,000814 136 6.0

PGMLOSmallholder Rehabilitation and Development Programme198 11,585 14,340 81% 0% 19% 6,720 67,2002,134 213 10.0

CREDISmallholder Credit, Input Supply and Marketing Project247 16,600 21,160 78% 0% 22% 110,000 660,000192 32 6.0

AGRICUpper-East Region Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project457 12,539 15,039 83% 3% 13% 40,000 280,000376 54 7.0

RURALRural Enterprises Project466 7,670 9,302 82% 0% 18% 16,000 100,000581 93 6.3

Ongoing

AGRICUpper West Agricultural Development Project477 10,061 11,316 89% 0% 11% 18,400 110,400615 103 6.0

RURALVillage Infrastructure Programme1002 10,000 60,000 17% 61% 22% 500,000 3,000,000120 20 6.0

AGRICRoot and Tuber Improvement Programme1053 9,017 10,109 89% 0% 11% 750,000 3,750,00013 3 5.0

AGRICUpper-East Region Land Conservation and Smallholder Rehabilitation Project - Phase II

1124 11,595 13,886 84% 0% 16% 34,400 206,400404 67 6.0

CREDIRural Financial Services Project1134 11,002 22,961 48% 44% 8% 330,000 1,320,00070 17 4.0

RURALNorthern Region Poverty Reduction Programme1183 12,335 59,584 21% 0% 79% 280,000 1,400,000213 43 5.0

RSRCHRural Enterprises Project - Phase II1187 11,245 29,274 38% 34% 27% 80,000 400,000366 73 5.0

DesignRoot and Tuber Improvement Programme - Phase II1312

135,165 315,787 43% 28% 30%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: 1002 - Ghana - Village Infrastructure Programme - VIP

2.1 The VIP is somewhat notorious and IFAD staff find it easy to blame the poor performance on the design inherited from the World Bank. The project logic is very weak. To say that people are poor in villages that lack infrastructure does not mean that provision of infrastructure will lead to people becoming less poor.

2.2 Relevance. The relevance of the VIP has been called into question by the assessments that led to attempts to reorient the project (RAP). The original analysis of need was not as weak as the identified mechanism for implementation. The types of facilities that were identified were unlikely to bring assistance to the poorer. For example; better market infrastructure is not likely to help those with little to sell; post-harvest transformation infrastructure is unlikely to be helpful to those who have very little agricultural production.

2.3 Trying to work through the district assemblies was an error since they did not have the contact with communities nor the skills nor the will to carry out the program as designed. This led to the implementation of work that was not highly relevant to the IFAD target groups. Confusion between public and private goods is blamed for the project drifting away from IFAD.

2.4 The irrigation structures were of value to the farmers who were able to exploit them and serious increases in yields were reported.

2.5 Maintenance of facilities is questioned and there is little suggestion of real ownership.

2.6 Effectiveness. The project needed to be redesigned and IFAD managed to force through a Restructuring Action Plan despite being a minor contributor. This means that it may not be very fair to judge the project against the plans. 500km of roads build against the planned 2200km. 99 out of 200 market places. Against the slow and weak progress in these pure infrastructure achievements the project put huge efforts into training and went far over budget in this area for very good reasons. The Mid-Term Review makes no mention of gender or of women

2.7 Efficiency. The District Assemblies were simply not able to act as the project implementers: they were not capable and were not adequately interested and a large training element had to be included in the project in an attempt to turn the progress around. Credit programmes were arranged on different systems and some of the rates were below agreed national norms. Most of the market places built were not viable and many were very poorly designed without proper environmental assessment.

2.8 The District Assemblies were known to be weak and new and the decision to work with them required complementary inputs in training and support direct to the DAs and this was poorly estimated. Therefore resources were wasted before attempts were made to rectify the situation. The Restructuring Action Plan was a large and necessary investment in trying to salvage the project and clearly damages the cost efficiency of the project.

2.9 Outcomes. The road building programme reduced travel times and increased the market opportunities for some but this was a minor impact compared with the project design. Training was provided to ten times as many people as planned.



2.10 The project was an important learning opportunity for IFAD and allowed it to demonstrate that it could negotiate with the World Bank and bring about radical changes in a project design and implementation even where IFAD is a minor donor (a third of the WB inputs). The project explored the possibilities of working at national level rather than in a restricted geographic area and the potential to engage with government on the basis of national coverage. The lessons to be drawn have largely been lost because the implementation was so poorly managed that most staff have tried to distance themselves from the work.

2.11 The Project Summary Forms say that there has been learning from about 20 pilots although it is not clear what the learning is. The absence of gender analysis and reporting against gender approach is a concern. The changes in women’s involvement in decision making are described as “insignificant”.



IEE Rating



3 The initial theory makes sense presuming that the conditions on the ground are as described.



2 The targeting goes wrong when the selection of activities is controlled by the District Assemblies.


1 A major restructuring was necessary and hardly able to prevent serious weaknesses.


2 The risk analysis was very weak and mitigation measures were not designed.

3 Summary of findings: 1187 - Ghana - Rural Enterprises Project - Phase II

3.1 REP II. The project is the second phase of a project that is seen to have been a significant success. REP I was important because it was one of the earliest projects in the region that had no direct agricultural production component but focused on credit and off-farm income generation.

3.2 Relevance. The perceived success of phase I has made it easy to design phase II with many of the same features and a slight modification of the business support to enable more effective targeting. The design of initiatives by the beneficiaries determines the appropriateness of the individual activities supported.

3.3 Targeting remains in the northern areas of the country but the activities may not be open to the very poorest; credit is only useful to the economically active and at least partly



entrepreneurial. The documentation refers to the possibility of helping the more poor by helping the less poor which is extremely dubious.

3.4 The project documentation does not provide a clear theory of action to defend work direct on income generation and the link to well-being. The case may not be difficult to make and the need to find alternative means of livelihood where production activities will not be sufficient may be obvious but it is not spelt out and therefore less easy to test. The question, “Does raised income lead to greater food security?” remains to be answered.

3.5 Some doubts exist over the sense of ownership of roads about there may be problems with maintenance.

3.6 Effectiveness. Road building carried over from REP I has been completed at 74% and allowed a doubling of traffic and provided work opportunities for 1100 people. Many of the training initiatives are alleged to be working well. The style of credit makes it attractive to women who make up a majority of beneficiaries. This is a clever feature of the project design that has been carried over from REP I.

3.7 Efficiency. The design allows for relatively easy throughput of loans and support from local skilled personnel reduces costs. The capital costs of buildings and road construction all occur in the early years and ratios should improve in later years. The large numbers already working on project initiatives shows high rates of impact.

3.8 Outcomes. Very good outcomes given the short life of the project so far. Some 5400 new businesses supported which is more than half the target number and a prediction that 90% will survive. Loan recovery is alleged to have increased from 43 to 87% and this must represent a success although a credit program running at only 43% recovery is clearly a disaster.

3.9 The monitoring work has been very bad and needs to be improved dramatically and the weaknesses recorded put some doubt on the claims for successes in earlier phases. The M&E should be providing learning to the rural finance interest group in IFAD headquarters.

3.10 Some evidence that the learning may be able to feed into national policy. And building on the work of REPI may make it possible to link communities to external provision of credit. Links to other partner agencies looks weak.



IEE Rating



4 The identification rides on the successes of REP I and is therefore vindicated fairly easily. Poor rural people have benefited from the inputs.



4 The credit inputs are effectively self-targeting and many poor rural women are able to make use of the provision that others would not find attractive. The modalities of provision of



technical support and training have been altered to improve targeting.


4 Unlike earlier IFAD interventions this focuses only on rural credit and is much simpler to implement and monitor.


4 Risk assessment if informed by the work done in the first phase and mit igation measures easy to predict.

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) 429A CENSUDI Programme for Rural

Bank-NGO Partnership for Promoting Savings and Effective Micro -enterprise Management through Families

PA 02-Nov-99 50,000 Ghana

617 CASSAVA Cassava Market Development Initiative for West and Central Africa

PA 29-Oct-02 75,000 Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria

597 ETC ECOCUL Participatory Design of Prolinnova: Programme to Build Regional R&D Partnerships for Prolinnova

PT 09-Aug-02 100,000 Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana

406 WORKSHOP International workshop on innovations on Micro-Finance for the Rural Poor - Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy Organised By IFAD, the German Foundation for International Development (DSE), IFPRI and the Bank of Ghana

PD/PA 04-Aug-98 100,000 Ghana

461 WORKSHOP Two Day Workshop on Rural Financial Services and Micro-enterprise Development in Accra

PA 19-Nov-99 20,000 Ghana



572 GTZ Regional Forum: Sector-wide Approaches: Do they really Help the Poor? Workshop, Nov.2001

PT/PA/PF 25-Feb-02 61,465 Ghana

598 CGAP Testing of the CGAP Poverty Assessment Tools

PT 08-Aug-02 95,000 Ghana, Benin, China

388 CASSAVA Global Cassava Development Strategy as a Commodity-based Approach to Poverty Alleviation: Action-Research Programme on Agro-Processing, Market Expansion, Food Security and Gender Aspects - Phase I

PA 04-Dec-97 200,000 Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana

457 IITA Programme for Poverty Alleviation and Enhanced Food Availability in West Africa through Improved Yam Technologies

PA 08-Sep-99 1,250,000 Benin, Cote-d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo

3.11 The majority of TAGs appear to have been to support workshops or one-off events. However the investment in research and trials of roots and tubers in the region has been of considerable importance and Ghana has been a participant in this work. In particular it has had a role in the work on yams.

4 Key Issues 4.1 Ghana is a very important country for IFAD and there is a large and varied portfolio and a very long history. Some of the very earliest projects of IFAD were started in Ghana. The random sampling selected two very different projects and it is not obvious that they provide a fair view of the work in the country.

4.2 The perceived weaknesses of the VIP have prevented it from being adequately exploited as a source of learning. As a failure it has become an orphan in the same way that the perceived success of REP has allowed it to accumulate many parents.

4.3 The learning from the REP experience should be reflected in work of the Rural Finance thematic group. The key question of how working on income directly fits with the agricultural focus of the Fund remains to be treated directly. There is a need for a study on the impact of small enterprise on livelihoods. It is possible that increased income leads only to increased consumption by powerful individuals and this needs to be examined if only to disprove its importance.

4.4 The impacts within a community need to be examined and the possibility of differential impacts should be understood. Monitoring so far has not allowed this to happen. The



possibility that the initiatives are not useful to the very poor who also do not benefit from the increased well being of their neighbours also should be assessed.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Guatemala

Guatemala Country Synopsis page 1

Guatemala Country Synopsis


1.1 IFAD approved its first loan to Guatemala in 1984 and has supported a total of five projects. This strategy is responding to the post conflict situation in the country (peace accord in 1996) and building on its work since 1995 of rural poverty reduction in the context of a pacification process. The focus will be on the highly vulnerable indigenous communities. The evolution from IFAD past strategy to the present document is summarised as:

Past Present Project oriented Programme oriented Site specific – war torn areas Nationwide coverage, focus on pockets of poverty Strengthen pacification process and poverty reduction

Strengthen poverty reduction, rural development and government decentralisation

Primary emphasis: social investments Primary emphasis: economic development Primary focus: war affected populations Primary focus: indigenous communities Projects implemented by FONAPAZ, ad hoc institutions created through peace accords

Programme implemented by Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition

Integration of war affected families within the social and economic development of the country

Support for the creation of a multicultural society

1.2 Three strategic axes are identified: (i) human and social capital development – activities focusing on health (including child nutrition, housing, sanitation and basic services) and education with an emphasis on strengthening local organisations and enabling their participation in Government decentralisation programmes and local development committees; (ii) income generation – to include agricultural and non agricultural production as well as off farm and urban employment potential and (iii) the strengthening of the institutional framework of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition (MALN) responding to intentions of Government. Gender equity (the ProGender regional technical assistance grant programme will provide technical support) and natural resource management and conservation are identified as two key crosscutting axes. Collaboration with environmental projects financed by the IDB and World Bank will be explored.

1.3 IFAD’s lending portfolio over the coming five years (2003-08) will focus on support to the phased development and implementation of the National Rural Development Programme in agreement with the Government and MALN concentrating activities on supporting the modernization and reorganization of the institutional framework that is responsible for rural development and poverty reduction. NRDP will be implemented in three phases both in terms of geographical coverage (by regions moving to national) and participation of institutions (beginning with MALN then including FONAPAZ and aiming to embrace all social investment funds and rural development programmes). Concepts on which to base the design of the NRDP have been agreed which include IFAD priorities of participation and gender equity combined with taking an holistic approach to rural development based on principles of decentralisation and demand led services and the rational use of natural resources.



1.4 The links with the IFAD institutional strategic framework and the Latin America regional strategy are not made explicit in the COSOP but there are clear areas of congruence. There is particular emphasis on strategic framework priorities of strengthening the capacity of the poor and their organisations and increasing equitable access to assets and services. The country strategy stresses empowerment of the rural poor, engaging in policy dialogue, developing partnerships, gender issues and sustainable use of natural resources all of which are elements in the regional strategy.

Summary of COSOP Evaluation 1.5 This is one of the new generations of COSOPs and it complies fully with all IFAD’s current institutional requirements. The analyses are thorough and link together poverty analyses of key target groups with their livelihood strategies (coping actions) and consequent priority needs. The implications for project responses to the context are clearly identified throughout the text. Table 2 in the key file which neatly summarises these issues would be a useful addition to the main document.

1.6 The document is particularly strong in the way it integrates issues of poverty, gender and equity throughout the text. Good links are made with government policies and plans combined with the definition of specific areas for the development of policy dialogue and other potential partnerships. The use of the IFAD funded regional networks and programmes is clearly explained. Areas of weakness are the logical framework, perhaps indicating the difficulties of using this tool for this level of planning, and in any mention of approaches to monitoring and evaluation for the strategy, which is all the more important given the emphasis placed on the transition from a project to a programme approach.

Overall rating of COSOP: 4


PLCountry portfolio history (1): Guatemala

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RSRCHGeneration and Transfer of Agricultural Technology and Seed Production Project154 Sep-84 Oct-84 IDB Cooperating Institution initiated Mar-85 Jun-944 21

RURALZacapa-Chiquimula Smallholders' Rural Development Project251 Dec-89 Oct-90 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-91 Jun-9843 23

RURALCuchumatanes Highlands Rural Development Project296 Dec-91 Nov-92 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-93 Dec-0050 53

Ongoing

RSRCHProgramme for Rural Development and Reconstruction in the Quiché Department (PRODERQUI)

1008 Dec-96 Jul-98 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Dec-98 Dec-0682 23

FLMRural Development Programme for Las Verapaces1085 Dec-99 Feb-01 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-01 Sep-1163 27

Not Signed

RURALNational Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region1274 Sep-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PLCountry portfolio history (2):Guatemala

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RSRCHGeneration and Transfer of Agricultural Technology and Seed Production Project154 4,698 23,898 20% 58% 22% 53,000 265,000451 90 5.0

RURALZacapa-Chiquimula Smallholders' Rural Development Project251 6,703 18,783 36% 49% 16% 5,200 29,1203,612 645 5.6

RURALCuchumatanes Highlands Rural Development Project296 7,500 20,822 36% 49% 15% 9,116 55,5252,284 375 6.1

Ongoing

RSRCHProgramme for Rural Development and Reconstruction in the Quiché Department (PRODERQUI)

1008 15,000 19,000 79% 0% 21% 2,000 10,0009,500 1,900 5.0

FLMRural Development Programme for Las Verapaces1085 15,004 26,005 58% 19% 23% 16,000 80,0001,625 325 5.0

Not Signed

RURALNational Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region1274 30,000 48,000 63% 21% 17% 6,000 30,0008,000 1,600 5.0

78,905 156,508 50% 31% 19%Totals

1 April 2004



Country Portfolio Issues – August 2003 1.7 IFAD support focuses on the consolidation of the peace process in two of the areas most affected by the civil conflict. Key risks/assumptions are the sustaining of the peace process by Government and the consolidation of the land titling processes.

2 Summary of findings: Programme for Rural Development and Reconstruction in the Quiche Department (PRODERQUI)

Timeline Date Activity June 95 Request from government at informal donors meeting Late 95 Initiation mission Feb-Apr 96 Formulation June 96 Appraisal Dec 96 EB approval July 98 Loan agreement Dec 98 Effectiveness 2.1 Objectives. The general objectives of the programme are to: help improve food security; increase income and improve the living conditions of the target group; rebuild the social fabric; and contribute to the consolidation of the Peace Process in the area. The programme seeks to:

§ increase income through the promotion and support of agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities for both men and women;

§ contribute to the recapitalization of small productive units;

§ promote and consolidate indigenous peasant organizations (men's and women's) so as to strengthen local institutions;

§ enhance the role of rural women in productive and social activities;

§ contribute to the sustainable conservation of their productive resources and environment; and support indigenous communities' rights over their territory, their natural resources, and the preservation of their cultural values.

Table: Overall 12-point project assessment Ratings: 4= High; 3= Substantial; 2= Modest; 1= Negligible

IEE Rating

Comments


3 Developed from a government request and deals with an area badly affected by conflict; clear congruence with IFAD country strategy of the time and still fits well with the subsequent COSOP and IFAD strategic framework as it focuses on indigenous people and strengthening of their organizations; it is less clear how well responds to beneficiary needs as perceived by themselves;




IEE Rating

Comments

The project predates the regional strategy and it is a particular post conflict situation here but there is clear congruence with integrating peasant communities into mainstream national economy as well as emphasis on participatory mechanisms, provision of financial services, non agricultural income generation and working in an area with high concentration of indigenous people


3 the target group within the geographical area is identified based on income criteria and the area of landholding; approx 24,450 farm families mostly of indigenous origin; women are estimated to be about 30% of beneficiaries with a relatively high percentage of female headed households in the project area; set of modules (technology packages) from which demand led interventions/small projects can be developed by beneficiaries and local technicians


3 Indications from PSR and supervision reports show that progress being made after a slow start – partially due to changes in government structures and loss of project director; good levels of beneficiary engagement are reported


2 The analysis of impact and probability is weak and does not fully address all the assumptions listed in the logframe

2.2 Effectiveness. The project has a general objective and a programme goal for all phases and a project purpose for the first phase. The logframe is somewhat confused as to levels but there is consistency between project objectives, components and strategy. There has been a reasonable attempt at defining outputs but indicators are rather weak with some that would be better placed at different levels. There are no quantitative measures provided in the indicators and the set of figures given in RRP (para 40) could have usefully been incorporated here.

2.3 There is a good review (RRP section E) of lessons learned in Guatemala with clear links made to the design of this project. However although lessons are pointed out there is no indication of dimensions of poverty reduction through previous projects. Environmental risks are identified with mitigation measures and there has been an attempt to integrate environmental measures in the logframe. The IRR has been calculated 18.8% with an opportunity cost of capital of 12%.

2.4 The RRP states that sustainability issues will be“operationalised to respond to cross cutting nature” (RRP 26); otherwise issues not explicitly discussed. The project strategy does contain implicit measures for capacity building in this area. Replicability is not specifically addressed but there are implicit opportunities in that project is closely linked to the operationalising of government accord on Agrarian situation (RRP 96). An innovative feature is identified as the setting up, and local management, of the small farmers fund for development.

2.5 Efficiency. The TRC/OSC was largely supportive of the project particularly the flexible and participatory nature of the approach. The appraisal document refers to the responses to the technical advice from IFAD (para 5). The changing functions of the Ministry are outlined with the new role for the private sector. There is some information on the modalities of FONAPAZ with more details in the appraisal document. The definition of roles in project management are clear. The programme is geared towards synergy with partners and a list of



identified actors (RRP 28) is given with whom there is the intention of signing operational working agreements although little detail is presented. Capacity building is an integral part of the programme (RRP 53).

2.6 The M and E system is not clearly described although the appraisal document has some suggestions. It is not strong on beneficiary participation in the process. An external agency is to be contracted, in addition to PMU, who would carry out baseline, mid term and final evaluation as well as undertake some case studies using PRA. This agency should guarantee participatory evaluation methodologies (RRP 45); and the programme should have performance indicators (RRP 46) but there is no reference made to the logframe.

2.7 The supervision report provided (April 2002 early in year 4); appears a thorough review of progress to date with sensible recommendations for action. Unfortunately the lack of comparison between a programme plan and actual achievements makes it hard to see what the reported activities actually mean in terms of progress towards outputs and purpose. A logframe based system would help here. The report does not refer to previous recommendations and actions. The PSR scores appear to reflect the issues contained in the supervision report.

Summary of evidence about outcomes

2.8 There are no evaluation reports to indicate outcomes. The PSRs show that there has been progress in the last two years on all fronts although it is puzzling that the overall assessment of performance goes down to a grade 2. The weakest of all elements has been the development of the monitoring and evaluation system. The assessment of meeting development objectives and gender equality are scored two.

Further Follow Up § M and E system development? Appears consistently weak in the LA area? Key issues?

Support from PREVAL? How is this working in practice? Beneficiary participation in monitoring?

§ What role does the logframe play in project management and monitoring? Participation in its development?

§ Beneficiary participation in project design? On what basis were the modules selected?

§ What have been the key strengths and weaknesses of the project? How would these be identified?

§ At what stage does reporting cover issues of achievement towards outputs and purpose?

§ Measurement of capacity building activities?

§ How does process of community planning and selection of sub-projects develop in practice? Sustainability issues are treated in what way?



3 Summary of findings: Rural Development Programme for Las Verapaces

Timeline Date Activity Dec 97 Inception paper Mar 99 Formulation mission June 99 Appraisal mission Dec 99 EB approval Feb 01 Loan agreement Sep 01 Loan effectiveness 3.1 Objectives. The general objective of the programme is to reduce rural poverty among peasants who live in a very fragile natural resource environment in the poorest municipalities of the Las Verapaces Department.

The specific objectives of the programme are to:

§ increase peasant incomes through the promotion and support of agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities;

§ promote and consolidate peasants' organizations in order to strengthen local institutions;

§ improve access by the rural population to rural financial services; § introduce and implement a gender-sensitive approach to all programme activities; § improve and preserve the natural resource base for future generations by

implementing sustainable natural resource conservation practices; § foster the integration of rural communities into the mainstream of the national

economy. These are addressed through five project components: (a) local institutional strengthening; (b) sustainable productive development; (c) rural financial services; (d) socio-economic investments; and (e) programme administration and coordination.


IEE Rating

Comments


4 Project planned prior to COSOP development; it is however consistent with the focus of the COSOP dealing with local institutional strengthening, agricultural and non agricultural income generating activities, implementing gender sensitive approaches and sustainable natural resource management; clear links are made with the strategy in place at the time (RRP 14). The project pre dates the regional strategy but reflects many of its aims: empowerment of the poor and organizations; gender equity; mainstreaming rural communities into the national economy; focus on indigenous communities. There is some presentation of women’s priorities in appraisal document but not a full presentation of beneficiaries needs analysis; according to appraisal document PRA, workshops, field focus group discussions (19 are stated in para 54) were held but no detail on who and what


4 The project targets 53,700 poor indigenous families, with an estimated 16,000 households benefiting directly, whose income is below the estimated rural poverty line of US$1.40




IEE Rating

Comments

per day. Levels of inequality, by gender and ethnicity are given with causal factors identified (RRP 8); no mention of HIV or social attitudes. Importance of having gender oriented approach cutting across all components and training in gender issues for all stakeholders is stressed (RRP 12) this to be incorporated into programme; socio economic variations to be taken account of but programme intends to use activities of women as an entry point; appraisal mission included a gender specialist and there is an excellent annex to appraisal document – unfortunately some of this interesting contextual information does not appear to feed in to RRP


3 It is really too early to comment from practice but the presentation of components is convincing


2 The risks presented in RRP body text (section H) do not reflect all the assumptions in the logframe; one (lack of coordination) is largely under the control of the project approach – unless there are institutional issues which are not analysed here; another (peasants' inability to adopt and achieve expected results) is surely the whole point of the project and not a risk? Environmental risks not included in the logframe

3.2 Effectiveness. There is some confusion over outputs/activities in the logframe but the objectives are clearly stated and measurable. The indicators have been carefully thought out and a decent attempt made to establish quantitative targets although some questions as to quality issues remain. Intermediate indicators (largely targets) are given in RRP Appendix III for end of year 4; given that first launching phase is estimated as possibly lasting 4 years these targets seem a bit ambitious. There is an interesting set of “programme implementation criteria” presented in RRP Apx IV which could have been used to refine some of the logframe indicators. The relationships between outputs and objective are sensible; there is also a very thorough presentation of how the components will work in early stages (RRP section C). A previous similar project is analysed and the importance of coordination between project components emphasised. Previous lessons are fully reviewed in appraisal Annex X appendix 2 but there are no details on the extent of poverty reduction.

3.3 The project area is noted to be important in terms of biodiversity and under threat. The reduction of resource degradation (largely by types of forestry activities) is an output. An environmental screening note was completed in 1999 and the project tentatively classified B under IFAD system – no requirement for formal EA. The appraisal gives a useful assessment of environmental risks and mitigation measures although these are not included in the logframe. The IRR is estimated at 15.7% (RRP appendix VI) with supporting calculations presented in appraisal documents.

3.4 Sustainability is addressed by using a phased approach – identification; implementation; consolidation and development of an exit strategy (RRP 35 and 46). Replicability is implicit in the phased approach and gradual expansion of activities but there are no opportunities identified beyond the project. The Flexible Lending Mechanism is identified as the most innovative aspect of the project.

3.5 Efficiency. PT made useful comments on the formulation report some of which were incorporated into the full appraisal document. However some of the requests for detailing of responsibilities do not appear to have been completely acted upon. There is little detail on institutional analysis. The appraisal document has some useful descriptive information but no real analysis of comparative strengths and weaknesses. There is good information on grass



roots organizations and also rural financial services providers in the appraisal annexes IV and V but not a lot on how partnerships will work in practice. The project management structure is clearly presented. There is little detail on how the M and E system will work in practice but a baseline study was planned for the first months of implementation. An environmental monitoring and mitigation plan was to be prepared to avoid risk of negative environmental impact.

3.6 There were no supervision reports available but three very useful reports by a consultant on technical support for monitoring and evaluation. Two years down the line there was still no base line study completed; there was nobody in charge of m and e; the gender person was only contracted 18 months after effectiveness date; and the m and e system is developing only very slowly. The first full PSR was only completed in 2003.

3.7 Outcomes. The project has only been effective for two full years hence it is not possible to judge outcomes. Good progress is being made according to the scores in the first full PSR dated July 2003 with only a few twos. Monitoring and evaluation scores two and this may be generous considering the reports of the support consultant where progress appears to be very slow. Beneficiary participation, institution building and poverty focus score ones whilst service providers, expected benefits and gender focus score twos. Overall assessment of project implementation, meeting development objectives and progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment score twos.

4 Key Issues for Further Follow Up § What role does the logframe play in project management and monitoring? Participation in

its development?

§ Beneficiary participation in design – reporting process?

§ Supervision reports? How is PSR completed?

§ The slow progress of monitoring and evaluation processes? PREVAL support?

§ Environmental monitoring plan? Gender monitoring issues? Support from ProGender?

§ Beneficiary participation – monitoring quality and quantity?

§ Key strengths, weaknesses, lessons learned?

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) The country portfolio issues sheet states that Guatemala has been a centre for the promotion of the regional TAG programme as well as a beneficiary. The details given are noted in the comments column.

1. Regional sub regional and Cross Regional


Small Grants


31-Dec-97 85 000

645 LAC forum Forum of rural finance for L America and Caribbean

29-Nov-02 93 000 Bolivia Mexico Guatemala Panama Peru Ecuador Haiti Nicaragua El Salvador



Other Research and & Training

302 IICA


12-Apr-95 790 000

Regional




Regional




10-Sep-98 600 000 Regional Impacted on programme

468 DESCO


09-Dec-99 1 550 000

Regional Meeting in Guatemala 2001 to present this programme

493 RUTA V

Regional Unit for Technical Assistance (RUTA) - Phase V 03-May -00 1 400 000

Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama: Impacted on programme

496 PROCASUR

Programa Regional Destinado a Consolidar las Estrategias de Incorporacion de los aspectos de Genero en los Proyectos Financiados por el FIDA en America Latina y Caribe PROGENDER

03-May -00 850 000

Regional will support projects through training and workshops

519 CATIE

Capacity of Local Organizations to Support Rural Investment SETEDER

07-Dec-00 880 000

Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama: Supported project operations

538 RUTA

Rural Financial Services Support Programme (SERFIRURAL) 26-Apr-01 750 000

Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua: Supported project operations

583 RIMISP

FIDAMERICA Network - Phase III 23-Apr-02 913 000

Regional Forum for information exchange – both projects included in the network

584 IICA


23-Apr-02 587 000

Regional Will support micro enterprise and handicraft development




Regional

Agricultural Research

322 IFDC

Networks on Soil Fertility Restoration and management in resource poor areas of Sub-Saharan Africa

17-Apr-96 1 000 000

Cameroon Ghana Nigeria Tanzania, Ugnada, Zambia China India Nepal Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala



2. Country Specific


Small Grants

528S GT Desarollo Rural de la Sierra de los Cuchumatanes, Project Completion Report

14-Sep-01 10 000

569 GT

Acceleration of Performance of Prodever Project and Support for Implementation of Proderqui Project

10-Sep-01 26 500 Support to the development of monitoring and evaluation system

NGO/ECP Grant Institutional Support to Cuchumatanes Association of Organisations (ASOCUCH) Number 221 (US$95,000 NGO cofinancing US$87,000)

To strengthen the managerial, institutional and technical capabilities of ASOCUCH in order to improve the services it is providing to grass roots organisations. ASOCUCH is a Mayan organization and has 16 member organizations. The grant links into a previously funded project (closed March 01) and relates to IFAD’s priorities for the empowerment of the rural poor and ethnic minorities.

Strengthening of Technical and Human Resources of the Foundation for the Activities of Participatory Development of Indigenous Communities (US$55,000)

The grant was a precursor to PRODEQUI with the grant going a national Foundation setting up a support office in Quiche.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Guinea

Guinea Country Synopsis page 1

Guinea Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 IFAD strategic niche. In this framework, and on the basis of lessons learned, IFAD strategy will be aimed at poverty alleviation through the sustainable improvement of agricultural and off-farm incomes as well as by improvements in well-being by social development activities. In this, it will support government policies of decentralisation and of private sector growth in rural development while building on institutional achievements in terms of grassroots organisation including FSA establishment under previous projects. IFAD’s niche will be constituted by three main complementary lines of interventions: i) participatory local development at village, farmer and women group level; ii) support to decentralization and to social and productive investments at the level of communities; and iii) cutting across these approaches: further support to proximity and beneficiary managed rural financial services on the basis of the experiences gained with FSA.

Overall rating of COSOP: 3 1.2 Summary. Overall this is a good descriptive document which explores the constraints and opportunities in as thorough a way as the length and style allow. There are a few methodical weaknesses like the lack of references but there is adequate support for most assertions. HIV/AIDS is not mentioned. There is a good treatment of the need to be working alongside government policy of decentralisation and of the usefulness of working at community level on savings through the FSA model. These suggestions do not appear with sufficient force to form aims that projects should support. Other statements of intent are not clear aims which do not provide guidance and it would be difficult to know if a project was conforming to the statements or not. Because of this mixture of focus and vagueness the document does not serve as a good strategic plan. It does not seem to guide project location or design beyond what would already be clear from the corporate strategy.

PACountry portfolio history (1): Guinea

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALSiguiri Rural Development Project56 Dec-80 Dec-80 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-81 Jun-920 20

AGRICGueckedou Agricultural Development Project170 Sep-85 Sep-85 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Sep-86 Dec-913 52

AGRICSecond Siguiri Rural Development Project285 Sep-91 Jan-92 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-93 Mar-9721 51

RURALSmallholder Development Project in the Forest Region313 Dec-92 Jan-93 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-94 Dec-017 56

RURALFouta Djallon Agricultural Rehabilitation Project444 Sep-88 Nov-88 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-90 Jun-967 60

RURALSmallholder Development Project in North Lower Guinea478 Sep-95 Oct-95 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jul-96 Dec-034 36

Ongoing

RURALFouta Djallon Local Development and Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme1003 Dec-96 Feb-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-98 Dec-0411 48

RURALVillage Communities Support Project1117 Dec-98 Feb-99 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Nov-99 Dec-0311 40

FLMProgramme for Participatory Rural Development in Haute-Guinée1135 Dec-99 Mar-00 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-01 Mar-1114 43

Not Effective

AGRICSustainable Agricultural Development Project in the Forest Region1206 Sep-02 Jan-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed 20

Not Signed

RURALSupport to Rural Development in North Lower Guinea Project1282 Dec-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Design

Smallholder Development Project in the Forest Region - Phase II1217 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PACountry portfolio history (2):Guinea

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALSiguiri Rural Development Project56 10,213 29,313 35% 31% 34% 6,000 42,0004,886 698 7.0

AGRICGueckedou Agricultural Development Project170 1,268 20,668 6% 62% 31% 16,000 112,0001,292 185 7.0

AGRICSecond Siguiri Rural Development Project285 12,481 26,966 46% 36% 18% 12,000 200,0002,247 135 16.7

RURALSmallholder Development Project in the Forest Region313 13,820 19,120 72% 0% 28% 7,000 59,5002,731 321 8.5

RURALFouta Djallon Agricultural Rehabilitation Project444 13,783 18,283 75% 0% 25% 17,250 120,7501,060 151 7.0

RURALSmallholder Development Project in North Lower Guinea478 15,200 25,500 60% 26% 14% 14,200 120,2001,796 212 8.5

Ongoing

RURALFouta Djallon Local Development and Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme1003 10,014 18,223 55% 25% 20% 22,000 146,400828 124 6.7

RURALVillage Communities Support Project1117 7,000 38,662 18% 72% 10% 280,000 1,400,000138 28 5.0

FLMProgramme for Participatory Rural Development in Haute-Guinée1135 14,015 19,806 71% 0% 29% 32,000 160,000619 124 5.0

Not Effective

AGRICSustainable Agricultural Development Project in the Forest Region1206 12,494 15,546 80% 0% 20% 66,000 330,000236 47 5.0

Not Signed

RURALSupport to Rural Development in North Lower Guinea Project1282 14,232 17,710 80% 0% 20% 24,000 120,000738 148 5.0

Design

Smallholder Development Project in the Forest Region - Phase II1217

124,520 249,797 50% 28% 22%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Guinea - Smallholder Development Project in North Lower Guinea – 478 - PAPE-BGN

2.1 Relevance. The original design focused on agricultural production but this was replaced with a huge increase in road building at start up. There are many project components that were planned and then not followed up. The monitoring has been very weak even by typical IFAD standards so it is rather difficult to assess the results from reports.

2.2 The switch from agricultural production to road building and the retreat from work on the valley bottoms and tree planting have created a project rather different from the one that is described\ in the planning documents.

2.3 Effectiveness. The road building has brought about a radical change in access and caused major changes in the marketing positions of people in the project area. There is some question over the maintenance of the roads because of uncertain attitudes to ownership. The work on the valley bottoms has not been effective and has led to situations of potential conflict between richer and poorer farmers and between farmers and herders.

2.4 The use of Financial Service Associations may be a meaningful innovation and provide an effective means of promoting income generation among the more poor. It is not described as such but has been effective in similar situations in other programmes in the region.

2.5 The project interim evaluation suggests that there have been important changes to attitudes to being connected to other political processes in Guinea and in reducing the trends in young men moving to towns. If these impacts are confirmed then the effectiveness of the project has to be assessed in these terms as well as in other more practical aspects of livelihoods of poor people.

2.6 Efficiency. Progress has been slow and it may be that large components were ignored. Only about 10% of the planned work on valley bottoms has been carried out and this may be that reservations about the ability of the project to carry out this work has allowed it to be abandoned. The same applies to tree planting with a derisory 2.5 ha planted against a planned 400 ha. No cereal banking infrastructure or support has been provided and again it is not clear if this is a failure in an over complex project or a deliberate relegation of a less important component.

2.7 Outcomes. The planned impact on 28500 people through increased production has not materialised and it could be argued instead that all the people in the area have benefited in different ways from the road building impact on access.

2.8 Work in water provis ion is below the planned: only 100 out of 205 boreholes and only 5 out of 23 wells have been completed. The access to water has been improved for a large number of people nonetheless. The impact is described as modest. Health centres and health posts have been built as well as a number of schools. A great deal of training has been provided but the impact is far from certain. Monitoring has been very weak. Impact on women is poorly described and improved access to schooling has been achieved for only 200 girls.



2.9 There are real environmental risks from increased wood cutting for fuel wood in towns that are now more accessible because of the new roads.



IEE Rating



4 The production and support needs are correctly identified and in line with policies.



3 The design targeted poor rural producers but was perhaps lacking in detailed understanding of intra-community differences.


2 The road building needs were reassessed at start-up and these changes were not well managed. Over complex project and poor log frame and too large and diverse an area for a project.


1 Risks in environment damage following road building, differential access to valley bottoms may provoke conflict.

3 Summary of findings: Guinea - Smallholder Development Project in the Forest Region – 313 - PD-PEF

3.1 Relevance. The need to work in this area of Guinea is clear and the focus on production methods and resources was important but missed the key issues of ownership and internal community concerns. The building of roads was underestimated and although there has been some impact there could have been a reorientation towards greater road building this has not really happened. The focus on the valley bottoms did not look at the complexity of ownership and use for other ends.

3.2 Effectiveness. Of 3500 ha planned for coffee production on 500 ha have been planted, 2300ha of valley bottoms improved against 3700 planned. 5000 farmers have been directly helped against the plan for assisting 52500. Over 11000 credit groups have been raised and other people have been helped by support to existing groups. 44 stores had been built, 9 health posts, 35 literacy schools and 10 offices for the ASF have also been constructed. These constructions may not lead to impacts for the most poor in the area. The work on road building should have been increased probably to improve access for everyone as an early stage in promoting easier marketing.

3.3 Development of the valley bottoms has been mostly to the benefit of those with tenure in these areas who tend to be better off farmers. The areas may lose their usefulness as sources for medicinal plants and as religious/cultural sites when developed for paddy cultivation.



Such losses are more likely to affect women negatively. The water management mechanisms are described as over-complicated for easy maintenance and sustainable management.

3.4 There has been a great investment in training but the numbers are well below those planned and it has been necessary to rearrange the training methods. A total of 1114 people trained against 7000 planned; the involvement in training for the ASFs has changed the numbers trained as trainers to look like a positive balance. The list looks like this: Agricultural extension agents 346 trained against 800 planned; 50 midwives against 200 planned, 308 FSA formed against 700.

3.5 Efficiency. The work on valley bottoms may have to be reorganised and the work on new areas will require longer planning work than imagined. The inputs from project staff are costly given the location and the difficulties of movement and the complexity of the project design. The refocus on 12 villages and a Gestion de Terroir approach may make this easier by unifying the different project initiatives.

3.6 The redesigning of the project components has been necessary because of the original design that was based on poor understanding of the reality on the ground. The potential in credit groups is important but at present there are no links to external credit sources to support the processes after the project.

3.7 The management of project interventions is so bad that it merits repeated comments in the supervision reports and a deterioration is noted when the situation is already described as poor. The lack of rigour in management may have led to inefficiencies in project processes.

3.8 Outcomes. The most celebrated impact of this project has been the production of 3500T of paddy from areas that produced no rice at all before the project. This has led to a much shorter hungry period than was common. The M&E has been very poor and is described as non-existent for most purposes. This makes it difficult to assess the outcomes and to validate the claims for successful impacts. The adoption of the Gestion de Terroir approach does not necessarily guarantee better targeting on the most poor.

3.9 There is no doubt that there should be a second phase of this project and this is partly because this is the sort of place that IFAD should work in. The forest zone is an example of a situation right at the heart of IFAD concerns and aims. The project should continue now that it has been able to gain the level of knowledge of the local realities that would make it possible to design and manage a highly effective project in the area for the benefit of the very poor people of the area.



IEE Rating



3 The identification was correct in terms of strategies but not on the reality of the beneficiaries’ situation, if the identification had been correct the design would have been correct and both would score 4.


design targeted the right people with 3 Targeting by geographic zone

was right and attempts to define




was right and attempts to define poor within the area was good but all this was based on genuinely poor knowledge of the area.


2 Too complex do-everything style based on activities not on people.


2 Very poor assessment of risks in developing valley bottoms and inadequate consideration of environmental risks.


337 W/SHOP Brainstorming on Rural Financial Services 09-Aug-96

100,000 Guinea

500 GN Building Local Capacity as Well as Develop and Strengthen Partnerships

20-Jul-00 20,000 Guinea

504 GN W/SHOP

Country Level Workshops in Guinea 20-Jul-00 20,000 Guinea

576M

GN Developpement Petites Exploitations dans la Region de Forêt, Project Completion

20-Jul-02 22,000 Guinea Republic

430 W/SHOP Organisation of two Implementation W/Shops in Guinea and Mauritania

08-Dec-98 25,000 Guinea, Mauritania

3.10 The TAGs have not been used to develop supporting or complementary activities within Guinea. Guinea project staff have not taken opportunities or not been able to take part in workshops relating to regional research work funded through TAGs.

4 Key Issues 4.1 The random sampling of projects led to the selection of two projects that have already closed but which will have second phases. The suspension of project activity makes it a little uncertain what will be observable during the country visit.

4.2 Both projects raise some of the same questions. How important has been the emphasis and work on road building. The interim reports suggest that the improvements in access have been of considerable material impact through improved marketing opportunities but also the visits should examine the effects on attitudes. In PAPE-BGN, it will also necessary to look at changes in access to fuelwood and the question of increased export to towns.

4.3 The development of production in the valley bottoms has also raised questions about the distribution of benefits and the environmental impacts.

4.4 The experience in credit provision has been varied with a change during the projects to the adoption of the ASF approach which has been very successful elsewhere. The interim



report for PDPEF suggests that the ASFs are successful but that only half are working well. The access to credit does not seem to show the bias towards women seen elsewhere and it would be interesting to understand what is working well in credit and if the situation is genuinely different from other places. For example; the take up by men may be encouraged because of a genuine lack of other opportunities that might exist in better connected parts of neighbouring countries.

4.5 Tree planting has been planned in both projects and not been very well taken up. It would be useful to understand the reasoning of possible beneficiaries to this part of project work.

4.6 It is not clear what has happened in access to water for rural populations as a result of project activities. There are confusing accounts of improved access despite very poor progress in providing infrastructure.

4.7 An important observation to assess during the visits will be the possibility that there have been some changes in the trends of rural-urban migrations.

4.8 As with all IFAD programmes there is a need to assess how much the projects are able to support each other and contribute to national level processes.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – India

India Country Synopsis page 1

India Country Synopsis


1.1 Relieving constraints on the poor while putting forward innovative approaches provides IFAD with its strategic niche in India and, if successful, leading to replication of the model by government and other donors. The main target will be the poor amongst Scheduled Castes and Tribes and in particular women, Major strategic thrusts will focus on increasing popular participation, strengthening grass roots institutions, providing greater access for the poor to common property and other resources, improving financial services to the rural poor and generating income from non-farm micro-enterprises. These translate into demand driven programmes to protect tribal rights, natural resource management based on watershed development, micro-finance, community initiatives to improve health education and literacy, and local infrastructure works. Implementation will be managed by communities with technical help where necessary.

1.2 The document presents a good analysis of the causes of poverty in India, its incidence and severity, particularly as it affects Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women. The regional and intrastate distribution of poverty is discussed. Because of the magnitude of the problem of poverty in India, IFAD with limited resources can have only a limited direct impact, so the rationale for IFAD’s intervention is based on its niche role in developing new or improved approaches to poverty alleviation, focused on SCs, STs and women in specific rural areas, with expansion dependent on partnerships. There is a clear statement of objectives, with supporting logframe, that address the main causes of poverty through strengthening grass roots and local community organizations with a focus on empowerment of the poor, increasing access to common property and other natural resources, improving the functioning and access to rural financial services for the poor, and generating additional income from non-farm enterprises. IFAD has some experience of all these activities in various parts of India and they are included as elements of proposed project initiatives. The integration of these activities in a way that benefits the target beneficiaries presents an enormous challenge, which is not adequately discussed. It will require integration of the activities of a number of line agencies but the capacity of such agencies and issues of integrating such capacity is not described.1 Nor is there a discussion of the process of monitoring and evaluation or of environmental issues.


1 In the view of the CPM, the draft COSOP relies more on building the people’s institutions based on the IFAD’s experience in the past and integration is expected to be brought at that level (para 52, page 15). In other words, integration is conceived to take place within the demand structure rather than within/among the supply structures (a more conventional way of effecting integration). The assumption here is that an empowered community is more likely to be able to “animate” the supply structure and acquire required services without resorting to administratively determined supply point-cantered integration process.

PICountry portfolio history (1): India

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

IRRIGBhima Command Area Development Project23 Sep-79 Oct-79 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Dec-79 Oct-843 9

RURALRajasthan Command Area Development and Settlement Project32 Dec-79 Jan-80 World Bank: IBRD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-80 Jun-882 8

RURALSundarban Development Project49 Dec-80 Dec-80 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-81 Dec-881 7

IRRIGMadhya Pradesh Medium Irrigation Project81 Dec-81 Jun-82 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Sep-82 Sep-8727 12

IRRIGSecond Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project124 Apr-83 Jul-83 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Oct-83 Mar-9014 10

RURALOrissa Tribal Development Project214 Dec-87 Feb-88 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced May-88 Jun-979 16

CREDITamil Nadu Women's Development Project240 Apr-89 May-89 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-90 Jun-984 34

RURALAndhra Pradesh Tribal Development Project282 Apr-91 May-91 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Aug-91 Sep-985 14

CREDIMaharashtra Rural Credit Project325 Apr-93 Jun-93 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-94 Mar-028 31

AGRICAndhra Pradesh Participatory Tribal Development Project349 Apr-94 May-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Aug-94 Sep-023 13

OngoingRURALMewat Area Development Project432 Apr-95 May-95 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-95 Dec-046 5

RURALRural Women's Development and Empowernment Project1012 Dec-96 Mar-97 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced May-99 Jun-0416 111

AGRICNorth Eastern Region Community Resource Management Project for Upland Areas1040 Apr-97 May-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-99 Mar-043 92

RURALJharkhand-Chattisgarh Tribal Development Programme1063 Apr-99 Mar-01 IFAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-01 Jun-0997 14

FLMNational Microfinance Support Programme1121 May-00 Feb-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-02 Jun-0993 6

FLMOrissa Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme1155 Apr-02 Dec-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jul-03 Mar-1334 29

AGRICLivelihood Security Project for Earthquake-Affected Rural Households in Gujarat1210 Sep-01 Feb-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-02 Dec-0922 37

Not Signed

CREDILivelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas1226 Dec-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

DesignMaharashtra Women's Development and Empowerment Project1314 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):India

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

IRRIGBhima Command Area Development Project23 43,663 93,663 47% 0% 53% 25,200 148,6803,717 630 5.9

RURALRajasthan Command Area Development and Settlement Project32 47,978 103,578 46% 0% 54% 39,000 195,0002,656 531 5.0

RURALSundarban Development Project49 15,907 36,207 44% 0% 56% 225,000 1,125,000161 32 5.0

IRRIGMadhya Pradesh Medium Irrigation Project81 25,000 232,100 11% 60% 29% 29,700 180,0007,815 1,289 6.1

IRRIGSecond Uttar Pradesh Public Tubewells Project124 30,093 176,993 17% 51% 32% 440,000 2,200,000402 80 5.0

RURALOrissa Tribal Development Project214 12,200 24,400 50% 6% 44% 12,500 62,5001,952 390 5.0

CREDITamil Nadu Women's Development Project240 17,000 30,600 56% 0% 44% 40,320 201,600759 152 5.0

RURALAndhra Pradesh Tribal Development Project282 19,980 46,518 43% 15% 42% 63,370 291,500734 160 4.6

CREDIMaharashtra Rural Credit Project325 29,198 48,352 60% 5% 34% 91,250 456,250530 106 5.0

AGRICAndhra Pradesh Participatory Tribal Development Project349 26,718 50,301 53% 11% 36% 76,810 385,000655 131 5.0

Ongoing

RURALMewat Area Development Project432 14,955 22,284 67% 0% 33% 40,000 380,000557 59 9.5

RURALRural Women's Development and Empowernment Project1012 19,208 53,510 36% 36% 28% 130,000 130,000412 412 1.0

AGRICNorth Eastern Region Community Resource Management Project for Upland Areas1040 22,900 33,223 69% 0% 31% 23,000 131,0001,444 254 5.7

RURALJharkhand-Chattisgarh Tribal Development Programme1063 23,000 41,664 55% 25% 20% 74,000 370,000563 113 5.0

FLMNational Microfinance Support Programme1121 21,961 134,027 16% 18% 66% 540,000 2,700,000248 50 5.0

FLMOrissa Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme1155 19,996 91,155 22% 57% 21% 75,000 338,0001,215 270 4.5

AGRICLivelihood Security Project for Earthquake-Affected Rural Households in Gujarat1210 14,981 23,962 63% 21% 17% 53,280 266,400450 90 5.0

Not Signed

CREDILivelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas1226 39,920 84,286 47% 0% 53% 72,000 360,0001,171 234 5.0

DesignMaharashtra Women's Development and Empowerment Project1314

444,658 1,326,823 34% 27% 40%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Maharashtra Rural Credit Project (Project ID 325)

2.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the 1977 Lending Policies and Criteria that were the relevant guidelines at the time of appraisal. In addition, the project is consistent with the current Strategic Framework as it aimed at reducing poverty amongst the poorest and provide them with access to financial services to develop productive resources. The target group is identified on the basis of income amongst SCs, STs and in particular women living in rural areas, based on an analysis of the distribution of poverty.

2.2 Effectiveness. There are consistent linkages between the project strategy, objectives, constraints and components. Objectives are clearly stated though there is no logframe and outputs and indicators are not presented. The lessons of previous experience, in particular from TNWP, are clearly set out and incorporated into project design. There is little discussion of environmental impact as it is assumed that initiatives by local communities will have little or no adverse environmental impact. The ERR is estimated at 18%. Sustainability is not explicitly discussed but it is implicit in the development of a viable rural credit delivery system and functioning SHGs. Nor is there explicit discussion of replicability, but it is clear that if successful, the implementing commercial banks would expand the system to other areas. The project is highly innovative as it introduces a rural credit delivery system that is new to both IFAD and India.

2.3 Efficiency. The TRC provided comments on financial sector issues rather than on the project design. Implementation arrangements are presented in detail and there is an analysis of the capacity of existing financial institutions with measures to address weaknesses detailed. A similar analysis of other involved institutions is lacking. M&E arrangement are specified though they are complex and involve several institutions. NABARD and CBs are partners and their expected contributions and roles are clearly defined. Supervision has been satisfactory with fairly consistent and rapid action on recommendations to address constraints. The MTR reviewed progress and made appropriate adjustments. The PCR concluded that project implementation was highly satisfactory, the objectives successfully achieved, and costs less and benefits greater than expected. Performance by IFAD, UNOPS and implementing agencies was satisfactory.

2.4 Outcomes. Project implementation was satisfactory with the total number of borrowers 120% of the appraisal estimate and women borrowers 72% of the appraisal estimate. The number of SHGs formed was 249% of appraisal estimate and loans to SHG members 375% of the appraisal estimate. Household incomes increased by 25 to 50% with an implicit improvement in food security and nutrition. The demand for and rapid formation of SHGs and the success of VDCs reflects the impact they have on empowerment, particularly of women. Improvements in drinking water supply, education and sanitation resulted from project support for VDCs. The project brought about a significant change in the approach of the banking system to rural credit and resulted in important policy changes. The introduction of the rural credit delivery system was innovative and provided a model for further expansion.



Table: Overall project Assessment Criteria IEE

Rating Comment


4

Design Targeting:The extent to which the design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

3


4


3

2.5 Issues. The main issue to be considered is how to replicate the successful credit delivery system in more recent IFAD projects that focus on the poorest in less favourable areas, where there may not be an established rural finance system.



3 Summary of findings: Jharkhand-Chattisgarh Tribal Development Programme (Project ID 1063)

3.1 Relevance. The programme is consistent with the COSOP and the regional strategy as it focuses on the poor in less favourable areas. The target population of poor tribal people, particularly women is based on a detailed analysis of the causes, incidence and distribution of poverty and a PRA exercise to establish needs.

3.2 Effectiveness. There is a clear link between the strategy, objectives, approach and project components. Objectives are clearly stated and outputs defined with measurable indicators of physical achievements, though indicators of empowerment and social change depend on proxies. Lessons of previous IFAD experience are clearly set out. The programme was classed as Category B following an ESS and includes a mechanism for environmental screening of community development proposals. The ERR is estimated at 14.2%. There is no specific discussion of sustainability but it is implicit in the development of empowered community based organizations. The programme is designed as a replicable model for future expansion and includes a number of innovative features, with flexibility, village based decision making and financial control and co-ordination by a newly established Tribal Development Society.

3.3 Efficiency. The programme is to be implemented in two states which may affect progress due to different bureaucratic arrangements and efficiencies. TRC concerns about the size and complexity of a project that would combine two earlier proposed state projects resulted in reformulation as a programme. Other TRC concerns about the development of new institutions did not appear to alter programme design as the programme includes institutional support. Although institutions and their responsibilities for implementation are clearly set out there is insufficient analysis of their current capacity. The need and arrangements for M&E are clearly defined. DFID is a co-financing partner but any future role in supervision is not discussed. There has been two supervision missions and the reports are clear and indicates progress on start up activities and the development of institutions.2

3.4 Outcomes. The loan became effective on 21/06/01 so assessment of outcomes is not feasible.

2 A third mission was undertaken in January 2004



Table: Overall 12-point project assessment Criteria IEE

Rating Comment


4


4


NA


3 Project design addresses most risks but project located in two states poses riks of divergent implementation

3.5 Issues. An important issue affecting this project is the capacity of agencies to implement a participatory approach in all project activities in the remote project area.

3.6 Another issue that may affect the programme is implementation in two states that may have differing capacity and bureaucratic procedures.

3.7 Insurgency or illegal logging may affect project implementation




TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date App Year Grant Amount Countries

346 YTH ACTION Afro-Asian Global NGO Forum on SS and SN Cooperation - Youth For Action

EAD 09/08/1996 1996 60 000 India

393 CCD/ASIA

Preparatory Activities towards the Regional Programme fro Asia: Preparation of the Regional Expert Group; Launching of Thematic Programme Network in China, India and Iran; Development of Tashkent Inter-regional Action Programme

PI 31/12/1997 1997 100 000 China, India, Iran

522 CIMMYT Enhancing rhe Rice wheat Productivity in the More Marginal Areas of the Indo-Gangetic Plains

PT 28/12/2000 2000 97 020 India

502K IN Pradesh Tribal Development Project PI 20/11/2000 2000 22 000 India

502P IN Pradesh Tribal Development Project Completion Report PI 20/11/2000 2000 3 404.52 India

550 IFAD/WFP Appi: Enhance the Performance of IFAD Loans and Grants in India and Asia and Pacific Region

PI 29/08/2001 2001 70 437 India, Asia and the Pacific

593 CFI Formation of a Self-Help Group Federation PI 26/07/2002 2002 98 000 India

594 FAO

Contract Farming of Livestock in India, Partnerships to Promote Environentally-friendly and Wquitable Intensification of Smallholder Market-oriented Livestock Production

PT 26/07/2002 2002 95 400 India



624 IDRC

Participatory Action Research on Linking Medicinal Plants with Livelihoods of People in Indian Uplands

PT 07/11/2002 2002 99 750 India

613 IFAD/WFP Symposium on IFAD's Strategy for Rural Poverty reduction in Asia and the Pacific, 01 December 2002

PI 09/09/2002 2002 75 000 India

600 RESULTS Testing of the Microcredit Campaign Poverty Targeting Tools PT 08/08/2002 2002 95 000 India, Sri Lanka,

Indonesia, Bangladesh Tag Nos.502K, 502P are SOF grants. Tag 550 is a grant under the Accelerated Project Performance Initiative to provide IFAD with field prescence through recruitment of an officer in the WFP office. Tag 593 is to finance an NGO to facilitate the development of a federation of self-help groups. Tag Nos 522, 624 and 600 are reseearch grants. Tag 613 is a grant to finance a workshop.



4 Summary of findings: Guinea - Smallholder Development Project in North Lower Guinea – 478 - PAPE-BGN

4.1 Relevance. The original design focused on agricultural production but this was replaced with a huge increase in road building at start up. There are many project components that were planned and then not followed up. The monitoring has been very weak even by typical IFAD standards so it is rather difficult to assess the results from reports.

4.2 The switch from agricultural production to road building and the retreat from work on the valley bottoms and tree planting have created a project rather different from the one that is described\ in the planning documents.

4.3 Effectiveness. The road building has brought about a radical change in access and caused major changes in the marketing positions of people in the project area. There is some question over the maintenance of the roads because of uncertain attitudes to ownership. The work on the valley bottoms has not been effective and has led to situations of potential conflict between richer and poorer farmers and between farmers and herders.

4.4 The use of Financial Service Associations may be a meaningful innovation and provide an effective means of promoting income generation among the more poor. It is not described as such but has been effective in similar situations in other programmes in the region.

4.5 The project interim evaluation suggests that there have been important changes to attitudes to being connected to other political processes in Guinea and in reducing the trends in young men moving to towns. If these impacts are confirmed then the effectiveness of the project has to be assessed in these terms as well as in other more practical aspects of livelihoods of poor people.

4.6 Efficiency. Progress has been slow and it may be that large components were ignored. Only about 10% of the planned work on valley bottoms has been carried out and this may be because reservations about the ability of the project to carry out this work have allowed it to be abandoned. The same applies to tree planting with a derisory 2.5 ha planted against a planned 400 ha. No cereal banking infrastructure or support has been provided and again it is not clear if this is a failure in an over complex project or a deliberate relegation of a less important component.

4.7 Outcomes. The planned impact on 28500 people through increased production has not materialised and it could be argued instead that all the people in the area have benefited in different ways from the road building impact on access.

4.8 Work in water provision is below the planned: only 100 out of 205 boreholes and only 5 out of 23 wells have been completed. The access to water has been improved for a large number of people nonetheless. The impact is described as modest. Health centres and health posts have been built as well as a number of schools. A great deal of training has been provided but the impact is far from certain. Monitoring has been very weak. Impact on women is poorly described and improved access to schooling has been achieved for only 200 girls.



4.9 There are real environmental risks from increased wood cutting for fuel wood in towns that are now more accessible because of the new roads.



IEE Rating



4 The production and support needs are correctly identified and in line with policies.



3 The design targeted poor rural producers but was perhaps lacking in detailed understanding of intra-community differences.


2 The road building needs were reassessed at start-up and these changes were not well managed. Over complex project and poor log frame and too large and diverse an area for a project.


1 Risks in environment damage following road building, differential access to valley bottoms may provoke conflict.

5 Summary of findings: Guinea - Smallholder Development Project in the Forest Region – 313 - PD-PEF

5.1 Relevance. The need to work in this area of Guinea is clear and the focus on production methods and resources was important but missed the key issues of ownership and internal community concerns. The building of roads was underestimated and although there has been some impact there could have been a reorientation towards greater road building this has not really happened. The focus on the valley bottoms did not look at the complexity of ownership and use for other ends.

5.2 Effectiveness. Of 3500 ha planned for coffee production on 500 ha have been planted, 2300ha of valley bottoms improved against 3700 planned. 5000 farmers have been directly helped against the plan for assisting 52500. Over 11000 credit groups have been raised and other people have been helped by support to existing groups. 44 stores had been built, 9 health posts, 35 literacy schools and 10 offices for the ASF have also been constructed. These constructions may not lead to impacts for the most poor in the area. The work on road building should have been increased probably to improve access for everyone as an early stage in promoting easier marketing.

5.3 Development of the valley bottoms has been mostly to the benefit of those with tenure in these areas who tend to be better off farmers. The areas may lose their usefulness as sources for medicinal plants and as religious/cultural sites when developed for paddy cultivation.



Such losses are more likely to affect women negatively. The water management mechanisms are described as over-complicated for easy maintenance and sustainable management.

5.4 There has been a great investment in training but the numbers are well below those planned and it has been necessary to rearrange the training methods. A total of 1114 people trained against 7000 planned; the involvement in training for the ASFs has changed the numbers trained as trainers to look like a positive balance. The list looks like this: Agricultural extension agents 346 trained against 800 planned; 50 midwives against 200 planned, 308 FSA formed against 700.

5.5 Efficiency. The work on valley bottoms may have to be reorganised and the work on new areas will require longer planning work than imagined. The inputs from project staff are costly given the location and the difficulties of movement and the complexity of the project design. The refocus on 12 villages and a Gestion de Terroir approach may make this easier by unifying the different project initiatives.

5.6 The redesigning of the project components has been necessary because of the original design that was based on poor understanding of the reality on the ground. The potential in credit groups is important but at present there are no links to external credit sources to support the processes after the project.

5.7 The management of project interventions is so bad that it merits repeated comments in the supervision reports and a deterioration is noted when the situation is already described as poor. The lack of rigour in management may have led to inefficiencies in project processes.

5.8 Outcomes. The most celebrated impact of this project has been the production of 3500T of paddy from areas that produced no rice at all before the project. This has led to a much shorter hungry period than was common. The M&E has been very poor and is described as non-existent for most purposes. This makes it difficult to assess the outcomes and to validate the claims for successful impacts. The adoption of the Gestion de Terroir approach does not necessarily guarantee better targeting on the most poor.

5.9 There is no doubt that there should be a second phase of this project and this is partly because this is the sort of place that IFAD should work in. The forest zone is an example of a situation right at the heart of IFAD concerns and aims. The project should continue now that it has been able to gain the level of knowledge of the local realities that would make it possible to design and manage a highly effective project in the area for the benefit of the very poor people of the area.



IEE Rating



3 The identification was correct in terms of strategies but not on the reality of the beneficiaries’ situation, if the identification had been correct the design would have been correct and both would score 4.

Design



6. - Targeting: The extent to which the design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

3 Targeting by geographic zone was right and attempts to define poor within the area was good but all this was based on genuinely poor knowledge of the area.


2 Too complex do-everything style based on activities not on people.


2 Very poor assessment of risks in developing valley bottoms and inadequate consideration of environmental risks.


337 W/SHOP Brainstorming on Rural Financial Services 09-Aug-96

100,000 Guinea

500 GN Building Local Capacity as Well as Develop and Strengthen Partnerships

20-Jul-00 20,000 Guinea

504 GN W/SHOP

Country Level Workshops in Guinea 20-Jul-00 20,000 Guinea

576M

GN Developpement Petites Exploitations dans la Region de Forêt, Project Completion

20-Jul-02 22,000 Guinea Republic

430 W/SHOP Organisation of two Implementation W/Shops in Guinea and Mauritania

08-Dec-98 25,000 Guinea, Mauritania

5.10 The TAGs have not been used to develop supporting or complementary activities within Guinea. Guinea project staff have not taken opportunities or not been able to take part in workshops relating to regional research work funded through TAGs.

6 Key Issues 6.1 The random sampling of projects led to the selection of two projects that have already closed but which will have second phases. The suspension of project activity makes it a little uncertain what will be observable during the country visit.

6.2 Both projects raise some of the same questions. How important has been the emphasis and work on road building. The interim reports suggest that the improvements in access have been of considerable material impact through improved marketing opportunities but also the visits should examine the effects on attitudes. In PAPE-BGN, it will also necessary to look at changes in access to fuelwood and the question of increased export to towns.

6.3 The development of production in the valley bottoms has also raised questions about the distribution of benefits and the environmental impacts.



6.4 The experience in credit provision has been varied with a change during the projects to the adoption of the ASF approach which has been very successful elsewhere. The interim report for PDPEF suggests that the ASFs are successful but that only half are working well. The access to credit does not seem to show the bias towards women seen elsewhere and it would be interesting to understand what is working well in credit and if the situation is genuinely different from other places. For example; the take up by men may be encouraged because of a genuine lack of other opportunities that might exist in better connected parts of neighbouring countries.

6.5 Tree planting has been planned in both projects and not been very well taken up. It would be useful to understand the reasoning of possible beneficiaries to this part of project work.

6.6 It is not clear what has happened in access to water for rural populations as a result of project activ ities. There are confusing accounts of improved access despite very poor progress in providing infrastructure.

6.7 An important observation to assess during the visits will be the possibility that there have been some changes in the trends of rural-urban migrations.

6.8 As with all IFAD programmes there is a need to assess how much the projects are able to support each other and contribute to national level processes.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Jordan

Jordan Country Synopsis page 1

Jordan Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 IFAD's development assistance for Jordan aims to improve the well being of the rural poor by assisting project beneficiaries to make a more profitable and sustainable utilization of private and common land, and water resources. Already among the world's most water-deficit countries, Jordan faces acute problems with land and water degradation, while development of these resources is hampered by many constraints (including weak farmer organisations, inefficient extension services, etc). The COSOP states that IFAD's programme will continue to focus on rainfed development, both in the relatively high rainfall areas and the rangelands. In the medium term, the strategic priorities will be towards: i) institutional building (for good governance through public institutions); ii) empowerment of the rural poor, including women; iii) protection of the environment (particularly with the conservation of natural resources, soil, water and rangelands). Much of this will be achieved through rural finance, increased beneficiary participation, partnerships with the private sector, technology transfer and a greater gender focus.

Overall rating of COSOP: 3 1.2 Relevance. The COSOP is consistent with IFAD’s strategic framework, but as it predates this strategy, it does make direct linkages to the framework. There is a particular focus in the COSOP on rainfed agricultural development and natural resource management, and this is congruent with the Strategic Framework 2002-2006 objectives of increasing equitable access to productive natural resources and technology. The COSOP was also produced before the NENA Regional Strategy, though again it is broadly consistent. In particular the COSOP addresses the key regional objectives concerned with natural resource management, as well as elements of empowerment of the rural poor, income diversification and gender issues.

1.3 The COSOP was produced as a result of extensive consultation with a range of stakeholders from bilateral and multilateral organisations, to representatives of the private sector, farmers and rural women. The country context, though mostly an overview, provides some useful analysis of key reasons why recent progress in Jordan is not sustainable in the medium-to-long term. This has important implications for the both the poorest socio-economic groups and IFAD’s work - though the latter is not always particularly well drawn-out.

1.4 The poverty analysis is based on evidence from two recent poverty studies, with a reasonable identification of key categories (and a general profile) of the poor in Jordan. The agricultural sector and the institutional and governance aspects are described, although at times the implications of the analysis are not always fully explained. For example, reference is made to a lack of appreciation of participatory approaches in Jordan, and yet there is little on how this might affect IFAD's portfolio and the way it operates. The treatment of gender issues is at time generalised, lacking supporting evidence and mostly considering women as a single category. The environmental analysis presents seemingly reasonable statements but these are not substantiated with evidence from available research or field experience. Empowerment and equity issues are not especially discussed. The COSOP is particularly good at highlighting a range of relevant projects and donor programmes, with the identification of possible linkages and opportunities for building strategic partnerships with UN agencies and other funds.



1.5 Effectiveness. The opportunities for project interventions, strategic linkages with donors and areas for policy dialogue are clearly set out, though less attention is given to constraints. The logical framework provides two clear, though all encompassing, objective statements - using very general language such as “sustainably improve socio-economic well-being…”. There is also some imprecision about the difference between outcomes and outputs, and the indicators are poorly defined, without baseline or target figures, and are not time-bound. Indicators of impact are particularly immeasurable, making very general statements such as simply a, “reduction in land degradation”.1

1.6 In terms of targeting beneficiaries, the COSOP sets out an approach which aims to involve beneficiaries (in a participatory manner) in the planning and implementation of interventions, and that future projects will conduct a socio-economic survey of rural women. There is a limited discussion of how activities will be integrated across the portfolio, and no explicit identification of innovations of IFAD interventions. The COSOP is especially comprehensive at identifying alliances and partnerships, both with donors (EU, GTZ, etc) while also NGOs and local initiatives - the latter of which is particularly specific, with details of initiatives and their relevance to IFAD. While opportunities for policy dialogue are described, they are done so in terms of what IFAD should do, rather than a clear identification of the means to engage and influence policy. There is a useful description of areas in which to improve portfolio management, such as in impact-orientated monitoring in the PMU. Issues of replicability, scaling-up and sustainability are not particularly addressed.

1.7 Efficiency. The COSOP provides a comprehensive analysis of past projects and lessons learnt. Little mention is made of monitoring and evaluation at the strategy or programme level - except in a brief discussion on moves to improve the PMU's focus on an impact-orientated monitoring system. Opportunities for leveraging funds and acting as a catalyst are explored in relation to partnerships with donors and NGOs, including within the framework of UNDAF, and relations with the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Global Environment Facility. Communication and dissemination issues are not particularly well addressed.


1 Admittedly at COSOP level it may be more problematic to have very precise indicators. It might however be expected that indicators would be more tightly defined. For instance, “land degradation” is a very general term that encompasses a range of possible measures (including erosion rates, soil fertility, land productivity, and so on…). In another sector, such as health, an impact indicator such as “improved health” would be considered insufficient (i.e. as opposed to more precise measures related to mortality rates, disease incidence, etc).

PNCountry portfolio history (1): Jordan

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

CREDICooperative Development of Rainfed Agriculture Project67 Sep-81 Sep-81 AFESD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-81 Mar-901 2

CREDISmall Farmers Credit Project115 Dec-82 Feb-83 AFESD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-83 Jun-929 2

CREDIIncome Diversification Project329 Apr-93 Jul-93 AFESD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-94 Jun-0113 47

AGRICAgricultural Resource Management Project in the Governorates of Karak & Tafilat481 Dec-95 Jan-96 AFESD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-96 Jun-035 25

Ongoing

LIVSTNational Programme for Rangeland Rehabilitation and Development - Phase I1071 Dec-97 Apr-98 AFESD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Sep-98 Dec-0417 22

AGRICYarmouk Agricultural Resources Development Project1092 Apr-99 Aug-99 AFESD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-00 Jun-0614 34

DesignAgricultural Resources Management Project - II1295 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PNCountry portfolio history (2):Jordan

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

CREDICooperative Development of Rainfed Agriculture Project67 9,785 27,152 36% 0% 64% 7,500 37,5003,620 724 5.0

CREDISmall Farmers Credit Project115 12,039 44,035 27% 20% 53% 1,400 10,50031,454 4,194 7.5

CREDIIncome Diversification Project329 10,030 19,685 51% 41% 8% 9,600 72,0002,051 273 7.5

AGRICAgricultural Resource Management Project in the Governorates of Karak & Tafilat481 12,810 18,517 69% 0% 31% 4,500 42,3004,115 438 9.4

Ongoing

LIVSTNational Programme for Rangeland Rehabilitation and Development - Phase I1071 4,003 9,048 44% 0% 56% 12,242 36,500739 248 3.0

AGRICYarmouk Agricultural Resources Development Project1092 10,143 28,255 36% 45% 19% 11,590 57,9502,438 488 5.0

Design

Agricultural Resources Management Project - II1295

58,810 146,692 40% 20% 40%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: National Programme for Rangeland Rehabilitation and Development – Phase I

2.1 Objectives. The main objectives of the project are to: (a) provide policy-makers with reliable and updated information on the current status of rangeland resources; (b) develop a national pastoral resource assessment monitoring system for the rangelands; (c) enhance environmental awareness in the utilization of rangeland resources; (d) develop a methodology of participatory planning with local communities for rehabilitation and management of grazing resource; and (e) assist beneficiaries and target communitie s directly in the implementation and periodic revision of rangeland development plans.








2


1

2.2 Relevance. The project predates the current COSOP, although its concentration on rangeland resources, and the conservation and management of natural resources is consistent with the country strategy. The COSOP also predates the current Regional Strategy for NENA, although clearly the NPRRD is congruent with many of the strategic objectives, especially with the objectives that refer to natural resource management (such as dealing with water scarcity and better rangeland management).

2.3 The poverty analysis as contained in the project documentation is limited, in part due to the lack of data on the depth and extent of poverty of the rangeland users. A socio-economic survey was however conducted, but the use of this evidence in targeting is limited. As a pilot project (first phase), the participation of beneficiaries in the project design is viewed as part of the implementation of the pilot, and so it is argued that some aspects of the project design are less detailed for this reason. It is further argued that the concept of 'target group' is not totally applicable in this case - largely because this first (pilot) phase of the project attempts to "address the rangeland in its entirety". In doing so, it is seen as necessary to involve all herders (small and large), and not to specifically target key groups.2 Similarly, there is limited gender analysis and discussion of the targeting women, with much of this being seen as implicit in the piloting approach.

2 As there is limited targeting, the project is rated as ‘2’ (modest) in this regard. While it may be argued that the concept of targeting is less applicable in the case of common property resources (such as the rangelands), there is still a need to be specific on how to address the needs of particular socio-economic groups, and also how not to exclude the poorest and most vulnerable. Indeed the use of participatory techniques have in other circumstances been criticised for their relative naivety of socio-political concerns – and there may be occasions where it is necessary to develop methods to work with (and increase the participation of) sub-groups, alongside more all-encompassing, ‘participatory’ fora.



2.4 Effectiveness. The objectives and logic of the intervention are clear, as are the main outputs of the project. Indicators are somewhat broad, and there is a lack of detail on how the monitoring system will function. Some risks are identified, although not particularly expanded or much explanation given of mitigating measures. It is argued that one of the purposes of the 'pilot' is to identify risks, and therefore it is not possible to know all the risks in advance. This project is however new to the country, and there are likely to have been a range of issues concerned with overlapping rights over common property resources and political-economic issues (with implications for the progress of the project and also its implementation).

2.5 An institutional review was conducted, covering issues such as the legislative/ regulatory framework, capacity, etc, although it tends towards describing the breadth of agencies involved in the rangelands, rather than drawing out implications for the design of the project. There is a useful assessment of projects and lessons learnt, including a relevant IFAD project in Morocco. There is no particular analysis of how other people in a similar situation have escaped poverty. Environmental impact is addressed reasonably well, with a full environmental assessment undertaken prior to the project and also a new unit to be established to monitor the state of the environment. Sustainability is treated mostly in terms of natural resource management, with the implicit conservation thrust of the project. Sustainability beyond the life of the project is not particularly well addressed, such as issues concerning the longer-term institutional aspects of the RMP process – although as a pilot, it is presumed that lessons learnt will feed into the design of subsequent phases. No particular mention is made of replicability, although as a pilot in five zones the project is designed for ultimately wider coverage. The project is identified as very innovative, as the first participatory, bottom-up approach to rangeland planning in the country.

2.6 Efficiency. The project documentation gives a comprehensive outline of management roles and responsibilities, although there is little discussion of actual capacity, incentives, and levels of commitment. Potential partners are listed in the appraisal although not particularly expanded in the final project design. An IFAD consultant undertook supervision, and the report provides a comprehensive account (with a clear list of actions, responsibilities, and timeframe). The PSR however, presents the situation (though some five months later) as much more positive. This may be in part due to progress, but also that the format and process of the PSR may lead to a less critical identification of concerns (i.e. most concerns raised are countered with either 'the issue has now been addressed' or 'is largely resolved'). Explanations are given in very broad terms and there is limited use of evidence and indicators.

3 Summary of findings: Agricultural Resource Management Project in the Governorates of Karak and Tafilat

3.1 Objectives. The principal objectives are: 1) improve incomes and living standards of target groups in areas of soil and water conservation works, viz. hill slopes and watersheds through available technology; and 2) adopt integrated Village-Based Resource Management (VBRM) to arrest resource degradation so as to optimise long-term productivity of land and water resources, based on active partnership and participation of beneficiaries.










3


2

3.2 Relevance. The project predates the present country strategy and NENA regional strategy. The project does however fit within the broad strategy of the COSOP (particularly the 'protection of the environment', but also empowerment of the rural poor and institution building). The project is also congruent with the current regional strategy, and especially its focus on natural resource management.

3.3 A major socio-economic survey of target groups was conducted during appraisal, as well as a Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). The project design documentation (RRP) however, makes little reference to this work, and is weak in its summary of the poverty analysis (which is mostly described in aggregate terms) and the justification for targeting (providing little substantive evidence). It is also not clear from the documentation the extent to which beneficiaries were involved in the project design. The project aims to address watershed management as a whole through water and soil conservation technologies: Targeting is by landholding size (not by socio-economic groupings), but it is not clear how this would work in practice. Indeed targeting by landholding size is identified by the MTE as a poor element of the design. Gender analysis is limited, and women are not explicitly identified in the 'targeting' section of the RRP, yet the project includes specific measures to address women’s issues (such as the identification of women

3.4 Effectiveness. The project is primarily about addressing land degradation with conservation technology, plus a range of other components (credit, institutional strengthening, agricultural development, women’s promotion activities). The logic of why these components (and not others) are included is not always clear. The objectives and outputs of the project are relatively clear, although the outputs are not particularly specific and indicators not well defined (being generally unspecific, and immeasurable). The logical framework does not have an assumptions column, and the project documentation states that, “no serious risks are associated with the technical practices and innovations to be promoted…”. Yet, while the soil and water conservation technologies may be well tested, the potential risks to project implementation for example are not considered.

3.5 The analysis of the institutional context provides mainly a descriptive account of key agencies, their roles and activities, and not particular governance issues, yet it is argued that these were not especially important for this project. Descriptions of past IFAD interventions are presented, although the key lessons are only given in very broad terms. In particular the discussion of past interventions does not particularly highlight the implications for mechanisms and measures that might be used in future projects. The environmental assessment is mostly technology-focused (which is said to be positive), with little consideration of other socio-cultural factors that may affect the overall impact. Sustainability is treated as implicit in the conservation nature of the project, but not necessarily in terms of the sustainability of benefits after project completion (e.g. exit strategies). Replicability and innovation are not expressly addressed in the project design.

3.6 Efficiency. The quality of the design process appears reasonable from limited evidence, with some issues identified in the quality assurance process addressed in the approved design. Other aspects, such as the tension between conservation technologies and the quick returns



demanded by sharecroppers or the rationale for institutional support, have been less well addressed. The approach to project management is said to be based on past experience in the country, although the actual description is limited, especially on the key issues that may undermine implementation (risks, levels of commitment, capacity constraints, etc). There is little on the definition of the role , responsibilities and expected contribution of other project partners. The PSR provides a reasonable account of the project, given the constraints of the format and structure. The MTR (June 2001) provides a detailed and comprehensive account of issues and lessons to be learnt.

Summary of evidence about outcomes (ARMP) 3.7 The Mid-Term Evaluation conducted in June 20013, shows evidence for good progress in the delivery of outputs, and especially the physical outputs. This can be summarised as:

• Good progress in the building conservation structures, as well as spring rehabilitation; • Reasonable progress in new orchards, but limited in other aspects (Agricultural

Development component); • A change in the Rural Financial Services component, which was not in the original design

as separate component, but has received high demand for its services and a good level of disbursement;

• Limited progress in the Women's Development component; • The organisation and management of the Institutional Strengthening component is well

developed, but there is an identified need for more training, technical assistance (TA) and research studies.

3.8 There is some analysis of sustainable changes to empowerment and social capital, though mostly in relation to some progress with credit for women, and the training and work experience of staff in PMU as a result of the project.

3.9 In terms of sustainable food security, the MTE states that soil and water conservation technologies have helped to reduce soil erosion, increased soil fertility, increased groundwater recharge (though little evidence presented). Future yields of olive trees and fruit trees are expected to increase, and while there has been a limited impact to-date of goat and sheep breeding loans (and even less dairy/milk processing), the indications are that there will be significant improvements to family nutrition.

3.10 Similarly for sustainable changes to environment and common pool resources, the MTE cites soil and water conservation measures (as above) but little actual evidence is presented. No particular negative effects are identified, though there is some concern about the concentration of livestock around mini-dams.

3.11 As for sustainable increases in income, the main reference is made to the 220 women borrowers, where the average increase in incomes has been about JD 150 per activity, about a 10-12% increase in annual family income. As repayment rates of credit funds are stated as almost 100% because of the system of guarantors, this should mean that funds will continue to be recycled, and future income benefits set to continue.

3.12 In terms of sustainable poverty impact, there are concerns that the data being collected by ARMP is not being recorded in a manner that would help properly identify the 3 The MTE was the latest evaluation document provided to the team at the time of the desk review (February 2004). A more recent Interim Evaluation has however just been completed (March 2004).



impacts of the programme. Gender dimensions of the findings are not particularly clear in the report, nor is evidence of sustainable public or private institutional reform or strengthening. There is little substantive evidence of actual attribution of benefits and impacts to the project, except most directly in terms of the credit component that is directly attributed to increases in income.

3.13 There is no substantive evidence or particular analysis of: the number of beneficiaries by gender compared with no anticipated at appraisal; increases in access to and use of social infrastructure; evidence of innovation, replication and unexpected benefits or dis-benefits.


IEE Rating




Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries 309 FAO Programme for the Establishment of a

Regional Animal Surveillance and Control Network (RADISCON) in North Africa, the Middle East and the Arab Peninsula

PT 14-Sep-95 1,250,000 Algeria, Bahrain, Tchad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Palestinia, N.A., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen

362 ACSAD Participatory Rainfed Agricultural Technical Development and Transfer to Farmers in the Semi-Arid Areas of NENA

PT 30-Apr-97 660,000 Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia

385 ICARDA Integrated Crop-Livestock Production in Low Rainfall Areas of Mashreq and Maghreb - Phase II

PT 04-Dec-97 1,500,000 Syria, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq

656 IFDC Cereal Production in the NENA Region PN 10-Apr-03 900,000 Morocco, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey 690 ICARDA Community-based Optimisation of the

Management of Scarce Water Resources in Agriculture in West Asia and North Africa

PT 18-Dec-03 1,000,000 Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia

Other Research and Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries 296 NENAMTA Programme for the Establishment of the

Near-East and North Africa Management Training in Agriculture

PN 06-Dec-94 3,000,000 Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, Syria

353 NENARACA Improving Access of the Rural Poor to Financial Services in the Near East-North Africa

PN 05-Dec-96 566,000 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

429 MICRO RFP Micro initiatives in rural finance for the poor - follow-up action on the IFAD-supported international workshop on innovations in micro finance for the rural poor - exchange of knowledge and implications for policy

PT 03-Dec-98 610,000 Ghana, Madagascar, Uganda, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Pakistan, Senegal

494 WOMEN-NENA Programme of Action to Assist IFAD Projects to reach rural women in Near East and North African Countries

PN 03-May -00 944,000 Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine



579 FAO Marine Resources Management Programme in the Red Sea

PN 23-Apr-02 1,000,000 Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan

Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000), 1994-2002 TAG No. Recipient Programme Division Approval Date Grant Amount Countries

420 PROMIS Training Workshop in Amman, 29 November to 3 December 1998

PN 06-Nov-98 29,000 Jordan

463 FAO Marine Resources and Environmental Surveys in the Red Sea, Northwest Arabian Sea and the Gulfs

PN 23-Nov 68,000 Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Sudan

510 JORDAN Country Portfolio Implementation Review and Strategy Workshop

PN 17-Oct-00 20,000 Jordan

429H NENARACA Micro initiatives in Rural Finance for the Poor - Restructuring Agricultural Development Banks

PN 18-Apr-01 30,000 Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon

429L JORDAN Development and Employment Fund PN 26-Jun-01 30,000 Jordan 546 CARDNE APPI: Assist IFAD-financed Projects in

Jordan, Lebanon and Syria PN 13-Jul-01 85,000 Jordan, Syria, Lebanon

576C JORDAN Income Diversification Project Completion Report

PN 20-May -02 22,000 Jordan



4 Key Issues 4.1 Targeting. Analysis of gender is mostly limited, although the projects reviewed do tend to design measures to benefit women. It is therefore not always clear as to the basis for mechanisms to target women, as well as there being a tendency to treat women as a homogenous group.

4.2 Sustainability. Due to the focus of the projects, there tends to be an implicit natural resource emphasis about sustainability (i.e. the enhancement of long-term productive assets). Other aspects to sustainability of benefits and impacts, such as exit strategies, are little considered.

4.3 Logical Frameworks vary considerably, and older versions are particularly weak. In general, there is a tendency not to be clear over the distinction between outputs and objectives, and a failure to adequately take account of risks and assumptions. Also, the indicators as presented in the logical framework are generally poorly defined (i.e. unspecific and immeasurable), with the implicit assumption that these will be determined during implementation.

4.4 The Project Design Process. In the projects reviewed, the analysis during appraisal is not always adequately reflected in the final design documentation (RRP). Even given the obvious space constraints, in some cases there has been a comprehensive socio-economic analysis at appraisal, but this is not even referenced nor seemingly reflected in the final project design (for example in the case of the results of a poverty analysis being transparently reflected in the identification of targeting beneficiaries).

4.5 Project Management. The design of the project management structure is mostly weak in its identification of those aspects that may undermine implementation, such as risks, levels of commitment, capacity constraints, incentives, etc. As many projects are located within the Ministry, this is a potentially important element of implementation.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Macedonia

Macedonia Country Synopsis page 1

Macedonia Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 Macedonia has seen a post-Communist growth in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which is providing an increasingly sound basis for the emerging mixed economy. In this context, the COSOP states that IFAD's strategic interventions in Macedonia will be in the provision of financial services to SMEs and smallholders in rural areas. The overall goals are to increase production and productivity, employment generation, greater diversification, modernisation and valorisation of the local economy. By focusing on the rural poor and their credit needs, along with complementary services, this appears to represent the best possible approach to the leverage of limited funds. The indicative primary target group is farmers with an average of 2.6 hectares or less than the average holdings and the unemployed.

1.2 At the time of finalising the COSOP, only one project in Macedonia had been financed by IFAD: the Southern and Eastern Regions Rural Rehabilitation Project (SERRRP). The COSOP sees sustainability as a key aspect of IFAD's loan portfolio in Macedonia, and project operations will be used as a means to attract commercial banks into the field of rural financial services. Forthcoming interventions are to include pilot programmes with the direct involvement of participating banks. Also the establishment of a rural credit project for western opstinas alongside SERRRPs would lead to the logical consideration of setting up a national rural financial services initiative.

Overall rating of COSOP: 2 1.3 Relevance. The Macedonia COSOP is almost exclusively focused on the provision of financial services to SMEs and rural smallholders. While the COSOP predates the existing IFAD Strategic Framework 2002-2006, it remains particula rly congruent especially with the core strategic objective, "to increase access to financial services and markets". The COSOP also states that it is aligned to the Regional Strategy for Eastern Europe, although provides little explanation is given beyond this. Again though, the COSOP remains consistent with the more recent regional strategy (Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States), and its overall objective, "to support the transition process with sustainable agriculture programmes that contribute to rural poverty reduction". The COSOP provides a description of the National Strategy, although does particularly identify the linkages with IFAD's strategies and interventions.

1.4 The COSOP provides a reasonable overview of the country context and agricultural sector. It is stated that Macedonia has "no official poverty line", and the dearth of information means that the poverty analysis concentrates heavily on a predominantly area-based assessment of poverty - as opposed to the identification of vulnerable groups, underlying causes, etc. There is mention of various institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy (MAFWE) and extension services, but no particular analysis of the governance and institutional issues in Macedonia. There is some assessment of other donor programmes, and the identification of IFAD's niche to focus on small enterprises



(where others have tended to concentrate more on medium-sized enterprises). Gender, environment1, empowerment and equity issues are not extensively assessed.

1.5 Effectiveness. Opportunities and constraints are identified in a number of places and with reference to different aspects, including opportunities for: outreach and partnerships; strategic alliances with donors; project intervention and innovation; and, in the rural poverty context. The statement of objectives is rather output-orientated, and concentrates more on the delivery of services rather than the beneficiary changes (use, adoption, uptake) as a consequence of service provision. Plus, with no logical framework it is less easy to assess the coherence of the development intervention. Indicators relate to the country as a whole (general social and economic data) and are not attributable to IFAD interventions per se.

1.6 The IFAD portfolio in Macedonia is narrowly focused on financial service provision to SMEs, and future interventions build upon, and are consistent with, the current project intervention (SERRP). Some areas for improving the portfolio management are identified, such as widening of the applicant criteria for credit - although risks associated with such changes are not explored. There is a clear identification of important relationships with bilateral donors (Italy, Netherlands, France), mostly in terms of technical assistance, as well as NGO partnerships. Targeting is expressed in terms of landholding size and the unemployed only (not the identification of particular socio-economic groups), with limited explanation of the rationale for this approach.

1.7 Improving the enabling environment and institutional infrastructure in Macedonia is especially highlighted as an area for policy dialogue, although the COSOP is not specific on the realistic opportunities for engagement and influence. Sustainability is mainly discussed in financial terms, such as the need to attract commercial banks into the field of rural financial services. The intention is also to scale -up to extend past work to national coverage, although there is little detail beyond this intention. No particular mention is made of innovations.

1.8 Efficiency. There is some assessment of past IFAD experience and especially issues raised by the on-going SERRP project. This is however mainly in general terms (e.g. 'a slow start' or 'it took a number of actions to fine tune management'), with little analysis of the causes, lessons learned and possible solutions. Opportunities for acting as a catalyst and leverage for funds are mainly mentioned with reference to attracting commercial banks into rural financial services. Monitoring and evaluation at programme or strategy level, plus issues of communication and dissemination, are not specifically addressed.


1 IFAD procedures require environmental screening and a scoping note at the project formulation stage, when there is more detail of the particular intervention.

PNCountry portfolio history (1): Macedonia

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Ongoing

CREDISouthern and Eastern Regions Rural Rehabilitation Project522 Sep-96 Jul-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Sep-97 Jun-0545 6

CREDIAgricultural Financial Services Project1162 Sep-00 Dec-00 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced May-02 Jun-0712 75

Totals

02 April 2004

PNCountry portfolio history (2):Macedonia

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Ongoing

CREDISouthern and Eastern Regions Rural Rehabilitation Project522 8,148 10,511 78% 0% 22% 26,200 89,850401 117 3.4

CREDIAgricultural Financial Services Project1162 8,044 17,256 47% 18% 35% 3,000 15,0005,752 1,150 5.0

16,192 27,767 58% 11% 30%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Southern and Eastern Regions Rural Rehabilitation Project (SERRRP)

2.1 Objectives. The project has two principal objectives: (i) provision of targeted credit and the establishment of credit delivery mechanism responsive to the needs of the rural sector through the establishment of a Revolving Credit Fund and the strengthening of the participating financial institution in the administration of such credit; and (ii) the strengthening of national institutional capacity in rural development for the country’s more disadvantaged areas, provision of incremental capital and operating costs for Project operations; establishment of the PCU in the MAFWE; and training of professional and technical staff.








3


1

2.2 Relevance. The project was the result of a government request, following Macedonia’s membership of IFAD being ratified. It pre-dates both the COSOP (November 1999) and the CEN Regional Strategy (March 2002), and as such, makes no explicit linkages to these strategies. Despite this, the project remains congruent with both strategies, and particularly the objective to "increase access to financial services and markets".

2.3 Target groups are identified by GNP below the national average and by spatial location (according to an assessment by the Agency for the Development of Undeveloped Regions, or ADUR). There is little analysis of the causes of poverty, although an evolving approach is proposed whereby the project will commence in the two poorest districts and expands to meet demand. The targeting of women is not particularly analysed or addressed, although women are clearly identified as important in a range of agricultural activities. Indeed the targeting of women is mainly described in very broad terms (such as, "Women will have full access to project credit funds..."). The level of beneficiary participation and direct involvement in project design is also not clear from the project documentation.

2.4 Effectiveness. The logic of the project intervention is straightforward, although the logical framework is not consistent or clear with the distinction between outputs and outcomes/ purpose levels; with some of the outputs not being directly attributable to the project. Indicators are fairly broad and not measurable in the form as presented (e.g. not time-bound, no baselines, no targets, broad statements). Limited attention has been paid to risk analysis and possible mitigation measures.



2.5 As the first IFAD project in Macedonia there is no particular opportunity to learn from past experience, although the project documentation makes limited reference to lessons from similar IFAD interventions in the region. There is no particular assessment about how other people in a similar situation have escaped poverty. Environmental impacts are identified (such as from extensive livestock development credit packages; other livestock production; fodder and crop production loans), although these are seen as negligible. The arguments appear credible although the claims are not substantiated with appropriate evidence. Benefits would be derived from a variety of rural enterprises made possible through the provision of credit. Financial returns are expected to vary from between 16% and 50% (with similar returns from small manufacturing and commercial ventures). However, due to the flexibility of the lending programme it is seen as impossible to estimate project benefits, and as such, no economic analysis has been carried out.

2.6 While replicability and scaling-up is not separately addressed, the inherent design of the project (i.e. “demand-driven credit”) lends itself to scaling up according to demand. Institutional and economic sustainability issues are not especially addressed (except implicitly), and the innovative nature of the project is not highlighted.

2.7 Efficiency. There is a clear description of the proposed management of the project, with the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), based within the Ministry, performing a central role for day-to-day operations. Issues concerned with the level of commitment, incentives and possible difficulties with project implementers are not particularly considered - while training and capacity needs are only identified in very general terms. There is a clear assessment of key project donors (USAID, World Bank), particularly with key links for technical services made for specific loan categories. At the project design stage, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is described in general terms, though with the identified need for a M&E Advisor, who will collect base data, formulate a set of key input and output indicators, plus supervise monitoring activities. Indeed subsequent to project implementation, the Technical Assistance Mission (May-June 2000) provides a more credible outline of the M&E system.

2.8 The UNOPS Supervisory Report (March 2002) details a range of important issues, and these are summarised in a table of recommendations/ actions, responsibilities and target dates. The report does not particularly prioritise key issues, and it is not directly comparable with subsequent reports of progress like the PSRs: The PSR (June 2003) indicates that progress has been made, such as with reference to the M&E functions, the establishment of the PCU, as well as links made with another IFAD project (AFSP) to increase sustainability. The PSR does however describe actions in broad terms with little supportive evidence provided. The latest UNOPS Aide Memoire (December 2003), notes that project performance continues to be satisfactory, although the speed of implementation is well below expectations – with the project completion data being twice extended.

3 Summary of findings: Agricultural Financial Services Project (AFSP)

3.1 Objectives. The overall goal of the project is to raise the standard of living of the target population in the rural areas through increased economic activity, responsive to and sustainable in the emerging market context. The project's principal objectives subsumed under this overall goal are: (a) to establish the institutional and financial basis for sustainable agricultural financial services, which are commercially viable but nevertheless affordable by the project's target group and appropriate to their development needs; and (b) to upgrade the project target group's economic conditions, and technical and managerial skills. The production and productivity of their enterprises is expected to reach quantitative and



qualitative levels that will maintain their viability in the country's emerging domestic markets and enhance the likelihood of their being able to access regional and other European export markets.




prior ities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is: 4




3


2

3.2 Relevance. The AFSP fits well with the Macedonia COSOP; the provision of financial services is central to the strategic opportunities identified, although admittedly the COSOP is narrowly focused and based around just one IFAD intervention (SERRRP). While no regional strategy is mentioned in the project design documentation, the AFSP has is clearly congruent with the current CEN Regional Strategy. For example the broad objective of the regional strategy is to, "support the transition process with sustainable agricultural programmes that contribute to rural poverty reduction", while it is also in-line with the regional priority for IFAD to focus on a few areas where it has a comparative advantage. In Macedonia, IFAD has developed a niche in financial services especially to smaller rural enterprises.

3.3 The poverty analysis is mostly spatially focused, and while there is some description of socio-economic groups (such as the traditionally poor households, the new poor rural unemployed, etc), the empirical evidence is limited and mostly related to the country as a whole. There is some gender analysis, although most data is to be collected as part of the project's socio-economic and husbandry baseline. Micro loans are to expressly target women, though the other aspects of the project (e.g. primary production loans, agro-processing loans, etc) do not explicitly mention gender issues.

3.4 Effectiveness. The intervention logic behind the project is relatively straightforward, although the logical framework is less clear, particularly with some of the definition of at the output and outcome/ purpose levels. The indicators presented in the logical framework are particularly broad and unspecific - with little specification of target groups, quantative and qualitative aspects, baselines, targets and the timeframe. Significant risks are identified, such as non-performing loans or the bank's unwillingness to adjust collateral requirements, though most of these relate to financial matters. There less consideration of risks associated with project implementation and the institutional environment.

3.5 One of the lessons from SERRRP is that institutional issues are a key constraint to the provision of rural financial services, and yet this is not explored in much depth. Other lessons from SERRRP are stated but not particularly addressed, at least explicitly; though presumably much of the experience from SERRRP has been incorporated in the design of AFSP. The



project is seen as having a minimal environmental impact, and the discussion of this issue is limited and not particularly well substantiated with evidence. No economic analysis was carried out, as it was argued (in-line with SERRRP) that because of the flexible lending programme it is not possible to quantify the economic benefits. Plus, with credit constituting a high proportion of project costs, credit was treated as a transfer of funds within the economy and therefore not counted as a cost stream. There is no particular analysis of how other people in a similar situation have escaped poverty.

3.6 Sustainability is mostly addressed in a financial sense, with the design of the project specifically seeking to attract and utilise banks in loans (to a minimum of 30%). Other more structural institutional or governance issues are given much less attention. Replicability and scaling-up are not explicitly part of the project design, although the project itself is a development from SERRRP, and it also aims to increase the involvement of banks that may help to extend coverage. The key innovation of the project is stated as the use of the discounting mechanism for wholesale lending through private banks (the Agricultural Credit Discount Fund), and in particular the risk sharing mechanism embedded in the concept - although no substantial evidence is used to justify this claim.

3.7 Efficiency. The TRC concerns itself with the lack of field observation or empirical data on which to base assumptions, an inadequate institutional analysis and no economic analysis. The project design gives justification for the lack of economic analysis while there remains limited attention to institutional aspects and the use of substantive evidence. Roles and responsibilities for overall management, technical support, etc are clearly set out - although the potential for delays by situating project management (the PCC) within in the Ministry is not much considered (i.e. capacity constraints, management experience, commitment and incentives, mechanisms for dispute, etc). The project is to be co-financed by Sida, but otherwise there is little mention of partners such as the banks who are an important part of the project's approach. The description of the M&E system is limited (with no mention of a baseline survey), coupled with the poor definition of indicators in the project logical framework.

3.8 The UNOPS Supervision Report (May 2003) highlights significant delays with the management of the project and due to the lack of actual implementation; it has little to say about performance. The report is comprehensive, but while it lists the recommendations, it does not particularly distil the key problems and priorities for action. The subsequent report, the PSR, was produced only 3 months later (August 2003) and offers only limited evidence of progress. The format, content and ratings contained in the PSR make it problematic to compare progress with the recommendations of the Supervisory Report. Also the PSR asserts that much of the blame for delays is due to externalities that could not be foreseen. Admittedly the civil war in 2001 was a major factor, but also the PSR barely mentions some key institutional, management and negotiation issues highlighted by the Supervisory Report. In general the PSR is a lot less critical of performance, and provides little substantive evidence of progress (i.e. such as from the project M&E system and key performance indicators). The latest Aide Memoire from UNOPS (January 2004) notes however that project performance is now satisfactory, and a monitoring and impact assessment has now been developed in collaboration with technical assistance from IFAD.

Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) No TAGs for Macedonia.



4 Key Issues COSOP. The Macedonia country programme is narrowly focused on financial services, particularly to SMEs and rural smallholders. Indeed when the COSOP was written there was just one IFAD project intervention in the country, and as such the strategy fits more around this one project than necessarily driving forward strategic direction. Targeting and poverty analysis is mainly considered in spatial terms with limited socio-economic and gender analysis. There is perhaps an over-reliance on the national system of poverty identification by the ADUR.2 Institutional Analysis. In general there is little attention paid to the broader institutional and governance context – and particularly to move beyond a description of key agencies. Admittedly the move in AFSP to get a greater involvement from commercial banks is a key aspect to ensuring longer-term institutional sustainability. And yet, AFSP provides a limited assessment of these institutions and their limitations in this role. Environmental Impact is mostly considered in general terms, and largely because agricultural credit is seen as having either a minimal, or a widely scattered, impact on the environment. This may be so, but the claims made are often not substantiated, with little attention paid to impacts on the farming system and natural resources in the longer term. Sustainability is mostly addressed in terms of financial aspects, although there is a shift from just repayment rates to broader issues concerned with the longer-term institutional sustainability of the loan process (for example, getting commercial banks involved). This is apparent in both the COSOP and the later AFSP. Project Management is mostly presented in a straightforward manner, and yet issues of working through the Ministry, capacity constraints and levels of commitment are not particularly explored. This is potentially important for reducing implementation delays. Monitoring and Evaluation. In general the logical frameworks presented are weak, particularly with regard to identifying performance indicators. The tendency is to view M&E as part of implementation, and while SERRRP is beginning to develop a useful system, it is someway into the life of the project. Supervisory Reports are detailed, although not in a consistent format, while PSRs are less useful – often detailing actions and progress in broad terms, with no substantial evidence of performance and impact, and difficult to compare with recommendations made during supervision.

2 The extent of targeting required at design stage is open to some debate. In this case the targeting of a region in Macedonia that is widely considered to be poor, was seen as the most cost-effective approach. More specific, micro level targeting was not considered appropriate, as too much targeting of the most vulnerable would exclude the most productive farmers and entrepreneurs - and the better returns needed to sustain the rural financial services. Even so, the effective monitoring of whether the most vulnerable groups are being excluded is important, and could feed into subsequent design changes.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis –Mongolia

Mongolia Country Synopsis page 1

Mongolia Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 Although the COSOP lacks some of the structure of more recent documents, it nevertheless provides a useful description of the changing economic status of the country following the breakdown of the soviet style command economy, and a good analysis of the distribution and causes of poverty within this framework. IFAD's niche role is clearly identified as addressing the needs of small herders. The proposed strategy is consistent with the Strategic Framework in its focus on poverty alleviation amongst the poorest, and although the need to provide the rural poor with access to credit and income generating activities is recognized, the strategy is wisely based on the conclusion that country specific social and institutional constraints mean that strategic initiatives to address these needs should be delayed until experience is gained from on-going field initiatives. Specific objectives are clearly articulated and are aimed at overcoming the main constraint faced by the target group; that of inadequate herd size. IFAD has limited experience in Mongolia, but the strategy is based on the experience of the on-going ARPAP and linked to local capacity.


PICountry portfolio history (1): Mongolia

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

LIVSTArhangai Rural Poverty Alleviation Project502 Apr-96 Jul-96 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Nov-96 Dec-0313 15

Ongoing

RURALRural Poverty-Reduction Programme1205 Sep-02 Nov-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-03 Sep-1011 32

Totals

02 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):Mongolia

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

LIVSTArhangai Rural Poverty Alleviation Project502 5,038 5,480 92% 0% 8% 5,800 25,000945 219 4.3

Ongoing

RURALRural Poverty-Reduction Programme1205 14,806 19,081 78% 0% 22% 80,000 360,000239 53 4.5

19,844 24,561 81% 0% 19%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Arhangai Rural Poverty Alleviation Project (Project ID 502)

2.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the regional strategy and the COSOP as it focuses on the poor and women in remote less favoured regions. Poverty is attributed mainly to the collapse of the command economy and leads to the identification of the main target group as the poor and very poor amongst livestock herders and in rural centres. Women, particularly female headed households, are specifically targeted

2.2 Effectiveness. Project objectives are clearly defined though the lack of a complete logframe means that there is less clarity about outputs and indicators. There is a consistent link between the strategy, identified constraints and project components. There were no previous IFAD projects in Mongolia but lessons from livestock distribution projects elsewhere have been incorporated into project design. Environmental impact is assessed as beneficial and the project includes measures for rangeland monitoring. Expected impact on households was modelled for livestock and vegetable production and a sensitivity analysis estimated ERR for the livestock component as between 8 - 13 %. Sustainability is implied in the development of community organizations and micro-enterprises. Expansion into a second aimag is based on the replicability of project initiatives. The project is innovative in introducing credit-in-kind to the Mongolian livestock sector. This, however, carries risks as there is no culture of credit repayment. In addition there are institutiona l risks in the capacity of implementing agencies. It is not clear that slow start up and provision of Technical Assistance advisors will adequately mitigate these risks.

2.3 Efficiency. Project design took account of recommendations concerning the livestock component from TRC. There is a detailed presentation of the roles and responsibilities of the implementing agencies with eligibility criteria for selection of participants and terms of reference for key staff. There is however, little analysis of the capacity of the implementing agencies. The PIU has responsibility for monitoring and evaluation but the detailed methodology is to be developed by an M&E advisor. Project supervision by UNOPS has been effective and action taken on recommendations has been appropriate. A review undertaken after 18 months of implementation recorded physical progress and impact on family incomes with recommendations to overcome some identified problems. There has been no formal evaluation report but the latest supervision report indicates that most project objectives have been successfully met with over achievement of many appraisal targets.

2.4 Outcomes. The project is successfully achieving the project objectives through more than achieving appraisal targets for the number of households participating in the programme of credit-in-kind for livestock re-distribution and in vegetable production in small lots. The credit-in-kind programme has been largely successful though problems of repayment have occurred. The project has had a significant impact on household income, particularly for herders and on food security, through increases in the production of milk and milk products and of vegetables. Women have participated in project activities and about 6% of project households are headed by women. Increased involvement by women in management of herds and the processing of milk products has given them increased awareness of self worth and accomplishment, but has also increased their work load. The open and participatory process of household selection, together with innovative training programs bringing together experienced and new herders has resulted in strengthening traditional resource management arrangements and an increase in the technical capacity of herdsmen and in parallel of vegetable growers. Decentralization of project control to the provincial level further devolved to lower administrative levels has increase awareness of project objectives and processes, while the capacity of the PIU to manage a large project has developed considerably.



Degradation of rangeland around rural centres due to a tendency of small herders to remain close to extended family for security is a problem that has not been rectified by the project as agreements for such herders to move back to more remote rural areas have not been met. A study of rangeland carrying capacity has been completed which should provide for rational use of the resource in the future. The project has been innovative in successfully introducing credit-in-kind in the livestock sector in Mongolia. It has also demonstrated successful expansion of vegetable growing. This experience has been incorporated into the design of the RPRP, recently approved by the IFAD board.

Table: Overall project Assessment

Criteria IEE Rating

Comment


4


4


3


2

2.5 Issues. On the basis of the most recent UNOPS supervision report the project appears to be largely successful in meeting its objectives. The main issue is, therefore, one of sustainability, with particular reference to credit repayment and the ability of the administration to revolve the funds and extend the facility to other poor herder families. Similarly, the sustainability of the credit programme for vegetable growers. The follow-up RPRP involves a PRFI in the provision of credit due to improvements in the rural financial sector. Are there similar plans for involvement in the Arhangi project area?

2.6 Other issues of sustainability relate to the continued provision of veterinary services and vegetable extension services.

2.7 From the point of view of institutions what is the future role of the PIU that was successful in co-ordinating project activities. It was an integral part of the provincial governor’s administration. Will it continue to function and in what capacity?



3 Summary of findings: Rural Poverty Reduction Programme (Project ID 1205)

3.1 Relevance. The programme is consistent with the Strategic Framework and the Regional Strategy. The target group is identified as poor herders and rural people based on a detailed poverty analysis and PRA surveys. Poor women, particularly female headed households are specifically included in the target group.

3.2 Effectiveness. Programme objectives are clearly set out in the text and a logframe together with the main outputs. Indicators are defined but these are mainly physical outputs rather than indicators of impact. Design logic is coherent with clear linkages between the strategy, constraints and opportunities and programme components. Lessons from the one previous IFAD project in Mongolia have been identified and taken account of in programme design. The programme is not thought to result in any adverse environmental impact and the ESSN classed it as Category B. No ERR has been estimated for a variety of reasons, including the long term nature of some benefits and the difficulties of quantifying others, but a more quantitative analysis would have been useful and probably feasible. There is no specific discussion of sustainability or replicability. The participatory design and implementation approach is an innovation in Mongolia, though it has been used elsewhere. Risks revolve around the ability of implementing agencies to sustain the participatory approach and it is not clear that TA will adequately mitigate this risk

3.3 Efficiency. The TRC broadly approved the programme and suggested improvements to the documentation were included. Although the roles and responsibilities of implementing agencies are defined, there is little analysis of their capacity. Programme management is decentralized to the provincial level, but eight different agencies are involved, including health and education agencies, agriculture, livestock and rural finance, so co-ordination of this multi-sectoral approach will be complex. The need for M&E is emphasized and will be the responsibility of the PIUs. Base line surveys and impact assessment are provided for, but there is a need for specific impact indicators. PRFI is the main partner organization and its role has been defined together with guidelines for credit administration. As a project that became effective in September 2003 there is no supervision experience, but proposals for UNOPS to act as the CI are included.

3.4 Outcomes. Project only effective 07/09/03 so assessment of outcomes is not feasible.


Criteria IEE Rating

Comment


4


4


2




2

3.5 Issues. The project design is significantly more complex than the preceding Arhangai Rural Poverty Alleviation Project as it includes not only livestock re-distribution and vegetable growing, but micro-enterprise development, health and education initiatives. Co-ordination of the activities of the various responsible agencies will be difficult.

3.6 Credit is to be provided through the PRFI. An early assessment of its capacity to administer credit in these remote rural areas is needed.

3.7 Design and implementation of the project is participatory, so an issue is the ability of implementing agencies to maintain a truly participatory approach during project implementation.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Mozambique

Mozambique Country Synopsis page 1

Mozambique Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 The Mozambique COSOP was approved by the Board in December 2001. The ExecSum defines four IFAD thrusts: commercialisation of production; empowerment of communities and small-scale producers; decentralisation; and the Proagri donor support-programme for the agriculture sector.

1.2 The second thrust is clearly consistent with the Strategic Framework and the first thrust with the Regional Strategy. (The March 2002 Regional Strategy has four ‘Strategic Thrusts’: A. Promoting efficient and equitable market linkages; B. Developing rural financial systems; C. Improving access to and management of land and water; D. Creating a better knowledge, information and technology system.)

1.3 The 1997 COSOP also featured commercialization of agriculture, and it is not clear why a revised 2001 COSOP was required, other than to obtain approval for the project pipeline. The addendum to the 2001 paper outlines how HIV/AIDS awareness will be incorporated into ongoing projects.

1.4 The country, agricultural and poverty analyses in the COSOP are concise and clear. The four strategic thrusts are clearly relevant.

1.5 The clarity of the COSOP is not helped by the attempt to apply a Logframe in Appendix IV. (A logframe is a project planning tool, and its application to a strategy document is not straight-forward, essentially because the outputs, presumably projects, will very rarely be sufficient to achieve the strategic purpose, which normally depends on the parallel actions of many other players.) The LF Objectives statement is convoluted, but is a plausible statement of a country objective. The six outputs contribute to the objective, but outputs 3, 5, and 6 are methods not outputs (Participation, decentralised systems and formulation). Outputs 1, 2, and 4 are indeed outputs (commercial linkages; producer groups; financial services). The indicators column is wisely left blank. However the LF is only loosely connected to the four proposed thrusts and is thus a confusing addition. Similarly, Appendix III lists 12 “Issues/challenges” and necessary actions, but does not provide a clear link them to the four selected thrusts.

1.6 The categorisation strategic opportunity does not appear in the COSOP. In terms of substance, the Recommendations (ExecSum para.8) note a new fisheries project and ongoing support to the current portfolio.

1.7 In sum, the presentation makes it difficult to obtain a clear, unequivocal statement of precisely what strategic opportunities are perceived. However, if the formulation of 'strategic thrusts' in the Executive Summary is understood as 'strategic opportunities', these are clear. Overall, the COSOP reads more as a discursive justification – mainly for an internal audience - for the project-related Recommendations in paragraph 8. Cutting the COSOP to a few-pages of clear text, explaining why and how the recommended pipeline has been proposed, would surely enhance its value to external readers.

Overall rating of COSOP: 3: Satisfactory

PFCountry portfolio history (1): Mozambique

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

PGMLONational Programme for Food Production in the Cooperative and Family Sector93 Mar-82 Aug-82 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-83 Jun-8618 28

FISHNampula Artisanal Fisheries Project334 Sep-93 Jan-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-94 Jun-0219 40

PGMLOSecond Agricultural Rehabilitation Project440 Sep-87 Oct-87 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-88 Jul-954 28

Ongoing

RURALNiassa Agricultural Development Project359 Apr-94 May-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-94 Dec-053 22

LIVSTFamily Sector Livestock Development Programme1005 Dec-96 Sep-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Feb-98 Jun-0441 21

MRKTGPAMA Support Project1109 Dec-99 Dec-00 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Sep-01 Sep-0752 39

RURALSofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project1184 Sep-01 Feb-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-02 Sep-0823 27

Not Signed

CREDIRural Finance Support Programme1267 Dec-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PFCountry portfolio history (2):Mozambique

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

PGMLONational Programme for Food Production in the Cooperative and Family Sector93 19,790 25,451 78% 0% 22% 25,000 125,0001,018 204 5.0

FISHNampula Artisanal Fisheries Project334 6,025 11,246 54% 18% 29% 12,539 47,147897 239 3.8

PGMLOSecond Agricultural Rehabilitation Project440 11,495 16,745 69% 24% 7% 1,227,000 6,135,00014 3 5.0

Ongoing

RURALNiassa Agricultural Development Project359 12,403 20,126 62% 20% 18% 28,600 116,190704 173 4.1

LIVSTFamily Sector Livestock Development Programme1005 19,403 25,672 76% 0% 24% 300,000 1,500,00086 17 5.0

MRKTGPAMA Support Project1109 22,783 26,610 86% 0% 14% 230,000 1,150,000116 23 5.0

RURALSofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project1184 18,000 30,583 59% 30% 11% 26,000 130,0001,176 235 5.0

Not SignedCREDIRural Finance Support Programme1267 9,460 34,306 28% 64% 9% 124,000 620,000277 55 5.0

119,359 190,739 63% 22% 16%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Project 1: Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project

2.1 This $11.3m project (IFAD loan c.$6m) was Board-approved in September 1993, before a COSOP or the Regional Strategy were in place. The project aimed to raise incomes for the 9,300 small-scale fisher families on the Nampula coast; rehabilitate 165km of roads; create a project credit facility and strengthen fisheries policy. The project is closed and a thorough PCR was published in October 2003.

2.2 No beneficiary involvement during formulation is apparent in the project documentation. There is a clear and practical selection methodology. The documentation indicates a good grasp of gender roles in the project area.

2.3 There is no logframe in the design. However, the text includes a clear, partially quantified, statement of objectives. Each component is clearly described and there are some quantified targets. The component to objective logic is sound. The risk assessment is practical and the key risks were discussed with Government.

2.4 The design notes practical lessons from two previous projects. The environmental assessment is thoughtful, and practical methods of measuring stock depletion are described. The economic analysis (RRP para.53) looks plausible.

2.5 Although no specific design features to promote sustainability or replicability are mentioned in the design, the focus on development of artisanal fisheries was apparently innovative in Mozambique. During implementation, however, the project contributed to institutional innovation including minimum fishnet sizing, exclusion areas and duty structures. Government enthusiasm to replicate much of the approach in a second project, and its impact on the key national fishery agencies, in some ways marked a transition from the original area-focus to an artisanal-fisheries sector development investment.

2.6 The management structure is clear on who is responsible for what, based on a simple area-based Steering Committee/PCU structure, with different implementers responsible for different components and activities. The organogram is fair, but could have been clearer in terms of line responsibility, contractual relationships and reporting. The RRP (para.35) makes a general note that capacity building of implementers is required, but does not give a clear estimate of how prepared the various implementers are to perform their assigned roles. It is hence difficult to assess the real implementation risks in the deign. The roles of different partners are described, but their capacity to perform them is not. For example: is the Fishery Research Institute capable of doing the important periodic environmental assessments? Unless assessed implementation capacity is clearly presented, it's difficult to know whether these agencies have just been written-in to the design, or if they are willing and in a position to perform. In practice, the project was fortunate to find a strong project manager, who was clearly pivotal to the positive outcome. The need for monitoring and reporting systems is repeatedly noted in the design documentation, but there is no comment on current M&E capabilities in the nominated units.

2.7 Supervision reports appear to provide a thorough account of activity and financial progress to date, with sound recommendations and a sensitive and appropriate treatment of financial inconsistencies and inadequacies. They include a clear presentation of PCU responses to previous supervision recommendations. Project Status Reports appear consistent with Supervision Reports.



2.8 The MTR in March 1998 was a thorough process including prior internal studies and mission workshops. The MTR coverage was good and dealt with technical, financial, organisational and policy issues leading to clear recommendations and presentation which were the basis for significant modification of the project approach.

2.9 The Interim Evaluation Report (November 2000) was based on field work in May 2000 after the project had been operational for over five years, and with another 18 months to run. However the ‘Lessons Learned’ (IE paras 98 to 112) and the Recommendations in the Understanding at Completion Point (UCP) are variously: very general, impractical, or inappropriate for a project in its closing months. It is not clear to whom the recommendations are addressed: some appear to refer to the running project; others to a follow-on. The practical and resource implications of the recommendations are not addressed in the IE. They appear to be based on little empirical study, and the practical information, data and insights from Supervision Reports are not included. The UCP states that the project would 'adopt and use ' the recommendations made. This is difficult to believe. Some of the UCP recommendations appear internally inconsistent, for example in endorsing an integrated area development approach whilst simultaneously calling for a switch to sector support. A ‘glossy’ bilingual publicity brochure was produced subsequently. It presents the success and results of the project in an attractive way, although the target audience is not clear. It offers general lessons, many of which will be thoroughly familiar to development professionals, but does not provide empirical research-based evidence on process or impact. OE argues that the IE Report was fundamental in the design of the follow-on Sofala Bank project. Other views are that the basis of the follow-on project was more the skills and experience the project team had acquired over time.

2.10 The PCR (October 2003), prepared by a local consulting firm, is an excellent report. It is clear, empirical and analytic. The methodology is sound and it offers a thorough, quantified and thoughtful analysis of impact, notably including the dynamic and sustainable impacts of the project.








2


2



3 Summary of findings: Project 2: PAMA Support Project

3.1 The PAMA support project was approved by the Board in December 1999, but effectiveness was delayed until September 2001 as a result of ministerial re-organisation and the 2000/01 flood emergency. This relatively large loan (c.$22.8m) is in line with both the 1997 and 2001 COSOPs, and the Regional Strategy (March 2002) in seeking to strengthen smallholder market access.

3.2 Targeting is generally clear. However leaving identification of the districts in the focal areas completely to Phase I seems overly-loose at design. Specification of clear criteria for selection would act as a useful safeguard for project management during implementation.

3.3 The objectives are clear and the Logframe is consistent with the text. However the 8 Logframe outputs (RRP App.III) don't map clearly onto the four components or the text in RRP paras 17 to 22. There are far too many indicators in the logframe, many of them impracticable.

3.4 The five lessons learned from previous projects are clear (RRP paras.7&8) and it is clearly stated when previous project approaches have limited relevance. The economic appraisal (AR Working Paper 10) is a reasonable, possibly modest, assessment. The treatment is formulaic and static, however, and more comment on the potential dynamic and longer-term returns would have been interesting.

3.5 Treatment of sustainability is poor. The project documentation insists that “The commercial linkages sought must be sustainable.” (RRP para.12) yet no design feature or precaution to promote sustainability is specified. Similarly, no design features to enable or encourage replication of aspects of the project are mentioned.

3.6 PAMA is innovative in terms of IFAD’s role in Mozambique in that it seeks to strengthen smallholder participation in the market; combines national policy development with infrastructure investment and promotes private sector implementation of key activities. It is also probably innovative in the region, in that it marks a substantial donor-financed effort to intervene in the complex and difficult area of increasing market efficiency and opportunities for smallholders.

3.7 On internal quality processes, TRC/OSC discussions covered several critical issues, including organisational complexity, geography, and size of the capacity building financing.

3.8 On the design of management and implementation arrangements, ToRs for the key staff are included in the AR, although the required qualifications for the Co-ordinator appear modest for a project of this size and complexity. The fact that the key individuals responsible for the management and leadership of the project will be hired through external recruitment is not clearly indicated in the RRP. For an ambitious project, the analysis of implementation capacity is thin (RRP Appendix VII). Involved government departments and others are listed, but without a capacity appraisal (AR paras 104 to 111). The arrangements for project monitoring (Appendix VII paras 15 to 17) list requisite actions, but make no assessment of the capacity of agencies to perform. The only apparent safeguard over implementation arrangements is in para.13 of the loan assurances, making the selection of the firm providing the staff of the central and provincial facilitation units subject to IFAD approval.










2


2

Summary of evidence about outcomes Nampula Artisanal Fisheries: Overall Outcome assessment: Substantial 3.9 The October 2003 PCR, prepared by a Maputo consulting firm, provides sound information and analysis on which to base outcome assessment. Overall, project performance was good, although there were significant weaknesses; notably the failure to put a reliable M&E system in place. The design required substantial amendment, which was completed during the MTR. The project credit scheme was a typical failure. Fisheries extension was weak. New co-management fisheries arrangements between government and fishing groups were a success whilst project-imposed ‘community associations’ were a failure, lacking autonomy, sustainability and motivation. The simpler activities: improving fishery input supply, improved technology, roads, schools, wells, were popular and successful, although with the usual questions about future o&m of the public infrastructure.

3.10 The total number of beneficiaries was higher than in the design, mainly due to the addition of public infrastructure works (wells, schools and clinics). The PCR contains a thorough and careful analysis of changes in income and food security. Although attribution is difficult due to good growth over the project period, it does appear that the project was a significant contributor to increased productivity in the fishing community; to producers receiving a larger share of the market price; and improved terms of trade for fish sales as against bought-in inputs. Reduced market price of fish should be contributing to improved national nutrition.

3.11 The institutional development achievements: changes in customs duty rates; trawler exclusion limits; fish net sizes; state/civil district co-management committees; are impressive. Both the commercial and household developments, and the changes in public policies and systems appear to be sustainable.

3.12 There were important replication effects including adoption of the project concept by the Ministry, extension into the Sofala Bank project and an African Development bank project in the north.



PAMA Support Project 3.13 With effectiveness delayed to September 2001, and the first two years devoted mainly to recruitment and surveys of the focal areas, little outcome information is available to date.





Date Grant

Amount Countries 1/

Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants for the period 1994-2002

284A ILRI

Integrated Approach to the Assessment of Trypanosomiasis Control Technologies & their Impact on Agricultural Production, Human Welfare & Natural Resources in the Tsetse-affected areas of Africa- Phase II

PT 23-Apr-98 900 000

Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe

633 IITA

Programme for the Development and Application of Sustainable Integrated-Pest Management Technologies for Cassava Pests and Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa

PT 11-Dec-02 1 000 000

Benin, Cameroon, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique

Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000) for the period 1994-2002

340 UNDETERMIN Smallholders on Speciality Crop Pricing and Marketing in East Africa PF 09-Aug-96 75 000 Mozambique

642 MZ Training in Areas of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Management, Administration and Leadership

PF 17-Dec-02 41 800 Mozambique

Other NGO-grants include support to CLUSA on marketing; for HIV/AIDS; marketing-related credit and a regional-grant to CARE on markets-research.



4 Key Issues Both projects will be visited during the field study phase. Issues to be followed up include:

4.1 Nampula

i) The project is closed. Completing the beneficiary survey and the other IEE formats will require contacting former staff who know the precise location of beneficiaries and can identify key individuals and agencies for interview. Estimating the number of beneficiaries by (IFAD standard) component will be important. These data are not available in the PCR.

ii) The PCR appears to be a rigorous piece of work. It will be helpful to contact the consultants, Kusi Limitade in Maputo, to review the PCR findings with them.

iii) Key impressions from the Desk Study for field validation include the following:-

There was a lack of discussion at design stage about priority project components with end-users

The appraisal of project management capacities and requirements during formulation and appraisal was poor

The design was possibly too complex in view of the country situation and management capacities available

The major re-alignment of the project at MTR came too late

The savings and credit scheme was poorly conceived from the outset

There was a lack of attention to sustainability in the design and the concept was not thoroughly internalised within all components

A motivated project team was the critical factor in improving performance as the project aged

Overall impact was positive

Were implementation delays more due to national and climatic events, internal problems or fund-flow and other administrative delays with the various project financiers?

Was the frequency and quality of supervision sufficient?

What were the other pivotal factors in enhancing performance?

4.2 PAMA support

i) This project is new, and will not have many end-user beneficiaries at the time of field study. Identifying and interviewing those who do exist will be a priority task.

ii) Key issues from the Desk Study for field validation include the following:-

Is the design over-ambitious?



Is performance overly-dependant on success of the PAMA programme?

Are the contracted central and provincial managers likely to be able deliver a successful project?

How involved was IFAD/UNOPS in ensuring that the best available project managers were hired?

Is an effective activity monitoring system in place?

Are there government concerns about the large process/software content of the loan?

Is the balance between process/ID components and physical works appropriate?

How well does PAMA articulate with Proagri? What do government and donors think?

Does the project team want or need more frequent supervision visits?

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Nepal

Nepal Country Synopsis page 1

Nepal Country Synopsis


1.1 The objective of the strategy is to develop sustainable livelihoods and social justice amongst poor indigenous people and other marginalized groups in upland and mountainous areas of western Nepal. The three main strategic thrusts are the development of income generating activities through natural resource based micro-enterprises, local capital formation and empowerment and community based natural resource management. This depends on building the capacity of local community institutions and the skills of the target population. The strategy would involve gradually building a program in a limited number of districts at a time, and up-scaling based on an iterative process of diagnosis and redesign.

Summary of Evaluation of COSOP

1.2 The document provides a good analysis of the poverty situation. The causes of poverty are identified and equity and distributional issues are discussed. The rationale for IFAD’s intervention in a specific geographic area and the objectives of such intervention are clearly stated. Although proposals for community-based NRM and rural credit schemes are based on fairly extensive experience in Nepal, the opportunities for development of NR-based micro-enterprises in remote areas are probably over-stated. Initiatives to overcome the constraints to the development of such micro-enterprises and supporting community institutions in remote areas are not adequately provided for. An important strategic objective is to improve governance, empowerment and social justice for the disadvantaged through training and awareness campaigns, but the fundamental issues of remoteness, lack of governance and landlessness is not addressed. However, the strategic approach is cautious with gradual development over the long term, based on pilot or demonstration experience.



PICountry portfolio history (1): Nepal

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALIntegrated Rural Development Project (Sagarmatha Zone)10 Dec-78 Mar-79 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Nov-79 Jun-8812 33

CREDISmall Farmer Development Project57 Dec-80 Feb-81 AsDB IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-81 Jun-8710 20

IRRIGCommand Area Development Project82 Dec-81 Jul-82 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Oct-82 Mar-8928 13

CREDISecond Small Farmer Development Project166 Apr-85 Sep-85 AsDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-86 Jun-9022 25

FISHAquaculture Development Project191 Sep-86 Nov-86 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Oct-87 Dec-918 48

CREDIProduction Credit for Rural Women Project208 Sep-87 Apr-88 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-88 Jun-9730 33

RURALHills Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project250 Dec-89 Jan-90 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-91 Jun-037 55

IRRIGGroundwater Irrigation and Flood Rehabilitation Project352 Apr-94 May-94 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-94 Jun-015 23

Ongoing

AGRICPoverty Alleviation Project in Western Terai1030 Sep-97 Dec-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-98 Jul-0413 12

FLMWestern Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project1119 Dec-01 Feb-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jan-03 Mar-148 47

Design

Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Project1285 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

Totals

02 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):Nepal

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALIntegrated Rural Development Project (Sagarmatha Zone)10 11,538 29,538 39% 52% 9% 50,000 250,000591 118 5.0

CREDISmall Farmer Development Project57 11,707 14,307 82% 0% 18% 50,000 250,000286 57 5.0

IRRIGCommand Area Development Project82 6,984 24,847 28% 52% 20% 14,500 90,0001,714 276 6.2

CREDISecond Small Farmer Development Project166 14,522 24,422 59% 16% 24% 50,000 250,000488 98 5.0

FISHAquaculture Development Project191 740 18,740 4% 64% 32% 6,000 42,0003,123 446 7.0

CREDIProduction Credit for Rural Women Project208 6,000 11,330 53% 29% 18% 16,390 81,950691 138 5.0

RURALHills Leasehold Forestry and Forage Development Project250 7,808 15,415 51% 22% 28% 51,800 259,000298 60 5.0

IRRIGGroundwater Irrigation and Flood Rehabilitation Project352 9,884 13,208 75% 16% 10% 25,000 137,500528 96 5.5

OngoingAGRICPoverty Alleviation Project in Western Terai1030 8,866 9,730 91% 0% 9% 21,563 107,815451 90 5.0

FLMWestern Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project1119 20,297 32,564 62% 12% 25% 115,000 610,000283 53 5.3

DesignLeasehold Forestry and Livestock Project1285

98,346 194,101 51% 29% 20%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Poverty Alleviation Project in Western Terai Project ID 1030

2.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the 1996 Strategic Framework. The poverty analysis is poor with little more than national social indicators and no analysis of the causes or distribution of poverty in the project area. There was a significant failure to identify bonded labourers as a specific target group. It is not clear whether beneficiaries were consulted, but the targeting of project activities to the poor and to women is appropriate.

2.2 Effectiveness. Objectives are stated in a generalized way but more specific objectives are presented in the logframe. Project logic is consistent as components lead to achievement of objectives and risks clearly identified. Physical outcomes are readily measured, but the impact of community and institutional capacity building is only reflected by proxy measures of numbers of courses or participants. The lessons of previous experience are identified satisfactorily and project design attempts to take account of them. There is no environmental analysis but satisfactory cost effectiveness is reflected in financial and economic analyses. There is little discussion of sustainability or replicability though it is implicit in the emphasis given to the viability of GBRs. A focus on the viability of rural bank branches rather than the number of branches is an innovation, but other project initiatives are based on past experience.

2.3 Efficiency. Government agencies were involved in project formulation, but it is not clear to what extent beneficiaries participated in project design. The TCR raised serious questions about financial sector operations and the proposed credit line to ADBN and GBs but it does not appear that any change in project design resulted. The institutional analysis does not identify capacity and strengths and weaknesses of implementing agencies. Responsibilities are defined but management arrangements involve a number of agencies. Inter-agency co-ordination is identified as a major issue, but the project does not provide mechanisms to overcome this constraint, other than a PCU. M&E responsibilities are diffused between several agencies.

2.4 Outcomes. Project achieved significant progress in physical and financial terms during the last five years of its implementation. 16 GBR branches provided micro-credit to 28, 800 poor women. 267 group based tune wells were installed benfiting 1540 small and marginal farmers creating an incremental irrigated area of over 600 ha. 929 self help credit groups were formed benefiting over 25,000 families. Progress was made towards sustainable rehabilitation of bonded labourer families. However, there was a lack of integration of project activities reducing their impact and there was an insufficient focus on the poor.


Criteria IEE Rating

Comment


3 Mainly relevant but for targeting (see below)


2 An important target group the bonded labour, was not identified until MTR

Complexity: The extent to which the design 2 Changes due to failure of targeting,



was implementable without major change was:

but complexity of implementation arrangements contributed to poor performance


2 The main risk, that of lack of integration was identified, but project design did not adequately address the risks

2.5 Issues. The most important issue affecting this project was the failure to identify an important target group, the bonded labourers, though this was rectified and the project reformulated. This emphasizes the importance of detailed poverty analysis for IFAD projects in particular.

2.6 Implementation arrangements were complex involving MLD as the main implementing agency, banks, government line agencies and NGOs. Interagency co-ordination identified as a major constraint but the project design did little to address this.



3 Summary of findings: Western Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project Project ID 1119

3.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the regional and C0SOP strategies focusing on the poor in less favourable remote mountain and upland areas of Western Nepal. The poverty analysis is adequate but not as comprehensive as in the COSOP, but target beneficiaries are identified, with adequate attention to gender and equity issues.

3.2 Effectiveness. The objectives are stated in rather generalized terms of “ensuring more resilient livelihoods and basic human rights” though more specifically defined in the logframe. Project logic is consistent as components and desired outputs are related to the analysis of constraints and possibilities and the risks adequately assessed. Lessons from earlier projects have been identified and the project design attempts to address the issues. There is little analysis of environmental impact as an earlier ESSN classed it as a Category B project. However, more discussion of environmental impact based on the ESSN would be useful, given the fact that community NRM is an important project component. There is no economic analysis as the project will be financed through the FLM. There is little discussion of sustainability issues, possibly because this is the first phase of a long-term FLM programme. However, the same long-term FLM programme ensures expansion and replicability, based on implementation experience. Although the “rights-based approach” of this project is seen as innovative, it is in effect targeted empowerment which is not new.

3.3 Efficiency. It is not clear whether beneficiaries were involved in project preparation and design. The initial design, presented in the formulation report was modified in the light of TRC recommendations for simplification and strengthening of agriculture and livestock technical issues. Institutional responsibilities are defined but there is little analysis of capacity to manage and implement a complex project in remote areas. Co-ordination of activities between implementing agencies is identified as a key issue. A monitoring and evaluation system is to be developed, but system procedures will not be defined until 12 months after project start-up which will reduce effectiveness. Nor is there provision for any base line studies. The project is benefiting from the placement of UNDP staff as LDF advisors at the district level. There has been one supervision and one PSR.

3.4 Outcomes. The project has been effective since 01/01/03. Supervision reports progress with project start-up but an assessment of outcomes is not yet feasible.


Criteria IEE Rating

Comment


4


3


NA


3 Major risk is insurgency, for which there can be no project solution.



Remoteness of area is also an inherent risk for the project

4 Key Issues

4.1 The main issue related to this project is the capacity of government agencies and NGOs to implement a project involving increased beneficiary participation in the development of micro-enterprises and the co-ordination of the activities of several agencies in such a remote area.

4.2 A second issue is the insurgency that will affect all aspects of implementation, in particular the placement of staff and the provision of inputs such as credit.







576H NP Groundwater Irrigation for Agric. Rehabilitation Project PI 24/05/2002 2002 22 000 Nepal

560 SAPNA

Appi: Pilot Capacity Building Programme to Enhance Implementation of Social mobilisation Activities

PI 02/10/2001 2001 98 450 Nepal, Sri Lanka

Tag No 576H is a SOF grant SOFs were also approved for 567NP and 452NP

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Pakistan

Pakistan Country Synopsis page 1

Pakistan Country Synopsis


1.1 Three key strategic objectives are to strengthen the capacity of the rural poor to overcome their poverty, to improve equitable access to natural resources and technology and to increase access to financia l services and markets. The five main thrusts to implement the strategy are an emphasis on agriculture and rural development, the empowerment of women, diversification of production and household food security, decentralization and access to resources. Devolution of power to new district governments and women nazims offers an opportunity to implement participatory programmes that counter elitist rural power structures and bureaucracy that may oppose change.

1.2 The strategy is consistent with IFAD's Strategic Framework, the Regional Strategy and the government's strategy to alleviate poverty. The target population is identified as poor small farmers, the landless and women, but there is only a limited discussion of the distribution and causes of poverty. The rationale for IFAD's strategic thrusts are clearly presented. The strategy identifies opportunities and responds to constraints It builds on the experience gained over many years and incorporates the lessons learnt. There is a consistent emphasis on the empowerment of people to identify their needs and control development programs and the need to adopt culturally sensitive programs to benefit women. Government policy on institutional decentralization is discussed but there is little analysis of the capacity of relevant institutions. Proposed policy dialogue includes the sensitive issues of good governance and land allocation to address equity concerns. Issues of sustainability are not explicitly discussed and replicability is only implicit in the future development of the programme. Nor is there significant discussion of environmental issues.


PICountry portfolio history (1): Pakistan

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

CREDISmall Farmers Credit Project18 Jun-79 Dec-79 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jun-80 Jun-8524 24

IRRIGSouth Rohri Fresh Groundwater Irrigation Project33 Dec-79 Jan-80 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Mar-80 Jun-905 9

AGRICBarani Area Development Project48 Dec-80 Feb-81 AsDB IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Aug-81 Jun-9011 26

IRRIGOn-Farm Water Management Project83 Dec-81 Jun-82 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jul-82 Jun-8526 5

CREDISmall Farmers' Credit Project II138 Dec-83 Mar-84 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Jul-84 Jun-8715 14

AGRICGujranwala Agricultural Development Project162 Dec-84 Jan-85 AsDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-85 Jun-934 22

RURALChitral Area Development Project209 Sep-87 Nov-87 AsDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-88 Jun-9711 52

LIVSTPunjab Smallholder Dairy Development Project234 Nov-88 Feb-89 AsDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-91 Mar-9810 104

AGRICSecond Barani Area Development Project257 Apr-90 Jun-90 AsDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-91 Dec-979 33

CREDISmallholder and Women's Rural Credit Project265 Oct-90 May-91 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-92 Sep-9433 56

RURALNeelum and Jhelum Valleys Community Development Project288 Sep-91 Oct-91 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-92 Dec-034 35

RURALMansehra Village Support Project319 Dec-92 Dec-92 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Mar-93 Jun-000 15

IRRIGPat Feeder Command Area Development Project353 Apr-94 Sep-94 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated Feb-95 Jun-0323 18

Ongoing

RURALDir Area Support Project524 Sep-96 Nov-96 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Apr-97 Jun-0610 20

RURALNorthern Areas Development Project1042 Sep-97 May-98 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-98 Jun-0535 16

AGRICBarani Village Development Project1077 Dec-98 May-99 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Sep-99 Jun-0522 16

IRRIGSouthern Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Project1078 Dec-00 Jan-01 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-02 Sep-086 78

RURALNorth-West Frontier Province Barani Area Development Project1182 Apr-01 Aug-01 AsDB Cooperating Institution initiated May-03 Jun-0916 90

Not Signed

RURALCommunity Development Programme1245 Dec-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Totals

02 April 2004

PICountry portfolio history (2):Pakistan

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

CREDISmall Farmers Credit Project18 26,620 387,620 7% 8% 85% 25,500 175,00015,201 2,215 6.9

IRRIGSouth Rohri Fresh Groundwater Irrigation Project33 5,677 43,477 13% 76% 11% 60,000 320,000725 136 5.3

AGRICBarani Area Development Project48 5,436 7,889 69% 0% 31% 14,200 71,000556 111 5.0

IRRIGOn-Farm Water Management Project83 10,182 109,782 9% 37% 53% 100,000 500,0001,098 220 5.0

CREDISmall Farmers' Credit Project II138 25,000 661,000 4% 12% 84% 116,000 6,000,0005,698 110 51.7

AGRICGujranwala Agricultural Development Project162 8,567 45,967 19% 61% 20% 109,450 744,260420 62 6.8

RURALChitral Area Development Project209 8,676 29,025 30% 61% 9% 61,250 490,000474 59 8.0

LIVSTPunjab Smallholder Dairy Development Project234 7,665 14,082 54% 11% 34% 27,000 162,000522 87 6.0

AGRICSecond Barani Area Development Project257 19,367 56,674 34% 45% 21% 70,000 420,000810 135 6.0

CREDISmallholder and Women's Rural Credit Project265 24,950 411,200 6% 13% 81% 468,000 2,340,000879 176 5.0

RURALNeelum and Jhelum Valleys Community Development Project288 15,830 24,299 65% 19% 16% 27,500 176,600884 138 6.4

RURALMansehra Village Support Project319 14,550 24,230 60% 22% 18% 21,000 140,0001,154 173 6.7

IRRIGPat Feeder Command Area Development Project353 27,140 40,050 68% 0% 32% 29,600 236,8001,353 169 8.0

Ongoing

RURALDir Area Support Project524 16,490 25,373 65% 0% 35% 14,500 72,5001,750 350 5.0

RURALNorthern Areas Development Project1042 14,631 22,589 65% 11% 24% 18,000 90,0001,255 251 5.0

AGRICBarani Village Development Project1077 15,258 25,149 61% 0% 39% 32,300 235,790779 107 7.3

IRRIGSouthern Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Project1078 17,154 21,859 78% 0% 22% 35,600 800,000614 27 22.5

RURALNorth-West Frontier Province Barani Area Development Project1182 14,448 98,666 15% 53% 33% 67,000 400,0001,473 247 6.0

Not Signed

RURALCommunity Development Programme1245 21,766 30,736 71% 0% 29% 123,000 861,000250 36 7.0

299,407 2,079,667 14% 18% 68%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Pat Feeder Command Area Development Project (Project ID 353)

2.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with IFAD's 1996 strategy focused on the alleviation of poverty and hunger through a broad spectrum of initiatives linked to irrigated agriculture. The target population is defined by the low level of household income and has been identified through PRA exercises and socio- economic surveys by the formulation and appraisal missions and other agencies. Women are a specific part of the target group.

2.2 Effectiveness. Project logic is consistent, linking project components with constraints and opportunities. Objectives are clearly stated, but there is no logframe (not required at the time the project was appraised) and there is a lack of clarity about outputs and indicators. Lessons from previous projects have been identified and incorporated into institutional design and the management of on-farm water management. Although environmental issues of salinity and water logging have been noted, there is no discussion and no monitoring or preventative measures included in the project. The ERR of the project, combined with the complementary R&I project is estimated at 8.4%. There is no discussion of sustainability other than the need to ensure that beneficiaries can meet recurrent costs of maintenance. The project cannot be considered as innovative as it incorporates systems tested in earlier projects.

2.3 Efficiency. TRC influence on the design process was modest but a recommendation to increase the emphasis on off-farm non-agricultural income generating activities, backed by rural credit was included. Project income generating activities are mainly for agricultural production of vegetable and other high value crops, though there is provision for credit. Implementation arrangements are clearly defined, but are complex, involving 17 units in four major line agencies, although not all would need to work in co-ordination. There is little analysis of the capacity of these agencies. Supervision was by AsDB and was mainly effective in identifying progress and constraints. Progress was extremely slow and MTR reported that only 16 of 1235 watercourses had been completed, there was no land levelling or drainage works, inadequate extension and research and a breakdown of community organization and rural credit support. Targets were radically reduced and a remedial action programme agreed.

2.4 Outcomes. The PCR recognized improvements in implementation after MTR, and most of the radically reduced targets were achieved. Community ADGs were formed and about 30% of the 10,000 members were women. There were significant increases in crop production with over 600% increase in yields for kharif and rabi crops taken together with a large increase in the area of cotton. Although no data is available these crop increases translate into improved household incomes and food security. Members of ADGs and WDGs participated actively in project activities and developed 16 primary schools on a self-help basis. Once the new NGO partner was in place, the rural credit and savings program was taken up by over 5000 borrowers all reflecting increased benefic iary empowerment. In addition, once the process of ADG and WDG formation was initiated there was a spontaneous demand with new leadership patterns developing through demonstrated capability to manage local resources and resolve conflict.


Criteria IEE Rating

Comment

Identification Relevance. The extent to which the project 4



fits country development priorities, IFAD strategy and beneficiary needs is: Design Targeting:The extent to which the design targeted the right people with appropriate activities was:

3


2 Major reduction in targets at MTR due to implementation delays


2 Important risks due to lack of coordination, weak management, inadequate technical packages, socail constraints and importantly failure to complete complementary R&I Project are identified correctly, and many of these risks were realized.

2.5 Issues. The most important issue is that of project sustainability, that depends in large part on the ability of ADGs to maintain the infrastructure. It also depends on effective functioning of water user groups so that all members abide by the rules.

2.6 Issues relating to poor performance prior to MTR were linked to lack of commitment by implementing agencies, inflexible budgeting arrangements, contractual difficulties with the original NGO partner and a lack of participatory skills amongst the staff of the line agencies.

2.7 The complexity of getting a host of agencies to respond to demands driven by beneficiaries is another issue of project design.



3 Summary of findings: NWFP Barani Area Development Project. (Project ID 1182)

3.1 Relevance. The project is consistent with the COSOP focusing on the poor in a less favoured area. The identification of the target population of poor small farmers and women is based on PRA, participatory village workshops and analysis of existing data.

3.2 Effectiveness. There is a clear linkage between the strategy, objectives, constraints and opportunities and project activities. Objectives are clearly stated but outputs are simply defined as components, while indicators are listed as performance targets. Lessons from previous experience are listed and incorporated into project design. An initial environmental examination concluded that the project had the potential to improve the environment, but risks with construction of rural roads were identified. The project makes provision for consultant and EP inputs to ensure appropriate measures are implemented. There is no specific discussion of sustainability, but there is an assumption that activities will be sustained because they are community based, rural finance units will be viable and the project period of 7 years allows organizations to mature.. The project makes no claim to be innovative as it repeats successful experience in BADP and MSVP.

3.3 Efficiency. Although TRC made recommendations for the simplification of the project and inclusion of funds for road maintenance by communities, it is not clear whether this had any impact on project design by the AsDB appraisal team. Organization and management roles and responsibilities are set out, but are very complex, involving 12 government agencies as well as NGOs and a PFI. The capacity of a number of NGOs and of the Khyber Bank is examined but there is little assessment of the capacity of government agencies, although these have been involved in implementation of BADP and MVSP. Co-ordination arrangements are defined but ensuring the multiplicity of agencies work towards a common goal will be difficult, although it will not always be necessary for agencies to work together to respond to demands from beneficiaries. As a new project there is no experience of supervision or evaluation.

3.4 Outcomes. The project became effective on 05/09/2003 so assessment of outcomes is not feasible.



Table: Overall project Assessment Criteria IEE

Rating Comment


4


4


NA


3

3.5 Issues. The main issues related to this project are concerned with its riskiness, due to conservative opposition to the empowerment of women, remoteness, and possible political instability.

3.6 A second issue relates to the complexity of implementation arrangements and the need to co-ordinate the activities of a number of government and non government agencies.

3.7 The willingness and ability of government agencies to adopt participatory approaches and respond flexibly to beneficiary demands is also an issue.







429M PAKISTAN Federal Bank for Cooperatives PN 26/06/2001 2001 30 000 Pakistan

528U PK Mansehra Village Support Project Completion Report PI 11/04/2001 2001 25 000 Pakistan

Tag Nos. 429M, 528U are both SOF grants

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Peru

Peru Country Synopsis page 1

Peru Country Synopsis


1.1 IFAD’s first loan to Peru was agreed in 1980. Strategies then evolved through a Special Programming mission in 1981, a consultancy report on strategy reformulation in 1990 and a General Identification Mission in 1993. The SPM recommended support to decentralization and regional projects; encouragement of community participation in project planning and management; emphasis on marketing activities, conservation of natural resources and non-agricultural activities in rural areas. The recommendations from the consultant’s report focused on three main areas: support to technology transfer, including watershed management and resource conservation; concentration of actions in the central and southern departments of the Sierra; targeting of small-holder families, female headed households and landless peasants in the Sierra (with recommendation that the indigenous populations in the Selva region and the pockets of rural poor existing in the Costa should also be considered as IFAD’s target population. The GIM concluded that the recommendations from the previous two missions remained valid and that priority would be on management of natural resources and rural-urban linkages. (The two projects reviewed here were prepared subsequent to findings from this mission).

1.2 IFAD’s current strategy for Peru (COSOP 2001), a middle -income country, takes into account the country’s vulnerability and the risk of rapid poverty increases as a result of globalisation. IFAD’s programme to date has supported the growth of beneficiaries’ assets, and assisted rural farmers and entrepreneurs in securing land titles and removing barriers to market integration and livelihood diversification. The COSOP is consistent with the regional strategy with a focus on supporting income-generating activities linked to the development of markets in favour of the rural poor, enhancing people’s assets and local development. It is also consistent with the Strategic Framework which emphasises strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations; improving equitable access to productive natural resources and technology and to financial assets and markets.

1.3 Proposed strategic actions are based on experience from previous and ongoing projects and on the explicit request made by the new government administration to concentrate efforts on what worked well in the past. The new strategy outlined in the COSOP targets the largest segment of the poor, which is concentrated in the highlands, many of whom are of indigenous origin. An estimated 11% of households are headed by women.

1.4 Proposed actions aim at:

§ Increasing small-scale farmer’s assets by investing in externalities and establishing competitive fund-transfer mechanisms;

§ Enhancing market development and beneficiary capacity to contract services and strengthening institutional and private-sector providers of these services;

§ Expanding access to information; encouraging joint ventures between rural inhabitants and the private sector and promoting new products and services to support diversification;

§ Fostering local development and identities, especially in areas with substantial cultural and ecological potential such as those found in the highlands.



Summary of COSOP Evaluation 1.5 There are several sections missing in the document: constraints and opportunities for rural poverty reduction; IFAD’s strategic niche; and partnership possibilities with NGO and private sector. There are clearly stated links with IFAD’s strategic framework regarding objectives of ?strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations; ?improving equitable access to productive natural resources and technology; and increasing access to financial assets and markets. The potential for IFAD’s catalytic role is not covered. The links with the regional strategy are described as: supporting income-generating activities linked to the development of markets in favour of the rural poor, enhancing people’s assets and local development. The strategy has evolved in a coherent manner over time and there is evidence of local ownership as described in the COSOP consultation process.

1.6 The document is very strong on the statement of objectives which are justified in terms of achieving the strategy. The targeting of the needs of the poor is also well done as are the identification of lessons learned and their application to ongoing projects. There are several opportunities identified for institutional collaboration but these tend to be more in the nature of practical arrangements rather than on strategic change promotion. The logframe is weak, it is not a complete matrix and has multi purposes and is very broad in nature. The indicators are weak in the same way. The monitoring and evaluation approach to the strategy is not described and there are no explicit arrangements for communication and dissemination.



PLCountry portfolio history (1): Peru

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

CREDICredit for Small Farmers on the Highlands Project38 May-80 Jun-80 IDB IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-80 Dec-857 14

RURALAlto Mayo Rural Development Project116 Dec-82 Mar-83 World Bank: IBRD Cooperating Institution initiated Jun-83 Dec-9311 13

AGRICCuzco Arequipa Highlands Rural Development Project185 Apr-86 Feb-87 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-87 Jun-9340 45

RSRCHPromotion of Technology Transfer Project to Peasant Communities in the Highlands297 Dec-91 Jan-93 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-93 Apr-9956 24

RSRCHManagement of Natural Resources in the Southern Highlands Project475 Sep-95 Jun-96 CAF IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-97 Dec-0340 41

Ongoing

RSRCHDevelopment of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project1044 Dec-97 Dec-99 IFAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-00 Dec-06104 45

Not Signed

RURALMarket Strengthening and Livelihood Diversification in the Southern Highlands Project1240 Dec-02 CAF IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Totals

02 April 2004

PLCountry portfolio history (2):Peru

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

CREDICredit for Small Farmers on the Highlands Project38 9,841 14,941 66% 0% 34% 6,500 39,0002,299 383 6.0

RURALAlto Mayo Rural Development Project116 19,000 79,700 24% 35% 42% 8,500 51,0009,376 1,563 6.0

AGRICCuzco Arequipa Highlands Rural Development Project185 6,936 14,616 47% 32% 21% 4,800 24,0003,045 609 5.0

RSRCHPromotion of Technology Transfer Project to Peasant Communities in the Highlands297 15,900 26,800 59% 21% 20% 40,680 203,400659 132 5.0

RSRCHManagement of Natural Resources in the Southern Highlands Project475 12,278 19,142 64% 21% 15% 10,560 52,8001,813 363 5.0

Ongoing

RSRCHDevelopment of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project1044 18,923 30,894 61% 0% 39% 14,400 72,0002,145 429 5.0

Not Signed

RURALMarket Strengthening and Livelihood Diversification in the Southern Highlands Project1240 15,985 21,730 74% 0% 26% 15,000 75,0001,449 290 5.0

98,863 207,823 48% 20% 32%Totals

1 April 2004



Country Issues Portfolio Review August 2003 1.7 The review highlights the delays between Board approval and effectiveness which are explained as due to institutional changes. In the Corridor project the executing institution had to be changed due to an alteration in the initial partner’s mandate and functions. There is one project in the pipeline, subject to some delays in signing the Loan agreement due to austerity measures and institutional changes that may affect the executing institution.

2 Summary of findings: Management of Natural Resources in the Southern Highlands Project (MARENASS)

Timeline Date Activi ty 1993 General identification mission Sept 94 Preparation mission April 95 Appraisal; Sept 95 EB approved June 96 Loan agreement April 97 Loan effectiveness Objectives 2.1 Stated in RRP and PSR the main objective of the project is to recover cultivable areas and rangelands and increase the market value of the natural productive resources of peasant farmers in the Southern Highlands. The project would:

§ quantify and assess the magnitude of natural resource degradation in the peasant communities included in the project area;

§ identify traditional and modern methods for recovering, preserving natural resources and enhancing their production capacities;

§ implement participatory methods for technology and knowledge transfer;

§ foster the strengthening of community structures needed for natural resource management;

§ disseminate the results of the experiences gained at a local, regional and national levels; and

§ increase patrimonial assets of peasant communities.

2.2 The project has four components: i) Training and technological exchange which involves local technicians and authorities, use of local fairs/contests, teacher training; ii) Production Support Services which will consolidate the knowledge gained from component i) and ensure sustainable use of natural resources, support would be through technical assistance services involving inputs and infrastructure; iii) Project Management and Administration; iv) monitoring and evaluation

2.3 The Interim Evaluation report (October 2002) states that the PMU reformulated the general development objective as follows: increase the capacity of communities and families to carry out their own development activities in a sustainable manner, exercising their civic



rights and duties, in a framework of gender equity. (Exec summary para 13). In logframe terms this would involve a change of purpose level objective. The alteration was made as the PMU felt there was a lack of consistency between the objectives set out in the appraisal report and the proposed methodology.


IEE Rating

Comments


4 Predates the COSOP but is coherent with the strategy of the time illustrated by a useful review of history and strategy evolution to date. It is coherent with the subsequent COSOP having a focus on supporting technology transfer including watershed management and resource conservation and actions focused on the poor in the central and southern departments. It is also coherent with the subsequently developed regional strategy and the strategic framework with focus on natural resource management, access to markets and strengthening community organizations.


3 The target group is small holder farmers, female headed households and landless peasants; the response to TRC recommendations states that mission held meetings with community leaders in all departments (who expressed interest!) but no indication of who, what and how. Project area includes parts of three out of the seven poorest departments in the country ; the project will give high priority to women and their problems; women will have special contests organized and own organizations.


4 The approach appears to have worked very well; little detailed information available on impact of training


2 Rather simplistic; no assessment of impact and probability and does not appear to appreciate difficulties inherent in conflict management

2.4 Effectiveness. This project pre-dates the requirement for a logframe. The overall objective is clear and measurable but there are no outputs as such, they are expressed as activities. Reformulating would be possible. There are no indicators in terms of logframe process but a few targets are suggested. Although there is no logframe the information presented would enable one to be constructed (apart from indicators which would need more refinement) which should be internally logical.

2.5 A very thorough summary of the whole portfolio to date is given which reviews results and identifies key lessons for the future. Successes are identified but there is a lack of concrete information on actual poverty impact and dimensions. The degradation of the natural resource base and its effects are described and links made to government strategy at community level. Conservation activities are an integral part of project including training in environmental education for teachers. The IRR is estimated as 9.23% with 30% of total project area improved after 20 years.

2.6 Sustainability is not explicitly addressed but there are opportunities implicit in the review of the country portfolio. There is a sensible view of conservation with the importance of relating to peoples’ living conditions and keeping costs low emphasised which will have an impact on sustainability. This project replicates some approaches from previous experiences. It is specified that the replicability issue will be examined in the MTR. The project is



innovative in that it uses new approaches to technology transfer and knowledge exchange based on local traditions.

2.7 Efficiency. There were good suggestions from TRC which were responded to by appraisal mission and compliance noted. The overall institutional environment for the project is described as is the management structure including roles. There is however no comparative institutional analysis. Monitoring activities were to be contracted out and the RRP describes some of the tasks to be done including a base line based on agro-ecological zones (as recommended by TRC). Evaluation will be done by independent consultants. There is no mention of participatory approaches or beneficiary involvement.

2.8 Note that in the PSR the CPM criticises the content of the supervision reports as not reflecting project performance (Dec 2000) and low frequency of missions (July 2002). The available May 2000 report does mark lower on achievement of physical targets; technical assistance; monitoring and evaluation; beneficiary participation; institution building. The report talks about completing the base line survey, two years after loan effectiveness, and it is clear that M&E is a general area of concern. Criteria for scoring the project are unclear. There is some attempt to pick up recommendations of previous visits – including that of the CPM – which would have been useful had the tables been completed. The PSRs demonstrate actions taken against its previous recommendations although these are not linked to the supervision report. The scores for the relevant PSR reflect the findings of the interim evaluation.

2.9 Outcomes. This section relies on the information presented in the interim evaluation report (October 2002). The report covers the relevant issues in great detail but it is rather discursive and it is not always clear what evidence is being presented in support of conclusions. The team visited 30 communities in 4 zones but there are not enough details of what these visits entailed to make an assessment of representativeness nor beneficiary participation. The project has clearly achieved a great deal and stimulated outside interest in replicating the innovative approach elsewhere in Peru. The accumulation of evidence, assessing the process effect of project activities on communities, quantifying outcomes and relevant impact on poverty reduction will be a challenge for the field teams.

2.10 The delivery of components appears to making good progress. The technological activities have included the introduction of at least ten new technologies and have achieved an average of about 75% of total target. An exception is the area of improved terracing which is only 22 % of target. The explanation given is that families are preferring to invest in areas closer to home and construct better quality, rather than quantity of terraces. There are few analytical details on the training conducted under the project. The numbers given show an average of 50% of target for the range of courses, these numbers are not disaggregated against gender. The computerised M and E system was only put in place July 2001, three years after start up. A parallel system for reflection/action has been developed and the report highlights the need to institutionalise the process within communities as well as integrating the two systems.

2.11 360 communities had participated directly in the project as of Dec 2001 – 100% of the plan. 20,015 families participated compared to the plan of 52,800, there is no mention of the number of women planned as 26,400 (half a family). There is at least one women's group for funds for microbusiness in each community.

2.12 Improved physical assets include better houses, corrals, terraces etc. Increased financial assets have resulted from reducing expenditure on external inputs and increased production and sale of surplus. There is a reported increased purchase of consumer goods. There is little information on social infrastructure.



2.13 The competition approach between communities has encouraged community cohesion although the level of participation is variable, averaging 40% of families in community. The methodology of interfamily competitions has reportedly resulted in the entire family reappraising the roles of heads of households, women and young people. Each community has to open a bank account which has resulted in empowerment through management responsibility. Community capacity to negotiate with local entities has improved through training and organization and there are more equitable relations with “wealthier” social groups in the community. It is noted that frequent changes of local trainers and community authorities necessitate ongoing training.

2.14 New production techniques have led to large and stable increases in production levels of family farmers and hence increased food security. Production is stated to have doubled or tripled on a large part of the land of families entering competitions largely due to improved practices rather than increases of area under cultivation. The improvement appears sustainable as based on low level of inputs and no recurring costs. The report finds that complete and appropriate management of community land not yet a reality but the process has begun.

2.15 The report states that it is difficult to quantify project impact on the income of families and communities but a direct and visible impact is the increase of currency in circulation at community level. There has been a reduction in family workload, especially for women. Women's groups are said to have enhanced prestige and empowerment of the women who have done the managing and women’s' influence, visibility and participation in community councils has been strengthened.

2.16 Community councils have been re-established or strengthened and community leaders trained. There is a greater recognition of the functions of community councils. Community organizations have been strengthened through the transfer of responsibilities under the project. Relationships with municipalities have developed from entry points to cofinancers and stakeholders with 20 districts having signed on to the project.

2.17 Attribution issues are not fully discussed but the project has a sizeable information base relating to the situation prior to the project and this would assist in further analysis. The project has been innovative in the application of new, or in some cases relearned technology, with good practical results. The contest approach fits around existing cultural practices.

2.18 Both MINAG and Ministry of Economy and Finance have shown keen interest in the project since 2001 and are interested in conducting studies of project methodology with a view to replicating the approach in similar areas of the highlands or where there is high degree of rural poverty. The implementing agency of the IFAD funded Corridor project is also interested in approach. The report has some useful comments and recommended actions for supporting replication. Project beneficiaries appear to demonstrate a strong sense of ownership which should help towards sustainability. The team comments on the sense of optimism and security in own capacity evinced by beneficiaries.

2.19 The interim evaluation identified one weakness of the project as a lack of an economic approach to the management of natural resources. The deficiency has led to a failure to calculate the cost of the recommended practices and lack of a strategy to link families, communities and women’s groups to the market. The latter may have resulted from a rather limited view of development through agricultural production instead of based on the varied livelihood strategies of the target group. Would this have been helped by more beneficiary participation in the design process? There are also concerns related to sustainability: will communities have sufficient resources to continue to purchase services?



Issues for the Field/Further Follow Up 2.20 Monitoring and Evaluation: the slow start up and implications for impact assessment; lack of support from the CI and low frequency of supervision missions; implications of contracting out m and e services/responsibilities; delays in baseline and attribution problems? Parallel systems?

2.21 Supervision Missions: linking with the PSR content or not? Standard of supervision – are there clear guidelines from IFAD about what it wants from supervision?

2.22 Gender: The PSR for 2003 comments that the original project design did not contain a gender component. However the RRP states that: 26,400 women are included as beneficiaries; project will give high priority to women and their specific problems; women will have special contests organized and their own organizations. What would be a gender component?

2.23 Objectives: Was the general objective changed formally or informally? Through what process?

2.24 Outcomes: comparisons of plans with actual achievements? What does this mean for progress; development of participatory indicators?

2.25 Competitions : why do all families not compete? Differential impacts of technologies within and between communities? Is anyone disadvantaged?

2.26 Municipalities: what does signing on to the project entail in practice?

2.27 Replication: has there been any follow up from MINAG/MEF? Policy dialogue as recommended in interim evaluation?

2.28 Markets : and other economic issues – progress? Supply exceeding demand?

2.29 Follow up: to the interim evaluation report recommendations?

2.30 Sustainability: resources to continue to purchase services? How will on going training be provided?



3 Summary of findings: Development of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project

Timeline Date Activity 1993 General identification mission 1994 Project Identification mission June 1995 Preparation mission and TRC revision 1996 CAF consultant (production, markets, microenterprise) Feb 1997 Workshop on project proposal August 97 Appraisal mission Dec 97 EB approval Dec 99 Loan agreement Oct 00 Effectiveness Aug 01 Full start up of activities 3.1 Objectives. The overall objective of the project is to increase the incomes of the rural poor, eradicating extreme poverty and allowing for a better access to markets of local goods and services. Specific objectives are to:

§ strengthen a demand-driven self-financing market of technical assistance services;

§ facilitate community investments;

§ increase value of products and services of farmers and small entrepreneurs in intermediate cities and towns;

§ strengthen financial institutions and increase coverage of rural financial services.


IEE Rating

Comments


4 Developed following a GIM which reviewed priorities with government; strong links to IFAD country strategy of the time and is still coherent with the subsequent COSOP; regional strategy and IFAD strategic framework; appears to address needs in context of general economic environment and potential less clear on how closely fits to beneficiaries own analysis of needs and priorities but the project approach of co financing by beneficiaries should ensure relevance at this level


3 Area is poor and eligibility criteria are established; opportunities linked well with economic analysis and previous experiences; little evidence of social analysis and participation of beneficiaries in design somewhat briefly dealt with; no gender analysis only some description of roles and position of women, unclear what the practical strategies for ensuring gender equity will be in project approach.


X Rather soon to say on evidence available; the logical framework has been revised (supervision report Sept 2003) but new version not presented so unclear what are the implications of changes




IEE Rating

Comments


2 Reasonable identification in logframe (as assumptions) although unnecessary to have at goal level; analysis in text does not correspond to logframe list and mitigation measures are rather simplistic

3.2 Effectiveness. The project overall objective (goal level) could be clearer, reduction of poverty is the goal and this should be enough. There are three objectives presented at purpose level but they are couched more in terms of outputs. There are as many outputs as purposes but not clearly linked. The indicators are reasonable but there is no quality, quantity or time given. The activities relate to outputs but are rather too brief. The description in the text illustrates the project logic and coherence better than the logframe.

3.3 Lessons from experience in the area of private initiatives in provision of extension services are well summarised. There is no explicit information on results in terms of poverty reduction impact but the lessons from experience give some indication of successful initiatives. The project is planned to have a beneficial impact on the environment through the provision of technical advice and incentives for reducing pollution, improving waste management and better sanitary conditions in local markets. There is an environmental indicator included at purpose level although how to monitor a problem avoided could be a problem. IRR is given as 19% with an opportunity cost of capital of 12%; cost/benefit ration is 1.18.

3.4 Sustainability issues are not specifically addressed but the co financing of initiatives by beneficiaries should assist the process. Replicability is not addressed either but the project itself is replicating successful approaches from elsewhere. The project is related to MARENASS and a project in Bolivia and is innovative in two aspects: private sector or market based approaches to delivery of production support services; promoting links between rural and urban sub sectors.

3.5 Efficiency. The design process included a review of the formulation report by beneficiaries and NGOs. There were some useful recommendations in TRC minutes of June 1995 but it is not clear from the documentation how these have been incorporated into appraisal, the specific demands of women are one example.

3.6 The structure of project management arrangements is described but at the time of approval the executing agency was yet to be defined. The one selected changed institutional status and this affected the project implementation process (supervision mission report page 4). There is some description of institutions but specific roles or comparative strengths and weaknesses are unclear.

3.7 A monitoring officer will be part of the PMU with an evaluation commission established by executing agency. The baseline survey is to be contracted out and this should refine indicators including gender differentiated ones. It is unclear on how beneficiary participation will be ensured in the monitoring process.

3.8 The supervision report of September 2003 (full start up of activities August 2001) largely reports on activity implementation rather than on output to purpose level progress. The logframe has apparently been revised following a consultant’s mission but the new one is not presented. The report makes reference to compliance with the majority of previous missions’ (not supervision by CAF) recommendations and there is a useful table, which summarises the response to the consultant mission in Oct 2002 and that of IFAD Jan and April 2003. There is



no cover sheet to link with indicators used on PSR format and this makes comparison difficult.

3.9 Outcomes. It is too early in project life to assess outcomes. The last two PSR (2002 and 2003) indicate good progress. The M and E scores one and this is unusual. Overall project performance, gender equality and achievement of development objectives all score one or A.

4 Key Issues

4.1 Institutional: effect of change of status of executing agency – common problem what lessons can be learned in terms of preparation/design phase or is it just one of those things that happens and there is little that can be done to prepare?

4.2 Monitoring and evaluation: preparation of base line studies and review of indicators? Participatory processes with beneficiaries? Why has this project done better in this regard than others in the region?

4.3 Logical framework: revised according to supervision report – where is the new version? Any implications for project implementation?



Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) Regional/Sub-Regional/Cross Regional


Small Grants



645 LAC Forum Forum of Rural Finance for L America and Caribbean 29-Nov-02 93 000

Bolivia Mexico Guatemala Panama Peru Ecuador Haiti Nicaragua El Salvador

Other Research and & Training

302 IICA

Programme for Strengthening Regional Capacity for Evaluation and Rural Poverty Allevation Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean

12-Apr-95 790 000


310 RIMISP

Research Methodological Network IFAD-Supported Project in Latin America

14-Sep-95 650 000

Regional Support in developing m and e provided to MARENASS project


Regional

324 GIA


17-Apr-96 800 000






468 DESCO


09-Dec-99 1 550 000

Regional Support in developing m and e provided to MARENASS project


09-Dec-99 500 000 Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Peru


Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay Support to MARENASS

496 PROCASUR

Programa Regional Destinado a Consolidar las Estrategias de Incorporacion de los aspectos de Genero en los Proyectos Financiados por el FIDA en America Latina y Caribe

03-May -00 850 000

Cross-regional


Regional

584 IICA


23-Apr-02 587 000

Regional





Phase II


Regional

Agricultural Research

411 CIP

Integrated Management of Potato Late Blight Disease: refining and Implementing local strategies through Farmer Field Schools

10-Sep-98 1 050 000

Bangladesh China Ethiopia Uganda Bolivia Peru

518 INBAR

Technologies for Smallholder Bamboo and Rattan based production Phase II

07-Dec-00 1 295 000

India Ghana Tanzania Ecuador Ethiopia Kenya Uganda Cameroon Nigeria Costa Rica Peru

652 CIP Integrating and Scaling up and Replicating technologies for resource poor potato growers

1-Apr-03 800 000 Uganda Ethiopia Bolivia Peru China Bangladesh

Country Specific


Small Grants

381 CCD International Training Course Peruvian CCD National Action Programme

13-Nov-97 20 000

502D PE Fomento de Transferimento de Tecnologias Comunidades Campesino Sierra

17-Oct-00 23 000

NGO/ECP 4.4 New Income generating Activities Project: Agricultural Tourism in Quillarumiyoc. Number 187 (US$ 60,000 with 54,000 NGO cofinancing)

4.5 The project will rehabilitate a local archaeological site and also provide for the development of microenterprises related to tourism. These include accommodation, crafts and local foods sales. There is also the potential to rehabilitate an ancient farming system for the use of the local community as the laws prohibiting the cultivation of land enclosed in archaeological sites has been repealed.

4.6 Promotion of Self Managed Organizations for the Development of Women in the Suyo District, Ayavaca Province Number 146 (US$75,000)

4.7 These organizations are located in the project area of the IFAD/World Food Programme Promotion of Technology Transfer to Peasant Communities in the Highlands. The focus of the project is to enable women to add value to their produce. This appears to involve the development of a corn threshing enterprise and the establishment of a micro credit fund.

4.8 Rural Credit for Peasant Women in the Communities of Sangarara and Marcacongar, Province of Cusco (US$ 45,000)

4.9 The project is a pilot experience of providing microcredit facilities to two communities in the area of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project. The credit is designed to enable women to set up profitable and sustainable activities of their own choice.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Rwanda

Rwanda Country Synopsis page 1

Rwanda Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 Description and assessment of the Rwanda COSOP (December 2002) requires a substantial effort to separate substance (which is clear and sound) from presentation (which is deeply confusing).

1.2 IFAD’s Strategic Guidelines for Rwanda (as summarised in ExecSum para.7) are to i) support national institutional development ii) exploit ‘all possible means’ of increasing the income of the poor and iii) pursue complementarity amongst projects.

1.3 The 10 Proposed Thrusts (paras.41 to 49) are to support a) decentralisation; b) MFIs c) technology transfer; d) income generation and market organisation; e) SMEs f) infrastructure; g) gender; h) decentralised project management and i) inter-project synergy. The difference between these two categories is unclear. The picture is further confused by: the Overall Aim (also called overall objective in para.39) to ‘take the lead’ in rural poverty reduction (surely an ambitious aim for a mid-sized donor without country presence); by the Logframe (Appendix III) which defines a Goal of poverty reduction ‘in IFAD project areas’ (an apparent conflict with the institutional development Strategic Guideline) and five Purposes (Local governance; MFIs; household participation; participatory R&D, equal opportunities); and by Priority Areas (Table 1 of Appendix III) which cover the first eight of the Proposed Thrusts. The one categorisation the COSOP does not present explicitly is Strategic Opportunities.

1.4 The Regional Strategy (March 2002) has four ‘Strategic Thrusts’: A. Promoting efficient and equitable market linkages; B. Developing rural financial systems; C. Improving access to and management of land and water; D. Creating a better knowledge, information and technology system. The various guidelines, thrusts, aim, objective, goal, purposes and priorities in the COSOP are roughly consistent with these four regional ‘thrusts’, but it is difficult to determine the direct correspondence. The second ‘strategic guideline’ (poverty reduction ‘by all possible means’) would make the COSOP consistent with any approach which was not clearly growth-destroying.

1.5 The inclusion of support to decentralisation seems questionable. Local government reform is not apparently within IFAD’s mandate; IFAD has little apparent experience or skills in the field and the evidence is that the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction is uncertain and highly contingent. Donor support should always be consistent with national systems of governance, but that is very different from proposing direct support to local government reform as an objective of country strategy.

1.6 There are modest changes in stated approach since the May 1999 COSOP. That COSOP included six ‘Strategic Thrusts’ supporting: CSOs; smallholder subsistence & cash crops; livestock development; input availability; decentralisation; the People’s Bank and MFIs. However the substance of present strategy would have been quite consistent with the 1999 COSOP.

1.7 Turning to substance, the December 2002 COSOP is clear. From para.9 of the ExecSum and Paras. 61 to 63, IFAD’s strategy over the next four years is to build on the proven success of the SME development project (RSMEPP); to extend the Umtara project, and develop a risky but potentially very significant new intervention in coffee, tea and other cash crops. This appears a plausible and realistic strategy, consistent with the Mandate and the Regional Strategy.

1.8 The country, agricultural, poverty and institutional analyses are good. A simple section describ ing IFAD’s current portfolio performance and noting newly identified opportunities could have led



directly to a clear and definitive statement of the substance of IFAD strategic opportunities in Rwanda over the coming period. The multiple reformulations in the current text and appendices subtract value. Despite the sound core of the COSOP as a statement of pipeline intentions, the length, confusion and contradictions of the document as a whole lead to a rating of 2: Poor.


PFCountry portfolio history (1): Rwanda

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALByumba Rural Development Project79 Dec-81 Jun-82 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-83 Dec-8927 40

AGRICBirunga Maize Project150 Sep-84 Oct-84 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-85 Jun-984 51

AGRICGikongoro Agricultural Development Project232 Nov-88 Jan-89 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Dec-89 Dec-008 47

AGRICByumba Agricultural Development Project - Phase II264 Oct-90 Feb-91 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-91 Jun-0117 39

AGRICIntensified Land Use Management Project in the Buberuka Highlands314 Dec-92 Nov-93 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jul-96 Dec-0349 140

AGRICRwanda Returnees Rehabilitation Programme1059 Sep-97 Oct-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-97 Dec-006 0

Ongoing

RURALRural Small and Micro-enterprise Promotion Project500 Apr-96 Jun-96 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-98 Jun-048 89

FLMUmutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Project1149 May-00 Jun-00 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Dec-00 Dec-104 25

RURALUmutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Twin Project1222 Dec-01 Mar-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-02 Dec-0716 30

MRKTGSmallholder Cash and Export Crops Development Project1232 Dec-02 Feb-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-03 Sep-108 32

Not Effective

RURALRural Small and Microenterprise Project - Phase II1276 Sep-03 Nov-03 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed 7

Totals

02 April 2004

PFCountry portfolio history (2):Rwanda

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALByumba Rural Development Project79 11,156 24,456 46% 46% 8% 19,400 110,0001,261 222 5.7

AGRICBirunga Maize Project150 3,800 4,340 88% 0% 12% 46,100 230,50094 19 5.0

AGRICGikongoro Agricultural Development Project232 11,200 24,278 46% 0% 54% 42,000 250,000578 97 6.0

AGRICByumba Agricultural Development Project - Phase II264 8,731 19,501 45% 33% 22% 33,600 184,800580 106 5.5

AGRICIntensified Land Use Management Project in the Buberuka Highlands314 9,477 10,780 88% 0% 12% 18,600 88,000580 123 4.7

AGRICRwanda Returnees Rehabilitation Programme1059 2,797 3,147 89% 11% 0% 45,000 250,00070 13 5.6

Ongoing

RURALRural Small and Micro-enterprise Promotion Project500 5,429 5,960 91% 0% 9% 12,000 60,000497 99 5.0

FLMUmutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Project1149 15,927 32,876 48% 37% 15% 51,000 242,500645 136 4.8

RURALUmutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Twin Project1222 11,997 24,230 50% 35% 15% 35,000 175,000692 138 5.0

MRKTGSmallholder Cash and Export Crops Development Project1232 16,263 25,089 65% 23% 13% 28,000 140,000896 179 5.0

Not Effective

RURALRural Small and Microenterprise Project - Phase II1276 14,914 17,566 85% 0% 15% 10,000 50,0001,757 351 5.0

111,691 192,223 58% 23% 19%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Project 1: Intensified Land Use Management Project in the Buberuka Highlands

2.1 This project was Board-approved in December 1992, but following force majeure suspension and consequent re-design over 1994-96, it was not effective until mid-1996. It is a $10.8m project (IFAD loan c.$.9.5m) to strengthen extension services; build 630Ha of terraces; rehabilitate 530Ha of marsh; protect 1200Ha of forest; organise 230 farmer groups and provide a project credit fund. Although the project was re-designed, the quality at entry assessment is based on the 1992 Appraisal Report and RRP.

2.2 There was no COSOP or Regional Strategy in 1992. Targeting appears sound, but throughout, the documentation is vague on the extent to which the project was designed in the field in accordance with the wishes and capacities of beneficiaries and implementers. It reads as a largely office-designed project. If there was participation in the design, it is not mentioned.

2.3 There is no logframe. The four objectives and vaguely expressed and not directly-measurable. Some indicators are given for the number of beneficiaries, but there is no systematic presentation.

2.4 Lessons from previous projects are vague. No direct experience of the success of similar approaches is mentioned. Concern about the environmental aspects of marshland development are mentioned. An apparently thorough ERR is given, although the absence of any clear appraisal of beneficiary and implementer interests and capacities in the design undermines confidence in it. No design features to promote sustainability or replication are mentioned. No particular innovation is mentioned (although this wasn’t a required ‘theme’ in 1992).

2.5 The management arrangements appear entirely formulaic. There is no hint that the design was based on a serious examination of the staffing, skills, systems, management, motivations or interests of the proposed implementers. Arrangements for project monitoring are a list of responsible agencies.

2.6 Following the 1996 re-design, the project suffered from slow start up. The project manager and accountant had to be changed in 1999. However following intensive support from the CI (UNOPS), the project began to perform. Further substantial reorganisation followed the MTR in July 2001, including redefinition of the target group, clarification of interventions, and a two-year extension.








2


1



3 Summary of findings: Rural Small and Micro-enterprise Promotion Project (RSMEPP)

3.1 RSMEPP was approved by the Board in April 1996 with an IFAD loan of c.$5.43m. There was no COSOP or RS in 1996, but development of SMEs is consistent with both the March 2002 Regional Strategy and the December 2002 COSOP. A new project, building on the implementation achievements of RSMEPP is included in the pipeline defined in the 2002 COSOP.

3.2 The RSMEPP design was clearly targeted in terms of location and beneficiaries, although it is not clear from the documentation if, or to what extent, SMEs, nascent producer associations and implementers were involved in the design process.

3.3 There is no logframe, but the definition and logic of the objective and components is clear in the text. No firm indicators are given. No lessons from previous projects, environmental impact assessment or economic return analyses are provided in the preparation. Sustainability and replicability are not directly treated in the preparation documentation. The project concept is new and innovative for IFAD in Rwanda.

3.4 The documentation of the internal quality assurance process indicates good inputs from PT, especially on project organisation and credit, and the TRC issues paper indicates considerable consensus after discussion.

3.5 The specification of management organisation and structure is clear, but there is no evidence of direct discussions with potential implementers in defining roles and capacities. There is no indication that the design was based on an examination of the staffing, skills, systems, management, motivations or interests of the proposed implementers. Arrangements for project monitoring are normative and similarly indicate no appraisal of existing project monitoring capacities.

3.6 The quality of supervision (UNOPS/Nairobi) was high and reports are clear and detailed.








3


2



Outcomes 3.7 No project completion report is available for either project. However from the limited information available in supervision and PSR reports, the indications of outcome (on the usual OE rating scale) are as follows:-

Buberuka: Overall Outcome: Low

3.8 By late 2003, a motivated project management had achieved good progress with infrastructure, mainly terracing, and with forestry. The substantial volume of terracing work has created technically-competent construction groups, now in a position to sell their services to other landholders.

3.9 All other activities appear to be either very small-scale or late. About 2,250 people, organised into associations, had received a variety of inputs ranging from agriculture to HIV awareness and literacy. For a project covering 11 districts, the numbers reached appear to be very small. Agriculture demonstrations were provided for about 250 people; 229 small loans provided through local MFIs; livestock training for 1,070 people.

3.10 Overall, and despite a two-year extension to June 2004, progress has been poor, and several activities have yet to start, including community development training and re-stocking. Activity monitoring continues to be weak, and it is uncertain whether the PCR will have the requisite data to assess overall impact. 87% of the IFAD $9.48 loan had been disbursed by August 2003, but it appears highly unlikely that this will have achieved the returns originally estimated in the design.

RSMEPP: Overall Outcome: High 3.11 Despite slow start-up, the project is now driven by committed and active management. Performance has been high on most criteria. Despite being a new and risky intervention in SME development, coverage has been greater than expected and many more solidarity groups and professional associations than envisaged in the design have been formed. By August 2003 (after 5 years) 3,200 SMEs were operational in 3 provinces covering 11,700 people. 40% were women. The RRP target estimate was 12,000 total after 5 years with 75% women. 382 solidarity groups & 138 professional associations had been formed. (The RRP had estimated 120 groups total). Local service providers are taking over most activities, and sustainability looks promising. The government is keen to extend the approach nation-wide and a follow-on project (RSMEP II) was approved by the Board in September 2003, building on the management team and experience gained in this project.





Date Grant

Amount Countries 1/

Other Research & Training Technical Assistance Grants for the period 1994-2002 377 RW Rwanda Returnees Rehabilitation Programme PF 11-Sep-97 2 100 000 Rwanda

Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000) for the period 1994-2002

528B RWANDA Projet de Developpement Agricole de Gikongoro, Project Completion Report PF 04-Apr-01 22 000 Rwanda

528C RWANDA Rwanda Returnees Rehabilitation Programme PF 04-Apr-01 22 000 Rwanda

528D RWANDA Developpement Agricole de Byumba, Phase II, Project Completion Report PF 04-Apr-01 22 000 Rwanda

All four TAGs are to finance PCRs or implementation support.



4 Key Issues

COSOP a) A concise statement of the country analysis and a justification of current pipeline plans would be more helpful than an excessively wordy document containing confusing multiple categorisations and over-generalised aspirations. Projects a) It is unclear from either project document whether there was discussion about priorities and capabilities with beneficiaries, and whether the project objectives and outputs were assembled accordingly. Both projects appear to be largely desk-preparations. b) It is unclear from either project document whether the skills, management, systems, capacities and motivations of the proposed implementers were thoroughly assessed. The need to re-structure both projects suggests they were not. Both projects only began to perform when competent, committed, management was in place. c) Neither design includes specific mention of sustainability-enhancing features. d) Determined and committed project supervision was essential in turning around both projects. e) The economic return estimates at entry are wholly notional given the long delays and underperformance of inadequate project management.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Senegal

Senegal Country Synopsis page 1

Senegal Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 COSOP Strategy. The objectives themselves are IFAD standard "increased food production, improved revenues, capacity building, group organisation…”. The earlier COSOP anticipates much of what appears in the later regional strategy paper. The very recent (February 2004) draft COSOP links explicitly to regional strategy and makes good the mention of HIV/AIDS.

Overall rating of COSOP: 3 1.2 Summary. Links well to strategic thrusts and a reasonably good description of trends although somewhat biased towards an economic analysis. The objectives are standard IFAD aims for the time. There is no mention of HIV/AIDS. The COSOP contains an unusual suggestion that farmers have only recently understood environmental concerns. A clear role for IFAD is identified although it is not clear that this was followed in implementation. Links to other agencies are focused on the perceived need to collaborate with the World Bank. The key issue for small farmers in the early part of the period was the marketing of produce, especially groundnuts. This led to the need to work with the WB although the need to work on marketing of cash crops did not emerge as a main theme in the COSOP.

PACountry portfolio history (1): Senegal

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALIntegrated Rural Development Project of M'Bour Louga26 Dec-79 Jan-80 AfDB IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jul-81 Dec-894 77

AGRICVillage Organization and Management Project315 Dec-92 Dec-92 BOAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Aug-93 Jun-992 34

AGRICAgro-Forestry Development Project447 Nov-88 Jan-89 BOAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Nov-89 Dec-978 40

AGRICSecond Small Rural Operations Project450 Sep-89 Nov-89 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Mar-90 Dec-988 16

AGRICAgricultural Development Project in Matam461 Dec-91 Jan-92 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Apr-93 Jun-006 65

Ongoing

RURALRural Micro-enterprises Project491 Dec-95 Jan-96 BOAD IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jan-97 Sep-046 50

RURALVillage Management and Development Project1019 Dec-97 Feb-98 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Aug-99 Dec-0610 77

RURALAgroforestry Project to Combat Desertification1102 Dec-98 Mar-99 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-99 Jun-0513 26

RURALNational Rural Infrastructure Project1130 Dec-99 Mar-00 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Feb-01 Mar-0513 47

RURALVillage Organization and Management Project - Phase II1156 Dec-00 Jan-01 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jul-01 Sep-085 25

RURALAgricultural Development Project in Matam - Phase II1219 Apr-03 Apr-03 BOAD IFAD initiated and cofinanced Nov-03 Dec-111 28

Design

Consolidation and Development of Local Filieres Project1287 IFAD initiated and cofinanced Rural Micro-enterprises Project - Phase II1308 IFAD initiated and cofinanced

DroppedAgricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project1107 Cooperating Institution initiated

Totals

02 April 2004

PACountry portfolio history (2):Senegal

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALIntegrated Rural Development Project of M'Bour Louga26 7,517 19,717 38% 30% 31% 18,200 130,0001,083 152 7.1

AGRICVillage Organization and Management Project315 8,150 10,178 80% 0% 20% 8,980 89,8001,133 113 10.0

AGRICAgro-Forestry Development Project447 9,990 15,990 62% 0% 38% 7,000 70,0002,284 228 10.0

AGRICSecond Small Rural Operations Project450 6,300 28,000 23% 58% 20% 15,000 150,0001,867 187 10.0

AGRICAgricultural Development Project in Matam461 16,090 27,640 58% 26% 15% 4,883 38,4005,660 720 7.9

Ongoing

RURALRural Micro-enterprises Project491 7,340 10,940 67% 0% 33% 5,100 25,5002,145 429 5.0

RURALVillage Management and Development Project1019 9,488 13,400 71% 10% 19% 1,700 8,5007,882 1,576 5.0

RURALAgroforestry Project to Combat Desertification1102 8,175 13,873 59% 14% 27% 3,780 37,8003,670 367 10.0

RURALNational Rural Infrastructure Project1130 7,498 42,886 17% 67% 16% 240,000 2,000,000179 21 8.3

RURALVillage Organization and Management Project - Phase II1156 13,671 21,484 64% 9% 27% 30,000 200,000716 107 6.7

RURALAgricultural Development Project in Matam - Phase II1219 12,508 24,288 51% 33% 16% 7,000 70,0003,470 347 10.0

Design

Consolidation and Development of Local Filieres Project1287

Rural Micro-enterprises Project - Phase II1308

Dropped

Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project1107

106,727 228,396 47% 31% 22%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: MATAM II 2.1 A major difficulty for the IEE in its assessment of work in Senegal is that the random selection of project produced two projects that were just beginning their second phases. The evaluation therefore has strayed into looking at the work done in the first phases of these projects.

2.2 Effectiveness. PRODAM seems to be a good project with measurable impacts on poor people near the Mauritania border. Initially, working around displaced people from conflict along the border, the project targeting was not very effective. The production increases were only available to people with access to land and water. The later work was more equitable and more inclusive (770 villages covered).

2.3 Efficiency. Some concern raised in the CPE that costs per beneficiary are very high. Not clear what the management response to this observation has been. Targeting is not regarded as having been effective and most of the material benefits are with and for the less poor producers. Herders are ignored until the formulation of the second phase of PRODAM (MATAM II).

2.4 Outcomes. Benefits may include large numbers of people who have received training, including many women who have received literacy training. The Senegal CPE is the most recent review of the project impact and it is positive in terms of real impacts on standard of living via very small shared initiatives. The project seems to be an example of successes despite a poor initial design.



IEE Rating



4 The focus is well done and benefits immediately from the review of the first phase.



3 A great deal of learning from phase I and now very good; gender approach lowers score. Not clear yet if all weaknesses in original design have been solved.


4 A clear and cleaner proposition than was normal. The design could survive without major change.


3 Still some risks around effective inclusion especially of young. Most other risks are identified and mitigation measures have been considered.



3 Summary of findings: POGV II 3.1 Relevance. POGV had a dreadful start but has improved considerably. It has interesting links with DFID on groundnut marketing. The project should be interesting since it is in an area where groundnut production was important (vital) to cash incomes when the parastatal groundnut marketing board was abruptly closed. The project is looking at ways to recreate the marketing chain that will bring incomes back to farmers in the area. The groundnut basin is a logical target area for IFAD.

Effectiveness Efficiency Outcomes Ratings:


IEE Rating



4 The issues are absolute centre of IFAD concerns and strategies at all levels.



3 The farmers are very clear targets for IFAD work, in terms of poverty, potential and absence of other actors. Design seems weaker in gender approach.


3


3 The risks remain higher than in Matam with the uncertainties around marketing and access.

Summary of evidence about outcomes 3.2 The CPE is very positive about the PRODAM project although somewhat concerned by the high cost of the project per beneficiary. More generally the CPE is less impressed with the achievements towards the IFAD aims of promoting innovation and scaling up from small successes. There is little evidence of innovation and all results are local with no obvious scaling up or impact through influencing of policy.

3.3 Generally credit reimbursements are poor and probably financial service organisations will not survive without project support.

3.4 There are interesting initiatives around marketing and the need for rice producers to sell their produce at lower prices and for groundnut producers to find new means of marketing their produce. There is potential for greater learning and the sharing of this learning should be facilitated by being near to the centres of regional information sharing projects.



Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) 497 UEMOA Support to Regional Intergovernmental

Organizations PA 03-May-

00 500,000 (Regional)

492 SG2000 A MARKET Driven Initiative for Millet and Sorghum Development in West and Central Africa

PA 03-May-00

1,000,000 (Regional)

691 ROPPA Support Programme to Strengthen ROPPA Capacity

PA 18-Dec-03 400,000 (Regional)

428 SITIA Creating a Regional Network in West and Central Africa (FIDAFRIQUE)

PA 03-Dec-98 900,000 Regional

471 STUDY In-country Assessment of Vegetable Market Development in West Africa


520 FAO Project for Design of Research on Appropriate Water-Lifting Technologies in West and Central Africa


523 WORKSHOP

Implementation Workshop PA 11-Dec-00 20,000 Regional

556 UNOPS Western and Central African Rural Development HUB- A tool for improved food security and rural poverty alleviation

PA 12-Sep-01 1,200,000 Regional

619 ROPPA Support to West Africa Farmers' Organization Network

PA 06-Nov-02

95,000 Regional

636 UNOPS Creating a regional information network in Western and Central Africa

PA 11-Dec-02 1,500,000 Regional

680 CBDP Community-based Development Projects in West and Central Africa: Preparation of a Knowledge Management Exchange Network

PA 29-Sep-03 95,000 Regional

689 ACP Advocacy and Communication Programme


354 AIDA Undertaking Studies in Senegal,

Completing Studies in CAR and Final Full Report on Study

EAD

14-Feb-97 100,000 Senegal

421 CCD/COP II

Financial Assistance for the Organisation of the Second Session of the Conference Parties in Senegal 30/11-11/12/1998

ED/PA

02-Nov-98

100,000 Senegal

502H

SN Projet d'Organisation et de Gestion Villageoises

PA 27-Oct-00 11,000 Senegal

528M

SN Développement Agricole dans le Département de Matam, Project Completion Report

PA 26-Jun-01 22,000 Senegal

429 WORKSHOP

Regional Knowledge Sharing Workshop in Dakar

PA/PT/PF

26-Oct-01 60,000 Senegal

528Z

SN Développement Agricole dans le Département de Matam, Project Completion Report, Suppl. to 528M

PA 01-Mar-02

854.23 Senegal

3.5 The TAGs designed for the Senegal program are not of very great importance. IN contrast the regional TAGs are among the most important in the region. There are three very important relatively new TAGs that are linked with Senegal mostly because of the ease of transport and communication offered by Dakar.



3.6 ROPPA is an attempt to link farmers’ organisations into the political debates and has succeeded in bringing some representatives into contact with influential political figures and political processes.

3.7 FIDAFRIQUE is not genuinely operational. It attempts to replicate the successes of the other regional learning networks.

3.8 The HUB is another information-based organisational project which has not been evaluated.

4 Key Issues 4.1 There is not really a country programme but moves are being made to bring the projects together.

4.2 The COSOP of 2004 is a far superior product to that of 1998 and the process was far better since it involved staff, partners and government. No one seems familiar with the old COSOP. The boast that the new is not simply the strategy for IFAD but also for Senegal may be an exaggeration but the point is good and earlier COSOPS being done by consultants was not a good approach. It will be interesting to see how the involvement of national stakeholders in the development of the strategy leads to improved ownership and involvement in the IFAD program.

4.3 Genuinely making progress as a program over the last ten years with better projects now than then. It is clear that there have been measurable impacts on poor people but the good results are poorly monitored and badly reported.

4.4 Financing infrastructure work has been done on a range of different models some do not conform to government policy which is supported by another IFAD project (PNIR).

4.5 Some confusion over what constitutes a poor person's rural organisation what constitutes local governance and what IFAD should support. Initial work with production interest groups (GIEs) (and forcing the creation of new groups) may be changing to working with community development groups (CVDs) since the former tends to favour larger producers of one particular production system.

4.6 M&E must be improved; training on using the OE manual is planned.

4.7 Senegal is one of the test countries for local presence but the funding for this experiment is rather small and it may not be a fair trial.

Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Country Synopsis – Tanzania

Tanzania Country Synopsis page 1

Tanzania Country Synopsis

1 Summary of the strategy 1.1 The current Tanzania COSOP was approved by the Board in December 2003. It follows the 1998 COSOP and 1993 Country Strategy Report. The 1998 COSOP marked a shift from area-based approaches towards support for irrigation, financial services and agricultural marketing. The 2003 COSOP maintains the key themes of 1998, but was prepared in a more participatory manner. It was discussed in the ESA Regional Workshop 2002, in the Country Programme Evaluation workshop in November 2002 and at three other country workshops. Following the country discussions, a pamphlet version of the COSOP was published in October 2003 and widely circulated. The contents of this version are very similar to the December 2003 Board-approved paper. The main difference is that the analysis of the country background, rural development and poverty analyses are more extensive in the October 2003 version. The comments in the rest of this synopsis refer to the December 2003 Board-approved COSOP.

1.2 The country, rural, and poverty analyses in the COSOP are sound. The lessons-learned sections are thoughtful. The constraints and opportunities for poverty reduction (paras. 17 and 18) are well-presented.

1.3 The COSOP does not offer a single clear statement of what IFAD sees as its strategic opportunities in Tanzania in the light of these identified constraints and opportunities. It is difficult for an external reader to discover exactly how IFAD sees its niche and role in Tanzania's development in the coming period. There are:

1.4 Three Future/Strategic Investment Thrusts: improving the rural poor’s livelihood systems and food security; policy and regulatory reform in rural finance, agricultural taxation and natural resources; good governance (ExecSum para.8);

1.5 Three Priorities: pro-poor growth; technological change; support to grass-roots institutions (ExecSum para.9)

1.6 Five innovations: agricultural support systems; agro-processing; water systems; livestock; health and HIV/AIDS (para.25)

1.7 Four Essential Instruments: grass-roots institutions; legal and social reform; targeting, empowerment and governance; knowledge-sharing, partnership and monitoring (para.26)

1.8 One goal (national goals plus MDGs), one objective (livelihoods of the poor); three Outputs (productivity of the poor; trade volume and export share; farm cash-flow and employment) and nine Strategic Actions in the Logframe

1.9 Two Corporate Thrusts/Strategies (Policy dialogue; Participation) encompassing seven Corporate Objectives (Appendix IV).

1.10 Several of the above are very broadly drafted and could justify almost any project concept. It is not possible to determine the inter-relationship and hierarchy amongst these alternative categorisations and typologies. The categorisation 'IFAD Strategic Opportunity' is not used.



1.11 The ACP following the November 2002 Country Programme Evaluation is appended to the COSOP. The ACP was intended to be a ‘building block’ for the COSOP (ACP para.1). Several of the ACP recommendations are internally contradictory on key issues of strategy. They propose, inter alia, targeting both the majority of the poor and the poorest of the poor; sector strategy, an area-based approach and multi-sectoral strategy (in the same paragraph); founding subsidy policy on national policy and on “a participatory approach”. The 'Table of Actions taken under the COSOP' in relation to the ACP recommendations resolves the problem of contradictory recommendations by simply adding a commentary to the heading (not the detail) of each recommendation.

1.12 In sum, the impression is that the effect of the ACP process on the debate around the Tanzania CPE was to obscure the significant issues of strategy and policy raised by the evaluation. No judgement is made here on the relative merits of the evaluators' and Region's arguments. But the issues are significant, and it is important that organisational processes should make policy issues transparent and indicate where decisions are required. Obscuring important issues with bureaucratic circumlocution cannot be helpful in a 'learning organisation'.

1.13 It is understood that because the GoT was involved in both the COSOP and the CPE process, it was desirable to attach the ACP to the COSOP. For an external audience, however, the addition of the ACP contributes nothing to the clarity of the COSOP overall.

1.14 The substance of the COSOP appears in para.37, which states that over 2004-07, Government and IFAD have tentatively agreed IFAD loans totaling $65m, for five projects in Agricultural Technology and Advisory Services; Livestock and Agropastoral Community Development; Small-Scale Participatory Irrigation; Small- and Medium-Scale Rural Enterprises and Agro-Processing; Health Services, Sanitation and HIV/AIDS. The role of the COSOP thus appears to be as much pipeline approval as a statement of current 'strategic opportunities.

1.15 Overall, the COSOP may be of value to an internal audience which understands the relative significance of the multiple categorisations. For an external reader (consultants, government officials, public) it is difficult to find clarity.

1.16 A more accessible treatment would have been to follow the sound country analyses and comments on experiences to date with a simple statement of IFAD's perceived strategic opportunities over the coming years and a description of how the five identified pipeline projects derive from those perceived opportunities. A few subsequent sentences indicating fit with Government policy; any changes from the previous IFAD approach etc. would provide most of what a country strategy paper requires. Where a prior evaluation has posed significant questions of strategy (majority vs. poorest of the poor; sector development vs. multi-sector area development etc.) it would be helpful if the COSOP addressed those issues directly and clearly described which alternative has been selected for the coming period.

1.17 Overall: the COSOP analyses are sound and there was high national participation. The substance of the COSOP (the proposed pipeline) appears relevant and desirable. However, for any external audience, the presentation of the COSOP is prolix, imprecise and confusing. It makes the document a poor vehicle for communicating IFAD country strategy to anyone other than well-informed insiders. The overall rating is therefore 2: Poor.

PFCountry portfolio history (1): Tanzania

Type Board approval

date

Signing date


Loan Effective

date

Compl-etion date

weeks to next stage

weeks to next stage

Closed

RURALMwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project2 Apr-78 Jun-78 World Bank: IDA Cooperating Institution initiated Feb-79 Dec-838 37

PGMLOSouthern Highlands Smallholder Food Crop Project176 Sep-85 Sep-86 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and cofinanced Aug-87 Jun-9355 44

AGRICSmallholder Support Project in Zanzibar242 Sep-89 Mar-90 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Mar-91 Jun-9727 49

RSRCHSouthern Highlands Extension and Rural Financial Services Project324 Apr-93 May-93 World Bank: IDA IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Jun-93 Mar-003 8

IRRIGSmallholder Development Project for Marginal Areas455 Dec-89 Mar-90 UNOPS IFAD initiated and exclusively financed Oct-90 Jun-9715 28

AGRICMara Region Farmers' Initiative Project489 Dec-95 Jan-96 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Jun-96 Dec-026 22

Ongoing

AGRICAgricultural and Environmental Management Project1006 Dec-96 Feb-97 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Sep-97 Jun-0411 28

IRRIGParticipatory Irrigation Development Programme1086 Sep-99 Nov-99 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Feb-00 Mar-069 14

FLMRural Financial Services Programme1151 Dec-00 Jan-01 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-01 Dec-107 36

MRKTGAgricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme1166 Dec-01 Jan-02 UNOPS IFAD initiated and cofinanced Oct-02 Dec-095 37

Design

Agricultural Technology, Extension and Research Programme1273 IFAD initiated and cofinanced Livestock Agro-Pastoral Community Development Programme1306 IFAD initiated and exclusively financed

Totals

02 April 2004

PFCountry portfolio history (2):Tanzania

Type IFAD Current

Financing (USD 000)

Project Current

Financing (USD 000)


USD per HH

no of individual

beneficiaries

Financing split

IFAD CoFin Dom.

USD per person

HH size

Closed

RURALMwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project2 9,488 25,088 38% 36% 26% 116,700 700,000215 36 6.0

PGMLOSouthern Highlands Smallholder Food Crop Project176 7,741 13,448 58% 10% 32% 350,000 1,500,00038 9 4.3

AGRICSmallholder Support Project in Zanzibar242 6,385 7,185 89% 0% 11% 33,000 165,000218 44 5.0

RSRCHSouthern Highlands Extension and Rural Financial Services Project324 15,811 18,086 87% 0% 13% 32,560 164,000555 110 5.0

IRRIGSmallholder Development Project for Marginal Areas455 9,463 12,143 78% 0% 22% 26,000 156,000467 78 6.0

AGRICMara Region Farmers' Initiative Project489 14,376 19,380 74% 11% 15% 40,000 280,000485 69 7.0

Ongoing

AGRICAgricultural and Environmental Management Project1006 14,834 24,119 62% 27% 11% 171,000 855,000141 28 5.0

IRRIGParticipatory Irrigation Development Programme1086 17,054 25,258 68% 17% 15% 15,700 78,5001,609 322 5.0

FLMRural Financial Services Programme1151 16,342 23,770 69% 18% 13% 55,000 275,000432 86 5.0

MRKTGAgricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme1166 16,345 42,302 39% 47% 14% 25,000 150,0001,692 282 6.0

DesignAgricultural Technology, Extension and Research Programme1273

Livestock Agro-Pastoral Community Development Programme1306

127,839 210,779 61% 23% 17%Totals

1 April 2004



2 Summary of findings: Rural Financial Services Programme 2.1 This $23.8m project (IFAD loan c.$16.3m) was approved by the Board in December 2000. The programme aims to strengthen the legal framework for MFI operation and train and develop MFIs and borrowers.

2.2 The Project is consistent with the December 2003 COSOP Strategic Framework i) Improving the rural poor's livelihood systems, or ii) regulatory reform. It would also be consistent with COSOP Priorities (para.9) pro-poor growth or grass-roots institutions; or with Logframe output 1 (productive capacity); output 2 (trade volume) or output 3 (Farmer cash-flow). The project is clearly consistent with the Regional Strategy’s Strategic Thrust B: Developing rural financial systems.

2.3 The accounts of the rural economy, poverty and the failure of existing financial services to reach poor are well done. The design included PRAs, beneficiary workshops and focus group discussions. Targeting criteria & justifications are clear (RRP paras 7 to 9) and there is sound analysis of selection, constraints & programme instruments in Appendix VI. There is a good inventory of beneficiary organisations (RRP para.8) and gender issues are clearly recognised throughout, with women's involvement targets included. The project is clearly relevant to Tanzania’s current circumstances.

2.4 The intention of the programme is clear in the text, although the four objectives and five components are presented in a lengthy and discursive way. The logframe is also comprehensible, but its single purpose and four outputs do not map directly onto the objective/component presentation in the text. A single, simple, presentation of such a straightforward project concept would surely be more helpful for implementers.

2.5 In the logframe: the logical structure is loose; the grasp of output, indicator and risk definitions is weak. The logframe was revised early during implementation, which suggests poor or unclear design. (The purpose and output structure is the conceptual spine of any project. Implementation should be solely concerned with AWPB’s to achieve the outputs, and should not have to re-visit the conceptual foundations of a project.). The logframe includes many useful indicators, although a smaller number, with QQT estimates would be of more practical use. The three Prime Risks noted in RRP para.27 do not stand out in the logframe.

2.6 The programme is clearly focused on sustainability of microfinance providers, in line with IFAD’s professional Rural Finance Policy. Many activities are described as ‘innovative’ in the documentation. This must be understood as innovative in the context of the current state of MF services in Tanzania.

2.7 On implementation structure and management, the organogram (RRP App.V Chart 1) is a stakeholder Venn diagram, not a professional organisation chart.. Management responsibility and lines of reporting are not clear. The presentational and conceptual confusion over whether MFIs are beneficiaries (eg RRP page vii para.1) or implementers (eg para.22) is unhelpful. It is unclear in the documentation to what extent the capacity of proposed implementers was appraised. AR Appendix 12, for example, (Matrix of Implementing Agencies) is simply a list of agencies and agency categories, with no assessment of the extent to which each is capable of performing the roles allotted to them, or the safeguards and capacity strengthening support and incentives which might be required. In the background AR Working Paper 6 (Organization and Management), there is a fuller analysis of the key banks and government agencies involved in the programme, although it is not clear if the proposed management and operational arrangements were discussed with the key implementers. The important fact that key staff will be recruited through open national advertisement is buried away in



para.14 of AR Working Paper 6 and repeated in para.94 of the AR. Job specifications for the advertisement and recruitment process are included in the Working Paper. This significant feature of project design was not reported to the Board in the RRP. Para.22 on Organisation and Management prefers the misleading presentation that 'the project will be implemented by the grass roots MFIs'. Para.18 of the RRP on procurement mentions goods, services, and 'consultants', but not that the key project implementers will be hired externally hired. Conceptually, the RFSP is a very straightforward project. It cannot be helpful that the presentation of key management and organisational issues lacks similar clarity.

2.8 Supervision Reports appear comprehensive, and the majority of recommendations from the previous supervision mission appear to have been implemented by project management.








3


2

3 Summary of findings: Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme

3.1 This $42m project, with a IFAD loan of c.$16.3m, was Board-approved in December 2001. The project is designed to strengthen about one thousand producer groups, including access to credit and input/output linkages; reform national policies; rehabilitate 900 km of roads and 30 markets; and strengthen the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing.

3.2 The project fits well with different strands of the December 2003 COSOP (Livelihood systems; policy reform; pro-poor growth) and with Strategic Thrust A (Promoting efficient and equitable market linkages) of the March 2002 Regional Strategy Paper.

3.3 The poverty and contextual analysis is well presented and the design notes prior consultation with households (RRP para.5). Geographical targeting is clear (two poor areas with high potential and criteria for district involvement; RRP para.6) and there is a clear definition of land-holding maxima for the target poor. Para 6 includes clear targets for women's participation in some components. Relevance is clearly high.

3.4 The Logframe objective is vague: the Intermediate Goal looks like the objective (what should happen if all the outputs are achieved). (The Intermediate Goal is described as the objective in the text: RRP para.8). Of the eight logframe outputs, 6 are clear, although they do not map directly onto



the five project components, or onto the three (clear) specific objectives in RRP para.8. There are far too many indicators. Few are QQT-specified, and few can be attributed directly to the project. The measurement costs of the indicators shown would be disproportionate. Although the logframe is different from the text, and includes non-standard elements, the logic is plausible. The Risk Analysis in the logframe lists 12 assumptions, but only three risks are treated in the text, all of which are potential killers (government retreat on price reform, private sector participation and decentralisation). "Adequate safeguards" have apparently been included for the three major risks, but it is unclear what these are or could be. (para.38).

3.5 No specific lessons from the previous 16 IFAD projects are mentioned (RRP para.4) although most are smallholder development projects. The AR includes a full economic analysis (Working paper 8) although RRP para.37 offers a poor summary.

3.6 No specific design features to promote sustainability are mentioned in the RRP. Mention of replication only refers to later phases of the project itself. The project is innovative for IFAD and in Tanzania, in that it seeks to strengthen market opportunities for smallholders through actions on policy reform and at local level.

3.7 On quality assurance, the Lead Advisor’s Memo deals with several points but they appear relatively minor. The issue of the complexity and large geographic coverage of the project; the vague specification of management arrangements; the absence of implementation capacity analysis; of treatment of sustainability/replicability in the design; are not picked up.

3.8 On the design of management and implementation arrangements, RRP Appendix IV Table 3 (Institutional Capabilities Matrix) lists aggregate weaknesses of some involved partners, but does not highlight current capacities and support-needs for key project implementers. AR Appendix VII provides a near-workplan for implementers, but makes no assessment of their capacity to perform. The apparent absence of analysis of management and implementation capacity for a large and complex project raises questions about lead-times and effectiveness. Similarly, the specification of monitoring responsibilities and systems is vague and general (RRP para.36). It reads as a normative statement of requirements rather than a researched specification of monitoring responsibilities and systems. This is reinforced by an apparent confusion between systems for impact assessment and routine activity monitoring.

3.9 Supervision Reports appear to be thorough, with practical recommendations. Internally, there appears to be a gap between supervision findings and the PSR reporting. The August 2003 PSR assessed project implementation as 2 (minor problems) when 9 of the 18 performance and impact indicators are 3 (Major problems) and the supervision report, presented one week later, had an overall rating of 4 (major problems). The latter rating suggests that the apparently weak appraisal of management capacities in the design may be pertinent.



Overall 12-Point Project Assessment Ratings:







2


2

3.10 Outcomes. Both projects are at an early stage of implementation and no outcome information is available.



TAG No. Recipient

Programme Division Approval Date

Grant Amount

Countries 1/

Agricultural Research Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002

308 ICIPE

Development of Sericulture and Apiculture Technologies for Enhancing the Income Generation Potential of Smallholders in Africa

PT 14-Sep-95 1 300 000

Kenya, Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

332 IDRC Development & Transfer of Technologies for Smallholder Bamboo & Rattan based Producers

PT 11-Sep-96 900 000 Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Costa Rica, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria

376 ILRI

Programme for Enhancing the Impact of Immunization against East Coast Fever with improved Sub-Unit Vaccine on the Smallholder Dairy Sector in Eastern Africa

PT 11-Sep-97 600 000

Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda

412 IITA Development and Application of a Biological Control Programme for the Cassava Green Mite in Africa

PT 10-Sep-98 1 500 000 Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Benin, Ghana,

491 ICIPE Programme for Improving Income-Generation Options based on Sericulture and Apiculture Technologies in Africa - Phase II

PT 03-May-00 1 600 000 Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, cross-regional in Africa

518 INBAR

Technologies for Smallholder Bamboo & Rattan-based Production - Phase II PT 07-Dec-00 1 295 000

India, Ghana, Tanzania, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon, Nigeria, Costa Rica, Peru

554 ILRI/ICIPE

Programme for Enhancing the Diffusion of new Tsetse Control: Technologies for Improved Livestock Health and Productivity in Smallholder Indigenous Communities of Sub-Saharan Africa

PT 12-Sep-01 1 258 000

Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia



633 IITA

Programme for the Development and Application of Sustainable Integrated-Pest Management Technologies for Cassava Pests and Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa

PT 11-Dec-02 1 000 000

Benin, Cameroon, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique

653 ICIPE Promotion of Productivity and Trade of Fruits and Vegetables: the African Fruit Fly Initiative PT 10-Apr-03 1 000 000 Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,

Cote-D'Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan

Other Research & Training Technical Assistance Grants, 1994-2002

303L PAN National Action Programme to Combat Desertification PF 17-Mar-97 126 409 Tanzania

Small-Technical Assistance Grants (below USD 100,000), 1994-2002

502G TZ Southern Highlands Extension and Rural Financial Services Programme PF 23-Oct-00 22 000 Tanzania

602 TZ Rural Financial Services Programme PF 27-Aug-02 19 000 Tanzania

603 TZ Participatory Irrigation Development Programme PF 27-Aug-02 11 000 Tanzania

618 WORKSHOP National Roundtable Workshop OE 31-Oct-02 25 000 Tanzania The small TAGs were to finance aspects of implementation support and consultation.



4 Key Issues 4.11 Both projects will be visited during the field study. In addition to completing the common Field Study formats, key issues from the Desk Study are as follows:-

Rural Financial Services Programme

• Why did the logframe have to be revised? • Are implementers clear on what they have to achieve? • How were the implementers selected? • Do the implementers have both the conceptual grasp of sustainable microfinance, and

the management capacity to deliver success? • Do the implementers have activity monitoring systems in place? • Is the concept of MFI sustainability internalised within the project? • Is supervision sufficiently frequent? • Is there a need for technical (as well as administrative) supervision support? • Is the project able to undertake policy dialogue effectively?

Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme

• Are implementers clear on what they have to achieve? • Are the Northern & Southern Highlands an appropriate size of working area? • How were the implementers selected? • Are the implementers capable of implementing a relatively complex project? • Do they have an activity monitoring system in place? • Are the major problems identified in the 2003 supervision report now under control? • How is project management balancing implementation of physical works and policy

reform? • Is the project able to undertake policy dialogue effectively?

Annex 9 - IFAD

Documents

Transcript of Annex 9 - IFAD