Anglin 1978 From Reference to Meaning

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From Reference to MeaningAuthor(s): Jeremy M. AnglinReviewed work(s):Source: Child Development, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), pp. 969-976Published by: Wiley-Blackwellon behalf of the Society for Research in Child DevelopmentStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1128736.

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From Reference to MeaningJeremy M. AnglinUniversityof Waterloo

ANGLIN, JEREMY M. FromReferenceo Meaning. HmLDDEVELOPMENT, 1978,49, 969-976.Auseful distinctionfor those concerned with the acquisitionof word meaning is between the ex-tension or the referentialscope of a word and the intensionor the meaning of that word. Devel-opmentalpsycholinguistshave often inferredthe intension or meaningof the child'swordssolelyfrom their extension or referentialscope. It is arguedhere that this approachmay be problematic,and 2 studies of the intension or meaningof the child'swords which involve a differentapproachare described. In the firststudy preschoolchildrenwere engaged in conversationsabout a set of12 commonnouns and encouragedto describe their knowledge of each word in as much detailas possible. In the second study a differentgroupof preschoolchildrenwas asked (1) to definea set of commonnouns, and (2) to classify picturesof objects as referentsor nonreferentsof thewords which they had just defined. Both studies revealed some rudimentaryconceptualknowl-edge in the preschoolchildren of the functionsas well as the appearanceof referentsof a numberof words and a tendency in the children to think in terms of particularswhen discussingwordmeanings. The second study also showed that preschoolchildren are most often inconsistent ntheir classificationof picturesof objectsinto verbalconcepts, with their definitionsof those verbalconcepts suggestingthat children'stermsof referenceare characterizedby a lack of coordinationbetween extensionand intension.In discussions both of concepts and ofword meanings philosophers, linguists, andpsychologists have often distinguished betweenthe extension of a concept or word and its in-tension. By extension is meant the set of objectswhich are instances of the concept or referents

of the word. By intension is meant the proper-ties which define the concept or word. So, forexample, the extension of the word animal (orthe concept ANIMAL)1 is the set of dogs, cats,fish, birds, insects, etc., which are its instances,while the intension of animal (or ANIMAL)is the set of properties lives, breathes, di-gests, is capable of spontaneous motion, andso on which define it. When applied to wordsthe distinction between extension and intensionis roughly equivalent to the distinction betweenreference and meaning. A word can be usedto refer to or denote a given set of objects,those included in its extension. Moreover, aword has a meaning above and beyond theobjects denoted by it; that is, its intension. Re-

cent studies of the child's terms of reference(by which I mean their object names) haverevealed that they differ from the correspond-ing words as used, understood, and describedby adults in both their extension and their in-tension.

With respect to the extension of terms ofreference it now appears that the child bothovergeneralizes and undergeneralizes relativeto adult standards. My own evidence for thisclaim was discussed in my talk at the Societyfor Research in Child Development meeting3 years ago in Denver (Anglin, Note 1) andsubsequently has been presented and discussedmore fully in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of my recentbook, Word, Object, and Conceptual Develop-ment (Anglin 1977). My conclusions, as statedabove, are that the child both overgeneralizesand undergeneralizes his first terms of refer-ence, and whether he will do the former or thelatter or neither or both depends upon a va-This is a slightly revised version of a paper entitled FromReference to Meaning whichwas presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Researchin Child Development,NewOrleans,March 1977, in a symposiumentitled The Acquisitionof Word Meaning' which wasorganized by MichaelSmith. I would like to thankDeborahKayand three anonymousreviewersfor their helpful commentson an earlierdraft of this paper. Reprintsmay be requestedfromtheauthor at the Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, CanadaN2L 3G1.1Throughoutthis paper, when a word is being discusseditalics are used (e.g., dog); whena concept is being discussed small capital letters are used (e.g., DOG).[ChildDevelopment, 978, 49, 969-976. @1978by the Society for Research n Child Development,Inc.0009-3920/78/4904-0005$00.81]


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970 Child Developmentriety of factors, of which the following fourappearto be most important.First, it dependson the particularchild in question. Some chil-dren overgeneralizecertainterms,while othersundergeneralizethose same terms, while stillothers neither overgeneralizethem nor under-generalize them much, relative to adult stan-dards.

Second, it depends upon the conditionsunderwhich the child's termsof referencearestudied. In these proceedings several of theparticipantshave pointed to asymmetriesbe-tween the production and comprehensionofwords by the child (see also Huttenlocher1974; Thomson & Chapman 1977; Rescorla,Note 2). I would only like to add to theircomments that overextensionis more strikingand quite possibly more prevalent when theperformance system studied is production,whereas underextension s more striking andquite possibly more prevalent when the per-formancesystem studied is comprehension.Third, certain verbal concepts appear tobe more often overgeneralizedby preschoolchildren,whereas othersare more often under-generalized.For example,the preschoolchild'sverbal concept of FLOWERften extends be-yond the correspondingadult concept, since inproduction he often calls various kinds ofplantssuch as philodendronsand elephantearsflower and in comprehensionhe often assentswhen asked if such plants are flowers. At thesame time, however,the child'sverbal conceptPLANT often appears o have narrowercopethanthe corresponding dultconcept,sincethechild often denies that certain atypical plants,such as trees and sometimes lowers,areplants.Fourth, and of greatest significance,whether the child will overextend or under-extend a given termof referencedepends uponthe nature of the instances and the nature ofthe noninstanceswhich he attemptsto classifylinguistically. Specifically, our studies havesuggestedthat instancesrated as being atypicalor peripheral exemplars of a given category(see Rosch 1973, 1975) are far more likelyto be discountedby the child as exemplarsofthat categorythan are typical or central exem-plars. For example, children are more likelyto agree that a horse is an animal than thata butterflyis an animal. A second factor maywell be the familiarityof the instance.Althoughthe effect for familiarity was not nearly asstrong as the centrality-peripheralityeffect,children in our studies actually excluded fa-

miliar instances from a given verbal conceptmore often than unfamiliar nstances.For ex-ample, children were less likely to count abutterfly as an animal than a centipede. Wesuspect that this was often due to their know-ing a preferreddominantname for the familiarinstance (e.g., That'sa butterfly,not an ani-mal ) which they did not know for unfamiliarinstancessuch as centipedes.

Finally, with respect to the noninstancesof verbal concepts, certain ones appear to bemost likely to evoke overgeneralizationn thechild. In our studies in which we attemptedtotease apartthe relative contributionsof a num-ber of factors in promoting overextension,itwas found that perceptual similaritybetweena noninstanceand an instanceof a conceptwas,by itself, often sufficientto evoke overexten-sion in the child. Indeed, perceptualsimilarityproved to be by far the most powerfulof thefactorswe studied in eliciting overextension ntwo studies of comprehension,n one study ofproduction, and in an analysis of 11 diaries(see Anglin 1977). In this respect my conclu-sionsare in substantialagreementwith those ofClark (1973, 1974, 1975) and also with thoseof Bowerman (1976). Occasionally factorsother than perceptual similaritymay also beinvolved in evokingovergeneralization,uch asassociation through contiguity, affective simi-larity, and even possibly functional similarity.Of these the most significant n ourstudieswasassociation through contiguity, as when thechild agrees that a lunch pail is breador whenshe calls a saddle a horse. In any event, al-though a varietyof factorsmay be involved inenticing the child to overgeneralize,I wouldnonetheless argue that perceptual similaritybetween a noninstanceof the verbal conceptand an instanceof the concept is the strongestand most pervasive factor enticing the youngchild to do so.Although it is possible to specify the di-mensionsalongwhich the child overgeneralizesand undergeneralizes, he significanceof suchmistakes or a theory of semantic develop-ment is not obvious. They do, however, raisean interesting possibility, which is that themeaning or the intension of the words is dif-ferent for the childrenthan for the adults whoobservethem. When the child overgeneralizes,as when he calls a dome a ball, a balloonan apple, a pile of buttons money, or a vasea flower, if his use of the word really indicatesthat he thinks that the object so named is aninstance of the category of things denoted by


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Jeremy M. Anglin 971the word, then these responses would seem tosuggest that the meaning of the word for thechild is not the same as it is for adults. Simi-larly, when he underextends, as when he de-nies that a cookie is food, that a tree is a plant,that a duck is a bird, or that a butterfly is ananimal, it might be argued again that he doesso because the words have a somewhat differ-ent meaning or intension for him than for anadult. This might seem like a safe assumption,and, indeed, it is very often made by develop-mental psychologists and psycholinguists whohave inferred intension or meaning directlyfrom the extension of the child's words.

Nonetheless, certain problems with suchan assumption suggest themselves immediately,two of which I shall attempt to outline here.The first has to do with the prevalence andconsistency of the child's overextensions andunderextensions. Although extension errors dooccur, as has been carefully documented in anumber of studies (see, e.g., Anglin 1977;Bloom 1973; Chamberlain & Chamberlain1904a, 1904b; Clark 1973; Leopold 1939,1949a, 1949b; Lewis 1959; Moore 1896; Piaget1962), they are not made quite as frequentlyor consistently as has at times been suggestedor implied (Anglin 1970; Brown 1958; Clark1973). Although I have also emphasized thedifferences between the scope of the child'sterms and that of the adult's, it must be ad-mitted that the range of referents to whicha child will apply a given word often overlapsto a considerable degree with the correspond-ing range of referents to which adults applythe same term. Moreover, although when testedin exactly the same way at two different timesthe child will tend to persist in either over-extending or underextending a given term(Anglin 1977), the child's referential mistakesappear less stable when he is tested in differentways. For example, as has been pointed outin these proceedings by several of the partici-

pants, the child who overgeneralizes in pro-duction will not necessarily overgeneralize thesame term in comprehension. In general, mystudies have also suggested a greater overallinclination in children to overextend words inproduction than in comprehension. Moreover,I think I have evidence for the same kind ofinconsistency sometimes working in the reversedirection when particular words are considered,by which I mean that at times the child willoverextend a certain word in comprehensionbut not in production. For example, childrenoften agreed that a picture of a pile of buttonswas money when asked Is this money? ontwo different occasions, but other children werenot nearly so inclined to produce the termmoney when asked to name the picture.2 Inany event, the question I would like to posehere is this: Is the degree of correspondencebetween the extension of the child's verbalconcepts and that of adults, combined with theinstability of the differences that do occur whenthey are tested in different ways, really con-sistent with the proposal that the child's un-derstanding of a word's meaning is radicallydifferent from the meaning that word holdsfor adults?A second problem is suggested by a differ-

ent kind of empirical phenomenon from theones I have emphasized thus far. It concernsthe child's early definitions of verbal concepts.There are, no doubt, clear structural differencesin the form in which a child defines categorylabels as compared to the form of adult defi-nitions. Children usually define such words interms of use or action or description or exam-ples, whereas adults more often define themin terms of a superordinate class and definingproperties (see Al-Issa 1969; Anglin 1977;Feifel 1949; Feifel & Lorge 1950; Wolman &Barker 1965; Campbell, Note 3). Nonetheless,as has been noted especially by Nelson (1973,1974), such definitions are often seemingly2 The purpose of the studies mentioned here was not to examine the asymmetrybetweenproduction and comprehension,and the resulting data do not represent an ideal test of thisasymmetry,since productionand comprehensionof the same termwere not observed in the samechild. Nonetheless, some of the pictures evoked a sufficientlygreaterdegree of overextension nthe comprehensionof a given word than in its productionto make it seem extremely ikely thatthe same sort of asymmetrywould hold if the same children were tested for both comprehen-sion and production.E.g., 76%of the children in our studies assented when asked if the pictureof buttons was money, whereas only 20%of a different group of children of approximately hesame age produced the term money when asked to name the picture. It should be pointed outthat our test of comprehensionwas not exactly the same as those of Huttenlocher (1974),Thomson and Chapman (1977), or Rescorla (Note 2), who have found evidence for overex-tension in productionbut not in comprehension.But this is really the point. Different methodsof assessing the extension of words can yield somewhat differentestimates of the scope of thechild's verbal concepts.


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972 Child Developmentquite apt, since the child often mentions theessential use or an almost defining action ofinstances of the category. Examples are: Foodis to eat ; A hole is to dig ; A dog is a thingwhat goes ruff. When he is capable of suchdefinitions his overextensions and underexten-sions, it might be argued, are simply obscuringhis real knowledge of the word's meaning,which is revealed by another more direct indi-cator: his facility in defining. Of course, moststudies of the child's definitions have usuallybeen concerned with children of 5 years orolder, so that, taken alone, their relevance foryounger preschool children is not entirely clear.However, we had observed in one study ofunderextension that preschool children between2 and 5 years of age could also sometimesgive a reasonable definition of a verbal cate-gory. For example, these young children wouldsometimes define the word food as to eat, orclothing as you wear it, even though thesesame children did not include certain edibleobjects or articles of clothing in the categoriesFOOD and CLOTHING in their classification ofpictures of objects. The question I would liketo raise about these observations is this: If thechild's underextensions meant that she did notknow the meaning of the word, then why was itthat she could sometimes define it?3

These were the kinds of questions whichled us to studies of the meaning or intensionof the child's terms of reference. In what fol-lows I would like to discuss two studies of theintension of the child's terms of reference andsummarize their major findings.

In the first study we attemnted to in-vestigate what words mean to children by adirect method. We encouraged the child todescribe his knowledge of 12 words (which wewould take as an indication of their meaningor intension for him) in as much detail as pos-sible. The children ultimately included in thestudy ranged from 2-8 to 6-7, and a few adultswere interviewed in the same way that thechildren were. The words which we decidedto discuss were: collie, dog, animal; rose,flower, plant; Volkswagen, car, vehicle; andapple, fruit, food. We chose these words sincewe had previously studied them in a numberof other investigations. We tried to ask a num-ber of questions about each word for eachchild, but these questions were not alwaysasked of each child, and often a variety ofother questions were asked. This flexibility wasintroduced into the interviews since we wantedto be guided to some extent by the kinds ofstatements made by the child. Thus this studywas decidedly not a controlled experiment inwhich every child was treated in the same way.Rather, it was a loosely organized and some-what free-floating attempt to engage childrenin a dialogue about a set of words as a basis formaking inferences about their meanings for thechildren.

We studied the conversations in detail andanalyzed the children's statements about the'words in a variety of ways. What follows isa summary of our major findings in this studybased upon an analysis of all of the conver-sations with children.

3 Threeanonymousreviewersof thispaper pointed out in one way or another hatI seemto beassumingthat the child's definitionsand descriptionsof words are a more direct indicatorof whatthosewords mean to him thanhis use of them to nameobjectsorhis comprehensionof them as re-vealed by his willingnessto assentwhen askedif a given object instantiateda given verbalconcept.Theirpoint was that even adults may not revealtheirunderstandingof a word'smeaningthroughtheirdefinitionsand that the child'sdefinitions, n particular,may at times fail to revealhis under-standingof a word'smeaning. I would agree that in those cases in which the child cannotgive areasonabledefinitionof a word it might well be a mistake to concludethat the childhas no knowl-edge of the word's meaning. In such cases it may be that his use and/or comprehensionof theword will suggest that he knows somethingabout the wordin spite of his inability (or unwilling-ness) to define it. However, when the child's definitionsof words are appropriate,as discussedabove and as they at times are, it might well be a mistaketo conclude that he does not know theirmeaningjustbecause he does not use them to refer to exactlythe same sets of objectsthat adultsdo. Moreover,when the child's definitionsand descriptionsof nouns are examined (as discussedabove and in the nextpartof the paper) they do often reveal one facet of his knowledgeof verbalconcepts which has not been clearly revealed by studies of overextensionand underextension-namely, his knowledge of the function of their instances, their implicationsfor him. As notedabove, studies of the extensionof the child's termshave tended to suggest the importanceof per-ceptual factors in bringing about the child's referentialproblems and have revealed the child'sknowledgeof formmuchmoreclearlythanhis knowledgeof function.His definitionsand descrip-tions of words,however,reveal his knowledge of the functionsof instances of his verbal conceptsas well as his knowledge of theirform and so can be of value to the developmentalpsycholinguistinterested in the acquisition of word meaning.


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Jeremy M. Anglin 973Even 3-year-old children could expresssome rudimentary knowledge of most of theverbal concepts which were the focus of thisinvestigation (with the exception of COLLIEandVEHICLE). The adults whom we also inter-viewed in this study clearly could express moreknowledge of every kind about each verbalconcept, but it is important to give the childcredit for the considerable knowledge whichhe is capable of expressing. In order to de-scribe the kinds of knowledge children ex-pressed about the words, a distinction shouldbe made among the kinds of words studied.Previous studies had indicated that childrentend to acquire one of the terms within eachhierarchy of terms first. For example, mostchildren appear to learn dog before collie oranimal; flower before rose or plant, etc. (seealso Brown 1958; Rosch 1976). The verbalconcepts within the hierarchies which childrenlearn first I will call basic concepts. Now,it turns out that for basic concepts the pre-school child is quite adept at describing prop-erties of instances of the concept and, in par-ticular, four kinds of properties: (1) propertieswhich describe what instances of the conceptlook like, (2) properties which describe whatinstances of the concept do, (3) propertieswhich describe the uses to which instances of

the concept are put, and (4) properties whichdescribe where you find instances of the con-cept. For some more general verbal conceptsthe child is most adept at providing the namesof instances (although as noted below func-tional properties are also sometimes mentionedfor such concepts). The most dramatic ad-vances in the child's expressible knowledge ofverbal concepts beyond this rudimentary baseinclude the ability to assign the concept to asuperordinate class and the ability to describecharacteristics of instances of concepts otherthan the basic concrete ones just mentioned,which include such characteristics as the rela-tion of instances of the concept to other thingsin the world, their internal constituents, andtheir origins.

The child's knowledge of these verbalconcepts often appeared to be instance ori-ented and seemed to be based upon his abilityto recollect specific encounters with particularinstances. Such an argument is borne out bythe fact that in discussing general conceptssuch as ANIMAL and rooD children were oftenobserved to rattle off the names of instances,sometimes exclusively. It may also be whyoften the properties which they did come up

with for basic concepts were not defining in thesense of being true of all and only the instancesof the concept. For example, one child, 3-4,when interviewed about the word dog, couldtell us very little about dogs except that theywere brown and white, properties which arein fact true of neither all nor only dogs. To-ward the end of the conversation it becameclear that he had recently encountered a brownand white dog at a park, suggesting that hisinitial response to questions about dog werebased primarily on his recollection of that par-ticular experience.Although many properties mentioned bychildren were of this nature and thereforenot defining, considerable numbers of them

did in fact specify the essential function ( eatit for FOOD) or an almost defining action( bark for DOG)-the kinds of properties thatadults use when they are asked to define theverbal concepts in question. However, therewere indications that the children did not seemto realize that these properties were essentialor defining or, in other words, the necessaryand sufficient criteria for inclusion of instanceswithin the concept. For example, one boy, 2-8,did mention that you eat it when discussingFOOD, but he did not mention it until ratherlate in the conversation, and he did list chairsas instances of the concept, suggesting thatfor him edibility was not always the criterionwhich determined whether an object was areferent of the word food.

Thus, even though the child is at timescapable of relating those properties which foradults are the essential functions or definingproperties of the terms, these essential func-tions or defining properties may not alwaysguide his production or comprehension of them.For example, even though the child might re-call and express the kinds of things he has donewith a ball (e.g., that he has bounced it,rolled it, thrown it, etc.) and the kinds ofthings it has done (e.g., that it has rolledunder the couch), neither these functions noractions will necessarily be the criteria whichwill guide his application of the term ball toobjects. Since such criteria have not been for-mulated by the child as essential, he will usethe term in his spontaneous speech to refer toobjects which, though bearing superficial per-ceptual similarity to instances of the verbalconcept, are not considered to be instances ofthe concept according to adult standards. Suchan analysis might explain why authors such as


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976 Child DevelopmentMoore (Ed.), Cognitive development and theacquisition of language. New York: AcademicPress, 1973.Clark, E. Some aspects of the conceptual basis forfirst language acquisition. In R. H. Schiefel-busch & L. L. Lloyd (Eds.), Language per-spectives: acquisition, retardation, and inter-vention.Baltimore:UniversityParkPress,1974.Clark, E. Knowledge, context and strategy in theacquisition of meaning. In D. P. Dato (Ed.),Georgetown University round table on lan-guages and linguistics. Washington, D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress, 1975.Evans, S. H. A brief statement of schema theory.PsychonomicScience, 1967, 8, 87-88.Feifel, H. Qualitativedifferencesin the vocabularyresponses of normals and abnormals. GeneticPsychology Monographs,1949, 39, 151-204.Feifel, H., &Lorge, I. Qualitativedifferences n thevocabulary responses of children. Journal ofEducationalPsychology,1950, 41, 1-18.Franks,J. J., &Bransford,J. D. Abstractionof visu-al patterns. Journal of ExperimentalPsychol-ogy, 1971, 90, 65-74.Huttenlocher, J. The origins of language compre-hension. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theoriesin cog-nitive psychology: the Loyola symposium.Po-tomac, Md.: Erlbaum, 1974.

Leopold, W. Speech development of a bilingualchild: a linguist's record. Vol. 1. Vocabularygrowth in the first two years. Evanston, Ill.:NorthwesternUniversity Press, 1939.Leopold, W. Speech development of a bilingualchild. Vol. 3. Grammarand general problemsin the first two years. Evanston, Ill.: North-western UniversityPress, 1949. (a)Leopold, W. Speech development of a bilingualchild. Vol. 4. Diary from age two. Evanston,Ill.: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1949. (b)

Lewis, M. M. How children learn to speak. NewYork:Basic, 1959.Moore,K. C. The mental developmentof the child.Psychological Review Monograph Supple-ments, 1896, 1(3).Nelson, K. Some evidence for the cognitiveprimacyof categorizationand its functional basis. Mer-rill-PalmerQuarterlyof Behavior and Develop-ment, 1973, 19, 21-39.Nelson, K. Concept, word and sentence: interrela-tions in acquisition and development. Psycho-logical Review, 1974, 81, 267-285.Piaget, J. Play, dreams and imitationin childhood.New York:Norton, 1962.Posner, M. I. Abstractionand the process of recog-nition. In G. H. Bower &J. T. Spence (Eds.),The psychology of learning and motivation.Vol. 3. New York:Academic Press, 1969.Posner,M. I. Cognition:an introduction.Glenview,Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1973.Rosch,E. H. On the internalstructureof perceptualand semanticcategories.In T. E. Moore (Ed.),Cognitive development and the acquisition oflanguage. New York: AcademicPress, 1973.Rosch,E. H. Universalsand culturalspecificsin hu-man categorization.In R. Breslin, S. Bochner,& W. Lonner (Eds.), Cross-culturalperspec-tives on learning.New York:Halsted, 1975.Rosch, E. H. Classificationd'objetsdu monde reel:origines et representationsdans la cognition.In S. Ehrlich &E. Tulving (Eds.), La Memoiresemantique. Paris: Bulletin de Psychologie,1976.Thomson,J. R., &Chapman,R. S. Who is daddyrevisited: the status of two-year-olds'overex-tended words in use and comprehension.Jour-nal of Child Language, 1977, 4, 359-375.Wolman, R. N., & Barker,E. N. A developmentalstudy of word definitions.Journalof GeneticPsychology, 1965, 107, 159-166.

Anglin 1978 From Reference to Meaning

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