ANG YU ASUNCION v CA.docx

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    ANG YU ASUNCION v CA

    FACTS:

    The Unijeng spouses owned certain residential and commercial spaces leased by Ang Yu.

    They offered to sell the said units to Ang Yu on several occasions and for P6M. Ang Yu

    made a counter offer for P5M. The Unijeng spouses asked Ang Yu to specify his terms in

    writing but the latter failed to do so. They failed to arrive at any definite agreement. When

    Ang Yu discovered that the spouses were planning to sell the property to others, he sued

    them for specific performance. While the case was pending, the spouses sold the units to

    Buen Realty for P15M.

    ISSUE: W/N there was a perfected contract of sale between Unijeng and Ang Yu

    HELD: NO. There was no perfected contract of sale yet since there was yet any meeting of

    the minds. Thus, there is no ground for specific performance. During the negotiation stage,

    any party may withdraw the offer madeespecially if it was not supported by any

    consideration. An Option Contract of a Right of First Refusal is separate and distinct from

    the actual contract of salewhich is the basis for specific performance. The remedy

    available to Any Yu, in case the withdrawal was made capriciously and arbitrarily, would be

    to sue on the basis of abuse of right. In case there was an option contract, timely

    acceptance would create an obligation to sell on the part of the vendor; but no such

    circumstance attends in this case.

    VILLONCO v BORMAHECO

    FACTS:

    Cervantes and his wife owned 3 parcels of land along Buendia where he buildings of

    Bormaheco Inc were situated. Beside their property were lots owned by Villonco Realty.

    Cervantes entered into several negotiations with Villonco for sale of the Buendia property.Cervantes made a written offer of P400/sqm with a downpayment of P100,000 to serve as

    earnest money. The offer also made the consummation of the sale dependent upon the

    acquisition by Bormaheco of a Sta. Ana property. Villonco made a counter-offer stating that

    the earnest money was to earn 10% interest p.a. The check was enclosed with the reply

    letter. Cervantes accepted and cashed the check. The Sta. Ana Property was awarded to

    Bormaheco; the transfer was also duly approved. However, Cervantes sent the check back

    to Villonco with the interest thereonstating that he was no longer interested in selling the

    property. He also claims that no contract was perfected; Villonco sues for specific

    performance.

    ISSUE: W/N there was a perfected contract of sale

    Held:

    Yes. YES. There was a perfected contract of sale. The alleged changes made in the counter-

    offer are immaterial and are mere clarifications. The changes of the words Sta. Ana

    property to another property as well as the insertion of the number 12 in the dateand

    the words per annum in the interest are trivial. There is incompatibility in the offer and

    the counter offer Cervantes assented to the interest and he, in fact, paid the same. Also,

    earnest money constitutes prood of the perfection of the contract of sale and forms part of

    the consideration. The condition regarding the acquisition of the Sta. Ana property was

    likewise fulfilled; there is thus no ground for the refusal of Cervantes to consummate the

    sale.

    DAILON v CA

    FACTS:

    Sabesaje sues to recover ownership of a parcel of land based on a private document of

    absolute sale executed by Dailon. Dailon denies the fact of the sale alleging that the same

    being embodied in a private instrument, the same cannot convey title under Art. 1358 of

    the Civil Code which requires that contracts which have for their object the creation,

    transmission, modification, or extinction of real rights over immovable property must

    appear in a public instrument.

    ISSUE: W/N there was a valid/perfected contract of s ale

    HELD: YES. The necessity of a public instrument is only for conveniencenot for validity and

    enforceability. Such is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale, which is

    perfected by mere consent. Dailon should thus be compelled to execute the correspondingdeed of conveyance in a public instrument in favor of Sabesaje. If the sale is made through a

    public instrument, it amounts to constructive delivery.

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    YUVIENGCO v DACUYCUY

    FACTS:

    Yuvienco entered into a contract with Yao King Ong and the other occupants, wherein the

    former will sell to the latter the Sotto property in Tacloban City for P6.5M provided that the

    latter made known their decision to buy it or not later than July 31, 1978. When Yuvienco's

    representative went to Cebu with a prepared and duly signed contract for the purpose of

    perfecting ANTONIO | HIPOLITO | IMPERIAL | ZARAGOSA 16and consummating the

    transaction, Yao King Ong and other occupants found variance between the terms of

    payment stipulated in the document and what they had in mind. Thus, it was returned

    unsigned. Thus, the action for specific performance.

    ISSUE: W/N the claim for specific performance of Yao King Ong is enforceable under the

    Statute of Frauds

    HELD:

    YES. It is nowhere alleged in the complaint that there is any writing or memorandum, much

    less a duly s igned agreement to the effect, that the price of P6,500,000 fixed by petitioners

    for the real property herein involved was agreed to be paid not in cash but in installments

    as alleged by Yao King Ong. The only documented indication of the non-wholly-cash

    payment extant in the record is the deeds already signed by Yuvienco and taken to

    Tacloban by Atty. Gamboa for the signatures of the respondents. In other words, the 90-day

    term for the balance of P4.5 M insisted upon by respondents choices not appear in any

    note, writing or memorandum signed by either the petitioners or any of them, not even by

    Atty. Gamboa. Hence, looking at the pose of respondents that there was a perfected

    agreement of purchase and sale between them and petitioners under which they would pay

    in installments of P2 M down and P4.5 M within ninety 90) days afterwards it is evident

    that such oral contract involving the "sale of real property" comes squarely under the

    Statute of Frauds (Article 1403, No. 2(e), Civil Code.) In any sale of real property on

    installments, the Statute of Frauds read together with the perfection requirements of

    Article 1475 of the Civil Code must be understood and applied in the sense that the idea of

    payment on installments must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum therein

    contemplated. While such note or memorandum need not be in one single document or

    writing and it can be in just sufficiently implicit tenor, imperatively the separate notes must,

    when put together', contain all the requisites of a perfected contract of sale. To put it the

    other way, under the Statute of Frauds, the contents of the note or memorandum, whether

    in one writing or in separate ones merely indicative for an adequate understanding of all

    the essential elements of the entire agreement, may be said to be the contract itself, except

    as to the form.

    DANGUILAN v IAC

    FACTS:

    Domingo owned 2 lots, which he donated through a private instrument to Danguilan for the

    consideration that the latter must take care of him for the remainder of his life and manage

    his burial. Domingos daughter, Apolonia, laid claim to the land, presenting a public

    document allegedly executed in her favor, the purchase price being paid for by her mother.

    She however failed to take possession of the said property after the execution of the deed.

    In fact, she moved out of the farm when Danguilan started to cultivate the same for as long

    as she was given a share from the harvests. She decided to file a case only after the

    deliveries of farm produce have ceased.

    ISSUE: Who has a better title over the land, Danguilan or Apolonia?

    HELD:

    DANGUILAN. At the onset, the donation in favor of Danguilan was valid even though

    embodied in a private instrument, because it was an onerous donation. The deed of sale

    presented by Apolonia was also suspicious. It was only 3 years old and the consideration

    was paid for by her mother. Assuming that it was valid, still the presumptive delivery is

    overcome by the fact that she failed to take possession of the property. Ownership, after

    all, is not transferred by mere stipulation butby actual and adverse possession. She even

    transferred the same to Danguilan possession of the same. She cannot have a better right in

    this case than Danguilan.

    PASAGUI v VILLABLANCA

    FACTS:

    Pasagui purchased a parcel of land form the Bocar Spouses for P2,800, which was

    embodied in a public instrument. They failed to take possession of the property becausethe Villablancas illegally took possession of the property and harvested the coconuts

    therein. Thus, Pasagui filed a case for ejectment before the CFI. The Bocar spouses were

    likewise impleaded. The latter contested that the case s hould be dismissed because the CFI

    did not have jurisdiction over forcible entry cases.

    ISSUE: W/N this is a case of forcible entry

    HELD:

    NO. The case was not for forcible entry because there was no allegation that Pasagui was in

    prior physical possession of the land and that the Villablancas, through force, stealth, or

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    threat, deprived them thereof. While the sale was made through a public document is

    equivalent to delivery, this presumption only holds true if there is no impediment to the

    possession of the purchaser. Such is not the case here. Since Pasagui had not yet acquired

    physical possession of the land, the case was not one for forcible entry and the CFI (not

    municipal courts) has jurisdiction.