Andreini vs. Air Force

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MICHAEL S. DANKO (SBN 111359) [email protected] CLAIRE Y. CHOO (SBN 252723) [email protected] DANKO MEREDITH 333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 145 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Telephone: (650) 453-3600 Facsimile: (650) 394-8672 Attorneys for Plaintiffs LINDA ANDREINI, EDWARD J. ANDREINI, and MARIO ANDREINI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA ANDREINI, EDWARD J. ANDREINI, and MARIO ANDREINI, individually and as successors-in-interest to EDWARD A. ANDREINI, Deceased, Plaintiffs, vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01169 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (Fed. Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq.) and Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983))

Plaintiffs Linda Andreini, Edward J. Andreini, and Mario Andreini, individually and as

successors-in-interest to Edward A. Andreini, deceased, by and through their counsel, and for

their Complaint against defendant United States of America, allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This action arises from the acts and omissions of the defendants agency, the

United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base. The Air Forces

acts and omissions resulted in the death of plaintiffs decedent, Edward A. Andreini. Plaintiffs

bring this action against defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims

Act, (28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq.), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983).

1 COMPLAINT

Case3:15-cv-01169 Document1 Filed03/12/15 Page1 of 15

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2. The Air Force promoted and produced an open house and air show at Travis Air

Force Base, called Thunder Over Solano, on May 3, 2014 through May 4, 2014. To attract

civilian stunt pilots to perform at its air show, the Air Force represented to prospective

performers that it would ensure their safety by, among other things, providing effective,

appropriate, and reasonable aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) services in the event a pilot

experienced a mishap in the course of his routine.

3. Regulations, directives, and orders designed to ensure effective ARFF response

to air show accidents required the Air Force to pre-position its ARFF equipment and personnel

in front of the shows crowd line and near show centerthe spot where an accident is most

likely to occur during an air show. Further, regulations and orders required the Air Force to pre-

position additional ARFF teams around the airfield such that a team could reach a crash on any

operational runway, regardless of its location, within three minutes of the accident.

4. The Air Force failed to comply with the requirements set forth above and thus

failed to provide a timely or effective ARFF response at the Thunder Over Solano air show.

For example, instead of pre-positioning teams to allow them immediate access to show center,

the Air Force positioned the ARFF teams either behind the crowd line or, alternatively, more

than one mile away from show center. Further, the Air Force failed to position ARFF teams so

as to ensure a team could reach performers anywhere on the runway within three minutes of a

crash. Indeed, ARFF teams were not even able to reach crashes at show center within that time

frame.

5. On May 4, 2014, while performing at the Thunder Over Solano air show,

Edward Andreini impacted the runway during an inverted ribbon-cut maneuver. The aircraft

slid upside down on the runway and came to a stop. Mr. Andreini broadcast over his aircraft

radio that he was uninjured but was trapped in the wreckage and needed immediate rescue. The

aircraft caught on fire. The Air Force ARFF dispatcher ordered ARFF trucks to respond

immediately, and the show announcer ordered all non-ARFF personnel to refrain from

rendering aid and to instead let the [ARFF teams] do their job. But the ARFF teams did not

do their job. As the crowd, other performers, crew members, and various Air Force personnel

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watched and waited for an ARFF team to arrive, Mr. Andreini struggled, alone, to extricate

himself from the wreckage.

6. Due to the Air Forces failure to comply with the applicable regulations,

directives, standards, and orders, no ARFF team arrived in time to effectively respond to Mr.

Andreinis mishap. Indeed, by the time the first ARFF truck arrived, nearly 5 minutes had

elapsed. By then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini needlessly died of extensive thermal injuries.

Had the Air Force provided effective and reasonably prompt firefighting and rescue service as

required by applicable regulations, standards, directives, and orders, appropriate ARFF

equipment would have reached Mr. Andreini within three minutes and Mr. Andreini would not

have perished.

THE PARTIES

7. Plaintiff Linda Andreini is decedent Edward A. Andreinis surviving spouse,

heir, and the successor-in-interest to his estate. Linda Andreini is a resident of Half Moon Bay

in San Mateo County, California.

8. Plaintiffs Edward J. Andreini and Mario Andreini are decedent Edward A.

Andreinis surviving issue, heirs, and successors-in-interest to decedent Edward A. Andreinis

estate. Edward J. Andreini and Mario Andreini are residents of Half Moon Bay in San Mateo

County, California.

9. Defendant United States of America, through its agency, the United States Air

Force, 60th Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base is located in Fairfield, California.

Defendant United States of America, including its directors, officers, operators, administrators,

employees, agents, and staff at the United States Air Force Base, 60th Air Mobility Wing are

throughout this complaint collectively referred to as the Air Force.

10. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the directors, officers, operators,

administrators, employees, agents and staff were employed by and/or acting on behalf of

defendant.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

11. This action is brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671

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et seq. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) which

states that this Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the

United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment.

12. This action also raises federal questions under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983.

13. This Court is the proper venue because plaintiffs reside in this district. An action

against the United States may be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiffs reside.

28 U.S.C. 1402(b).

14. This action should be assigned to the San Francisco/Oakland division of this

Court because plaintiffs reside in San Mateo County.

15. On or about July 16, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted an administrative claim for the

claim set forth below to the United States Air Force, 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air

Force Base. As of the date of the filing of this complaint, plaintiffs have not received a final

disposition of the claim. It has been more than six months after the claim was submitted to the

Air Force. Under 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), the failure of the Air Force to make a final disposition is

deemed a final denial of the claim. Thus, plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative

remedies.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS

ARFF Rules and Requirements

16. The Air Force began planning for the Travis AFB Open House Thunder Over

Solano, in November 2013. As part of its preparation, the Air Force sent Lt. Col. Eric Weber

and another representative to the International Council of Air Shows (ICAS) annual tradeshow

in Las Vegas.

17. Lt. Col. Weber returned from the ICAS tradeshow with a manual entitled Air

Shows 101: Air/Ground Operations Training. The manual addressed the importance of pre-

positioning ARFF equipment, stating that [t]he primary purpose of your ARFF personnel and

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equipment is to rapidly and effectively respond to an aircraft emergency at your air show, to

keep your performers and public safe. . . . This requires your ARFF team to be properly

prepared, and positioned accordingly to respond immediately upon notification. (Emphasis

added.)

18. The Air Shows 101 manual further advised that [t] hose [ARFF responders]

assigned to support flight operations and respond to incidents in front of the crowd line should

have unrestricted access to the aerobatic box. (The aerobatic box is the area within which

performing aircraft fly their routines.)

19. Consistent with the guidance set forth in the Air Shows 101 manual, the Air

Forces own directives require that it pre-position its emergency vehicles so as not to be

trapped behind the crowd control lines. (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-1004, Conducting Air

Force Open Houses.)

20. Similarly, the Air Forces Thunderbirds manual requires the Air Force to

position ARFF personnel within the aerobatic box and outside the crowd line so that rescuers

have immediate access to the show line. The 60th Air Mobility Wing specifically agreed to

comply with that directive with regard to Mr. Andreinis performance when it scheduled the

Thunderbirds (the Air Force aerial demonstration team) to perform later in the day. (DD Form

2535, Request for Military Aerial Support.)

21. Air Force directives make plain that proper pre-positioning of ARFF equipment

and personnel is critical for a timely response to any aircraft rescue and firefighting emergency.

For example, the Department of Defense incorporates within its own regulations, instructions,

and directives the codes and standards advanced by the National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA), a trade association that promulgates standards and codes for firefighting and rescue

response. See Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.06, Fire and Emergency

Services (F&ES) Program (December 21, 2006.) Those standards provide that [t]he response

time of the first responding ARFF vehicle to reach any point on the operational runway and

begin agent application shall be within 3 minutes of the time of the alarm. (National Fire

Protection Association. (2014) NFPA 403: Standards for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting

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Services at Airports, 9.1.3.1, emphasis added.)

22. ARFF must reach any aircraft in three minutes or less after impact because:

The survivable atmosphere inside an aircraft fuselage involved in

an exterior fuel fire is limited to approximately 3 minutes if the

integrity of the airframe is maintained during the impact. . . . When

the aluminum skin is directly exposed to flame, burnthrough will

occur within 60 seconds or less, while the windows and insulation

may withstand penetration for up to 3 minutes. Because of this

serious life hazard to occupants, rapid fire control is critical.

Therefore, whenever flight operations are in progress, ARFF

vehicles and personnel should be located so that optimum response

and fire control can be achieved within this time frame. [] Any

delay in response time is critical.

NPFA 402: Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting Operations, 6.1.1-6.1.2.

23. The Coalition for Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety states that [w]hatever

the role of ARFF personnel at an aviation accident, there is ample evidence to verify that they

must arrive at the accident scene in less than three minutes if they are to save lives. (Surviving

the Crash: The Need to Improve Lifesaving Measures at Our Nations Airports, Coalition for

Airport and Airplane Passenger Safety (1999), 15, emphasis added.) There is nearly universal

agreement on the critical 3-minute response requirement.

24. In fact, even if the 3-minute response is sufficient for standard operations, it may

be insufficient for an air show that involves aerobatic flying. The International Council of Air

Shows states:

[Air] shows provide an environment that can be best described as

non-standard. While a firehouse may be built in a location to

provide an appropriate response during standard operations, Air

Show Layout Plans may (and usually do) require ARFF Equipment

to be pre-positioned to provide unrestricted access to the aerobatic

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box.

Air Shows 101, supra, at 3. Thus, to meet the minimum 3-minute requirement, the Air Force

must pre-position it resources for an air show. Fire stations should be located to allow rapid

direct access to operational runway(s) so that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the

vehicles can be utilized to enable them to reach any point on the runway(s). NFPA 402,

supra, at 6.1.3-6.1.4, emphasis added.

Thunder Over Solano

25. The Air Force requested Edward A. Andreini, a Hall of Fame aerobatic pilot

with over 60 years of flying experience, to perform a routine, including an inverted ribbon cut

maneuver, at the Thunder Over Solano Open House and Airshow at Travis AFB on May 3

and May 4, 2014. The Air Force agreed to provide for the benefit of Andreini and other

performers appropriate and effective emergency services in the event of a mishap.

26. During the Air Forces pre-show safety briefing, one performer raised concerns

about the ARFF trucks proximity to show center. The Air Force assured the performers that

the emergency response team had everything managed, and that if a response was needed it

would be swift as the Air Force would position fast response vehicles nearby. The Air Force

told performers that in the event of an emergency, they should not seek to render aid to a fellow

performer: Dont do it yourself; let the [Travis] fire department do their job.

27. During the briefing, performers also raised their concerns about an incident at an

air show at Barksdale Air Force Base. In that case, the ARFF response to an aircraft fire was

delayed because ARFF personnel were not wearing their protective gear during the airshow and

thus were not ready to respond immediately upon receiving an alarm. As a result, while the

ARFF personnel got dressed, a performer felt he had no alternative but toand did

extinguish the fire himself. On behalf of the performers, the civilian Air Boss specifically

asked the representative of the Travis AFB fire and rescue team whether such would be an

issue at this air show. The Travis AFB representative assured the Air Boss and the performers

that the Air Force had nearly 60 trained people who were prepared for any situation that may

come up at the air show and that the mistakes made at Barksdale would not be repeated.

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28. On Sunday, May 4, 2014, Edward Andreini was piloting his Boeing E75

Stearman at the air show. Per the Air Forces request, Andreini was to perform a ribbon-cut

maneuver, which required the pilot to invert the plane, fly low over the runway and use the

aircrafts tail to cut a ribbon stretched between two poles located on the runway at show center.

As it approached the ribbon at low altitude, for reasons unknown, Mr. Andreinis aircraft

descended several feet and impacted the runway. The aircraft slid inverted on the runway and

came to a stop near show center. Approximately 10 seconds passed from time of impact to

when the aircraft came to rest.

29. The engine on the plane was still running and Mr. Andreini broadcast over the

aircraft radio, I am okay but I cant get out. Mr. Andreini shut down the engine and the white

smoke system on the plane was stopped.

30. Shortly after coming to rest, Mr. Andreini called over the radio, Im on fire

get me out! One of Mr. Andreinis crew members called for fire and rescue on his handheld

radio. Mr. Andreini yelled from his aircraft, I cant get out.I cant get out! Mr. Andreinis

crewmember again called for fire and rescue, Get out here now! The emergency dispatcher

ordered ARFF trucks to roll immediately. Black smoke started to rise from the aircraft as a

small fire started under the engine cowling. At this point, approximately 30 seconds had

elapsed since impact.

31. Crucial seconds and minutes passed. The air show announcer warned all to stay

back, not render aid, and let the [emergency responders] do their job. Approximately two

minutes after impact, an airport maintenance crew member driving his pick-up truck

disregarded the warning and slowly approached Mr. Andreinis aircraft. As he approached, the

maintenance crew member could see that Mr. Andreini was still trapped in his cockpit and

struggling to get out.

32. The crew member took a small fire extinguisher out of the bed of the truck. One

of Mr. Andreinis own crew members grabbed the small fire extinguisher from the maintenance

crew member and, with no ARFF trucks in sight, attempted to put the fire out himself. His

efforts had little effect. Approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds had passed since the moment

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of impact. Still, no ARFF vehicle had arrived.

33. Finally, approximately 4 minutes and 30 seconds after the aircraft impacted the

runway, the first fire fighting vehicle, the P-245, arrived at the aircraft. This vehicle,

however, did not meet the applicable extinguishing agent standards and was thus considered to

be one of the extra trucks, not a qualifying ARFF vehicle. Because the truck did not have the

appropriate extinguishing agent on board, it too had little or no effect on the fire.

34. The next vehicle, CRASH-10 (also referred to as the P-23), arrived more

than 35 seconds laterabout 5 minutes and 5 seconds after the impact. CRASH-10 had the

appropriate extinguishing agent on board. But by then, it was too late. Mr. Andreini was dead.

The coroners autopsy report showed that the crash had caused Mr. Andreini no blunt force

trauma. Otherwise uninjured, the cause of Mr. Andreinis death was extensive thermal injuries.

35. Despite the Air Forces knowledge that it was to pre-position its ARFF trucks so

that they would arrive at the scene of a crash anywhere on the field within three minutes or less,

no ARFF equipment or personnel arrived at show center until well after that window had

closed. The first vehicle, the P-245, was not suitable as it did not meet the Air Forces own

extinguishing agent requirements and, in any event, did not arrive until more than 4 minutes

and 30 seconds after impact. The second arriving ARFF vehicle arrived 35 seconds later, in

violation of DoDI 6055.06 which requires that, regardless of how long it takes the first ARFF

vehicle to reach the crash site, additional units must arrive in intervals not exceeding 30

seconds.

Why ARFF Failed to Arrive

36. The Air Force was required to pre-position its ARFF vehicles so that they have

immediate access to the runways. It failed to comply with that requirement. Instead, it

positioned the closest ARFF station from which trucks could respond to show center 1.3 miles

away. There was a closer fire stationthe primary crash response unitbut the Air Force

had improperly positioned that station behind the crowd line and thus, the ARFF teams route

to the runway was blocked by spectators, rendering the station of no use to the performers.

37. Furthermore, the Air Force improperly imposed on the ARFF vehicles various

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and conflicting speed limits which essentially assured that, given their distances from show

center, a timely and effective response to show center would be virtually impossible. For

example, though some of the ARFF vehicles are capable of speeds in excess 65 mph, Travis

imposed on all responding vehicles using the taxiways a speed limit of 25 mph. This is in

conflict with the NFPAs standard, adopted by the Air Force, that ARFF vehicles be placed so

that maximum acceleration rate and top speed of the vehicles can be utilized. NPFA 402,

supra, at 6.1.4.

38. Further reasons ARFF personnel failed to respond to the accident at show center

in a timely fashion were that (1) the Air Forces ARFF personnel were not ready to go and

(2) communications were muddled, confused, and delayed.

39. The ICAS training documents state:

Even when your ARFF team is positioned perfectly, if they are not

ready to roll immediately they may as well be back in the air

conditioned fire house. The team chosen to operate in front of the

crowd line must realize that they are continuously ready to roll

from the moment they report in position until they return to the

firehouse at the end of the show. This means that they are suited

up, equipment at the ready, vehicles running and ready to roll

immediately. No lawn chairs, no cookouts and absolutely no

family members in or on the trucks. Those few seconds could be

the difference between life and death.

Air Shows 101, supra, at p. 3, emphasis added.

40. Unfortunately, ARFF crew members were not in a state of readiness, and were

not in their protective gear. Instead, they were across the field taking pictures of aircraft.

Further, only one crew member at the fire station had the necessary equipment to communicate

by radio, and there was no PA system at the fire station to simultaneously and effectively alert

all the ARFF crew members of the need to respond. Thus, after the alarm was sounded, the sole

crew member with a radio had to find and gather together the other picture-taking crew

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members before they could respond to Mr. Andreinis emergency. Even then, according to one

Air Force witness, [d]ue to . . . the standby posture of the [ARFF] personnel there were several

minutes of apparent inactivity as crews dressed in their bunkers and rolled their vehicles to the

scene.

CLAIM I - Wrongful Death Based on Negligence and/or Gross Negligence

41. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as though fully stated herein all of the

foregoing paragraphs.

42. The Air Force, acting by and through its various departments, agencies and/or

divisions, was responsible for providing aircraft rescue and firefighting services for the Travis

Air Force Base at the Open House on May 4, 2014.

43. At all relevant times mentioned above, all of the individuals responsible for the

planning of the open house, including but not limited to the positioning, staffing, and

supervision of aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicles and crew members, and all of the

individuals were responsible for responding to the aircraft fire which caused Mr. Andreinis

death, were employees of the Air Force.

44. The Air Force had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid

injury to Mr. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to

otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.

45. The Air Force breached its duty of care to Mr. Andreini and acted with

deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or

with an extreme departure from what a reasonably careful person would do in the same

situation to prevent harm to oneself or to others, through, inter alia, the following acts and

omissions, which are set forth in greater detail above:

a. Failing to pre-position the ARFF vehicles and crewmembers within the

aerobatic box to reduce response time;

b. Failing to use appropriate extinguishing agents as required by standards, codes,

guidelines, and regulations;

c. Failing to have ARFF crew members dressed and ready to respond to any

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emergencies;

d. Failing to coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable

manner; and

e. Failing to respond to the aircraft fire within 3 minutes as required by the NFPA,

federal aviation regulations, and other standards, codes, guidelines, and

regulations; and

f. Failing to implement appropriate and federally mandated procedures to prevent

injury and death during aircraft emergencies.

46. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, gross

negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference to known and obvious dangers, and/or other

wrongful acts and/or omissions of the Air Force, Edward A. Andreini suffered massive

incineration and death.

47. As a result of Edward A. Andreinis death, plaintiffs sustained pecuniary and

non-pecuniary losses, including without limitation, grief, loss of society, loss of support,

services, care, comfort, affection, moral support, solace, and other losses for which recovery is

authorized under applicable law.

CLAIM II - Violation of Constitutional and Federally Protected Rights and Wrongful

Death as Authorized Under 42 U.S.C. 1983

48. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as though fully stated herein all of the

foregoing paragraphs.

49. As a result of the acts set forth herein, plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini were

subjected to deprivation of rights by the Air Force, which rights include, but are not limited to,

privileges and immunities secured to plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini by the Constitution and

laws of the United States. By reason of such acts, the Air Force has violated the constitutional

rights and liberty interests of plaintiffs and Edward A. Andreini, which are protected under,

among other things, the 14th Amendments prohibition against depriving a person of life and

family relationships without due process of law.

50. At all relevant times, the Air Force and the individuals responsible for aircraft

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rescue and firefighting were acting under the color of law and of statutes, or ordinances,

regulations, customs, and usages of the law of the United States.

51. At all relevant times, the Air Force was responsible for, inter alia, emergency

rescue services for Travis AFB and required to provide such services in the event of an aircraft

incident.

52. At all relevant times mentioned above, the Air Force owed Edward A. Andreini

and plaintiffs a duty to, inter alia, exercise reasonable and ordinary care and to avoid injury to

Edward A. Andreini, to provide rescue services in a safe and reasonable manner, and to

otherwise coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable manner.

53. The Air Force breached its duty of care to Edward A. Andreini and plaintiffs

and acted recklessly and/or with callous or deliberate indifference to known and obvious

dangers, with a lack of due or proper care and/or with an extreme departure from what a

reasonably careful person would do in the same situation to prevent harm to oneself or to

others, through, inter alia, the following acts and omissions, which are set forth in greater detail

above:

g. Failing to pre-position the ARFF vehicles and crewmembers within the

aerobatic box to reduce response time;

h. Failing to use appropriate extinguishing agents as required by standards, codes,

guidelines, and regulations;

i. Failing to have ARFF crew members dressed and ready to respond to any

emergencies;

j. Failing to coordinate response efforts in a proper, safe, careful and reasonable

manner;

k. Failing to respond to the aircraft fire within 3 minutes as required by the NFPA,

federal aviation regulations, and other standards, codes, guidelines, and

regulations; and

l. Failing to implement appropriate and federally mandated procedures to prevent

injury and death during aircraft emergencies.

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54. At all times herein mentioned, the Air Force knew, or should have known of the

obvious dangers, was deliberately indifferent to them, ignored them, and failed to provide

rescue services for Edward A. Andreini.

55. The conduct of the Air Force was so egregious and outrageous and contrary to

the right to life implicit in ordered liberty and common decency so as to shock the conscious of

the community.

56. As a direct result of the Air Forces deliberate indifference and conduct,

Edward A. Andreini was deprived of the necessary rescue, medical intervention, care and

treatment, was essentially abandoned in the aircraft fire, and suffered serious injuries and death,

and as a result of the injury, pain, and suffering Edward A. Andreini suffered prior to his death,

plaintiffs claim damages for loss of life and pain and suffering prior to Edward A. Andreinis

death as a survival action.

57. As a result of the foregoing violations which caused and/or contributed to the

death of Edward A. Andreini, plaintiffs sustained pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses,

including, without limitation, grief, loss of support, services, care, comfort, affection, moral

support, solace and other losses for which recovery is authorized under applicable law.

58. As a further direct result of Edward A. Andreinis death, plaintiffs incurred

expenses for funeral, burial, attorneys fees and seek recovery for all damages authorized by

law in an amount to be determined at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs hereby pray relief against defendant as follows:

A. For judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendant on all claims as alleged in

the Complaint;

B. For compensatory and pecuniary damages in an amount to be ascertained at

trial;

C. For costs of suit incurred herein;

D. For attorneys fees to the extent authorized by law; and

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E. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 12, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

DANKO MEREDITH

By: ________________________ MICHAEL S. DANKO CLAIRE Y. CHOO Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Michael S. Danko

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INTRODUCTIONTHE PARTIES

Andreini vs. Air Force

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Transcript of Andreini vs. Air Force