Andmeside loeng 12 simple OPEN honeypot will do the trick •Else, if the probed SSID list contains...

IRT0030 ANDMESIDE

LOENG 12

Indrek Rokk

3

Võrgu turvamine

• Absoluutset turvalisust ei ole

• WiFi võrgud füüsiliste eripärade tõttu kergemini

rünnatavad

• Tea, mis maailmas toimub

• Ole tuttav vastaste (pahalaste) vahenditega, saad

neid võrgu kaitsmisel ära kasutada

• Ole tuttav seadusandlusega (järgmised slaidid) –

lisaks veel varjatud jälgimine ja sõnumi saladus

• Kõige olulisem järgmisel slaidil

4

DON’T

PANIC

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EESTI seadusandlus (1)

Karistusseadustik § 206. Arvutiandmetesse sekkumine

Arvutisüsteemis olevate andmete või programmi ebaseadusliku muutmise, kustutamise, rikkumise või sulustamise, samuti arvutisüsteemi andmete või programmi ebaseadusliku sisestamise eest – karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni kolmeaastase vangistusega Elutähtsa valdkonna arvutisüsteemi vastu või oluline kahju karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni viieaastase vangistusega

Allikas: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/105072013010

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§ 207. Arvutisüsteemi toimimise takistamine

Arvutisüsteemi toimimise ebaseadusliku häirimise või takistamise eest andmete sisestamise, edastamise, kustutamise, rikkumise, muutmise või sulustamise teel – karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni kolmeaastase vangistusega Oluline kahju või takistatakse elutähtsa valdkonna arvutisüsteemi tööd või avalike teenuste osutamist karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni viieaastase vangistusega

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§ 2161. Arvutikuriteo ettevalmistamine

Käesoleva seadustiku §-s 206, 207, 208, 213 või 217 sätestatud kuritegude toimepanemise eesmärgil selleks vastavalt kavandatud või kohandatud seadme, programmi, ka salasõna, kaitsekoodi või muude arvutisüsteemile juurdepääsuks vajalike andmete valmistamise, valdamise, levitamise või muul viisil kättesaadavaks tegemise eest, samuti muude käesolevas paragrahvis nimetatud kuritegude toimepanemiseks vajalike andmete kasutamise, levitamise või muul viisil kättesaadavaks tegemise eest – karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni kolmeaastase vangistusega

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§ 217. Arvutisüsteemi ebaseaduslik kasutamine

Arvutisüsteemile ebaseadusliku juurdepääsu eest koodi, salasõna või muu kaitsevahendi kõrvaldamise või vältimise teel – karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni kolmeaastase vangistusega Sama teo eest: 1) kui sellega on tekitatud oluline kahju või 2) kasutatud riigisaladust, salastatud välisteavet või ainult ametialaseks kasutamiseks ettenähtud andmeid sisaldavat arvutisüsteemi või 3) juurde pääsetud elutähtsa valdkonna arvutisüsteemile, karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni viieaastase vangistusega

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§ 156. Sõnumisaladuse rikkumine

Kirjavahetuse ja sidevahendi abil edastatud sõnumi saladuse

rikkumise eest –

karistatakse rahalise karistusega

Sama teo eest isiku poolt, kes pääses sõnumi juurde oma

tööülesannete tõttu -

karistatakse rahalise karistuse või kuni üheaastase

vangistusega

§ 208. Nuhkvara, pahavara ja arvutiviiruse levitamine

§ 213. Arvutikelmus

Eetilisus • Tehniliste võimaluste ning

oskuste kooslus on privileeg

• Sellega kaasneb vastutus

• Inimeste elu on netis püha

ja privaatne

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11

Rünnaku meetodid • Eavesdropping

• Hijacking

• Man-in-the-middle

• Denial of service (DoS)

• Management interface exploits

• Encryption cracking

• Authentication cracking

• MAC spoofing

• Captive Portal Circumvention

• Peer-to-peer attacks

• Social engineering

Where did we go wrong?

Where are we going? • Technology of convenience versus the

inconvenience of securing it.

• The poor, poor users were left out in the

authentication cold.

• Half-ass security standards pass the buck and /

or provide defacto insecure options.

• Security acronyms have taken precedence over

proper implementation.

Allikas: http://airsnarf.shmoo.com/rogue_squadron.pdf

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Eavesdropping – Pealtkuulamine/jälgimine

• Wardriving ja muud analoogilised asjad

• Raadio kaardil kaks olekut (mode), mis seda võimaldavad • Promiscuous – kuulab ainult BSS liiklust mille küljes ollakse

• Monitor – võimaldab kuulata kogu raadiovõrgu liiklust

Basic Service Set

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Eavesdropping – Pealtkuulamine/jälgimine (2)

• Wardriving

• Raadio kaardil kaks olekut (mode), mis seda võimaldavad • Promiscuous – kuulab ainult BSS liiklust mille küljes ollakse

• Monitor – võimaldab kuulata kogu raadiovõrgu liiklust

• Mitmed erinevad programmid • Eetri jälgimiseks – NetStumbler (aktiivne), KisMet

(passivne) jne

• Liikluse salvestamiseks – Airodump-ng, Wireshark, muud paketianalüsaatorid

Uusi nippe pealtkuulamiseks

Wifi ruuter UPSi kestas

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Allikas: http://renderlab.net/projects/sneaky/

Rogue APs for “Penetration Testers”

http://www.shmoocon.org/2008/presentations/

Larry_Pesce-Rogue_APs_for_Penetration_Testers.pdf

Uusi nippe pealtkuulamiseks (2)

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Allikas:http://2010.hack.lu/archive/2009/tmplab-HostileWRT-5-hacklu.pdf

Blue For The Pineapple …. http://penturalabs.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/blue-for-the-pineapple/

Bring Your Own Rogue [Router|DHCP|Access Point] http://blog.rootshell.be/2013/02/07/bring-your-own-rogue-routerdhcpaccess-point/

Uusi nippe pealtkuulamiseks (3)

• The iPhone wireless LAN ownage in a box

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Allikas: http://www.formortals.com/Home/tabid/36/EntryID/97/Default.aspx

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Hijacking/Man-in-the-Middle (1)

• Tuntud kui Evil Twin rünnak

• Vajadus – ohver vaja ühendada sobiliku AP

külge, millel originaalse AP SSID

• Kasutatakse DeAuth pakette, mida ründaja

saadab välja AP nimel

• Ohver otsib uue AP millega ennast autentida ja

ühendub ründaja omasse, sest sellel tugevam

signaal.

NB! Windows automaatselt ühendab ennast, kui

DeAuth

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• Kui ründaja AP mingeid teenuseid ohvrile ei paku

on tegemist layer 2 DoS ründega

• Ründaja AP ühendab ennast originaalse AP

külge. Ohver ei saagi aru, et liiklus käib nüüd läbi

ründaja AP. Hea nüüd ohvriga toimetada.

• WiFi phishing rünnak – püsti vale captive portal

leht, küsib ohvri andmeid. Kõik paistab õige

olevat.

• Session hijacking

• Firefox’i plugin

• Täpsem info:

http://codebutler.com/firesheep

• Korralikku kaitset ei ole, mis on

see tegelikult ei kaitse – Fireshepherd.

Mis viga - FireShepherd continuously sends random

data over the network in an attempt to confuse session

hijacking tools such as Firesheep.

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Firesheep

http://codebutler.com/firesheep

Click Me.

Allikas: https://docs.google.com/present/view?id=dtv8cxf_20x2xhpvg2

What needs to be done?

• Sites need to transmit session cookies over SSL. • Hotspots need to use WPA encryption. NOT WEP.

o NOT WEP. WEP is very weak and poorly written WEP doesn't stop Firesheep in a shared hotspot

• People need to know the risks. (Spread the word.) o Anybody else at a Hotspot, Hotel/Airport Wifi o Unencrypted wifi at home o Anybody on a shared hub (Hotels with ethernet) o Anybody at your ISP or further upstream

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Kliendid teevad kasutaja elu mugavaks

• Windows kliendi häda – otsib aktiivselt APd mille

külge ennast ühendada. Need on APd mille

külge on ennast kunagi ühendatud. Ründaja

teatab et tema on selline AP.

Tarkvaraline AP Karma

http://www.secguru.com/link/karma_wireless_client_security_assessment_tools

Jasager http://www.digininja.org/jasager/

Kui unikaalne otsitav võrk on?

Wigle (Wireless Geographic Logging Engine)

http://wigle.net/

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12. aprill 2013

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19. november 2013

Klientide ja APde seos

• Airgraph-ng http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=airgraph-ng

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'Free Public WiFi'

• Võrk nimega “Free Public WiFi”

• Tegemist Ad-Hoc võrguga

• Windows XP bug – parandatud SP3s

• Kui võrku ei leia, pane püsti võrk viimase võrgu

nimega

• Järgmised XP masinad mis ei leia võrku –

Ad-Hoc võrk viimase nimega

• Hetkel Eestis veel levib

Allikas: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130451369

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Wi-Fish

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Allikas: MD Sohail Ahmad, Prabhash Dhyani Wi-Fish Finder: Who Will

Bite the Bait

https://www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-archives/dc-17-archive.html

Wi-Fish (2)

• If the probed SSID list contains at least one OPEN network

A simple OPEN honeypot will do the trick

• Else, if the probed SSID list contains at least one WEP network

Caffe Latte will do the trick

• Else, if the probed SSID list contains only WPA-PSK networks

Honeypot attack still possible!

• Else, if the probed SSID list contains only WPA2 network

Honeypot attack still possible in some cases

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Võõrad APd (Rogue AP)

• APd millel pole meie võrku asja, aga mingil

põhjusel olemas.

• Odavad kodukasutuse APd

• WiFi kliendid

• Tarkvaralised või viruaalsed APd, ka mobiilseadmetes

• AP ja STA roll samaaegselt

• Suurematel tootjatel omad lahendused nende

tuvastamiseks.

• Tuleb alati kindlaks teha, kas nähtav võõras on

üldse meie võrgus

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Kaitse võõraste APde eest (1)

• Disabling unused Ethernet ports. This is a simple solution,

but it should not be relied on by itself because people do

make mistakes and leave ports open.

• Using port security on switches. Many switches support

port-based filtering by MAC addresses and other

parameters. You can specify that the only MAC addresses

that can connect to your switch are those in the specified

list. This is not a wireless MAC address in this case, so

the attacker would have to guess a valid MAC address

rather than sniffing for one on the WLAN.

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• State clearly in your acceptable use policy that

users cannot install APs. This will most certainly

not prevent the installation of all rogue APs, but it

will deter many from installing them.

• Implement enterprise-capable WLAN solutions

that automatically detect and report rogue APs

and graphically show their locations.

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• Implement network access control technology. This will

cause the attacker’s computer to go straight to the

quarantine area when he or she accesses the network.

The NAC device/server would be installed between the

switch that provides connectivity to your Ethernet ports

and the rest of the network. Any device that connects will

now have to be authenticated and validated, which will

make many attackers run away quickly for fear of being

caught by the IT professionals who knew enough to

protect that port.

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Denial of Service (1)

• Võivad olla nii lihtsad kui keerukad

• OSI kihil 1 – raadio segamine (RF jamming) –

summutatakse meile kasulikku signaali

• Meelega – signaali generaatorid

• Kogemata – mikrolaineahjud, traadita telefonid

• Ainuke kaitse on allikas ülesse otsida ja kõrvalda.

Abiks spektrianalüsaatorid. Näit. WiSpy 2.4x

http://www.metageek.net/products/wi-spy_24x

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• OSI kihil 2 tavaliselt assotsiatsiooni ja autentimise rünnakud

• Näiteks: • PS-Pool floods

• Association floods

• Authentication floods

• Empty data floods

• Rünnakuid võimaldab kaitsmata management kaadrid, tulekul/olemas standard IEEE802.11w

• Servapidi DoS – väikse kiirusega klient meie võrgus = levisaatel (broadcast) kiirus väike

Autoimmunity Disorder in Wireless LAN

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Allikas: http://www.airtightnetworks.com/home/resources/knowledge-center/wlan-self-dos.html


• Takistame klientidel APga ühendumist

• Teooria: Another frame type related to authentication frames is the de-

authentication frame, which when sent to a WLAN client

causes the client to disconnect from the AP to which the client

is currently connected. This may cause a WLAN client to go

through the entire probe request process again, or at least

make it restart the authentication/association process. De-

authentication frames can be sent to the broadcast MAC

address and cause the disconnection of every client associated

with the AP sending that frame, but many current WLAN clients

ignore multicast de-authentication frames, diminishing the

potential scale of this type of attack.

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Management Interface Exploits

• Enamus APsid ikka veel vaike seadistusega.

• Netis saadaval tabelid vastavate seadetega

• Kaitseks muuta seaded ja kasutada turvalisi

ühendusi (HTTPS, SSH2 ja SNMPv3)

• Mida ei kasutata keerata kinni.

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Encryption Cracking

Hiljem pikemalt

• WEP hästi lihtsalt murtav

• WPA/WPA2 halvasti valitud paroolid/võtmed

sõnastikega murtavad

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Authentication cracking

• WPA ja WPA2 autentimine pealtkuulatav

• Kui ei õnnestunud pealkuulata, kasuta DeAuth rünnet

• Kui on olemas autentimis paketid, SSID ja võimalike paroolide sõnastik siis on võimalik kättesaada WPA ja WPA2 võti.

Vahendiks CoWPatty

• Mõned EAPd (seletus hiljem) on murtavad, sh. Cisco LEAP

http://www.willhackforsushi.com/Asleap.html

http://www.cwnp.com/community/articles/hacking_solutions_cracking_cisco_leap_authentication.html

Võrgunime peitmine

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Defcon ja SSID

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Veel toredaid SSID

• GOOD HACKER VIRUS

• itimeesonloll

• Ostsin endale wifi

• AndroidAP

• HTC Portable Hotspot

• Saab sõnasõdu pidada

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/12/the-funniest-wifi-networks-

conversations-video_n_1875165.html

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MAC spoofing / Captive Portal Circumvention

• MAC aadressi lihtne muuta, kui õige kaart. Osad kaardid näitavad, et saadavad pakette muudetud MAC aadressiga, tegelikult saadavad originaal MACiga.

• Tsitaat - MAC address authorization: “That’s not a lock. That’s a speedbump. If you drive around a speedbump instead of over it, is that illegal?”

• Mööda hiilimiseks MAC Spoofing või tunneldamine kasutades ICMP ja DNS protokolle

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Peer-to-Peer Attack

• A peer-to-peer attack occurs anytime one WLAN STA attacks another WLAN station that is associated with the same AP. Hijacking attacks are sometimes referred to as peer-to-peer attacks as well.

• Ciscol kaitseks Public Secure Packet Forwarding (PSPF), teistel tootjatel sarnased lahendused.

• Rünnaku näiteks ründaja Ad-Hoc võrk mille SSID on sama eetris oleva võrgu SSIDga

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Social Engineering • Social engineering is a technique used for persuading people to give you something that they should not give you. Successful social engineering attacks occur because the target might be ignorant of the organization’s information security policies or intimidated by an intruder’s knowledge, expertise, or attitude. Social engineering is one of the most dangerous and successful methods of hacking into any IT infrastructure—wired or wireless.

• "Hackers rely on you to be naïve. They are counting on it,“ Allikas: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9131571/_Mafiaboy_spills_the_

beans_at_IT360_on_underground_hackers

• Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack Allikas: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack.ars

• Robin Sage - wikipedia

The Seven Deadly Social Engineering Vices

• Curiosity

• Courtesy

• Gullibility

• Greed

• Thoughtlessness

• Shyness

• Apathy

Allikas:

http://blog.knowbe4.com/bid/290552/The-Seven-Deadly-Social-Engineering-Vices

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Social Engineering (2)

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Inimesed käitusid soovitud suunas. NB! Exit 107 ja õige koha valik kontrolliks.

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Mida head näeme?

Allikas: http://fishbowl.pastiche.org/2013/04/14/it_security_in_a_nutshell/

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AAA

• IT turvalisuse kontseptsioon authentication,

authorization ja accounting - AAA

• Authentication Who are you?

• Authorization What do you want?

• Accounting What have you done?

Kliendi ühendumine võrku • Before an 802.11 client can send data over a WLAN network, it goes through

the following three-stage process: • 802.11 probing—802.11 networks make use of a number of options, but for an enterprise

deployment, the search for a specific network involves sending a probe request out on multiple

channels that specifies the network name (SSID) and bit rates.

• 802.11 authentication—802.11 was originally developed with two authentication mechanisms.

The first one, called “open authentication”, is fundamentally a NULL authentication where the

client says “authenticate me”, and the AP responds with “yes”. This is the mechanism used in

almost all 802.11 deployments.

• A second authentication mechanism is based on a shared WEP key, but the original

implementation of this authentication method is flawed. Although it needs to be included for

overall standards compliance, it is not used or recommended.

• Open authentication is the only method used in enterprise WLAN deployments, and as

previously mentioned, it is fundamentally a NULL authentication, Therefore, “real authentication”

is achieved by using 802.1X/EAP authentication mechanisms.

• 802.11 association—This stage finalizes the security and bit rate options, and establishes the

data link between the WLAN client and the AP.

• A typical secure enterprise WLAN AP blocks WLAN client traffic at the AP until a successful

802.1X authentication.

• If a client has joined a network and roams from one AP to another within the network, the

association is called a re-association. The primary difference between an association and a re-

association event is that a re-association frame sends the MAC address (BSSID) of the previous

AP in its re-association request to provide roaming information to the extended

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Olekumasin

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Autentimine

• Open System Authentication - Kõik, kes tulevad

autenditakse automaatselt. On kasutusel, sest

uuemad autentimis süsteemid ja WPA/WPA2

kasutavad seda alguspunktina.

Cisco seadmetel dot11AuthenticationType on

sellisel juhul OpenSystem.

• Shared Key Authentication – kasutab WEP

protokolli ja on seetõttu kasutu.

WiFi võrkude turvalisus

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Paketi pikkuse suurenemine

• WEP lisab 8 baiti

• WPA lisab 20 baiti

• WPA2 lisab 16 baiti

• Essential Crypto for Pen Testers (Without the

Math!)“

• Link:

http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/Es

sential_Crypto_Without_the_Math_Webcast-

20100426.pdf

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WEP • Tsitaat:

In fairness to the IEEE, since I have not seen it clearly documented elsewhere outside the standards, the original specification stated that WEP was intended to protect “authorized users of a wireless LAN from casual eavesdropping” (emphasis added). It was never intended as a robust security technology in the first place. I would argue that it still protects authorized users from casual eavesdropping, depending on how you define casual.

Allikas: Tom Carpenter “CWNA : Certified Wireless Network Administrator Official Study Guide (Exam PW0-100)”

WEP – What on Earth does this Protect

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WEP põhimõte

• WEP encryption is based on the RC4 stream cipher.

First the preshared key (40 or 104 bits) is combined

with a 24 bit initialization vector (IV) that should

change from packet to packet (WEP does not specify

how to select the IV).

• The combined key (preshared key + IV) is fed to the

RC4 algorithm that generates a continuous

keystream.

• The plaintext information is bit-wise combined with

the keystream by employing the XOR operation, thus

producing the encrypted information.

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XOR võlud

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http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/

Essential_Crypto_Without_the_Math_Webcast-20100426.pdf

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WEP Cracking – what is it? • WEP is a per packet encryption

mechanism which uses a

combination of a shared secret

(WEP Key) and an Initialization

Vector (IV) for generating the key

stream using the RC4 encryption

mechanism. This key stream is

XOR’ed with the data and

transmitted

• WEP cracking involves trying to

infer the WEP Key using various

statistical attacks – FMS, KoreK

• Lets now look at the historical

evolution of WEP Cracking

See ja järgnevad 2 slaidi: http://security-freak.net/defcon15/WEP-Cloaking-Defcon15.ppt

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This hasn’t stopped people from using

band-aids to stop leakage

128-bit key

Suppress weak IV generation

ARP filtering

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WEP puudused

XOR, RC4 (ei ole turvaline, nõrgad IVd)

• Ei ole öeldud kust tulevad IVd. Tootja laisk (000),

valib suvaliselt (sünnipäeva paradoks – 23

inimesega 50 % tõenäosus, 57 inimesega 99 %

tõenäosusega), IV+1

• Arvati et väiksed võrgukiirused, 24 bitti IVd piisav

~ 16 miljonit paketti

• Osa paketti kindla sisu ja pikkusega. ARP pakett

36 baiti

WEP krüpteerimine

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The protocol defines no measures against

replay attacks.

Replay attack

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The protocol defines no measures against

replay attacks.

• Vaata üle

Allikas: Understanding the WPA/WPA2 Break

http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/TKIP_Attack_Webcast_2008-11-17.pdf

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SpeedTouch APd - ajalugu

• Kui tehase seadetega, siis WEP võti tuletatav

SSIDst

http://web.tahvel.info/2008/07/miks-vahetada-

speedtouch-ruuteri-parool/

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Paremad lahendused vaja

• In the beginning, there was the wired equivalent

privacy (WEP) protocol. There were unforeseen

weaknesses in this protocol, and it was filled with

darkness. Then the IEEE said, “Let there be a

new Clause 8,” and there was a new Clause 8

and darkness fled from the face of the WLAN.

• Clause 8 oli enne standard IEEE802.11i

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Uued krüpto algoritmid (1)

• TKIP/RC4 – IV pikkus on 48 bitti ja staatilise võtme pikkus on 128 bitti.

• Iga pakett on krüpteeritud eraldi võtmega, mis koosneb staatilisest võtmest, IVst ja saaja ning saatja MAC aadressidest.

• Andmepakettide kontrolliks parem algoritm – Message Integrity Check (MIC). Kaitseb WEPist tuntud bit-flipping rünnaku vastu.

• TKIP/RC4 rakendus on WPA.

• Üleminek WEP – WPA on võimalik firmware upgradega • Saab kasutada sama RC4 riistvara

Võtmed täpsemalt

• The way WPA/WPA2 PSK works is that, it derives the per-

sessions key called Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), using

the Pre-Shared Key and five other parameters—SSID of

Network, Authenticator Nounce (ANounce), Supplicant

Nounce (SNounce), Authenticator MAC address (Access

Point MAC), and Suppliant MAC address (Wi-Fi Client

MAC). This key is then used to encrypt all data between the

access point and client.

• So how is the Pre-Shared Key created? It is derived by

using the WPA-PSK passphrase supplied by the user, along

with the SSID. The combination of both of these are sent

through the Password Based Key Derivation Function

(PBKDF2), which outputs the 256-bit shared key.

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WPA Võtmed

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WPA ühenduse loomine

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Nounce – number used once

MIC täpsemalt

• A MIC (Message Integrity Code) provides a keyed

cryptographic checksum to detect forgeries (also

called Message Authentication Code, or MAC)

• The MIC function is a one-way cryptographic

hash function

• The MIC is calculated over the source and

destination MAC addresses and the plaintext

after being seeded by the 64-bit MIC key

• The Cryptographic Doom Principle http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/the-cryptographic-doom-principle/

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Uued krüpto algoritmid (2)

• CCMP/AES – RC4 asemel kasutusel AES.

Krüpteeritakse 128 bitised blokid 128 bitise

võtmega

• AES kasutamine nõuab “suurt” protsessori

jõudlust, seega toetavatel raadiokaartidel uus

protsessor. Osad tootjad üritavad teha asja

tarkvaraliselt, aeglustab tööd.

• CCMP/AES rakendus on WPA2

Stream chipher vs. Block chipher

• Stream ciphers produce a string of pseudo-

random output bits which are XORed with the

message to be encrypted

• Block ciphers process plaintext blocks which they

encrypt

• Block cipher modes allow you to randomly access just a

portion of an encrypted message, without wasting time

decrypting the whole thing.

• A second advantage is that block ciphers can be used

to construct both encryption and message

authentication (MACs), which makes them a wonderful

building block for constructing authenticated encryption

modes.

82

83

Preshared Key (PSK) autentimine

• Tuntud kui WPA-Personal ja WPA2-Personal

• Tehakse järgnevad sammud: • STAs discover the AP’s security policies through passive

monitoring of the Beacon frames or through active probing. The

pairwise master key (PMK) is set to the value of the PSK.

• The four-way handshake is performed.

• The authenticator sends the GTK (group temporal key) to the

supplicant for use in decryption of multicast and broadcast frames.

• Oluline on, et PSK oleks piisavalt pikk (20 märki)

ja keerukas, muidu lahti murtav

Paroolide murdmiseks

Two Types of Password Cracking

• Online

- Trying different passwords to log in

- Can be slow and noisy

- You may only be allowed a few guesses

• Offline

- You grabbed the password hashes

- You now are only limited by how fast your

computer is

84

Rainbow tables - linke

• How Rainbow Tables work

http://kestas.kuliukas.com/RainbowTables/

• http://www.shmoocon.org/slides/matt_weir_shmoo09.pdf

• http://www.freerainbowtables.com/

• http://hak5.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=12708

• http://renderlab.net/projects/WPA-tables/

faili suurus 33Gb

86

Pyrit • Kasutame

GPUd

87

Allikas: http://code.google.com/p/pyrit/

WPA kaitse

• To prevent this attack, we suggest using a very short

rekeying time, for example 120 seconds or less. In 120

seconds, the attacker can only decrypt parts of the ICV

value at the end of a packet.

• Alternatively disabling the sending of MIC failure report

frame frames on the clients would also prevent the attack.

The best solution would be disabling TKIP and using a

CCMP only network.

Allikas: http://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf

88

• "RockYou" password list - 14-million unique

passwords

• Simply comparing the RockYou list to a list of

hashes from a domain controller gives you from a

third to a half of the passwords in seconds, even

when there are good password policies. Mutating

the RockYou list gives you even more passwords.

89

Paroolide statistikat

• Average Length of Password:

Phpbb.com: 7.06 characters

Finnish: 7.09 characters

• Percentage of passwords that contained an uppercase letter:

Phpbb.com: 4.38%

Finnish: 6.63%

• Percentage of passwords that contained a special character:

Phpbb.com: 0.75% <-Yes that is less than 1%

Finnish: 1.03%

• Percentage of passwords that contained a digit:

Phpbb.com: 44.18%

Finnish: 44.07%

• Percentage of passwords that ONLY had lowercase letters

Phpbb.com: 53.00%

Finnish: 52.13%

Allikas: http://reusablesec.blogspot.com/2009/04/ok-some-actual-results.html

90

Paroolide statistikat - Eesti

• Hiljuti sattus üks tuttav rakenduse otsa, kus

kasutajate paroole hoiti loetava tekstina (üldiselt

halb plaan ja see läks ka muutmisele). Samas

andis see võimaluse teha huvitavat parooli-

statistikat selle kohta, et mida siis kasutada ei

tohiks.

Allikas:

http://irve.eu/blog/2009/10/kas-tunned-oma-parooli-ara

91

Populaarsemad paroolid

1. 123456

2. [kasutusotstarbel põhinev]

3. parool

4. armastus

5. [mehenimi]

6. lilleke

7. musike

8. maasikas

9. [wtf firmanimi]

10. kiisuke

92

Populaarsemad paroolid (2)

11. rebane

12. Kallis

13. [kasutusotstarbel põhinev]

14. pisike

15. [anomaalia] <- üle kümne kasutaja teinud omale?

16. saladus

17. musirull

18. liblikas

19. sipsik

20. lammas

93

Teine vaade paroolidele

The work involved in hacking passwords is very

simple. There are 5 proven ways to do so:

• Asking: Amazingly the most common way to gain access

to someone's password is simply to ask for it (often in

relation with something else).

• Guessing: This is the second most common method to

access a person's account.

• Brute force attack: Very simple to do.

Allikas: http://www.baekdal.com/tips/password-security-usability

94

Teine vaade paroolidele (2)

• Common word attacks: A simple form of brute-force

attacks, where the hacker attempt to sign-in using a list of

common words.

• Dictionary attacks: Same concept as common word

attacks - the only difference is that the hacker now uses

the full dictionary of words (there are about 500,000

words in the English language).

95

Parooli valikust - soovitus

96

Allikas: http://xkcd.com/936/

Soovitus teisest vaatest

97

Thanks to the XKCD comic, every password cracking word

list in the world probably has correcthorsebatterystaple in it

already

Anatomy of a hack: How crackers ransack passwords like “qeadzcwrsfxv1331” http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/05/how-crackers-make-minced-meat-out-of-your-

passwords/

98

Allikas: http://xkcd.com/538/

WPS ja Reaver

• Wi-Fi protected setup

• Bruteforce rünnaku võimalik teha.

• Artikkel:

http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck_wps.pdf

• Reaver will recover the target AP's plain text WPA/WPA2

passphrase in 4-10 hours, depending on the AP. In

practice, it will generally take half this time to guess the

correct WPS pin and recover the passphrase.

99

Hole 196

• Affecting WPA/WPA2 Enterprise networks, this

issue allows an authenticated user to manipulate

other clients on the network to establish ARP

spoofing attacks, to impersonate data frames

from the AP or to create a DoS attack against

other users. This is all through leveraging a key

shared among all of the authorized clients in a

wireless LAN known as the Group Temporal Key

(GTK).

100

Hole 196

• Reflections on “hole196″

• http://www.willhackforsushi.com/?p=495

• http://www.airtightnetworks.com/fileadmin/pdf/WP

A-Too-Hole196-Defcon18-Presentation.pdf

101

Teine vaade Hole 196 ründele

• In fact, the exploit continues to demonstrate a

lack of any effective method of cracking the WiFi

Alliance WPA/WPA2 certified versions of IEEE

encryption standards found in WiFi gear of the

past seven years. Brute force and dictionary

attacks against short passphrases used typically

on home and small-business networks are still

the only means of key recovery.

Allikas: http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2010/07/wifi-hole196-major-exploit-or-

much-ado-about-little.ars

102

103

IEEE 802.1X autentimine

• Defineerib pordi põhise autentimise

• Kuna APdel raadio poole peal pordid puuduvad

on defineeritud Port Access Entity (PAE), mis

kontrollib andme edastust kindlale MAC

aadressile

104

Üldpõhimõte

105

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

• Erinevad tüübid

107

Rakendamise link

• Secure wi-fi Net : freeRadius + WRT54G =

802.1x (WPA-radius EAP/TLS) http://oriolrius.cat/blogcms/?item=secure-wi-fi-net-freeradius-wrt54g-

802-1x-wpa-radius-eap-tls

• Choosing the right flavor of 802.1X http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/general/0,295582,sid14_gci1167

608,00.html?track=wsl3

108

Tehnoloogiate võrdlus

Wireless Penetration Test Process

• Locate the target network.

• Tools: Kismet and Airodump-ng

• Determine encryption and authentication used by the network.

• Kismet and Airodump-ng will identify:

• WEP verse WPA

• PSK verse Enterprise Authentication

• Must manually identify the EAP type used by Enterprise

109

Wireless Penetration Test Process

• Authentication.

• Launch appropriate attacks based on the information

gathered above.

• Success of the attack relies on gathering reliable

information.

• If you do not know the EAP type you are shooting blind

and hoping your attack will work.

• Tööriist EAPeak

110

Gathering Usernames

• PEAP, TTLS, EAP-Fast, and LEAP transmit

unencrypted usernames.

• PEAP, TTLS and EAP-Fast transmit the username

before the encrypted tunnel is established.

• Different usernames can be used inside and outside the

encrypted tunnel.

• Some clients support this but it is very rarely implemented.

• This information leakage can be used to build a

list of usernames and domains at the target

organization.

111

AP Impersonation Attack

112

The AP Impersonation attack has been recently revitalized with new attacks

against WPA Enterprise.

This attack targets EAP/TTLS and PEAP networks.

Lugemist: http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/whitepapers/802.11 Attacks.pdf

http://wirelessdefence.org/Contents/FreeRadius%20Wireless%20Pwnage%20Edition.htm

AP Impersination Attack (2)

113

Both EAP/TTLS and PEAP have the ability of establishing mutual

authentication between the client and the authentication server prior to

passing its inner authentication credentials (most often MSCHAPv2). It is

common, however, that client systems are not properly configured to validate

the authentication server’s TLS certificate or the client supplicant puts the

decision to decide whether or not to connect with a non-validated certificate.

Depending on the inner authentication protocol used, these credentials can be

passed in clear text, or may be subject to a brute force attack. Finally, because

it is commonplace to use Windows Domain authentication credentials in

EAP/TTLS and PEAP configurations, the attacker may also gain access to the

corporate domain.

Kaitseks: http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/PEAP_Shmoocon2008_Wright_Antoniewicz.pdf

Slaidil 37 on näide õigest Windows konfiguratsioonist, vigased

konfiguratsioonide näited slaididel 24 – 26.

114

Zealous Autoconfig

Link: http://xkcd.com/416/

Põhimõtteliselt olemas :)

Linke: https://edge.arubanetworks.com/blog/2008/04/overzealous-wzc

http://airodump.net/intuitive-wifi-hacking-gui-ubuntu-linux/

115

Harivaid linke (1) NB! Lingid mõeldud enesetäiendamiseks ja hilisemaks lugemiseks.

Kui huvi ei ole lugema ei pea.

• WiFi kasutamisest https://www.ria.ee/wifikasutamine

• 802.11 Attacks http://www.foundstone.com/us/resources/whitepapers/802.11%20Attacks.pdf

• WEP / WPA / WPA2 krüpteeringu murdmine http://wireless-comm.blogspot.com/2008/04/how-to-crack-your-wifi-wpa-psk.html

• The Final Nail in WEP’s Coffin

http://tapir.cs.ucl.ac.uk/bittau-wep.pdf

• 802.11 Security Inaccessible star?

http://2006.hack.lu/images/0/08/Wifi-security_hacklu2006.pdf

• Practical attacks against WEP and WPA http://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf

116

Harivaid linke (2) • Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Course

http://www.kjhole.com/Standards/Intro.html

• A Comprehensive Review of 802.11 Wireless LAN Security

and the Cisco Wireless Security Suite http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/witc/ao1200ap/prodlit/wswpf_wp.htm

• Wi-Fi security – WEP, WPA and WPA2 http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/articles/hakin9_wifi/hakin9_wifi_EN.pdf

• WPA PSK Crackers: Loose Lips Sink Ships http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/tutorials/article.php/10724_3667586_1

• WPA Security Tips http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/tutorials/article.php/3737016

• Wireless Vulnerabilities & Exploits http://www.wirelessve.org/

117

Harivaid linke (3) • HOWTO: Wireless Security - WPA1, WPA2, LEAP, etc.

http://ubuntuforums.org/showthread.php?t=202834

• Wireless Tools for Linux

http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Jean_Tourrilhes/Linux/Tools.html

• Wireless LAN Sniffer Applications and Scanners for Linux http://tuxmobil.org/linux_wireless_sniffer.html

• Wi-Spy Spectrum Analyzers Shows What's in Your Wireless

Backyard http://www.wifinetnews.com/archives/007861.html

• Five Wireless Threats You May Not Know http://www.sans.edu/resources/securitylab/wireless_security_1.php

• Breaking 40-bit WEP in less than 30 seconds? http://radajo.blogspot.com/2007/04/breaking-40-bit-wep-in-less-than-30.html

• Tarkus “kõrvataha” http://voru.wifi.ee/index.php?leht=7

• SSID valimise reeglid http://voru.wifi.ee/index.php?leht=48

• Näide enamlevinud SSIDest http://voru.wifi.ee/wardriving/ssid.php

• Your Wi-Fi can tell people a lot about you http://www.news.com/Your-Wi-Fi-can-tell-people-a-lot-about-you/2100-7355_3-

6163666.html

• WPA Cracking with CUDA: A How To http://www.wifiblog.org/2010/02/wpa-cracking-with-cuda-a-how-to/

• Wireless / Wifi Hack or Crack - ( fi.sh & karma ) http://capcomzone.blogspot.com/2009/08/wireless-wifi-hack-or-crack-fish-

karma.html

• 802.11_ (WiFi) Wireless Network Security http://www.raulsiles.com/resources/wifi.html

Harivaid linke (4)

Harivaid linke (5)

• Exploit Sweatshop http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/exploit-sweatshop/

• "Wi-Fi (In)Security - All Your Air Are Belong To..." http://www.taddong.com/docs/Wi-Fi_(In)Security_GOVCERT-

2010_RaulSiles_Taddong_v1.0_2pages.pdf

• More WPA2 Hole 196 Reflections and TCP/IP Stack

(Mis)Behaviors http://blog.taddong.com/2010/09/more-wpa2-hole-196-reflections-and.html

• WPA TOO ! http://www.willhackforsushi.com/tmp/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ahmad-WPAToo.pdf

• Shifting the Focus of WiFi Security: http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-

de_bouvette-farina.pdf

119

Harivaid linke (6)

• Vista Wireless Power Tools http://www.inguardians.com/pubs/Vista_Wireless_Power_Tools-Wright.pdf

• Essential Crypto for Pen Testers (Without the Math!) http://www.willhackforsushi.com/presentations/Essential_Crypto_Without_the_Mat

h_Webcast-20100426.pdf

• The twilight of Wi-Fi Protected Access http://pyrit.wordpress.com/the-twilight-of-wi-fi-protected-access/

• Wifi Security -or- Descending Into Depression and Drink http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-10/Kershaw_Mike/BlackHat-DC-

2010-Kershaw-dragorn-wifi-security-slides.pdf

120

Harivaid linke (7)

• PIN analysis http://www.datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/index.html

• Linkedin Password Infographic http://securitynirvana.blogspot.com/2012/06/linkedin-password-infographic.html

• Password cracking, mining, and GPUs http://blog.erratasec.com/2011/06/password-cracking-mining-and-gpus.html

• Common misconceptions of password cracking http://erratasec.blogspot.com/2012/08/common-misconceptions-of-password.html

• Revisiting password meters http://securitynirvana.blogspot.com/2010/11/revisiting-password-meters.html

• What's the deal with RC4? http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2011/12/whats-deal-with-rc4.html

• An Overview of Cryptography http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html

121

Harivaid linke (8)

• Cryptography I https://www.coursera.org/course/crypto

• Divide and Conquer: Cracking MS-CHAPv2 with a 100%

success rate https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/

• Password cracking, part II: when does password cracking

matter? http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/09/04/password-cracking-part-ii-

when-does-password-cracking-matter/

• The only secure password is the one you can’t remember http://www.troyhunt.com/2011/03/only-secure-password-is-one-you-cant.html

• A crossword based on the Adobe password leak http://zed0.co.uk/crossword/

122

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