And When is Now.pdf

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1/23

"And When Is Now?" (On Some Limits of Perfect Intelligibility)Author(s): Samuel WeberSource: MLN, Vol. 122, No. 5, Comparative Literature Issue (Dec., 2007), pp. 1028-1049Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30133975.

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2/23

"AndWhen

s

Now?"

(On

Some

Limits f

Perfect

ntelligibility)

Samuel

Weber

This

paper

was

originallyresented

s the

keynote

address

t

the imits

f

ntelligibility

onference

t

Johns opkinsUniversity

n

March

10,

2007

Enabling

"The Limitsof

Intelligibility"

"The Limitsof

Intelligibility"-this

hrase,

when extracted

rom

ny

defined ontext

xcept

hat

f

erving

s

the

title f this

onference-is

as

suggestive

s it s

ambiguous:

ndeed,

suggestive

ecause f

ts

mbi-

guity.

ts

ambiguity

estles

first nd

foremost

n

theword

intelligibil-

ity,"

nd

more

specifically

n

the

gap

that

eparates

ts

non-technical

from ts

technical,

which s to

say,

philosophical,

usage.

The

OED,

which

traces the use

of the

word

in

English

back to

1610,

gives

as

itsprimary efinition,Thequality r character fbeing ntelligible;

capability

f

being

understood;

comprehensibility."

he definition

given

in

Wikipedia-and hope,

the

Williams

College

Library

not-

withstanding,'

hat

may

be

permitted

o

cite this

ource,

at least as

corroboration-[

Wikipedia]

oes

further hen t

states:

Intelligibility

means

clearness,

xplicitness,

ucidity,

omprehensibility,

erspicuity,

legibility,lain speaking,

manifestation,

recision,

word

to

the

wise.

The

degree

to

which

peech

can be

understood."

The

question

that such

unambiguousdefinitions o not address

is

ust

what t

s

thatdetermines

the

degree

to which

peech

can

be

understood"?Or

as

the OED

puts

t,

"the

capability

f

being

under-

stood,"

of

being

"comprehensible"?

Nor do such

definitionsmake

clear what

s to

be understood

by

the

word

"intelligible."

s

it,

s

both

MLN

122

(2007):

1028-1049

@

2008

by

The

JohnsHopkins University

ress

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3/23

MLN

1029

definitions

resuppose,

clarity,"

comprehensibility,"

understand-

ing,"

nd

perhaps

ltimately,comprehensibility"?

nd

f

o,

s

such

"comprehensibility"n essential ropertyfknowledge?f"think-

ing"-which learly

s not

necessarily

he same

as

knowing?

s it a

"property"

t

all,

or rathermore kin o a

condition-a condition f

"possibility"-that

of

being

understood"?

Without

ursuing

his

ineof

uestioning

ny

urther,

ll

that eems

clear

t

this

oint

s

that he

dictionary

efinitionsf

"intelligibility"

are

themselves

ar ess

"intelligible,"

n

the ense

of

being

ucid nd

free

f

ambiguity,

han

one

might

ssume. heir

ack

of

precision,

however,eserves o be taken eriously,ince uch definitionsend

to

reflecthe

prevailing

onceptions

hat

nform

idespread

sage

f

the

word,

ven

fsuch

conceptions

o

not

necessarily

omprehend

what

t s

that

hey

re

actuallyaying.

The

ambiguitiesmplicit

n

such

dictionary

ormulations

cquire

newdimension

henwe

consider

hemore

echnical,

hilosophical

usesof

heword. ne of

he

firstraitshat

merges

hen

ne

begins

to

investigate

he

philosophical

otion f

the

"intelligible"

s

that

t

seems

necessarily

inked o an

enabling

limit,"

amely,

hatwhich

distinguishestfromwhat s often alledthe"senses." husKant,n

his

naugural

issertationf

1770,

writtenn

Latin

nd

entitled,

e

mundi ensibilis

tque

ntelligibilisorma

t

principiis

On

the orm nd

Principles

f

he ensiblend

ntelligible

orld),

efines

intelligible"

s

"that

which ontains

othing

utwhat an

be

cognized

olely

hrough

the

nderstanding"

nisi

per ntelligentiam

ognoescendum).

his

tradition

of

defining

he

"intelligible" y

demarcating

t

from

the

"sensible"

has,

to

be

sure,

very ong history,

nd it s

one

that

uggests

hat

ambiguities

ssociated

with

he

word are

not

ust

situated

betweents

non-technicalnd

philosophical

uses

(and

avatars),

buteven

more,

within

the notion itself nsofar s

it is

linked

to

knowledge.

This

relationship

f

intelligibility

o

knowledge

raises

the

question

of

the

enabling

imits f

both as

early

s

Plato's

Republic.

n Book

VI,

Socrates

seeks

o

determineherelation f

knowledge

o

the

Good

(I

quote

the

passage

t

some

ength

n

order o recall ts

ontext):

SOCRATES.

he

sun,

presume

ou

will

ay,

ot

nly

urnisheso

visibles

the

power

of

visibility

ut

t

also

provides

or

their

generation

nd

growth

and nurture hough t s not itself eneration.

GLAUCON.

f

coursenot.

SOCRATES.

n ike

manner,hen,

ou

reto

ay

hat

he

bjects

f

knowl-

edge

not

only

receivefrom he

presence

of the

good

their

being

known,

but their

ery

xistence nd essence

s

derived o themfrom

t,

hough

the



4/23

1030 SAMUEL WEBER

good

tself

s not ssence ut till ranscends

ssence

epekeina

is

usias]

n

dignity

nd

surpassingower.

Rep.,

VI,

509b)3

The

cognizability,

r,

f

you

will,

intelligibility"

f that

which

can be

known

erives

otfrom

ny

mmanent

roperty

r

characteristic

t

may

possess

butfrom

omething

hat ies

"beyond"-epekeina-its

essence"

or

"properties"-ousia-as

well as

beyond

that

whichreveals tself o

the senses.

In

thus

demarcating

tself

onstitutively

rom

the world

of the

senses,

thatwhich

makes

things

knowable,

heir

ntelligibility,

defines

tself

through

what

s held to be

its

ntrinsic

imit,

hrough

which t

"transcends"

he transient

emporality

f sense

experience.

ThisBeyond, omewhatike thesun, s the condition fvisibilityith-

out

itself

eing

simply

isible.

f one

attempts

o

apprehend

t

directly

as

though

t were

ust

anothervisible

bject,

t not

only

scapes

sight,

it

destroys

t.As the condition

nd source of

visibility

nd

knowledge,

the Good

itself s neither

imply

isible nor knowable.Here

is

how

Socrates sums

up

the

resulting

ituation:

This

then

s the lass

hat describeds

intelligible

noetos],

t s

true,

ut

with

hereservation

hat he oul

s

compelled

o

employ

ssumptions

n

the nvestigationf t,notproceedingo a firstrincipleecauseof ts

inability

oextricate

tselfromnd rise

bove

ts

ssumptions,

nd

second,

that tuses s

images

r ikenesses

..

the

very bjects

hat re themselves

copied

nd adumbrated

y

heclassbelow

hem,

nd that

n

comparison

with hese

atter re

esteemed s

clear

nd

held n honor.

I

understand,

aid

he

[Glaucon]

hat

ou

re

peaking

fwhat alls nder

geometry

nd the

kindredrts.

Understand

hen,

aid

,

that

y

theother ection

f the

ntelligible

meanthatwhich

hereason

tself

ays

hold of

by

the

power

f

dialectic,

treating

ts

ssumptions

ot

s

absolute

eginnings

ut

iterally

s

hypoth-

eses,underpinnings,ootings,ndas springboardso tospeak, oenable

it

to

rise

o that

which

equires

o

assumption

nd

s

the

tartingoint

f

all,

nd

after

ttaining

o that

gain aking

old

of

thefirst

ependencies

from

t,

o to

proceed

ownward

othe

onclusion,

aking

o usewhatever

of

any bject

f ensebut

only

f

pure

deas

moving

n

through

deas to

ideas

nd

ending

with deas.

I

understand,

e

said,

not

fully,

or

t

s

no

slight

ask hat

ou

ppear

to

have

n

mind,

ut do

understandhat

you

mean to

distinguish

he

aspect

f

reality

nd

the

ntelligible,

hich s

contemplated

y

he

power

ofdialectic,s somethingruer nd more xact han heobject fthe o-

called

rts

nd scienceswhose

ssumptions

re

arbitrary

tartingoints.

(Rep

VI,

511a-c)4

Glaucon's admission hathe

understands,

lthough

not

fully,"

eems

symptomatic

f

the

Socratic ttitude

owards he "limits f

ntelligibil-



5/23

MLN

1031

ity":

he

ntelligible,

hich

s defined

by

tsradical demarcation rom

all

experience

based

upon

the

senses-that

is,

from ll

experience

that s limited

by space

and time-can never be understood, n the

sense

of

being

fully

nown.

The limits hat define t also

delimit

ts

own

intelligibility,

t

least

in the sense of its

knowability.

s Charles

Sanders Peirce will

put

it at

the

beginning

f the

20th

century,

One

cannotwelldemand

a reasonfor easonableness tself."" utwhat oes

that tell us about the

function

f "limits" n

delimiting intelligibil-

ity"?

o the "limits"

f

intelligibility

ark

imply

he

point

at

which

intelligibilitytops

and

the

unintelligible egins?

Or

do those

imits

affect intelligibility"romwithin, s itwere,vastly omplicatingts

relationto what

exceeds

it?

"Perfectlyntelligible"

These,

at

least,

re some

of the

questions

hat he title f our confer-

ence

imposed

upon

me.

I

have no

idea,

of

course,

f

they

n

anyway

resemble

he considerations

hatwere

n

the mindsof the

organizers

when

they

hose this

title orour

meeting.

Nor am I in

a

position

o

even

begin

o

give nything

ike principledr

comprehensiveesponse

to

these

uestions.

recisely

s

unanswered, owever,

hey

will ontinue

to inform nd

agitate

he remarks

have to

present

o

you today,

nd

which,

ou

will

hardly

e

surprised

o

earn,

oncern he texts f think-

erswho

chronologically

t east re much closer o us thanthose

have

just

touched on. But

as

you

will soon

hear,

the

question

of

proximity

itself

willbe one

of the ssues

n what

have to

say.

Let me

begin

then

with

passage

from short ut

very

rovocative

essay

that

ppeared

in

English

n

2004.

The

text temsfrom

Giorgio

Agamben

nd is

entitled,

uite simply,Friendship."'

he

essay egins

by stating

hat,

s its

name

indicates,

philosophy"

as

traditionally

been "so

closely

inked" o

friendship philia]

thatwithout

t,

philoso-

phy

would not

in

fact

be

possible."

However,

Agamben

notes,

today

the relation"between

the two

has "fallen" nto such

disrepute

that

professional hilosophers"

an

only

onfront

he "so to

speak

clandes-

tine

partner

f

their

hought"

with

embarrassmentnd

[an]

uneasy

conscience."

He then

goes

on to

demonstrate his mbarrassment

y

recounting wo necdotes.The firstoncerns project"toexchange

letters n the

subject

of

friendship"

hathe had

elaboratedwith

my

friend,Jean-Lucancy":

hetwo

riends hus

hoped

"to

tage problem

that

eemed otherwise

o elude

analytical

reatment."

gambenbegan

by writing

he first

etter,

nd then

"waited,

not without

repidation,



6/23

1032 SAMUEL

WEBER

for the

reply."

When

it

finally

rrived, owever,

gamben

notes that

Nancy's

response

erved

nly

to

signify

he end

of

the

project."

Their

friendship,

e comments, urned ut to be "an obstacle"rather han

a

condition under

which

this

difficult

opic-difficult

t least

for

philosophers-could

be

confronted

ollaboratively.

Agamben

then

goes

on

to

give

a

second

example

of

the

difficulty

philosophers

oday

have

in

dealing

with

he

topic

of

friendship.

he

other

philosopher,

who this

ime s not

designated

s a

friend,

t

least

not

explicitly,

s

Jacques

Derrida,

who at

the timewas

in

the

process

of

writing

book

that

would be

published

under the

title,

olitiques

de 'amitietranslateds PoliticsofFriendship).'orthisbook,Agamben

observes,Derrida,

moved

by

an

analogous

nd

probably

onscious

neasiness..

chose

s

Leitmotiv

of

hisbook n

friendship]

sibylline

otto,

raditionally

ttributedo

Aristotle,

that

egates riendship

n

the

very esture

ith

hicht

eems o

nvoket:

o

philoi,

udeis

hilos,

o

friends,

here re

no friends."

sic]8

2)

But to returnnow

to

Agamben's

essay:

his second

anecdote is con-

cerned with hecorrection

f a

different

rror,

his

ime

nvolving

he

Greekphrasetraditionallyttributed oAristotle nd so often ited.

The

phrase

tself s to be found not in

Aristotle's

writings

hemselves

but

n

Diogenes

Laertius'sLives

f

he

hilosophers,

n

the

chapter

dedi-

cated

to

Aristotle

V.21).

However,

Agamben

observes,

If

we

open

a modern

dition f he

Lives...

we

do

not

find

..

the

phrase

in

question,

utrather ne almost

dentical

n

appearance,

he

meaning

ofwhich s nonetheless

ifferent

nd far ess

nigmatic:

i

(subscript

ota)

philoi,

udeis

hilos,

he

whohas

(many)

riends,

as no

friend."

3)

Agamben

then recountshow he was

able to "clarify"heenigma,or

rather,

o cause it

to

disappear:

A

library

isit as

nough

o

clarify

he

mystery.

n

1616 he

great

Genevan

philologist

saac Casaubon

ecided o

publish

new dition f

the

Lives.

Arriving

tthe

assage

n

question-which

till

ead,

n

the

dition

rocured

by

his

father-in-law,

enry

tienne,

philoi

o friends)-he

orrected

he

enigmatic

ersion

f the

manuscripts

ithout esitation.

3)

As a

result,

gamben

oncludes,

without

esitation,

he

phrase

"became

perfectlyntelligible

nd

for

this easonwas

acceptedy

modernditors"

3,

italics

mine).

In

short,

ccording

to

Agamben,

ver ince

1616

"modern ditors"

have been

aware that

he

apparent nigma

of

the

phrase

ttributed o

Aristotle

yDiogenes

Laertiuswas

n

fact

merely

he

result f a

simple



7/23

MLN 1033

errorof

transcription.

o wonder

then,

s

Agamben

tells

us,

thathe

"immediately

nformed

Derrida

of

the results f

[his]

research."

He

does not mentionwhether erridarespondedand if o, how. But he

does recounthow

"astonished"

e was

when,

ollowing

he

publication

of

Politiques

e

'amitie,

e discovered

hat he book

contained

not

the

slightest

trace

fthe

problem"

owhichhe

had

sought

o call

Derrida's

attention.

gamben's

ppeal

had

gone

unheeded.

However,

s

Agam-

ben

concludes,

It was

certainly

ot out

of

forgetfulness"

hat

Derrida

persisted

n

citing

he

phrase

"in

ts

original

orm,"

ut

rather

ecause

"itwas essential o

the book's

strategy

hat

friendship

e,

at the same

time,both affirmednd distrustfullyevoked" 3). In this,Agamben

notes,

Derrida

repeats

a

gesture

already performed

by

Nietzsche,

who also would

have

been familiar

with

Casaubon's

emendation nd

nevertheless

isregarded

t for imilar

easons:

"Both the

necessity

f

friendship

nd,

at

the same

time,

certain

distrust owards riends

were

essential o Nietzsche's

trategy.

his

accounts

for

his

recourse

to the traditional

eading,

which

was

already, y

Nietzsche's

ime,

no

longer

current"

3).

There

is, then,

for

Agamben,

"traditional

eading"

of the

phrase,

and a modern,currentone; the traditional ne is enigmatic,but

only

because

it s based

on an

error;

he

modern version s

perfectly

intelligible,

imply

orrecting

he traditional

rror.The

traditional,

erroneousversion

has nevertheless

een retained

by

certain

hinkers,

Nietzsche and Derrida

among

them,

because it suits their

trategy,

which

s

ambivalent,

equiring

riendship

o be both

"affirmednd

distrustfully

evoked."

One is reminded

here,

mutatis

mutandis,

f the

exchange

that

Hei-

degger

had

with

reader

of his

book,

Elucidations

f

Holderlin's

oetry,

concerning

heremarkwithwhich

Heidegger

had introduced ne of

his

readings.Heidegger prefaced

his

essay

on

H61lderlin's

oem,

Wie

Wenn m

Feiertage

"As

On

a

Holiday")

with he

following

ote: "The

[poetic]

texthere established

s

based,

after enewed xamination f

the

original

drafts,

n

the

following ttempt

t

an

interpretation."'

The

reader,

doctoral

tudent

f German

Literature,

etlev

Liiders,

wrote

Heidegger

asking

for

larification,

r

rather,

uggesting

hat n

the future

e

correct

what eemed

to be

an obvious mistake:

I don'tunderstandow text anbebasedonits nterpretation.text,

would

have

hought,

s

something

hose

wording

s fixed.

our

entence

contains he

paradox

hat

hetext

n

theone hand s "established"

s a

basis-

"zugrundegelegt

--and n the ther

and s tself

ased

n

something

that s

thereforeven

more

riginal

nd fundamental.

rom his

oint

f



8/23

1034

SAMUEL

WEBER

view he ext

an no

longer

e referredo

as

a

"basis." nd

yet

his s what

you

call

t.'"

Heidegger's

reply,

which have discussed

elsewhere,

begins

with

a

phrase

thatwillbe echoed

frequently

n

the

writings

f

Derrida:

"Dear

Mr.

Luiders:

ou're

right."

"Sie

haben

Recht,

vous

avez

raison)."

And

he

therefore

romises

o

"strike"

he ncriminated

hrase

should here

be

a new

edition"

of

his book.

Having

thus

abandoned

all

rights

o

the

phrase,

Heidegger

nevertheless

oes

on to

make two

points.

First,

were

he

to

correct he incriminated

hrase

by

simply

nverting

t,

as

Herr

Luiders

uggests,

hereby

cknowledging

hat

his

nterpretation

is based on the poetic textratherthan the otherwayaround, this

would result n "a

grosstriviality"

nd would therefore

ssentially

e

"superfluous."

he second

point

thathe

goes

on to

make

consists ot

in an

acknowledgement

f errorbut

in a

series of

questions:

Of

course,

he

uestion,

hat

a

text"

s,

how ne should

ead tand when

it is

completely

stablisheds

text,

till emains. his

question ertains

so

essentially

o the

question

f the ssence

f

anguage

nd of

inguistic

tradition

hat have

lways

imited

myself

o what s

absolutely

ecessary

when

omething

as

o

be

noted

oncerning,nterpretations,

lucidations

etc.

237)

And

after

short

remarkon

the

problematic

nd uncertain

tatus

of

the

then current

dition

of

H61lderlin,

eidegger

concludes

his

response

with

question

thatfor

him

presumably

ums

up

"what s

absolutely

ecessary...

concerning

nterpretation"

nd itsrelation

o

its

object, namely

he

question:

"Is therea text

n

itself?"

Now t

s

unlikely

hat

Giorgio

Agamben,

keen reader f

Heidegger,

would have

ever

responded

to

this

uestion

with

simple

ffirmative.

And yet, his s preciselywhatendows whatotherwisemight ppear

to be

a casual

phrase

with

ignificance.

asaubon's

emendation,

he

says,

enders he

phrase

attributed

o Aristotle

y

Diogenes

Laertius,

and

by

a host

of eminent

successors,

perfectly

ntelligible."

nd it

is therefore

nly

on the

grounds

of

strategic

onsiderations

hat t

could be

ignored

by

a

long

and illustrious

radition,

ulminating

n

Derrida's

Politics

f

riendship.

he

question

thathas to be

addressed,

then,

s

ust

wherein

he

strategy

esides

thatcauses thinkers

uch as

Nietzsche

and

Derrida

to

ignore

the obvious

and to

reject "perfect

intelligibility"

n favor

f

a

"mystery"

hat

s

really

none

at

all.

AlthoughAgamben

does

notuse the

term,

he

primary

haracteristic

of the

general

strategy

e attributes

o both

Derrida

and Nietzsche

could

be described

as

that

of a certain

ambivalence,

ne that both



9/23

IV L

N1U

J3

"affirmsnd

distrustfully

evokes"

friendship

t one and

the same

time. t is this mbivalence hatcauses

thinkers o

reject

Casaubon's

emendation, n contrast o the

contemporary

ditors nd translators

who have

adopted

it.

In

other

words,

perfect

ntelligibility

ould

be

defined

by

the

law of

non-contradiction.

Many

friends,

o

friend"

allows for univocal

nterpretation,

hereas"0

my

friends,

here s

no

friend,"

eems

ntelligible nly

s a

paradox:

how can one

address

"friends,"

f one asserts hat"there s no

friend"?

What ,

borrowing

but also

extending

Freudian

term,

ave

designated

s

"ambivalent,"

and what

Agamben

forhis

part

characterizes s a

mixture f

"affirma-

tion"and "distrustfulevocation,"tretches he imits f ntelligibility

by

splitting

he

object

it

intends.

f

friendship

s

something

hatcan

and

must at the same time be "affirmed"

nd

yet

also

"distrustfully

revoked,"

hen thisfractureshe "one and

the same"

of that time"

y

removing

tfrom

tself.

certain

rreducible

patiality,

s

the medium

of

nonidentity

nd of

alterity,

s

thus

ntroduced nto

the self

dentity

of

"friendship,"islocating

ts

meaning

so

that t no

longer

reflects

homogeneous

and coherent nternal

tructure r

seriesor

properties

but rather

ppears

as the resultant f a

conflictual

elationof

forces.

To be perfectlyntelligible,hen,wouldbe to exclude or reduce the

internaldissonance and distance that

prevents

he

object

it

invests

from

supporting

nd

sustaining

unified nd

univocal

meaning.

It is

therefore ot

entirely urprising

hen,

n

the

short

ssay

that

follows his

necdotal

ntroduction,

he

category

n which

Agamben's

account of

friendship

epends

s one that

nvolves

precisely

he

reduc-

tion of distance and

correlatively

he

emergence

of

what he

calls

"excessive roximity."

He

elaborates this

conception by

interpreting

painting by

the

Italian

baroque

artist,GiovanniSerodine (1600-31). This

painting

depicts

the

"Meeting

of

Saints Peter and

Paul"

(Incontro

dei

Santi

Pietro t

Paolo,

1625-26)

(Figure

1).

What

Agamben

finds

articularly

remarkable n this

painting

is that erodine

has

portrayed

he

two

postles

o

close

together-with

their oreheadslmost

lued

ne to one

another-so

hat

hey

re

bsolutely

unable o

ee ach

ther.n the

road

to

martyrdom,hey

ook

at,

without

recognizing,

ach other. his

mpression

f

xcessive

roximity,

s it

were,

isaccentuatedy he ilent esturef haking ands t thebottom fthe

picture,

carcely

isible.

4,

my

talics-SW)

Let

us leave aside

Agamben's

assertion that

the

two

apostles

"are

absolutely

unable to see

each

other." t is

no doubt an

arguable



10/23

1036 SAMUEL WEBER

Figure

1. Serodine

(1600-1631)

Meeting f

ts.Peter nd Paul

(1625-26).

@ Araldo de

Luca/Corbis.

interpretation,nd it sbyno means theonlyone.Wemayreturn o

this

ater.

For the moment et us

merely

onsiderthe

argument

hat

Agamben develops

here.

This

painting,

is

argument

uggests,

s the

visual

ounterpart

o Casaubon'semendation.Whereas he attermade

the

Aristotelian

uote "perfectly

ntelligible,"

he

painting

contains

a

perfect llegory

f

friendship"

nsofar s the "excessive

roximity"

of the

Apostlesprevents

hem

recognizing

ach other-and

yet

not

from

making

ontact. romthis

eading,Agamben

oncludeswith he

rhetorical

uestion:

"What s

friendship,

n

effect,

f

not a

proximity

such that t s mpossible o makefor neself ither representationr

a

concept

of t?"And this

nability

f

friendship

o be

represented

r

conceived s a

concept

eads

him

to a second

determination,

his ime

negative: Friendship

s not a

property

r

quality

f a

subject"

4).

It is no accidentthat

Agamben

turns

o

a

painting

o findwhathe

takes o be a

"perfect

llegory

f

friendship."

or

although

he

painting

permits gamben

to tell us what

friendship

s

not-representable

or

conceptualizable-this

negative

efinition

egates

irstnd foremost

certain

visibility

nd

thereby

resupposes

t.

Friendship

husbecomes

a questionof notbeingable to see and be seen,wherebyseeing" nd

"recognizing"

re

inseparably

inked. The two

Apostles

re

depicted

so close

together

hat,

ccording

to

Agamben,they

an

neither

ee



11/23

MLN

1037

nor

recognize

each

other.When

however t

comes

time to elaborate

not

ust

what

friendship

s not

but rather

what t

is,

Agamben

turns

not to a

painting

but to a

long

and dense

passage

fromAristotle's

Nicomacheanthics

1170a 28-1171b35),

whichhe

suggests

contains

the

ontological

basis"

of Aristotle's

heory

f

friendship.

will

quote

here

ust

enough

of this

passage

for

you

to

be able to

follow,

ope-

fully,

he

argument

Agamben

draws

from

t:

And f he ne who ees

perceives

hat e

sees,

he ne

whohears

erceives

that e

hears,

he newho

walks

erceives

hat ewalks..

and

f

erceiving

that

we

perceive

r thinks

perceiving

hatwe

exist

for

s we

aid,

xisting

is perceivingr thinking);nd ifperceivinghat ne is alive s pleasant

(edeon)

n

tself,

nd

especially

or hosewho re

good,

becausefor hem

existing

s

good,

nd

pleasant

for

oncurrent

erceptionsynaisthanom-

enoi]

of

what s

in

itself

ood,

n

themselves,

ives

hem

leasure;

nd

if

as the

good person

s to

himself,

o he is to

hisfriend

since

hefriends

another self

[heteros

autos])

then

ust

as for

each his

own existence

to

auton

inai)

s

desirable,

o his

friend'ss

too,

or

to a

similar

egree....

In

that

ase,

he needs

o be

concurrently

erceiving

is

friend"-that e

exists

oo-and this

will ome about

n

their

iving

ogether,onversing

and

sharingkoinonein)

heir alk

nd

thoughts

..

(5)

Although

have had to

abbreviate nd

simplify

he

passage Agamben

quotes

from

Aristotle,

trust

hat

neverthelessts main lines

will till

be discernible: bove

all,

the

emphasis put

on both

perception

nd

thinking

s thatwhich

defineshuman

existence.But

although

Aris-

totle

previously istinguishes

uman

from

nimal

existence

precisely

through

he

presence

of

thought

s

opposed

to mere

perception,

n

this

passage

at

least,

t is

perception

that

seems to be

decisive.And

it

is not

ust

any

perception

that s

significant

ut

perception

of the

good, linkedto

self-perception:

heperception foneself inaction."

Which

in

turn means "alive."

Perception

of

oneself n

action,

and

therefore

live,

s

pleasing, especially

or

thosewho are

good."

Now,

for

Agamben

his ense of

being

alive s what inks

he self o the other

in

friendship,

nd

it does so

by

plitting

r

doubling

the

perception

f

oneself nto the simultaneous

erception

of self nd

other,

r rather

of self

becoming

..

other":

Inherent

n

this

erception

f

existing

s

another

erception,pecifically

human, hich akes he orm f concurrenterceptionsynaisthanesthai)

of

the riend'sxistence.

riendship

s

the

nstance fthis

oncurrent

er-

ception

f he riend's

xistencenthe wareness

f ne's

wn xistence

..

The

perception

f

xisting

s,

n

fact,

lwayslready

ivided

p

and

shared

or con-divided.

riendship

ames his

haring

r

con-division.

6)



12/23

1038 SAMUEL WEBER

Agamben's

notion here of

"sharing"

recalls

the

importance

that

his

friend,

Nancy,

ttaches to

the French

word

partage,ust

as

his

neologism,"con-division" ould be read as an echo of Derrida's

notion of

"divisibility."

hat

Agamben's

account of

friendship

ere

in

any

case shares-if

not

divides-with his

two

absent

nterlocutors

is

what constitutes heir

ommon

Heideggerian

egacy

although by

no

means restricted o

Heidegger:

Walter

Benjamin,

for

instance,

is no less

implicated

n

it):

namely,

he effort

o think

friendship

s

something

adically

ndependent

of all

subjectivity:

There

s no

trace ereof

ny

nter-subjectivity-that

himera fthe

mod-

erns-norof ny elation etweenubjects:ather,xistingtselfsdivided,

it

s

non-identicalo

tself:

he and

thefriend

re thetwo

aces-or the

two

oles-of

this on-division.

6)

Concerning

Aristotle's efinition

fthefriend

s

"another

elf'-heteros

autos-Agamben

explains

hat his

phrase

mustbe

distinguished

rom

its Latin

translation,

s alter

go.

The Latin

go

doesnot

xactly

ranslate

utos,

hich

ignifies

oneself."

he

friend

s

not nother but n

otherness

mmanent

n

self-ness,

becoming

other f he elf. t hepoint twhich perceivemy xistencespleasant,

my

perception

s

traversed

y

a

concurrent

erception

hat islocatest

and

deports

t toward he

friend,

oward he other self.

Friendship

s this

de-subjectivization

t the

very

eart f

the most

ntimate

erception

f

self.

6)

Agamben

understands

concurrent

erception"

s

thus

imultaneously

ontological

nd

political:

he

self-perception

hat onstitutes

xistence

necessarily

ntailsa dislocation nd

displacement

f the self

toward

the

other,

movement hat

mpliesco-habitation, living ogether

based not on "a common

substance

but"

on

"a

purely

xistential on-

division,"

he

perception

of

whichhe defines

s

"friendship.""

Having completed

this

brief but

dense account

of

"friendship,"

Agamben

eaves

his

readersto

reflect n the

following

uestion:

Howthis

riginal oliticalynaesthesia

ould

become,

n

the

ourse f

ime,

the onsensusowhich

emocraciesntrust

heir ates

n

this

atest xtreme

and exhausted

hase

oftheir

volution,

s,

s

they ay,

nother

tory,

nd

one

upon

which shall eave

you

o

reflect.

7)

Whether

his

oncluding

remark,

whichconstrues he

historical

hift

from

what

Agamben

describes s an

"original olitical ynaesthesia"

o

the "consensus" hat

nformsmodern democracies n their

extreme

and exhausted

phase,"

s

not related to the

soteriological

ontextof



13/23

MLN 1039

the

Serodine

paintingportraying

he

Apostles

on

their

way

to

mar-

tyrdom,

his s a

question

to which will return

t

the

conclusion of

theseremarks.

In

any

event,

we

are

perhaps finally

n

a

position

to delineate

at

least

part

of the

"problem"

of which

Agamben

was

surprised

not to

find he

slightest

race nscribed

n

Politiques

e

'amitie.What he

finds

both

troubling

nd at the same time

symptomatic

f the

modern

predicament,

pitomized

here

by

Nietzsche

and

Derrida,

involves

the

sacrifice f a

"perfect ntelligibility"

hat would

affirm,

ut

not

distrustfully

evoke,

riendship

s the

experience

of the

self ecoming

othern theprocess fperceivingtself he sacrifice f the intelligibility

of this

co-perception

nvolves

otjust

a

cognitive

matter

ut above all

the "fall"

rom certain

purity":

rom

hat

pure

erception

f

being"

impliedby

the

"original olitical ynaesthesia"

hat

Agamben

finds n

Aristotle

nto an exhausted and

degraded

form

f

ambivalence

that

characterizes

ontemporary

onsensual

heories f

democracy

n

their

most

exhausted

phase.

In

short,

what

s at

stake s the

history

f a

"fall"

from he

experience

of a certain

purity

f

existence s

"purely

...

con-division" o a

most

mpure

consensus that

must

deny

what t

affirms. rput yet notherway--and his sperhapsone of tsdecisive

elements-it is the

problem

of a fallfrom

certain

rust o a distrust

f

that

original, riginating

urity. riendship

or

Agamben

hus

merges

as

the

promise

of a

healing

of the

wound,

since

in

affirming

ivision

it

transcends t as con-division:s that

barely

isible

grasping

f

hands

beforeand

beyond

all

self-recognition.

This is

the

problem

of

whichhe finds

no "trace" n

Derrida's

Politics

of

Friendship.

nstead of faith n the

"purity"

f an

"origin,"

Agamben

registers

strategy

f affirmation

oupled

with

distrust-and

hence,

not the

slightest

race of the

problem

he communicated o Derrida.

It is as if

Derrida failed

to

see,

or take

note

of,

Agamben's

mportant

discovery.

nd

yet,

s we shall

see,

or rather

ead,

Politics

fFriendship

s

laced

with racesof the

problem

withwhich

Agamben

s concerned.

One No More

The

problem,

however,

s

that

Agamben'sproblem

s not

Derrida's-

not at least in the form n whichAgambenpresents t in his text

and

presumably

lso

in

his communication

o

Derrida. This however

is

not at all

tantamount o

the

problem

being

ignored.

Indeed,

an

entire

chapter

s devoted to it. Its

title,

n

French,

s

Replis,

which s

translated nto

English

s

"Recoils";

t should be noted

however

hat



14/23

1040 SAMUEL WEBER

the Frenchword also

suggests

withdrawal"r "retreat."t deals with

the fact hatthere s an alternate ersion f the remark ttributed o

Aristotle,he one communicated o Derridaby Agamben,and that

this lternative emands

a

certainkind of decision:

The timehas

perhaps

ome to decidethe ssue. t would

e

fitting

hen

to also

give

ne's reasons

or

deciding,

or

deciding

o lean to one

side

rather han o

another,

ven

f,

etthere e no

mistake,

petty'3hilologi-

cal

coup

e

theitre

illnever xhaust hevenerable radition

hich,

rom

Montaigne

o

Nietzschend

beyond,

rom ant

o Blanchot nd

beyond,

willhave bestowed

o

many uarantees

n the bias

of

a

copyist

r of

a

reader

n a

hurry

ho bet without

nowing

t on a

reading

hatwas

so

tempting,

ut

misguided

errante),

nd

probably

ff hemark

egaree).

Fortunately

or

s,

no

orthographic

estoration,

o

archivist's

rthodoxy

will

ver

mputate

entamera]

his ther rchive hat n the

meanwhile

hasbecome

edimented,

his reasurerove f educed nd seductiveexts

thatwill

lways ive

s

more o think bout han he

policeguardrails

o

which

ne would

iketo

subject

hem.No

philological

undamentalism

(integrismehilologique)

ill

ver rase he nheard f hance f

genial

invention.

ecausewhat

s

there,

o

doubt,

s a

staggering

rtifact,

n off-

handed

xegetical oup

that s as

risky

s it s

generous,

ndeed imitless

(abyssal)n itsvery enerativity.f howmany reat extswouldwe have

been

deprived

f omeone

but

who,

n

fact?)

ad not

one

day

aken,

nd

perhaps

eliberatelyeigned

o

take,

ike

great ambler,

ne

omega

for

another?

ot ven

n accent

or

nother,

carcely

letter

or

nother,

ust

a soft

spiration

un

esprit

oux)

for

hard

ne-and the mission f he

subscript

ota.

234/208)14

It s difficult

ot to see

this

passage

as

in

part

response

o

Agamben's

discovery,lthough

rather arsh

one,

as

though

Derridawereantici-

pating

the

essay

hat

Agamben

was to

publishmanyyears

ater.

Philo-

logical

emendations,

o the

argument

would eem to

go,

shouldnotbe

allowed

to foreclosediscussion

f the

history

f the differentersions

and their elative

ignificance.

ut this

discussion,

nd the decision t

entails,

need not be

thatof an

either/or.

We

are not

speaking

here

of true or

false,"

Derrida continues

mmediately

fter he

long pas-

sage

ust quoted.

Rather,

t s a

question

of

"doing ustice

to

another

passage."

The

"passage"

n

question

s not

ust

one textual

eading

or

the

other

but the transition

rom

he one

to the otherand what this

movementnvolves. he passagemarks he movement rom

a

reading

hat

s

eloquent

ut ess

robable

nd ess

onvincing

o

reading

that s

more

iscreet,

ore

teadfast,

ore

atient

n

testing

he ext? his

passage

ould wellresemble

substitution,oubtless,

ven correction



15/23

MLN

1041

of

an error.

t should howeverbe a

question

of

something

lse,

and,

we

hope,

of a

less

normativizing rocedure.

More

respectful

f

great

ances-

tors.Without utting robityn trialbutout ofconcern withphilological

probability.

235/208)

It is

worthwhile

underscoring

the

"respect"

that

Derrida here

insists

on,

given

the

widespread

but erroneous

tendency

to

see his work

as

destructive

f

all tradition. Here in

any

case his

strategy

s not

informed

by

the

alternative true or false

and does

not aim at

establishing

the

exclusive

right

of the one

reading

at

the

expense

of the

other:

Without

ny

value of

orthodoxy,

ithout

call to

order,

without iscredit-

ing the canonical version, the

passage]

would

engage

differently,

nd

along

other

paths,

sometimes

ntersecting

ith

the first

version),

new

adventures

f

thought.

his other

wager

will

ertainly

e less

risky,

ince t

relies on

a

greaterprobability.

t

will

put

into

play

another

ante,

another

bias,

certainly,

ut without

bsolute

assurance.

There will

be

a

pledge

and

a

wager,

s in

all

readings,

here

will be

speculation

on

possible

nterest,

wherethe

ssue does not concern

imply

pelling, rammar,

nd

accentua-

tion.

235/208)

Is it this

Nietzschean affirmation of

the

inevitable

"lack of

assur-

ance"-the

"dangerous

perhaps"-as

well as

the

"speculation

on

pos-

sible

interest"

that

Agamben

registers

s

the

"affirmation

nd

distrust"

and that

he seems to

distrust?

In

any

case,

as the title of

this

chapter

in

its

over-determination

sug-

gests,

the two

versions are

historically

folded into

one

another,

which

does

not mean

that

they

re

of

equal significance.

Derrida

here

"turns

back"

to this "fold"

not to

confirmthe

authenticity

f

one of

ts

sides or

to

discover

which

of

the two

readings

is

more

authoritative

but

rather

"to mark withseveral signposts [reperes]he possibilityand the stakes

of an

alternative

reading"

(236/225).

This

statement is

contained

in

a

footnote,

in

which Derrida

acknowledges

the

indebtedness of

his

discussion to

a number

of

"friends":

Here

I

should thank the

friends,

men and

women,

who

have

helped

me

along

these

international

aths,

through

he

several

languages,

ibraries

or

bibliographies

o which

refer

here,

whether

Latin,

talian,

Spanish,

English

or German ..

(236/225)

The first ame on the listthatfollows-which, to be sure, is arranged

alphabetically--is

that of

"Giorgio

Agamben."

If

there can

still

be

any

doubt

about

whether the

message

of this

friend

arrived

at its

destina-

tion,

this

footnote should

remove it. The

footnote

is

appended

to the

third

word

in

the

following

passage

of

Derrida's main

text:



16/23

1042

SAMUEL WEBER

To

myknowledge,

here xists n

edition n

English

hat s based

on

the

text,

h6i

philoi,

udeis

hilos,

ranslateds "He

who has

friendsan

have

no true riend." ne could alsotranslate:cannot ave ny rue riend."

(236/209)

Derrida's

philological

"knowledge"

s thus

indebted

to a series

of

"friends,"

he first f

which,

t least n

alphabetical

order,

s

Giorgio

Agamben.

Derrida

proceeds

to cite

similar

ranslations

n

Italian and

German,

before

oncluding

his

survey

ith

what

s

probably

he most

literal

ranslation,

erhaps

because it s

"closer o the

source,"

namely

in

Latin: Cui

amici,

micus

nemo

237/209).

Given thatthisentire hapter s organizedaround a discussionof

the two

possible readings

of the

citation ttributed

o

Aristotle nd

that

GiorgioAgamben

s

named

among

those

friends

whose

help

was

essential o

ts

writing,

he

"problem"

with

which

Agamben

s

concerned

has to

lie

elsewhere. Could it be

precisely

question

of

number?

Too

many

friends,

o friend? oo

many

names

in

the listof

friends

acknowledged

n

the footnote? oo

many

friends,

lso,

to be

subject

to the kind of

"co-synaesthesia,"

o that

concurrent

erception"

hat

Agamben

construes s the essence of

friendship?

hould we

recall

here that n Italian, s in French and in German, heprimarymean-

ing

of the word

"concurrent"-concorrenza,oncurrence,

onkurrenz-is

"competition"?

Would

the

Nietzschean

agonistics"

e

entirely oreign

to the

problem

that

Agamben

has

withDerrida's

strategy?

However that

may

be,

it is true

that

although Agamben,

among

others,

s thankedfor his

help,

there s no

doubt thathis

equation

of the revisionist ersionwith

perfect ntelligibility"

s

severely

riti-

cized. And this s also consistent ith he overall

trategy

r

argument

of the book in which Derrida seeks to

elaborate a mode of

inquirythat would do

justice

to that

"dangerous

perhaps"

that Nietzsche

associateswiththe

"coming

philosophers"

n

Beyond

ood nd

Evil.'5

This is

why

what nterests im

is not

ust

the

"canonical"

versionor

the more

probable,

more

plausible

revisionist

ne,

but

rather heir

interplay

nd

what this reveals about each.

Whereas this

revisionist

reading

consists n a direct

tatement,

declaration,

n

unequivocal

proposition,

r in the

language

of

speech-act

heory,

"constative,"

the

"canonical"

and

improbable

version

appeals

to

Derrida

precisely

because it s firstnd perhapsforemost,n appeal,which s tosay, lso

an

address,

nd moreover ne that

tages

n obvious and undeniable

"performative

ontradiction"

something

of which Derrida himself

was often

ccused).

For

how

can Aristotle ddress his "friends"

f t s

only

to

tell them that there s no friend"?



17/23

MLN

1043

What

ppeals

to

Derrida

n

this

performatively

ontradictory

ppeal

is that

t

foregrounds

wo

things

hat

the

constative

ersion

tends to

hide. First, t manifests he element of address thatinheres n all

language,

ncluding

constatives,

nsofar

s

the

latter

re,

and

always

must

be,

addressed to some

one,

or

more than

one.

And

second,

the

paradoxical

appeal

or address

attributed o

Aristotle

stages

the

contradictory,

ven

aporetical

relation

between the

constative

nd

performative

imensionsof

discourse,

ach

presupposing

he

other

and

yet

each

displacing

nd

dislocating

he

other.

The

constative s

presupposed

by

he

performative-one

must

know

hat

"friend"s n

ordertoappeal toone. Buttheperformativentheform f an appeal

or

address s

also

presupposed

nd

contained

within

very

onstative,

as a

form f

utterance n

general.

As

Derrida

puts

t:

The

reader

r isteners

not

imply

implied"

y

r

"implicated"

n

[impli-

quis]

he

tructuref he

tterance.

minimum

f

riendship

rof

onsent

must

e

supposed

f

them;

ne

must

ppeal

to a

minimal

onsensusn

order o

say

nything

t

all.Whether

his

ppeal

s

in

act

met

by

ompre-

hension r

greement,

f

nly

oncerning

he

meaning

f

what

s

aid-this

is

secondary

ith

espect

o the

ppeal

tself.

he

atter

s

coextensive

ith

themost onstative oment f the tatementconstat).n short,heres

indeed

ome ilent

nterjection,

ome

O

friends"

n

the

evisionist

ersion.

It

resoundsn

the

erformative

pace

f n

appeal

ven

eforets

irst

ord.

And

this s

the

rrefutableruth f

the

anonical

ersion.

242/214)

At

the

same

time,

the fact

that

every

ct

of

language

has to

address

itself

o

"someone"

endows

t with

what

Derrida

calls

"two

great

des-

tinies"

or

destinations.

he first s

that

every

nunciation

must

be

addressed

to

"someone"

but

without

ver

being

able

to

precisely

r

exhaustivelydentify

ts

addressee,

whether

male

or

female, ingular

or

plural.

The

reason

for this

uncertainty

s not

simply

mpirical.

Rather,

t

is rooted in

the

structure f

singularity

hat

determines

the

"second

destiny"

f

the

phrase.

Such

singularity-which

hould

be

radically

distinguished

rom

"individuality"-does

not

exclude

multiplicity

ut rather

necessarily

ngenders

t.

The

singularity

f an

appeal

or

an

address s

relational

nd

heterogeneous.

or,

s

Derrida

puts

t,

it s

impossible

o address

anyone,

male or

female,just

nce."

To be

addressed,

an

addressee

must

be

identifiable,

ecognizable,

and thereforeterable. hat s iterable-but neversimplyterated-is

"thus

internally

multiple

nd

divided n

its

occurrence,

n

any

case

in

its

advent s

event

ve'nmentialite)"

243/215).

To

"this

drama

or

this chance

of a

singular

multiplicity,"

oth

versions,

he

canonical

and

the

revisionist,

ear

witness

hrough

heir

ontrast f

the

plural,



18/23

1044

SAMUEL

WEBER

"friends,"

nd

the

singular

friend." here is

no

friend, hen,

n

the

sense that the

singular

an never be

identifiedwith he

actuality

f

an individual, onstrued s self-contained nd self-identical; ather,

the

singular

s,

to use a word

of

Novalis that Derrida does not

cite,

dividual,

nternally

nd

constitutively

ivisible

y

virtue f ts

terability,

withoutwhich t can

neverbe

recognized

or

experienced

s

singular.

The

singular,

n

short,

s not

simply

he

unique:

it

s

nevitably

ultiple,

but

n

a

singular

manner.And it s

onlyrecognizable,

nameable

after

the fact.After he

fact,however,

t

s no

longer

thatwhich t was. The

experience

of

singularity

hen

always

ntails a sense of

loss,

a kind

ofmourning.

All of this s summed

up

in

a French

phrase

thatresists ranslation:

plus

d'un,

whose

meaning hangesdepending

n how t s

pronounced:

with

he s of

"plus"pronounced,

t

means

more han

ne;

with

he final

s

silent,

t means oneno more. ne

possible

English

rendition,

which

however

equires

rather ntricate

cansion,

nd which lso

introduces

an

"appeal"

into what would

otherwise e a mere

"constat,"

might

therefore e

one-no-more

but

pronounced,haltingly,

s: "One. No

More ")

The ambivalence fthis one-no-more "scloseto andyet till uite

remotefrom he

kind of

synaesthesia

r

co-perception

hat

Agamben

seems to

envisage

s characteristic

f

friendship-and

ndeed,

of exis-

tence itself.

or

Derrida,

the other

cannot be construed s

another

self:

nor does

the self"become"

other;

rather rom he

start,

r-to

use

a recent

American

expression,

fromthe

"get-go,"

t is irreduc-

ibly

and

aporetically

ther.From

this

perspective,

t is

by

virtueof

its

singularity

hat there can

be "no

friend,"

ua

individual,

imply,

because

any

friend

would have to

be

both more

and less than one:

one-no more Because number nd timecannotbe

separated,

this

inevitably

nvolveswhatwe call the "indefinite

rticle,"

hat

n

French

and

German,

but not

n

English, verlaps

n

the

single

word "un

e),"

"ein(e)."

In

English

we have to

distinguish

etween one"

and "a" or

"an." At

any

rate,

t s

precisely

uch

singular

multiplicity

hat

enderst nevitablehat he

olitical

e takennto ccount

...

It cuts crosswhat s calledthe

question

f the

ubject,

f ts

dentity

or ts

putativeelf-identity,

ts

upposed

ndivisibility

hat auses t to enter

into ountable tructuresorwhicht seems o be made. 244/215)

As this

passage

shows,

he

strategy

f

Derrida,

here as

elsewhere,

s

both

very

lose to and

yetvery

far from he

argument

ketched

by

Agamben

n his brief

ssay.

Both

deploy

a notion of

friendship

hat



19/23

MLN

1045

is

determined

y

n irreducible

lterity

r

heterogeneity.

ut whereas

Agamben

construes his

lterity

r

heterogeneity

n

terms

f

a

simulta-

neity

f

perception

nwhichthe self s

"deported"

by

and toward he

perception

of

another,

Derrida

develops

his

notion

of

friendship

s

the

effect fa

simultaneity

n

which here s

no

"becoming"

ut

rather

a

discontinuous

jump

or

leap

or cut

n

the

unity

f

the

moment-the

(Nietzschean,

Kierkegaardean)Augenblick.

his

temporality-or

em-

porization,

s his notion of differance

ould

suggest-is

performed

not

through co-perception

but rather

through

co-reading

nd

"co-signing"

f

texts,

whichretraces

nd

reinscribes he

trajectory

f

citations nd re-citationsf an original ppeal that annot be located

as

such-for

nstance,

n

the

corpus

of the

Aristotelian

ext-and

yet

which

precisely

orthatreason continues

o

take

place

once

and for

all in

innumerable

ver-singular

terations.

As a

result,

Derrida formulates

"principle

f

intelligibility"

hat

can neverbe

"pure"

or

based

on an

"origin."

Rather,

he

locates this

"principle"

n

the structural

penness

of

every

etermining

ontext:

A

contexts

never

bsolutely

losed,

onstraining,

etermined,

aturated.

A

structural

pening ermits

t to

transformtself

r to

make

place

for

another ontext. his s

why very

mark etainsforce fdetachmenthat

not

nly

an iberate rom his r that

eterminate

ontext,

ut ven

ssures

it ts

principle

f ntelligibility

nd ts

tructure

ua

mark,

hich s to

say,

ts

iterabilityrepetition

nd

lteration)....

And

this s

what

appens

with

he

history

f ur

phrase.

ts ntire

istory,

rom

he

tart,

ill

ave onsistedn

taking

eave f

unique

ontextnd of n

indivisible

ddressee.

hatwill

havebeen

possible nly

ecause ts nitial

ddressee

friend

r

enemy

ut

in

no

way

eutral)

will avebeenfirstf

ll

multiple,

otentially

etached

from he

ontext

f

ts nitial

ccurrence.

245/215)

This

potential

or

detachment,

errida

concludes,

s also the

reason

that

between he "one no

more" nd

the "more

thanone"

there s not

just

"friendship"

ut also

enmity

nd

"war":

why

he

enemy

s

always

ready

to take the

place

of

the

friend,

nd

why

both

"take

place

in

taking

he

place

of the other"

244/216).

Does this amount to the "distrustful

evocation"

f

friendship

r

the

recognition

f its

neluctable mbivalence?

t

would

in

any

case

suggest

hatthe

"cohabitation"

f

which

Agamben

speaks

can

never

have been purebut ratherhas always lso been the siteand the con-

ditionfor

onflict,

f concurrence

n all

the

multilingual

enses of

that

word.

This

n

turndefines he

"principle

f

intelligibility"

s one

that

is

hyperbolic,

lways

xceeding

and also

defaulting

n

itself,

hich s to

say,

n

what

ppears

to consciousness s its

nitiating

ntention:



20/23

1046 SAMUEL WEBER

When omeone

peaks

n

private

r n

public,

hen e

teaches,

ublishes,

preaches,

rders,

romises

r

prophesies,

nforms

r

communicates,

hat

someforcen him truggleslsonot obeunderstood,pproved,ccepted

in

the

onsensus.. it s

necessary

hat he

ossibility

f ailures not

merely

an

accidental

dge

but

omething

hat

haunts,

nd

leaves ts

mpression

on,

the

very ody

tseems o threaten.

246/218-19)

Without

imply subscribing

o such a

haunting,"

errida neverthe-

less

concludes that

No

"good"

ecisionwould ver ccedeto

responsibility,

ithout hich o

event ould ver

appen.

Undecidability

and

hence ll nversionsf

igns

betweenriendshipnd ts pposite)s not sentence hat decision an

leavebehind. he crucial

xperience

f he

perhapsmposed y

heunde-

cidable-that

s to

say,

hecondition f

decision-isnot

moment o be

exceeded,

orgotten,

r

suppressed.

t

continueso constitutehe

decision

as

such: tcan never

gain

be

separated

rom

t;

t

produces

t

qua

decision

in

and

through

he

undecidable;

here s

no

decision ther han his ne:

decision

n the matter nd

form

f the

undecidable.... The

instant f

decisionmust

emain

eterogeneous

o all

knowledge

s such .. even f

it

may

nd must e

preceded

y

ll

possible

cience nd conscience. he

latterreunable o determine

he

eap

of

decision ithoutransformingt

into he

rresponsible

pplication

fa

program,

ence

without

epriving

it

of... whatmakes

ta

decision,

f

here s one.

(247/219)

"If

there s one

...

." Let me

conclude

by

returning

or

one

last

time

to that

perfect

llegory

f

friendship"

hat

Agamben

finds

depicted

the

painting

f Serodine.

The

two

Apostles,

eter and

Paul,

meet on

their

way

o their eath.

They

are too close

to see each

other,

ut

also

close

enough

to

grasp

each other'shand.

This "excessive

roximity,"

in

which

Agamben

discerns

he

perfect

llegory

f

friendship,

eems

thusinseparablefrom he proximityf death-but of a death that

carrieswith t the

promise

f

something

ther,

omething

ot

entirely

visible ut

perhaps o-perceptible:

he

promise

f

"cohabitation" hat

is

synonymous

ith

human

"existence"

tself.

n

friendship,

uman

existence

grasps

itself nd

thereby

ranscends ts limitations. his

seems to

be the subtext f

Agamben's

reading

of the

painting

that

can

be

"concurrently

erceived"

n

viewing

t-if,

that

s,

one

only

has

sufficient

rust.

One need

only

have trust n

friendship,

ather

than

affirming

nd

revoking

t

"distrustfully,"

n

order to

perceive

"concurrently"

hatwillneverbe

simply

ccessible o the

single

vision

of a mortal elf.

There is no doubt that the

"principle

of

intelligibility"-"if

here

is

one"-elaborated

by

Derrida

in

Politics

f

Friendship

s

very

differ-



21/23

MLN 1047

ent from the

"perfect" ntelligibility

hat

Agamben

associates with

Casaubon's

correction,

hanging

vocative

ppeal

and

address nto

what ooks ike a straightforwardtatement. or the "force fdetach-

ment" that

for Derrida constitutes he

structural

ondition of the

intelligibility

f

every

mark

delimits nd limits t at

once,

making

t

always

more and less than

one,

more and less than

tself,

making

t

"one-no,

more "This

points

oward differentindof"cohabitation"

from

hatwhich the

"perfect llegory

f

friendship"

n

its

"perfect"

intelligibility

nvisages.

uch

cohabitations

perhaps

ess

dramatic,

ess

perceptible,

nd

certainly

ess

reassuring

han thatwhich

s

depicted

on the

"way

o

calvary"-which,

ust by

chance,

is also the titleof a

paintingbya contemporaryfSerodine,Domenichino [1610] (Fig-

ure

2).

In

this

painting,

Christ,

ormented

y

his

captors,

fixesthe

beholder withhis

glance

from

below,

visual

equivalent

perhaps

of

a

verbal

ddress,

ppeal

or

interpellation.

Even less

perfectlyntelligible, erhaps,

than this

glance

is a

very

different,

nd

yet

perhaps

not

totally

nrelated

cene,

described n the

Figure

2.

Domenichino

Domenico

Zampieri,

581-1641)

The

Way

o

Calvary

1610).

@

The

J.

Paul

Getty

Museum,

Los

Angeles.



22/23

1048 SAMUEL WEBER

followingassage

rom

Maurice

Blanchot's

Writingf

Disaster,

hich

Derrida ites n a footnoteo an earlier

hapter

fhis

book,

nd with

which will finally)onclude:

If heMessiahs tthe

ates

fRome

mong

he

eggars

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