and the Battlefields of Normandy...C&E Commemorative Battlefield Study Tour Return to Vimy and the...

C&E Commemorative Battlefield Study Tour

Return to Vimy and the

Battlefields of Normandy1–10 April, 2017

A quick guide and booklet for participants, including space for making personal notes.

Name:

Day C&E (Signals) Bus #1 C&E (Signals) Bus #2 Notes2 April Juno BeachArrival at Airport Depart on Assigned Buses

Juno Beach Academy Bernieres-sur-Mer & St. Aubin-sur-Mer Beaches

Check into Hotels after last event.

Bernieres-sur-Mer & St. Aubin-sur-Mer Beaches

Juno Beach Academy

Juno Beach Centre Outside Tour Juno Beach Centre Inside Tour

Juno Beach Centre Inside Tour Juno Beach Centre Outside Tour

3 April Normandy Day

Beny Cemetery Beny Cemetery Group ceremony at Beny Cemetery.Carpiquet Airfield Point 67

Point 67 Pegasus Bridge

Pegasus Bridge Abbaye d’Ardenne

Abbaye d’Ardenne Carpiquet Airfield4 April Dieppe Day

Blue Beach (Puys) Dieppe Cemetery Drive to Dieppe.

Red/White Beach (Dieppe) Blue Beach (Puys)

Green Beach (Pourville) Red/White Beach (Dieppe)

Dieppe Cemetery Green Beach (Pourville)

5 April Ypres Day

Cloth Hall Museum Passchendaele Drive to Ypres.Evening ceremony at Menin Gate.Vancouver Corner (St. Julian) Cloth Hall Museum

Mont Sorrel Hill 62 Vancouver Corner (St. Julian)Passchendaele Mont Sorrel Hill 62

6 AprilThe Somme

Adanac Cemetery Beaumont Hamel Drive to Lille.

Beaumont Hamel Thiepeval

Thiepeval Courcellette

Courcellette Adanac Cemetery

7 AprilVimy Area Sites

1 Cdn Div Memorial Lens 1915–18 Museum

C&E Branch participants’ dinner: Carlton Hotel.

Neuville German Cemetery 1 Cdn Div MemorialNotre Dame de Lorette Neuville German Cemetery

Lens 1915–18Museum

Notre Dame de Lorette

8 April Givenchy-en-Gohelle Arras 1918

Amiens Givenchy-en-GohelleArras 1918 Canal du NordCanal du Nord Amiens

9 April Vimy

Vimy Ceremony Vimy Ceremony

10 April Travel

Depart for Paris Depart for Paris

C&E Branch Battlefield Tour Booklet 2017 1

Locations/ Dates Signals Bus #2 (Deserving) Signals Bus #1 (VIP)

Norm

andy

2–

4 Apr

il 201

7Royal Hotel, Caen1 place de la république, 14000 Caen+02 31 86 55 33www.hotel-caen-centre.com

Mercure Omaha BeachChemin du Colombier, 14520 Port-en-Bessin-Huppain+33 2 57 28 06 67www.omaha-beach-hotel.com

Diep

pe

4–5 A

pril 2

017

Hotel Windsor, Dieppe18 boulevard de Verdun, 76200 Dieppe,+33 2 35 84 15 23www.hotelwindsor.fr

Hotel Europe Dieppe63 Bd De Verdun, 76200 Dieppe,+33 (0)2 32 90 19 19www.hotel-europe-dieppe.com

Ypre

s 5–

6 Apr

il 201

7

Ieper Peace VillageNieuwkerkestraat 9a, B-8957 Mesen+32 57 226 040www.peacevillage.be

Mercure RoeselareAccent Business Park, Kwadestraat 149B, 8800 Roeselare,+32 51 43 20 00www.mercureroeselare.be

Lille

6–

10 Ap

ril 20

17

Holliday Inn Lille OuestAutoroute A25 Lille Dunkerque, Impasse Bertha Sortie Englos, 59320 Englos+33 3 20 10 58 58www.hilille.com

Carlton Hotel Lille3 rue de Paris, Lille, 59026, France+33 3 20 13 33 13www.carltonlille.com

Other important contact numbers:

2 C&E Branch Battlefield Tour Booklet 2017

JUNO BEACH — D-Day

Exerpts from: The Victory Campaign, The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945

By COLONEL C. P. STACEY, O.B.E., C.D., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S.C. Director, Historical Section, General Staff

The “Initial Joint Plan” stated that the object of Operation “Neptune”, the assault phase of “Overlord”, was “to secure a Lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed”.

Within the Operation Neptune plan four corps headquarters were responsible for seaborne divisional assaults on the beaches of Normandy. In the American sector, a single divisional attack on “Utah” Beach in the Cotentin and a similar assault against “Omaha” Beach, west of Port-en-Bessin, were directed respectively by the 7th and 5th United States Corps; in the British sector, the 30th Corps commanded a one-division attack against “Gold” Beach, on the right flank, while farther east the 1st Corps coordinated two divisions’ assaults on “Juno” and “Sword” Beaches. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was to make the “Juno” assault, in the centre of the British sector.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, commanded by Major-General R. F. L. Keller, and with the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade under command, was to make its D Day assault against “Juno” Beach, in the centre of the sector allotted to the Second Army. The Canadian attack was to be made on a two-brigade front, through sectors known as “Mike” (right) and “Nan” (left), including the villages of Courseulles-sur-Mer, Bernieres-sur-Mer and the western outskirts of St. Aubin-sur-Mer. On D-Day General Keller’s troops were to seize an area extending some 10 miles inland to include high ground west of Caen, astride the main road to Bayeux.

The landing was to be carried out with the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group on the right and the 8th Brigade Group on the left. In the first of four phases these brigades would land on both sides of the mouth of the Seulles, mop up the coastal region and capture a beachhead objective known as “Yew”. The intermediate divisional objective, “Elm”, would be taken in the second phase. It included crossings over the Seulles and one of its tributaries, the Mue, as well as high ground on the eastern flank near the villages of Colomby-sur-Thaon, Anisy and Anguerny. Speed would be essential. Meanwhile,

the reserve formation, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (Brigadier D. G. Cunningham) would be landing through either “Mike” or “Nan” sectors, as the situation dictated, and preparing to assist the 7th Brigade in the succeeding phase, the capture of the final objective west of Caen, called “Oak”. The fourth and final stage of the assault would consist of reorganization on “Oak” to meet the anticipated counter-attack.

Thus, by nightfall on D-Day General Keller hoped to have the 7th and 9th Brigade Groups well forward, astride the Caen-Bayeux road. The 7th would hold the triangle formed by Putot-en-Bessin, Bretteville l’Orgueilleuse and Norrey-en-Bessin; to the east of the Mue River, the 9th would have control of the Carpiquet—Franqueville—Authie area, within a mile of the outskirts of Caen. Immediately behind these formations the 2nd Armoured Brigade, consisting of the 6th Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars), 10th Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) and 27th Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment), would be concentrated, under divisional command, ready to strike at any counter-attack, while the 8th Brigade Group was preparing to move westwards, behind the 7th. The Division would thus be firmly entrenched in positions of great tactical value, prepared for further offensive operations.

The Canadian assault, which began at approximately 0800 hours 6 June, was centred on the village of Bernieres -sur- Mer. It was attacked by 8 CIB followed up by 9 CIB, while 7 CIB attacked Courseulles-sur -Mer, located a short distance to the west. The tanks of 2 CAB landed with or before the infantry, while the artillery laid down covering fire from the landing craft. At the end of the day, while the D-Day objectives were not reached, the Canadians had established a four to five-mile bridgehead, and made contact with the British 50th Division on the right. Contact had not been made with the British 3rd Division on the left because it had met the first German counter-attack force and failed to reach its objectives. Casualties were heavy but less than anticipated: 961 compared to an estimate twice as great.


SIGS AT JUNO

From 24 April First Canadian Army took part in a wireless deception scheme (Exercise “Quicksilver”), sending out fictional messages designed to build up a picture of the Army, with one U.S. corps under command, and itself under the 1st U.S. Army Group, preparing to attack the Pas de Calais. The Third U.S. Army, which also figured in this scenario, was represented as being in East Anglia. “Quicksilver” went on until 14 June, eight days after D-Day. How far this particular scheme was effective cannot be determined with certainty from the available German records. The Germans certainly knew that we were running such schemes, for one of their intelligence documents dated 9 June refers to “the radio games played with the enemy Intelligence Service”. They seem to have placed their main intelligence reliance on agents.

For 3 Div Sigs and 2 CAB Sigs, D-Day was the climax of a long period of planning, training, and acquiring equipment and supplies in order to be able to duplicate every wireless link both for the Forward Group, which would land on 6 June, and for the Main Group due to land later. On the actual day, communications worked extremely well. There was a problem contacting the Engineers until it was found that most of the operators in the first wave had been picked off by snipers. Assault cable was found to be useless, and regular line could not be run until units were off the beach due to both vehicles and men breaking the cables. Because of the crowding on the beaches with limited exits, the second wave of signallers due to land later on D-Day did not, until one or two days later.

The Forward Group of 3 Div Sigs, with only 8 signallers in the HQ who worked 72 hours straight, had to carry on in spite of casualties and line detachments disappearing. Fortunately, casualties were light: four KIA, Lt R.B. Murchison, A/Cpl N.A. Hauk, LCpl E.G. Swan, and LCpl F.M. Trainor, and one man wounded.

There were two unusual occurrences on D-Day. The first involved a line detachment running a line from 7 CIB HQ to 12 Fd Regt HQ, about 1.5 miles distant. On reaching a cross-road, they thought it wise to have one of the three with a Bren gun cover the other two from a ditch about 20 yards away. At that point a German soldier appeared saying that some of his company were in the fields and wanted to surrender. A few minutes later a German officer appeared with a pistol and when challenged opened fire only to be cut down by the Bren. Shortly thereafter a German major appeared and offered to surrender his whole company, and soon about 60 soldiers appeared. After disarming the lot, two of the linemen marched them down the road toward the village of Banville. LCpl M.V. Hughes stayed at the cross-roads and had about 20 more Germans surrender, so he followed the main body. After a short time, more Canadians appeared, and the group of Germans, numbering nearly 100, were marched off to POW cages on the beach. Hughes and his detachment: Sigmn E.W. Martin and J.D. McPhee continued with their line laying. Although the tale was well documented, the trio never received formal recognition.

The second unusual event happened to Capt G.V. Eckenfelder, RCCS at 7 CIB HQ, who, after passing the village of Fontaine Henry, took the wrong road and was stopped by a German road block and captured. He was placed in a German HQ in a large quarry, where he was soon joined by a Lt Germain of the Canadian Provost Corps (C Pro C). After a few hours, during which there was a lot of firing outside, a German officer said that his artillery unit had fired off all their ammunition and wished to surrender. Eventually, under Eckenfelder’s command, as he was the senior POW officer, about 100 Germans surrendered, and at the same time six Canadian other ranks, who had been taken prisoner, were released. Capt Eckenfelder, who eventually was awarded a MiD, recovered his jeep and was soon on his way.


Bény-sur-Mer Canadian War Cemetery

On June 6, 1944, now known to history as D-Day, Operation Overlord, the long-awaited invasion of Northwest Europe, began with Allied landings on the Cost of Normandy.

The 3rd Division and the 2nd Armoured Brigade were Canada’s major ground contribution to the D-Day landings. These were representative of the whole nation: three of the infantry battalions came from Ontario, one from Quebec, three from the Western provinces and two from the Maritimes; the artillery, engineers, signals and service units were equally diverse in origins. The three regiments of the armoured brigade regiments represented Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec.

Under command of the British Second Army, supported by an impressive array of firepower from artillery, rocket-firing landing craft and naval guns, the Canadians stormed ashore at “Juno” beach, in the centre of the British sector, through rough water, beach obstacles, wire, mines and gunfire. By nightfall they had secured a beachhead, which, although short of the planned objectives, was firm enough to withstand enemy counter-attacks. In the days that followed the lodgement was strengthened and enlarged until by 11 June, the bridgehead was deemed secure enough to accommodate new formations that were to pour ashore in the next phase.

Name Age Date KIA Rank Unit SN Location Additional Information

ARMSTRONG FREDERICK JAMES F J 31 June-29-44 SignalmanFirst Cdn. Army Sigs.

‘F/95497’ XI. G. 16.

SON E OF G. FREDERICK AND MARY ARMSTRONG; HUSBAND OF MARIE C. ARMSTRONG, OF TRURO, NOVA SCOTIA.

ARMSTRONG JOHN HERBERT J H 22 June-29-44 SignalmanFirst Cdn. Army Sigs.

‘B/132379’ X. H. 9.SON OF RUSSELL AND INEZ ARMSTRONG, OF ENGLEHART, ONTARIO.

BOLTON WALTER VERDON W V 25 July-10-44 SignalmanFirst Cdn. Army Signals.

‘B/110869’ XIII. C. 5.SON OF WALTER AND NELLIE BOLTON, OF TORONTO, ONTARIO.

BRODIE STANLEY FRANCIS S F 26 July-21-44 Signalman 2nd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘H/20284’ XV. D. 5.

SON OF BENJAMIN JOHN AND CLARA ANN BRODIE; HUSBAND OF AGNES WALLACE SINDAIR BRODIE, OF WINNIPEG, MANITOBA.

CRAWFORD JOHN DOUGLAS J D 29 July-13-44 Signalman 3rd Div. Sigs. ‘A/37249’ XI. D. 9.

SON OF JOHN EDMOND AND MARY MCKAY CRAWFORD; HUSBAND OF BEATRICE ALICE CRAWFORD, OF HEATON NORRIS, STOCK-PORT, CHESHIRE, ENGLAND.

CRAWFORD PATRICK MORRIS P M July-10-44 SignalmanFirst Cdn. Army Signals.

‘B/38550’ XIII. A. 3.

EISENER HAROLD GEORGE H G 22 June-11-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘F/29653’ V. H. 1.SON OF GORDON B. EISENER, AND OF BESSIE EISENER, OF HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA.

GORDON WILLIAM K. W K August-08-44 Signalman II Cdn. Corps Sigs. ‘D/21035’ XV. B. 7.

GRITTNER LESLIE LOREN L L 35 July-12-44 Corporal 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘M/41933’ III. A. 5.SON OF JULIUS AND DELLA MAE GRITTNER; HUSBAND OF THELMA M. G. GRITTNER, OF KELOWNA, BRITISH COLUMBIA.

HANNAY ALEXANDER A July-13-44Lance Sergeant

II Cdn. Corps Sigs. ‘C/3526’ XIII. A. 7.

HOWES DOUGLAS G. D G 24 July-26-44 Signalman First Cdn. Army Sigs. ‘L/20001’ XV. B. 9.SON OF JOHN HENRY NORMAN AND DAISY HOWES; HUSBAND OF MARGARET MARY HOWES, OF MITCHAM, SURREY, ENGLAND.

LOGAN ANDREW JAMESA J 24 July-15-44

Signalman2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. Sigs.

‘B/75064’ XII. G. 14.SON OF JOHN AND JANET LOGAN, OF TORONTO, ONTARIO.

LUTHER GORDON RUFUS G R 33 July-10-44 Signalman2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. Sigs.

‘A/103763’ IX. E. 4.

SON OF GEORGE W. AND CLARA MARGARET LUTHER, OF PARKHILL, ONTAR-IO; HUSBAND OF MARGARET CHRISTENA LUTHER (NEE CLUNESS), OF PARKHILL.

Royal Canadian Corps of Signals — Buried at Beny-sur-Mer Canadian War Cemetery


MAGUIRE CLARENCE A. C A 29 July-26-44 Signalman II Cdn. Corps Sigs. ‘L/110012’ XVI. D. 11.SON OF ELEZER W. AND VIOLA M. MAGUIRE, OF SASKATOON, SASKATCHEWAN.

MAJORROLAND ROHER ALBERT

R R A

June-09-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘C/75693’ VI. A. 1.

MILLER LLOYD G. L G July-23-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘L/74849’ XIV. F. 2.HUSBAND OF GLORIA E. MILLER, OF VERNON, BRITISH COLUMBIA.

MOLE GEORGE H. G H 28 July-15-44 Signalman2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. Sigs.

‘A/2113’ XVI. A. 6.

MOUNT PHILLIP JAMES P J August-09-44 Signalman II Corps Sigs. ‘B/32374’ VII. C. 14.SON OF LUCY L. MOUNT, OF TORONTO, ONTARIO.

MURCHISON ROBERT BRUCE R B 23 June-06-44 Lieutenant I. B. 6.

SON OF GORDON AND EDNA VIRGINIA MURCHISON; HUSBAND OF MARY FLORENCE MURCHISON, OF OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

MacLEAN NORMAN D. N D 27 July-14-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘L/100250’ IV. G. 6.SON OF DUGALD AND MARY MACLEAN; HUSBAND OF WINNIFRED ALICE MACLEAN, OF MEDSTEAD, SASKATCHEWAN.

NICOLETTI ROLAND R 25 June-26-44 Lieutenant VI. D. 10.SON OF FRANCESCO AND ANNE ISABELLA NICOLETTI, OF TORONTO, ONTARIO.

RHODES JAMES R. J R 20 July-23-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘A/55970’ XIV. D. 6.SON OF JOHN B. AND ALBERTA RHODES, OF CHATHAM, ONTARIO.

SHIRLOW ARCHIE E. A E July-13-44 Corporal II Corps Sigs. ‘B/32284’ XII. F. 4.

SIMONEAU PAUL P August-08-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘E/10437’ VII. E. 1.SON OF CHRYSOLOGUE AND VICTORIA SIMONEAU, OF MONTREAL, QUEBEC.

SMITH SYDNEY W. S W 26 August-08-44 Sergeant 3rd Cdn. Inf. Div. Sigs. ‘H/38644’ VII. C. 10.SON OF SYDNEY AND JEAN SMITH, OF SANDY LAKE, MANITOBA.

STANLEY WILLIAM HAROLD W H 22 June-16-44 Signalman 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘H/102710’ III. E. 12.SON OF WILLIAM AND ELIZABETH STANLEY, OF WINNIPEG, MANITOBA.

SWAN ELMER GRENVILLE E G 23 June-06-44Lance Corporal

3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘C/75648’ V. E. 13.SON OF JOHN AND CARRIE MAY SWAN; HUSBAND OF HELEN EILEEN SWAN, OF PRESCOTT, ONTARIO.

TADGELL WILLIAM H. W H 24 June-29-44 Signalman First Cdn. Army Sigs. ‘D/116159’ X. H. 3.SON OF HUBERT JOHN AND MARGARET JANE TADGELL, OF MONTREAL. PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

TOLSTAD JOHN J 40 August-09-44 Corporal 3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘M/41934’ XII. D. 13.SON OF MATHEA AND IVERSEN TOLSTAD; HUSBAND OF EILEEN MAY TOLSTAD, OF BRISTOL, ENGLAND.

TRAINOR FRANCIS MAURICE F M 23 June-06-44Lance Corporal

3rd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘F/26430’ I. F. 13.SON OF STEPHEN AND ALICE M. TRAINOR, OF CHARLOTTETOWN, PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND.

VANACKER EDMOND E July-15-44 Signalman 2nd Cdn. Div. Sigs. ‘A/2384’ XVI. H. 9.

The cost in lives had been high, though not as high as had been estimated, and certainly not as high as it would have been without Dieppe. On D-Day alone, Canada suffered almost a thousand casualties, of whom 340 were killed or died of wounds. The list lengthened during the following days as the Germans sought desperately to drive the Allies out.

The men who fell on the beaches and in the bitter bridgehead battles are buried in Beny-sur-Mer Canadian War Cemetery which, despite

its name, is near the village of Reviers. The cemetery contains 2,049 headstones enclosed by pines and maples. These mark the dead of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and the graves of 15 airmen. The mayor and people of Reviers take a special interest in the cemetery for, although it bears another name, they feel it to be their own. Fine hedges decorate the entrance, and the flanking registry buildings have platforms from which the visitor can see the whole area and appreciate the skill and devotion that has gone into the planning and design of this superb cemetery.


THE DIEPPE RAID

The Dieppe Raid was one of the most devastating and bloody chapters in Canadian military history. Of the 4,963 Canadians who embarked from England for the operation, only 2,210 returned, and many of them were wounded. Casualties totalled 3,367, including 916 dead and 1,946 prisoners of war.

As the assault force approached the coast of France in the early hours of August 19, 1942, the landing craft of the eastern sector unexpectedly encountered a small German convoy. There was a sharp, violent, sea fight, and that noise alerted the German coastal defences, particularly at Berneval and Puys. With the Germans ready to man their defences, the element of surprise was lost. The crafts carrying No. 3 Commando were scattered, and most of the unit never reached shore. Those who did were quickly overwhelmed. One small party of 20 commandos managed to get within 180 metres of the German battery. Their accurate sniping prevented the German guns from firing on the assault ships for two-and-a-half vital hours before they were safely evacuated.

The forces in the western sector attacked with some degree of surprise. In contrast to the misfortune encountered by the No. 3 Commandos on the east flank, the No. 4 Commando operation was completely successful. The units landed as planned and successfully destroyed the guns in the battery near Varengeville, and then withdrew safely.

The main attack was made across the pebble beach in front of Dieppe. It was timed to take place a half-hour later than the assault on its flanks. The German troops, concealed in clifftop positions and in buildings overlooking the promenade, were well prepared for the Canadians. As the men of the Essex Scottish Regiment assaulted the open eastern section, the enemy swept the beach with machine-gun fire. All attempts to breach the seawall were beaten back with terrible casualties. When one small platoon managed to infiltrate the town, a message was sent back to Headquarters offshore which misleadingly led General Roberts to believe that the Essex Scottish had established themselves in the town. To support them, the reserve battalion Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was sent in. Like their comrades who had landed earlier, they found themselves pinned down on the beach and exposed to intense enemy fire.

The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry landed at the west end of the promenade opposite a large isolated casino. They were able to clear this strongly-held building and the nearby pillboxes and enter the town. Some men of the battalion crossed the bullet-swept boulevard and moved into the town, where they engaged in vicious street fighting.

The Calgary Regiment also encountered unexpected obstacles. Although they were supposed to land immediately after an intense air and naval bombardment, they were put ashore ten to fifteen minutes late. This left the infantry without support during the first critical minutes of the attack. Then, as the tanks came ashore, they met an inferno of fire and were brought to a halt. They were stopped not just by enemy guns, but also by the pebble beach and a seawall. The tanks which managed to overcome the seawall found their way blocked by concrete obstacles that sealed off the narrow streets. Still, the immobilized tanks continued to fight, supporting the infantry and contributing greatly to the withdrawal of many of the soldiers. The tank crews themselves became prisoners of war (POWs) or died in battle.

The raid also produced a tremendous air battle. While the Allied air forces were able to provide protection for the ships off Dieppe from the Luftwaffe (the German air force), the cost was high. The Royal Air Force lost 106 aircraft, the highest single-day total of the war. The Royal Canadian Air Force lost 13 aircraft.

Debate over the merit of the raid continues to the present day. Some believe that it was a useless slaughter, others maintain that is was necessary for the success of the invasion of the continent two years later on D-Day. Without question, the Raid on Dieppe was studied carefully in planning later attacks against the enemy-held coast of France. There were improvements in the technique, fire support and tactics, which reduced D-Day casualties to an unexpected minimum. The lessons learned at Dieppe were instrumental in saving countless lives on June 6, 1944.


DIEPPE — SIGS

How did Canadian signallers fare in the face of their first and most difficult combat situation?

The operation was so secret that the 2 Div Sigs War Diary recorded that news of the raid was first heard on the BBC, which led to the speculation that it must be 2 Div Sig personnel, who were supposedly on EX FORD. Eventually, it was learned that two men, LSgt R.C.S. Upton and Sigmn W.G. Carrier, who had returned to England, had died of wounds. Nineteen men were missing and only after some time was it known that six of them had been killed: Sigmn A. K. Adams, W. J. Browne, T.M. Dean, H.C. Foster, E.P. Hilt, and K.L. Marsh. The other 13 men were taken prisoner. One member of 1 CAB Sigs was also killed, Sigmn W. H. Smith, and Maj Rolfe and 4 men were taken prisoner. Capt D.B.D. Warner, Lt Morrall and six men (three from each Signal Section) who returned to England were hospitalized with wounds; one man from 1 CAB Sigs was also wounded. Three 2 Div Sigs personnel were assigned to each of the infantry battalions to work the rear link to Bde HQ. The nine sent to the R Regt C, the E Scots, and the RHLI were all missing, according to the ‘J’ Section War Diary, but unknowingly Sigmn Carrier had returned to England, where he died of his wounds. The ‘L’ Section War Diary recorded those attached to the SSR, Camerons, and Fus MR also missing, along with three others, but was unaware that LSgt Upton’s body had been brought back to England.

The War Diaries of ‘J’ and ‘L’ Sections and a personal memoir of Sgt D.L. Hart provide a glimpse of the trials and tribulations of signallers during those few hours at Dieppe. Hart, 2 IC of ‘J’ Section, had a Cpl, two Sigmn, and a lineman to operate a WS No. 19 on the Div HQ net and a WS No. 18 on the 4 CIB net. They were on LCT No. 10 with the Brigade Major (BM), Maj D.G. Cunningham, serving as an alternate

HQ. Capt D.B. Warner, OC of ‘L’ Section, with Brig S. Lett, Commander of 4 CIB, had a similar wireless setup, WS No.19 and No. 46, on LCT No. 8. Hart’s ship was supposed to land him and his detachment on Red Beach but became immobilized about 25 feet from the shore in about 10 feet of water. There was no way to get the wireless sets to dry land, so they stayed where they were and operated on both nets. Hart was in communication with the E Scots and the RHLI but never with the R Regt C. He watched with horror the men of the E Scots and later the Fus MR being decimated on the beach. He made particular note of Sigmn J.F. Crosby, attached to the E Scots, who, after his WS No. 18 was destroyed, took one from the back of a dead regimental signaller and netted it in to call down air support. Crosby was taken prisoner but on Hart’s recommendation received the MM. When the order to evacuate was given Hart made sure that the battalions in 4 CIB got the message and, noticing that Div HQ was not getting through to 6 CIB, Hart changed over to the frequencies of the SSR and the Camerons and alerted them. His action undoubtedly saved lives and for that he was subsequently awarded a MM. Hart and the alternate HQ for 4 CIB in their disabled LCT were taken in tow by a couple of RN launches and safely made it back to England. Capt Warner’s ship, LCT 8, had much the same fate as LCT 10; it was disabled by heavy fire that seriously wounded Brig Lett and shot away their aerial four times.

A number of signallers gave post-action reports. Sigmn R.S. McMillan, who was attached to the Fus MR, reported that they landed at 0700 hours under heavy rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire. Almost immediately contact with the companies was lost. Attempts to pinpoint the sources of the direct fire were unsuccessful and the situation became more and more untenable. When the evacuation came at about 1200 hours, only half the ships that came ashore were capable of leaving, so heavy was the German fire.


Canadian Corps in the Ypres Salient

On May 25, 1915, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division officially became part of the British Expeditionary Force with headquarters at Shorncliffe Army Camp in Sussex. The division’s three infantry brigades were regionally based, the 4th from central Ontario, the 5th from Quebec and the Maritimes, and the 6th from the West. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were represented in locally recruited battalions, the 25th and 26th. French-speaking Canadians had been marginalized in the formation of 1st Division, but after a delegation of prominent leaders, including Sir Wilfrid Laurier, petitioned Ottawa and promised $50,000 for initial expenses, the government agreed to mobilize the 22nd Battalion as a French-language unit within 2nd

Division. Two other Quebec battalions, the 24th (Victoria Rifles) and the 23rd (which became a reserve battalion), were also recruited.

Brigadier Richard Turner took over command of the 2nd Canadian Division when it arrived in France in September 1915. The arrival of another Canadian division meant it was necessary to form a Canadian Corps to be able to control and administer two divisions. Arthur Currie took over 1st Division and the newly promoted Lieutenant-General Edwin Alderson was assigned command of the Canadian Corps. The appointment of a British officer to command the Canadian Corps generated much debate in Ottawa.

The Canadians spent the summer and fall of 1915 holding the line in the Ypres Salient. It was a miserable period of trench warfare punctuated with raids and small company-level attacks, but no major actions. The Canadians were out of the line in December when the Germans conducted an experiment with a new gas. The attack at Messines began with the release of chlorine and an intense shrapnel bombardment. The enemy then fired artillery shells containing colourless phosgene, hoping to create panic among the defenders, whose gas masks could not cope with high concentrations of the new gas. Despite heavy casualties, including 120 who died from inhaling phosgene, the troops held.

When Lieutenant-General Julian Byng took over the Canadian Corps in June 1916, the Canadians were responsible for the sector of the Ypres Salient from the Menin Road to south of St. Eloi. The recently formed Third Division commanded by Major-General Malcolm Mercer held the left of the line, clinging to the only part of the Ypres ridge still in Allied hands, an area the official Canadian historian, G.W.L. Nicholson, described as “a flat knoll called Mount Sorrel and two slightly higher twin eminences, ‘Hill 61’ and ‘Hill 62,’ the latter known as Tor Top.” From Tor Top, a “broad span of largely farm land, aptly named Observatory Ridge, thrusts nearly a thousand yards due west between Armagh Wood and Sanctuary Wood.”

Byng, who had been with the Corps less than a week, ordered an immediate counterattack that proved to be a costly failure. He then stepped back and organized an intensive artillery-based attack employing two composite brigades of Arthur Currie’s 1st Division veterans. The original line was restored following an equally heavy Canadian bombardment and quick advance on June 13. The two weeks of close combat, including the loss of Hooge, a village on the Menin Road, cost the Corps close to 9,000 casualties, including hundreds of shell-shock cases. But the Battle of Mont Sorrel was quickly forgotten because, on July 1, 1916, the Battle of the Somme began.

During the summer of 1916, the Canadian Corps was re-armed with new weapons, most importantly with the Lee-Enfield rifle. Although 1 CID had been re-armed earlier, the rest of the Corps was still using the Canadian Ross rifle. By this time, the Ross had been found wanting, especially during rapid fire when it tended to jam and become inoperable.


YPRES — SIGS

Soon after arriving in France, Canadian Signallers had become reconciled to the realities of communications on the Western Front. With the closeness of the opposing trenches and the Germans usually holding the dominating ground, it was nearly impossible to use visual signalling. Even telegraph was limited, not only by the shortage of trained operators but also by the necessity to erect poles beyond the range of German guns. Wireless was still in its infancy and distrusted by staff officers who refused to code messages. Telephone became the norm for communication, especially as magneto telephones were acquired from civilian sources. Likewise, civilian lines and exchanges were adopted but increasingly military exchanges and lines were constructed. Telephone cables had to be buried to prevent them from being torn up by vehicle and human traffic, and by shell fire.

In the Ypres area, where the water table was very high, waterproof cable had to be used and buried at least three feet deep or strung along the sides of communication trenches. Either way the system required a great deal of human effort to establish links from division to brigade to battalion and, most importantly, to the supporting artillery batteries. Under these circumstances, the use of Despatch Riders (DRs) on motorcycles became more important and regular schedules were set-up. Good communications became vital to the survival of front-line troops, in the case of a German attack or counter-attack, in order to be able to call down artillery fire. One new element of communication was just coming into its own — the use of homing pigeons. Already 12 birds were being kept at brigade headquarters. It was a system, that in spite of difficulties (pigeons would not home at night or in fog or smoke), grew exponentially; by 1918 over 20,000 birds were in service in the Canadian Corps.

For Signallers, the biggest improvement made during this struggle in a “morass of mud” was the decision to bury all telephone cable at least six feet deep. This decision was driven by the German’s increased use of the 5.9-inch howitzer, which produced a deep crater.

The 1 Div Sigs Coy mandate of 28 July 1915 to bury the cables to a depth of three feet was increased to six feet and made mandatory within the Canadian Corps on 1 January 1916. It was acknowledged by the British to be one of the most important standards in keeping communications working in spite of the increasing use of heavier forms of artillery. It had an obvious drawback: the enormous amount of labour required to dig the cable trenches.

Another problem affecting the use of telephones in the front lines was the ability of the Germans to detect and listen to conversations. It was mid-1915 before it was realized that using the earth as a second conductor in the front lines to minimize the amount of cable used set up a process known as induction. By placing wire probes in the ground in front of their trenches, the Germans could listen to telephone conversations up to 600 yards away in suitable soil. Of course, Canadians could do the same thing, and Maj Lister (OC 1 Div Sigs Coy) wrote of trying the induction technique in September 1915. The obvious solution was to run the earth wire several hundreds of yards to the rear before grounding it. The threat of induction was responsible for the introduction of voice procedure to train operators to avoid the use of sensitive information. The problem was serious enough to make it a court martial offence for anyone detected of giving away information to the Germans by poor voice procedure.

There were three DCMs awarded in June to Pte J.G. Hood and to Sgts W. de F. Henderson and G.C. Massey of 3 Div Sigs Coy, both subsequently commissioned. On 25 March 1916, the Military Medal (MM), a new award for other ranks for gallantry, was instituted. It ranked just below the DCM, which was not awarded casually as it ranked just below the Victoria Cross. Now there was a greater possibility of being singled out for a single display of bravery or steadiness under fire over an extended period. In June 1916, five signallers were recognized: A/Cpl J.L. Collins, Cpl T.R. Craven, Sgt W. Fullerton, Sgt T.D. Lee, and Sgt F.S. McPherson.


SOMME AND BEAUMONT HAMEL

The Battle of the Somme began in northern France on July 1, 1916, when waves of Allied soldiers began climbing out of their trenches to advance through a hail of enemy fire toward the German lines. It would be a tragic beginning to a costly battle where more than 57,000 Commonwealth soldiers would become casualties on the opening day of the fighting alone. The brave members of the Newfoundland Regiment who went into action near Beaumont-Hamel were hit especially hard, with only 68 of the more than 800 men who had taken part being able to answer the roll call the next morning.

The Battles of the Somme and Beaumont-Hamel would grind on for more than four and a half months and the Canadian Corps would see action there in the late summer and fall. Sadly, more than 24,000 Canadian soldiers became casualties before the fighting finally came to an end in November.

For most of the summer of 1916, the Canadian Corps had been manning a section of the Western Front in Belgium. In late August, however, they began to shift to the Somme front near the French village of Courcelette. The Canadians immediately encountered some stiff action there and suffered some 2,600 casualties before the major new offensive they had been tasked with had even gotten underway.

On September 15, our soldiers took part in a large-scale attack that was launched at dawn and pushed forward on a 2,000-metre wide front. Making use of a newly developed tactic called the creeping barrage, the Canadians advanced behind a carefully aimed wave of Allied artillery fire that moved ahead on a set schedule. This heavy bombardment forced the enemy defenders to stay under cover for protection and prevented them from cutting down the advancing troops with their rifle and machine gun fire. For this tactic to work, though, the soldiers had to stay perilously close to the heavy shellfire and many were wounded by the Allies’ own artillery explosions.

The Courcelette battlefield also saw another Allied innovation — the first use of the tank in warfare. They were primitive, few in number and mechanically unreliable, but the tanks’ shock value alone was enough to throw the enemy into confusion. The attack went well and by 8:00 a.m., the shattered German defensive position known as the Sugar Factory was taken. The Canadians then pushed ahead to Courcelette itself which was captured later that day. The Germans did not relent, however, and launched numerous counter-attacks which our soldiers repulsed as they consolidated their newly won positions. As was often the pattern during attacks on the Western Front, however, the enemy soon brought up major reinforcements, the defences solidified and any further gains became incredibly hard.

The fighting would not yet come to an end on the Somme, though. In the weeks that followed, soldiers of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions would be repeatedly flung against a series of German entrenchments. The final Canadian objective was a defensive line that had been dubbed Regina Trench, but it repeatedly defied capture.

The 4th Canadian Division arrived on the Somme in mid-October to take over from their exhausted fellow Canadians who had been fighting there. They faced a battlefield that had turned to mud and a determined German defence that continued to take a murderous toll on Allied attacks. Despite these great challenges, the Canadians finally captured the shattered remains of Regina Trench on November 11. A week later, in the final attack of the Battle of the Somme, the Canadians took Desire Trench. There were no further advances as the winter weather came and the offensive staggered to a halt. The ‘Big Push’ had resulted in the Allied lines being moved forward only some ten kilometres.


SOMME — SIGS

September had proved to be a difficult month for Canadian signallers. Moving from the Ypres Salient into a new area near Courcelette to take part in the Battle of the Somme meant laying out new communication routes, digging in cables, and establishing new headquarters at the brigade, division, and corps levels. If the attack at Courcelette was to be successful, communications up to the time of H-hour had to be secure, and as the attack went forward cable had to be laid immediately behind the assaulting troops if artillery fire was to be brought down on the inevitable German counter-attack. The first real trial for wireless was at the Somme, where one station did follow the troops into Courcelette. There it was realized that putting out an aerial drew artillery fire, and moreover to encode and decode Morse Code messages slowed the passage of information, especially as the operators had to do the encoding and decoding.

In December 1915, a gallantry award, the Military Cross (MC) was announced for junior officers and warrant officers. Similar to the March 1916 MM, it recognized individual acts of bravery or continuous periods of dangerous work carried out in the face of the enemy. In August 1916, Lt H.S. Quigley, DCM, was awarded the MC. There were 16 awards of the MM in August and September.

The 4 Div Sigs Coy War Diary recorded significant detail about signal operations on the Somme. During the capture of Regina Trench, the Div Sigs Coy’s lines were 8 miles long, and were maintained by parties

of 2 or 3 linemen, who lived in dugouts every three-quarters of a mile. Because of the extreme length of the lines and the wet soil, telephone signals were weak. Communications to the forward troops were only possible using runners and pigeons. The Company had only one fatal casualty on the Somme: Cpl W.A. Taylor on 15 November 1916.

The next offensive would see all four divisions attacking together with improvements in infantry tactics, artillery support, and communications, especially from brigade HQ forward; all vital to success. The last three months of 1916 had been less costly to Canadian Signallers in terms of casualties, in addition to Cpl W.A. Taylor there was: Capt W.W. Wilson, Paymaster for 1 Div Sigs Coy; Spr V.F. Posthill, CHQ Sig Coy; and Sgt W. Bird, Sigs Trg Depot.

On 18 November 1916, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner presented awards. For his leadership at the Somme Maj T. E. Powers received the DSO and also a MiD. There were 9 awards of the MC, 3 awards of the DCM, and 20 awards of the MM. For the first time a Bar to the MM was awarded to Sgts H.J. Faulkner and E.G. Weeks, and Cpl L.P Smardon. There were 10 awards of a MiD.

Another eight NCOs were commissioned from the ranks. Just as a reminder that not everyone was a saint, 1 Div Sigs Coy War Diary recorded that on 18 December 1916, the CSM was court-martialled for drunkenness, and reduced in rank to private.


VIMY

The Germans made a surprise withdrawal of about 20 miles across a front of 50 miles in mid March 1917 to the Hindenburg Line. The withdrawal, however, did not include the vital ground at Vimy Ridge, which was the cornerstone of the German defences in the area of Arras.

It was to this area that the Canadian Corps was moved after the campaign at the Somme. It had three months to prepare for the assault. Success was dependent on the Canadian artillery neutralizing the German front line defenders until the Canadian infantry reached them. Then the infantry, using new weapons and tactics, could fight its way forward once inside the German lines. The artillery, now armed with plenty of shrapnel shells to cut the German wire, would lead the infantry into the German defences behind an improved creeping barrage, while at the same time Canadian counter-battery guns would be silencing the German batteries. The formation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps (CMGC) armed with the Vickers Machine Gun, capable of both direct and indirect fire, gave intimate support to the infantry in the face of German counter-attacks. The infantry at the platoon level, now armed with the Lewis light machine gun, was re-organized into four sections: rifle, grenade, rifle grenade, and Lewis gun, allowing it to fight its way forward using fire-and-movement. The three month’s preparation time permitted the Corps to build roads, railways, and tunnels to ensure that the assaulting troops could be maintained during the attack with few casualties from German artillery. The extra time also gave the infantry the opportunity to practise their attack in a secure training area set-up to resemble the ground over which they would move.

As the dawn of 9 April broke on that Easter Monday morning at Vimy, close to a hundred thousand Canadians poured from trenches, dugouts and tunnels, surged up a slope in blowing snow and sleet and conquered an enemy position considered impregnable by its

German defenders and, frankly, by Canada’s allies. The Corps, having sustained 10,602 casualties, dug in at noon on April 12th, after a gain of 4,500 yards. Byng received a promotion to command Britain’s Third Army. Replacing him was the 41-year-old Currie, the first Canadian to command Canada’s army in the field.

It was a costly victory. Ten thousand Canadians lay dead or wounded on the 9th: the worst day’s losses for Canada in the war. A British military advisor, Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin, had warned Sir Robert Borden’s government that voluntary recruiting could only keep two divisions in the line. Vimy’s losses forced Canada into the deeply divisive policy of conscription: forcing young men to serve, a policy that divided Canadians more deeply than ever before. Canada’s fragile unity was another casualty of Vimy Ridge.

Vimy was followed by other Canadian victories, some of them even greater feats of arms. Sir Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps commander after Sir Julian Byng, boasted that he had won an even better victory at Lens when he persuaded his British commander-in-chief to let the Canadians capture Hill 70, forcing the Germans to counter-attack at enormous cost in German soldiers’ lives. Currie’s arguments for smarter tactics carried weight chiefly because of Canadian success at Vimy. The Vimy experience provided a pattern for future successes. The Canadians had rehearsed tirelessly before the battle. Nothing that could help soldiers succeed would be ignored.

In August 1918, Borden and other premiers from the British Empire agreed that the war was destined to last two or three more terrible years. It ended on November 11. At Valenciennes on November 1, with Vimy-style tactics the Canadians collapsed the last German defensive line. Ten days later an Armistice was signed. Canadians had done a great thing and, with French and English, First Nations and recent immigrants, they had done it together.


VIMY — SIGS

Canadian Signallers had their part to play. As of 17 January 1917, it was the Canadian Corps Signal Service (CCSS). The corps and divisional signal companies spent the three months preparing the communication lines that would keep the artillery and infantry in immediate contact up to the day of the assault, and then carry them forward right into the German defences. For example, 4 Div Sigs Coy recorded that it had buried 1,350 yards of cable, 7 feet deep, at a cost of 13,500 hours of work, which was completed just 24 hours before the assault. 1 Div Sigs Coy noted in its War Diary that 450 men of the 107th Battalion had laboured on its cable laying at a cost of 6 killed and 7 wounded. While wireless was still not accepted by senior commanders, the Wireless Section persisted and set up a station close to the front to ensure good reception. Unfortunately, it was spotted by the Germans and received a direct hit, which buried the two operators alive. They were dug out 10 hours later, remarkably unhurt, but the wireless set was a write-off.

Every facet of signalling was employed: from corps HQ to divisional HQ airline was used, from division to brigade both airline and cable, from brigade forward all cable. Even visual signal points, using Lucas Lamps, were established. The Brigade Signal Sections were to accompany the third wave in the assault dragging telephone cable behind them. To supplement their manpower, the CHQ Sig Coy sent an officer and ten men to each Division. Most importantly, 2 officers and 54 men were assigned permanently to the Canadian Heavy Artillery HQ to ensure that Canadian counter-battery fire was timely and effective.

Something new was tried: communication by the induction method, which required no cable. Called Power Buzzer, it needed heavy equipment and high power, which could only be supplied in the front lines by heavy re-chargeable batteries. The heavy equipment had to be manhandled, which was a detriment, and the soil composition

affected the reception of the Morse Code signal. In good soil it could transmit a signal up to 2,000 yards. It did work, in some instances at Vimy, where wireless did not. One tried and true method was to prepare laddered lines, two cables, about 60 yards apart, joined together at intervals like the rungs on a ladder, and pull them forward following the advancing infantry. They had the advantage that if shellfire broke part of one of the lines the current would still flow by way of the rungs to the other line and back again to the broken line beyond the break.

Sometimes, in the effort to find good places to set up a signal station or to look for German signal equipment, often superior to the British, signallers got themselves ahead of the action. A Spr Gregson went into a dark German dugout and found some good equipment, but while rescuing it, realized that another person wanted it too. After a short struggle, Gregson, who was a powerful man, won out only to find the other person was the German operator, who was trying to take his equipment with him. Spr C.T. Corbett had a similar experience in the Spandau Hof Tunnel, where he came across four Germans who had been left behind. Corbett’s Colt revolver made the difference and he had four prisoners. The general appreciation by the signal companies at Vimy was that the land-line telephone worked well, especially by the forward elements with laddered lines; visual signalling, wireless, and power buzzer were not needed.

There were a number of awards within CCSS. Majs E. Forde and G.A. Cline received the DSO. A special honour was given to Maj Forde, who was appointed AD Signals on 17 June 1917 and promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Now a Canadian was in charge of the CCSS, although in theory he reported to the Chief Engineer. Maj Cline assumed command of 1 Div Sigs Coy on 20 June 1917. Other awards were made: the MC to 4; DCM to 2; MM to 30; Bar to the MM to 2; MiD to 13.


Notes: 2 April

Suggested tips for compiling your notes:1. Sites visited:2. Photos/videos taken:3. What major lesson can be learned from what we saw today?4. How did the battles observed today shape modern warfare?5. What things about the battles observed today are the same or different from modern warfare?6. For you, what stood out in today’s visit(s), and why?


Notes: 3 April



Notes: 4 April



Notes: 5 April



Notes: 6 April



Notes: 7 April



Notes: 8 April



Notes: 9 April


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