Do legislatures –and legislators- matter for poverty reduction?

Andrés Mejía Acosta

Institute of Development Studies

a.mejia@ids.ac.uk

with

Jorge Valladares, IDEA

Peru Country Report

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)

Institute of Development Studies,

At the University of Sussex

Brighton, BN1 9RE

Tel: + 44 1 273 606261, Fax: + 44 1 273621202 or 915688

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Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 2

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3

2. Politics and poverty reduction in Peru ....................................................................... 4

a) Exploring the linkage between politics and poverty reduction .............................. 6

3. Mapping poverty reduction capabilities in the Peruvian Congress ........................... 7

b) Political motivations .............................................................................................. 8

c) Resources and Capabilities .................................................................................. 11

d) Party politics and legislative dynamics ................................................................ 12

e) The international dimension ................................................................................ 13

4. Conclusions and future implications for poverty reduction efforts ......................... 15

5. References ............................................................................................................... 17

Appendixes ..................................................................................................................... 21

Appendix A: List of interviews (in alphabetical order) .................................................. 21

Appendix B: Questionnaire............................................................................................. 22

Abstract

Are elected politicians genuinely concerned with poverty reduction efforts? If so, do they

have the professional motivations, technical capacities and material resources to

effectively design and implement poverty reduction strategies? As part of a comparative

study of pro-poor legislatures around the world, this report offers an initial effort to

identify the individual and institutional factors that facilitate –or hinder- legislators’

poverty reduction efforts in the Peruvian National Congress. Drawing on elite interviews

and legislator surveys, the report finds that a) legislators have multiple and diverging

interpretations of what constitutes effective poverty reduction strategies, b) they

acknowledge a tension between the short term demands from their electorate and the long

term poverty reduction efforts, c) some constraining factors include internal party

dynamics, constitutional restrictions to service delivery, and the lack of technical advisers,

and d) there is room for greater involvement of international cooperation agencies to

strengthen the technical capacity of legislative committees. The report concludes with

some policy recommendations and strategies to effectively put Congress back in the

policymaking map.

December 2008

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Do legislatures –and legislators- matter for poverty reduction?

A preliminary mapping of political actors, motivations, and resources.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, a significant share of international cooperation efforts has focused

on supporting and securing appropriate domestic conditions to effectively design and

implement poverty reduction strategies (PRS). Some of those efforts sought to enhance

the institutional capabilities and individual skills of policymakers and stakeholders to

successfully influence PRS. The implicit assumption of this approach is that policymakers

–politicians in particular- are genuinely concerned with poverty reduction outcomes, and

that such concern is directly aligned with their own political career goals. But the extent to

which these premises are correct remains an empirical question.

This report offers an initial effort to identify the professional motivations, technical

capacities and material resources of Peruvian legislators to advance poverty reduction

efforts. The mapping exercise heavily draws on information obtained from 19 open-ended

elite interviews to legislators, congressional staffers, government officials and policy

experts, conducted in Lima between September 15 and 19, 2008. The interviews sought to

understand what are the legislators’ political motivations to engage with PRS, what type of

policies they associate with poverty reduction, and what kind of financial, political and

informational resources do they have to facilitate or hinder pro-poor policy formulation.

Our preliminary findings suggest that: a) legislators have a wide range of interpretations

and definitions about what constitutes effective poverty reduction strategies, b) for the

most part legislators acknowledge that long term programmatic strategies for poverty

reduction are not always compatible with the short term and concrete demands from their

electorate (and a smaller number of legislators provided examples on how to reconcile

both goals), c) there are multiple factors constraining legislators’ ability to engage in PRS,

including the role of internal party dynamics, constitutional restrictions to service delivery,

and the absence of technical staff, and d) efforts led by international cooperation agencies

have contributed to improving legislators’ ability to design PRS, disseminate initiatives,

and capacitate beneficiaries, but interviewees believe there is room for greater

involvement to strengthen the technical capacity of legislative committees. The empirical

findings are thoroughly discussed throughout the report and complemented with evidence

from alternative sources.

The National Congress is a critical arena where the local demands and needs of

constituents are reconciled with the national policymaking priorities and constraints.

Consequently, Congress offers a strategic opportunity to design and implement poverty

reduction efforts. In the Peruvian context, the legislative branch has traditionally played a

marginal role in the design, approval and implementation of policies to reduce poverty and

socio economic inequalities. The weak policymaking ability of Congress is partly

explained by a persistent pattern of executive predominance, widespread decentralization

and erosion of political parties. Paradoxically, the recent resource bonanza has further

concentrated decision making power away from Congress through the adoption of revenue

sharing schemes between the national and sub national governments (Mining Canon).

This report finds that even when legislators are motivated by poverty reduction goals, they

lack the access to resources to fund long term investment projects in their districts. Even if

legislators enjoy constitutional prerogatives to do casework, they lack the professional

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expertise and job security to engage in long term technical planning. The final section of

this report discusses some "entry points" that would allow a more comprehensive

understanding of political motivations and legislative dynamics, and proposes a few

strategies to effectively put Congress back in the policymaking map.

2. Politics and poverty reduction in Peru

Poverty reduction in Peru is a puzzle that attracts significant domestic and international

media attention. While the country has benefited from unprecedented and continued

economic growth, largely due to a resource export bonanza, it has not been able to tackle

socio economic poverty and inequality in the same proportion (Economist, 2008). On the

one hand, Peru has experienced a significant and sustained economic growth mostly due to

the significant increase in commodity prices worldwide since 2002. As shown in Chart 1,

it is estimated that extractive industries contributed an approximate 18% of the country’s

GDP in 2006, with the mining industry alone contributing nearly 12% of GDP growth in

that year (up from 5.2% in the year 2000). The resource bonanza has also contributed to

greater government revenues. Tax earnings related to mining have increased from a

modest average of 3.6% of the total fiscal revenues between 1998 and 2001 to records of

20.9% in 2006 and 24.6% in 2007, largely outnumbering the contribution from fishing and

agricultural industries (De Echave 2007, Macroconsult 2008).

Chart 1 Natural resource extraction and mining industries’ share of total GDP (Peru, 2000-2006)

Year Extraction* Mining**

2000 13.0 5.2

2001 12.5 4.9

2002 12.7 5.5

2003 13.0 6.1

2004 14.3 7.7

2005 15.3 8.9

2006 17.9 11.8

*% of total GDP. Includes fishing, agricultural and mining.

**% of total GDP. Mining encompasses extraction of mineral (copper, silver, lead, gold, etc.), oil and natural gas. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática

The recent windfall of extractive revenues has triggered citizens’ expectations for tangible

improvements in their socioeconomic conditions, especially from sectors that are most

marginalized and ironically, live in mining regions from where the new wealth is

extracted. This “paradox of plenty” is illustrated by the fact that poverty rates have not

reduced in proportion to the magnitude of economic growth. While official figures suggest

that the country is on its way to meet president Garcia’s goal of reducing poverty to 30%

by 2011 (MEF 2008), experts suggest that socioeconomic inequality may be stalled or

increasing (Campodonico 2008, Gonzales de Olarte 2008). In the period 2004-2007,

poverty and indigence rates fell in nearly 10 and 5 points respectively (Chart 2) but

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indicators remain above Latin American averages estimated at 35.1% of poor and 12.7%

of indigent, according to ECLAC.

Despite government efforts to reduce children malnutrition, improve quality of education,

build infrastructure and effectively target social policies, independent estimations coincide

on identifying slower progress –if no progress at all- in reducing inequality than in

reducing poverty.1 The lack of progress has raised concerns about the design, and

effective implementation of pro poor policies. As one interviewee succinctly argued,

poverty reduction rates could be influenced by sudden changes in macroeconomic

variables like GDP growth or inflation rates, but tackling socioeconomic inequalities is a

political decision of wealth redistribution”.2

Chart 2 Peru: Poverty rates 2004-2007 by areas of residence (%)

Year Total* Urban Rural Costa Sierra Selva

2004 48.6 37.1 69.8 35.1 64.7 57.7

2005 48.7 36.8 70.9 34.2 65.6 60.3

2006 44.5 31.2 69.3 28.7 63.4 56.6

2007 39.3 25.7 64.6 22.6 60.1 48.4

* Confidence interval ± 1.5 Source: INEI, National Household Survey 2004-2007

Chart 3

Peru: Indigence rates 2004-2007 by areas of residence (%) Year Total Urban Rural Costa Sierra Selva

2004 17.1 6.5 36.8 4.0 33.2 25.0

2005 17.4 6.3 37.9 3.8 34.1 25.5

2006 16.1 4.9 37.1 3.0 33.4 21.6

2007 13.7 3.5 32.9 2.0 29.3 17.8

Source: INEI, National Household Survey 2004-2007

1 Empirical estimations built on expenditures and incomes have converged on the notion that there have been

marginal variations in inequality. Campodonico (2008), and Gonzales de Olarte (2008) have separately

observed that inequality is either freezing or increasing. As the latter reports meaningless positive variations,

the former find slightly greater Gini coefficient (from 0.422 in 2004 to 0.423 in 2006) but a clear wider gap

between the extremes: in 2007 the richest percentile consumed 7.23 times what the poorest did, while in

2004 the proportion was 6.57. Others have found that “distribution of income are now more evenly

distributed on a national basis” but worse in the rural-urban axis (Morón et al 2008: 6-7). 2 Interview # 4. This report has guaranteed our interviewees the right to remain anonymous and subsequent

citations will only refer to the interview number.

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a) Exploring the linkage between politics and poverty reduction

How is poverty reduction a political problem? What is the linkage between good

governance and effective pro poor policies? How does the abundance of mineral rents

affect legislators’ motivations to work for the poor? There are very few studies who have

analyzed through case studies, the linkages between political motivations and poverty

reduction and inequality (Manor 2000, Crook 1989). Comparative empirical studies

suggest a positive empirical association between the quality of political institutions (i.e.

legislative capabilities), the policy making process and policy outcomes (IADB 2006).

Some intervening factors include the effective number of parties in congress, internal party

dynamics, the nature of legislative careers, and the degree of committee specialization. For

example, institutional factors will influence the extent to which resulting policies

represent the preferences of privilege organized interests or the majority of voters,

whether policy actors can facilitate the adoption of policy changes, whether policies

remain stable once adopted, and policies are effectively implemented over time (Stein et al

2008). The quality of policies in turn, is believed to have a positive impact on socio

economic development, judged by poverty reduction, human development and inequality

indicators (IADB 2006).

At a more specific level, little is known about the political incentives to develop poverty

reduction strategies, or conversely, how can the poor hold elected representatives

accountable for their actions (Taylor Robinson 2008). A first analytical problem is the

difficulty of defining which policy efforts are legitimate pro poor: is it building a road that

will increase access to markets, supporting a school vouchers program, funding a cash

transfers project for distant communities, or offering tax incentives to a job creating firm

in a particularly poor district?3 A second challenge is the attribution effect, or the

difficulty of identifying a direct causal link between a given “pro poor” initiative and its

(successful) impact on reducing poverty within one political cycle. This problem is

enhanced if we take into consideration that poverty reduction initiatives undergo a

complex policy process that would ideally require inclusive policy formulation, legislative

approval, effective bureaucratic implementation and independent oversight. A third

problem, specific to the legislative arena, is the lack of defined political accountability for

pro poor efforts. Even if it could be confidently argued that a program to subsidize a

nutritious breakfast to school attending children is likely to have a positive impact to

decrease malnutrition and improve school performance, which political party, legislative

committee or individual representative can credibly claim credit for promoting such

policy?

A useful though imperfect approach to observe and measure “pro poor” legislative effort

can be derived from looking at existing linkages between voters and politicians. This

distinction, widely developed in the political science literature, analyzes why do some

politicians appeal to voters by offering distinct policy choices and programs while others

obtain votes in exchange of favors, jobs, rents and other forms of political influence

(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Clientelistic linkages are defined as a direct form of

accountability, a political exchange whereby a citizen (or principal) gives her vote to a

politician (an agent) in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment,

goods and services. This exchange is built on three conditions: a) that politicians can

3 Inherent to this problem is the lack of consensus on measuring poverty –and pro poor success- from a

legislative perspective: is it a reduction in the share of people under poverty lines, a concrete improvement

on a MDG indicator, or aggregate (per capita) government spending on any given poor district.

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effectively learn and anticipate the preferences of voters, b) that there are sufficient

motivations or material incentives to secure the transaction, and c) that there are effective

instruments to monitor compliance and punish defections.4

From a poverty reduction perspective, clientelistic practices appear to offer a second best

strategy to deliver short term, highly visible and directly consequential resources to well

defined segments of voters. While it is uncertain that these efforts are efficient poverty

reduction alternatives to long term programmatic policies, empirical evidence repeatedly

shows that clientelistic efforts are systematically targeted towards poor and marginalized

communities (Magaloni et al 2007, Dresser 1994, Lyne 2007, Krishna 2007). Further

empirical work has explored the political determinants that influence the legislators’

likelihood to pursue legislative initiatives of a clientelistic nature in India, Honduras,

Ecuador and Paraguay (Keefer 2008, Taylor Robinson 2008, Mejía Acosta et al 2006).5

The premise of these works is that initiating particularistic bills is legislators’ way of

signaling their commitment to poverty reduction. To this date however, no such efforts

have been developed to empirically study the “pro poor” motivations of Peruvian

legislators.

3. Mapping poverty reduction capabilities in the Peruvian Congress

An elite survey was implemented in order to understand the extent to which legislators are

committed to poverty reduction efforts, and whether they have the political motivations,

resources and capabilities to develop effective PRS. While it was not possible to survey

the entire legislative universe, selection criteria sought to extract a representative sample

of legislators according to partisan affiliation, whether they came from the capital or

periphery, committee affiliation, and whether they were senior politicians or newcomers.

To balance responses from legislators, interviews were also carried out with government

officials and policy experts whose work relates to the legislative arena. These included the

Secretary General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM), the technical

secretaries of both the National Accord (AN) and the Poverty Reduction Roundtable

(MCLP), representatives from quasi-governmental offices with explicit poverty reduction

mandates, and policy experts from independent think-tanks: Macroconsult and Citizen

Participation.

In total, 19 interviews were held, including 13 members of congress, one chief of advisory

staff, three government officials and two independent poverty monitoring experts

interviewed in Lima, Peru between September 15th

and 19th

of 2008. Chart 4 shows the

demographic profile of respondents. The complete list of interviewees’ backgrounds and

the text of the survey instrument is attached in the Appendixes A and B.

4 Compared to clientelistic networks, programmatic linkages are relatively low maintenance. These are built

around policy discourses and expectations around a uniform “party” program, and politicians work to deliver

such policies. They are materially cheaper to sustain because there is no immediate expectation of resources,

but the focus is on “ideology” and the politician’s work consists in persuading that a preferred policy choice

advances the interests of their constituents. 5 Electoral institutions shape legislators’ incentives to provide public goods: a) “Open list”, personalized

electoral rules encourage legislators to cultivate personal reputations through particularistic legislation, b)

“Closed list” systems empower party leaders over individual legislators -fewer incentives to cultivate

personal votes (Mejía Acosta et al 2006).

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Chart 4 Peruvian MPs interviewed for the mapping exercise

Group Number Position in block*/party Constituencies President of committees

included

AP 1 Block leader Puno

FUJ 1 Block leader Lima

NAC 2 1 block leader; 1 committee

chair Lima y Cusco Social Security

UPP 2 2 committee chair Ayacucho y

Ucayali Amazonian and Andean

Communities; Ethics

UN 4 1 block leader; 1 party leader;

2 committee chair Lima (3);

Cajamarca (1) Economy; Decentralization

PAP 2 1 party leader Lima and

Moquegua

IND 1 Without block and party Moquegua

*Parties organized themselves as blocks or groups within the parliament. These are often coalitions. Block leaders (voceros) are not necessarily party leaders.

To complement the survey and contribute to the interpretation of responses, the report

builds upon two studies on party unity and programmatic preferences in the parliament

undertaken by International IDEA during 2008. One study analyzes roll-call voting and

party unity scores on legislative initiatives discussed between 2006 and 2007 (IDEA

2008a); the second instrument is a survey of legislative motivations, career patterns,

legislative dynamics, and ideological positions of 99 Peruvian legislators between May

and July of 2008 (IDEA 2008b).

b) Political motivations

When asked about legislators’ –or politicians- personal motivations to enter into politics,

most respondents expressed their commitment to poverty reduction among their goals.6

This response is corroborated by wider and recent studies which reveal that poverty was

mentioned as “most pressing national problem” according to 41% of 98 surveyed

legislators (IDEA 2008b). Similar findings were reported by a 2006 study (of the same

group of legislators) (PELA 2008). While legislators’ commitment towards poverty

reduction appears to be uncontested, there is much variation concerning the individual

conceptions of adequate pro poor policies, and the legislative strategies to achieve this.

Approaches to poverty reduction

The next interview question sought to identify legislators’ (preferred) approaches to

poverty reduction. The question was open ended, and despite the relatively small number

of respondents, responses covered a fairly broad range of poverty reducing mechanisms

available. If we consider the degree of state intervention in poverty reduction efforts,

respondents moved in both directions of the ideological spectrum. At the most liberal or

market oriented end, legislators highlighted the role of the state to legalize, protect and

6 There is not an explicit distinction between poverty reduction and inequality reduction strategies in the

public debate or among legislators themselves. For practical purposes, I will use both terms interchangeably

to denote pro poor strategies.

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enforce property rights as an economic precondition to emerge from poverty (Interview

#2).7 Others mentioned the state’s need to provide tax and other economic incentives to

boost investment and productivity in rural and peripheral (non-Lima) areas (Interview

#16). Towards the state-centered end of the spectrum, many respondents highlighted the

role of the state for reducing poverty and closing inequalities, but respondents were fairly

critical of state efforts that targeted poverty alleviation programs without adequate

coordination (Interviews #1, #7). Others were critical of state efforts that developed a

“paternalistic” or “clientelar” approach to poverty reduction without improving future

prospects of self provision (Interview #18). We coded respondents who favored a direct

“cash transfer” scheme for poverty reduction in the middle of the state intervention

spectrum (Interviews #1, #12, #18 and #16), since citizens receive a direct benefit from the

state but the state has no associated role for improving the associated infrastructure or the

quality associated with the provision of a good or a service.

In general, interviewees’ responses were consistent with the ideological affiliation of their

political parties. In a single ideological dimension, where “leftist” or state oriented parties

are coded as 1 and “rightist” or market oriented parties are coded 10, the median Peruvian

legislator has an ideological score of 4.8. Their ideological scores or party affiliation did

not vary according to their geographic origin: legislators from rural/peripheral districts

were equally likely to favor market approaches than those ones with urban constituencies

in Lima. The relationship remained robust when we compared findings with results from

the legislative survey. According to the survey, there is a strong association between

ideological affiliation and the preferred role of the state when it comes to regulating food

prices (γ=+.525), and a weaker but still positive association between ideological affiliation

and the extension of cash subsidies to the poor (γ=+.255) (IDEA 2008a).

Regarding the political feasibility of such poverty reduction mechanisms, many

interviewees recognized –and supported- the market oriented approach to poverty

reduction preferred by the government including the use of cash transfers and simplifying

a plethora of social assistance government programs. However, respondents also

acknowledged an apparent contradiction, or at least coexistence between market-oriented

initiatives with state-assisted programs that emerged since the early 1980’s. Government

programs such as Vaso de Leche or Comedores Populares, provided subsidized food and

milk to poor segments of society, but were also originally conceived as mechanisms to

promote community organizing (Interview # 10). Over time, they have developed

entrenched interests of program coordinators who defend their political survival despite

documented inefficiencies and wastage of government transfers (Vásquez 2005; Vásquez

and Franco 2007; Schuldt 2008). They (Vaso de Leche organizers) “are a political force to

be reckoned with” argued a government official (Interview # 9).

Committee affiliation and political careers

It is less clear whether legislators’ policy preferences about poverty reduction translated

into effective legislative strategies. When asked about their ideal affiliation to legislative

committees, 14% of legislators want to be part of the Budget Committee (Comisión de

Presupuesto) (IDEA 2008: 16), and a further 45% of surveyed legislators believe that the

most important issue on the congressional agenda is either constitutional reform or state

reform. Only a total of 16% of respondents believe that employment, social security,

education, or creating equal opportunities are urgent issues of the legislative agenda

7 Our respondent mentioned that over 60% of people with illegal or precarious titles of their property.

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(IDEA 2008b: 40). In recent years, legislators have developed a greater interest in being

part of the budget committee, and remain active members for more than three years

(Carranza et al 2006). The government party has also taken an interest in securing a

partisan majority and chairmanship of the committee, which is an interesting indicator of

its growing political relevance.

Further empirical analysis (not reported here) shows that committee affiliation patterns do

not seem to vary according to political party or geographical region. This is partly because

internal legislative rules establish that committees should reflect the same proportion of

political representation that parties have in congress. In the current period (2006-2011), it

means that the government APRA party has the plurality but not the majority of members

in legislative committees. Yet, there is not a distinct “pro poor” bias about committee

affiliation of government or opposition parties. The geographic origin of legislators is also

not a good predictor of committee affiliation; urban (Lima) legislators are not necessarily

more present in committees dealing with economic issues, nor peripheral (non Lima)

legislators have necessarily greater participation in social issues committees.

While the study of committee affiliation does not suggest that legislators tend to specialize

in particular committee work (whether pro poor or not), the capacity of Peruvian

legislators is also affected by their inability to develop legislative careers over time.

Nearly 70% of surveyed legislators expressed an interest for remaining on a public or

political posting when they finish their congressional mandate, but only 15% of

incumbents (18 out of 120) succeeded in achieving reelection in 2006. A low percentage

of surveyed legislators (11%) declared that they had plans to run for local Mayor or

regional President (IDEA 2008b: 14). What becomes clear is that legislators lack the job

security to make effective use of the technical knowledge and legislative expertise

developed during their time in office, and this is a serious constraint for developing

poverty reduction strategies in the long run.

Awareness of poverty reduction strategies

Legislators are generally well informed about global and government-led strategies to

reduce poverty. At the national level, legislators are familiar with assistential programs

like Comedores Populares or Vaso de Leche, but they also know about poverty reduction

schemes that distribute cash transfers to targeted beneficiaries (Juntos). Fewer legislators

were aware of and emphasized the need to focus on Millenium Development Goals

(MDGs) and other long term –programmatic- mechanisms to poverty reduction such as

outcome oriented budgets (presupuesto por resultados). In 2006, an explicit legislative

committee, the MDG Special Multiparty Committee, was formed to design and include

poverty reduction targets in the government agenda, with appropriate funding in the

national budget. Despite a proactive and much praised activity by fellow legislators, the

president of the MDG committee stepped down in 2008 with no clear political successor

to continue on that role. In the words of a former MDG committee member, not only the

committee lacked effective policymaking influence, but gaining access to resource

allocation and costing for MDG initiatives was best achieved as a member of the

Economics or the Budget committee (Interview #13).

Other legislators interviewed agreed that they had very few opportunities to actively

engage in poverty reduction efforts. Legislators, and newcomers in particular, would

complaint about executive predominance in the policymaking process (Interview #1), their

limited ability to influence the government (“I cannot get the government to build a

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bridge”, Interview #14), and their inability to access direct government funding to develop

constituency service. As a result, many interviewed legislators did not see themselves as

being critical policymakers but rather political intermediaries between the demands and

needs of constituents, special interest groups and local governments, and the central

government. This type of influencing (gestionar favores) is a legal form of political

currency and it includes for example advocating for speedy government transfers or loans

to a locality, doing case work for particular constituencies or special groups, or bringing

government attention to emerging issues in a particular location (IDEA 2008a). Yet the

focus on short term, particularistic efforts of legislators, has usually undermined the

possibility of pursuing longer term and more ambitious poverty reduction strategies in

Peru.

c) Resources and Capabilities

An evaluation of pro poor legislatures should not only take into consideration politicians’

commitment to poverty reduction, but also whether they have the political resources and

institutional capacities to accomplish this task. While there is not a defined notion of what

makes a “pro poor” legislature, the Congressional Capabilities Index provides a valuable

tool to assess some institutional features of legislative strength (Saiegh 2008). These

elements include

a) The number, staffing and specialization of congressional committees

b) The education level and technical expertise of legislators

c) The extent to which congress is a desirable career place for politicians

d) The level of public confidence in congress as an institution

The decision to add these indicators is not free from controversy since they combine elite

survey data (c) with public opinion surveys (d), and some objective indicators.

Nevertheless, the four indicators have been added along a single dimension to produce the

Congressional Capabilities Index (Saiegh 2008). Comparative research has illustrated

how congressional strength has a positive influence over the quality of policy outcomes

(r= 0.699) and consequently on reducing inequality and poverty reduction (IADB 2006:

141, Stein et al 2008).

Compared to other Latin American cases, the Peruvian data features close to average

legislative capacities, below countries like Brazil Chile or Uruguay but with a more

capable legislature than in Argentina, Mexico or Guatemala (Saiegh 2008: 41). According

to our recent interviews in Peru however, the comparative ranking seems to overestimate

some important weaknesses and shortcomings regarding the congressional capabilities of

legislators. For the most part, legislative committees don’t offer clear recruitment

patterns, job security or fixed appointments for their staff (Inteviews #13, 17). This

situation affects the technical policymaking and oversight capacity of legislators,

particularly in the budget committee (Santiso y García 2004).

The situation of legislative party blocks (bancadas) is not so different. Well organized and

well funded parties like APRA or UN are able to compensate the weakness of legislative

staff by recruiting and retaining competent technical advisers to the party (Inteviews #2

and #13). However, even in these well organized parties, political advisers may be

selected on the basis of professional merits but they lack job security, so their job is

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dependent on the “quality” of their political advice at best or, on the good will of the party

leader.

Another important constraint to policymaking is that legislators are constitutionally

banned from creating new expenditures. Given the technical weaknesses and professional

capacity of the budget committee vis-à-vis the Executive, legislators have not been able to

exert decisive influence over budget allocation either. As a result, legislators have

engaged with resource reallocation in an indirect way by legislating tax exemptions for

specific interest groups, creating new government entities that require government

funding, or setting up earmarks and off budget amendments (Carranza et al 2006). As

discussed before, legislators also engage in active case work (gestionando favores) as a

way to gain future votes. The interviews revealed that legislators have greater incentives to

invest a significant amount of their time and legislative effort doing constituency service –

for electoral gain- rather than developing long term programmatic poverty reduction

efforts.

d) Party politics and legislative dynamics

The next set of questions took into account some of the collective action patterns affecting

legislative attitudes towards poverty reduction. First, we are interested to know whether

the party structure (candidate selection, party size, government affiliation, internal

discipline) affected their legislative behavior. Previous work has suggested that legislators

with a more direct electoral connection to their districts are more likely to initiate

particularistic legislation (“pork”) to benefit their constituencies. Candidate selection

procedures also affect legislators’ likelihood to initiate particularistic legislation: they are

more likely to initiate “pork” when they compete through open party primaries, rather than

when they are appointed by a centralized party leader (Mejía Acosta et al 2006). In Peru,

there is little systematic evidence to infer that the open list preferential voting system has

created incentives for initiating pork; rather, recent field interviews and preliminary data

on party unity suggests that party blocks matter (“la bancada importa”) and that all

legislative initiatives are previously discussed with the party leadership before going to the

voting floor (Interview #12).

Contrary to conventional expectations, party blocks have shown considerable –or at least

increasing- rates of voting cohesion, scoring 0.90 in average in the period 2006-2007,

calculated with a modified Rice coefficient.8 One feasible explanation for this

performance, as survey’s data suggests, is that their members are disciplined, in terms that

more often than expected are willing to abandon their individual preferences in order to

converge into unitary positions. A gross estimation of legislators’ movement towards unity

indicates that at least 50% of voting cohesion is a consequence of coordination within

blocks, as mere programmatic convergence poorly scores an average of 0.45. Coordination

seems to be a key explanatory variable in this equation. Group meetings are highly

frequent (73% declares their blocks organize them weekly), and well attended (93% of

respondents attends all or most of them). Lastly, survey data also shows that legislators

consistently declare positive views on supporting block positions on several issues (IDEA

2008b: 24). This is a provocative and somewhat counterintuitive finding for a political

system that had cultivated a reputation of having a loose and fragmented party system

(Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Payne et al 2002).

8 IDEA includes abstentions in its model and excludes issues with high levels of consensus.

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Our investigation suggests that party unity matters especially among members of larger

parties. Indeed, APRA and UN score the highest discipline rates (0.59 and 0.53,

respectively). Members of the government APRA party have improved access to political

and material resources to develop constituency service, as long as they don’t challenge

party unity. According to an interviewee, if a legislator faces a dilemma between

advancing her constituencies’ interests and the interests officially sponsored by the party

line, he or she will have to obtain the consent of party leaders to abstain from that

controversial vote or not attend the legislative session (Interview # 17). Party unity also

matters for opposition parties, but the availability of coalition resources on the government

side may encourage some individual defections of maverick legislators (Mejía Acosta

2009). A concrete implication for legislative dynamics is that legislators are believed to

have very few incentives for starting or developing policy initiatives outside their party

structures or without consent of its leadership.

The field interviews explored the relationship between legislators and other spheres of

national and sub national government when it came to negotiating poverty oriented

strategies. As previously illustrated, belonging to the party in government helped

legislators have privileged, more direct access to cabinet ministers in charge of specific

programs or projects (Interview # 2) or because she/he presides a highly influential

committee (Interview # 13). According to our interviews, legislators also play an

important role to articulate demands from sub national representatives, namely mayors and

regional presidents. Given that legislators do not have access to direct or indirect

budgetary allocations to advance constituency service; the legislators’ support translates in

their ability to advocate on their behalf (gestionar favores) with a specific cabinet minister

or government official. This role could not be directly confirmed by sub national

authorities themselves (none of the contacted sub national authorities was available for

interview9), but there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that effective political linkages

have been developed between sub national politicians and legislators. Only two of the 25

regional presidents belong to the government party (APRA), while the remaining

presidents come from a variety of independent political movements.

Party organizations are important filtering devises that could facilitate or hinder individual

poverty reduction efforts. Being part of the government party may give legislators greater

leverage to do effective constituency service, and gain faster access to material, technical

and political resources. The other side of the coin is that government legislators would

have less ability to challenge the official party line or implement innovative policies that

are not previously approved by the party leadership. Opposition legislators by contrast,

would have more interest in policy innovation but would generally lack the tools and

resources to engage with effective PRS. As it will be discussed in the next section, the

conditional nature of intra party dynamics makes it more uncertain for international

cooperation to invest in strengthening and improving the technical capacity of legislative

advisers.

e) The international dimension

9 Vladimiro Huaroc (Junin) and Yehude Simon (Lambayeque) confirmed availability for an interview but a

scheduled visit to Sao Paulo (invited by the President) prevented them to make it happen.

P a g e | 14

The field interviews also sought to assess whether the international cooperation had played

a significant role in strengthening legislators’ pro poor orientation, and whether legislators

could identify areas for future engagement to advance poverty reduction efforts.

Respondents agreed that the international cooperation, especially from UN and European

Union, had a positive influence in setting the development agenda through the

introduction of MDGs and performance-based budget allocation. Similarly, they played

an important role to offer technical expertise to legislative committees in the production of

specialized reports (Interview #13). A third area of influence was through strengthening

capacity development initiatives aimed to improve the skills and practical knowledge of

people in most marginalized districts. An illustrative example was given by a legislator

who sought to transform social networks as Vaso de Leche committees or Comedores

Populares into entrepreneurial units by acquiring new skills and progressively greater

autonomy from public subsidies (Interview #2). In addition to agenda setting, technical

assistance and capacity development, international cooperation efforts were relevant to

disseminate publications and findings of legislative workshops and congressional activity

in general (Interview # 6).

Inevitably, some legislators were critical of the role of international cooperation,

especially with regards to the ideological influence of market-oriented approaches to

poverty reduction (Interview #14), and the financial and economic conditionalities

attached to the disbursement of poverty reduction funds (Interview #6). The latter point is

factually incorrect as the mineral rich Peruvian government does not depend on

international aid to fund poverty alleviation programs. Foreign technical assistance

devoted to poverty reduction efforts through NGO’s has also fallen under scrutiny due to

the poor coordination between external funds and public sector funding, thus leading to

possible aid inefficiencies (Interview #18).

Looking ahead, legislators agreed that international assistance could make a meaningful

contribution by strengthening, supporting and disseminating the work done by legislative

representatives and staffers. Interviewees concurred on the relevance of disseminating the

nature and contents of the legislative work to a wider public audience. Most people

favored the targeting of international cooperation funds to promote the capacity

development of legislators, technical staff and information resources of legislative

committees. While some people advocated for greater capacity development of party

groups (bancadas) instead, our empirical survey shows that investing in long term,

institutional and programmatic arenas such as legislative committees is a more effective

strategy to improve Congress’ commitment to poverty reduction.

P a g e | 15

4. Conclusions and recommendations to strengthen poverty reduction efforts

The guiding premise of this report was to ask whether legislators genuinely cared about

poverty reduction efforts, what does that mean to them, and what do they do about it.

While the answers about motivation were overwhelmingly positive (PELA 2008, IDEA

2008b), there is no single approach to poverty reduction that is particularly favored, and

perhaps consequently, there is little evidence to conclude that legislative activity reflects

pro poor concerns in Peru. For one thing, respondents favored an eclectic range of poverty

reducing options, from cash transfers, to state led efforts of social assistance, to long term

programmatic approaches such as the Millennium Development Goals. A preliminary

analysis of committee membership -as an indicator of legislative activity- reveals that the

most sought after committees relate to Finance, Budget and Constitutional control issues.

More conventional “poverty oriented” committees such as agriculture, health, education,

and even the MDG special committee do not appear to be attractive political posts.

Legislative efforts to design and adopt poverty alleviation programs (even for members of

the sought after Budget committee), are undermined by constitutional barriers to public

funds, poor technical capacity and short terms in office. Alternatively, and perhaps as a

response to existing constraints, legislators tend to invest significant amount of time and

resources in doing constituency service work. This type of micro political campaigning

ranges from credit claiming strategies, casework opportunities, political influencing and

interest group advocacy. One legislator for example, claimed to have received –and

attended- more than 7000 petitions from constituents of the most diverse nature in a period

of two years (Interview # 12). While effective constituency service may improve

politicians’ electoral prospects, casework does not amount to long term and programmatic

poverty reduction efforts. Very few legislators interviewed claimed to have been able to

combine programmatic efforts with constituency oriented work, for example by

negotiating public works for the province of origin while overseeing the effective and

transparent implementation of public contracting from a legislative committee (Interview

#6) or seeking to enhance farmers’ ability to engage into market chains while sponsoring

capacity building initiatives among their constituencies (Interviews #2 and #12).

Given the limited nature of this scoping exercise, the next section will outline some

critical areas for future research and policy engagement. Simply put, much exploration is

required to identify a) How can poverty reduction efforts be reconciled with the political

careers and goals of Peruvian legislators? b) How can different types of legislative activity

reveal politicians’ efforts and/or commitment to poverty reduction efforts? and c) How can

the international cooperation strengthen legislators’ professional, technical and material

capabilities to work for the poor?

1. Political careers and poverty reduction efforts. The report highlights a tension

between the short term horizon of elected politicians and the need for devising long

term sustainable poverty reduction efforts. Empirical evidence shows that legislative

careers tend to be short lived and political trajectories are quite volatile. What are the

specific incentives or factors that would motivate elected politicians to remain longer

periods in office, seek reelection and develop legislative careers? Are these incentives

related to improved internal party organization, different electoral rules, or inclusive

legislative dynamics? There is existing survey data (IDEA 2008b) as well as

congressional information to further investigate what is the link between legislative

motivation, political profiles and legislative career patterns (static ambition). Further

data needs to be collected to explore whether legislators abandon congress because

P a g e | 16

they are interested in running for sub national governments or seek some type of

executive appointment (upward or downward ambitions). Reconstructing the “political

trajectories” of politicians (party identification, district of origin, previous political

experience) will be a useful step to identify what motivates legislators to privilege

some forms of poverty reduction strategies over others, some type of beneficiaries

over others (national vs. local constituencies, selective vs. universal policies).

2. Defining and measuring pro poor activity. One important implication of this survey

exercise is that legislators do not share a single vision of what a poverty reduction

effort is. Not only the lack of agreement carries out severe ideological implications for

designing pro poor policies in the legislative arena, but it hinders the ability of

policymakers to measure success –or failure- of poverty reduction efforts made in

congress. This is a critical area where political science has not made substantive

progress to define and measure poverty reduction. One partial approximation to the

problem has been to distinguish “programmatic” (long term, universal) from

“clientelistic” (short term, selective) linkages between voters and elected politicians.

This report suggested that most legislators lacked the resources to sponsor long term

programmatic initiatives to combat poverty, and instead invested a substantive amount

of time attending short term demands from particular groups of voters. A concrete way

to evaluate the nature of legislative activity is by looking at the type and nature of

legislation initiated in the Peruvian congress (bills). This data (available from the

National Congress) can be classified according to the objective of the intended

legislation (regulatory, distributive, and redistributive), and the scope of the impact

(national, regional, municipal, or individual) (Mejía Acosta et al 2006). This type of

analysis will provide a clearer understanding of how political factors (party, ideology,

political careers and goals) influence legislators motivation to enact pro poor

legislation.

3. Strengthening pro poor legislatures. The scoping exercise highlighted several

factors that constraint effective policymaking, including pro poor initiatives. But most

importantly, it showed how legislative efforts are mediated by material resources,

party dynamics and personal ambitions, and this is a key point to remember when

devising initiatives for congressional strengthening. The evidence clearly shows that

there is an important deficit of technical capacity in the Peruvian congress, but field

interviews suggest that investing in long term, institutional and programmatic bodies

like legislative committees is the most effective strategy to improve legislators’

commitment to poverty reduction.

a. One specific way to strengthen legislative committees is through the

recruitment and training of specialized advisers, providing them with access to

informational resources, and offering the means to discuss and disseminate

their legislative work with the wider policymaking community of academics,

media and public at large.

b. An additional initiative is to support the creation of an independent monitoring

body to promote greater executive-legislative oversight, transparency and

communication, ensure public access to political information, and guarantee

the analysis and dissemination of legislative activity, including voting records,

legislative initiatives and legislative priorities.

P a g e | 17

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Appendixes

Appendix A: List of interviews (in alphabetical order)

Name and Affiliation Brief background Date of

interview

Alberto Rey Lima. Economist. Independent. Chief of Staff APRA block. Ex principal economist of the Energy and Mining Society.

September 17th, 2008

Carlos Monge Member of Citizen Participation Group (Participación Ciudadana), expert in Decentralization and Poverty Reduction.

September 16th, 2008

Daniel Abugattás (PNP)

Lima. Lawyer. Secretary of Organization of Nationalist Peruvian Party. Researcher and consultant for poverty reduction programs (Pronaa, Foncodes) and world Bank. Textile entrepreneur. Committees: Constitution, Economics, Oversight (member).

September 16th, 2008

Elmer Cuba (Macroconsult)

Economist. Member of Macroconsult. Ex director of Osinerg (Energy and Mining Regulator) y Milpo Mining Company.

September 15th, 2008

Elizabeth León (UPP) Ayacucho. Agronomist Engineer. Member of Unión por el Perú. Town Councilor in Huamanga. Committees: Ethics (president) y Agricultural (member).

September 18 th, 2008

Félix Grandez (MCLP) Technical Secretary of Poverty Reduction Roundtable (MCLP). September 16 th, 2008

Güido Lombardi (UN). Lima. Lawyer and Journalist. Committees: Economics (president), ex President of the Special Multiparty MDG Committee.

September 15th, 2008

Hilda Guevara (APRA) Moquegua. Obstetrician. Former public servant at the Regional Office of the Ministry of Health. Committees: Education, Woman and Health (member); Women Multiparty Roundtable (president).

September 16 th, 2008

José Elice (PCM) Secretary General - Presidency of Council of Ministers (PCM). Lawyer. Ex Director of the Parliament (2000s), and Town Councilor (80s).

September 16th, 2008

Luis Galarreta (UN) Lima. Lawyer. Former Town Councilor in Lima (2002-2006). Committees: Oversight, Ethics, Education.

September 17th, 2008

Mercedes Cabanillas (APRA)

Lima. Teacher. President of Politics Committee of APRA. Committees: Defence, Education and Housing (member). Ex minister of Education (1985-87), ex presidential candidate (1995) and ex President of the Congress (2006-2007).

September 17th, 2008

Max Hernández (AN) Technical Secretary National Accord (AN). Lima. September 16t th, 2008

Raúl Castro (UN) Lima. Lawyer. Vice-president of Popular Christian Party. Committees: Constitution, Justice (member)

September 19th, 2008

Róger Nájar (UPP) Ucayali. Economist. Founder of General Workers Union-Ucayali. Committees: Production (members) and Andean and Amazonian Peoples (president).

September 15th, 2008

Rolando Sousa (FUJ) Lima. Lawyer. Block Leader. Committees: Constitution (member), Justice (members), Revisory of Criminal Code (president).

September 15th, 2008

Rosa Florián (UN) Cajamarca. Lawyer. Member of the Popular Christian Party. Ex mayor of Contumazá (1999-2001). Committee: Decentralization (President) y Overseeing (member).

September 17th, 2008

Víctor Mayorga (PNP) Cusco. Lawyer. Town Councilor in Lima for United Left (80s). Committees: Constitution (member), Foreign Trade (member) y Social Security (president).

September 16th, 2008

Yohny Lescano (AP) Puno. Lawyer. Block Leader. Member of Popular Action Party. Committees: Constitution, justice and Banking and Insurance (member).

September 15th, 2008

Washington Zeballos (IND)

Moquegua. Economist. Elected with UPP. Ex president CTAR Tacna, Economics Development Manager in Regional Government of Moquegua and president of MLCP. Universitary Professor. Committees: Economics, Education (member). Presided a working group on mining revenues.

September 17th, 2008

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Appendix B: Questionnaire

I. Ambiciones Políticas e incentivos de combate a la pobreza

a. Motivación para ingresar en política. ¿Cuál es la función más importante de

un diputado? ¿Qué le piden sus electores?

b. ¿Cuál es su relación con su electorado? ¿Son influyentes los electores

menos privilegiados en su provincia a través de algún grupo o movimiento?

c. En decisiones controversiales, ¿usted vota con el partido o por su propia

conciencia? ¿Quién se encarga de mantener las decisiones tomadas al seno

del partido? ¿Funciona la disciplina?

d. Para coordinar acciones de combate a la pobreza dentro del legislativo,

¿usted se comunica con el presidente del Congreso? ¿Con los líderes de las

bancadas? ¿Con los miembros de su comité legislativo? ¿Con nadie en

particular?

e. Para coordinar acciones de combate a la pobreza con el poder ejecutivo,

¿usted se comunica con el presidente? ¿Con el premier? ¿Con ministros del

gabinete? ¿Con nadie en el ejecutivo?

f. Para coordinar acciones de combate a la pobreza con gobiernos

subnacionales, ¿usted se comunica con el presidente de los organismos

regionales? ¿Con los presidentes regionales? ¿Con los alcaldes? ¿Con nadie

en lo subnacional?

II. Disponibilidad de recursos

a. ¿Qué tipo de acciones legislativas se pueden hacer/usted prefiere/pueden

ser más efectivas para combatir la pobreza? ¿Legislación, negociación de

partidas presupuestarias, negociar proyectos de inversión? ¿Apoyar la

promoción de iniciativas selectivas a grupos organizados específicos?

b. ¿Qué acciones prefiere usted o siente que han sido más efectivas como

partido o individuo?

c. Como diputado, ¿usted tiene acceso/usa la negociación de partidas

presupuestarias por provincia? ¿Por sector?

d. ¿Lo hace directamente o a través de su partido? ¿Con quién lo negocia en el

Ejecutivo? Ejemplos.

e. ¿Tiene usted/su partido/su comisión legislativa los recursos técnicos

necesarios para elaborar propuestas de combate a la pobreza o evaluar

propuestas alternas?

f. ¿Cuánto tiempo pasa desde que se negocia/aprueba una asignación y esta

entra en efecto? Ejemplos.

III. Conocimiento y preferencias sobre acciones anti pobreza

a. ¿Qué mediciones de pobreza existen?

b. ¿Cuán severo es el problema de la pobreza en Perú?

c. En su opinión, ¿cuál es el método más efectivo de combate a la pobreza?

i. ¿Planificar o decentralizar?

ii. ¿Que gaste el estado o que gaste la gente?

iii. ¿Generar empleo y crecimiento o asistir a los más desprotegidos?

iv. ¿Entregar transferencias a los pobres o fomentar micro-crédito?

v. ¿Redistribuir rentas, para la provincia extractiva o para otras

también? ¿En qué proporción?

P a g e | 23

d. ¿Está usted familiarizado con distintas iniciativas de combate a la pobreza

en Perú? ¿Plan nacional de desarrollo, otros planes o metas por sectores

(económicos, sociales)? Ejemplos.

e. ¿Está usted familiarizado con distintas iniciativas de combate a la pobreza

en la región, en el planeta? ¿ODM, OEA Carta de Derechos, Acuerdos de

la CAN?

IV. Papel de la cooperación extranjera.

a. ¿En qué medida los organismos de cooperación extranjera han participado

o no en estrategias de reducción de pobreza?

b. ¿Qué modalidades de influencia han sido más efectivas en el pasado?

¿Préstamos? ¿Asistencia técnica? ¿Ofrecer legitimidad y transparencia a

esfuerzos domésticos? ¿Ninguna? Ejemplos.

c. ¿Qué modalidades de influencia pueden ser más

efectivas/relevantes/bienvenidas en el futuro? ¿Préstamos? ¿Asistencia

técnica? ¿Ofrecer legitimidad y transparencia a esfuerzos domésticos?

¿Ninguna? Ejemplos.

V. Factores adicionales.

a. ¿Piensa usted que han cambiado la prioridad/atención/interés en el combate

a la pobreza a raíz de los últimos efectos que afectan al país? ¿El proceso

de democratización del año 2001? ¿El proceso de descentralización de

2002? ¿El boom de la industria extractiva a partir del 2004?

b. El Congreso en su conjunto, ¿ha aumentado o reducido su participación e

influencia en el diseño de políticas de combate a la pobreza?