Q How does a conference on the future of nuclear

weapons, a conference that looks forward to potential

changes in nuclear weapon requirements , affect your

thinking and planning about the future of Los Alamos and

the nation’s nuclear weapons complex?

A The primary job of the Laboratory is to provide the

technological foundation for a credible nuclear deterrent.

Deterrence is a broad and dynamic concept—for one

thing, an effective deterrent must be technically viable

and politically credible.

Experience shows us that maintaining such a deterrent

requires frequent technical revisions and adaptations of

the nuclear stockpile. These changes meet shifting chal-

lenges, including new nuclear weapon missions mandated from time to time by the

national leaders. In other words. the Laboratory must not just maintain today's

stockpiled weapons but must provide what I call nuclear competence. Competence

implies a readiness to meet new challenges, a flexibility to respond in new technical

directions, and a far-reaching technological vision that assures

the nation won’t be caught unprepared by technological sur-

prise. To do this. we must maintain the highest level of scien-

tific and technological excellence in our weapons and basic

research programs. Only then can our leaders be confident of

our ability to meet our nation’s requirements.

Future of Nuclear Weapons

But we also know that future nu-clear weapons requirements—the re-quirements that provide technical di-rection for the weapons program—willdepend greatly on developments in na-tional security policy and the politicsthat surround that policy. The Confer-ence helped us examine that technologypolicy interface. It focused attention onthe emergence of a world with multi-ple power centers and brought to thefore many questions about the role ofnuclear weapons. We can’t predict thefuture, but the Laboratory must be pre-pared to face any changes that mightoccur. Technological developments re-quire long-term planning, a difficult taskin the context of’ a changing politicalclimate. Understanding the importantbut complex links between the weap-ons technology on the one hand and thesecurity policy on the other helps ourlong-term planning for the Laboratory.

Q Is nuclear testing an important partof nuclear competence?

A Nuclear weapons testing is one ofthe critical elements of’ maintaining acredible nuclear deterrent. Such testingis current U.S. policy, and the reasoningbehind it is well known. For example,testing is required if me are to ensurenuclear deterrence in a changing strate-

gic environment. Also, testing assuresus of’ the reliability of the stockpile andallows us to improve the safety and se-curity of nuclear weapons with confi-dence.

What’s sometimes missed in our po-sition regarding the need for testingof nuclear weapons is that it's no dif-ferent than the position taken by anyother high-technology, activity-that is,component and product testing are uni-versally considered indispensable. Inthe auto industry car frames are shakenthrough millions of cycles of simulatedroad tests: in the aviation industry windtunnel tests help shape new designs;in the aerospace industry almost ev-ery component is thoroughly tested be-fore being accepted for flight use, TheGovernrnent, taxpayers, and consumersalike consider it a crime, or, at the veryleast, a breach of professional ethics, toplace untested consumer and industrialproducts on the market, And although

nuclear weapons have important differ-ences from other complex technical sys-tems, the need for testing is fundamen-tally the same and the impact of error isconsiderably greater. From a technicalperspective it makes sense to depend onnuclear testing for as long as we con-tinue to rely upon our nuclear deterrentfor security+ specially if’ nuclear armsare reduced as a result of arms control.

Q Can't nuclear weapons be devel-oped simply by using our current knowl-edge of the physics involved? Why dowe need to carry out explosive nucleartests?

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Future of’ Nuclear Weapons

A The events that occur in a nuclear sures likc those inside a star and cannotexplosion tire so complex and insuffi- be simulated in a laboratory. Thus, we

ciently understood that even today we must use an iterative design process in-still cannot design weapons from first volving theory, computer modeling and

principles of physics or from computer calculation. non-nuclear laboratory tests.simulations alone. Further. nuclear ex- and underground nuclear tests. Ulti-plosions produce temperatures and pres- mately, nuclear tests are essential in cal-

ibrating our theoretical design models.which undergo continuous development.

The same holds true for the engineer-ing problems. Nuclear tests provide the

The Nevada Test Site is the location of all U.S.underground nuclear weapons tests. Here, aring of dust rises as the underground cavityformed by a nuclear explosion collapses. In-set: in preparation for another undergroundtest, this diagnostics rack will be lowered intoa bore hole, giving instruments attached to ita line of sight to “ground zero, ” the location ofthe nuclear device.

31

Future of Nuclear Weapons

Two research efforts at Los Alamos that couldhave an impact on directed-energy weaponstechnology are the neutral particle beam andthe free-electron laser. Right: the objectivelens of the Laboratory’s large-bore magnetictelescope for a neutral particle beam was test-ed recently at Argonne National Laboratory.Left: grazing reflections, which spread out abeam’s “footprint,” allow the intense light ofa free-electron laser to be redirected withoutdamaging the optic surface of the mirror. Thetechnique, simulated here using the red lightof a helium-neon laser, also reduces the ef-fects of mirror aberration and scatter.

final proof of warhead engineering andthe packaging of components. The sub-tle effects of’ many engineering changeson warhead performance are often moredifficult to predict than changes in thephysics design.

Q Then are you opposed to a compre-hensive test ban treaty?

A I have already stated that nucleartesting is critical to maintaining a cred-ible nuclear deterrent. We believe thatunder a comprehensive test ban our nu-clear design and engineering expertisecould erode, and erosion could under-mine the nation nuclear competence.

Yet I recognize that there are otherconsiderations in the debate about nu-

clear weapons. Nuclear testing hastaken on great symbolic significance.and some people believe that curtailingtesting will end, or at least slow down.the arms race.

in the end the nation’s policymakersmust look at the trade-oft’s between po-tential benefits of increased restraints onnuclear testing and the technical risksand consequent military penalties. Ourjob is to objectively evaluate the techni-cal risks of further testing restraints.

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Future of Nuclear Weapons

A First, I think we have to keep inmind that even in the midst of the cur-rent enthusiasm for reducing nuclearweaponry, nuclear deterrence remains acritical element of our defense posture.Even if the number of U.S. nuclear war-heads were substantially reduced, therewould still be a continued need for sig-nificant research and development at thenuclear weapons laboratories. Smallernuclear stockpiles that continue to sup-port deterrence would likely requirechanges in the kinds of weapons as wellas changes in nuclear designs.

Furthermore, the size and the diver-sity of the current stockpile providesome insurance against both surpriseattack and the sudden emergence of un-foreseen technologies by another nation.If large numbers of nuclear weaponsare eliminated. the weapons laborato-ries will be continually called upon toassure the survivability and technicalrobustness of the remaining stockpile.We must also continue to inform the na-tion of technological possibilities on thehorizon that we may be forced to defendagainst,

We seek to complement our directnuclear weapons programs with otherkinds of scientific and engineering re-search that will help us remain at the

cutting edge of scientific knowledge.We strive to maintain a world-class sci-entific institution staffed with some of[he best professionals in the nation. Inthis way we will continue to serve a vi-tal national function by retaining ourability to solve large, complex scientificand engineering problems. In the pastthe base of nuclear weapons science andtechnology at Los Alamos has given riseto numerous nonweapon technologies;in the future we will count on challeng-ing programs at the forefront of research

and development to help maintain theknowledge and personnel base requiredto assure nuclear competence.

Along these lines I would point outthat about one-fourth of the current Lab-oratory budget is spent on research forimaginative and powerful non-nucleardefense concepts, including the neu-tral particle beam and the free-electronlaser. Another one-fourth of our effortis directed toward fundamental researchin areas such as high-temperature su-perconductors, supercomputing, map-ping the human genome, and in energyand other civilian technologies. Thesescientific programs may not only havetremendous long-term payoffs to the na-tion. but they contribute to the Lab’s ex-panding scientific and technical base andform a natural part of the Laboratory’smission—to offer creative solutions toproblems of national urgency, These ef-

Advanced techniques and diagnostic capabili-ties developed for nuclear weapons programshave frequently been adapted for use in a num-ber of other applied technologies, includingthe design and testing of conventional weap-ons. Here a warhead developed by Physics In-ternational is being dynamically tested usingthe Laboratory’s high-speed, monorail rocketsled. After having been accelerated along thetrack from left to right, the warhead detonatesat the target, which, in this case, is “pro-jected 1995 Soviet armor.” Surrounding thetarget area are a variety of diagnostic instru-ments, including intense x-ray machines thatrecord the interaction of the warhead with thetarget (see “ATAC and the Armor/Anti-ArmorProgram” and ‘{Studying Ceramic Armor withPHERMEX”).

33

Future of Nuclear Weapons

The Soviet and U.S. flags flying from a derrick at the Soviet’s underground test site at Semi-palatinsk symbolize the milestone reached when scientists of both countries participated in jointverification experiments at their respective underground nuclear test sites. These experimentsallowed both groups to calibrate their detection techniques against controlled, baseline events.The effort does much to ensure that either country can verify compliance with nuclear test treatiesby the other.

A The long-term trend appears to betoward reduced nuclear arms. But inthe short term there are well-recognizeddeficiencies developing in our deterrentposture that may require new technolo-gies or concepts. For example, our mili-tary planners are becoming increasinglyconcerned about our ability to hold atrisk a number of high-value Soviet tar-gets, such as mobile missiles and deeplyburied or super-hard structures. Theearth-penetrating warhead and otherLaboratory weapons concepts providetechnical options to U.S. military plan-ners,

But the issue is more general thanthat specific example. Long-term trendsin nuclear weaponry may very well re-sult in different technical requirementsin the future, and we must be able tomeet them. For instance, improvementsin the safety and security of nuclearweapons are clearly desirable, regard-less of the size of the nuclear arsenal.Improvements of this kind are madepossible by research and developrnent.Finally. we need to build a technologyhedge—a hedge against breakthroughsin weapons technology that could placethe nation’s deterrent at risk. Suchbreakthroughs would have a greater im-pact in an environment of significantlyfewer weapons,

A The Laboratory is already contribut-ing very significantly to conventionalweapons, This year we are conduct-ing over $200 million in research onnon-nuclear technologies that includeconcepts that may be truly revolution-ary, such as particle beams, lasers, and

34 Los Alamos Science Summer 1989

Future of Nuclear Weapons

high-powered microwaves. We are alsoinvolved in more evolutionary tech-nologies, such as those pertinent to thearmor/anti-armor balance of’ tank war-fare. In this case we are using diagnos-tic capabilities and other advanced tech-niques developed in the nuclear weap-ons program to assess the effectivenessof a broad variety of’ applied technolo-gies.

Although the Lab plans a vigorousprogram of activities in conventionalweapons, we are not assuming that thesetechnologies will replace nuclear weap-ons. Rather it is our view that theywill be used to augment and comple-ment nuclear deterrent forces. Thereis considerable controversy whethereven extremely accurate conventionalweapons, including the so-called zero-CEP weapons, can ever serve as aneffective deterrent by themselves. Notonly are there some military missionsthat can only be accomplished with nu-clear weapons, but non-nuclear strategicweapons lack the psychological impact.and thus the full deterrent effect. of nu-clear weapons, Accurate conventionalweapons can serve as effective comple-ments to nuclear weapons, providing agreater range of conventional alterna-tives before nuclear use must be con-templated.

Q The nation faces a major problemin cleaning up and modernizing the nu-clear weapons production complex. Canwe do that and still maintain the tech-nology base at the Laboratory?

A The cleanup and modernization ofthe Department of Energy weapons pro-

duction complex is one of the excep-tionally difficult problems facing thenew administration. Everyone recog-nizes that the situation is unacceptablenow and that wc must single out theworst problems and attack them head-on. This effort is going to require thecommitment of new financial and tech-nical resources if’ it’s to succeed. Wethink the Laboratory can play a signif-icant role in the development and ap-plication of advanced technologies thatmay efficiently, and at reduced overallcost, assist with the cleanup. In otherwords, the bulldozer-and-asphalt ap-proach won’t work, and it’s too costly.We have to do “smart” cleanup withadvanced technologies.

The Laboratory can also help design amodern production complex that will beboth more reliable and environmentally’benign. Many of the applicable tech-nologies are spinoff’s from the lab’sweapons technology base. The im-portant considerations of environment,health, safety, security, safeguards, andmaterials accountability have to be in-tegrated into process and plant design,not added sequentially in layers. Thelaboratories can help.

Q What is the sigle most important

contribution that Los Alamos can maketo the nation's security in the future?

A Los Alamos and the other weaponslaboratories are themselves a criticalpart of this nation’s ability to deter war.A policy of mutual deterrence dependsupon the belief of national leaders, be-yond a reasonable doubt, that their ownand their adversaries nuclear forcesare survivable, are deliverable, and willfunction as intended. This belief’ doesnot rest upon the technical knowledgeof our national leaders but upon assur-ances those leaders receive from scien-

tists and engineers and upon the cred-ibility that the scientists and engineershave with their leaders. Unlike non-nuclear weapons-which have a tech-nical base of a thousand or so defensecontractors, almost one hundred servicelaboratories and many universities—the nuclear weapons technology baseand the resulting competence rests prin-cipally with the three Department ofEnergy weapons labs. Their combinedtechnical expertise forms the backboneof nuclear deterrence as it evolves overtime, regardless of the specific policiesor technical directions the nation mightchoose. ■

Los Alamos Science Summer 1989 35