Anamnesisjournal.com-Pluralism and the Pragmatic Liberal Tradition

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defense of democracy. 4

In what sense does pragmatism constitute a tradition with its own core beliefs and standards of rationality?

Pragmatism has been portrayed by critics as anti-tradition, although adherents claim it has deep roots in the

American experience, both politically and culturally. In The Genius of American Politics , historian Daniel Boorstin ha

provided us with a past in which the pragmatic temperamentcommon sense-loving, problem-solving, hostile to fixe

dogma or ideologywas pervasive throughout America.5John Dewey, on the other hand, invoked Thomas Jefferso

as the first modern to state in human terms the principle of democracy.6Sidney Hook reiterated that the philosoph

of American liberalism is rooted in Jefferson and flowered in the philosophy of John Dewey.7In fashioning his post-

modernist version of Deweyan pragmatism, Richard Rorty added Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman to the

genealogy.8

Arguably, though, Dewey may be considered the leading theoretician of the progressive movement, given that he

advocated a wholesale refounding of the American regime.9Deweys quest for community was exemplified by his

support of World War I, which he saw as a cultural-political-military opportunity in collective self-discovery, to

metastasize the American mind.10In his Freedom and Culture (1939), he portrayed American political culture as a

democratic way of life which had not yet fully emerged, but which would have to exclude the authoritarian,

hierarchical, and dogmatic (the Catholic Church, as far back as Charles Peirce, was repeatedly portrayed as

intrinsically un-American).11For Dewey Stalinism and Catholicism embodied twin totalitarianisms. 12InterestinglyDeweys narrative completely omitted any reference to Tocquevilles Democracy in America , most likely due to

Tocquevilles recognition of the salutary effect of pervasive religious belief.

While conventional histories of pragmatist philosophy are fond of making reference to the trinity of classical

pragmatists (William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey), they also acknowledge that Dewey triumphantly

achieved a systematic, comprehensive formulation of his predecessors.13In the 1950s, his thought was temporarily

eclipsed, a phenomenon that some have attributed to the importation of British analytical philosophy. Others targete

Sidney Hooks Cold War liberalism for poisoning pragmatism within academic circles.14Rorty attributed the decline o

interest in Dewey simply to boredom and an episodic change in fashion.15Nonetheless, Deweys thought has bee

revitalized by a plethora of more recent books, to the point that James Campbell has announced a golden age ofDewey studies.16Robert Westbrook and Alan Ryans widely read Dewey biographies certainly contributed to the

renaissance.18Very notably, Richard Rortys controversial synthesis of European post-modernism and Deweyan

pragmatism stimulated additional interest both inside and outside the world of professional academic philosophy.

Finally, the communitarian movement, including Robert Bellah and Michael Sandel, acknowledged Deweys

inspirational role.19According to John Diggins, pragmatism offers a promise of an overarching synthesis, given its

applicability to a variety of discourses (law, politics, social science, religion and, of course, education), while at the

same time integrating moral values with naturalistic, scientific methodology. The reason it ultimately did fail, Diggins

concluded, was due to its irresolution regarding the crisis of World War II.20A legion of new admirers of Dewey insis

that his thought was never refuted, only misunderstood. Any weaknesses which do exist are explained as Deweys

failure to fully develop a particular argument, although even these undeveloped thoughts are consistent within theDeweyan paradigm.17

In point of fact, such Dewey idolatry insulated disciples from objections to the prevailing orthodoxy. At the time,

however, the attacks mounted by Reinhold Niebuhr, Lewis Mumford, Archibald MacLeish, and Mortimer Adler (amon

others) put pragmatism on the defensive, to the point that in 1944, Jacques Barzun observed that today it is rather

Deweys Reconstruction in Philosophy [purely scientific instrumentalism] that seems on the other brink of the gulf.2

II.

Though he employed the term, we Deweyans as well as we pragmatists, Richard Rortys radical historicism has


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been stridently attacked by gatekeepers of the Dewey legacy.23It is thought that Rorty arrived at a philosophical

dead-end by denying that there can be an objective argument for democracy, arguing that it was pointless to even

debate opponents about it. For example, James Gouinlock charged, Insofar as he [Rorty] succeeds in appropriating

Deweys legacy, he will reject what was surely dearest to Dewey himself.24Although a critic of Rorty, Robert Talisse

admits that Dewey himself didnt facilitate genuine open discourse. Dewey routinely and reductively dismissed

classical philosophical thinkers with ad hominem attacks, accusing them of merely rationalizing the hierarchical

power of the political status quo. At the same time, conscientious philosophical critics were stigmatized as irrational

adversaries. Dewey invoked the term fascism in reference to Robert Maynard Hutchins, and he dismissed

essentialist critics like William Bagley as aiding forces of reaction. It would appear that Deweys quest for communit

was not inhibited by an overriding commitment to pluralism. Rortys statement that democracy trumps philosophy

does have some legitimate basis in Deweys writings.

Recognizing that John Rawls was widely acknowledged to be the leading political theorist of the last half-century,

Talisse invoked Rawlsian public reason in order to demonstrate that Dewey formulated a substantive,

comprehensive world-view that excluded plausible alternatives. Rawls argued that a continuing shared

understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical doctrine can be maintained onlyby the oppressive use

of state power, adding that appeals to such universalist dogmas should be excluded from political discourse.

25Talisse juxtaposes four theses of Deweyan democracy:

1. The Continuity Thesis: The democratic political order is a moral order characterized by a distinctive conception of

human flourishing.

2. The Transformative Thesis: The democratic process is one in which individual preferences, attitudes, and opinions

are informed and transformed rather than simply aggregated.

3. The Way of Life Thesis : Democracy is not simply a kind of state or a mode of government but a way of life.

4. The Perfectionist Thesis: Democratic states may enact legislation and design institutions for the express purpose

fostering the values and attitudes necessary for human flourishing.26

It is clear from the theses that a tension existed between reasonable pluralism and his monistic world-view. RichardGale detected a kind of latent Hegelianism in Deweys appeals to democracy as a way of life, the ultimate goal of

humanity, and the greatest of human goods to be applied to every aspect of human society.27For Dewey, the fate

democracy depends upon comprehensively implementing the political-economic transformation to obtain them. A

universal system of mandatory public schools was crucial to this process: education cant be neutral or indifferent to

the kind of social organization that existseducation must operate in view of a deliberately preferred social order.28

Other scholars also describe the totalistic nature of Deweyan democracy. For example, in John Deweys Ethics

(2008), Gregory Pappas argued that Deweys views about democracy cannot be separated from his plea that we

accept a certain metaphysics.29

Dewey held that the task of future philosophy is to clarify mens ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their

day,30 and no one implemented that mandate more vigilantly than Sidney Hook. Yet, perhaps because of his vitriolic

reproach of ritualistic liberalism, Hook has been excised from historical accounts of American pragmatism and specif

analyses of John Dewey. It is telling that Richard Schusterman (in his Pragmatism and Liberalism between Dewey

and Rorty) doesnt even mention Hook. James Campbells book, Understanding John Dewey, excluded any

reference to Hook. Despite Richard Rortys insistence that besides William Hames and Hohn Dewey, Sidney Hook

was the greatest influence for good of any American philosopher, Cheryl Misak airbrushed Hook from her historica

account in The American Pragmatists (2013)31. Reasonable pluralism doesnt appear to be hold much sway among

mainstream pragmatists.

Talisse argued plausibly that Hook advocated and was pivotally influenced by Charles Peirces epistemic


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methodology, as articulated in Peirces famous essay, The Fixation of Belief.32Pierces thought offered Hook a

pragmatic alternative for deliberative democracy. Contrary to Dewey, Talisse himself has maintained that where

intellectual freedom flourishes a variety of rationally defensible positions will be advocated in the public arena.

Responsible democratic citizens will utilize reasons and evidence while engaging their opponents in open debate.

They not only recognize but address contending arguments. He claimed that these epistemic norms are internal to th

practice of holding beliefs rather than being externally imposed. Cognitive commitments are exemplified by, but not

confined to, scientific methodology.33Talisse praised Sidney Hook for modeling, albeit imperfectly, such proper

conduct as a public controversialist.34

While Dewey did argue for the importance of liberating the capacities of individuals and facilitating students moral

growth, this should unfold within the context of training citizens for social service. Dewey denounced the child-

centered school: to fail to assure them guidance and direction is not merely a permit to operate in a blind and

spasmodic fashion, but it promotes the formation of habits of immature, undeveloped, and egoistic activity.35Dewey

further contended that the democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual to do as he pleases, even if

be qualified by adding provided he does not interfere with the same freedom on the part of others.36In Democracy

and Education, he described schooling as crucial for moral transmission: society exists through a process of

transmission quite as much as biological life. The transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of living

thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger. Without this transmission, communication of ideals, hopes,

expectations, standards, and opinions from those members of society who are passing on group life to those cominginto it, social life could not survive.37His pedagogical agenda thus prioritized the inculcation of democratic habits.

This was consistent with his understanding of democracy. For Dewey, the burden of proof was always on the

dissenter.38In Human Nature and Conduct, he chastised the bohemians as follows: Fastening upon the convention

elements in morality, they hold that all morality is a conventionality, hampering the development of individuality.Th

treat subjection to passion as a manifestation of freedom in the degree to which it shocks the bourgeois. The urgent

need for a transvaluation of morals is caricatured by the notion that an avoidance of conventional morals constitutes

positive achievement.39Indeed, Deweys demeanor exuded bourgeois sobriety.40As Tocqueville observed, not

antinomian self-creation but mass homogeneity constituted the immanent trajectory of modern democracy.

Deweys Hegelian preoccupation with social unity was even more manifest when he attempted to put theory into

practice. He undertook pilgrimages to the Soviet Union and Mexico. His penchant to such democratic totalism is

graphically exhibited in his eulogizing the collective cultural experiment in Stalins Soviet Union as nobly heroic,

evincing a faith in human nature which was democratic beyond the democracies in the past.41Touring Mexico as a

educational consultant at the invitation of the Calles regime in Mexico, Dewey applauded the governments campaig

to suppress, if not destroy, the Catholic Church. Amidst the savage repression during the Cristero War, he contended

that: the church can hardly escape the penalty for the continued ignorance and lack of initiative which it has tolerate

if not cultivated.42For Dewey Mexican culture was bifurcated between Catholicism and scientific secularism: the

Catholic Church was an obstacle to Mexicos social-political integration and had to be exorcised. 43In contrast, Dewe

was disconcerted by the rough-and-tumble adversarial aspect of American electoral politics. His understanding of

substantive democracy mandated the imposition of a morally substantive agenda, not simply the maintenance of

neutral procedural institutions.

III.

Talisse, then, has formulated a compelling case for the incompatibility of Deweyism with reasonable pluralism. How

pluralistic is Talisses non-metaphysical, minimalist epistemic understanding of pragmatic, democratic liberalism?

Although he did address criteria for responsible public discourse, it still remains to ask, who determines what is

reasonable and what constitutes justifiable evidence?44Are religiously grounded beliefs impermissible? Is state

coercion legitimate if bolstered by a reasonable explanation? Are there clear limits to the means employed to police


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and regiment enlightened conduct upon non-liberals?

Such an exploration of Deweys understanding of democracy is timely, for similar questions have surfaced again in t

current debate involving religious freedom and health care. Advocates of deliberative democracy often expose the

limitations of their openness when forced to identify what they are specifically against. Charles Peirce juxtaposed the

despotic method of authority of the Catholic Church in priest ridden states to his scientific approach. 45 John Rawls

opined that it would go against the ideal of public reason if someone voted against abortion rights as delineated in

Roe v. Wade.46While ostensibly welcoming Christians into the public arena, Jeffrey Stout privileged a certain type

anti-institutional personal spirituality. He eulogized, for example, Rosemary Radford Reuther who stridentlycampaigned to democratize the Catholic Church. Robert Talisse insisted that, laws forbidding homosexual sodom

fail to be publicly justifiable because there is no case forbidding homosexual sodomy that does not depend ultimately

upon some sectarian religious doctrine.47Talisse disregarded the argument of natural law theorists, like Robert

George, who utilize empirical, biologically based evidence to oppose sodomy. Is natural law theory inadmissible?

Shouldnt Talisse refute the claim that natural law can provide a reasonable basis for public discourse? Talisse also

maligned Thomas Nagel, because he, even though an atheist, maintained that Intelligent Design theory can be

discussed in the public schools.48

It would seem, then, that any position that directly or indirectly enhances Christianitys plausibility must be held to be

intrinsically suspect. And yet, this very suspicion seems to contradict Talisses maxim that it is not what people believ

but how they hold their beliefs that is paramount. Likewise, it could be said that Sidney Hooks adoption of Ludwig

Feuerbachs explanation for the psychological origin of religious belief in the projection of human ideals is tantamoun

to a personal attack, given that such an explanation violated his own principles as stated in The Ethics of

Controversy. We could also say that Hooks allegation that religious believers were afflicted with a failure of nerve

did not facilitate productive public discourse.

Hopefully, in the future, Talisse will not only bid farewell to Deweyan democracy but to Deweys key initiative to

secularize the schools. Will Talisses epitaph on Deweyan democracy entail an emancipation of the public schools

from a strict adherence to exclusively secular discourse? Beneath the professions of pluralism and relativism, one ca

detect a liberal intolerance that, in Talisses case, services the public schools to inculcate democratic epistemologica

virtues. This tutelary democracy is reminiscent of John Stuart Mills advocacy of purging the native population inIndia of its backwardness in order to train them for eventual self-government.

Gary Bullert is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia Basin College.

Endnotes:

1. Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2004), 3. See Thaddeus

Kozinskis treatment of John Rawls, MacIntyre, and Stout in The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism (New YorkLexington Books, 2010), 203ff. Pope John Paul II addressed the topic of pluralism during his trip to the United States

in 1987 as follows: But pluralism does not exist for its own sake; it is directed to the fullness of truth. In the academic

context, the respect for persons which pluralism rightly envisions does not justify the view that ultimate questions

about human life and destiny have no final answers or that all beliefs are of equal value, provided that none is

asserted as absolutely true or normative. Truth is not served this way (Pope John Pauls Address, Origins[1

October 1981]: 269).

2. On the gospel of social intelligence as an instrument of progress, see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Ol

Order, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 13. Reinhold Niebuhr conceded that no one is better certified for

modern liberalism than John Dewey (Niebuhr, The Pathos of Liberalism, Nation[11 September 1935]: 30304).


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3. Sidney Hook, Philosophy and Public Policy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 25778.

4. Robert Talisse, A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy, Political Studies(2011): 50926. Richard Gale aptly

categorized this as sheer heresy against the pragmatist orthodoxy (Gale, Review of Robert B. Talisse,A Pragmatist

Philosophy of Democracy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research[September 2012]: 435).

5. Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 200.

6. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture(New York: Capricorn Books, 1939), 155. Deweys narrative on American

political culture made no reference to Tocqueville, and the role of religion was totally marginalized. On Deweys veryselective appropriation of Jefferson, see Henry Edmondson, John Dewey and the Decline of American Education

(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), 5766.

7. Sidney Hook, Convictions(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 302. When Hook added Abraham Lincoln to th

pantheon of pragmatists, Max Eastman objected to Hooks elasticizing of pragmatist to mean simply a prudent

statesman. A more substantive criticism would be contrasting Deweyan repudiation of inalienable rights and Lincoln

appeal to these God-given rights, rooted in the claim that Jeffersons Declaration of Independence is the bedrock of

the American founding. See Hook, Abraham Lincoln, American Pragmatist, New Leader (18 March 1957): 1618;

Max Eastman, Lincoln Was No Pragmatist,New Leader (23 Sept. 1957): 1920.

8. Richard Rorty,Achieving Our Country(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 151. See Talisse, APragmatist Critique of Richard Rortys Hopeless Politics, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2001): 61126; Pete

Lawler, Rortys America, Perspectives on Political Science (Fall 1998): 199205.

9. See Tiffany Miller, John Dewey and the Philosophical Refounding of America, National Review (31 December

2009): 3740. The cover article identified the Four Horsemen of the Progressive apocalypse as John Dewey, Herbe

Croly, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Richard Ely. See also Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1970), 301.

10. John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York: Henry Holt, 1915), 143.

11. John Dewey lauded Paul BlanshardsAmerican Freedom and Catholic Power(Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 10For a contemporary rejoinder, see Patrick Brennan, Are Catholics Unreliable from a Democratic Point of View?

Thoughts on the Occasion of the 60thAnniversary of Paul Blanshards American Freedom and Catholic Power,

Villanova Law Review(2011): 199226. On the history of anti-Catholicism, see John McGreevy, Catholicism and

American Freedom (New York: Norton, 2003), 431.

12. Dewey to W. E. Hocking (16 May 1940), Dewey Correspondence, Center for Dewey Studies, Carbondale, IL.

Deweys Committee for Cultural Freedom initially focused its attention upon Stalinist totalitarianism and Popular Fron

apologists. This agenda was held in abeyance when attention shifted to defending Bertrand Russell, who was denie

employment at the City College of New York. Though the charges of atheism and hedonism were initiated by an

Episcopal Bishop, William Manning, the issue was framed to indict the totalitarian Catholic Church, since the

presiding judge was a Catholic. See John Dewey, The Case of Bertrand Russell, Nation (June 1940): 732

33.Dewey concentrated on defending academic freedom and not Russells specific views on sex and marriage. After

helping to arrange a job for Russell with Albert Barnes (Russell later sued Barnes), Dewey deemed Russell to be so

obnoxious that he expressed reservations about defending him in the first place.

13. Robert Talisse, Recovering American Philosophy, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly

Journal in American Philosophy, (Summer 2013): 425.

14. See John Capps, Pragmatism and the McCarthy Era, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society(Spring

2003): 6176. An imposing list of scholars ostensibly operate within the pragmatic tradition, including W. V. O. Quine

Susan Haack, Philip Kitchens, Hilary Putnam, and Cornel West.


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15. A more plausible account would take up Deweys pernicious educational influence See Lawrence Cremin, The

Transformation of the School (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 381.

16. For example, James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey(Chicago: Open Court, 1993); Richard Bernstein,

One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy, Political Theory

(November 1987): 53863. Further illustrations were cited by Talisse in A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, (Ne

York: Routledge, 2007), 141.

17. Robert Talisse, Toward a New Pragmatist Politics, Metaphilosophy (2011): 554.

18. Alan Ryan insightfully concluded that Robert Westbrooks John Dewey and American Democracy (1991)

reinvented Dewey in order to customize him for the New Left (Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American

Liberalism[New York: Norton, 1995], 11. In order to establish any credibility for this contention, Westbrook demonize

Deweys foremost disciple, Sidney Hook, who was definitely on the other side of the barricades during the 1960s. Se

Westbrook, Stream of Contentiousness, Nation(27 May 1987): 72630.

19. Bruce Frohnen, The New Communitarians and the Crisis of Modern Liberalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas

Press, 1996), 120. Frohnen separated MacIntyre from this camp of communitarians. Another communitarian leftist

invoking Dewey was Harry Boyte, a 2008 campaign consultant for Barack Obama. See Boyte, A Different Kind of

Politics: John Dewey and the Meaning of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, Dewey Lecture at the University o

Michigan, 1 November 2002, at www.cpn.org/crm/contemporary/different.html. Talisse also endeavored to establish

linkage to the real world of American politics by discussing another Obama advisor, democratic theorist, Cass

Sunstein (Talisse, Democracy After Liberalism [New York: Routledge, 2005], 10911).

20. John Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 515.

21. Jacques Barzun, The Literature of Ideas, Saturday Review of Literature (5 August 1944): 27.

22. Jean Porter, Moral Traditions, in Kenneth Grasso and Cecilia Castillo, Theology and Public Policy (New York:

Lexington Books, 2012), 13839.

23. James Campbell, Rortys Use of Dewey, Southern Journal of Philosophy (Summer 1984): 175

87. In a lettershortly before his death, Sidney Hook upbraided Rorty for employing the term, we Deweyans, in addition to

attacking Rortys false portrayal of Deweys actual philosophy. The difference between Hook and Rorty roughly

mirrors the conflict between modernism and post-modernism. See the letter, Hook to Rorty (20 March 1989) in Hook

Correspondence, Hoover Institute Archives, Stanford University.

24. James Gouinlock, What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rortys Interpretation of Dewey, Journal of the Histo

of Philosophy (April 1990): 251.

25. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 37.

26. Robert Talisse, Toward a New Pragmatist Politics, 554.

27. See Richard Gale, John Deweys Quest for Unity (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2010), 215.

28. Cited from Diane Ravitch, Left Back(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 220.

29. Gregory Pappas, John Deweys Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 267.

30. John Dewey,Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 26.

31. Cheryl Misak, The American Pragmatists (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 304; Richard Shusterman,

Pragmatism and Liberalism between Dewey and Rorty, Political Theory (August 1994): 391413.


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32. Talisse,A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 11530.

33. Talisse, Pragmatist Political Philosophy, Philosophy Compass (2 September 2014): 12330.

34. Talisse, Sidney Hook Reconsidered, The Pragmatism Cybrary, www.pragmatism.org/genealogy/hook.htm.

35. John Dewey, How Much Freedom in the Schools, The New Republic(9 July 1930): 205.

36. John Dewey, Democracy and Education Administration, School & Society (April 1937): 459.

37. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: MacMillan, 1916), 3.

38. John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, 2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 1932), 282.

39. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Random House, 1922), 8.

40. An analysis of the complicated relationship between Dewey, Hook and Rorty transcends the scope of this article

Nonetheless, Rorty described himself as a post-modern bourgeois liberal. He candidly acknowledged that his own

moral preferences were the product of his family roots, life experience, and inherited culture. He eluded the abyss of

Nietzsches nihilism by admittedly freeloading off the moral capital of the Christian tradition.

41. John Dewey, A Country in a State of Flux, The New Republic (28 November 1928): 14. For an analysis ofDeweys transition from Soviet sympathizer to the anti-Stalinist Left, see Gary Bullert, The Committee for Cultural

Freedom and the Roots of McCarthyism, Education and Culture 29, no. 2 (2013): 2552.

42. John Dewey, Mexicos Educational Renaissance, The New Republic (23 September 1926): 116.

43. John Dewey, Church and State in Mexico, in The Later Works, 192553, ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale:

Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 9798.

44. Henrik Rydenfelt asked how there could an external method-independent way of evaluating the reasonableness

of the scientific method itself. See Rydenfelt, Epistemic Norms and Democracy, Metaphilosophy (2011): 581.

45. Charles Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, Popular Science(November 1877): 115.

46. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 204.

47. Robert Talisse, Religion, Respect and Eberles Agape Pacifist, Philosophy & Social Criticism(9 January 2012):

2.

48. Scott Aiken, Robert Harbour, and Robert Talisse, Nagel on Public Education and Intelligent Design, Journal of

Philosophical Research (2010): 20019.

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