Analysing the Nature of War : Past , Present , and Future

On Effects-based Operations, Biologival On Effects-based Operations, Biologival Evolution, and Some Other Interesting Evolution, and Some Other Interesting StuffStuff

Lt. Col. Lt. Col. Dr. Dr. ZoltZoltaan Jobbn Jobbaagygy

Analysing the Nature Analysing the Nature of War: Past, Present, of War: Past, Present, and Futureand Future

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MOTHER COURAGE:“That must be a rotten general.”

THE COOK:“He’s ravenous all right, but why rotten?”

MOTHER COURAGE:“Because he’s got to have men of

courage, that’s why. If he knew how to plan a proper campaignwhat would he be needing men of courage for?

Ordinary ones would do. It’s always the same; wheneverthere’s a load of special virtues around it means something

stinks.”THE COOK:

“I thought it meant things is all right.”

(BERTOLT BRECHT)

Why do Soldiers NeedWhy do Soldiers NeedCourage?Courage?

On Today’s MenuOn Today’s Menu Theorising – what does ‘effects-based’ stand for?

Originating – where are the concept’s origins?

Reflecting – can we tame war’s unpredictable mechanism?

Conceptualising – what does a complex adaptive system stand for?

Generalising – how can we think ‘complexity-based’?

Concluding – how can we create ‘effects-based’ strategies?

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Our Giude Through This LectureOur Giude Through This Lecture

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You Know Him Better This Way …You Know Him Better This Way …

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Theorising Effects-Based OperationsTheorising Effects-Based Operations

Assumed Advantages of EBOAssumed Advantages of EBO

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PoliticallyCorrect

EmploymentOf

Force?

ShortDuration

LimitedDestruction

LowCasualty

LowCost

Approaches CheckedApproaches Checked

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NAME ORGANISATION APPEARANCE

Enthusiastic Approach USAF 1995

Analytic Challenge Approach RAND 2001

Decision Superiority Approach IDA 2001

Jointness Approach USJFCOM J9 2001

Network Centric Approach CCRP 2002

Methodological Approach ACC 2002

Success Paradigm Approach AU CADRE 2002

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First ImpressionsFirst Impressions• Technological Focus – stealthy platforms and precision weapons as

basis …• Direct Causality – tactical actions aimed at achieving strategic level

effects …• Deductive Thinking – top-down, proceeding from the big picture to

the small …• Systemic Approach – enemy seen as system, sub-system,

elements, …• Analytic Categories – observable structures based on logical

reasoning (CoG) …

• CONTROL – focus on psychology (influencing enemy thinking and behaviour) …

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• Technological Focus – too firepower centric, requires a certainsymmetry …

• Direct Causality – cause and effect relationships often confusing …• Deductive Thinking – war is fluid and friction is everywhere …• Systemic Approach – unclear whether system-of-system or complex

adaptive system …• Analytic Categories – most enemies have no analytically

observable structures …

• CONTROL – not always possible therefore in war you have to kill sometimes …

First ConcernsFirst Concerns

SemanticSemantic Problems Problems(Webster’s)(Webster’s)

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Effect refers to result or outcome, something that is produced by anagent or a cause directly. Thus it follows immediately the antecedent

as a resultant condition and implies something that necessarilyfollows a cause

Effect is synonymous with result, consequence, upshot, after-effect,aftermath, sequel, issue, outcome and event. They all signify remote

conditions that are ascribable to a cause or a combination of causes

Some Some RemarksRemarks(Van Riper, Jobbagy)(Van Riper, Jobbagy)

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OK – direct, first order effects

Is the term ‘effects-based’ vacuous?

Is the concept scarcely more than military truism & commonplace?

Unfortunately, Clausewitz pointed out good two centuries ago that whatever we do “consequences of some kind [would] always follow.”

BUT – indirect, higher order outcomes, events, or consequences!

DO WE GENERATE HOT AIR?DO WE GENERATE HOT AIR?

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EE is for is for EffectsEffects

You thought it was a planning You thought it was a planning methodology. It is really an OPSEC methodology. It is really an OPSEC tool. When the insurgents read our tool. When the insurgents read our classified documents they can’t classified documents they can’t figure out what the hell we are up figure out what the hell we are up too! Come to think of I have no idea too! Come to think of I have no idea either.either.

Warfighter’s RemarkWarfighter’s Remark(OIF Alphabet Part One)(OIF Alphabet Part One)

Common Elements andCommon Elements andCharacteristicsCharacteristics (Jobbagy)(Jobbagy)

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EFFECTS-FOCUS

Causality

Deduction

Clearly and directly linking actions, and effects

Strategic objectives into tactical actions

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

Intangibles

Control

Focus on thinking, decision, behaviour and will

Destruction as means in order to influence

SYSTEMS APPROACH

Categorisation

Analysis

All elements of power involved

System-of-system or omplex adaptive system

A dA deductive nomological (scientific) approach!eductive nomological (scientific) approach!

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Continuum as function of an ends-means relationship

Continuum of WarContinuum of War(Jobbagy)(Jobbagy)

Means

Ends

Destruction Influence

Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

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Examples for Effects AchievedExamples for Effects Achieved

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

Destroying anenemy tank, IFV, APCkilling soldiers, etc.

Conducting PSYOPS,CIMIC activities, hearts and

mind campaigns, etc.

(Systemic)Damaging electric power supply,

lines of communication,critical infrastructure, C2 facilities,

etc.

Japanes soldiers comittingsuicide after military defeat

Strategic bombing campaignof Harris during WW II

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Where and why does this exclusive focus come from?

EBO in the EBO in the Continuum of WarContinuum of War

Means

Ends


Physical

PsychologicalEffects-Based Operations

(subordinating the means to the end,focusing on direct causality between

actions and outcome, emphasising thestrategic over the tactical, seeing the

whole by mostly neglectingthe particular)

(Systemic)

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Originating Effects-Based OperationsOriginating Effects-Based Operations

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Confusing OriginsConfusing Origins(Explaining everything and nothing)(Explaining everything and nothing)

• According to Clausewitz “manifestations in war … result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions” and stretching ideas can result in loss of proper meaning and declining value

• Regarding the origins of EBO most sources deliver only superficial generalisations that de-emphasise specific social, political, cultural and economic factors, which depend on certain historical circumstances

• It is undeniable that ‘strategy’ mostly follows a deductive logic in which the conclusion about particulars and the course of actions proceeds from general or universal premises

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Examining the ClassicsExamining the Classics• It is useful to take a close look at the vocabularies of

significant past theorists of war in order to examine to what extent and in which context their works contained the term ‘effect’ and its derivatives

• The intention is not to deliver a broad historical, philosophical, cultural or even linguistic overview but to allow the respective authors to speak for themselves as they represent different periods

• The aim is to detect references that point toward the three identified elements of effects-based operations such as effects-focus, advanced technology, and systems approach

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Selected Past ‘Classics’Selected Past ‘Classics’

Machiavelli (pre-

modern)

Sun Tzu (ancient)

Jomini (modern)

Clausewitz (modern)

“The Art of War”

500 B. C.


1521


1838

“On War”

1832

‘we muchlike his book’

‘we don’tknow (t)his book’

‘we bash anddismiss his book’

‘we extensivelyquote his book’

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Element One – Effects-FocusElement One – Effects-Focus(Meyer/Wilson, etc.)(Meyer/Wilson, etc.)• Sun Tzu intended his advices not as replacement for but as an

adjunct to the actual use of force. He emphasised the importance of strategy and forming strategic alliances as alternatives to bloody wars

• Machiavelli was less interested in how an army fights and more how it is possible to establish and sustain one that fights, which is reflected in the absence of the term ‘effect’ in his 27 rules of war

• Jomini’s four maxims regarding the fundamental principles of the art of war do not contain any references to ‘effects’. Only as a succession of inconsiderable affairs could armies be destroyed without pitched battles

• Clausewitz wanted to warn theorists that reality is too multifaceted for causal explanations (see book two/chapter five). In a critical analysis he addressed the inherent problem when attempting to detect cause-and-effect relationships in war

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Element Two – AdvancedElement Two – AdvancedTechnologyTechnology• No theorist put emphasis on elaborating on the difference that

technology can and cannot make in war. Weapons were operated mostly by muscle power and being mounted on a horse was the fastest possible means of advancement

• Although the disparity between methods and weapons used became clear as early as the Crimean and American Civil Wars, military lessons of past ages were not significantly influenced by changing technological conditions

• Weapons of industrial mass production with their ever increasing destructive potential shattered the value of past military experience only in the 20th century as the immense gap became clear during World War I

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Element Three – SystemsElement Three – SystemsApproachApproach

SUN TZU MACHIAVELLI

Way

Only indirectlydetectable

basedon the content

of his books

Weather

Leadership

Terrain

Discipline

JOMINI

Strategy

Grand tactics

Logistics

Engineering

Tactics

Discipline

CLAUSEWITZ

People

Military

Government

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Carriages vs. CarsCarriages vs. Cars• The allure to refer to past theories in order to support present

day strategic thought is appealing. It provides for better prospect and stronger arguments to sell ideas and gain influence

• Any such reference prohibits the decoding of unique historical conditions and detaches theory from practical relevance, which is superficial, misleading and extremely dangerous

• A carriage pulled by a horse and a car driven by a combustion engine reveal obvious similarities but do not indicate that those who invented the carriage also had the car in mind

• According to Clausewitz “every age had its own kind of war.... Each period … [holds] to its own theory of war … It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities”

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Gen. DeptulaGen. Deptula – USAF – USAF((Interwiev Interwiev March 2003)March 2003)

• The idea of effects-based operations came out of the scarcity of available aerial resources during the 1991 war against Iraq and appeared as a practical problem of how to compensate for this shortcoming

• The unexpected success of the approach and the power of advanced technology resulted that from then on “that was the philosophy … we used in targeting for the rest of the war planning effort and then during the war”

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Reflecting Effects-Based OperationsReflecting Effects-Based Operations

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Obvious Similarities I.Obvious Similarities I.

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Psychological focus

Limited destruction

Low casualty rate

Low costs

Short duration

MILITARY COERCION

Psychological focus

Limited destruction

Low casualty rate

Low costs

Short duration

• Most air-power theories aim at certain vulnerable elements of the enemy with the intention to achieve victory through various coercive mechanisms aimed at influencing enemy thinking and behaviour

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Obvious Similarities II.Obvious Similarities II.(K. Mueller(K. Mueller, Jobbagy, Jobbagy))

MILITARY COERCION

Target

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATION

Force Mechanism CHANGE

Object Action Mechanism EFFECT

BOTH APPROACHES REFOCUS FROM THE USE OF BRUTE FORCE

MECHANISMS OTHER THAN ATTRITION & ANNIHILATION

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Military Coercion vs. Brute ForceMilitary Coercion vs. Brute Force

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

COLD WARprimary focus onmilitary coercion

HOT WARprimary focus on

brute force

(Systemic)

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Locating the MechanismsLocating the Mechanisms(Pape(Pape, Jobbagy, Jobbagy))

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

Annihilation

Attrition

Denial

Decapitation

Punishment

Risk

(Systemic)

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• Pape – every mechanism poses serious problems: either because we don’t like them (attrition, annihilation), or they don’t work (punishment, decapitation), or they require specific circumstances (risk), or they are slippery (denial)

• Clausewitz – used the term ‘friction’ in order to describe the nature of war. He argued that intellectual activity, exact sciences and mathematical logic are of little help since waging war is basically an art “in the broadest meaning of the term”

• Watts – reconstructed friction and concluded that it is manifest in danger, physical exertion, imperfect information, structural resistance, chance events, physical & political limits, unpredictability from interactions, and disconnects between ends/means

• He indicates that much of war has similarities with gambling, which means that “friction, uncertainty, and confusion are not superficial annoyances to be gradually eliminated” but integral and dominant parts of the game

Mechanism and FrictionMechanism and Friction((Pape, Pape, Clausewitz, Watts)Clausewitz, Watts)

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Properties of FrictionProperties of Friction(Perrow)(Perrow)• The essence of friction in war can best be grasped through a

structural analysis based on two properties such as couplings and interactions

• The properties are of a qualitative nature and were originally introduced to understand and study the way accidents happen

• Within this framework friction is understood as a phenomenon that comes mostly in the form of unintended and unexpected effects

• The advantage of this approach is that it can also address the so-called ‘intricate’ relationship between causes and effects

• Whereas couplings can be tight or loose, interactions can be linear or complex

• The two properties offer four possible combinations that can be projected onto the continuum of war

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Explaining the PropertiesExplaining the Properties(Perrow, Czerwinski)(Perrow, Czerwinski)

• Linear interactions – refer to highly structured, logical, sequential, and predictable relationships

• Complex interactions – offer less predictability due to the presence of unplanned and unforeseen relationships

• Tight couplings – stand for high centralisation and rigidity, which allow for close monitoring and a certain tolerance

• Loose couplings – mean decentralised operations and allow for a wide variety of possible outcomes

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Structural Analysis for Decomposing Structural Analysis for Decomposing FrictionFriction (Perrow(Perrow, , CzerwinskiCzerwinski, Jobbagy, Jobbagy))

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

Simple(tight coupling

& linear interaction)

Complicated(loose coupling


Complex(loose coupling

& complex interaction)

Chaotic(tight coupling


(Systemic)

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• Simple – stands for known causes and effects with clear and visible relationship. Due to their empirical nature causal relationships are not open to dispute as this area can be characterised by the predominance of centralised causes and centralised effects

• Complicated – refers to knowable causes and effects. Although causal relationships exist, due to spatial and temporal separations they might not become fully known. Causality is difficult to comprehend as centralised causes increasingly yield decentralised effects

• Complex – refers to cause-and-effect relationships that are not open to any inspection and defy most attempts at categorisation or other analytical techniques. Causes and effects are mostly decentralised and appear coherent only retrospectively but even then debatable

• Chaotic – refers to cause-and-effect relationships that are not visible or perceivable. Due to spatial and temporal separations prediction is impossible as there is no meaningful way to plan for effects or discern any sort of causal relationships

Explaining the AreasExplaining the Areas(Snowden et. al.)(Snowden et. al.)

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• Colloquially we can say that in tightly linear systems everyone can detect causality. Whereas in loosely linear systems experts might detect causality, in loosely complex systems causality often becomes clear only retrospectively. Unfortunately in tightly complex systems there is no discernible causality that can guide our actions

• In other words, effects-based operations offer considerable promise only for physical effects but in terms of psychological effects the concept appears to be pretty hopeless. In the case of systemic effects the concept roughly touches the borderline that separates prediction from pure guesswork

• Effects-based operations are generally good for creating desired physical effects, and might occasionally be good for generating desired systemic effects. However, in the case of psychological effects the concept does not work well, although sometimes it might contain useful information

Consequences for BeingConsequences for Being‘‘Effects-Based’Effects-Based’ (E. Lorenz)(E. Lorenz)

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Conceptualising Effects-Based Conceptualising Effects-Based OperationsOperations

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Structural Analysis Structural Analysis AgainAgain

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

Simple(tight coupling


Complicated(loose coupling


Complex(loose coupling


Chaotic(tight coupling


(Systemic)

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Structural Analysis ExtendedStructural Analysis Extended

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

Chaos(far from equilibrium,

turbulence reigns)

Complexity proper(dynamic equilibrium,

emergence reigns)

Non-linearity

Stability(equilibrium,

linearity reigns)

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Increasing UnpredictabilityIncreasing Unpredictability

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

As we move towards the area of effects-based operations the combinations of coupling and interaction

indicate increasing structural instability with seriousconsequences for causal relationships.

Consequently, we suggest to extend the original exclusive focus of the concept to the continuum of war in order to

take the entire band-with of causality betterinto account

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‘‘Dynamic Law of War’Dynamic Law of War’(Clausewitz)(Clausewitz)

• Clausewitz observed that every “action in war is not continuous but spasmodic. Violent clashes are interrupted by periods of observation, during which both sides are on the defensive”

• He defined this attribute the ‘Dynamic Law of War’. According to him in wars periods of inaction and response change with periods of action since “periods of active warfare will always be interspersed with greater or smaller periods of rest”

• Although Clausewitz defined war by this continuous cycle, he was ready to emphasise that the “state of crisis is the real war; the equilibrium is nothing but its reflex”

• Thus war oscillated for him on a continuum characterised by stability and chaos, which indicates that if he had the terminology of our times at his disposal he might have used the term ‘COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM’

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War as War as CASCAS(One Definition)(One Definition)

War seen as a CAS’ indicates anon-linear dynamic system composed of interacting,semi-autonomous, and hierarchically organised parts

that continuously self-organise as a result of changingenvironmental conditions thus showing emergent

attributes

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

Chaos(far from equilibrium,

turbulence reigns)

Stability(equilibrium,

linearity reigns)

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Characteristics of Characteristics of CASCAS

• A CAS forces us to think in terms of opposites, in which one side cannot be right at the expense of the other. Stability and chaos allow for polarities to manage rather than problems to solve

• Consequently, the original approach focusing on causality, reduction, deduction, and analysis must be extended with a holistic approach

• Clausewitz also argued that “the vast, the almost infinite distance … between cause and its effect, and the countless ways in which these elements can be combined” demand things to be seen in a comprehensive fashion

• All the characteristics of a CAS guide our thinking towards the application of appropriate METAPHORS

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What is a Metaphor?What is a Metaphor?(Holland, Saperstein, Duran, etc.)(Holland, Saperstein, Duran, etc.)

• An implied comparison or a figure of speech in which a word denoting a certain object or action is used for another in order to suggest an analogy – it enlarges our perception by producing insightful connections and interpretations

• A figurative expression in which a word or phrase designating one thing is used to designate another in the form of an implicit comparison.

• A qualitative leap from reasonable, prosaic comparison to identification or fusion of two objects as the resulting new entity possesses the characteristics of both

• A paradoxical statement: literally false according to abstract rationality, but true according to imaginative rationality

• An essential as-gates in the human cognitive process since they enable the understanding of one thing in terms of another

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Levels of MetaphorsLevels of Metaphors(Ilachinski)(Ilachinski)

• Transfer – level one means the transfer of a single term into another context in order to create new meaning

• Construction – level two is the construction of analogies as part of a specific theory or a general and systematic inquiry to elucidate phenomena

• Unification – level three stands for a unifying view of an entire paradigm, often symbolised by a specific term that refers to the whole frame of understanding under a given paradigm

• Merger – level four can be seen as the most comprehensive in which science itself is understood as an irreducible metaphor.

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Consequences forConsequences forConceptualisationConceptualisation

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

Metaphors(structures are so fleeting and instable that

boundaries are not an inherent feature of reality:a tank is a tank but what is enemy psyche – even if it is

real , it is never absolute)

Reductionism(structures are so persistentand stable that they can be

assumed to be real andabsolute)

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For a CAS Biological MetaphorsFor a CAS Biological MetaphorsAre of First ImportanceAre of First Importance

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• Darwin had no intention at all to spend much time examining the nature of war. However, even he had to recognise in his book On the Origins of Species that genetic usurpation and endemic warfare share similarities.

• In chapter three he drew an analogy between war, battle and natural selection and saw evolution as a “[b]attle within battle [that] must ever be recurring with varying success.”

• This analogy made him conclude that “from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows.”

• Biological evolution was for him a “great and complex battle of life”, which together with the ‘Law of Battle’ for survival formed a recurrent pattern also in his second epic work The Decent of Man.

Biology Biology andand War War I. I.(Darwin)(Darwin)

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• Boyd suggested that similar to biological evolution also war oscillates on a continuum that cannot be broken into discrete points or steps in time. Therefore both soldiers and ecologists try to find a mechanism that matches the ‘crude reality’ of life

• Thus we regard war as a conflict between two self-organising, living and fluid-like organisms consisting of many mutually interacting and co-evolving parts that form a rich interlacing tapestry of emergent possibilities

• He also pointed out that the theory of evolution by natural selection and the conduct of war are intimately related since both “treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very fundamental way”

• Based on the idea of the evolving biosphere and in order to be in lieu with the military tradition to express thoughts in metaphors we propose to conceptualise war in the framework of an ‘ORGANIC STRATEGIC ECOSYSTEM’

Biology Biology andand War War II. II.(Boyd)(Boyd)

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• Organic – born out of complex adaptive systems theory it emphasises war as a conflict between two self-organising, living and fluid-like entities

• Strategic – interacting and co-evolving parts form emergent possibilities that have relevance on the strategic level in the form of victory and defeat

• Ecosystem – biological evolution forms the basis for conceptualising war as an open ended and dynamic system

Organic Strategic EcosystemOrganic Strategic Ecosystem(Jobbagy)(Jobbagy)

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The greater the uncertainty, the greater the possibility that victory is acombination of relative superiority and fortuitous circumstance. Thus in

war there is simply no guarantee that a particular outcome expressed as desired effect is the best one as there are many other possible

solutions to the same problem

COMPLEX OPTIMISATION IS TRIAL-AND-ERROR!

War is ‘Complex Optimisation’War is ‘Complex Optimisation’(Alchian, van Creveld, Arthur)(Alchian, van Creveld, Arthur)

There are so many variables in war that must be taken into accountthat approaches trying to optimise make more sense than thoseattempting to maximise – in war even the mediocre is quite

an achievement

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Generalising Effects-Based OperationsGeneralising Effects-Based Operations

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• Although evolution and war cannot be equated with each other, in an evolutionary framework war can be seen as a transforming large-scale system for which biology is uniquely appropriate explain its bewildering attributes

• Comprehending war as complex optimisation problem in an evolutionary framework rejects classical theorising and promotes ‘complexity thinking’ that requires a shift from mechanics to biology

• Consequently, the emphasise moves from statics to dynamics, from time-free to time-prone reality, from determinism to probability and chance, and from uniformity to variation and diversity

• In other words, men and animals successful in the struggle succeed because they happen to be best suited to their surrounding conditions, whether those conditions are simple or complex, high or low

‘‘Complexity Thinking’ RequiredComplexity Thinking’ Required(Modelski/Poznanski, Andreski, Ovington)(Modelski/Poznanski, Andreski, Ovington)

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Biology Biology ofof War War• War is full of multi-layered problems and demands an

approach that is less rigid and more flexible, less artificial and more organic, less mechanistic and more living, which emphasises actions ‘in’ the environment

• Similar to the biological evolution of species war is a co-evolutionary process in which the constant adjustments of the belligerents do not make possible to know all values for all relevant variables beforehand

• Perpetual novelty must be regarded as a typical feature of war, which makes predictions generally difficult and in the case the enemy is able to learn and adapt the difficulty increases enormously

• SIMILAR TO CO-EVOLUTION WAR IS ALSO OPEN ENDED

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• Biological evolution indicates spontaneous processes that take place on a continuum that can be defined by two end-poles such as stability and chaos (see the ‘Dynamic Law of War’ of Clausewitz)

• Conceptualising a CAS can best be done by a mechanism called ‘fitness’, which allows biological evolution to be depicted as a migratory process on a landscape

• The surface of the landscape changes continually due to the simultaneous play of many forces which promote emergence and self-organisation rather than gradual processes

• The challenge is to strike an appropriate balance between exploiting (‘adaptive walk’) locations of high fitness and exploring (‘long jump’) new locations that might have the potential of even higher fitness

‘‘Fitness Landscape’Fitness Landscape’(Wright, Kaufmann)(Wright, Kaufmann)

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• Sewell Wright expanded on Darwin’s theory in the 1930’s . He wanted to get a grip on the properties of gene mutation and concluded that in biological evolution even a limited number of mutations can result in an almost infinite field of variants

• In other words he faced a similar causality problem as outlined by Clausewitz who pointed out that war is very difficult to comprehend in strict causal terms as (remember: “the vast, the almost infinite distance … between cause and its effect, and the countless ways in which these elements can be combined” demand things to be seen in a comprehensive fashion)

• In order to comprehend the problem of mutation he introduced a flexible and picturesque metaphor emphasising a shifting balance in evolution. It was graphic representation that looked like a topographical map containing multiple peaks surrounded by circular contours

Depicting BiologyDepicting Biology(S. Wright)(S. Wright)

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Surface of Adaptive ValueSurface of Adaptive Value((Fitness LandscapeFitness Landscape))

• Wright proposed adaptation to be a balance between natural selection and random genetic drift with each having a varying contribution to the survival and extinction of species over time and space

• Wright introduced a flexible and picturesque metaphor emphasising a shifting balance in evolution

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Landscapes and the MilitaryLandscapes and the Military(Dockery/Woodcock)(Dockery/Woodcock)

• The literal interpretation understands landscape as terrain with its geographical features that have always been influential for the conduct of war and warfare

• The first level of abstraction is embodied by the topographical map that directly refers to geography since it depicts the physical landscape in standard symbols

• The second level of abstraction is representation by metaphor and indicates political, economic, and cultural landscapes that have no physical basis

• The third level of abstraction allows us to understand landscapes as tools for analysing and modelling complex problems

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Landscape and Landscape and Network-CentriNetwork-Centrismsm(Cebrowski/Garstka)(Cebrowski/Garstka)

• Wright’s idea resembles a clear similarity with the current idea of network-centric warfare, which is characterised by factors such as

• The re-focus from the sum of individual platforms to the network of possibilities they provide for together with the gains that can be exploited

• The re-focus from mostly isolated and homogenous actors to the various interdependencies smaller and more specified players stand for

• The re-focus from strategy development in traditional terms to issues such as adaptation and learning under continuously changing conditions

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• Thus we see war as a not always causally connected phenomenon. It is regarded as a temporal sequence of aggregates rather than a linear process in which earlier events simply cause later ones

• The biological analogy indicates war to be a conflict laden task in which we always have to deal with various constraints. This makes very difficult to strive towards predefined end-states in the form of desired effects

• War perceived within this framework means that deductive thinking aimed at detecting clear causality only narrows the range of possible options

Landscape and ConsequencesLandscape and Consequences

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‘‘Effects’ LandscapeEffects’ Landscape• In a similar fashion the surface of the effects landscape is not

fixed but changes due to the interaction of the belligerents who try to optimise their own position by achieving effects that point toward a competitive advantage

• Similar to the idea of the fitness landscape also effects landscape emphasises a constantly changing environment in which the belligerents suitability to changing circumstances can alter in subtle and dramatic ways

• As the environment and the enemy change the value attributable to any given effect will also change thus indicating that the height of the peaks in the landscape move constantly up and down over time

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• Wright and Clausewitz indicate that in complex phenomena we not always find clear causal relationships. Finding out precisely the way feedback routes is often difficult if not impossible and we face endless combinations

• In feedback information loops can occasionally cross their own path. However, in the case something can be seen both as a cause and an effect rationality is up for grabs and we face a paradox. This is the very reason why war can occasionally produce counterintuitive behaviour

• We often equal waging war with managing war and assume more oversight than we really have and more than we will ever have regardless the technological achievements. Complex phenomena have their own dynamic and we have little to say in terms of causality

Feedback EverywhereFeedback Everywhere((KellyKelly))

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• Efficiency – stands for the ‘maximum principle’. It allows for reductionism and assumes that peaks can be defined and solutions come as a result of ‘engineering’. This is the domain that makes an exclusive top-down deductive approach possible. Optimisation and the drive for perfection make sense as it is possible to focus on single dimensions to make things better. Efficiency stands for adaptation via 1-mutant fitter variants

• Effectiveness – stands for the ‘minimum principle’. According to this approach peaks have to be found first in order to achieve useful effects. Solutions mostly come as a result of an evolutionary trial-and-error mechanism. Not control but coping is possible, which emphasises the importance of satisficing and acceptance. Here the focus is on adaptation and learning and the way they develop over time and space. Effectiveness stands for adaptation via J-mutant fitter variants

Explaining Efficiency andExplaining Efficiency andEffectivenessEffectiveness (Merry, March, Meyer)(Merry, March, Meyer)

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Consequences for a GeneralisationConsequences for a Generalisation

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

Effectiveness(exploring peaks; peak as becoming effective; doing right things;environment changes dynamically; high degree of uncertainty)

Efficiency (climbing peaks; peak

as maximum efficiency; doingthings right; environment changes

slowly; high degree ofcertainty)

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Concluding on Effects-Based Concluding on Effects-Based OperationsOperations

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‘‘Engineering’ StrategyEngineering’ StrategyDevelopmentDevelopment (Mintzberg/Mintzberg et. al.)(Mintzberg/Mintzberg et. al.)

• The military is regarded as a self-sufficient system containing the necessary means to determine and attain objectives that come as a result of constant balancing between the two

• The military is seen as a rational machine with decisions being governed by prediction and control. The enemy is not allowed to affect reasoning, drawing up and the pursuit of objectives

• War is a series of discrete actions in which events come in a visible and serial sequence as nothing occurring in the course of its execution should affect the determination to carry out the plan

• High degree of stability and calm is assumed in order to provide a basis for the rational patterns of orders in which the total body of available information is analysed and reduced

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Non-engeneerable Non-engeneerable ProblemsProblems• We claim to identify single peaks and the path leading to those

peaks, although the surface changes dynamically an unpredictably

• By going step-wise through the various levels of war we assume that objectives simply add together

• Instead of promoting flexibility by creating options we shut down or at least limit the chance to exploit emerging opportunities

• By focusing on relatively singular strategies and occupy only one spot on the landscape we impose (analytic) blinders on ourselves

• Although we might do things right we not obviously do the right things. We are efficient but not effective – we are too anxious about making mistakes

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De-engineering FactorsDe-engineering Factors(Betts)(Betts)

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

(Systemic)

GamblingGambling

CognitionCognitionCommunicationCommunication

SequencSequencee

PersonalityPersonalityFrictionFriction

ConstraintsConstraintsDeflectionDeflection

ContingencyContingency

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‘‘EvolutionaryEvolutionary’ Strategy’ StrategyDevelopmentDevelopment

• Stands for creativity, constant change, evolving situations and limitations regarding comprehension, prediction and control

• Emphasises open strategic options and the possibility of various paths that can better contribute to a rapid change of directions as events unfold

• Never assumes that a particular input produces a particular output but indicate probabilistic occurrences within the domain of focus

• Acknowledges that it is sometimes better to let patterns emerge than impose an artificial consistency prematurely

• Promotes learning and adaptation, which require a peripheral vision to detect and take advantage of unfolding opportunities

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On Effects-Based StrategiesOn Effects-Based Strategies(Pascale, Beinhocker, Courtney et. al.)(Pascale, Beinhocker, Courtney et. al.)

• By applying the two sorts of strategy development in parallel we are able to harmonise internal diversity with external demand and combine efficiency with effectiveness

• Whereas bottom-up enables subordinates to exhibit autonomy and flexibility, top-down secures a certain degree of compliance throughout the organisation in order to avoid fragmentation of resources

• Influential and important ideas for strategy development are distributed widely reaching even to the peripheries where soldiers are exposed to factors that often defy ‘strategic’ ideas coming from the top (peripheral vision vs. focused vision)

• ORGANIC STRATEGIC ECOSYSTEM INDICATES THAT WE SHOULD CAST THE NET AS WIDE AS POSSIBLE

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SuggestionsSuggestions(Boyd, Kaufmann, Eisenhardt et. al.)(Boyd, Kaufmann, Eisenhardt et. al.)• Strategy as Mission – by combining the higher rhythm

generally found at lower levels with the lower rhythm generally found at higher levels we couple bottom-up initiative with top-down intent; by synchronising the general or larger efforts on the highest level with particular activities conducted at lower levels we achieve a vertical and horizontal harmony within the organisation

• Strategy as Rules – by defining a few critical strategic processes delineated only by a few parameters in the form of simple rules we define directions without confining them; by establishing a simple focus aimed at increasing flexibility we create an abundance of opportunities from which the best can be captured, exploited, or dropped should they fail to develop accordingly

• Strategy as Patches – by exploiting internal tensions through constant adjustments we become able to constantly re-map onto evolving opportunities; by deforming the surface of the landscape through selfish optimisation we exploit the underlying dynamism and despite the errors made during the process we can eventually find good enough strategic directions

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Strategies and the ContinuumStrategies and the Continuumof Warof War (Jobbagy)(Jobbagy)

Means

Ends


Physical

Psychological

As Engineering(‘synchronisation’)

As Mission(‘self-synchronisation’)

As Rules(‘de-synchronisation’)

As Patches(‘a-synchronisation’)

(Systemic)

Non-linearity

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Usefulness & UselessnessUsefulness & Uselessness of EBO of EBO(Confusing Causation with Correlation)(Confusing Causation with Correlation)

• Despite references to CAS most assumptions of effects-based operations resemble attributes of prescriptive thinking since the supporting assumption is that war displays order and equilibrium, the possibility for rational choice, and the ability to steer and control events

• Undoubtedly, war can be described in general terms using causal relationships but anything that goes beyond the immediate spatial and temporal horizon cannot be predicted with any great accuracy. Everything is interrelated and all we can attain is nothing more than a partial interpretation

• During turbulent times in which orientation becomes difficult humans increasingly turn to panaceas for advice. Thus if we do not understand or can cope with challenges we often look for simple or simplistic solutions that promise a quick help

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‘‘True’ Nature of WarTrue’ Nature of War(Clausewitz, Liddel Hart)(Clausewitz, Liddel Hart)

• Probably the most important message effects-based operations have is that instead of focusing on certain predefined desired effects we should rely on the ability to respond consistently to the unpredictable nature of war

• Complex adaptive systems are open and dynamic, which indicates the possibility of several different futures and the impossibility to rely only on mechanical, deductive systemic analyses aimed at detecting causality

• War requires that we evolve rapidly in order to handle dynamic and changing situations instead of focusing on anticipated circumstances and conditions that come as a result of single and rigid prescriptive models

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• Successful commanders have always realised that it is possible to defeat the enemy but never uncertainty. Thus the greater the uncertainty the better it is to avoid tight control over subordinates. Out of need they accepted unpredictability and tried to make the best out of the situation.

• In the battle of Jena fought in 1806 Napoleon achieved one of his biggest victories, although he “… had known nothing about the main action that took place on that day; had forgotten all about two of his corps; did not issue orders to a third, and possibly to a fourth; was taken by surprise by the action of a fifth; and, to cap it all, had one of his principal subordinates display the kind of disobedience that would have brought a lesser mortal before a firing squad.”

Example: Example: NapoleonNapoleon and Jena – 1806 and Jena – 1806(Van Creveld)(Van Creveld)

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• Being successful means that “instead of fusing individual into a mass through the suppression of their individuality and the contraction of their thought, the lead … only has effect, lightning effect, in proportion to the elevation of individuality and the expansion of thought. For collective action it suffices if the mass can be managed; collective growth is only possible through the freedom and enlargement of individual minds. It is not the man, still less the mass, that count; but the many.”

• He essentially argued that regarding cause and effect relationships in war “bad means deform the end, or deflect the course thither” and concluded that “if we take care of the means the end will take care of itself.”

Being on the ‘Edge’Being on the ‘Edge’ of War of War(Liddel Hart)(Liddel Hart)

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The End – Questions?The End – Questions?

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Analysing the Nature of War : Past , Present , and Future

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