An evaluation of the An evaluation of the Defence White Paper 2009Defence White Paper 2009

Peter AbigailPeter Abigail

Rod LyonRod Lyon

Defence White Paper Policy AlignmentDefence White Paper Policy Alignment

OperationalOperationalCommitmentsCommitments

StrategicStrategicPolicyPolicy

DefenceDefenceCapabilityCapability

Finance &Finance &ManagementManagement

•Priority

Priority

•A

ffordability

Affordability

•AffordabilityAffordability

•EfficiencyEfficiency

What do we want our military to do?How do we want to shape the strategic environment?

What is affordable?What is required?

What is our experience?

•Req

uire

men

ts

Req

uire

men

ts

•Fea

sibi

lity

Feas

ibili

ty

•ReflectReflect

•ShapeShape

•Feasib

ility

Feasib

ility

•Sh

ape

Sh

ape

•PriorityPriority

•EfficiencyEfficiency

Defence White Paper 2009Defence White Paper 2009

Politics, themes, identityPolitics, themes, identity

Political ‘location’Political ‘location’

• an overdue WPan overdue WP– 3 DUs intruding onto the strategic ‘space’3 DUs intruding onto the strategic ‘space’

• rising concern about mismatchesrising concern about mismatches– between strategy, capability, and financesbetween strategy, capability, and finances

• a new ALP government, writing a WP after a new ALP government, writing a WP after 8 years of GW Bush8 years of GW Bush– counterfactual: what if a re-elected Howard counterfactual: what if a re-elected Howard

government had written it?government had written it?

Howard’s legacyHoward’s legacy

• despite ET and WP2000, John Howard despite ET and WP2000, John Howard better remembered for post-9/11 legacybetter remembered for post-9/11 legacy– his strategic proximity to US and Bushhis strategic proximity to US and Bush

– the ‘globalised’ ANZUS alliancethe ‘globalised’ ANZUS alliance• that took us into Afghanistanthat took us into Afghanistan

– a rise in army’s fortunesa rise in army’s fortunes

– his theoretical open-ness about ‘the his theoretical open-ness about ‘the privatisation of war’privatisation of war’

Labor’s prioritiesLabor’s priorities

• marginalise the Coalition on strategic marginalise the Coalition on strategic policy policy – reverse the more contentious elements of reverse the more contentious elements of

Coalition defence policyCoalition defence policy

– re-state the ‘classical’ strategic veritiesre-state the ‘classical’ strategic verities

• re-build the linkages between strategy, re-build the linkages between strategy, force development and moneyforce development and money– fiscal disciplinefiscal discipline

White Paper 2009White Paper 2009

• Title: Title: – Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific

century: Force 2030century: Force 2030

• tells you it’s more about strategy and force tells you it’s more about strategy and force development, than financesdevelopment, than finances– looking at the ‘strategic’ side herelooking at the ‘strategic’ side here

– Peter will say more on finances and force Peter will say more on finances and force developmentdevelopment

‘‘Restorational’ imperativesRestorational’ imperatives

• its key messages are ‘classical’ onesits key messages are ‘classical’ ones– the main role of ADF is to engage in the main role of ADF is to engage in

conventional combat against other armed conventional combat against other armed forcesforces

– Australia and its immediate neighbourhood Australia and its immediate neighbourhood are our top strategic prioritiesare our top strategic priorities

– maritime capabilities should be at the core of maritime capabilities should be at the core of our defence forceour defence force

• the ‘reversing Howard’ messagesthe ‘reversing Howard’ messages

Strategic coherenceStrategic coherence

• but does DWP09 tell a broader, coherent but does DWP09 tell a broader, coherent tale abouttale about– the security environment? (mainly Chapter 4)the security environment? (mainly Chapter 4)

– Australia’s role in the world? (Chapters 5, 6, Australia’s role in the world? (Chapters 5, 6, etc)etc)

• cautionary note: a WP is a public policy cautionary note: a WP is a public policy document, not the 10 commandmentsdocument, not the 10 commandments– beware reading too much into the documentbeware reading too much into the document

Weaker global trends?Weaker global trends?

• WP2000 identified two hallmarks of a WP2000 identified two hallmarks of a stable, positive global orderstable, positive global order– globalisation, andglobalisation, and

– US strategic primacyUS strategic primacy

• WP2009 shows more hesitancy about WP2009 shows more hesitancy about bothboth– fewer reliable ‘pillars’ in the global system?fewer reliable ‘pillars’ in the global system?

Globalisation?Globalisation?

• still ensuring closer linkages between still ensuring closer linkages between states and regionsstates and regions

• but crises—demographic, environmental, but crises—demographic, environmental, public health, TNC—are also globalised public health, TNC—are also globalised – increasing the prospects for conflictincreasing the prospects for conflict

• and the GFC still unfoldingand the GFC still unfolding

• so, a mixed picture of globalisation (cf so, a mixed picture of globalisation (cf WP2000)WP2000)

US strategic primacyUS strategic primacy

• 4.14: a big endorsement of continuing US 4.14: a big endorsement of continuing US strategic primacy—out to 2030strategic primacy—out to 2030

• 4.19: US strategic primacy will be 4.19: US strategic primacy will be ‘increasingly tested’‘increasingly tested’

• 6.23: US strategic primacy is being 6.23: US strategic primacy is being ‘transformed’ as economic changes re-‘transformed’ as economic changes re-distribute strategic powerdistribute strategic power

• so, a mixed picture of US primacyso, a mixed picture of US primacy

A multi-polar global order?A multi-polar global order?

• indeed, earlier in chapter 4, hints of a indeed, earlier in chapter 4, hints of a markedly different global ordermarkedly different global order– 4.3: we’re unlikely to see the emergence of a 4.3: we’re unlikely to see the emergence of a

rival to the network of liberal, market-based rival to the network of liberal, market-based economieseconomies

– 4.4: but the global order will become 4.4: but the global order will become increasingly multi-polarincreasingly multi-polar• driven by ‘changing patterns of…economic power driven by ‘changing patterns of…economic power

and political influence’and political influence’

The security environmentThe security environment

• so, globally, fewer fixed points of so, globally, fewer fixed points of reference, greater uncertaintiesreference, greater uncertainties– para 4.4: ‘many futures’para 4.4: ‘many futures’

– para 3.9: ‘strategic shocks should be para 3.9: ‘strategic shocks should be expected at some stage in the foreseeable expected at some stage in the foreseeable future’future’

– para 3.20: ‘the range of uncertainties is para 3.20: ‘the range of uncertainties is disconcertingly wide’disconcertingly wide’

The Asia-PacificThe Asia-Pacific

• a region ‘connected’ by economic growth a region ‘connected’ by economic growth and evolving security mechanismsand evolving security mechanisms

• but tensions where the interests of US, but tensions where the interests of US, China, Japan, India and Russia intersectChina, Japan, India and Russia intersect– US-China; US-Japan-China the keysUS-China; US-Japan-China the keys

• and China’s strategic future uncertainand China’s strategic future uncertain– 2 Chinas: ‘good’ China/‘bad’ China2 Chinas: ‘good’ China/‘bad’ China

Southeast AsiaSoutheast Asia

• paras 4.32 and 4.33: two pictures of Indonesiaparas 4.32 and 4.33: two pictures of Indonesia– ‘‘the stable, democratic state with improved social the stable, democratic state with improved social

cohesion’cohesion’

– ‘‘a weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable a weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable communal problems, poverty and failing state communal problems, poverty and failing state institutions’institutions’

• the second less likely than first, but plays upon the second less likely than first, but plays upon an enduring worry in Australian strategyan enduring worry in Australian strategy

• so, major uncertainties in both NEA and SEAso, major uncertainties in both NEA and SEA

South PacificSouth Pacific

• the one constant in a changing world!the one constant in a changing world!– 4.35: economic stagnation, political and social 4.35: economic stagnation, political and social

instability, weak governance, crime, natural instability, weak governance, crime, natural disasters, climate change worriesdisasters, climate change worries

• ‘‘enduring interests’ for Australiaenduring interests’ for Australia– geography, history, humanitarian and geography, history, humanitarian and

strategic reasonsstrategic reasons

The ‘afterthoughts’The ‘afterthoughts’

• the back end of Chapter 4 contains a the back end of Chapter 4 contains a series of disparate ‘add-ons’series of disparate ‘add-ons’– Middle East and Africa (troubled and violent)Middle East and Africa (troubled and violent)– South Asia and Afghanistan (and Indian South Asia and Afghanistan (and Indian

Ocean)Ocean)– Islamist terrorism ( a generational problem)Islamist terrorism ( a generational problem)– the growth of military capabilities in Asia-the growth of military capabilities in Asia-

Pacific and WMD worldwide (the odd man out Pacific and WMD worldwide (the odd man out in this list)in this list)

– new security concerns: climate change and new security concerns: climate change and resources security (uncertain consequences)resources security (uncertain consequences)

Australia’s strategic identityAustralia’s strategic identity

• what does the WP tell us about ourselves?what does the WP tell us about ourselves?– we take sovereignty and freedom of action we take sovereignty and freedom of action

seriouslyseriously– we’re still nervous about our neighbourswe’re still nervous about our neighbours

• 5.7: ‘what matters most is that they are not 5.7: ‘what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia’a source of threat to Australia’

– we’re nervous about US abandonment (4.17)we’re nervous about US abandonment (4.17)– we like rules-based orders at the global level, we like rules-based orders at the global level,

but trust power closer to our shoresbut trust power closer to our shores– we still think of our defence as ‘core issues we still think of our defence as ‘core issues

plus add-ons’plus add-ons’

Australia’s strategic interestsAustralia’s strategic interests

• Ch. 5: ‘abiding strategic interests’Ch. 5: ‘abiding strategic interests’– a secure Australia a secure Australia

– a secure immediate neighbourhood; a secure immediate neighbourhood;

– strategic stability in APac (first mention of strategic stability in APac (first mention of ‘security architecture’) ‘security architecture’)

– a stable, rules-based global security order a stable, rules-based global security order (four paras on UN rules with one on US (four paras on UN rules with one on US strategic-underpinning)strategic-underpinning)

Our strategic perspectiveOur strategic perspective

• in chapter 6 a specific disavowal of either in chapter 6 a specific disavowal of either a DoA or an ‘expeditionary’ viewa DoA or an ‘expeditionary’ view

• but clear geographical ‘layering’ of our but clear geographical ‘layering’ of our priorities priorities

• and only first two priorities, DoA and and only first two priorities, DoA and immediate region are actual force immediate region are actual force determinantsdeterminants– though other interests ‘enhance’though other interests ‘enhance’

Self-reliance, the policy centreSelf-reliance, the policy centre

• 6.16: ‘self-reliance, plus’6.16: ‘self-reliance, plus’– self-reliant in the direct defence of Australia self-reliant in the direct defence of Australia

and our unique interestsand our unique interests

– plus = ‘a capacity to do more when required’, plus = ‘a capacity to do more when required’, on shared strategic interests, within the limits on shared strategic interests, within the limits of resourcesof resources

• 6.20-6.22: won’t be self-reliant in critical 6.20-6.22: won’t be self-reliant in critical enablers, sensitive technologies, industryenablers, sensitive technologies, industry

And ANZUSAnd ANZUS

• a confusing picturea confusing picture– 6.32: we would only expect the US to come to our aid 6.32: we would only expect the US to come to our aid

where we were under attack from a major power (!)where we were under attack from a major power (!)

– 6.33 it’s the ‘enablers’ that are indispensable to us6.33 it’s the ‘enablers’ that are indispensable to us

– 6.34: ‘for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we are 6.34: ‘for as long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia’ (?)to deter nuclear attack on Australia’ (?)

• the document says nothing about when we the document says nothing about when we expect to go to the aid of our allyexpect to go to the aid of our ally– nor is our ANZUS commitment a force determinantnor is our ANZUS commitment a force determinant

Is an attack on Australia likely?Is an attack on Australia likely?

• no: 6.23 says we’re too remote from the no: 6.23 says we’re too remote from the world’s trouble spotsworld’s trouble spots

• 6.27 says we’ve been secure because of 6.27 says we’ve been secure because of US strategic primacyUS strategic primacy

• but para 3.8, and 5.6: but para 3.8, and 5.6: – major powers with different interests to ours major powers with different interests to ours

might encroach on our approachesmight encroach on our approaches

– more affluent, tech-savvy neighbours may more affluent, tech-savvy neighbours may erode our traditional advantageserode our traditional advantages

ADF tasksADF tasks

• deter and defeat attacks on Australiadeter and defeat attacks on Australia

• contribute to security and stability in South contribute to security and stability in South Pacific and East TimorPacific and East Timor

• contribute to military contingencies in Asia-contribute to military contingencies in Asia-PacificPacific

• and finally in support of global securityand finally in support of global security

What’s NOT a task?What’s NOT a task?

• being prepared to deploy to the ME, central and being prepared to deploy to the ME, central and South Asia, or Africa ‘to engage in ground South Asia, or Africa ‘to engage in ground operations against heavily armed adversaries operations against heavily armed adversaries located in crowded urban environments’located in crowded urban environments’– the ‘Fallujah option’ the ‘Fallujah option’

• we would only do that ifwe would only do that if– govt convinced ADF had the required capabilitiesgovt convinced ADF had the required capabilities

– Australian population supported such a deploymentAustralian population supported such a deployment

Force 2030Force 2030

• a large amount of hardware signalled in a large amount of hardware signalled in Chapter 9Chapter 9– definite numbers sit atop strategic—and definite numbers sit atop strategic—and

fiscal—uncertaintyfiscal—uncertainty– and 3.21 says they might need to be even and 3.21 says they might need to be even

bigger numbers in the futurebigger numbers in the future

• primarily a signal about ‘weight’: that primarily a signal about ‘weight’: that Australia is committed to being a ‘player’ Australia is committed to being a ‘player’ in 2030in 2030– 4 WPs and 7 elections away4 WPs and 7 elections away

The ‘relationships’ afterthought?The ‘relationships’ afterthought?

• Chapter 11: a different author?Chapter 11: a different author?– comes comes afterafter the core chapters the core chapters

• on the security environment, our strategic on the security environment, our strategic interests, our defence policy, our intended force interests, our defence policy, our intended force structurestructure

– and sandwiched between ADF readiness and and sandwiched between ADF readiness and Defence intelligenceDefence intelligence

• says relationships are ‘central’ to our says relationships are ‘central’ to our strategic posturestrategic posture– ‘‘internationalist’ in outlookinternationalist’ in outlook– where earlier chapters ‘nationalist’where earlier chapters ‘nationalist’

Strategy and identityStrategy and identity

• overall: some mixed messagesoverall: some mixed messages– an uncertain world:an uncertain world:

– where core stabilising influences at the global where core stabilising influences at the global level are weakeninglevel are weakening

– and Asian power balances are shiftingand Asian power balances are shifting

• Australia ‘hedging’ against adverse Australia ‘hedging’ against adverse outcomesoutcomes– but finding most of the ‘strategic weight’ for but finding most of the ‘strategic weight’ for

that policy in self-reliance? that policy in self-reliance?

Defence White Paper 2009Defence White Paper 2009

OperationalOperationalCommitmentsCommitments

StrategicStrategicPolicyPolicy

DefenceDefenceCapabilityCapability

Finance &Finance &ManagementManagement

•Coming to terms with shifting great power relativities: multiple plausible futuresComing to terms with shifting great power relativities: multiple plausible futures•Commitment to US Alliance: but foreshadows increased US expectationsCommitment to US Alliance: but foreshadows increased US expectations

•Strategy continuity: shaping, hedging, strategic weight, self relianceStrategy continuity: shaping, hedging, strategic weight, self reliance•Four key ADF tasks: recognition of linkages Four key ADF tasks: recognition of linkages

•Uncertainty: 5-year White Paper cycleUncertainty: 5-year White Paper cycle•GFC: the collapse of revenuesGFC: the collapse of revenues

•+2.5% for inflation to 2030+2.5% for inflation to 2030•Growth: +3% (ave) to 2018, +2.2% real to 2030Growth: +3% (ave) to 2018, +2.2% real to 2030

•Deferrals until 2016/17Deferrals until 2016/17•Improved preparedness managementImproved preparedness management

•Strategic Reform ProgramStrategic Reform Program•+$130b real to 2030+$130b real to 2030

•Confirmation of previous plans Confirmation of previous plans •Remediation of deficienciesRemediation of deficiencies

•Air force: fleet transitions, introductions, 100 JSFAir force: fleet transitions, introductions, 100 JSF•Army: regional focus, internal balance, ReservesArmy: regional focus, internal balance, Reserves

•Navy: replacements, more and more capableNavy: replacements, more and more capable•New capabilities: strike, information and emergentNew capabilities: strike, information and emergent

•Many decisions well downstreamMany decisions well downstream•Delivery capacity: DMO, industry, personnel?Delivery capacity: DMO, industry, personnel?

•Leadership in the near regionLeadership in the near region•Coalition contribution elsewhereCoalition contribution elsewhere

•Ground force exclusionsGround force exclusions

Uncertainty, not strategic epiphany - yetUncertainty, not strategic epiphany - yet

More money,More money,but later..….but later..….

More, butMore, butmuch later….much later….

Limited liabilityLimited liability

Some pegs in theSome pegs in thesands of uncertaintysands of uncertainty

ReservesReserves• Better integration and removing impediments to contributionBetter integration and removing impediments to contribution

• Enhance HRR – deployable and domesticEnhance HRR – deployable and domestic

• Army – more effective use of part-time components with options for:Army – more effective use of part-time components with options for:– Changed internal balanceChanged internal balance

– Increased utilityIncreased utility

– Repositories of high-end, longer lead time capabilitiesRepositories of high-end, longer lead time capabilities

• Air Force – an integrated total forceAir Force – an integrated total force

• Navy – surge for all force elementsNavy – surge for all force elements

• Focused (task-based) contributions and “sponsored Reserves”Focused (task-based) contributions and “sponsored Reserves”

• Implementation plan by end 2009Implementation plan by end 2009

• Strategic Reform Program:Strategic Reform Program:– Reserves costs +$40mReserves costs +$40m

– Expected savings $380m over the decadeExpected savings $380m over the decade

2030+………………2030+………………

2030+………………2030+………………

2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 20392009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039

White PaperFSRBudget AuditDCP

DWP DWP DWP DWP DWP DWPDWP DWP DWP DWP DWP DWP

Defence Planning HorizonDefence Planning Horizon

2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 ElectionsElections

1st Pass beyond 20161st Pass beyond 2016Future FrigateFuture FrigateLACMLACM

SatcomSatcom

BMDBMD MUAVMUAV

SealiftSealift

JCSEJCSE

DCP 2006-16 IOCDCP 2006-16 IOC

DefenceCapabilityPlan

Future SubmarineFuture Submarine

Offshore CombatantsOffshore CombatantsICT ReformICT Reform

Non-lethal weaponsNon-lethal weapons

JSF WeaponsJSF Weapons

MLHMLH

Selected DCP 2009 Selected DCP 2009 AdditionsAdditionsYOD/IOCYOD/IOC

Counter-IEDCounter-IED

DefencDefenceeFundingFunding

Average 3% real growthAverage 3% real growth Average 2.2% real growthAverage 2.2% real growth

$20b Strategic Reform Program$20b Strategic Reform Program

>$8b deferrals>$8b deferrals RecoveryRecovery

2.5% fixed indexation2.5% fixed indexation

Questions?Questions?