An Analysis of the Trade Regime in Senegal (2001) and UEMOA’s … · 2016. 7. 17. · Alberto...

ABSTRACT

This note evaluates Senegal’s trade regime in 2001 and UEMOA’s common exter-nal trade policies, using the methodology developed in Hinkle et al (2003). We findthat the trade regime was reasonably open. Its exchange regime and the avoidanceof NTB were international good practice. Senegal was also quite advanced in termsof the average import duties as well as the reimbursement of VAT to exporters. Onthe other hand, it used surcharges, exemptions, and other policies selectively toelevate the protection accorded to certain industries. It also failed to provide accessto duty-free inputs to exporters, which exacerbated the anti-export bias of the traderegime. Despite the remaining weaknesses, however, Senegal’s trade regime in2001 was the most open among the African countries to which the methodologydeveloped by Hinkle et al has been applied to date (although some countries thatwere evaluated previously have subsequently implemented reforms). Senegal’s traderegime would have been even closer to the international good practice if UEMOA’scommon trade policies were applied without deviations.

An Analysis of the Trade Regime in Senegal (2001) andUEMOA’s Common External Trade Policies

Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 67

The Africa Region Working Paper Series expedites dissemination of applied research and policystudies with potential for improving economic performance and social conditions in Sub-SaharanAfrica. The Series publishes papers at preliminary stages to stimulate timely discussion within theRegion and among client countries, donors, and the policy research community. The editorial boardfor the Series consists of representatives from professional families appointed by the Region’s SectorDirectors. For additional information, please contact Paula White, managing editor of the series,(81131), Email: [email protected] or visit the Web site: http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/index.htm.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s),they do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or thecountries they represent and should not be attributed to them.

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Administrator

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Africa RegionWorking Paper Series No. 67

An Analysis of theTrade Regime inSenegal (2001) andUEMOA’s CommonExternal Trade Policies

Alberto Herrou-AragonKeiko Kubota

June 2004

ii

The authors would like to thank Larry Hinkle and Francesca Castellani for valuable suggestionsand support which improved the paper substantially. Vargha Azad assisted with the research,and Paula White prepared the document for publication.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s), they donot necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countries they repre-sent and should not be attributed to them.

Authors’Affiliation and Sponsorship

Alberto Herrou-Aragon,Economist, International Issues Foundation, Cordoba, ArgentinaEmail: [email protected]

Keiko Kubota,Economist, AFTP3, The World BankEmail: [email protected]

iii

Contents

Introduction 1

Foreign Exchange Regimes and Controls 3

Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Barriers on Imports 4

Discriminatory Domestic Taxation 4

Tariff Regime 4

Preferential Arrangements 4

Common External Tariffs 5

Surtaxes and Other Deviations from the UEMOA Regime 5

Tariff Rates 6

Escalation Effects 7

Tariff revenues 9

Exemptions 9

Effective Protection Rates 10

Inefficiencies in Customs Administration 11

Export Regime 12

The B Index 13

Comparison with Other Methods 15

Conclusion 17

List of Tables

Table 1: Tariff and Surcharges

Table 2: Unweighted Average Nominal Protection Tax Rates on Import-competing Goods

Table 3: Tariff Collections

Table 4: Effective Protection Rates

Table 5: B and B* Indices

iv

An analysis of the trade regime in Senegal (2001) and UEMOA’s common external trade policies

Table 6: Contribution of Each Policy Instrument to the Anti-Export Bias in B Index

Table 7: Comparison to Other Methodologies

List of Annex Tables

Annex 1: Basic Economic Data

Annex 2:Table A.1: Foreign Exchange Regime and Controls

Table A.2: Summary of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs)

Table A.3: Summary of Import Monopolies

Table A.4: Discrimination against Imports through Domestic Indirect Taxation

Table A.5: Structure of Tariff Regime

Table A.6: Tariff Regimes

Table A.7: Unweighted vs. Output-Weighted Average NPTRs

Table A.8: Escalation of Trade Barriers by Economic Use

Table A.9: Revenue Collection

Table A.10: Composition of Nominal Protection Rates

Table A.11: Effective Protection Rates (EPRs)

Table A.12: Perceptions of Corruption Index

Table A.13: Export Regime

Table A.14a: B Index

Table A.14b: Components of B Index (numerator)

Table A.14c: Components of B Index (denominator)

Table A.15: B* Index

Table A.16: IMF 1997 Classification Scheme for Overall Trade Restrictiveness

Table A.17: IMF 2000 Classification Scheme for Tariff Restrictiveness

Table A.18: Major Exports

Table A.19: Major Import-Competing Industry Output

List of Figures

Figure 1: Recent Economic Performance

Figure 2: Exchange Rates

1

Senegal, the second largest economy in the western CFA franc zone afterCôte d’Ivoire, experienced a period of solid economic growth of 5.3 percent

This note analyzes the trade regime of Senegal in 2001, using the methodol-ogy developed in How Far Did Africa’s First Generation Trade ReformsGo? An Intermediate Methodology for Comparative Analysis of Trade Poli-cies by Hinkle et al (2003), hereafter the methodology. This report is de-signed to be self-contained but readers are referred to the original paper fordetailed explanations of the methods as well as the derivations of the vari-ables used in the evaluation. Since the thirteen countries in the original sample(hereafter the original sample),1 the methodology has been applied to Chileand Bolivia as a benchmarking exercise because they are developing coun-try examples of good practice in trade policies. Senegal (2001) constitutesthe first new African country-year observation to which the methodology isapplied. As such, this note serves both as a prototype which future applica-tions of the methodology will follow and as a vehicle to introduce a fewrefinements to the methodology. The data for this study were obtained fromthe Senegalese authorities, and the calculations presented are staff estimatesunless otherwise noted.

Introduction

An Overviewof EconomicPerformanceand TradeReforms

1 The countries in the original sample are Benin (1996), Burkina Faso (1996), Cameroon(1996), Côte d’Ivoire (1996), Ghana (1996), Malawi (1995), Mali (1997), Senegal (1996),South Africa (1996), Tanzania (1996), Uganda (1997), and Zimbabwe (1997).

0

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2

3

4

5

6

7

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

real exports real imports real GDP

US$ mn(const '95)

Figure 1: Recent Economic Performance

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2 Other countries in the original sample have also implemented trade reforms since then,and some may very well have more open regimes now than when they were analyzed last.

per year or 2.6 % in per capita terms since 1996, the year in which its traderegime was evaluated last using the methodology (see figure 1). Macroeco-nomic stability had been restored since the devaluation of the CFA franc in1994, with its fiscal and balance of payments deficits at manageable levels,and inflation and growth of public debt under control. However, this growthin a relatively healthy macroeconomic environment had not resulted in alarge reduction in poverty: sixty-three percent of the population lived belowthe poverty threshold, according to the African Competitiveness Report (WEF2000). A low rate of investment (19% of GDP in 2001) is likely to be one ofthe reasons for the economic growth not contributing to creating employ-ment, and ultimately to poverty reduction.

Senegal’s imports and exports of goods and non factor services (in con-stant US$ terms) grew at an annualized rate of 5.4 percent and 5.8 percentrespectively since 1996. Throughout this period, imports were roughly 20percent larger than exports, which partly reflects the receipt of developmentaid. The ratio of trade (imports plus exports) to GDP increased slightly from70 percent in 1997 to 74 percent in 2001, but this is not as high as it was in1990 (82 percent).

Senegal is the largest exporter of groundnuts in Africa, and also a largeexporter of phosphates. The share of “traditional exports,” defined as thethree largest export commodities as a share of merchandise exports, declinedfrom roughly 50 percent in 1980 to less than 30 percent in 2001, whichcould be interpreted as a healthy sign of diversification.

In 1996, Senegal’s trade regime was moderately open with almost noquantitative restrictions but with higher average import duties than othercountries in the sample. Since 1996, Senegal implemented trade reformsthat resulted in liberalization in general and an important reduction of effec-tive protection rates on the import-competing sectors in particular. Senegal’strade regime in 2001 compares favorably to the regimes in the originalsample.2 Senegal (2001) had four official tariff rates (0, 5, 10, and 20), whichwould have been the best practice among the original sample. The maxi-mum, average, and dispersion of tariff rates in 2001 were below the medianobservation in the original sample, although they were not quite as low asthose in the most open countries. In contrast, Senegal’s effective protectionrates of import-competing manufacturing and agricultural sectors in 1996were among the highest in the original sample but in 2001, it was well belowthe median for the manufacturing sector and comparable to the median forthe agricultural sector.

3

An Overview of Economic Performance and Trade Reforms

3 Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine is a monetary and customs union with 8members : Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, andTogo.

Many of Senegal’s reforms were introduced in the context of adoptingUEMOA3 common trade policies. The design of the UEMOA customs unionwas conceived in the late 1990s based in part on the experience of CentralAfrican Economic Monetary Community, which was launched in 1994. TheUEMOA common external tariffs were introduced in Senegal and othermember countries in January 2001. A full implementation of the UEMOAcommon external tariffs will require an elimination of all exemptions otherthan those recognized by the common investment code (which had not beenagreed upon at the time of this writing) as well as all unauthorized surcharges.If the UEMOA common external tariffs are implemented without deviations,the anti-export bias in Senegal’s trade regime will be reduced further. Theexisting disincentives to produce exports would also be mitigated if a systemdesigned to allow exporters access to duty free inputs is implemented prop-erly.

Components of the trade regime used for applying the methodology,namely, foreign exchange regime, non-tariff barriers, discriminatory domes-tic taxation, tariff regime, and export policies, are discussed below in theorder in which they were addressed in Hinkle et al (2003). Along with the2001 and 1996 observations, we also report what the values of each policyindicators would have been if the UEMOA common external tariffs wereimplemented without deviations, and those of the benchmark countries, Bo-livia (2001) and Chile (2001). Note that even if the UEMOA policies werefollowed strictly, the policy indicators would not be identical in every mem-ber of the UEMOA, because trade structures as well as the classifications ofgoods differ across member countries (this point is discussed in more detailin section 5). The presentation of an overall measure of the trade regime (Bindex) follows the discussions of individual policy indicators. In order toprovide comparison, tables containing data of all original sample countriesare in the appendix.

Foreign ExchangeRegimes andControls

Little had changed between 1996 and 2001 in Senegal’s foreign exchangeregime: it continued to be international good practice. Its currency, the CFAfranc, was fully convertible for current transactions, as obligated by IMF’sArticle VIII to which Senegal is a signatory. France continued to support theconvertibility of the CFA franc, as it had done since Senegal’s independence.There was no difference between the market and official exchange rates.Capital transactions were free between Senegal and France but required ap-proval between Senegal and the rest of the world. The only difference from

4


Figure 2: Exchange Rates

0

30

60

90

120

150

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 20010

0.0005

0.001

0.0015

0.002

0.0025

Indexincrease=appreciation

US$/ CFA f

Devaluation ofCFA franc againstFrench franc

Real Effective Exchange Rate (left scale, 1990=100) US$/ CFA franc (right scale)

the 1996 regime was that the CFA franc is pegged to the euro at 655.957CFA franc per euro as opposed to the French franc (at an equivalent rate).

As is well known, CFA franc was highly over-valued prior to the 50percent devaluation against the French franc in 1994, which marked the turn-ing point for the currency and the countries that used it. The real effectiveexchange rate depreciated 25 percent in 1994. It was on a gradual deprecia-tion path between 1986 and the devaluation, and this trend continued since,after the shock of the devaluation subsided. This gradual depreciation, ow-ing to sustained low inflation rates, tends to counter somewhat the overallanti-export bias in the trade policies.

QuantitativeRestrictions andOther Non-TariffBarriers onImports

In 2001, there continued to be no quantitative restrictions (import or export)except for 7 products, which were subject to inspection for health reasons.Import and export licensing had also been eliminated, but traders are re-quired to obtain identification cards.

No official import monopolies remained in Senegal although marketimperfections gave quasi-monopolistic power to some export parastatals, suchas SONACOS (groundnut company). See the export section below.

DiscriminatoryDomesticTaxation

The only domestic tax (on the books) that discriminated against imports wasthe “droit d’accises” on cigarettes, which is 30% on imported cigarettes butonly 15% on domestic ones. This regime had not changed since 1996, and

5

Discriminatory Domestic Taxation

4 In 2001, capital goods (according to BEC) entering Senegal faced 9% import duties onaverage. The common external tariff gives zero tariff rate to capital goods that are notproduced locally, and the list of eligible capital goods (as for all other types of goods) wassubject to intense negotiations among UEMOA members. This process probably led togranting extensive exemptions to capital goods under investment code for those that werenot eligible for the zero rate category (see the paragraph on exemptions below).

was in violation of an UEMOA directive (03/98/CM/UEMOA) as the “droitd’accises” had since been harmonized within the UEMOA. In addition, a20% tax (TDP or Taxe degressive de protection) on cigarettes were levieduntil it was suspended in 2002. However, according to Olarreaga (2001),there were pressures from the domestic industries to revive it, along withthose on milk, matches, and a number of other products.

Tariff Regime

Preferential Arrangements

In 2001, Senegal was supposed to have granted (limited) duty-free access tothe fellow members of UEMOA. Collected import duties excluding VAT onimports from UEMOA countries averaged 10 percent, about two thirds ofthe rate applied to extra-regional imports (14%). The collection rate wasnowhere close to zero (as it should be if the trade was truly duty-free) fortwo main reasons. First, intra-regional free trade is currently granted onlyfor raw products and goods that were on the positive list, agreed to by allUEMOA members and subject to rules of origin requirements. Second, thedata at our disposal do not distinguish between imports of goods originatingfrom the UEMOA countries and re-exports transiting through them. The sec-ond problem makes it difficult to evaluate how well the intra-regional freetrade functioned. Olarreaga (2001) reports that UEMOA was aiming for anintroduction in 2004 of a new rules of origin system based on best practices.

Even including the re-exports, imports from the UEMOA members rep-resented less than 3% of total imports. There were just 15 tariff lines forwhich the UEMOA member(s) was the sole exporter to Senegal. Since theintra-regional trade was such a small part of Senegal’s over all trade, we didnot conduct an extensive analysis on the impact of the preferential treatmentof intra-UEMOA trade for the purpose of this study.

Common External Tariffs

Senegal’s import tariffs are determined in principle by UEMOA’s commonexternal tariff, which has four rates: 0% for socio-cultural and scientific goods,agricultural inputs, capital goods4 and computer and data equipment notavailable through local production; 5% for raw materials, crude oil, and ce-reals for industrial use; 10% for intermediate goods, diesel and fuel oil, and

6


5 The purpose of this community tax is to compensate UEMOA members for tariff revenuelosses associated with the implementation of the common external tariffs.

6 The average tariff rate is computed by taking the tariff revenues that are actually collectedfor each tariff line (HS 10 digits) divided by the value of imports. This quotient is thenadjusted for exemptions as follows. As we are interested in estimating the impact of tradepolicies on domestic prices, we treat the exemptions granted for imports of consumergoods as rents accruing to the beneficiaries and, as a result, not having a significant effecton domestic prices and resource allocation across activities as long as the same good wasimported under the MFN (that is, non-exempt) regime. Therefore, for the purpose of com-puting the unweighted and import-weighted average tariffs (but not for computing the

other cereals; and 20% on consumer goods. In addition to the common ex-ternal tariffs, there are statistical and community taxes5 of 1% each on allimports (even on 0 rated imports unless exempted specially). The complica-tion of the common external tariff arises from UEMOA’s classification, whichdiverges from the basic economic classification (BEC), with the (not acci-dental) result of all import-competing goods tending to be classified “con-sumer” goods regardless of what the BEC dictates. Moreover, the classifica-tion used in each member country differs from one another, reflecting therange of import-competing goods produced in each economy.

Surtaxes and Other Deviations from the UEMOA Regime

Senegal deviated from UEMOA’s common regime in a number of ways. Onthe books, there was a 20% surtax on imports of onions, potatoes, bananas,cigarettes, and rice and a 10% surtax on some cereal products such as milletand sorghum. According to Olarreaga (2001), there were also some 800 tar-iff lines (out of the total of roughly 6000) in Senegal’s tariff schedule that donot have corresponding lines in UEMOA’s. In 2001, approximately 180 bil-lion CFA franc (14 percent of total imports) worth of goods were importedunder tariff lines that had no correspondence in the UEMOA schedule (400tariff lines in total). The average tariffs and surcharges collected on thesegoods was 13 percent, or slightly lower than the overall average. The cus-toms revenues (border levy including tariffs and all surcharges but excludingVAT and excise tax) collected on these products represented more than 14percent of the total customs revenues. In addition, according to the data col-lected by the customs, there were other deviations from the UEMOA regimethat cannot be explained by the official policies. For example, the officialmaximum trade tax is 42% with the maximum CET (20%), surcharge (20%)and statistical and community taxes (2%) but in reality, the border levy oncotton imports (excluding VAT and excise tax) in 2001 was about 52%. De-spite these unexplained surcharges, Senegal’s unweighted average tariff rate(collected rate adjusted for exemptions6 ) in 2001 at 14.4% turned out to be

7

Tariff Regime

Table 1: Tariff and Surcharges

Unweighted average tariff &sc on all Unweighteddutiable imports by economic use (BEC) Import- average NPTR

weighted on all import-Maximum Consumer Intermediate Capital All average competing

Year tariff &sc goods goods goods goods tariff &sc goods

1996 75.0 35.6 16.0 12.4 19.5 14.6 46.6

2001 52.0 23.3 12.6 8.8 14.4 11.2 26.4

UEMOAa 22.0 20.3 13.3 10.1 14.8 11.7 19.7

Good practice benchmarks (2001)

Bolivia 10.0 9.8 9.8 6.9 9.3 8.0 10.0

Chile 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 12.6a UEMOA row indicates what the rates would have been if the CET were applied correctly. The UEMOA tariff rates are higher than the actual rates in 2001 because Senegal granted

extensive exemptions to intermediate and capital goods.

collection rate), we treat duty-exempt consumer goods as if they had paid the full duty. Incontrast, the exemptions granted to firms for imported inputs and capital goods are, ingeneral, aimed at giving additional effective protection to import-competing activities.Such exemptions create a two-tier price system by which firms receiving the exemptionscan benefit from lower prices on their imported inputs vis-à-vis excluded firms. There-fore, we use the actual duties paid to compute the average tariff rates on intermediate andcapital goods. For more details, see Hinkle et al (2003).

slightly lower than the unweighted average UEMOA common external tariffrate, 14.8%. The rate implemented by Senegal was lower than that stipulatedby the UEMOA common external tariff rate because there were more than200 tariff lines for which Senegal granted complete exemptions (more dis-cussion on exemptions to follow).

Tariff Rates

Even with the official and unofficial deviations from the UEMOA commonexternal tariffs, however, Senegal’s trade regime was much less restrictivethan it used to be. Tariffs were lower in 2001 than in 1996 in every waymeasured. First, the maximum tariff and surcharges declined from 75% to52%. This rate was still much higher than 22% that is sanctioned by theUEMOA rules but was a sizable step in the right direction. Second, theunweighted average tariff &sc rate decreased by 5 percentage points to 14.4%.This was roughly equal to 14.8% that should prevail if UEMOA CET wereapplied correctly. Third, the import-weighted average tariff rate declined from15% to 11%. Fourth, tariffs on capital, intermediate, and consumer goodswere 9%, 13%, and 23% respectively in 2001, down from 12%, 16%, and

8


7 We define the nominal protection tax rate (NPTR) as the rate of protection accorded to thedomestic import-competing industries through tariffs, surcharges, and discriminatory in-direct taxes. The NPTR plus the tariff equivalent of non tariff barriers (NTBs) is the morefamiliar nominal protection rate (NPR). As Senegal imposes no NTBs, their NPTR andNPR coincide.

36% in 1996 (the UEMOA rules dictate 2%, 12%, and 22% respectively butthe correspondence is not exact because of the differences in the UEMOAand basic economic classification (BEC)). Fifth, the nominal protection taxrates on domestically produced import-competing goods,7 which were muchhigher than the tariff rates on overall imports, declined from 47% to 26%between 1996 and 2001 (see Table 2).

When Senegal’s trade regime is compared against the benchmark goodpractices of Chile (2001) and Bolivia (2001), it is clear that its tariff barriersare still quite high despite the progress. Senegal’s 52% tariff peak, or eventhe one sanctioned by UEMOA (22 %), was substantially higher than thosein Bolivia and Chile. All other tariff measures and the nominal protectionrates of Senegal and UEMOA exceeded those of Bolivia and Chile, some ofthem by substantial margins.

Escalation Effects

The average tariff rates escalated at about the same speed in 2001 as they didin 1996: the unweighted average tariff on consumer goods was about threetimes as high as that on capital goods in both years. This is in fact a progress,as the standard deviation of tariff rates was down from 17 to 10 (it should be7 under the UEMOA rules). The unweighted average nominal protection taxrate on import-competing consumer goods was about 20% higher than thaton capital goods in 2001. The escalation was steeper in 1996 when the NPTRon consumer goods was about 32% higher than that on capital goods.

Under the UEMOA common external tariffs (CET), the nominal protec-tion tax rate on capital goods are higher than that on consumer goods be-cause the definition of capital goods under the UEMOA rules differed quitedramatically from that under the basic economic classification (BEC). In-deed, among the goods produced domestically, there was only one good thatBEC identified as a capital good (metal can), and it was classified as a con-sumer good under the CET. Other capital goods (not produced domestically)according to BEC had high rates (i.e. classified as consumer goods), whichis likely to have been a major reason why much of the imported capital goodswere granted exemptions under the investment code (the issue of exemp-tions are discussed further in section 5.7).

As was the case in 1996, the weighting method (unweighted versus out-put-weighted) did not make a large difference in the averages. Among the

9

Tariff Regime

Table 2: Unweighted Average Nominal Protection Tax Rates on Import-competing Goods

Standarddeviation of NPTR

All import- on all import-Consumer Intermediate Capital competing competing

Year goodsa goods goods goods goods

Unweighted

1996 51.7 31.9 29.5 46.6 18.9

2001 28.6 21.9 23.0 26.4 9.2

UEMOA 21.4 15.6 22.0 19.7 5.3


Bolivia 10.0 10.0 7.0 9.4 1.9

Chile 12.6 9.3 8.0 10.7 9.3

Output-weighted

1996 52.1 34.7 35.0 44.9

2001 29.5 25.5 23.0 27.6

UEMOA 21.6 15.7 22.0 19.8


Bolivia 10.0 10.0 7.4 10.0

Chile 10.2 8.9 8.0 9.5a Using basic economic classification

8 We refer here to the economic use as defined in basic economic classification (BEC).

original sample, the output-weighted average NPTR was about 20% higherthan the unweighted average in countries with relatively complex domesticproduction, namely South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire, but not in countries withrelatively few import-competing sectors, one of which was Senegal (see AnnexTable A18 for major import-competing industries). Hence, we only reportthe effective protection rates and B index computed using the unweightedaverages in sections below for the ease of exposition (output weighted aver-ages are available from the authors upon request).

Despite the progress, Senegal’s NPTRs (and those sanctioned by UEMOA)were more distortionary than those in Bolivia and Chile in three main ways.First, as discussed in the previous subsection, the levels were much higherthan those in either Bolivia or Chile. Second, the NPTRs exceeded tariffs bylarger margins than they did in the benchmark countries. These margins areindications of the extent to which the government used trade policies selec-tively, presumably for protection purposes, on goods with domestic produc-tion. Third, the escalation of rates depending on economic use8 in terms ofpercentage point differences was more pronounced in Senegal than in Bo-livia or Chile, although it was smaller in terms of percentage difference.

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Table 3: Tariff Collections

Tariff & sc Tariff & sc Non-dutiable Exemptions asrevenues as revenues as imports as % % of dutiable All Dutiable Collection

Year % of GDP % of tax revenues of total imports imports imports imports percentageb

1996 4.2 25.6 2.2 16.8 14.2 14.5 88.6

2001 3.7 20.7 13.0 16.5 9.7 11.0 83.4

UEMOAc 4.0 21.9 13.0 0 9.9 11.4 100


Bolivia 1.1 6.6 3.6 0 5.5 5.7 100

Chile 2.0 11.6 0.3 0 5.4 5.4 100a Collection rate is the ratio of all tariff revenues to the value of imports.b Collection percentage is the ratio of actual to potential revenues where the potential revenue is the sum of foregone and actual revenues collected from dutiable imports. Foregone

revenues are computed by multiplying the total value of exemptions by the import-weighted average tariff & sc rates (minus any revenues collected from partially-exemptimports).

c We assume no exemptions are granted under the UEMOA rules but that this does not change the import quantities or the GDP.

Collection ratea

Tariff revenues

The government of Senegal appears to be becoming less dependant on tariffrevenues as a source of income. At about 21% of total tax revenues, revenuesfrom tariffs and other surcharges on imports in 2001 were a less importantsource of revenue to the government than they were in 1996 when the gov-ernment collected approximately 26% of its tax revenues from this source.Tariff revenues as a share of GDP was 3.7% in 2001, down from 4.2% in1996. Among the original sample, Senegal in 1996 was more dependent ontariff revenues than many. Only Mauritius (1996) and Burkina Faso (1996),at roughly 33% and 28% of tax revenues, respectively, relied more on tariffrevenues than Senegal. Even at 21% of tax revenues, Senegal in 2001 wasstill more reliant on tariff revenues than most countries in the original sample,and much more so compared to Bolivia (2001) and Chile (2001). The gov-ernment of Senegal would have collected even more tariff revenues if it didnot grant as many exemptions: it forwent 17% of potential revenues, roughly20 billion CFA franc or US $30 million (see Table 3).

Exemptions

The share of non-dutiable imports, which are goods imported by the govern-ment, NGOs, embassies, and so forth, climbed from 2% of total imports in1996 to 13% in 2002. We have not been able to identify the reasons for thisjump. It could be that bilateral and multilateral aid projects increased dra-matically in this period, or that the two estimates are not consistent. In con-trast, exemptions, which are dutiable imports but are imported with no orreduced duties for various reasons (investment promotion, political favors,

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Tariff Regime

and so forth), stayed roughly the same at about 17% of dutiable imports.About 70% of duty-exempt imports were associated with concessions grantedunder Senegal’s national investment code. Since the official tariff rate ap-plied to capital goods that are not produced locally is 0%, exemptions weregranted on capital goods with domestic competition or those with ambigu-ous classifications (such as beds for a hotel, which are normally considereda consumer good). Although the trade regime is moving in the right direc-tion, Senegal’s exemption rate remained higher than those of other countriesin the original sample, and dramatically higher than in Chile (2001) andBolivia (2001), which granted no exemptions at all. Discretionary grantingof exemptions for investment or any other purposes decreases transparencyand is one of the remaining weak areas in Senegal’s trade regime.

Effective Protection Rates

Effective protection rates (EPR) are computed in a number of ways in thisstudy. For import-competing sectors, we estimate them using the input-out-put table (IO table) as well as using an assumption that the domestic valueadded in manufacturing is 40% and in agriculture 88%. The EPRs usingstandard coefficients (the indicative EPRs) are estimated because we did nothave the IO tables for all of the original sample countries. In contrast, all theEPRs on exports are estimated using the IO table because we had reasonableguesstimates of input-output coefficients for all exports of the original sample,as they were not numerous. We were able to substitute the input-output coef-ficient of the good produced in a “comparable” country when we did nothave the IO table for the country in question. Obtaining input-output coeffi-cients, however, was not an issue for Senegal, as we have the IO table cre-ated in 1996.

The indicative EPR for the import-competing manufacturing sector halvedbetween 1996 and 2001, from 103 % to 51% while the EPR for agriculturedeclined by about 30 percent to 23%. The EPR for manufactured and agri-

Table 4: Effective Protection Rates

Import-competing

Manufactured Agriculture

Standard coefficient Based on Standard coefficient Based onYear (indicative rate) IO table (indicative rate) IO table Manufactured Agriculture

1996 103.3 72.2 32.1 31.1 –14.2 –3.4

2001 51.1 40.8 23.4 35.2 –19.9 -2.2

UEMOA 35.1 27.5 13.4 21.8 –11.7 –1.8

Good practice benchmarks

Bolivia 15.2 12.0 10.0 10.8 –2.0 –0.2

Chile 8.8 12.7 9.1 9.4 –1.9 –2.8

Exports

12


culture would be 35% and 13% if UEMOA’s common external tariffs wereapplied consistently. The EPRs are much higher than those in Bolivia (2001)and Chile (2001), whose effective rates of protection were not much higherthan their nominal rates, reflecting the flat tariff structure, no additionalcharges in the form of discriminatory indirect taxes (see also sections 5.3and 5.5), and absence of exemptions. When the estimates are based on theIO table, Senegal’s performance is better in both years, and the magnitude ofimprovement between two years is comparable. Even though the EPRs werestill quite high, they still constitute a good news as anti-agriculture bias hasdiminished considerably in the intervening 5 years.

The news was not so good in the export sector of manufactured goods, asthe negative incentives for the exporters deteriorated (became more nega-tive) for manufactured goods from –14% to –20%. This deterioration shouldbe interpreted with caution, because the estimates of the EPRs for the exportsector are not as robust as those for the import-competing sector as therewere only three categories of exportable manufactured goods (vegetable oils,other food, and chemicals) and one category of exportable agricultural goodsin the IO table. Even though these estimates are only rough indicators, disin-centives for Senegalese producers of manufactured goods to export wereclearly higher compared to those in Bolivia (2001) and Chile (2001).

The agricultural exporters were discouraged less, as the EPR improvedslightly from –3% to –2%. The EPR on agricultural exports was one areaSenegal performed better than Chile (2001), although not as well as Bolivia(2001).

Inefficiencies in Customs Administration

Perception of corruption, as measured by Transparency International’s in-dex, worsened slightly since 1996 from 3.3 to 2.9 (on a scale ranging from10 to 1 with 10 being the cleanest). While the change is not large, it is stilltroubling not so much because of a small decline but because there has notbeen a decisive change for the better. Senegal’s ranking has accordinglyslipped from 55th to 65th out of 91 countries surveyed. The score and rankingare disturbing when compared to Chile whose score and ranking in 2001were 7.4 or 18th, respectively, which are comparable to the scores for OECDcountries such as Germany and Ireland. On the other hand, Bolivia’s score at2.7 or 71st was considerably worse than many SSA countries’ includingSenegal’s.

This index is of course, a general perception of corruption, and only avery rough proxy for how the customs office is performing. Since opaqueand unpredictable customs administration is a grave impediment to trade,improvement in this area is highly desirable.

13

Export Regime

Export Regime Export monopolies and monopsonies

No official export taxes nor export monopolies were in place in 2001. Someresidual monopsony power for the groundnuts parastatal may have existedbecause the incumbents had first mover advantages over the newcomers.According to Olarreaga (2001), SONACOS had a near monopoly on thepurchase and processing of groundnuts due primarily to a credit market im-perfection, rather than official policies on groundnuts. Senegal is not a majorproducer of cotton, and there was no reported evidence that the cotton monop-sony (listed as a trade barrier in 1999, the last year for which we have data onquantitative restrictions) was causing distortions in the economy in 2001.

Access to duty and tax free inputs

On exporters’ access to duty free inputs, a range of instruments existed in2001. These included: (1) temporary duty free admission that requires firmsto export 80% of their production and to be established for more than 2years; (2) bonded warehouses (3) duty drawbacks; and (4) duty free zone,where preferential exemptions of taxes and import duties have been extendedto firms outside the zone. According to Olarreaga (2001), none of these re-gimes functioned successfully and very few firms actually used them. Forexample, the duty free zone of Dakar had 13 firms registered, of which 5were no longer in business. Duty drawbacks were used by a handful of firmsmainly in the apparel and textile sector. The delays in reimbursement and thehigh cost of credit were quoted as reasons why the drawback system was notused. This situation had not changed much since 1996, and therefore, wecontinued to assume that the duty exemptions for inputs to exports wereeffectively “0” for the purpose of computing the EPRs and the B index. Thecustoms authorities were reportedly discussing with the private sector imple-mentation of a regime that was better suited for exporters. The decline intariffs and surcharges on inputs (13% for manufacturing and 12% for agri-culture in 2001, down from 16% and 15% in 1996, respectively) mitigatedthis problem to a certain extent.

VAT reimbursement

In contrast, reimbursement of VAT paid on inputs to exporters was fairlyreliable and significant (as it was in 1996). Exporters were reimbursed withnon-interest bearing certificates for paying VAT that could be sold to otherVAT payers. In our calculations of the EPR on exports, we assume that 80%of VAT was effectively reimbursed, factoring in some delay and consideringthe certificates are non-interest bearing. Reimbursing VAT to exporters issomething that other SSA countries are having trouble implementing, andtherefore, is an aspect of Senegalese trade regime that is more advanced than

14


Table 5: B and B* Indices

B* indexa,c

Year B indexa,b Standard coefficient Based on IO table

1996 1.6 2.3 1.9

2001 1.4 1.8 1.7

UEMOA 1.3 1.4 1.4

Good practice benchmarks

Uganda 1997d 1.5 1.8 n.a.

Bolivia 2001 1.1 1.1 1.1

Chile 2001 1.1 1.2 1.2a All indices are calculated for manufacturing imports and all exports. For other ways of calculating the B and B* indices, see tables A12 and A13 in the Appendix. For more details,

see Hinkle et al (2003).b The denominator of the B index is a simple average of the tariff rates on inputs used in manufacturing and agricultural exports. It is assumed that inputs represent 60% of the value

of manufacturing production and 12% in the case of agricultural exports. In agricultural exports, it is further assumed that 4% of production value is accounted for by the use offertilizers and 8% by purchases of non fertilizer inputs.

c The B* indices are computed using the unweighted averages.d Uganda (1997) was the best performer in the original sample.

its neighbors. Both Chile and Bolivia have effective mechanism to reim-burse VAT (as well as import duties paid on inputs to exports). Castellani etal (2003) reports that Chilean exporters generally do not bother to demandreimbursement of import duties paid on inputs because they consider theadministrative costs outweigh the benefits. The difference between dysfunc-tional reimbursement mechanisms often found in SSA countries and the “un-used” system in Chile is that the amounts of the reimbursement at stake, andtherefore, the implied costs involved in obtaining the reimbursement, aremuch higher in SSA countries than in Chile because the tariff rates are muchhigher in most SSA countries than in Chile.

The B Index The B index defined

In this section, we present a summary measure of the degree of trade-restric-tiveness, using the B index, developed by Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati(1978). This index is computed as follows:

where Em/E

x is the ratio of nominal exchange rates applied to imports (m)

and exports (x), which is 1 in the case of Senegal; t is the average importduty, n is any additional differential domestic taxation of imports, PR is thedifferential between the domestic and border prices of importable commodi-ties subject to NTBs, which is 0 in the case of Senegal (2001), s is any

15

Export Regime

export subsidy (s>0) or export tax (s<0), tI is the taxes and duties on trad-

able inputs used in production of exportable goods (that is, the tax rate oninputs multiplied by the share of that input in total production costs), and ris any import duty rebate granted to producers of exportable goods (0 in thecase of Senegal).

This index can be computed using nominal protection rates or value addedprices: we call the first one the B index and the second the B* index. For theB index, we use the NPTR on manufacturing sector for t+n. The NPTR plusPR equals NPR. On the export side, there is no subsidy or tax, and an overallaverage for all exports is estimated for t

I (see footnote b of Table 5 and Ap-

pendix Table A13 for details). For the B* index, we use the EPR on themanufacturing sector for t+n+PR, and the EPR on the export sector for s-tI+r. We use the manufactured import-competing goods and all exports to

compute a representative B index because this measure is useful in under-scoring the biases against exports and agriculture. Since trade policies inSenegal, and in SSA countries in general, were designed primarily to protectthe import-competing manufacturing sector, we consider this measure as areasonable summary of the trade regime. For some countries (although notfor Senegal), however, the B index differed dramatically depending on thechoice of sectors used in computation, and therefore, we report other waysof computing the B and B* indices in Appendix Tables A13 and A14.

The B index

The B index declined from 1.6 in 1996 to 1.4 in 2001 (about a 13% reduc-tion). The greatest part of this progress is the result of the reduction in theaverage rate of nominal protection tax on import-competing manufacturingactivities, which underscores the importance of import tariffs on the anti-export bias. If the UEMOA common external tariff was applied without de-viation, the B index would have been 1.3. Even with the deviations from theUEMOA CET, the actual reduction in distortions Senegal managed by 2001was still enough to make its B index lower than that for Uganda (1997),which had the least distorted trade regime in the original sample. These re-sults are less encouraging when they are compared to 1.1 scored by the bench-mark countries. This B index is what would prevail if a country had a freetrade regime except for a 6-14 percent uniform tariff for revenue raisingpurposes (which indeed appears to be the policy adopted by Chile and Bo-livia). In sum, Senegal has made a good progress, but it still had some waysto go in reducing disincentives to export.

The remaining sources of anti-export bias, as measured by the B index,are summarized in Table 6. The second column of the table shows the actualvalue of each policy instrument in 2001, and the third column reports thereduction in the B index if that instrument had taken a free trade value (thatis, 1 for exchange rate, 100% for reimbursement of VAT and tariff on inputs,and 0 for all other instruments). The single largest contributor is the NPTR

16


Table 6: Contribution of Each Policy Instrument to the Anti-Export Bias in B Index

Policy instruments Value Contributiona

Em/Ex 1.00 —

NPTR on domestically produced goods (manufactured) 28.0 0.30

NTBs on manufacturing sector output 0 —

Taxes on export industry output 0 —

of which Taxes on manufactured export industry output 0 —

Taxes on agricultural export industry output 0 —

Tariffs &sc and taxes on inputs to exports 9.4 0.07

of which Duties and taxes on inputs to manufactured exports 9.6 0.07

of which Tariffs &sc on inputs 12.6 0.05

VAT on traded inputs 15 0.01

Duties and taxes on inputs to agricultural exports 1.5 0.01

of which Tariffs &sc on fertilizers 5.4 0.00

Tariff & sc on other agricultural inputs 12.3 0.01

VAT on fertilizers 0 —

VAT on other traded agricultural inputs 15 0.00

VAT reimbursement rate for exporters % 80 0.02

B Index 1.4a Contribution refers to by how much the B index would be lowered if the trade instrument was set to the free trade value. These figures do not add up to the amount by which

Senegal’s B index exceeds unity (0.4) because the equation for computing the B index is not linear.

on import-competing manufacturing goods, which accounted for three quar-ters of the anti-export bias: the B index would have been 1.1 if the nominalprotection tax rate on manufactured imports were 0. Second contributor, whichwas only a sixth of the largest, was the import tariffs levied on inputs tomanufactured exports.

The B* index

The B* index declined from 2.3 in 1996 to about 1.8 in 2001 (or from 1.9 to1.7 according to the estimates based on the IO table), representing a 22 %reduction in the anti-export bias. The B* index of Senegal (2001) is equiva-lent to that of the best performer in the original sample (again, Uganda 1997).Had the UEMOA common external tariffs been implemented fully, the B*index would have been 1.4, and the reduction in anti-export bias would havebeen 40%. As was the case with the B index, the B* index show that Senegal’santi-export bias (even if it implemented all UEMOA rules correctly) wasmuch more pronounced than those in Chile and Bolivia.

If the effects of corruption in customs administration are taken into ac-count, however, Senegal’s ranking is likely to worsen, as it had one of the

17

Export Regime

Table 7: Comparison to Other Methodologies

Hinkle et al (2003) a

Methodology B index B* index ACRb IMF c (1997) IMF c (2000)

1996 6.3 7.5 10 d 3 10

2001 4.0 5.2 Na 2 5

UEMOA 3.5 3.6 Na 2 3a Normalized so that undistorted value (1) equals 1 and the most distorted regime among the original sample (2.1 and 2.7 for B and B* indices, respectively) equals 10.b Normalized so that the most open (0) equals 1 and the least open (3) equals 10.c Both IMF methodology scores range between 1 and 10.d For 1999, the only observation available.

worst TI scores among the countries analyzed to date. Chile’s good tradepolicies will stand out even further when combined with its exemplary TIscore while Bolivia’s would be less impressive when the poor perception ofcorruption is factored in (see section 5.9).

Comparison withOther Methods

The IMF methodology

The IMF (1997) methodology classifies trade regimes using measures fortariff and nontariff barriers on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 (see Annex Table15). It classifies Senegal’s tariff regime in 2001 as “Relatively Open,” animprovement from “Moderate” in 1996 due to reduction in tariff barriersimplemented since 1996. The NTB regime was already “Open,” the bestavailable, in 1996. Overall, Senegal (2001) would be rated “2,” up from “3.”The IMF (2000) methodology is a variation of the IMF (1997) methodologywith a modification of the scales and the definition of tariff barriers (seeAnnex Table 16). According to this methodology, Senegal’s progress in tradeliberalization was even more impressive as it went from “10,” the worst clas-sification, to “5,” half way to the top classification. It should be noted thatthe IMF (2000) methodology is not terribly useful for comparing the perfor-mance among the original sample, as it gives “10” to all but three of theoriginal sample countries (Uganda and South Africa (5), and Cameroon (7))on account of high nominal protection tax rates and export taxes. When weconsider the time-series performance of Senegal, however, the IMF (2000)and the B* index (normalized to vary between 1 and 10) give a similar im-pression both in terms of openness level, and the progress made and couldbe made if the UEMOA rules are adopted correctly.

The Africa Competitiveness Report Methodology

The openness to trade sub-index of the Africa Competitiveness Report (2000)combines ten indicators, namely, average tariff rate, hidden import barriers,import barriers (whether they are a serious impediment to firms’ access to

18


raw materials and equipment), foreign exchange (whether it is readily avail-able at the official exchange rate), hard currency (whether it is readily avail-able for business needs), export position (whether it is a national priority),export credit and insurance (whether they are available at reasonable price),real exchange rate, exchange rate policy (whether it is favorable to exportexpansion), and exchange rate volatility. All these indicators except for theaverage tariff rates are based on the Executive Opinion Survey, which “cap-tures the perceptions of the leading investment and business decision-mak-ers worldwide – most of whom represent [World Economic] Forum’s mem-ber companies” (World Economic Forum 2000). The Africa Competitive-ness Report gives Senegal (1999) the “the least open” score (“3” in theirindex, and renormalized in Table 7 so that the scores vary between 1 and 10).It is not clear how the individual indicators are combined to arrive at theoverall openness subindex: Senegal ranked seventh or better in all indicatorsbut two, “hidden import barriers (22nd)” and “availability of export creditand insurance (13th)” but is ranked 23rd out of 24 African countries surveyedin 1999. Unfortunately, the 1999 observation is the only one available forSenegal so far. We consider this as a “pre-UEMOA reform” observation,which should be compared to our findings for 1996. It will be interesting toknow if a post-UEMOA reform observation (expected in 2003) will registera comparable improvement as it did in other methodologies.

The African competitiveness report also discusses the investment cli-mate of each country surveyed. According to the surveys conducted by theWorld Economic Forum on businesses operating in Africa, the most impor-tant factor by a considerable margin in determining levels of investment ispolitical and economic policy stability. The second was the tax system, fol-lowed by the adequacy of infrastructure. In addition, the deleterious effect ofcorruption on foreign businesses are also cited. As discussed in section 1,Senegal enjoyed a relatively stable political and economic policy environ-ment since 1994. However, its tax system was not the most attractive tobusinesses, as the corporate, personal income, value added, and employerpayroll tax rates were higher than most other countries surveyed. Perhapsnot surprisingly, businesses considered tax evasion as more wide-spread inSenegal than in other countries surveyed. As for adequate infrastructure, ofthe 15 questions asked, Senegal ranked in the top half among the 24 coun-tries surveyed for all but those pertaining to the quality of road infrastruc-ture, automobile per capita, and internet access and users. Consistent withthe observations made in section 5.9, the African Competitiveness Reportsurveys found perceived levels of corruption in the government as an ob-stacle to doing business in Senegal, more so than in other countries: busi-nesses tended to agree that irregular payments were demanded by the gov-ernment, that time to obtain permits was protracted, and that governmentregulations were not fully enforced.

Reflecting inter alia foreign businesses’ perceptions of investment cli-mate reported in the Africa Competitiveness Report, the foreign direct in-

19

Comparison with Other Methods

vestment entering Senegal in 2001 was 28.6 billion CFA franc, or 0.03 per-cent of GDP (IMF 2003). Although these figures are infamously unreliable,it is safe to conclude that it was miniscule. The dearth of investment inflowin addition to the low domestic investment (19 percent of GDP) is problem-atic. However, the current low rate of investment belies Senegal’s potentialto be attractive to foreign investors for several reasons: it has political andmacroeconomic stability; it is strategically located to act as a base to coverthe entire UEMOA zone; the quality of its infrastructure is higher than itsneighbors and; the available human resources are in a reasonable state. In-creasing investments will be one of the key challenges for Senegal to sustaineconomic growth.

Conclusion In 2001, Senegal’s trade regime was reasonably open. Its exchange regimeand the use of NTB were international good practice. It was also quite ad-vanced in terms of the average import tariffs as well as the reimbursement ofVAT to exporters. On the other hand, it used surcharges, exemptions, andother policies selectively to elevate the protection accorded to certain indus-tries. It also failed to provide access to duty-free inputs to exporters, whichexacerbated the anti-export bias of the trade regime. Despite the remainingweaknesses, however, there is no doubt that Senegal has made a large stridein opening its trade regime since 1996. Indeed, its trade regime in 2001 re-places Uganda (1997) as the best observed practice among the SSA coun-tries to which this methodology have been applied to date (although, as men-tioned earlier, other countries in the original sample have also implementedreforms since). This progress is not as encouraging when compared to bench-mark countries, Bolivia (2001) and Chile (2001). Senegal’s trade regimewould have been closer to the good practice if the UEMOA common tradepolicy is implemented by the book. It follows that other members of UEMOAare likely to have trade regimes similar to that of Senegal, and that the coun-tries with fewer deviations from the common trade policy would have smalleranti-export biases than Senegal.

20


References Bhagwati, J. 1978. Anatomy and consequences of exchange control regimes.Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.

Castellani, F. and A. Herrou-Arragon. 2004 forthcoming. “An analysis oftrade regime in Bolivia.” Africa Region Working Paper Series.

________. 2004 forthcoming. “An analysis of trade regime in Chile.” AfricaRegion Working Paper Series.

Hinkle, L., A. Herrou-Aragon, and K. Kubota. 2003. “How far did Africa’sfirst generation trade reforms Go? An intermediate methodology for com-parative analysis of trade policies.” The World Bank. Africa Region Work-ing Paper Series. 58a and 58b.

Integrated Framework. 2003. Diagnostic trade integration study: Senegal.International Monetary Fund. 2002. “Annual report on exchange arrange-

ments and exchange restrictions.”Krueger, A. 1978. Foreign trade regimes and economic development: liber-

alization attempts and consequences. New York: Ballinger PublishingCompany.

Olarreaga, M. 2001. “Senegal trade policy.” The World Bank mimeo.Pursell, G., 1998. “Cotton Policies in Francophone Africa,” The World Bank,

Washington, DC.Sharer, R. 1998. “Trade liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa.” In Iqbal and

Khan edd. Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa. Washing-ton, DC.

Subramanian, A., E. Gelbard, R. Harmsen, K. Elborgh-Woytek, and P. Nagy,2000. “Trade and Trade Policies in Eastern and Southern Africa”, IMFOccasional Paper #196, IMF, Washington, D.C.

Transparency International. 2002. “Perception of corruption index.” Pub-lished on their website: www.transparency.org.

World Economic Forum. 2000. “The Africa competitiveness report 2000/2001.” New York: Oxford University Press.

21

Annexes

Annex 1

Basic Economic Data

1980 1990 2000 2001 1980–90 1990–00 00–01

levels growth rates

Population (mn) 5.5 7.3 9.5 9.8 2.8 2.7 2.5

GDP at market prices (current US$, bn) 3.0 5.7 4.4 4.5 6.7 –2.6 1.8

GDP at market prices (current LC, bn) 631.0 1,551.5 3,112.3 3,386.5 9.4 7.2 8.8

GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$, bn) 3.1 4.2 5.8 6.1 3.1 3.4 5.8

Per capita GDP (current US$) 539.4 777.8 460.0 457.2 3.7 –5.1 –0.6

Per capita GDP (constant US$) 552.0 566.4 609.2 628.7 0.3 0.7 3.2

GNI per capita (current US$) 530.0 720.0 500.0 490.0 3.1 –3.6 –2.0

GDP deflator Index (1995 = 100) 41.0 75.0 109.0 111.0 6.2 3.8 1.8

Exports of goods and non–factor services f.o.b.(current US$, mn) of which 875.0 1,491.0 1,339.0 1,375.0 5.5 –1.1 2.7

Merchandise exports (current US$, mn) 480.0 912.0 959.0 992.0 6.6 0.5 3.4

Non–factor service exports (current US$, mn) 395.0 579.0 380.0 383.0 3.9 –4.1 0.8

Exports of goods and non–factor services(% of GDP) 29.3 26.2 30.5 30.8 — — —

Exports of goods and non–factor services(constant 1995 US$, mn) 956.0 1,485.0 1,968.0 2,097.0 4.5 2.9 6.6

Export as capacity to import (constant LC, bn) 228.2 386.3 425.2 456.0 5.4 1.0 7.2

Real growth of non–traditional exports — — — — — –2.6 4.4

Share of top 3 commodities in merchandise exports 47.0 41.0 30.0 27.0 –1.4 –3.1 –10.0

Imports of goods and services c.i.f. (current US$, mn) of which 1,302.0 1,728.0 1,729.0 1,747.0 2.9 0.0 1.0

Merchandise imports (current US$, mn) 1,105.0 1,335.0 1,500.0 1,678.0 1.9 1.2 11.9Non–factor service imports (current US$, mn) 197.0 393.0 229.0 69.0 7.2 –5.3 –69.9

Imports of goods and non–factor services(% of GDP) 43.6 30.3 39.4 39.1 — — —

Imports of goods and non–factor services(constant 1995 US$, mn) 1,548.0 1,928.0 2,306.0 2,426.0 2.2 1.8 5.2

Total trade (current $, mn) 2177.0 3219.0 3068.0 3122.0 4.0 –0.5 1.8

Total trade (constant $, mn) 2504.0 3413.0 4274.0 4523.0 3.1 2.3 5.8

Total trade % GDP 72.9 56.5 70.0 69.9 — — —

Terms of trade (goods and non–factor services)(1995 = 100) 100.0 109.0 90.0 91.0 0.9 –1.9 1.1

(continued on next page)

22


Basic Economic Data (continued)

1980 1990 2000 2001 1980–90 1990–00 00–01

levels growth rates

Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 12.0 14.0 20.0 20.0 — — —

Gross fixed capital formation(constant 1995 US$, mn) 448.0 600.0 988.0 1,034.0 3.0 5.1 4.7

Official exchange rate(LCU per US$, period average) 423.0 545.0 712.0 733.0 2.6 2.7 2.9

Real effective exchange rate index (1990 = 100) 108.0 100.0 56.0 56.0 –0.8 –5.6 —

Source: SIMA, Regional data base.

23

Annexes

Table A.1: Foreign Exchange Regime and Controls

Premium in theForeign Exchange

Country Year Foreign Exchange Restrictions (a) Parallel Market (b)

Benin 1996 Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 0per FF; current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions freebetween Benin and France but require approval between Benin and the rest of world.

Import Restrictions: No restrictions on import financing. No foreign exchange budget.

Export Restrictions: Repatriation of foreign exchange earnings within 180 days.

Côte d’Ivoire 1996 Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 per FF; 0current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions free between Coted’Ivoire and France but require approval between Cote d’Ivoire and the rest of the world.


Export Restrictions: Repatriation of foreign exchange earnings within 120 days.Exports of lumber and certain metals are subject to quantitative restrictions.

Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 per FF; 0current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions free betweenBurkina and France but require approval between Burkina and the rest of world.

Burkina Faso 1996 Import Restrictions: No restrictions on import financing. No foreign exchange budget.

Export Restrictions: Repatriation of foreign exchange earnings within 120 days.Exports and re-exports of certain products may require prior official authorization fromrelevant ministries.

Mali 1997 Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 per FF; 0current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions free between Maliand France but require approval between Mali and the rest of world.



Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 per FF;current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions free betweenSenegal and France but require approval between Senegal and the rest of world.

Senegal 1996 Import Restrictions: No restrictions on import financing. No foreign exchange budget. 0

Export Restrictions: Exports do not require prior authorization with a few exceptions(precious metals, sugar, and groundnut oil). Repatriation of foreign exchange earningswithin 120 days.

Cameroon 1996 Currency Convertibility: Full convertibility into the FF at a fixed rate of CFAF100 per FF; 0current transactions free of exchange controls; capital transactions free betweenCameroon and France but require approval between Cameroon and the rest of world.



Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is determined in the inter-bank foreignexchange market. Free convertibility for current transactions, restrictions on capitaltransactions.


Annex 2

24


Ghana 1996 Import Restrictions: No foreign exchange budget. 1.1

Export Restrictions: Exports proceeds should be remitted to the country within60 days of shipment. Traditional exports are not subject to surrender requirements.Non-traditional export proceeds can be sold at market rates upon receipt in the banks.Cocoa must be exported through Cocoa Board and is subject to an export tax.

Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is determined in the foreign exchangemarket. Free convertibility for current transactions; approval is needed by the ReserveBank for capital transactions.

South Africa 1996 Export Restrictions: Exports proceeds should be remitted to the country within seven 5.3days of accruals. Exporters may retain export proceeds for 180 days after accrual ordate of shipment, whichever comes first, in foreign currency accounts with authorizddealers. A limited number of products require export permits.

Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is determined in the interbank market.Current transactions are free of exchange controls, but capital transactions are subjectto approval by the Bank of Tanzania.

Tanzania 1996 Import Restrictions: No foreign exchange budget. 6.0

Export Restrictions: Export proceeds must be repatriated within 180 days of the dateof exportation. Export licensing required for health or sanitary reasons.

Malawi 1995 Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is determined in the foreign exchangemarket. Free convertibility for current transactions. Not fully convertible for capitaltransactions as residents’ accounts cannot be converted into foreign currencies.

Import Restrictions: No foreign exchange budget. 8.2

Export Restrictions: Repatriation of 60% of foreign exchange received from exportsis required immediately. The remaining 40% can be held in the exporter’s foreigncurrency account. Exports of agricultural products subject to licensing.

Uganda 1997 Currency Convertibility: Domestic currency is convertible into foreign currencies at a 8.9freely floating exchange rate for both current and capital transactions.


Export Restrictions: Exports of coffee are subject to a quota under ICO rules.

Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is market determined and freely convertiblefor both current and capital transactions.

Mauritius 1996 Import Restrictions: Importers must be licensed. No foreign exchange budget. 10.4

Export Restrictions: No repatriation requirements.Quotas on textiles and clothing to theUS and Canada subject to bilateral export-restraint agreements. Sugar exports to theEU and US are restricted. Exports of certain foodstuffs controlled.

Currency Convertibility: The external value of the currency is determined in the foreignexchange market. Foreign exchange transactions are subject to control by the ReserveBank of Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe 1997 Import Restrictions: The Central Bank establishes import priorities to which commercial 12.4banks have to allocate their foreign exchange.

Export Restrictions: Export licensing required for a variety of products. Export proceedsmust be converted to local currency in the market within a specified period.

Chile (c) 1998 Currency Convertibility: The official exchange rate is kept withing a crawling band 9.3around the US dollar. Free convertibility for current transactions. Controls on capitaltransactions.Dual foreign exchange structure.


Export Restrictions: No repatriation requirements.

Chile 2001 Currency Convertibility: The exchange rate is market determined and freely convertible 0for both current and most capital transactions.Unified exchange rate.






Table A.1: Foreign Exchange Regime and Controls (continued)

25

Annexes

Table A.2: Summary of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs)

Share of import Estimated effect Estimated effectcompeting sector of QR on prices of QR on average

Products Subject Share of imports output covered of products price of all ICICountry Year to QRs covered by QRs by QRs concerned (%) output (a)

Benin 1996 Portland Cement na 12 10 1

Edible Cotton Oil

Powdered Milk

Yogurt

Wheat Flour

Burkina Faso (b) 1997 Rice 12 23 26 6

Sugar

Electrical Batteries

Tires

Inner Tubes for Tires

Cameroon 1995 Wheat Flour 9 21 12 3

Meats

Fisheries

Edible Oils

Sugar Refining



Bolivia 2001 Currency Convertibility: Crawling peg to US $. The official selling rate is determined at 0auctions held daily by the Central Bank. The official exchange rate is the average of thebid rates accepted in the latest auction and applies to all foreign exchane operations inBolivia. Before each auction, the Central Bank determines the amount to be auctionedand a floor price below which it will not accept any bids. This floor price, which isexpressed in dollars, is the official exchange rate, and follows a crawling peg to theUS$. Free convertibility for current transactions. Capital controls exist.



Senegal 2001 Currency Convertibility: Fixed peg to Euro. Full convertibility into the euro at a fixed rate 0of CFAF 655.957 per euro; current transactions free of exchange controls; capitaltransactions free between Senegal and France but require approval between Senegaland the rest of world.


Export Restrictions: Exports do not require prior authorization with a few exceptions(precious metals, sugar, and groundnut oil). Repatriation of foreign exchange earningsrequired within 120 days.

Senegal 2001 Currency Convertibility: Same as Senegal (2001) 0

(UEMOA) Import Restrictions: Same as Senegal (2001)

Export Restrictions: Same as Senegal (2001)

Note: (a) Source: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, IMF, for the year concerned.

(b) Source: Global Currency Report and International Financial Statistics for the year concerned.

(c) Source: Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2003).

Table A.1: Foreign Exchange Regime and Controls (continued)


26


Soap

Insecticides

Medicines

Guns

Côte d’Ivoire 1997 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Ghana 1999 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Malawi 1999 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Mali 1997 Cigarettes 1.5 15 13 2

Tobacco

Matches

Mauritius (c) 1999 Imports of sugarcane are 0 0 0 0prohibited

Senegal 1999 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

South Africa 1999 Black Tea 0 0 0 0

Tanzania 1999 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Uganda 1999 Only for security purposes 0 0 0 0

Zimbabwe (d) 1997 Animal Oils 3 11 9 1

Meats

Live CattleDairy Products

Fruits

Honey and Ice Cream

Corn and Corn Meal

Sugar

Mean 2.1 6.3 5.4 1.0

Median 0 0 0 0

Chile 1998 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Chile 2001 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Bolivia 2001 Used passenger cars 0 0 0 0

Worn clothing

Health and security reasons.

Senegal 2001 Canned and preserved, and 0 0 0 0other consumer goods mustbe labeled in French. Severalproducts are subject toinspection for health reasons.

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 Only for health or security reasons. 0 0 0 0

Source: For Cameroon, UNCTAD-TRAINS data, 1995; for the rest of the countries, data obtained by Bank staff for the year concerned.

Notes: a) ICI: import-competing industry

b) Excluding sugar on which there is also an import monopoly and which is included in Table A3.

c) Sugar cane is assumed to be non-traded because of its perishability and high transport costs.

d) Excluding corn and corn meal for which there is also an import monopoly and which are included in Table A3.

Share of import Estimated effect Estimated effectcompeting sector of QR on prices of QR on average

Products Subject Share of imports output covered of products price of all ICICountry Year to QRs covered by QRs by QRs concerned (%) output (a)

Table A.2: Summary of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) (continued)

27

Annexes

Table A.3: Summary of Import Monopolies

Effect ofShare of import Effect of monopolies on

competing sector monopolies on average price of alloutput covered average price on import competing

Country Year Import monopolies by monopolies % products concerned % sector output %

Benin 1998 Petroleum products can be imported only 0 0 0by a state company and licenses privateenterprises (a)

Burkina Faso 1998 Private monopoly for imports of sugar (b) 10 30 3

Cameroon 1998 The extent of the oil refinery import monopoly 7 40 3was reduced to 80% in 1998.

Côte d’Ivoire 1998 None 0 0 0

Ghana 1998 None 0 0 0

Malawi 1998 None 0 0 0

Mali 1998 None 0 0 0

Mauritius Domestic 1998 None 0 0 0 Industry

Senegal 1998 None 0 0 0

South Africa 1998 None 0 0 0

Tanzania 1998 None 0 0 0

Uganda 1998 None 0 0 0

Zimbabwe 1998 Corn can be imported only by the Grain 3 26 1Marketing Board or by others with permissionof the Board (c)

Mean 1.5 7.4 0.5

Median 0 0 0

Chile 1998 None 0 0 0

Chile 2001 None 0 0 0

Bolivia 2001 None 0 0 0

Senegal 2001 None 0 0 0

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 None 0 0 0

Source: Authors’ computations based on data obtained from authorities of the countries.

Notes: (a) No domestic production. Import monopoly is a fiscal device for generating revenues for the public sector.

(b) There is also a QR on sugar. Estimate is for the combined effects.

(c) There is also a QR on corn and corn meal. Estimate is for the combined effects.

28


Table A.4: Discrimination against Imports through Domestic Indirect Taxation

Country Year Product subject to discriminatory indirect taxes Resulting percentage increase in prices of imports

Benin 1996 None 0

Mali 1997 None 0

Cameroon 1996 None 0

Uganda 1997 None 0

Malawi 1995 None 0

Ghana 1996 None 0

Zimbabwe 1997 None 0

South Africa 1996 Mineral Waters na

Lemonade na

Beer 3.2

Côte d’Ivoire 1996 Soft Drinks 10.0

Fruit Juice 10.9

Average Rate 8.0

Senegal 1996 Cigarettes 13.0

Beer 42.8

Whisky 6.8

Margarine 6.9

Vegetable Oil 5.9

Wheat Flour 5.8

Sugar 6.1

Tanzania 1996 Blankets 42.0

Bed Sheets 42.0

Cement 16.8

Iron Sheets 6.5

Tires 24.8

Inner Tubes 24.8

Bicycles 6.5

Average Rate 18.3

Burkina Faso 1996 Cigarettes 70.3

Beer 124.3

Wine 36.0

Mauritius 1996 Alcohol 360.0

Cigarettes 113.0

Cigars 461.9

Average Rate 219.0

Chile 1998 None 0

Chile 2001 None 0

Bolivia 2001 None 0

Senegal 2001 Cigarettes 13.0

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 None 0

Source: Data collected by Bank staff from the countries concerned.

na: Not available.

29

Annexes

Table A.5: Structure of Tariff Regime

Country Year Import Tariff Rates (in %) Import Surtaxesa (in %)

Benin 1996 Fiscal duties: 0–5–10–15–20 A 1% surtax is applied on imports from nonpreferential regional trade agreements

Burkina Faso 1996 Fiscal duties: 0–5–10–15–25–30 Special Intervention Tax (TSI) of 2.0% applied over allStatistical tax: 5 dutiable imports

Cameroon 1996 0–5–10–20–30 Wheat Flour: 19.3 (50.0)

Portland Cement: 14.2 (35.4)Detergents: 15.4 (46.6)

Maize Meal: 29.6 (40.7)

Côte d’Ivoire 1996 Customs duties: 0–5 Meats: 14.3 (37.1)

Fiscal duties: 0–5–10–15–25–30 Tomato Preserves: 5.6 (33.2)

Statistical tax: 5 Vegetable Oils: 9.6 (41.7)

Cigarettes: 236.2 (273.8)

Cigars: 14.8 (52.5)

Smoking Tobacco: 56.1 (93.7)

Ghana 1996 Fiscal duties: 0–10–25. Specific duties on milk, wheat flour A 17.5% surcharge is applied mostly on importsvegetable oils, sugar confectionery, fruit juices, sauces, of consumer goodssoft drinks, beer, spirits, cigarettes, soaps, fabrics, wornclothing, iron and steel bars and rods, and petroleumproducts.

Mali 1997 Customs duties: 0–5 None

Fiscal duties: 0–10–25

Statistical tax: 0–5

Malawi 1995 Customs duties: 0–5–7.5–10–15–20–25–30–35–40–45 None

Mauritius 1996 Customs duties: 0–5–10–15–20–30–40–55–80 A 20% surcharge is applied on imports from severalcountries including Japan, South Korea andSwitzerland.

Senegal 1996 Fiscal Duties: 0–10–20–30–50 A 20% surcharge is applied on imports of several luxuryCustoms Duties: 0–10 goods. A reference price is applied on imports ofStatistical Tax: 0–5 refined sugar.

South Africa 1996 Customs duties are in 45 bands ranging from 0 to 57.5. NoneSpecific and a combination of specific and ad–valoremduties apply on several items.

Tanzania 1996 Fiscal duties: 5–20–25–30–40–50 None

Uganda 1997 0–5–10–20–30–60 None

Zimbabwe 1997 0–5–10–15–20–25–30–35–40–45–50–55–60–65–70–75– Mostly on consumer goods 10.080–85–90–95–100 Specific duties on Textiles 50.9 (160.9)

Chile 1998 Customs duties: 0–11 Variable levies on:Wheat: (25.1)

Wheat Flour: (27.4)

Vegetable oils: (11.0)

Sugar: (49.0)


30


Table A.5: Structure of Tariff Regime (continued)

Country Year Import Tariff Rates (in %) Import Surtaxesa (in %)

Chile 2001 Customs duties: 0–8 Variable levies on:Wheat: (22.0)

Wheat Flour: (28.0)

Vegetable oils: (55.0)

Sugar: (35.0)

Bolivia 2001 Customs duties: 0–2–5–10 None

Senegal 2001 Common external tariffs: 0–5–10–20 A 20% surcharge is levied on onions, potatoes,Statistical tax: 1 bananas, cigarettes, and rice. A 10% surcharge isCommunity tax: 1 levied on some cereals.

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 Common external tariffs: 0–5–10–20 NoneStatistical tax: 1Community tax: 1

Source: Data obtained by Bank staff from the countries in the study.

Note: (a) The numbers in parentheses are NPTR (tariff plus the surcharges and any discriminatory excise taxation).

31

Annexes

Tabl

e A.

6: T

ariff

Reg

imes

Impo

rt-Co

llect

ion

Unw

eigh

ted

Indi

cativ

e Ef

fect

ive

Prot

ectio

nTa

riff &

scTa

riff &

scw

eigh

ted

rate

s on

all

aver

age

Rat

es o

n im

port-

com

petin

gre

venu

esre

venu

esUn

wei

ghte

dav

erag

eSt

anda

rd im

ports

NPTR

on

dom

estic

goo

ds a

s %

of

as

% o

fav

erag

e ta

riff

tarif

f &sc

devi

atio

n of

all i

mpo

rt-GD

P ta

x re

venu

esUn

wei

ghte

d&

sc ra

te o

nra

te o

nta

riff &

scco

mpe

ting

aver

age

MFN

Max

imum

dutia

ble

dutia

ble

on d

utia

ble

good

sCo

untr

yYe

arta

riff r

ate

Tarif

fs &

scim

ports

impo

rtsim

ports

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Agric

ultu

reM

anuf

actu

red

Beni

n19

96na

21.0

10.1

7.2

7.0

5.1

14.2

12.7

34.6

1.1

8.3

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

na11

9.0

28.9

19.6

11.6

14.8

32.9

23.4

83.7

3.3

28.0

Cam

eroo

n19

96na

50.0

11.5

10.5

10.8

9.6

30.6

34.2

68.8

1.3

10.2

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

na27

3.8

14.7

14.5

13.6

9.4

34.7

21.9

92.4

1.8

11.0

Ghan

a19

96na

42.5

11.2

7.3

15.6

6.9

29.7

27.9

67.2

1.1

7.0

Mal

awi

1995

na45

.016

.310

.935

.18.

238

.01.

489

.83.

018

.8

Mal

i19

97na

30.0

20.2

12.9

13.2

8.8

30.2

na50

.52.

215

.8

Mau

ritiu

s19

96na

80.0

26.4

20.3

30.4

16.2

65.4

21.4

149.

06.

232

.9

Sene

gal

1996

na75

.019

.514

.617

.414

.246

.632

.110

3.3

4.2

25.6

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

na57

.512

.25.

215

.24.

927

.30.

067

.60.

83.

3

Tanz

ania

1996

na66

.021

.613

.323

.98.

042

.928

.984

.22.

020

.0

Ugan

da19

97na

60.0

7.1

9.3

9.6

8.0

25.4

22.4

72.6

0.8

7.5

Zim

babw

e19

97na

160.

923

.816

.242

.67.

140

.814

.010

7.0

6.1

23.2

Mea

nna

83.1

17.2

12.4

0.4

9.3

35.3

20.0

82.4

2.6

16.3

M

edia

nna

60.0

16.3

12.9

15.2

8.2

32.9

22.1

83.7

2.0

15.8

Chile

1998

11.0

11.0

11.0

10.9

0.4

9.4

12.7

12.4

15.4

2.2

13.5

Chile

2001

8.0

8.0

8.0

8.0

0.3

5.4

10.7

9.1

15.2

2.0

11.6

Boliv

ia20

019.

410

.09.

38.

02.

55.

59.

410

.08.

81.

26.

6

Sene

gal

2001

14.8

52.0

14.4

11.2

10.1

9.6

26.4

23.4

51.1

3.7

20.7

Sene

gal

(UE

MOA

)20

0114

.822

.014

.811

.77.

010

.419

.713

.435

.14.

021

.9

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.

Note

s:a)

Incl

udes

tarif

fs, s

urch

arge

s, a

nd th

e ad

-val

orem

equ

ival

ents

of s

peci

fic d

utie

s.

b) T

ariff

rate

s av

erag

ed o

ver H

S8 d

igit-

leve

l tar

iff li

nes,

exc

ept f

or S

eneg

al a

nd M

ali w

here

the

aver

ages

are

ove

r HS1

0 di

git.

c) T

otal

reve

nues

from

tarif

fs a

nd s

urch

arge

s di

vide

d by

tota

l val

ue o

f im

ports

.

d) N

PTR

(Nom

inal

Pro

tect

ion

Tax

Rate

) inc

lude

s ta

riffs

, sur

char

ges,

and

dis

crim

inat

ory

dom

estic

taxe

s (b

ut n

ot th

e ef

fect

s of

NTB

s) w

hich

pro

tect

impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

good

s.

32


Table A.7: Unweighted vs Output-Weighted Average NPTRs

Unweighted average NPTR Output-weighted average NPTRCountry Year on all import-competing goods on import-competing goods Difference (%)

Benin 1996 14.2 14.9 4.9

Côte d’Ivoire 1996 34.7 44.4 28.0

Ghana 1996 29.7 na na

Mali 1997 30.2 31.0 2.6

Senegal 1996 46.6 44.9 –3.6

South Africa 1996 27.3 32.9 20.5

Mean 30.6 33.6 9.9

Median 30.2 32.9 8.9

Chile 1998 12.7 12.2 –3.9

Chile 2001 10.7 9.5 –11.2

Bolivia 2001 9.4 10.0 6.4

Senegal 2001 26.4 27.6 4.5

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 19.7 19.8 0.5


33

Annexes

Tabl

e A.

8: E

scal

atio

n of

Tra

de B

arrie

rs b

y Ec

onom

ic U

se

Unw

eigh

ted

aver

age

tarif

f &sc

on

dutia

ble

impo

rtsUn

wei

ghte

d NP

TR o

n im

port-

com

petin

g go

ods

std

std

devi

atio

nal

l im

port-

devi

atio

nco

nsum

erin

term

edia

teca

pita

lal

l dut

iabl

e(a

ll du

tiabl

eco

nsum

erin

term

edia

teca

pita

lco

mpe

ting

(all

impo

rt-Co

untr

yYe

argo

ods

good

sgo

ods

impo

rtsim

ports

)go

ods

good

sgo

ods

good

sco

mpe

ting

good

s)

Beni

n19

9614

.48.

58.

010

.17.

013

.715

.4na

14.2

4.6

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

34.9

28.2

20.2

28.9

11.6

43.8

32.5

na32

.916

.1

Cam

eroo

n19

9626

.79.

87.

411

.510

.830

.930

.621

.230

.64.

9

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

28.7

12.6

7.3

14.7

13.6

43.0

25.2

27.6

34.7

30.6

Ghan

a19

9627

.65.

73.

111

.215

.633

.024

.310

.029

.722

.7

Mal

awi

1995

38.3

12.3

11.1

16.3

35.1

43.1

27.0

40.0

38.0

18.2

Mal

i19

9729

.818

.012

.620

.213

.233

.629

.05.

030

.29.

7

Mau

ritiu

s19

9652

.719

.519

.026

.430

.463

.870

.0na

65.4

80.1

Sene

gal

1996

35.6

16.0

12.4

19.5

17.4

51.7

31.9

35.0

46.6

18.9

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

22.0

9.8

7.2

12.2

15.2

39.0

17.6

11.8

27.3

22.1

Tanz

ania

1996

33.5

18.2

12.3

21.6

23.9

50.3

33.5

5.0

42.9

25.8

Ugan

da19

9720

.45.

62.

17.

19.

630

.820

.8na

25.4

10.3

Zim

babw

e19

9755

.417

.710

.523

.842

.668

.428

.637

.540

.824

.8

M

ean

32.3

14.0

10.2

17.2

18.9

41.9

29.7

21.5

35.3

22.2

Med

ian

29.8

12.6

10.5

16.3

15.2

43.0

28.6

21.2

32.9

18.9

Chile

1998

11.0

11.0

11.0

11.0

0.4

13.4

12.3

11.0

12.7

6.9

Chile

2001

8.0

8.0

8.0

8.0

0.3

12.6

9.3

8.0

10.7

9.3

Boliv

ia20

019.

89.

86.

99.

32.

510

.010

.07.

09.

41.

9

Sene

gal

2001

23.3

12.6

8.8

14.4

10.1

28.6

21.9

23.0

26.4

9.2

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

20.3

13.3

10.1

14.8

7.0

21.4

15.6

22.0

19.7

5.3

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.

34


Tabl

e A.

9: R

even

ue C

olle

ctio

n

Tarif

f &sc

reve

nues

Tarif

f & s

c re

venu

esCo

llect

ion

rate

s on

Nond

utia

ble

impo

rtsEx

empt

ions

as

% o

fCo

llect

ion

rate

s on

Colle

ctio

nCo

untr

yYe

aras

% o

f GDP

as

% o

f tax

reve

nues

all i

mpo

rtsas

% o

f tot

al im

ports

dutia

ble

impo

rtsdu

tiabl

e im

ports

(a)

perc

enta

ge (b

)

Beni

n19

961.

18.

35.

148

.414

.17.

289

.7

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

3.3

28.0

14.8

27.2

15.0

19.6

93.5

Cam

eroo

n19

961.

310

.29.

68.

819

.110

.584

.7

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

1.8

11.0

9.4

29.7

10.3

13.4

91.4

Ghan

a19

961.

17.

06.

914

.750

.07.

774

.9

Mal

awi

1995

3.0

18.8

8.2

9.1

32.1

9.0

73.0

Mal

i19

972.

215

.88.

848

.314

.112

.990

.6

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

1996

6.2

32.9

16.2

33.3

12.4

18.9

90.7

Sene

gal

1996

4.2

25.6

14.2

2.2

16.8

14.5

88.6

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

0.8

3.3

4.9

7.1

4.3

5.2

96.2

Tanz

ania

1996

2.0

20.0

8.0

36.6

21.8

11.4

80.7

Ugan

da19

970.

87.

58.

02.

814

.88.

389

.0

Zim

babw

e19

976.

123

.27.

167

.713

.816

.288

.2

M

ean

2.6

16.3

9.3

25.8

18.4

11.9

87.0

Med

ian

2.0

15.8

8.2

27.2

14.8

11.4

89.0

Chile

1998

2.2

13.5

9.4

1.4

09.

410

0

Chile

2001

2.0

11.6

5.4

0.3

05.

510

0

Boliv

ia20

011.

26.

65.

53.

60

5.7

100

Sene

gal

2001

3.7

20.7

9.6

13.0

16.5

11.2

83.4

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

4.0

21.9

10.4

13.0

011

.410

0

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.

Note

:(a

) Tot

al re

venu

es fr

om ta

riffs

and

sur

char

ges

divi

ded

by th

e to

tal v

alue

of d

utia

ble

impo

rts.

(b) A

ctua

l to

pote

ntia

l rev

enue

s w

here

pot

entia

l rev

enue

is th

e su

m o

f for

egon

e an

d ac

tual

reve

nues

col

lect

ed fr

om d

utia

ble

impo

rts.

Fore

gone

reve

nues

are

com

pute

d by

mul

tiply

ing

tota

l val

ue o

f exe

mpt

ions

by

the

impo

rt-w

eigh

ted

aver

age

tarif

f & s

c ra

tes

(min

us a

ny re

venu

es c

olle

cted

from

par

tially

-exe

mpt

impo

rts).

35

Annexes

Tabl

e A.

10: C

ompo

sitio

n of

Nom

inal

Pro

tect

ion

Rate

s

Tarif

f &sc

Disc

rimin

ator

yco

mpo

nent

(a)

dom

estic

taxe

sNP

TR (b

)M

onop

oly

QRs

NPR

(c)

Coun

try

Year

man

ufag

man

ufag

man

ufag

man

ufag

man

ufag

man

ufag

Beni

n19

9614

.911

.80

014

.911

.80

04.

00

18.9

11.8

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

36.7

22.6

5.1

041

.822

.63.

00

5.6

050

.422

.6

Cam

eroo

n19

9629

.131

.20

029

.131

.23.

00

1.3

033

.431

.2

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

44.5

20.5

00

44.5

20.5

00

00

44.5

20.5

Ghan

a19

9630

.325

.00

030

.325

.00

00

030

.325

.0

Mal

awi

1995

43.3

1.3

00

43.3

1.3

00

00

43.3

1.3

Mal

i19

9729

.0no

n-tra

ded

00

29.0

none

00

2.0

031

.0no

n-tra

ded

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

1996

60.2

19.3

11.1

071

.319

.30

00

071

.319

.3

Sene

gal

1996

49.2

30.1

1.7

050

.930

.10

00

050

.930

.1

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

32.9

expo

rtabl

e0.

00

32.9

expo

rtabl

e0

00

032

.9ex

porta

ble

Tanz

ania

1996

34.9

26.7

9.7

044

.626

.70

00

044

.626

.7

Ugan

da19

9732

.420

.00.

00

32.4

20.0

00

00

32.4

20.0

Zim

babw

e19

9752

.411

.50.

00

52.4

11.5

01

10

53.4

12.5

M

ean

37.7

20.0

2.1

039

.820

.00.

50.

11.

10

41.3

20.1

Med

ian

34.9

20.5

00

41.8

20.5

00

00

43.3

20.5

Chile

1998

12.7

12.3

00

12.7

12.3

00

00

12.7

12.3

Chile

2001

10.9

9.0

00

10.9

9.0

00

00

10.9

9.0

Boliv

ia20

019.

410

.00

09.

410

.00

00

09.

410

.0

Sene

gal

2001

26.3

21.8

1.7

028

.021

.80

00

028

.021

.8

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

20.3

12.8

1.7

022

.012

.80

00

022

.012

.8

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.

Note

s:(a

) The

tarif

f rat

es a

vera

ged

(unw

eigh

ted)

onl

y ov

er th

e lin

es w

ith im

port-

com

petin

g do

mes

tic p

rodu

ctio

n.

(b) T

he N

PTR

(Nom

inal

Pro

tect

ion

Tax

Rate

on

impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

indu

stry

) is

the

sum

of t

ariff

s, s

urch

arge

s, a

nd d

iscr

imin

ator

y in

dire

ct ta

xes.

(c) T

he N

PR (N

omin

al P

rote

ctio

n Ra

te o

n im

port-

com

petin

g in

dust

ry) i

s th

e su

m o

f NPT

R an

d NT

Bs.

36


Tabl

e A.

11: E

ffect

ive

Prot

ectio

n Ra

tes

(EPR

s)

Impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

Expo

rtabl

e

Tarif

f &sc

on

Tarif

f &sc

EPR

EPR

base

dTa

riff &

sc n

on fe

rtiliz

erEP

REP

R ba

sed

onEP

R ba

sed

onCo

untr

yYe

aron

inpu

ts (a

)NP

R(in

dica

tive)

(b)

on I-

O ta

ble

on fe

rtiliz

ers

inpu

tsNP

R(in

dica

tive)

(c)

I-O ta

ble

I-O ta

ble

(d)

man

ufac

turin

gag

ricul

ture

man

ufac

agric

Beni

n19

968.

518

.934

.633

.210

.03.

511

.812

.712

.4–1

0.6

–52.

5

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

28.2

50.4

83.7

0.0

9.0

20.7

22.6

23.4

nano

ne–3

1.6

Cam

eroo

n19

969.

833

.468

.80.

05.

810

.531

.234

.2na

–16.

4–4

7.8

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

12.6

44.5

92.4

41.3

6.0

12.6

20.5

21.9

17.0

–11.

2–4

2.2

Ghan

a19

965.

730

.367

.20.

00.

05.

725

.027

.9na

–21.

9–3

4.3

Mal

awi

1995

12.3

43.3

89.8

0.0

0.0

0.4

1.3

1.4

na–3

.3no

ne

Mal

i19

9718

.031

.050

.50.

05.

018

.2no

n–tra

ded

nana

none

–28.

8

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

1996

19.5

71.3

149.

00.

09.

01.

419

.321

.4na

none

none

Sene

gal

1996

16.0

50.9

103.

372

.25.

020

.230

.132

.131

.1–1

4.2

–3.4

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

9.8

32.9

67.6

48.9

0.0

0.6

expo

rtabl

e0.

0ex

porta

ble

–5.5

–8.3

Tanz

ania

1996

18.2

44.6

84.2

0.0

3.7

13.6

26.7

28.9

na–1

1.3

–3.7

Ugan

da19

975.

632

.472

.60.

00.

04.

020

.022

.4na

–3.1

–1.7

Zim

babw

e19

9717

.753

.410

7.0

0.0

3.5

0.0

12.5

14.0

na–4

.7no

ne

M

ean

14.0

41.3

82.4

15.0

4.4

8.6

20.1

20.0

20.2

–10.

2–2

5.4

Med

ian

12.6

43.3

83.7

0.0

5.0

5.7

20.5

22.1

17.0

–10.

9–3

0.2

Chile

(b)

1998

11.0

12.7

15.4

14.3

11.0

12.3

12.3

12.4

12.1

–2.6

–3.8

Chile

(b)

2001

8.0

10.9

15.2

12.7

8.0

9.0

9.0

9.1

9.4

–1.9

–2.8

Boliv

ia (

c, d

)20

019.

89.

48.

812

.010

.010

.010

.010

.010

.8–2

.0–0

.2

Sene

gal

2001

12.6

28.0

51.1

40.8

5.4

12.3

21.8

23.4

35.2

–19.

9–2

.2

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

13.3

22.0

35.1

27.5

7.0

9.3

12.8

13.4

21.8

–11.

7–1

.8

Sour

ce:

Auth

ors’

com

puta

tions

bas

ed o

n da

ta o

btai

ned

from

aut

horit

ies

of th

e co

untri

es.

Note

s:(a

) We

use

the

tarif

f & s

urch

arge

s on

dut

iabl

e in

term

edia

te g

oods

as

a pr

oxy.

(b) C

ompu

ted

usin

g a

stan

dard

coe

ffici

ent o

f 0.6

0 fo

r tra

dabl

e in

puts

.

(c) C

ompu

ted

usin

g st

anda

rd c

oeffi

cien

ts o

f 0.0

4 fo

r fer

tilize

r (tra

dabl

e) a

nd 0

.08

for n

on-fe

rtiliz

er tr

adab

le in

puts

.

(d) A

ssum

ing

the

VAT

on in

puts

is re

imbu

rsed

at t

he ra

te in

dica

ted

in T

able

A13

.

37

Annexes

Table A.12: Perception of Corruption Index

Country Year TI Peceptions of Corruption TI Rank TI Perceptions of Normalized Rescaled TIIndex 1998 (a) Corruption Index with the Perceptions of Corruption

Scale Reversed (b) Index (c)

South Africa 1998 5.2 32 4.8 0

Mauritius Domestic Industry 1998 5.0 33 5.0 0.5

Zimbabwe 1998 4.2 43 5.8 2.6

Malawi 1998 4.1 45 5.9 2.9

Ghana 1998 3.3 55 6.7 5.0

Senegal 1998 3.3 55 6.7 5.0

Cote d’Ivoire 1998 3.1 59 6.9 5.5

Uganda 1998 2.6 73 7.4 6.8

Tanzania 1998 1.9 81 8.1 8.7

Cameroon 1998 1.4 85 8.6 10

Benin 1998 na na na na

Burkina Faso 1998 na na na na

Mali 1998 na na na na

Mean 3.4 56 6.6 4.7

Median 3.3 55 6.7 5.0

Chile 1998 6.8 20 3.2 na

Chile 2001 7.5 18 2.5 na

Bolivia 2001 2.0 84 8.0 na

Senegal 2001 2.9 65 7.1 na

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 2.9 65 7.1 na

Source: Transparency International, Berlin (for the year concerned).

Notes: (a) For the TI Corruption Index: 0 = most corrupt, 10 = cleanest

(b)Reversed scale. The scale of the TI index has been reversed by subtracting the original values from 10 so that the scale will be consistent with the other indicators usedin this study where 0 is the least distortionary value of an indicator and 10 is the most distortionary value.

(c) The reversed scale index normalized so the lowest observed value in the sample group is 0 and the highest observed value in the sample is 10.

38


Tabl

e A.

13: E

xpor

t Reg

ime Ov

eral

l ave

rage

Tarif

fs &

sc o

n in

puts

Dutie

s on

inpu

ts e

xem

pted

VAT

on in

puts

to e

xpor

tsVA

Tta

x on

exp

ort

to e

xpor

ts (e

stim

ate)

for e

xpor

tsre

imbu

rsem

ent

indu

stry

out

put

(est

imat

e, %

)ra

te (

estim

ate,

%)

Coun

try

Yea

r(e

stim

ate,

%)

man

ufac

agric

man

ufac

ferti

lizer

non

fert.

ag

Beni

n19

9623

.014

.45.

70

15.2

1.2

17.8

0

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

14.0

34.9

16.8

08.

80

0.2

0

Cam

eroo

n19

964.

026

.78.

90

15.0

015

.00

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

7.0

28.7

10.4

015

.50

5.9

0

Ghan

a19

969.

027

.63.

8na

15.0

015

.00

Mal

awi

1995

038

.30.

3na

15.0

015

.00

Mal

i19

978.

029

.813

.80

5.8

012

.70

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

1996

052

.73.

9pr

obab

ly m

oder

ate

but d

elay

ed0

00

0

Sene

gal

1996

016

.015

.10

15.0

015

.080

.0

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

09.

80.

4pr

obab

ly m

oder

ate

but d

elay

ed15

.00

15.0

0

Tanz

ania

1996

018

.210

.3pr

obab

ly lo

w a

nd a

rbitr

ary

15.0

015

.00

Ugan

da19

970

5.6

2.7

prob

ably

low

and

arb

itrar

y15

.00

15.0

0

Zim

babw

e19

970

17.7

1.2

prob

ably

low

and

arb

itrar

y15

.00

15.0

15

M

ean

5.0

24.6

7.2

12.7

0.1

12.0

7.3

Med

ian

026

.75.

715

.00

15.0

0

Chile

1998

011

.011

.910

019

.019

.019

.010

0

Chile

2001

08.

08.

710

019

.019

.019

.010

0

Boliv

ia20

010

9.8

10.0

100

13.0

13.0

13.0

100

Sene

gal

2001

012

.611

.70

15.0

0.0

15.0

80

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

013

.312

.40

15.0

0.0

15.0

80

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

. Exc

hang

e Ar

rang

emen

ts a

nd R

estri

ctio

ns (I

MF

for t

he y

ear c

once

rned

). C

otto

n po

licie

s in

Fra

ncop

hone

Afri

ca (P

urse

ll 19

98).

39

Annexes

Table A.14a: B Index

Country Year man imports/ all imports/ all imports/ all imports/ man imports/ ag imports/all exports all exports man exports ag exports man exports ag exports

Benin 1996 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.9

Burkina Faso 1996 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.8 2.0 2.4

Cameroon 1996 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.5

Côte d’Ivoire 1996 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7

Ghana 1996 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.9

Malawi 1995 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.1

Mali 1997 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.5 na

Mauritius Domestic Industry (a) 1996 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.3

Senegal 1996 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.3

South Africa 1996 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.6 na

Tanzania 1996 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.9 1.3

Uganda 1997 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3

Zimbabwe 1997 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.5 2.0 1.2

Mean 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5

Median 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.3

Chile 1998 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2

Chile 2001 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1

Bolivia 2001 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1

Senegal 2001 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2

Senegal (UEMOA) 2001 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1


Note: (a) For domestic firms without preferential access to the EU sugar market, the EU and US garment markets, or to foreign exchange.

40


Tabl

e A.

14b:

Com

pone

nts

of B

Inde

x (n

umer

ator

)

man

ufac

turin

gag

ricul

ture

over

all

Effe

ct o

f NTB

s on

Effe

ct o

f NTB

s on

Effe

ct o

f NTB

sav

erag

e pr

ice

onav

erag

e pr

ice

onon

ave

rage

pric

eNP

TR o

n im

port-

impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

NPTR

on

impo

rt-im

port-

com

petin

gNP

TR o

n im

port-

on im

port-

com

petin

gCo

untr

yYe

arEm

/Ex

com

petin

g go

ods

good

sco

mpe

ting

good

sgo

ods

com

petin

g go

ods

good

s

“t+n

”“P

R” (b

)“t

+n”

“PR”

(b)

“t+n

”“P

R” (a

)

Beni

n19

961

14.9

4.0

11.8

014

.21.

0

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

141

.88.

622

.60

32.9

9.0

Cam

eroo

n19

961

29.1

4.3

31.2

030

.66.

0

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

144

.50

20.5

034

.70

Ghan

a19

961.

0130

.30

25.0

029

.70

Mal

awi

1995

1.04

43.3

01.

30

38.0

0

Mal

i19

971

29.0

2.0

none

030

.22.

0

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

(a)

1996

1.05

71.3

019

.30

65.4

0

Sene

gal

1996

150

.90

30.1

046

.60

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

132

.90

expo

rtabl

e0

27.3

0

Tanz

ania

1996

144

.60

26.7

042

.90

Ugan

da19

971

32.4

020

.00

25.4

0

Zim

babw

e19

971

52.4

1.0

11.5

1.0

40.8

2.0

M

ean

1.02

39.8

1.5

20.0

035

.31.

5

Med

ian

1.01

41.8

020

.50

32.9

0

Chile

1998

1.05

12.7

012

.30

12.7

0

Chile

2001

110

.90

9.0

010

.70

Boliv

ia20

011

9.4

010

.00

9.4

0

Sene

gal

2001

128

.00

21.8

026

.40

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

122

.00

12.8

019

.70

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.

Note

:(a

) For

dom

estic

firm

s w

ithou

t pre

fere

ntia

l acc

ess

to th

e EU

sug

ar m

arke

t, th

e EU

and

US

garm

ent m

arke

ts, o

r to

fore

ign

exch

ange

.

(b) T

he s

um o

f est

imat

ed e

ffect

s of

QRs

and

impo

rt m

onop

olie

s on

the

aver

age

pric

e of

impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

good

s (T

able

s A2

& A

3).

41

Annexes

Tabl

e A.

14c:

Com

pone

nts

of B

Inde

x (d

enom

inat

or)

man

ufac

turin

gag

ricul

ture

over

all

Coun

try

Year

“-s”

“tI”

“-s”

“tI”

“-s”

“tI”

(d)

Beni

n19

960

015

.08.

515

.238

.92.

210

.01.

23.

517

.823

.08.

615

.2

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

00

23.7

28.2

8.8

46.5

2.0

9.0

020

.70.

214

.012

.98.

8

Cam

eroo

n19

960

5.0

15.8

9.8

15.0

9.1

2.4

5.8

010

.515

.04.

09.

115

.0

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

00

18.0

12.6

15.5

25.3

1.8

6.0

012

.65.

97.

09.

915

.5

Ghan

a19

960

012

.95.

715

.033

.01.

70.

00

5.7

15.0

9.0

7.3

15.0

Mal

awi

1995

00

17.5

12.3

15.0

01.

20.

00

0.4

15.0

09.

415

.0

Mal

i19

970

014

.918

.05.

838

.02.

95.

00

18.2

12.7

8.0

8.9

5.8

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

1996

00

11.7

19.5

0.0

00.

59.

00

1.4

0.0

06.

10

Sene

gal

1996

800

11.7

16.0

15.0

02.

15.

00

20.2

15.0

06.

915

.0

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

00

15.8

9.8

15.0

01.

30.

00

0.6

15.0

08.

515

.0

Tanz

ania

1996

00

21.6

18.2

15.0

02.

63.

70

13.6

15.0

012

.115

.0

Ugan

da19

970

012

.95.

615

.00

1.6

0.0

04.

015

.00

7.2

15.0

Zim

babw

e19

9715

019

.617

.715

.00

1.2

3.5

00.

015

.00

10.4

15.0

M

ean

7.3

0.4

16.2

14.0

12.7

14.7

1.8

4.4

0.1

8.6

12.0

5.0

9.0

12.7

Med

ian

00

15.8

12.6

15.0

01.

85.

00

5.7

15.0

08.

915

.0

Chile

1998

100

06.

611

.019

.00

1.4

11.0

19.0

12.3

19.0

04.

019

.0

Chile

2001

100

04.

88.

019

.00

1.0

8.0

19.0

9.0

19.0

02.

919

.0

Boliv

ia20

0110

00

5.9

9.8

13.0

01.

210

.013

.010

.013

.00

3.5

13.0

Sene

gal

2001

800

9.6

12.6

15.0

01.

55.

40

12.3

15.0

05.

515

.0

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

800

10.0

13.3

15.0

01.

37.

00

9.3

15.0

05.

715

.0

Sour

ce: A

utho

rs’ c

ompu

tatio

ns b

ased

on

data

obt

aine

d fro

m a

utho

ritie

s of

the

coun

tries

.No

te:

(a) F

or c

ount

ries

for w

hich

we

do n

ot h

ave

actu

al V

AT in

form

atio

n fo

r the

rele

vant

yea

rs (U

gand

a, T

anza

nia,

Sou

th A

frica

, Mal

awi,

Zim

babw

e), w

e as

sum

e a

unifo

rm 1

5% V

AT ra

te, e

xcep

t for

ferti

lizer

s, w

hich

we

assu

me

wer

e 0

rate

das

they

wer

e m

ostly

impo

rted

duty

free

as

bila

tera

l aid

. W

e us

e av

erag

e ta

riffs

and

VAT

on

all t

rada

ble

inte

rmed

iate

goo

ds a

s a

roug

h ap

prox

imat

ion

for t

hose

on

inpu

ts to

man

ufac

turin

g.(b

) Wei

ght o

n fe

rtiliz

ers

= 0.

04, w

eigh

t on

othe

r inp

uts

= 0.

08.

(c) F

rom

Tab

le A

13.

(d) U

nwei

ghte

d av

erag

e of

“t I”

man

and

“t I”

ag.

VAT reimbursment ratefor exporters % (estimate)

Average tax on industryoutput (%) (estimate)

(Duties and taxes oninputs) * (share oftradable inputs)

Tariff & sc on inputs

Estimated import-weightedaverage VAT on tradedinputs (a)

Average tax on industryoutput (%) (estimate)

(Duties and taxes oninputs) * (share oftradable inputs) (b)

Tariff &sc on fertilizers

Estimated average VAT onfertilizers

Tariff & sc on non fertilizerinputs

Estimated average VAT ontradable non fertilizerinputs (a)

Tax on industry output (%)(estimate) (c)

(Duties and taxes oninputs) *(share of tradableinputs)

Estimated import-weightedaverage VAT on tradedinputs (a)

42


Tabl

e A.

15: B

* In

dex

Effe

ctiv

e Pr

otec

tion

Rate

s (E

PR)

B*In

dex

Impo

rt-co

mpe

ting

Expo

rts

Unw

eigh

ted

Indi

cativ

eIn

dica

tive

aver

age

Unw

eigh

ted

rate

s on

rate

s on

ind

icat

ive

aver

age

man

imp/

all i

mp/

all i

mp/

all i

mp/

man

imp/

ag im

p/Co

untr

yYe

arE m

/Ex

(a)

man

uf.

agric

.ra

tes

(b)

Man

uf.

Agric

.ra

tes

all e

xpal

l exp

man

exp

ag e

xp m

an e

xpag

ex

Beni

n19

961

34.6

12.7

23.6

–10.

6–5

2.5

–31.

62.

01.

81.

42.

61.

52.

4

Burk

ina

Faso

1996

183

.723

.453

.5no

ne–3

1.6

–31.

62.

72.

2na

2.2

na1.

8

Cam

eroo

n19

961

68.8

34.2

51.5

–16.

4–4

7.8

–32.

12.

52.

21.

82.

92.

02.

6

Côte

d’Iv

oire

1996

192

.421

.957

.2–1

1.2

–42.

2–2

9.8

2.7

2.2

1.8

2.7

2.2

2.1

Ghan

a19

961.

0167

.227

.947

.5–2

1.9

–34.

3–2

5.0

2.2

2.0

1.9

2.3

2.2

2.0

Mal

awi

1995

1.04

89.8

1.4

45.6

–3.3

none

–3.3

2.0

1.6

1.6

na2.

0na

Mal

i19

971

50.5

na50

.5no

ne–2

8.8

–28.

82.

12.

1na

2.1

nana

Mau

ritiu

s Do

mes

tic

Indu

stry

(c)

1996

1.05

149.

021

.485

.2no

neno

nena

nana

nana

nana

Sene

gal

1996

110

3.3

32.1

67.7

–14.

2–3

.4–1

0.2

2.3

1.9

2.0

1.7

2.4

1.4

Sout

h Af

rica

1996

1.03

67.6

0.0

33.8

–5.5

–8.3

–7.7

1.9

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.8

1.1

Tanz

ania

1996

1.03

84.2

28.9

56.6

–11.

3–3

.7–8

.82.

11.

81.

81.

72.

11.

4

Ugan

da19

971.

0472

.622

.447

.5–3

.1–1

.7–1

.71.

81.

61.

61.

61.

91.

3

Zim

babw

e19

971.

0610

7.0

14.0

60.5

–4.7

none

–4.7

2.3

1.8

1.8

na2.

3na

M

ean

1.02

82.4

20.0

52.4

–10.

2–2

5.4

–17.

92.

21.

91.

72.

12.

01.

8

Med

ian

1.01

83.7

22.1

51.5

–10.

9–3

0.2

–17.

62.

21.

81.

82.

22.

11.

8

Chile

1998

1.05

15.4

12.4

13.9

–2.6

–3.8

–2.6

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

Chile

2001

115

.29.

112

.2–1

.9–2

.8–1

.91.

21.

11.

11.

21.

21.

1

Boliv

ia20

011

8.8

10.0

9.4

–2.0

–0.2

–1.5

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.1

Sene

gal

2001

151

.123

.437

.3–1

9.9

–2.2

–16.

41.

81.

61.

71.

41.

91.

3

Sene

gal (

UEM

OA)

2001

135

.113

.424

.2–1

1.7

–1.8

–9.7

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.3

1.5

1.2

Sour

ce:

Auth

ors’

com

puta

tions

bas

ed o

n da

ta o

btai

ned

from

aut

horit

ies

of th

e co

untri

es.

(a) U

nwei

ghte

d av

erag

e of

the

para

llel a

nd o

ffici

al e

xcha

nge

rate

s (in

dom

estic

cur

renc

y te

rms)

div

ided

by

the

offic

ial e

xcha

nge

rate

(Tab

le A

1).

(b) U

nwei

ghte

d av

erag

e of

the

indi

cativ

e EP

Rs o

n m

anuf

actu

red

and

agric

ultu

ral g

oods

.

(c) F

or d

omes

tic fi

rms

with

out p

refe

rent

ial a

cces

s to

EU

suga

r mar

ket,

EU a

nd U

S ga

rmen

t mar

kets

, or t

o fo

reig

n ex

chan

ge. F

or th

ese

firm

s a

mea

ning

ful E

PR o

n ex

ports

cou

ld n

ot b

e co

mpu

ted

beca

use

thes

e ex

ports

wer

e ne

glib

le.

43

Annexes

Table A.16: IMF 1997 Classification Scheme for Overall Trade Restrictiveness

Non-Tariff Barriers

Open Moderate Restrictive

less than 1% 1–25% 25%Tariffsa coverageb coverageb coverageb or higher

0 ≤ t < 10% 1 4 7

10 ≤ t < 15% 2 5 8

15 ≤ t < 20% 3 6 9

20 ≤ t < 25% 4 7 10

25% or higher 5 8 10

Source: Sharer (1998)

Notes: (a) Unweighted average tariff & surcharges on dutiable imports.

(b) Coverage of trade or production.

Table A.17: IMF 2000 Classification Scheme for Tariff Restrictiveness

Non-Tariff Barriersa

Absolutely no restrictions Few restrictions; Substantial restrictions; Pervasive restrictions;

Trade taxesb 0-20 % trade coveragec 20-40% trade coveragec > 40% trade coveragec

0 ≤ t < 10% 1 3 5 7

10 ≤ t < 15% 2 4 6 8

15 ≤ t < 20% 3 5 7 9

20 ≤ t < 25% 4 6 8 10

25 ≤ t < 35% 5 7 9 10

35% or higher 10 10 10 10

Source: Subramanian et al (2000).

Notes: (a) Includes restrictions on exports and imports and other NTBs.

(b) Includes customs duties and other charges levied exclusively on imports, as well as export taxes. We use the sum of NPTR on all import-competing goods and exporttaxes as a proxy for this variable.

(c) Refers to the share of total trade being affected by NTBs.

44


Table A.18: Major Exports

Product description Value in millions of US$ Export share BEC category SITC

Fish, crustaceans, and aquatic invertebrates 246.5 24.9 consumer 03

Petroleum, petroleum products, and related materials 139.3 14.0 intermediate 33

Organic chemicals (phosphates) 77.4 7.8 intermediate 51

Groundnut and other vegetable oils 71.5 7.2 intermediate 42

Crude fertilizers 30.4 3.1 intermediate 27

Essential oils and perfume materials 23.9 2.4 consumer 55

Feeding stuff for animals 22.3 2.3 intermediate 08

Fertilizers 20.1 2.0 intermediate 56

Power generating machinery and equipment 17.6 1.8 consumer 71

Miscellaneous manufactured articles 15.4 1.6 consumer 89

Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 10.9 1.1 intermediate 66

Metalworking machinery 9.7 1.0 capital 73

Textile fibers 9.2 0.9 intermediate 26

Vegetables and fruit 8.4 0.8 consumer 05

Paper and paper products 7.3 0.7 intermediate 64

Machinery 6.9 0.7 consumer 72

Chemical materials and products 6.9 0.7 intermediate 59

Plastics in nonprimary forms 6.2 0.6 intermediate 58

Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 5.9 0.6 intermediate 28

Raw hides, skins, and furskins 5.9 0.6 intermediate 21

Textile, yarn, fabrics 5.0 0.5 consumer or intermediate 65

Iron and steel 4.7 0.5 intermediate 67

Other 240.5 24.2

Total 991.8 100.0

Source: COMTRADE

Table A.19: Major Import-Competing Industry Output

Production share (1996) BEC category

Beef 17.8 consumer

Metal cans 9.5 capital

Millet 9.5 intemediate

Textiles 8.9 intemediate

Bakery 6.7 consumer

Cosmetics 6.5 consumer

Soft drinks 4.8 consumer

Shoes 4.6 consumer

Refined sugar 4.6 consumer

Cement 4.4 intemediate

Paper containers 3.8 intemediate

Batteries 3.5 consumer

Cigarettes 2.3 consumer

Rice 2.3 consumer

Matches 1.9 consumer

Total 100

Source: Data collected by the Bank staff from the countries concerned.

45

List of Publications

ARWPS 1 Progress in Public Expenditure Management in Africa: January 1999 C. KostopoulosEvidence from World Bank Surveys

ARWPS 2 Toward Inclusive and Sustainable Development in the March 1999 Markus KostnerDemocratic Republic of the Congo

ARWPS 3 Business Taxation in a Low-Revenue Economy: A Study June 1999 Ritva Reinikkaon Uganda in Comparison with Neighboring Countries Duanjie Chen

ARWPS 4 Pensions and Social Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: October 1999 Luca BarboneIssues and Options Luis-A. Sanchez B.

ARWPS 5 Forest Taxes, Government Revenues and the Sustainable January 2000 Luca BarboneExploitation of Tropical Forests Juan Zalduendo

ARWPS 6 The Cost of Doing Business: Firmsí Experience with June 2000 Jacob SvenssonCorruption in Uganda

ARWPS 7 On the Recent Trade Performance of Sub-Saharan August 2000 Francis Ng andAfrican Countries: Cause for Hope or More of the Same Alexander J. Yeats

ARWPS 8 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: November 2000 Miria PigatoOld Tales and New Evidence

ARWPS 9 The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: November 2000 Channing ArndtA Preliminary Assessment Jeffrey D. Lewis

ARWPS 10 Revisiting Growth and Convergence: December 2000 C. G. TsangaridesIs Africa Catching Up?

ARWPS 11 Spending on Safety Nets for the Poor: How Much, January 2001 William J. Smithfor How Many? The Case of Malawi

ARWPS 12 Tourism in Africa February 2001 Iain T. ChristieD. E. Crompton

ARWPS 13 Conflict Diamonds February 2001 Louis Goreux

ARWPS 14 Reform and Opportunity: The Changing Role and March 2001 Jeffrey D. LewisPatterns of Trade in South Africa and SADC

ARWPS 15 The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa March 2001 Miria Pigato

ARWPS 16 Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes for Developing April 2001 Fahrettin YagciCountries

Africa Region Working Paper Series

Series # Title Date Author

46


ARWPS 17 Export Processing Zones: Has Africa Missed the Boat? May 2001 Peter L. WatsonNot yet!

ARWPS 18 Rural Infrastructure in Africa: Policy Directions June 2001 Robert Fishbein

ARWPS 19 Changes in Poverty in Madagascar: 1993–1999 July 2001 S. PaternostroJ. RazafindravononaDavid Stifel

ARWPS 20 Information and Communication Technology, Poverty, August 2001 Miria Pigatoand Development in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia

ARWPS 21 Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings September 2001 Navin Girishankar :Governance Underpinnings of School Performance A. Alemayehuin Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region Yusuf Ahmad

ARWPS 22 Child Malnutrition in Ethiopia: Can Maternal October 2001 Luc ChristiaensenKnowledge Augment The Role of Income? Harold Alderman

ARWPS 23 Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing November 2001 Beth Verheyand Reintegrating

ARWPS 24 The Budget and Medium-Term Expenditure December 2001 David L. BevanFramework in Uganda

ARWPS 25 Design and Implementation of Financial Management January 2002 Guenter HeidenhofSystems: An African Perspective H. Grandvoinnet

Daryoush KianpourB. Rezaian

ARWPS 26 What Can Africa Expect From Its Traditional Exports? February 2002 Francis NgAlexander Yeats

ARWPS 27 Free Trade Agreements and the SADC Economies February 2002 Jeffrey D. LewisSherman RobinsonKaren Thierfelder

ARWPS 28 Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks: From Concept February 2002 P. Le Houerouto Practice. Preliminary Lessons from Africa Robert Taliercio

ARWPS 29 The Changing Distribution of Public Education February 2002 Samer Al-SamarraiExpenditure in Malawi Hassan Zaman

ARWPS 30 Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: An Agenda for April 2002 Serge Michailofthe Africa Region Markus Kostner

Xavier Devictor



47




ARWPS 31 Efficiency of Public Expenditure Distribution and May 2002 Xiao YeBeyond: A report on Ghanaís 2000 Public Expenditure S. CanagarajaTracking Survey in the Sectors of Primary Healthand Education

ARWPS 32 Promoting Growth and Employment in South Africa June 2002 Jeffrey D.Lewis

ARWPS 33 Addressing Gender Issues in Demobilization and August 2002 N. de WattevilleReintegration Programs

ARWPS 34 Putting Welfare on the Map in Madagascar August 2002 Johan A. MistiaenBerk SolerT. RazafimanantenaJ. Razafindravonona

ARWPS 35 A Review of the Rural Firewood Market Strategy August 2002 Gerald Foleyin West Africa Paul Kerkhof

Djibrilla Madougou

ARWPS 36 Patterns of Governance in Africa September 2002 Brian D. Levy

ARWPS 37 Obstacles and Opportunities for Senegalís International September 2002 Stephen GolubCompetitiveness: Case Studies of the Peanut Oil, Ahmadou AlyFishing and Textile Industries Mbaye

ARWPS 38 A Macroeconomic Framework for Poverty Reduction October 2002 S. DevarajanStrategy Papers : With an Application to Zambia Delfin S. Go

ARWPS 39 The Impact of Cash Budgets on Poverty Reduction November 2002 Hinh T. Dinhin Zambia: A Case Study of the Conflict between Abebe AdugnaWell Intentioned Macroeconomic Policy Bernard Myersand Service Delivery to the Poor

ARWPS 40 Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey November 2002 Stephen N. Ndegwa

ARWPS 41 An Industry Level Analysis of Manufacturing December 2002 Professor A. MbayeProductivity in Senegal

ARWPS 42 Tanzaniaís Cotton Sector: Constraints and Challenges December 2002 John Baffesin a Global Environment

ARWPS 43 Analyzing Financial and Private Sector Linkages January 2003 Abayomi Alawodein Africa

48




ARWPS 44 Modernizing Africaís Agro-Food System: Analytical February 2003 Steven JaffeeFramework and Implications for Operations Ron Kopicki

Patrick LabasteIain Christie

ARWPS 45 Public Expenditure Performance in Rwanda March 2003 Hippolyte FofackC. ObidegwuRobert Ngong

ARWPS 46 Senegal Tourism Sector Study March 2003 Elizabeth CromptonIain T. Christie

ARWPS 47 Reforming the Cotton Sector in SSA March 2003 Louis GoreuxJohn Macrae

ARWPS 48 HIV/AIDS, Human Capital, and Economic Growth April 2003 Channing ArndtProspects for Mozambique

ARWPS 49 Rural and Micro Finance Regulation in Ghana: June 2003 William F. SteelImplications for Development and Performance David O. Andahof the Industry

ARWPS 50 Microfinance Regulation in Benin: Implications June 2003 K. Ouattaraof the PARMEC LAW for Development and Performanceof the Industry

ARWPS 51 Microfinance Regulation in Tanzania: Implications June 2003 Bikki Randhawafor Development and Performance of the Industry Joselito Gallardo

ARWPS 52 Regional Integration in Central Africa: Key Issues June 2003 Ali ZafarKeiko Kubota

ARWPS 53 Evaluating Banking Supervision in Africa June 2003 Abayomi Alawode

ARWPS 54 Microfinance Institutionsí Response in Conflict June 2003 Marilyn S. ManaloEnvironments: Eritrea- Savings and Micro CreditProgram; West Bank and Gaza – Palestine for Creditand Development; Haiti – Micro Credit National, S.A.

AWPS 55 Malawiís Tobacco Sector: Standing on One Strong leg June 2003 Steven Jaffeeis Better than on None

AWPS 56 Tanzaniaís Coffee Sector: Constraints and Challenges June 2003 John Baffesin a Global Environment

49




AWPS 57 The New Southern AfricanCustoms Union Agreement June 2003 Robert KirkMatthew Stern

AWPS 58 a How Far Did Africaís First Generation Trade Reforms June 2003 Lawrence HinkleGo? An Intermediate Methodology for Comparative A. Herrou-AragonAnalysis of Trade Policies Keiko Kubota

AWPS 58 b How Far Did Africaís First Generation Trade Reforms June 2003 Lawrence HinkleGo? An Intermediate Methodology for Comparative A. Herrou-AragonAnalysis of Trade Policies Keiko Kubota

AWPS 59 Rwanda: The Search for Post-Conflict Socio-Economic October 2003 C. ObidegwuChange, 1995–2001

AWPS 60 Linking Farmers to Markets: Exporting October 2003 Morgane DanielouMalian Mangoes to Europe Patrick Labaste

J-M. Voisard

AWPS 61 Evolution of Poverty and Welfare in Ghana October 2003 S. Canagarajahin the 1990s: Achievements and Challenges Claus C. Pˆrtner

AWPS 62 Reforming The Cotton Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa: November 2003 Louis GoreuxSECOND EDITION

AWPS 63 (E) Republic of Madagascar: Tourism Sector Study November 2003 Iain T. ChristieD. E. Crompton

AWPS 63 (F) République de Madagascar: Etude du Secteur Tourisme November 2003 Iain T. ChristieD. E. Crompton

AWPS 64 Migrant Labor Remittances in Africa: Reducing Novembre 2003 Cerstin SanderObstacles to Development Contributions Samuel M. Maimbo

AWPS 65 Government Revenues and Expenditures in January 2004 Francisco G. CarneiroGuinea-Bissau: Casualty and Cointegration Joao R. Faria

Boubacar S. Barry

AWPS 66 How will we know the Development Results when June 2004 Jody Zall Kusekwe see them: Building a Results-Based Monitoring Ray C. Ristand Evaluation System to give us the answers Elizabeth M. White

AWPS 67 An Analysis of the Trade Regime in Senegal (2001) June 2004 Alberto Herrou-and UEMOA’s Common External Trade Policies Arago

Keiko Kubota

50


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