Almond_verba_cap 1 an Approach

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terns.

ptions,

t. Con-

stable

e. The

307

337CHAPTER I

An Approach to Political Culture

THIS IS A STUDY of the political culture of democracy and of

the social structures and processes that sustain it. The faith

of the Enlightenment in the inevitable triumph of human

reason and liberty has been twice shaken in recent decades.

The development of Fascism and Communism after World

War I raised serious doubts about the inevitability of de-

mocracy in the West; and we still cannot be certain that

the continental European nations will discover a stable

form of democratic process suitable to their particular cul-

tures and social institutions; nor can we more than hope

that together they will discover a European democracy.

Without having first resolved these doubts, the events

since World War IIhave raised questions of the future of

democracy on a world scale. The "national explosions" in

Asia and Africa and the almost universal pressure by previ-

ously subjected and isolated peopIes for admission intothe modem world put this more special political question

into the broader Context of the future character of the

world's culture. Culture change has acquired a new sig-

nificance in world history. The groping toward enlighten-

ment and control aver nature that acquired momentum

three or four centuries aga in the "Vest has became a

world-wide process, and its tempo has shifted from cen-turies to decades.

The central question af public palicy in the next dec-


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1Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction, New York, 1936,pp.324-46.

2 Committee on Compara tive Politics, Social Science Research Council,

Memorand'lm on the Concept of Modernization, November 1961.

ades is what content this emerging world culture will have.

We already have a partial answer to this question and could

have predicted it from our knowledge of the processes ofcul-

tural diffusion.1

Physical goods and their mode of production

seem to presem the least difficulties in diffusion. It is apparent

that these aspects of Western culture are diffusing rapidly,

along with the technology Upon which they dependo Since

economic modernization and national unification require a

large social overhead investment in transportation, communi-

cation, and education, and since these in turn call for taxation,

regulation, and administration, the model of a rational bu-

reaucracy also diffuses relatively easily. The idea of an efficient

bureaucracy has much in common with the idea of a rational

technology. Lucian Pye refers to modern social organization as

being based on an organizational technology.2 It has in com-

mon with engineering and technology a mixture of rationality

and authority. Engineering is the application of rationality

and authorty to material things; modern social organization is

their application to human beings and social groups. Though

the non-Western world is far from having successfuIIy developed

an industrial technology and an efficient bureaucracy, there

can be little q'llestion that it wams these institutions and hassome uncIerstanding of them.

What is problematical about the coment of the emerging

world culture is ts political character. AIthough the move-

ment toward technology and rationality of organization ap-

pears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direc-

tion of poltical change is less clear. But one aspect of this

new world political culture is discernible: it wiU be a po-

ltical culture of participation. If there is a poltical revolu-

tion going on throughout the world, t is what might be

called the participation explosion. In all the new nations ofthe world the belief that the ordinary man is political1y rele-

vam - that he ought to be an involved participam in. the po-

litical system - is widespread. Large groups of people who

2An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political

have been outside of pOliti4

political system. And the I

profess commitmem to this :

Though this coming wo

dominated by the partici)

of participation will be is

are presented with two diticipatory state, the deml

democratic state offers the

take part in the political (

ential citizen; the totalitar:

ticipant subject." S Both 11

tions, and which wiU win

the two does not emerge -

If the democratic model

velop in these new natio

formal institutions of dem

litical party, the elective

part of the totalitarian p.not functional sense. A d(

litical system requires as

with it. But the transfer o

ern democratic states to f

rious difficulties. There an

these concerns the natun

The great ideas of demol

of the individual, the priJ

the governed - are eleva ti

imaginations of many of t

the modernizing older one

demoeratic polity and its

political elites make decis

wellas the norms and at

relation to government aI

der cultural components.

8See Frederick C. Barghoon

pared for the Summer Institu

Committee on Compara tive Pol

mer 1962.


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o Political Culture

cuIture will h ave.uestion and could

he processes ofcul.

mode of production

sion. It is apparent

diffusing rapidly,

hey dependo Since

fication require a

rtation, communi-

n call for taxation,

of a rational bu-

idea of an efficient

idea of a rationalial organization as

y.2It has in com-

ture of rationality

on of rationality

ial organization is

l groups. Though

cessfullydeveloped

ureaucracy, there

stitutions and has

of the emerging

hough the move-f organization ap-

world, the direc-

ne aspect of this

it will be a po-

a political revolu-

s what might be

e new nations of

is politicaIly rele-

ieipant in the po-

S of people who

on, New York. 1936,

ce Research Council.mber 1961.


have been outside of politics are demanding entrance into thepolitical system. And the political elites are rare who do notprofess commitment to this goaI.

Though this coming world politi~al culture appears to be

dominated by the participation explosion, what the mode

of participati0l! will be is uncertain. The emerging nations

are presented with two different mode!s of the modern par-

ticipatory state, the democratic and the totalitarian. The

democratic state offers the ordinary man the opportunity to

take part in the political decision-making process as an influ-

ential citizen; the totalitarian offers him the role of the "par-

ticipant subject:' 8 Both modes have appeal to the new na-

tions, and which will win out - if indeed some amalgam ofthe two does not emerge - cannot be foretold.

1 the democratic mode! of the participatory state is to de-

velop in these new nations, it will require more than the

formal institutions of democracy - universal suffrage, the po-

litical party, the elective legislature. These in fact are also

part of the totaltarian participation pattern, in a f,rmalif

not functional sense. A democratic form of participatory po-

ltical system requires as well a poltical culture consistent

with it. But the transfer of the political culture of the West-

ern democratic states to the emerging nations encounters se-

rious difficulties. There are two principal reasons. The first of

these concerns the nature of the demoeratic culture itself.The great ideas of democraey - the freedoms and dignities

of the individual, the principIe of government by consent of

the governed - are elevating and inspiring. They capture the

imaginations of many of the leaders of the new states and of

the modernizing older ones. But the working principIes of the

democratic polity and its civic culture - the ways in which

poltical elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as.

well as the norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his

relation to government and to his fellow citizens - are sub-

tIer cultural components. They have the more diffuse proper-

8 See Frederick C. Barghoom, "Soviet Political CuIture," a paper pre-

pared for the Summer Institute on Political Culture. sponsored by theCommittee on Compara tive Politics. Social Science Research Council. Sumomer 1962.

')'


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4 An Approach to Political Culture

ties of belief systems or of codes of personal relations, whichthe anthropologists teU us spread only with great difficulty,undergoing substantial change in the processo

Actually, Western social sdence has onIy begun to codifythe operating characteristics of the democratc pality itself.The doctrine an practice of a rational bureaucracy as an in.strument of the democratic political powers are less than acentury old. Doubts about the possibility of a neutral bu-reaucracy were expressed in England as recently as the 1930's,and on the European continent such doubt is widespread to-day. The complex infrastructure of the democratic polity-

politicaI parties, interest groups, and the media of communi-

cations - and the understanding of their inner workings,op-erating norms, and sociaI-psychologica! preconditions are onlynow being realized in the West. Thus the image of the dem-ocratic polity that sconveyed to the elites of the new na-

tio05 is obscure and incomplete and heavi!y stresses ideologyand legal norms. What must be learned abaut democracy is amatter af attitude and feeling, and this is harder to learn.

The second principal reason why the diffusion af democ-

racy encounters difficulties among the new nations concernsthe objective problems confronting these natiom. They areentering"history wth archaic technologies and social systems,drawn toward the gleam and power of the technological andscientific revolutions. It is not difficult to see why they should

be drawn toward a technocratic image of the polity: a polityin which authoritarian bureaucracy predominates and politica!organization becomes a device for human and social engineer-ing.

In almost every instance, however, though in differing meas-ure, the leaders of the modernizing nations appreciate the dis-tortions and the risks in adopting an authoritarian form of

polity. Though they cannot fully understand the subtle baloances of the democratic polity and the nuances of the civiccuIture, they tend to acknowledge their Iegitimacy as the ex-

pression of an impulsetoward the humane poly. In charac-terizing their situation, we have left out a significam elementoFor. though it is true that they are fascinated by scence andtechnology and are drawn to ao impatient technocratic polity

An Approach to Po

as a means of attaini

also the creatures

would prefer to deal

were available,

THE C!VIC CULTURlE

It is as an answer

recommends tself. Fture, but one that cooffers an example ofvelopment of the ci,as the product of ation and traditionalsignificant change btas to acate disintegher insular security,ficaton and of absoof aristocratic, local,tinental Europe, A

separation rom thetoleration af relgi01gence of a thriving ;involvement of comlations of trade and (

Independem aris

countryside, courag(dent merchants - tItradi tion of the feution and enabled Ilutism without destrthe industri.al revolelites which made itchanges in sodal sticenturies withoutWhigs found it poformst merchan ts a

principIes of parE;

The tradicional ari~~ough o this cvi


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as a means of attaining the new things of this worId, they arealso the creatures of their own traditional cultures and

would prefer to deal gently with these cultures if this choicewere available,

THE CIVIC CULTURE

It is as an answer to this ambivalence that the civic culturerecommends itself. For the civic culture is not a modem cul-ture, but one that combines modernity with tradition. Britainoffers an example of how such a cllJture can develop. The de-

velopment of the civic culture in Britain may be llnderstoodas the product of a sedes of encounters between moderniza-tion and traditionalism - encounters sharp enough to effectsignificam change but B ar 5 0 sharp 01' 50 concentrated in timeas to ereatedisintegraton ar polarizatian. Partly because ofher insular security, Britain carne imo lhe era of national uni-ficatian and af absolutism able to tolerate a greater measureof aristocratic, local, and corporate autollomy than could con-tinental Europe. A first step toward secularization was theseparation fTOm the Church of Rome and the beginnings oftoleration of reIgious diversity. A second step was the emer-gence of a thriving and self-confident rrierchant dass, and the

involvement of court and arstocracy in the risks andcalcu-lations of trade and commerce.

Independem aristocrats with secure local power in thecountryside, courageous nonconformsts, rich and seU-confi-dent merchants - these were the forces that transformed thetradition of the feudal estates into the parliamentary tradi-tion and enabled Britain to pass through the era of abso-lutism without destroying her pluralismo Britan thus enteredthe industrial revolution with a poltical clllture among itselites which made it possible to assimilate the grss and rapidchanges in social structure in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies without sharp discontinuities. The aristocratieWhigs found it possible to enter a caalition with noncon-formist merchants and industrialists, to establsh securely the

principIes of parliamentary supremacy and representation.The traditional aristocratic and monarchc forces assimilatedenough af this dvic culture to compete wtn the secularist

to Political Culture

onal relations, which

with great difficu1ty,ess.

nIy begun to codifyocratic polity itself.ureaucraey as an in-

wers are Iess than ay of a neutral bu-

ecentIy as the 1930's,

Uht is widespread to-democratic polity-media of communi-inner workings,op-econditions are only

e image of the dem-ites of the new na-ily stresses ideology

bout democraey is lirder to learn.

diffusion of democ-w nations concerns

nations. They are and social systems,

e technological andee why they shouldthe polity: a polityinates and political

and social engineer-

h in differing meas-appreciate the dis-

horitarian form ofnd the subtle bal-

uances of the civicgitimaey as the ex-

polity. In charac-ignificant elementoted by science andtechnocratic polity

An Approach to Political Culture 5


6/44

We have concentrated on British experience because thewhole story of the emergence of the civic culture is told inBritish history, whereas developments in the United Statesand the countries of the "Old Commonwealth" began aftersome of the major battles had been won. ActualIy, in thecourse of the nineteenth century the development of the dem-ocratic culture and infrastructure was more rapid and moreunequivocal in the United States than in Britain, since theUnited States was a new and rapidly expanding society andrelatively unimpeded by traditional institutions. Though their

basic pattems are similar, the civic cultures of Britain and theUnited States have somewhat different contents, reflectingthese differences in national histories and social structures.

On the European continent the record is more mixed.

tendencies for popular support and, indeed, to mitiga te theirrationalism and mpart to them a love and respect for thesacredness of the nation and its ancient institutions.

What emerged was a third culture, neither traditional normodem but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based oncommunication and persuasion, a cuIture of consensus anddiversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it.

This was the civic culture. With this civic culture already con-soldated, the working classes could enter into politics and, ina process of trial and error, find the language in which to

couch their demands and the means to make them effective.

It was in this culture of diversity and consensualism, ration-alsm and traditionalism, that the structure of British democ-racy could develop: parliamentarism and representation, theaggregative political party and the responsible and neutral

bureaucracy, the associational and bargaining interest groups,and the autonomous and neutral media of communication.English parliamentarism included the traditional and modemforces; the party system aggregated and combined them; the

bureaucracy became responsible to the new political forces;and the poltical parties, interest groups, and neutral media of

communication meshed continuously with the diffuse interestgroupings of the community and with its primary communica-'

tions networks.

6

An Approach to Political Culture An Approach to Poli

Though their patternBritain and America,tries, and Switzerlandversion of a polticaland compromise. In ]ters between moderni;ers seem to have beelto permit the emergecommodation. The ci

piration, and the deI

being attained.The civic culture agreat and problematIscience of the West hapossession and everytraditional societies acivic culture - man'sway to handle socialwell?

As we consider theculture - indeed, astheir emergence is stior both of two moodla process whereby masurface muddled tO\\violence and gropedstructive instrumentbecomes a unique cuThe second mood isreplaced the mood (fore World War I. ]tudes so fragile, soout of historical ansubtleties and theseourselves in a world

nology run wild, de:and possibly of life it:

No one can proviBut as social scientisl


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Though their patterns differ in many respects from those ofBrtain and America, the Scandinavian countries, Low Couo-tries, and Switzerland appear to have worked out their ownversion of a political culture and practice of accommodatonand compromise. In France, Germany, and ltaly the encoun-ters between modernizing tendencies and the traditional pow-ers seem to have been too massive and too uncompromisingto permit the emergence of a shared culture of poltical ac-commodation. The civic culture is present in the form of as-piration, and the demoeratic inrastructure is still ar rombeing attained.

The civic culture and the open polity, then, represent thegreat and problematic gifts of the West. The technology andscience of the West have now already passed out of her unique

possession and everywhere are destroying and transformingtraditional societies and cultures. Can the open polity, and thecivic culture - man's discovery of a humane and conservativeway to handle social change and participation - spread aswell?

As we consider the origin of the open polity and the civicculture - indeed, as we consider the areas in the West where

their emergence is still in doubt - we may faIl victim to oneor both of two moods. The first is one of mystery or awe overa process whereby mankind on only a smalI part of the earth'ssurface muddled toward a humane and reasoned taming ofviolence and groped toward its transformation into a con-structive instrument available to alI i.l1terests. As mystery, itbecomes a unique cultural heritage unavailable to foreigners.The second mood is one of pessimism, which seems to havereplaced the mood of democratic optimism that existed be-fore World War L How can a set of arrangements and atti-tudes so fragile, so intricate, and so subtle be transplantedout of historical and cultural context? Or, how can these

subtleties and these humane etiquettes survive even amongourselves in a world caught in the grip of a science and tech-nology run wild, destructive of tradition and of communtyand possibly of lHe tself?

No one can provide defini tive answers to these questions.But as social scientists we can put the questions in such a way

to Political Culture

d, to mtigate their

and respect for thetutions.

ther tradtional nortic culture based one of consensus and

e but moderated it.culture already con-nto politics and, in

guage in which toake them effective.sensualism, ration-

e of British democ-representation, thensible and neutralng interest groups,of communication.tional and modernmbined them; the

ew poltical forces;d neutral media of

the diffuse interestimary communica-

rience beca use theculture is told in

the United Statesealth" began after

ActuaIly, in thepment of the dem-e rapid and moreBrtain, since thending society andons. Though theirof Brtain and theontents, reflectingial structures.

is more mixed.

An Approach to Political Culture7


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as to get useful answers. Though we may share the mood of

wonde. and awe at the intricacy of the democratic mecha-nisrns and the unique historical experience out of which they

e~~rged, we are confronted with a contemporary historicaIchailenge for which mood by itself is an inadequate re-sponse. ,1. we. are to come doser to understanding the problemsof the cllfuslOn of democratic culture, we have to be able to

specify the contem of what has to be diffused, to develop ap-

propnate measures for it, to disco ver its quantitative ind-dence and demographic distribution in countries with a

wide range af experience with democracy. With such knowl-edge we can speculate intelligently about "how much of

what" must be presem in a country before democratic insti ..tutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations.

E~orts to. deal with this problem have usually beeo basedon ImpresslOns and inferences from history, on inferencesfrem democratic ideology, on certain kinds of socioloQ"icalanalysis, ar 011 psychologica! insights. Thus in our effor;s toestimate the prospeets of democracy in countries such as Ger-man)' and Italy, or in the developin.g areas of the non-'iVestern

world, we freguem!y try to draw "lessons" from British and~meriean. hi~tory. It has been argued, for example, that theIong cont!nUlty of British and American political experienceand the gradual process of change have both contributed toeffective democratization. Similar1y, the growth of a vigorous

and numerous middle c1ass, the developrnent of Protestantism,and in particular the nonconformist sects, have been consid-

ered vital to the development of stable dernocratic institutionsin Britain, the Old Commonwealth, and the Unted States.There have been efforts to derive fram these experiencessome standards as to what attitudes and behavior must be

present in other countries if they are to become democratic.

Even more common than drawing inferences from historyhas becn our tendency to derive criteria of what has to bediffused rom the institutional and ideological norms of de-mocracy itself. XL 1S argued that if a democratic svstem is basedon tbe sharing of influence among the adu1t p;pulation as awbole, then, if the system is not to be subverted, the indi-viduaI musi use his power .intelligently for the good of the

An Approach to Politl

polity. Theorists of d~stressed that democraCltticipation in civic affailpublic affairs, and by ,ity. These doctrines teI

be like if he is to bel

the system.Stil! a third type of

the development of st:nomic and social conetems. Both Lipset and

tween indices of moamain problem presentand psychoIogieal co

and processes are left tin comparison to otheliterate and educatedand wealth are highertions the amenities ojanalysis not only omit

tion, it also cannot exGermany and France,ernization, are classifCuba and Venezuela,

development in Latinship and instability.potheses but does nolattitudes is associated .

Another type af apdemocracy is based oLasswelI has gone fu;acteristics of the "deI

acter qualities he in,means a warm an in

4 Seymour M. Lipset, FA. Almond and James (Princeton, N.}., 1960, pp.

I) The Political Writinl

495ft; LassweIl,Power an


9/44

Political Culture

are the mood ofmocratic mecha.u of whch theyporary historical

inadequate re-ng the problemsve to be able to, to deve10p ap-

uantitative inc-

untries with aith such knowl-"how much of

democratic insti ..xpectations.

ually been basedy, on inferences

of socioIogicaln our efforts toies such as Ger-the non-\Vestem

rom British andxample, that theiticaI experience

h contributed towth of a vigorousof Protestantism,ave been consid-atc nstitutionse United States.hese experienceshavior must beome democratic.ces from history""hat has to be

caI norms of de-c system is basedpopuIation as a

verted, the indi-the good of the

An Approach to Political Culture 9

polity. Theorists af democracy from Aristotle to Bryce havestressed that democraces are maintained by active citizen par-ticipation in civic affairs, by a high level of information aboutpublic aftairs, and- by a widespread sense of civic responsibil-ity. These doctrines teU us what a demo era tic dtizen ought to

be like if he is to behave according to the requirements Df

the system.Stil! a third type o investigation of the conditions favoring

the deveIopment of stable democracy are studies of the eco-nomic and sodal conditions associated with democratic sya-tems. Both Lipset and CoIeman find a strong correlation be-tween indices of modernizatiol1 and democratization.4 Themain problem presented by these studies is that the culturaland psychologieal consequences of "modem" technologiesand processes are left to inference. We know that democraces,in comparison to other political systems, tend to have more!iterate and educated peopIe, that their per capita incomeand wealth are higher, and that they enjoy in greater propor-tions the amenities of modem civilization. Rut this type ofanalysis not only omits the psychological basis of democratiza-tion, it also cannot explain the significant deviam cases. Thu.sGermany and France, which rank high ou the indices of mod-

ernization, are classified by Lipset as unstable democracies.Cuba and Venezuela, both of Wh1Chrank high in economicdevelopment in Latin America, have long histories of dictator-ship and instability. This kind of study is suggestive of hy-potheses but does not teU us directIy what kind of duster ofattitudes is assocated with democracy.

Another type o approach to the eulture and psyehology ofdemocracy is based on the insights of psychoanaIysis. HaroldLasswelI has gone furthest in specifying the personality char-aeteristics of the "democrat." 5 In his list of demoeratic ebar-acter quaIities he includes (1) an "open ego," by which hemeans a warm and inclusive attitude toward other human be-

4 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960, pp. 4511.;GabrielA. Almond and James Coleman, Thc Politics of the Developing Areas,Princeton, N.J., 1960, pp. 538ff.

li The Poltical Writings of Harold D. l.asswell, Glencoe, m., 1951, pp.495ff.; Lasswell,Power and Personality, New York, 1946, pp. 148ff.


10/44

HJ An Approach to Political Culture

ings; (2) a capacity for sharing values with others; (3) amultivalued rather than a single-valued orientation; (4) trustand confidence in the human environmem, and (5) relativefreedom trom anxiety. Though the relationship between thesecharacteristics and democratie behavior seems to be c1ear,

Lasswell's democratie qualities are not specifically politicalattitudes and feelings, and they may actually be encounteredin great frequency in societies that are not democratie instructure.

Our study grows out of this body of theory about the char-acteristics and preconditions of the culture of democracy.

What we have done amounts to a series of experiments in-tended to test some of these hypotheses. Rather than inferringthe properties of democratic culture fram political institu-tions or social conditions, we have attempted to specify itsCOntent by examining attitudes in a number of operatingdemocratic systems. And rather than deriving the social-

psychological preconditions of democracy from psychologiealtheory, we have sought to determine whether and to what ex.tent these, relations actually exist in functioning democratic:systems. We do not argue that our study wilI shut off specula.tion and provide the precise and tested propositions of a com-

plete theory of democracy, but, rather, that some of thesepropositions wilI survive the test of empirical-quantitativeanalysis"and some will not. This stage of experiment shouldfocus and direct inquiry by providing some answers to oldquestions and suggesting some new questions.

In stilI another respect we hope to contribute to the de.velopment of a scientific theory of democracy. By far thegreatest amount of empirical research on democratic attitudeshas been done in the Unted States. In our study we have in-cluded, in addition to our own Country, Britain, Germany,Italy, and Mexico. Why we selected these particular countriesis discussed below. Our five-country study offers us the oppor-

tunity to escape from this Amercan parochialism and to dis-cover whether or not relations found in the American data arealso encountered in democratic countries whose. historieal ex-

periences and poltical and social structures differ from ooeanother.

An Approach to P

TYPES OF POLITICA

In our comparisc

porary democraci.esc1assifications Whld

We speak of the ":the "national charalitical socialization"rearing in generallogical and anthroItudes to other com 1those theories whic

velopment in gen.einto his adult polacoulcl not have belhistorians, social Ips)'chologists, and Ithe relationshi pscharacteristics of ngreatly influenced 1tural appro


11/44

6 General theoretical statements of lhis approach are lO be fOllnd inter

alia in RUlh Benedict, Pallt'l'IlS of Culture, New York, 1934; Alex lnkcles

and Daniel Lcvinson, "National Character: The Stuuy of Modal Person.

ality and Socio-Cultural Systems," in Garuner Lindze)' (eu.), Hal1dbook of

Social Psychology, Cambriuge, l\fass., 1954, VoI. Il; Bert Kaplan (ed.),

Studyil1g Persollality Cmss.Cullurall)'. Evanston, m., 1961; Abram Kardi.ner. The Psychological Frol1tiers of Society, New York, 1939; Kardiner,

The Individual and His Societ)', New York, 1945; Clyde Klllckhohn, Henry

Murra)', and David Schneider, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture,

New York. 1955; Harold D. LassweIl, Psychopathology and Politics in Polit.

ical Writings, op. cit.; Nathan Leites, "Psychocultural Hypotheses About Po.

litical Acts," in J-florld Polilics, Vol. I, 1948; Ralph Linton, The Cultural

Backgroul1d of Persollllli/y,. New York. 1945; l\l:u'garet l\l~au, "The Study

of National Character," in Daniel Lemer anu Harold D. Lasswell, The

Policy Sciellces, Stan(ord, 1951. Particularly relevam lo our work is Alex

lnkeles, "National Character and Modem Political Systems," in Francis L. K.

Hsu (ed.), Psychological Atltilroj)ology, Homewood, m., 1961. And one of

the most importam recent contributions to the theory of national charac.

TYPES OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In our comparison o the political cultures o five contem-

porary demotracies, we employ a number of concepts and

classifications which it will be useul to specify and define.

We speak of the "political culture" o a nation rather than

the "national character" or "modal personality," and o "po-

litical socialization" rather than of child development or child

rearing in general terms, not beca use we reject the psycho-

logical anel anthropological theories that relate political alti-tudes to other components o personality, or because we reject

those theories which stress the relationship between child de-

velopment in general terms and the induction a the child

inta his adult political roles and altitudes. lndeed, this study

coulcl not have been made without the prior work a those

historians, social philosophers, an thropologists, sociologists,

ps)'chologists, and psychiatrists who have been concerned with

the relationships between the psychological and political

characteristics of nations. In particular, this study has been

greatly influenced by the "culture-personality" or "psychocul-

tural approach" to the study of political phenomena. This

approach has developed a substantial theoretical anel mono-graphic literature in the past twenty-five years.G

to Political Culturt:

with others; (3) a

rientatian; (4) trust

nt, and (5) relative

onship between these

seems to be clear,

specifically political

ally be encountered

not democratic in

ory about the char-

Iture of democracy.

of experiments in-

ather than inferring

m political institu-

pted to specify its

mber of operating

eriving the social-

from psychological

er and to what ex-

ioning democratir.

H shut olI specula-

positions of a com-

hat some of these

pirical-q uantita tive

experiment should

ne answers to old

ribute to the de-

cracy. By far the

mocratic attitud~s

study we have in-

Britain, Germany,

rticular contries

ffers us the oppor-

ialism and to dis-Ameriean data are

hose historical ex-

s dilIer from one



12/44

A .4ppmnch to Poltin . ...4


13/44

chology as social!zation, culture conJlict, and acculturation.

Similarly, our capacity to understancl the emergence anel

transformation of political systems grows when we draw upon

the body of theory anel speculation concerned with the gen-

eral phenomena of social structure and processo

We appreciate the fact that anthropologists use the term

cuIture in a vo.riety of ways, anel that by bringing it into the

conceptual vocabulary of political science we are in clanger of

importing its ambiguities as weIl as its advantages. Here we

cao onIy stress that we employ the concept of culture in only

one of its many meanings: that of psychological orientation

toward social objects. When we speak of the political culture

oi a society, we refer to the political system as internalizeel in

the cognitions, feelings, anel evaluations of its population.

People are inducteel into it just as they are socializeel into

nonpolitical roles anel social systems. Confiicts of political cul-

tures have much in common with other culture conflits, anel

political acculturative processes are more understandable if

we view them in the light of the resistances and the fusional

and incorpora tive tendencies of cultural change in general.

Thus the concept of political culture helps us to escape

rom the diffuseness of such general anthropological terms as

cultural ethos and ram the assumption af homogeneity that

the concept implies. lt enables us to formula te hypotheses

about relationships among the different components of cul-

ture and to test these hypotheses empirically. With the con-

cept of political socialization we can go beyond the rather

simpIe assumpticns of the psychocultural school regarding re-

lationships between general child development patterns and

adult poltical attitudes. 'iN'e can relate specific adult political

attitudes and behavioral propensities to the manifest and la-

tent political socialization experiences of childhood.

The politica! culture of a nation is the particular distribu-

tion of patterns oi orientation toward political objects among

the members of the nation. Before we can arrive at such dis-tributions, we need to have some way of systematically tap-

ping individual orientatio13 toward poltical objects. In other

words, we need to define and specify modes of poltical orien-

tation and classes of political objects. Qur definition and

Political Culture

for two reasons.

between political

ntal patterns, we

even though the

Qur terminology

thus refers to the

es toward the po-

tudes toward the

a political culture

or a religious cul-

edal set of sodal

ather than some

o utilize the con-

hropology, sociol-

riched when we

ropology and psy-

Personality, and Na.

S a general theory of

a study of Burmese

llY Incurablel Phila.

d National Socialist

odnick, Postwar Ger-

herland. A Study o/

48.

orer, The Arneriean

Your Powder Dry,

Crowd, New Haven,

ns on Contemporary

Geoffrey Gorer and

1949; Nathan Leites,

ead, Soviet Attitudes

asic, The lmpaet 01

ish Charaeter, NewGarne of Polities in

t Mead, Themes in

ie, Village in T he

e Ruth F. Benedict,

An Appmach to Political Culture 13


14/44

Cognition

Affect

Evaluation

Syst.

ger

ob

forcement. What w(

sis, and one that is

of polticaI culture:

ticipant and subjec

presence or absencc

structures. For our

of great importam

are also invoIved i

tions and that the s

in the performance

for our classifica tio

oriented to, how 1

these objects are I

flow of policy mak

enforcement. We 1

when we define the

We can consoIid:

viduaI orientations

TabIe 1.1 teUs us t1J

can be tapped systeJ

TABLE I.! Dimensions.

An Approach to Po

by which authoritati'

tures predominantly

bureaucracies and cal

We realize tha t a

actuaI continuity of

functionality of pol

made in bureaucraci

Iabel as input, such

are often concerned


classification of types of poltical orientation foIlow Parsons

and Shils, as has been suggested elsewhere.7 "Orientation" re.

fers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. 1t

incIudes (1) "cognitive oriemation," that is, knowledge of

and belief about the poltical system, ts roles and the in.

cumbems of these roles, ts inputs, and its OUtputs; (2) "af.

fective oriemation," 01' feelings about the political system, ts

roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) "evaluational

oriemation," the judgments and opinions about poltical ob.

jects that typicaIly invoIve the combination of value standards

and cri teria with information and feelings.

In classifying objects of poltical orientation, we start with

the "general" poltical system. We deal here wth the system

as a whole and incIude such feelings as patriotism 01' aliena.

tion, such cogntions and evaluations of the nation as "large"

01' "smalI," "strong" or "weak," and of the poliry as "demo-

cratic," "consttutional," or "socialistic." At the other extreme

we distinguish orientations toward the "self" as poltica 1 ac-

tor; the contem and quality of norms of personal poltical

obligation, and the content and quality of the sense of per-

sonal competence vis-.vis the poltical system. In treating the

component parts of the poltical system we distingllish, first,

three broad classes of objects: (1) specific roles 01' sI ructures,such as legislative bodies, executives, 01' bureaucracies; (2)

incumbl:nts of roles, such as particular monarchs, legisIators,

and administrators, and (3) particular public po1ies, de-

cisions, 01' enforcements of decisions. These structllres, in.

cumbems, and decisions may in turn be cIassified broadly by

whether they are involved ether in the political 01' "input"

process 01' in the administrative 01' "output" processo Ry "po-

ltical" ar "input" process we refer to the flow of demands

from the society imo the polty and the conversion of these

demands imo authortative policies. Some structures that are

predominamly involved in the input process are political

parties, interest groups, and the media of coInmunicatioll. Bythe administra tive or output process we refer to that process

7 Gabriel A, Almond, "Compara tive POlitical Systcllls," }oumal o/ Pol-

"fies, Vol. XVIII, 1956; Talcott Parsons and Edward A: Shils, Toward a

General Theory o{ Action, Cambridge, Mass" 1951, pp. 53ff.


15/44

by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced. Struc-tures predominantly involved in trns process would incIude

bureaucracies and courts.

We realize that any such distinction does violence to theactual continuity of the poltical process and to the multi-unctionality o political structures. Much broad policy ismade in bureaucracies and by courts; and structures that we

label as input, such as interest groups and political parties,are often concerned with the details of administration and cn-

forcement. What we are referring to is a difference in empha-sis, and one that is of great importance in the classificationof poltical cultures. The distinction we draw between par-ticipant and subject political cultures turns in part on the

presence or absence of orientation toward specialized inputstructures. For our classification of politicaI cultures it is notof great importance that these specialized input structuresare also involved in the performance of enforcement func-tions and that the specialized administra tive ones are involvedin the performance of input functions. The important thingfor our cIassification is what political objects individuaIs areoriented to, how they are oriented to them, and whetherthese objects are predominantly involved in the "upward"fiow of policy making or in the "downward" fiow of policyenforcement. We shalI treat this probIem in greater detailwhen we define the major classes of politicaI culture.

We can consolida te what we have thus far said about indi-vidual orientations toward the polity in a simple 3 x 4 matrix ..Table 1.1 teUs us that the political orientation of an individualcan be tapped systematically if we explore the following:

TABLE I.1 Dimensions of political orientation

15

SeI! as

object

4.J.

OutjJut

objects

2.

lnput

objects

1.

System as

general

object


Cognition

Affect

Evaluation

o Political Culture

ion follow Parsons.7"Orientation" re-

nd relationships. 1tis, knowledge of

roles and the in-s outputs; (2) "af.

political system, its(3) "evaluational

about political ob-of value standards

tion, we start withre with the systemtriotism 01' aliena-e nation as "large"e polit)' as "demo-

the other extremeU" as poli tical ac-

personal politicalf the sense of per-em. In treating thee distingllish. first,roles or stl'uctllres,

bureaucracies; (2)narchs, legisla tors,

ublic policies, de-ese structllres, in.

assified broacl1y byolitical 01' "input"" processo By "po-

ftow of demandsonversion o[ thesestructures that areocess are poli tiralommunration. By

er to that processll1s," J al lm al a f 1'01 -

u A. Shils, T aU 'f lr d a

.53ff.


16/44

4. Ho",,, does he perceive of himself as a member of his po-ltical system? What knowledge does he have oi his rights,

powers, obIigations, and of strategies of access to influence?How does he EeeI about his capabilities? What norms of par-tieipation or of performance does he acknowledge and employin formulating poltical judgments, or in arriving at opinions?

TABLE 1.2 Types of political culture

System asSeI! asgeneral In/'ut Output acti'ueobject objects objects participant

ParochialO O O OSubject 1

O I OParticipantI I 1 I

Characterizing the polticaI culture of a nation means, ineffect, filling in such a matrix for a valid sample of its popu-

lation. The politieal culture becomes the frequency of differ-em kinds of cognitive, aifective, and evaluative orientations

toward the poltical system in general, ts input and outputaspects, and the seH as poltica! actor.

Pamchial Political Culture. When this frequency of ori-entations to specialized poltical objects of the four kindsspecified in Table 1.2 approaches zero, we can speak of the po-

An Approach to Paii;

liticaI culture as a pAfrican tribal societiesferree! to by CoIemanF

soceties tItere are no ~chietainship, "shamareligious roles, and f,litical orientations totheir religious and setion also implies the '

change initiated by tpects nothing from. thtralized African ch1ef(refers. the poltical cchiaI, although the dized roles in these semore differentiated Fand more differentiatenantly parochial cultulikcly to oceur in sim

specialization is ~in.inpolitical systems 15lIk

than cognitive. Thatgeria or Ghana may bistence of a central p'it are uncertain ar nenorms to regulate his r

The Subject Polit(DoliticaI culture liste'Here there is a highferentiated political s~the system, but orientand toward the seIf The subject is aware

he is affecti.vely orienthaps disliking it; andas noto Rut the relateral leveI, and towarcward flow" side of the

8 Almond and Coleman,


1. What knowledge does he have of his nation and of hispoliticaI system in general terms, its history, size, location,power, "constitutional" characteristics, and the like? What arehis feelings toward these systemic charaeteristics? What arehis more or less considered opinions and judgments of them?

2. What knowledge does he have of the structures and roles,the various political elites, and the palicy proposaIs that areinvolved in the upward ftow of poliey making? What are his

feelings and opinions about these structures, leaders .. and poI-icy proposaIs?

3. What knowIedge does he have of the downward flow ofpolicy enforcement, the structures, individuaIs, and decisionsinvoIved in these processes? ""Vhat are his feelings and opin-ions of them?


17/44

17An Approach io Political Culture

ltica1 culture as a parochial oue. The po1iticaI cultures ofAfrican tribal societies anel autonomo'us local communities re-feneci to by ColemanR would fall into this category. In thesesocieties the.,.c are no specialized political roles: headmanship,chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse politica1-economic-religious roles, anel for members of these societies the po-

ltical orientations to these roles are not separatecl romthei" religious and social orientations. A parochial orienta-tion also implies the compara tive absence of expectations ofchange initiated by the political system. The paro chiaI ex-

pects nothing from the political system. Similarly, in the cen-tralized African chiefdoms and kingdoms to which. Colemanrefers, the political cultures would be predominantly paro-chiaI, although the development of somewhat more speciaI-ized roles in these societies might mean the beginnings ofmore differentiated politicaJ orientations. Even larger-scaleand more di.fferentiate polities, however, may have predomi-nantly parochial cultures. But relatively pure parochi:lism islikely to occur in simpler traditional systems where politicalspecialization is minima!. Parochialism in more differentiatedpolitical systems i.>likely to be affective and normative ratherthan. cognitive. That is to say, the remate tribesmen in Ni-

geria 01' Ghana mal' be aware in a dim sort of way of the ex-istence of a central political regime. But his feelings towardit are uncertain or nega tive, and he has not interna1ized anynorms to regulate his relations to it.

The Subject Political Culture. The second major type ofpolitical culture listed in Table 1.2 i5 the subject culture.Here there i5 a high frequency of orientations toward a dif-ferentiated political system and toward the output aspects ofthe system, but orientations toward specifically input objects,and toward the sel as an active participant, approach zero.The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority;he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, per-haps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate oras nol. But the relationship is toward the system on the gen-eral leveI, and toward the output, administrative, ar "down-ward flow" side of the poltica! system; ir is essentially a pas-

8 Almond and Coleman, Politics of lhe Developing Arcas, p. 254.

member of his po-ve of his rights,cess to influence?

hat norros of par-edge and employving at opinions?

O

O

I

SeIf as

ut active

ects participant

OVvllward fJ.ow ofls, and declsionselings and opin-

frequency of ori-f the four kindsn speak of the po-

nation means, inmple of its popu-equency of differ-ative orientationsnput and output

Political Culture

aton anel of hisry, size, location,he li.ke? What areistics? What are

gmems of them?uctures anel roles,

ropasals that areng? What are his

leaders, and poI-


18/44

18 An Approach to Political Culture

sive relationship, although there is, as we shall show below, a

limited form of competence that is appropriate in a subjectculture.

Again we are speaking of the pure subject orientation thatis likely to exist in a society in which there is no differentiatedinput structure. The subject orientation in poltical systemsthat have developed democratic institutions is likely to beaffective and norma tive rather than cognitive. Thus a French

royalist is aware of democratic institutions; he simply does notaccord legtimacy to them.

The Participant Political Culture. The third major type ofpoltical culture, the participant culture, is one in which themembers of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to thesystem as a whole and to both the poltical and adminstrativestructures and processes: in other words, to both the inputand output aspects of the political system. Individual mem.bers of the participant polity may be favorably ar unfavor-ably oriented to the various classes of poltical objects. Theytend to be oriented toward an "activist" role of the self in the

polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role

may vary rom acceptance to rejection, as we shaIl show below.This threefold classification of poltical cultures does notassume that one orientation replaces the others. The subjectculture does not eliminate diffuse orientations to the primaryand intima te structures of community. To the diffuse orienta.tions to lineage groups, religious communty, and village itadds a specialized subject orientation to the governmental in-stitutions. Similarly, the participant culture does not supplantthe subject and parochiaI patterns of orientation. The par.ticipant culture is an additional stratum that may be added

to and combined wth the subject and parochial cultures.Thus the ctizen of a participant polty is not only orientedtoward active participation in politics, but is also subject to lawand authorty and is a member of more diffuse primarygroups.

To be sure, adding participant orientations to subject andparochial orientations does not leave these "earlier" orienta-tions unchanged. The parochial orientations must adaptwhen new and more specialized orientations enter into the

An Approach to Politica,

picture, just as both .raroewhen participant onentatthe l1lost significant differfive uemocraces includedthe way in which parochtions have combined, fu:individuaIs of the polity.9

Another cauton is neo

ply homogeneity.or unifelitical systems wlth predeven in the limiting caSEaIs. The imperfections otion, personal preferencfin opportunities to leal'and parochials, even incies. Simi!arly, parochi;"high" subject cultures.

Thus there are two as'tura! "mix." The "citizesubject, and parochia! o

particular mix of ctizectizen we need concept:gruence to handle the ~ticipant, subject, and ptive performance. For tin detai! be!ow, we nelthresholds, and congrw"mix" of citizens, subjelfective performance of (the poltica! cultures ooccasion to discuss these

Our threefold c1assifi

rochial is only the begJtures. Each one of the~our classification has Ilitica! deve10pment anelatter question first, sinlem of subc1assification

9 See below, chaps. VIII aI


19/44

picture, just as both parochial and subject orientations change

when participant orientations are acquired. Actua11y, some of

the 11l0stsignificant differences in the political cultures of the

five democracies included in our study turn on the extent and

the way in which parochial, subject, and participant orienta-

tions have combined, fused, ar meshed together within theindividuais of the polity.9

Another caution is necessary. Our classification does not im-

ply homogeneity or uniformity of poltical cultures. Thus po-liticaI systems with predominantly participant cultures will,

even in the limiting case, include both subjects and parochi-

aIs. The imperfections of the processes of political socializa-

tion, personal preferences, and limitations in intelligence or

in opportunities to learn will continue to produce subjects

and parochials, even in we11-establshed and stable democra-

cies. Similarly, parochials will continue to exist e~en in"high" subject cultures.

Thus there are two aspects of cultural heterogeneity or cul-

tural "mix." The "citizen" is a particular mix of participant,

subject, and parochial orientations, and the civic culture is a

particular mix of citizens, subjects, and parochials. For thecitizen we need concepts of proportions, threshoIds, and con.

gruence to handle the ways in which his conste11ation of par-

ticipant, subject, and parochial attitudes is related to effec-

tive performance. For the civic culture, which we sha11 treat

in detail below, we need the same concepts of proportions,

thresholds, and congruence to handle the problem of what

"mix" of citizens, subjects, and parochials is related to the ef.

fective performance of democratic systems. When we compare

the political cultures of our five countries we sha11 have the

occasion to discuss these questions again.

Our threefold classification of participant, subject, and pa-

rochial is onIy the beginning of a classification of poltical cul-

tures. Each one of these major classes has its subclasses, and

our classification !:las left out entirely the dimension of po-

litical development and cultural change. Let us look into this

latter question first, since it will enable us to handle the prob-

lem of subclassification with a better set of conceptual tools.9 See below, chaps. VIU and IX.

Political Culture

ha11show below, a

riate in a subject

t orientation that

s no differentiated

political systems

s is likeIy to be

e. Thus a French

e simply does not

ird major type of

one in which the

y oriented to the

and adminstrative

o both the input

Individual mem.

rably or unfavor-

cal objects. They

e of the self in the

ns of such a role

sha11show below.

cultures does not

hers. The subject

ns to the primary

he diffuse orienta.

y, and village it

governmental in-

does not supplant

ntation. The par-

at may be added

arochial cultures.

not onIy oriented

also subject to Iaw

diffuse primary

ns to subject and

"earlier" orienta.

ons must adapt

ns enter into the

An Approach to Political Culture .19


20/44

evaluation grow inthis scale as one ofthe first column in

legiant stuation: cmatch; as we movetoward alienation: ,stitutions or structm

But this scale s 'may take the form lrole incumbents (eoracy); 01' it may beshift from a simphcomplex one. We h:tures (with the excmxed. Thus a parare oriented as sub]will contain somemixed" poltical cusignii1cant proportiplex patterns of or:systemically mixed,

Cognitive orienta~ion

Affe::tiveorientat!on

Evaluative orientation

., A (+) sign means a li

or of evaluation toward f

of negative evaluations o

ference,

TABU 1.3 Congruence{i

and strv.cture

An Approach to Pol

congruence s strongentations approach 1Jthe political structurtive -feeling anel eva]

Incongruence betweewhen the indiffereno

An Appmach to Poltical Cuhure20

Political cultures may 01' may Dot be congruent wth lhestructures of the political system. iA congruent poltical struc-ture woulel be one appropriate for the culture: in other words,where poltical cognition in the population would tend to beaccurate anel where affect and evaluatio1 wou1d tenel to befavorableo In general, a parochiaI, subject, or participant cuI.ture wou1eI be most congruent wth, respectvely, a traditional

poltical structure, a centralized authortarian structure, anel ademocratic polticaI structure. A parochial political culturethat was congruent wirh ts structure would have a high rate

of cogntive orientations and high rates af positive affectiveand evaluative orientations to the diffuse structures of thetribal or village communityo A subject poltical culture con-gruent with its system wauId have a high rate af cognition anelhigh positve rates of the other two types of orientation to thespecialized poltical system as a whole, anel to ts administra tive

oroutput aspects; whereas the congruent participant culturewouJd be characterized by high and positive rates of orientationto alI four classes af political objectso

Political systems change, and we are justified in assumingthat culture and structure are often incongruent with eachother. ParticularIy in these decades of rapid cultural change,

the most numerous political systems may be those that havefailed to attain congruence, or are moving from one form of

polit)' to' another.

To represent schematical1y these relatons of congruencejincongruence between poltical structure and cuIture, we pre-sent Table 1.3.

Any one of the three major types of poltical cultures maybe located on the matrix in Table 1..3. Thus we may speak of"allegiant" 10 parochiaI,. subject, and participam cultureswhen cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to theappropriate objects of the polity approach uniry, or perfectcongruence between cuture and structure. But congruence

between culture and structure may be best represented in theforro of a scaleo The Iimits of congruence betvveen cuIture andstructure are established in columns I and 2 of the table. The

10 We have borrowe lhe concept "Allegiant" fwm Robert E. Lane'sbook, Polilical Ideology, New York, 1962, pp, 17011'.


21/44

--_._-------'-....- __ ...:__ .. ---._-

'"A (+) sign rneans a high reqw~ncy or awareness, OI' of positive feeling or of evaluation toward poltical objects. A (-) sign means a high 'frequencyof negative evaluations OI' feelings. A (O)means a high frequency of indif-ference.

congTuence 15 strong when the frequendes of pOSltlve ori.emations apprpach unity (+); the congruence is weak whenthe po!itical structure i.s cognized but the frequency of posi-tive feeIing and evaluati.on approaches indifference or zero.Incongruence between political cuhure and structure beginswhen the inelifference paim 1Spassed and nega tive affect anel

TABLE 1.3 Congruence/incongruence between politieal c'ulture

und structure'"

21

+

Alienation

+O

O

Apathy

+

++

Allegiance

An Approach to Political Culture .

Cogllitive orientationAffective orientationEvaluative orientation

PoliticalCuh-ure

gruent with thent political struc-o: in othef words,

would tend to bewould i:end to ber participant cul-elv. ;;. traditional

n s~~'ucture, anel a

political culturehave a high rateposi tive affective

si:ructures of theical culture con-

of cognition andorientation to theits a(lministrative

articipant cultureates of orientation

ified in assuming

gruent with eachcultural change,e those that havefrom one forro of

ns of congruencej

el cul ture, we pre-

tical cultures mayS we may speak ofrticipam culturesrienta dons to the

unit)!, ar perfect. But congruencerepresented in thetv,reen culture and

2 of the table. 'lhe

wm Robert E,Lane's

evaluatiol1 grow in frequency (-). We may also think ofthis scale as one of stability jinstability. As we move toward

the first colunm in the figure. we are moving toward an aI-legiant situation: one in which attitudes and institutionsmatch; as we move toward the third. column, we are movingtoward a1ienation: where attitudes tenel to reject poltical in.sttutions ar structures.

Rut this scale s only a beginning, since lhe incongruencemay take the form. oi a simple rejection of a particular set ofrole incumbents (e.g., a particular dynasty anel its bureauc-facy); ar it ma)' be an aspect of a systemic change, that is, ashift from a simpler pattern of poltical culture to a morecomplex ane. We have already suggested that alI poltical cul.tures (with the exception of the simple parochial ones) are

mixed. Thus a participam culture contains individuaIs whoare oriented as subjects and parochials; anel a subject cu1turewill contain some parochills. "iNe use the term "systemicallymixed" politcal cultures to rder to those in which there aresignificam proponions of both Lhe simpler and more com-

plex patterns of orientatons. 'When we say these cultures aresystemically mixed, we do Dot inten.d to suggest that there 13


22/44

22 An Approach to Political CultuTe

an inevitable tendency for the development to complete it-

self. The process of politieal cuIture change may stabilize at a

point that faIls short of congruence with a centraIized author-

itarian structure or a democratic one; or the development

may take a course such as in Britain, where a sIow, continu-

ous 'pattern of cultural change was accompanied by corres-

pondingly continuous changes in structure. Political cultures

may remain systemicaIly mixed for a very long time indeed,

as witnessed by the experience of France, Germany, and Italy

in the nineteenth and present centuries. When they do remain

mixed, however, there are inevitable strains between culture

and structure, and a characteristic tendency toward structuralinstability.

If the three types of poltical cuIture represented in Table

1.2 are the pure forms of poltical cuIture, we may distinguish

three types of systemicaIly mixed political cuItures: (1) the

parochiaI-subject culture, (2) the subject-participant cuIture,

and (3) the parochiaI-participant cuIture.

The PaTochial-Subject Culture. This is a type of poItical

cuIture in which a substantial portion of the popuIation has

rejected the excIusive cIaims of diffuse tribal, vilIage, or feu-

dal authority and has developed aIlegiance toward a more

compIex poIitical system with specialized central govern-mental structures. This is the cIassic case of kingdom build-

ing out of reIatively undifferentiated units. The chronicIes

and histories of most nations incIude this early stage of shift

from local parochialism to centralized authority. But the shift

may stabilize at a point that faIls short of a fuIIy deveIoped

subject culture. The loosely articulated African kingdoms,

and even the Ottoman Empire, are exampIes of stabIe, mixed

subject-parochial cuItures where the latter predominates and

central authority takes the form of a primarily extractive,

dimly cognized set of political objects. The probIem of cul.

tural change from paro chiaI to subject patterns is a difficuIt

one, and unstable moves back and forth are common in theearly history of nations.11

11The classic case is that of lhe succession to King Solomon in lhe king.

dom of Israel. When Solomon died, the parochial (tribal and lineage)

leaders of Israel came to his son Rehoboam, saying, "Thy father made our

An Approach to Polit;

What we are sugge:

cIass may be viewed as

At one extreme we m

Prussian absolutism, w

rochial orientations; aI

Ottoman Empire, whi,

tive externaI reIationsl

rochial units. The con

soIutism is an interest

have aIready made th,tures are mixes, and tl

ing them are also mix,

case, we may assume t.

tion was much strongc

Britain we suggest th

more, the parochial ai

These psychological n

the eighteenth century

the first, of kadavergel

if deferentiaI, countq

IarIy, the cultural mix

poIarization between

empIified in the extn

German estates - an

groups most affected

the bureaucracy dOWJ

yoke hard; but do thou n

and his heavy }'okewhich

boam's older counselors a

respect to the autonomy

groups. His younger men

brated advice to tell the tl

is thicker than my father's

a heavy yoke,I will add te

whips, then will I chasti:

The consequences of Reh.

modernizers, as told in ti

tack 011 parochialism may

decline to apathy and ali

and national destruction.


23/44

yoke hard; but do thou now make lightcr the hard service of thy father,

and his heavy yoke which he put upon us and we will serve thee." Reho-

boam's older counselors advised him to lighten the yoke and pay more

respect to the autonomy of the persisting paroehial tribal and lineage

groups. His younger men - fanatical modernizers - offered him the ceie.

brated advice to teU the traditional leaclers of the people, UMy little finger

is thicker than my father's loins .... If roy father hath burdened you with

a heavy yoke, 1 will add to your }'oke; if my falher hath chastised you with

whips, then will 1 chastise you with scorpion thorns" (I Kiugs 12:4-11).

The consequences of Rehoboam's acceptancc of the advice of the youngmodernizers, as toId in the rest of Kings, suggest that too violem an at-

tack 011 parochialism may cause both parochial and subject oricntations to

decline to apathy and alienation. The results are political fragmentation

and national destruction.

What we are suggesting is that the COmpoSltlOn of this

class may be viewed as subvarieties alTanged on a continuum.

At one extreme we might place the political culture under

Prussian absolutism, whieh went rather far in suppressing pa-

rochial orientations; at the other, the poltical culture in the

Ottoman Empire, which never went further than an extrac-

tive externaI relationship to its constituent, more or less pa-

rochial units. The contrast between Prussian and British ab-

sOlutism is an interesting one rom this point of view. We

have already made the point that even "high" political cul-

tures are mixes, and that the individual orientations compris-

ing them are also mixes. In Prussia, in the typical individual

case, we may assume that the intensity of the subject orienta-

tion was much stronger than that of the parochial, while in

Britain we suggest there was greater balance, and, further-

more, the parochial and subject strata were more congruent.

These psychological mixes may explain the contrast between

the eighteenth century Prussian and British authority images:

the first, of kadavergehorsam; the second, of the self-confident,

if deferential, country squire, merchant, and yeoman. Simi-

larly, the cultural mix in Prussia probably involved more of a

polarization between a persisting parochial sub-culture - ex-

emplified in the extreme case by the pcasantry on the East

German estates - and a subject subculture among those

groups most affected by the impact of Prussian absolutism:

the bureaucraey down to the lowest leveIs and the increas-

23An Approach to Political Cultureolitical Culture

to complete it-

ay stabilize at a

tralzed author-

e development

a slow, continu-

anied by corres-

oltical cultures

ng time indeed,

many, and Italy

they do remain

between culture

ward structural

olomon in the king-

(tribal and lineage)

Thy father made our

sented in Table

may distinguish

ultures: (I) the

icipant culture,

ype of political

population has

village, or feu-

toward a more

central govern-

kingdom build-

The chronicles

arly stage of shift

ty. But the shift

fully developed

frican kingdoms,

of stable, mixed

redominates and

marily extractive,

problem of cul.

rns is a difficult

common in the


24/44

ingly large proportion of Prussian rnanpower undergoing thePrussian army experience.

Thus change from a parochial to a subject political culturemay stahilize at a number of points on the (ontinuum and

produce different poli ti cal, psychoIogicaI, and cultural mixes.

We also suggest that the kind of mix that results has ~eatsignifieance for the stability and performance of the pohtlcalsystem.

The Subject-Parteipant Culture. The way in .which theshift from a parochial to a subject culture is solved greatly af-fects the way in which .he shift from a subject to a participantcuIture tak~s place. As Pye points out, the inculcation of asense of national loyaIty and identification, and of a pro-

pemity to obey the regulations of central authority, i.s the firstpriority problem in the emerging nations.l2 In the Shlft fram asubject to a participant euIture, lhe parochial and local au-tonomies, if lhey survive, may contribute to the developmentof a democratic infrastructure. Certainly this is what hap-pened in the British case. Local authorities, municip~l cor?o-:rations, religious communities, and merchant groups m WhlCh

the tradition of guild freedoms sti11 persisted became the firstinterest groups in the deveIoping British democraey. The les-son is a significant ane. PreciseIy beca use the development Df asubject culture in England stopped short of destroying localand parochial structures and cuItures, these could becomeavailable at a later time and in modified form as an innuencenetwork that cou!d relate Britons as competent ctizens totheir government. The more massive impact of the Prussianstate authority drove parochial insttutions into privacy, orassimilated t.hem to stat~ authority. Thus lhe era of democra-tization in. Germany began with a great gap between the pri-vale and pubIle spheres, and the infrastructure that emerg~d

failed to are across from individual, family, and commumtyto the insttutons of governmental authority.

In the mixed subject-partkipant culture a substantial partof. the population has acquired specialized input orientationsano an activisl set of seH-orientations, while most of the Te.

12 Pye, Politics, Pes~nality, and Nation Building, pp. 3ff.

24 An Approach to Political Cu.lture An Approach to Pai

mainder of the popuauthoritarian goverI1passive set of self-ori

amples of this ty~eand !taly in the mma characteristic patt(nation or authoritamore than structura

tural mixo The eultlthe struetural insta!:participant orientat!

population, a~d be(persisting sub]ect 51tarian interludes,

population cann~t. 1enced body of CltlZpirants. That is, thture, but their sens(or on a confident SItural instabilities t

ject-participant cu]democratic infrastrtend to produce aically oriented ele]this kind of a pc

syndrome with C~Ition rom the POlIl

parties, interest g~'~The mixed sub)

long period of t~msubculture. Dunnlian-oriented grouf

within a formallymust develop a deAlthough this doe:democratic one, il

degree. It is notarise in poltical


25/44


26/44

POLITICAL SUBCUL Tl;RE

"Ve have already made the point that most political cu 1-

t~~es are heterogeneous. Even the most fuHy deveIoped par-

ticIpam cultures wiII contain surviving strata of subjects and

parochials. And even within that part of the cuIture that is

oriemed toward participation the~e wiII be persistent and

significam differences in politicaI orientation. Adapting the

terminology of Ralph Linton to our purposes, we u se the

term "subcuIture" to reIer to these component parts of po-litical cultures.

I3But we have to distinguish at least two types

of subcultural cIeavage. First. the term may be used to refer

13Ralph Linton. The CultUral Background of Personality."

An Approach to Pc

to population strata

toward policy inpu!

ented toward the I

States the left wing c

of the Republican p

American politics ;

from each other on

policy issues. We reff

But the kind of (

which occurs in syst,

parochial-subject culoriented toward dif

toward the specializ

system. A mixed p;

characterized by a

Thus if the polity

ponents, then there

ject subculture, the

mally merged traditi

The mixed subje,

and even more contl

fuI shift from a sub

diffusion of positivfrastructure, the acCo

the development of

stan tial proportion (

combine with subje(

conflict. England iJ

moved toward and ,

these orientations. I

the first 'part of the

Labour left-wing gr'

monarchy and the ]

sulted in the transfo

stitutions. Poltical!

examples of our firs

sistent policy differe

ferem orientations t(

France is the ela:


26

tures tend lo have populistic overtones, and in the more re-

cent period of totalitarianism these regimes have even adopted

the democratic infrastructure in a grossly distorted formo

. !he Parochial.Participant CultU1'e. In the parochial-par_

tIclpant culture we have the contemporary problem of cul.

tural development in many of the emerging nations. In most

of t~ese countries the political culture is predominamly pa-

rochIa~. The structural norms that have been introduced are

usua.U!, participam; for congruence. therefore. they require a

partlcIpant cuIture. Thus the problem is to develop speciaI-

Ized output and input orientations simultaneously. It is not

surprising that most of these political systems. aIways threat-

ened by p arochial fragmentation, teeter like acrobats on

tightropes. leaning precariously at one time toward authori-

tarianism, at another toward democracy. There is no structure

on either side to lean on, neither a bureauc:racy resting upon

loyal subjects, nor an infrastructure arising from responsible

and competent citizens. The problem of development from

parochial to participant culture seems. on first Iook. to be.a

hopeJess one; but if we remem bel' that most parochial auton-

omies anel loyalties survive. we may at Ieast say that the de-

veIopment of participant cultures in some of the emerging

nations has not yet been preeluded. The problems are to pen-

etrate the parochiaI systems without destroying them on the

output side, and to transform them into interest groups onthe input side.


27/44

to population strata that are persistently oriented in one way

toward policy inputs and outputs, but are "allegiantly" ori.

enled toward the political structure. Thus in the United

States the left wing of the Democratic party and the right wing

of the Republican party accept as legitimate the structures of

American politics and government, but differ persistently

rom each other on a whole range of domes tic and foreign

policy issues. We refer to these as policy subcultures.

But the kind af cIeavage we are most interested in is that

which occurs in systemically mixed systems. Thus in a mixedparochial-subject culture one part of the population would be

oriented toward diffuse traditional authorities, and another

toward the specialized structure of the central authoritarian

system. A mixed parochial-subject culture may actually be

characterized by a "vertical" as weU as a horizontal cIeavage.

Thus if the polity incIudes two or more traditional com-

ponents, then there wiII be, in addition to the emergi~g sub-

ject subculture, the persisting separa te cultures of the for-mally merged traditional units.

The mixed subject-participant culture is a more familiar

and even more contemporary problem in the West. .A success-

fuI shift from a subject to a participant culture involves thediffusion of positive orientations toward a democratic in-

frastructure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, and

the development of a sense of civie competence among a sub-

stantial proportion of the population. These orientations may

combine with subject and parochial orientations, or they may

conflict. England in the nineteenth and present centuries

moved toward and attained a political culture that combined

these orientations. It is true, of course, that the RadicaIs in

the first part of the nineteenth century and the Socialist and

Labour left-wing groups at a later time were opposed to the

monarchy and the House of Lords. But these tendencies re-

sulted in the transformation, not the elimination, of these in-

stitutions. Political subcultures in England, consequently, are

examples of our first type of cIeavage, the one based on per-

sistent policy differences rather than upon fundamentaUy dif.

ferent orientations toward poltica! structure.

France is the dassic case of the second type of poltical-

olitical Culture

in the more re.

ve even adopted

ed formo

e parochial-par-

problem of cul.

nations. In most

edominantly pa-

introduced are

they require a

develop special-

ously. It is not

, always threat-

ke acrobats on

toward authori-

e is no structure

acy resting upon

rom responsible

velopment from

st look, to be a

parochial auton-

say that the de-

of the emerging

lems are to pen-

ng them on the

erest groups on

st political cuI.

developed par-

of subjects and

culture that is

persis ten t and

. Adapting the

ses, we use thent parts of po-

t least two types

be used to refer

lity.



28/44

28 Ar/. Approach to Political Culture

cultural heterogeneity. The French Revo!ution did not result

in a homogeneous orientation toward a republican policaIstructure; instead, it polarized the French population imo

two subcultures, ane of participant aspiration and one domi.

nated by subject and pawchiaI orientations. The structure ofthe French political system nas been at issue ever since [hat

time, and wIlat was at first a bipolarization of political culture~vas folIowed by urther fragmentations, as the Sodalists fol-lowed the Jacobins, and the Communists the Socialists, andas the right wing divided imo a "rallied" and an "umallied"

part. In many other Europe:m countries the failure of thedominant elites to respoi1d to the moderate demands forstructuraI and policy changes put forward by the left in thefixst naU af lhe nneteenth centm:y led to lhe deve10pment of

lhe structurally alienated, :revolutionary socialist, syndicalist,and anarchist left of the seeond half Df the nineteenth cen-tury.

In England, the Old Commonwealtl.1, the United States, andthe Scandinavian countries, the ssues of political structurewere resolved in the course of the nineteenth and eadv tweu-tieth centl1.ries: wb.at emerged were homogeneol1.s ;oIitic;1cultures, in the sense of struetl1.ral orientation. The subcuI-

turaI phenornena in these countries tum on persistent poliey

differences. Left and right both tend to accept the existingpolitieaI structure and difer onIy on the substance af policy

and poltical personneI. What is most interesting is that inthis group of countries in the last decades, the policy differ-enees nave tended to become less sharp, and there is a larger

common body of agreement. In other woros, subculturaldeavage has attenuated and cultural homogeneity has ex-tended fmm strueturaI orientation imo policy orientation.

This brief discussion cf politicaI subculture serves onIy tointroduce the concept. Some af its implications and conse-quences will be considered at later points in the book. But we

would mislead the reader if we we~e to suggest that our studytreat.s p:roponionaHy each :ispeet of polticaI culture. Ourstudy stresses orientation to poltical strueture. and process,not orientatioD. to the substance oI politicaI dernands and out.

An Approach to Po

puts. Vve need not

point out how .t~~s(mensions oi pQlltlca

tween general psyd

politics ana pubIic rpublic policy wouldas the present one.types o{ public poli,and cultural values,with which they are

of pubIie policy ori

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