AL-GHAZALI, ABU HAMID (1058-1111)

al-Ghazali is one of the greatest Islamic Jurists, theologians and mystical thinkers. He learned various branches of traditional Islamic religious sciences in his home town of Tus, Gurgan and Nishapur in the northern part of Iran. He was also involved in Sufi practices from an early age. Being recognized by Nizam al-Mulk, the vizir of the Seljuq sultans, he was appointed head of the Nizamiyyah College at Baghdad in AH 484/AD 1091. As the intellectual head of the Islamic community, he was busy lecturing on Islamic jurisprudence at the College, and also refuting heresies and responding to questions from all segments of the community. Four years later, however, al-Ghazali fell into a serious spiritual crisis and finally left Baghdad, renouncing his career and the world After wandering in Syria and Palestine for about two years and finishing the pilgrimage to Mecca, he returned to Tus, where he was engaged in writing, Sufi practices and teaching his disciples until his death. In the meantime he resumed teaching for a few years at the Nizamiyyah College in Nishapur

Al-Ghazali explained in his autobiography why he renounced his brilliant career and turned to Sufism. It was, he says, due to his realization that there was no way to certain knowledge or the conviction of revelatory truth except through Sufism. (This means that the traditional form of Islamic faith was in a very critical condition at the time.) This realization is possibly related to his criticism of Islamic philosophy. In fact, his refutation of philosophy is not a mere criticism from a certain (orthodox) theological viewpoint. First of all, his attitude towards philosophy was ambivalent; it was both an object and criticism and an object of learning (for example, logic and the natural sciences). He mastered philosophy and then criticized it in order to Islamicize it. The importance of his criticism lies in his philosophical demonstration that the philosophers’ metaphysical arguments cannot stand the test of reason. However, he was also forced to admit that the certainty, of revelatory truth, for which he was so desperately searching, cannot be obtained by reason. It was only later that he finally attained to that truth in the ecstatic state (fana’) of the Sufi. Through his own religious experience, he worked to revive the faith of Islam by reconstructing the religious sciences upon the basis of Sufsm, and to give a theoretical foundation to the latter under the influence of philosophy. Thus Sufism came to be generally recognized in the Islamic community. Though Islamic philosophy did not long survive al-Ghazali’s criticism, he contributed greatly to the subsequent philosophization of Islamic theology and Sufism.

1 Life2 Theological conceptions3 Refutation of philosophy4 Relation to philosophy5 List of   works 6 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

1 Life

The eventful life of Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali (or al-Ghazzali) can be divided into three major periods. The first is the period of learning, first in his home town of Tus in Persia, then in Gurgan and finally in Nishapur. After the death of his teacher, Imam al-Haramayn AL-JUWAYNI, Ghazali moved to the court of Nizam al-Mulk, the powerful vizir of the Seljuq Sultans, who eventually appointed him head of the Nizamiyyah College at Baghdad in AH 484/AD 1091.

The second period of al-Ghazali’s life was his brilliant career as the highest-ranking orthodox ‘doctor’ of the Islamic community in Baghdad (AH 484-8/AD 1091-5). This period was short but significant. During this time, as well as lecturing on Islamic jurisprudence at the College, he was also busy refuting heresies and responding to questions from all segments of the community. In the political confusion following the assassination of Nizam al-Mulk and the subsequent violent death of Sultan Malikshah, al-Ghazali himself fell into a serious spiritual crisis and finally left Baghdad, renouncing his career and the world.

This event marks the beginning of the third period of his life, that of retirement (AH 488-505/AD 1095-1111), but which also included a short period of teaching at the Nizamiyyah College in Nishapur. After leaving Baghdad, he wandered as a Sufi in Syria and Palestine before returning to Tus, where he was engaged in writing, Sufi practices and teaching his disciples until his death.

The inner development leading to his conversion is explained in his autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-dalal (The Deliverer from Error), written late in his life. It was his habit from an early age, he says, to search for the true reality of things. In the process he came to doubt the senses and even reason itself as the means to ‘certain knowledge’, and fell into a deep scepticism. However, he was eventually delivered from this with the aid of the divine light, and thus recovered his trust in reason. Using reason, he then set out to examine the teachings of ‘the seekers after truth’: the theologians, philosophers, Isma‘ilis and Sufis. As a result of these studies, he came to the realization that there was no way to certain knowledge except through Sufism. In order to reach this ultimate truth of the Sufis, however, it is first necessary to renounce the world and to devote oneself to mystical practice. Al-Ghazali came to this realization through an agonising process of decision, which led to a nervous breakdown and finally to his departure from Baghdad.

The schematic presentation of al-Munqidh has allowed various interpretations, but it is irrelevant to question the main line of the story. Though certain knowledge is explained in al-Munqidh as something logically necessary, it is also religious conviction (yaqin) as mentioned in the Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences). Thus when he says that the traditional teachings did not grip him in his adolescence, he means to say that he lost his conviction of their truth, which he only later regained through his Sufi mystical experiences. He worked to generalize this experience to cure `the disease' of his time.

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The life of al-Ghazali has been thus far examined mostly as the development of his individual personality. However, since the 1950s there have appeared some new attempts to understand his life in its wider political and historical context (Watt 1963). If we accept his religious confession as sincere, then we should be careful not to reduce his thought and work entirely to non-religious factors. It may well be that al-Ghazali’s conversion from the life of an orthodox doctor to Sufism was not merely the outcome of his personal development but also a manifestation of a new stage in the understanding of faith in the historical development of Islam, from the traditional form of faith expressed in the effort to establish the kingdom of God on Earth through the shari‘a to a faith expressed as direct communion with God in Sufi mystical experience. This may be a reflection of a development in which the former type of faith had lost its relevance and become a mere formality due to the political and social confusion of the community. Al-Ghazali experienced this change during his life, and tried to revive the entire structure of the religious sciences on the basis of Sufism, while at the same time arguing for the official recognition of the latter and providing it with solid philosophical foundations.

2 Theological conceptions

Al-Ghazali wrote at least two works on theology, al-Iqtisad fi'I-i`tiqad(The Middle Path in Theology) and al-Risala al-Qudsiyya (The Jerusalem Epistle). The former was composed towards the end of his stay in Baghdad and after his critique of philosophy, the latter soon afterwards in Jerusalem. The theological position expressed in both works is Ash'arite, and there is no fundamental difference between al-Ghazali and the Ash‘arite school (see ASH‘ARIYYA AND MU‘TAZILA). However, some changes can be seen in the theological thought of his later works, written under the influence of philosophy and Sufism (see §4).

As Ash‘arite theology came into being out of criticism of Mu‘tazilite rationalistic theology, the two schools have much in common but they are also not without their differences. There is no essential difference between them as to God's essence (dhat Allah); al-Ghazali proves the existence of God (the Creator) from the createdness (hadath) of the world according to the traditional Ash‘arite proof. An atomistic ontology is presupposed here, and yet there are also philosophical arguments to refute the criticism of the philosophers. As for God's attributes (sifat Allah), however, al-Ghazali regards them as `something different from, yet added to, God's essence' (al-Iqtisad: 65), while the Mu‘tazilites deny the existence of the attributes and reduce them to God's essence and acts. According to al-Ghazali, God has attributes such as knowledge, life, will, hearing, seeing and speech, which are included in God's essence and coeternal with it. Concerning the relationship between God's essence and his attributes, both are said to be ‘not identical, but not different’ (al-Iqtisad: 65). The creation of the world and its subsequent changes are produced by God's eternal knowledge, will and power, but this does not necessarily mean any change in God's attributes in accordance with these changes in the empirical world.

One of the main issues of theological debate was the relationship between God's power and human acts. The Mu‘tazilites, admitting the continuation of an accident (arad) of human power, asserted that human acts were decided and produced (or even created) by people themselves; thus they justified human responsibility for acts and maintained divine justice. In contrast, assuming that all the events in the world and human acts are caused by God's knowledge, will and power, al-Ghazali admits two powers in human acts, God’s power and human power. Human power and act are both created by God, and so human action is God’s creation (khalq), but it is also human acquisition (kasb) of God's action, which is reflected in human volition. Thus al-Ghazali tries to harmonize God’s omnipotence and our own responsibility for our actions (see OMNIPOTENCE).

As for God’s acts, the Mu‘tazilites, emphasizing divine justice, assert that God cannot place any obligation on people that is beyond their ability; God must do what is best for humans and must give rewards and punishments according to their obedience and disobedience. They also assert that it is obligatory for people to know God through reason even before revelation. Al-Ghazali denies these views. God, he says, can place any obligations he wishes upon us; it is not incumbent on him to do what is best for us, nor to give rewards and punishments according to our obedience and disobedience. All this is unimaginable for God, since he is absolutely free and is under no obligation at all. Obligation (wujub), says al-Ghazali, means something that produces serious harm unless performed, but nothing does harm to God. Furthermore, good (hasan)and evil (qabih) mean respectively congruity and incongruity with a purpose, but God has no purpose at all. Therefore, God's acts are beyond human ethical judgment. Besides, says al-Ghazali, injustice (zulm) means an encroachment on others' rights, but all creatures belong to God; therefore, whatever he may do to his creatures, he cannot be considered unjust.

The Mu‘tazilites, inferring the hereafter from the nature of this world, deny the punishment of unbelievers in the grave from their death until the resurrection, and also the reality of the various eschatological events such as the passing of the narrow bridge and the weighing on the balance of human deeds (see ESCHATOLOGY). Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, rejecting the principle of analogy between the two worlds, approves the reality of all these events as transmitted traditionally, since it cannot be proven that they are rationally or logically impossible. Another important eschatological event is the seeing of God (ru’ya Allah). While the Mu‘tazilites deny its reality, asserting that God cannot be the object of human vision, al-Ghazali approves it as a kind of knowledge which is beyond corporeality; in fact, he later gives the vision of God deep mystical and philosophical meaning. In short, the Mu‘tazilites discuss the unity of God and his acts from the viewpoint of human reason, but al-Ghazali does so on the presupposition that God is personal and an absolute reality beyond human reason.

3 Refutation of philosophy

Al-Ghazali’s relationship with philosophy is subtle and complicated. The philosophy represented by AL-FARABI and IBN SINA (Avicenna) is, for al-Ghazali, not simply an object of criticism but also an important component of his own

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learning. He studied philosophy intensively while in Baghdad, composing Maqasid al falasifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers), and then criticizing it in his Tahafut al falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). The Maqasid is a precise summary of philosophy (it is said to be an Arabic version of Ibn Sina’s PersianDanashnamah-yi ala'i (Book of Scientific Knowledge) though a close comparative study of the two works has yet to be made). In the medieval Latin world, however, the content of the Maqasid was believed to be al-Ghazali’s own thought, due to textual defects in the Latin manuscripts. As a result, the image of the ‘Philosopher Algazel’ was created. It was only in the middle of the nineteenth century that Munk corrected this mistake by making use of the complete manuscripts of the Hebrew translation. More works by al-Ghazali began to be published thereafter, but some contained philosophical ideas he himself had once rejected. This made al-Ghazali’s relation to philosophy once again obscure. Did he turn back to philosophy late in life? Was he a secret philosopher? From the middle of the twentieth century there were several attempts to verify al-Ghazali’s authentic works through textual criticism, and as a result of these works the image of al-Ghazali as an orthodox Ash‘arite theologian began to prevail. The new trend in the study of al-Ghazali is to re-examine his relation to philosophy and to traditional Ash‘arism while at the same time recognizing his basic distance from philosophy.

Al-Ghazali composed three works on Aristotelian logic, Mi‘yar al-‘ilm(The Standard Measure of Knowledge), Mihakk al-nazar f'l-mantiq (The Touchstone of Proof in Logic) and al-Qistas al-mustaqim (The Just Balance). The first two were written immediately after the Tahafut `in order to help understanding of the latter', and the third was composed after his retirement. He also gave a detailed account of logic in the long introduction of his writing on legal theory, al-Mustasfa min ‘ilm al-usul(The Essentials of Islamic Legal Theory). Al-Ghazali's great interest in logic is unusual, particularly when most Muslim theologians were antagonistic to it, and can be attributed not only to the usefulness of logic in refuting heretical views (al-Qistas is also a work of refutation of the Isma‘ilis), but also to his being fascinated by the exactness of logic and its effectiveness for reconstructing the religious sciences on a solid basis.

There is a fundamental disparity between al-Ghazali’s theological view and the Neoplatonic Aristotelian philosophy of emanationism. Al-Ghazali epitomizes this view in twenty points, three of which are especially prominent:

(1) the philosophers’ belief in the eternity of the world, (2) their doctrine that God does not know particulars, and (3) their denial of the resurrection of bodies.

These theses are ultimately reducible to differing conceptions of God and ontology. Interestingly, al-Ghazali’s criticism of philosophy is philosophical rather than theological, and is undertaken from the viewpoint of reason.

First, as for the eternity of the world, the philosophers claim that the emanation of the First Intellect and other beings is the result of the necessary causality of God's essence, and therefore the world as a whole is concomitant and coeternal with his existence (see CREATION AND CONSERVATION, RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE OF). Suppose, say the philosophers, that God created the world at a certain moment in time; that would presuppose a change in God, which is impossible. Further, since each moment of time is perfectly similar, it is impossible, even for God, to choose a particular moment in time for creation. Al-Ghazali retorts that God's creation of the world was decided in the eternal past, and therefore it does not mean any change in God; indeed, time itself is God's creation (this is also an argument based on the Aristotelian concept of time as a function of change). Even though the current of time is similar in every part, it is the nature of God's will to choose a particular out of similar ones.

Second, the philosophers deny God's knowledge of particulars or confine it to his self-knowledge, since they suppose that to connect God's knowledge with particulars means a change and plurality in God's essence. Al-Ghazali denies this. If God has complete knowledge of a person from birth to death, there will be no change in God's eternal knowledge, even though the person's life changes from moment to moment.

Third, the philosophers deny bodily resurrection, asserting that 'the resurrection' means in reality the separation of the soul from the body after death. Al-Ghazali criticizes this argument, and also attacks the theory of causality presupposed in the philosophers’ arguments (see CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT). The so-called necessity of causality is, says al-Ghazali, simply based on the mere fact that an event A has so far occurred concomitantly with an event B. There is no guarantee of the continuation of that relationship in the future, since the connection of A and B lacks logical necessity. In fact, according to Ash‘arite atomistic occasionalism, the direct cause of both A and B is God; God simply creates A when he creates B. Thus theoretically he can change his custom (sunna, ‘ada) at any moment, and resurrect the dead: in fact, this is 'a second creation'.

Al-Ghazali thus claims that the philosophers' arguments cannot survive philosophical criticism, and Aristotelian logic served as a powerful weapon for this purpose. However, if the conclusions of philosophy cannot be proved by reason, is not the same true of theological principles or the teachings of revelation? How then can the truth of the latter be demonstrated? Herein lies the force of al-Ghazali’s critique of reason.

4 Relation to philosophy

Philosophy declined in the Sunni world after al-Ghazali, and his criticism of philosophy certainly accelerated this decline. Nearly a century later, IBN RUSHD (Averroes) made desperate efforts to resist the trend by refuting al-Ghazali’s Tahafut in his Tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) and Fasl al-maqal (The Decisive Treatise), but he could not stop it. Philosophy was gradually absorbed into

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Sufism and was further developed in the form of mystical philosophy, particularly in the Shi'ite world (see MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM). In the Sunni world also, Aristotelian logic was incorporated into theology and Sufism was partially represented philosophically. In all this, al-Ghazali’s influence was significant.

Ghazali committed himself seriously to Sufism in his later life, during which time he produced a series of unique works on Sufism and ethics including Mizan al-‘amal (The Balance of Action), composed just before retirement, Ihy’ ‘ulum al-din, his magnum opus written after retirement,Kitab al-arba‘in fi usul al-din (The Forty Chapters on the Principles of Religion), Kimiya’-yi sa‘adat (The Alchemy of Happiness), Mishkat al-anwar (The Niche of the Lights) and others. The ultimate goal of humankind according to Islam is salvation in paradise, which is depicted in the Qur’an and Traditions as various sensuous pleasures and joy at the vision of God. The greatest joy for al-Ghazali, however, is the seeing of God in the intellectual or spiritual sense of the beatific vision. In comparison with this, sensuous pleasures are nothing. However, they remain necessary for the masses who cannot reach such a vision.

Resurrection for IBN SINA means each person's death - the separation of the soul from the body - and the rewards and punishments after the `resurrection' mean the pleasures and pains which the soul tastes after death. The soul, which is in contact with the active intellect through intellectual and ethical training during life, is liberated from the body by death and comes to enjoy the bliss of complete unity with the active intellect. On the other hand, the soul that has become accustomed to sensual pleasures while alive suffers from the pains of unfulfilled desires, since the instrumental organs for that purpose are now lost. Al-Ghazali calls death `the small resurrection' and accepts the state of the soul after death as Ibn Sina describes. On the other hand, the beatific vision of God by the elite after the quickening of the bodies, or 'the great resurrection', is intellectual as in the view of the philosophers. The mystical experience (fans) of the Sufi is a foretaste of the real vision of God in the hereafter.

A similar influence of philosophy is also apparent in al-Ghazali’s view of human beings. Human beings consist of soul and body, but their essence is the soul. The human soul is a spiritual substance totally different from the body. It is something divine (amr ilahi), which makes possible human knowledge of God. If the soul according to al-Ghazali is an incorporeal substance occupying no space (as Ibn Sina implies, though he carefully avoids making a direct statement to that effect), then al-Ghazali’s concept of the soul is quite different from the soul as 'a subtle body' as conceived by theologians at large. According to al-Ghazali, the body is a vehicle or an instrument of the soul on the way to the hereafter and has various faculties to maintain the bodily activities. When the main faculties of appetite, anger and intellect are moderate, harmonious and well-balanced, then we find the virtues of temperance, courage, wisdom and justice. In reality, however, there is excess or deficiency in each faculty, and so we find various vicious characteristics. The fundamental cause for all this is love of the world (see SOUL IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY).

The purpose of religious exercises is to rectify these evil dispositions, and to come near to God by `transforming them in imitation of God's characteristics' (Iakhalluq bi-akhlaq Allah). This means transforming the evil traits of the soul through bodily exercises by utilizing the inner relationship between the soul and the body. Al-Ghazali here makes full use of the Aristotelian theory of the golden mean, which he took mainly from IBN MISKAWAYH. In order to maintain the earthly existence of the body as a vehicle or an instrument of the soul, the mundane order and society are necessary. In this framework, the traditional system of Islamic law, community and society are reconsidered and reconstructed.

The same is also true of al-Ghazali’s cosmology. He divides the cosmos into three realms: the world of mulk (the phenomenal world), the world ofmalakut (the invisible world) and the world of jabarut (the intermediate world). He takes this division from the Sufi theorist Abu Talib al-Makki, although he reverses the meanings of malakut and jabarut. The world ofmalakut is that of God’s determination, a world of angels free from change, increase and decrease, as created once spontaneously by God. This is the world of the Preserved Tablet in heaven where God's decree is inscribed. The phenomenal world is the incomplete replica of the world ofmalakut, which is the world of reality, of the essence of things. The latter is in some respects similar to the Platonic world of Ideas, or Ibn Sina's world of inteiligibles. The only difference is that the world of malakut is created once and for all by God, who thereafter continues to create moment by moment the phenomenal world according to his determination. This is a major difference from the emanationist deterministic world of philosophy. Once the divine determination is freely made, however, the phenomenal world changes and evolves according to a determined sequence of causes and effects. The difference between this relationship and the philosophers' causality lies in whether or not the relation of cause and effect is necessary. This emphasis on causal relationship by al-Ghazali differs from the traditional Ash‘arite occasionalism.

The Sufis in their mystical experience, and ordinary people in their dreams, are allowed to glimpse the world of the Preserved Tablet in heaven, when the veil between that world and the soul is lifted momentarily. Thus they are given foreknowledge and other forms of supernatural knowledge. The revelation transmitted by the angel to the prophets is essentially the same; the only difference is that the prophets do not need any special preparation. From the viewpoint of those given such special knowledge of the invisible world, says al-Ghazali, the world is the most perfect and best possible world. This optimism gave rise to arguments and criticism even in his lifetime, alleging that he was proposing a Mu‘tazilite or philosophical teaching against orthodox Ash‘arism. He certainly says in his theological works that it is not incumbent upon God to do the best for humans; however, this does not mean that God will not in fact do the best of his own free will. Even so, behind al-Ghazali’s saying that God does so in actuality, we can see the influence of philosophy and Sufism.

Al-Ghazali's criticism of philosophy and his mystical thought are often compared to the philosophical and theological thought of Thomas AQUINAS, NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT, and even DESCARTES and PASCAL. In the medieval world, where he was widely believed to be a philosopher, he had an influence through the Latin and Hebrew translations of his writings and through such thinkers as Yehuda HALEVI, Moses MAIMONIDES and Raymond Martin of Spain.

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See also: ASH‘ARIYYA AND MU‘TAZILA; CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT; IBN SINA; IBN RUSHD; ISLAM, CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY IN; MYSTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM; NEOPLATONISM IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

5 LIST OF WORKS:

Al-Ghazali (1094) Maqasid al falasifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers), ed. S. Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1961. (A precise summary of Islamic philosophy as represented by Ibn Sina.)

- (1095) Tahafut al falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927; trans, S.A. Kamah, Al-Ghazali's Tahafut al-Falasifah,Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963. (Al-Ghazali’s refutation of Islamic philosophy.)

- (1095) Mi‘yar al-‘ilm (The Standard Measure of Knowledge), ed. S. Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1961. (A summary account of Aristotelian logic.)

- (1095) Mihakk al-nazar fi’l-mantiq (The Touchstone of Proof in Logic), ed. M. al-Nu‘mani, Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-Hadithah, 1966. (A summary of Aristotelian logic.)

- (1095) al-Iqtisad fi’l-‘tiqad (The Middle Path in Theology), ed. I.A. Qubukçu and H. Atay, Ankara: Nur Matbaasi, 1962;partial trans. A.-R. Abu Zayd, Al-Ghazali on Divine Predicates and Their Properties, Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf,1970; trans. M. Asin Palacios, El justo medio en la creencia,Madrid, 1929. (An exposition of al-Ghazali’s Ash‘arite theological system.)

-- (1095) Mizan al-‘amal (The Balance of Action), ed. S. Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1964; trans. H. Hachem,Ghazali: Critere de l’action, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1945. (An exposition of al-Ghazali’s ethical theory.)

- (1095-6) al-Qistas al-mustaqim (The Just Balance), ed. V. Chelhot, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959; trans, V Chelhot, ‘Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim et la connaissance rationnelle chez Ghazali’, Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales 15, 1955-7: 7-98;trans. D.P. Brewster, Al-Ghazali: The Just Balance, Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1978. (An attempt to deduce logical rules from the Qur’an and to refute the Isma‘ilis.)

- (1096-7) Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), Cairo: Matba‘ah Lajnah Nashr al-Thaqafah al-Islamiyyah, 1937-8, 5 vols; partial translations can be found in E.E. Calverley, Worship in Islam: al-Ghazali’s Book of the Ihya’ on the Worship, London: Luzac, 1957; N.A. Faris, TheBook of Knowledge, Being a Translation with Notes of the Kitab al-ilm of al-Ghazzali’s Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din, Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1962; N.A. Faris, The Foundation of the Articles of Faith: Being a Translation with Notes of the Kitab Qaw‘id al-‘Aqa’id of al-Ghazzali’s Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din, Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1963; L. Zolondek, Book XX of al-Ghazali’s 1hya’ ‘Ulum al-Din, Leiden: Brill, 1963; T.J. Winter, The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife: Book XL of the Revival of Religious Sciences,Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 1989; K. Nakamura,Invocations and Supplications: Book IX of the Revival of tae Religious Sciences, Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society,1990; M. Bousquet, Ihya’ ‘ouloum ed-din ou vivification de lafoi, analyse et index, Paris: Max Besson, 1951. (Al-Ghazali’s summa of the religious sciences of Islam.)

- (1097) al-Risala al-Qudsiyya (The Jerusalem Epistle), ed. and trans. A.L. Tibawi, ‘Al-Ghazali's Tract on Dogmatic Theology’, The Islamic Quarterly 9 (3/4), 1965: 62-122. (A summary of al-Ghazali’s theological system, later incorporated into the Ihya’.)

- (1106-7) Mishkat al-anwar (The Niche of the Lights), ed. A. Afifi, Cairo, 1964; trans. WH.T Gairdner, Al-Ghazzali's Mishkat al-Anwar, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1924; repr. Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1952; R. Deladriere, Le Tabernacle des lumieres, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981; A.-E. Elschazli, Die Nische der Lichter, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987. (An exposition of al-Ghazali’s mystical philosophy in its last phase.)

- (1109) al-Mustafa min ‘ilm al-usul (The Essentials of the Islamic Legal Theory), Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Amiriyyah,1322-4 AH. (An exposition and standard work of the Islamic legal theory of the Shaffite school.)

- (c. 1108) al-Munqidh min al-dalal (The Deliverer from Error), ed. J. Saliba and K. Ayyad, Damascus: Maktab al-Nashr al-‘Arabi, 1934; trans. W M. Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali, London: Allen & Unwin, 1953; trans. R.J. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazali’s al-Munqidh min al-Dalal and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazali, Boston, MA: Twayne,1980. (Al-Ghazali’s spiritual autobiography.)

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING:

Abu Ridah, M. (1952) Al-Ghazali and seine Widerlegung der griechischen Philosophie (Al-Ghazali and His Refutation of Greek Philosophy), Madrid: S.A. Blass. (An analysis of al-Ghazali’s refutation of philosophy in the framework of his religious thought.)

Campanini, M. (1996) ‘Al-Ghazzali’, in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds)History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 19, 258-74. (The life and thought of al-Ghazali is discussed in detail, with a conspectus of his thought through his very varied career.)

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Frank, R. (1992) Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazali and Avicenna, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag. (One of the recent works clarifying the philosophical influence upon al-Ghazali, representing a new trend in the study of al-Ghazali.)

(1994) Al-Ghazali and the Ash‘arite School, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. (A new attempt to prove al-Ghazali’s commitment to philosophy and his alienation from traditional Ash‘arism.)

Ibn Rushd (c.1180) Tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of Incoherence), trans, S. Van den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut, 2vols, London: Luzac, 1969. (A translation with detailed annotations of Ibn Rushd's refutation of al-Ghazali’s criticism of philosophy.)

Jabre, F. (1958a) La notion de certitude selon Ghazali dans ses origines psychologiques et historiques (The Notion of Certitude According to al-Ghazali and Its Psychological and Historical Origins), Paris: Vrin. (A comprehensive analysis of al-Ghazali’s important concept of certitude.)

(1958b), La notion de la ma'rifa chez Ghazali (The Notion of Gnosis in al-Ghazali), Beirut: Librairie Orientale. (An analysis of the various aspects of the notion of mystical knowledge.)

Laoust, H. (1970) La politique de Gazali (The Political Thought of al-Ghazali), Paris: Paul Geuthner. (An exposition of al-Ghazali’s political thought, showing him as an orthodox jurist.)

Lazarus-Yafeh, H. (1975) Studies in al-Ghazali, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press. (Literary stylistic analyses applied to al-Ghazali’s works.)

Leaman, O. (1985) An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A good introduction to al-Ghazali’s philosophical arguments against the historical background of medieval Islamic philosophy.)

(1996) ‘Ghazali and the Ash‘arites’, Asian Philosophy 6 (1):17-27. (Argues that the thesis of al-Ghazali’s distance from Ash‘arism has been overdone.)

Macdonald, D.B. (1899) ‘The Life of al-Ghazzali, with Especial Reference to His Religious Experiences and Opinions’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 20: 71-132. (A classic biography, dated but still somewhat useful.)

Marmura, M.E. (1995) ‘Ghazalian Causes and Intermediaries’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 115: 89-100. (Admitting the great influence of philosophy on al-Ghazali, the author tries to demonstrate al-Ghazali’s commitment to Sufism.)

Nakamura Kojiro (1985) ‘An Approach to Ghazali’s Conversion’, Orient21: 46-59. (An attempt to clarify what Watt (1963) calls ‘a crisis of civilization’ as the background of al-Ghazali’s conversion.)

(1993) ‘Was Ghazali an Ash‘arite?’, Memoirs of Research Department of the Toyo Bunko 51: 1-24. (Al-Ghazali was still an Ash‘arite, but his Ash‘arism was quite different from the traditional form.)

Ormsby, E. L. (1984) Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazali’s ‘Best of All Possible Worlds’, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (A study of the controversies over al-Ghazali’s ‘optimistic’ remarks in his later works.)

Shehadi, F (1964) Ghazali's Unique Unknowable God: A Philosophical Critical Analysis of Some of the Problems Raised by Ghazali's View of God as Utterly Unique and Unknowable, Leiden: Brill. (A careful philosophical analysis of al-Ghazali’s religious thought.)

Sherif, M. (1975) Ghazali's Theory of Virtue, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (A careful analysis of al-Ghazali’s ethical theory in his Mizan and the philosophical influence on it.)

Smith, M. (1944) Al-Ghazali the Mystic, London: Luzac. (A little dated, but still a useful comprehensive study of al-Ghazali as a mystic and his influence in both the Islamic and Christian worlds.)

Watt, W M. (1963) Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali,Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (An analysis of al-Ghazali’s life and thought in the historical and social context from the viewpoint of sociology of knowledge.)

Zakzouk, M. (1992) Al-Ghazali’s Philosophie im Vergleich mit Descartes(Al-Ghazali’s Philosophy Compared with Descartes), Frankfurt: Peter Lang. (A philosophical analysis of al-Ghazali’s thought in comparison with Descartes with reference to philosophical doubt.)

KOJIRO NAKAMURA

6

Imam Al-Ghazali’s views on children's education Foundation for Science Technology and Civlilsation, 9 December 2001

Amongst the many Muslim scholars who wrote on the education of children, are Ibn Sina, Ibn Khaldun and Al-Ghazali. Here focus is placed on the latter.

Al-Ghazali, known in Europe as Algazel, is one of the most illustrious Muslim scholars, who wrote many works, and became renowned for his learning. In his thirties, he became the principal teacher at Madrasah Nizamiyyah of Baghdad, the most renowned institution of learning in eastern Islam (Cordova in the West). His ideas on education dominated Islamic educational thought for centuries after his death. Here, the focus is how he saw the education of the child and the role of the master. The sources for this brief account, other than the original source itself, are C. Bouamrane-L. Gardet; A. Tritton, and A. Tibawi.

According to Al-Ghazali, "knowledge exists potentially in the human soul like the seed in the soil; by learning the potential becomes actual."

The child, Al-Ghazali also wrote, "is a trust (placed by God) in the hands of his parents, and his innocent heart is a precious element capable of taking impressions".

If the parents, and later the teachers, brought him up in righteousness he would live happily in this world and the next and they would be rewarded by God for their good deed. If they neglected the child’s upbringing and education he would lead a life of unhappiness in both worlds and they would bear the burden of the sin of neglect.

One of the elements Al-Ghazali insists upon is that a child should be taught the words of the Creed in his earliest days and be taught the meaning gradually as he grew older; corresponding to the three stages of memorising, understanding and conviction.

The way the child relates to the world at large occupies a large concern in Al-Ghazali’s mind. In concert with Ibn Al-Hajj, he stresses amongst others that a child must not boast about his father’s wealth, and must be polite and attentive to all. He should be taught not to love money for love of it is a deadly poison. He must not spit nor clean his nose in public. He must learn to respect and obey his parents, teachers and elders. As he grows older, he must observe the rules of cleanliness, fast a few days in Ramadhan, avoid the wearing of silk, gold and silver, learn the prescriptions of the scared law, fear thieving, wealth from unclean sources, lying, treachery, vice and violent language. The pupil must not be excessively proud, or jealous. He should not tell off others. He must avoid the company of the great of this world, or to receive gifts from them. He must act towards God as he would wish his servant acted towards him. He should treat every human as he would like to be treated himself.

The perspective of Al-Ghazali is centered upon personal effort in the search for truth; and this presupposes, he insists, a received education and the direction of a master. Education (tarbiya), Al-Ghazali states in Ayyuha l-walad is like "the labour of the farmer, who uproots the weeds, trims wheat so as it grows better and gives a better harvest." Every man needs a teacher to guide him in the right direction. To try and do without leads to worst illusions. In Ayyuha l-walad the pupil’s outward respect for his teacher is evidence of esteem for such in one's heart.

He who undertakes the instructions of the young, points Al-Ghazali, "undertakes great responsibility". He must therefore be as tender to his pupils as if they were his own children. He must correct moral lapses through hinting… above all he himself must set an example so that his action accords with his precepts. The teacher should never criticise the subject taught by another. He must adapt his teaching to the pupil's capacity and ability, and not to overburden the pupil's capacity, nor give him fright. He must respect the less gifted pupil, who might if lost, leave safe foundations for standards he would never reach. And after school, Al-Ghazali insists, the pupil must be allowed to have recreation. To prevent play and insist on continuous study leads to dullness in the heart, diminution in intelligence and unhappiness. Even more on this matter, in ‘Ihya ulum al-din’, the teacher, Al-Ghazali holds, carries eight duties. First and foremost he is a father for his pupils. He must teach for the sake of God. He would advise the student with prudence, fight the excessive urge to learn too quickly, and to overtake his peers. He would reprimand with moderation, in private, discreetly, not in public. To blame too much is to make the pupil too stubborn in his way of seeing and doing things. And one other duty of the teacher is to make sure that what he teaches he pursues in his life, and that his own acts do not contradict what he is trying to inculcate.

References:

Panorama de la pensee Islamique by: C. Bouamrane, L. Gardet Sindbad; 1-3 Rue Feutrier; Paris 18 (1984) , principally chapter 10, by Louis Gardet (Notion et principe de l'education en Islam: pp 205-226)

Ihya ul’Ulum by: Al-Ghazali Al-Ghazali, Ihya ul’Ulum, part I, book 2, section 2.

Ayyuha l’walad by: Al-Ghazali Al-Ghazali, Ayyuha l’walad: UNESCO, Beyrouth 1951 (Arabic text).

Islamic Education by: A.Tibawi A.Tibawi: Islamic Education, Luzac and Company Ltd, London, 19727

Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages by: A.S. Tritton Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages; Luzac and Company, London, 1957.

Ghazali and Educational Philosophy B. BEHARDIN

Ghazali's search for knovvledge,

Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali was born in the city of TuÃs, northern Persia (Iran), in theyear 1058/450H.

His father, a wool spinner, used to enjoy the company of preachers and scholars and prayed that his sons would be like them. Ghazali, became 'the most scholarly person of his generation and the imam of his time'; his brother Ahmed 'an awe-inspiring preacher' (Al Sabki p.94). Through them, their father's prayers were ansvvered.

After their father's death, the broth-ers, along with their inheritance, were entrusted to a poor ascetic. When the inheritance ran out, the ascetic coný-mended them to pursue their education in a school where they might be finan-cially supported. Ghazali excelled as a student. He used to 'thirst after com-prehension of things as they are' (Watt, p.21). He recalls: 'we studied 'um, knovvledge, for other than Allah, but it refused to be studied except for Allah.' (Zabidi,p.l94).

He left for Jurjan, where he took notes on the lectures of Abu Nasr al-Isma'ili. On his return journey, he was waylaid by a highwayman. He pleaded only for his notebooks. The highvvay-man mocked: 'How can you cali your-self a scholar, when, if I take your books you have lost your knovvledge?' His books vvere returned to him, and, as a result of the incident, he spent the next three years memorizing his notes, so that 'no highvvayman could rob him of his knowledge' (Sabki, p. 195).He travelled to Naisabur, the largest town in Khorasan and studied there under imam al-Haramain, 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini. After his sheikh's death, he headed for the Seljuk camp of the Sultan Nizam al-Mulk in Baghdad. The scholars of Baghdad recognised Ghazali's excellence and he was soon appointed head of the Nizamiya school. it was whilst in this position that he became famous and involved himself in the political and religious disputes of the time.

In 1093/485H, Ghazali renounced celebrity and public influence for devo-tional retreat. He spent long periods in contemplation in the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. He also visited Makkah several times. it was in 1097/489H, that, at the grave of the Prophet Abraham, he concluded never 'to receive money from any ruler, nor to greet any ruler ör to be inspector över anyone' (Ghazali, p.85). On his way home to Tuþ, he travelled through Baghdad, but, upholding his vow, he stayed at the retreat of Abu Sa'id al-Naisaburi and did not visit its rulers. it was there that he told of the work he had carried out in recluse and the resulting book ihya 'Ulum al-Din. On arrival in Tuþ, he concentrated on wor-ship and teaching until, on seeing the poor state of education, he returned to Naisabur and the public defence of the Suma using the teachings of his book ihya, until on Monday 14 Jumadi al-Akhira 1113/505H when, after praying his morning prayers, he told his brother Ahmed to prepare for his funeral. He died that day and vvas buried next to the imam Ali Rida in Mashad, Iran.

Philosophy of Education among the Muslims before Ghazali

Ghazali's philosophy contained noth-ing that could not be traced back to the Qur'an and Sunna.

The Islanýic philosophy of education dravvs largely on the stories in the Qur'an as its primary source. An example is the story in which Allah teaches Adam the meaning of 'things', and then instructs him to teach the Angels. Among other stories in the Qur'an used by Müslim educationalists to justify their philosophy is the story of Musa and Khidr and the numerous stories of the Prophets and their disci-ples.

The Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace, advised many of his Companions how to teach. He told Muadh bin Jabal and Abi Musa vvhen they vvent to the Yemen: 'Make things easy and do not make things difficult, teach and do not chase avvay' (Bukhari). On another occasion he said: 'Teach and do not rebuke for the teacher is better than the öne vvho rebukes.' (Tayalasi)

'Schools' in the form of 'study cir-cles' vvere established during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the fýrst four Caliphs. These 'learning centres' developed around the prominent com-panions.

Although the sayings of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, and the main companions concerning education vvere not recorded together, they vvere contained in scattered collections and transmitted practically \vherever schools existed.

The first book expounding the edu-cational philosophy of islam vvas adab al-muallimin by Muhammad bin �ahmýn. This vvas follovved by books by Ibn Jizar al-Qairawani and Abu Hasan al Qabini.'

Ghazali's ihya is a milestone in the development of educational philosophy because it brought together and simplified many of the ideas of his predeces-sors. Most subsequent \vritings on Islamic teaching philosophy merely abridged ör commented upon his work.

8

Ghazali's vvritings on edu-cation

Among Ghazali's writings on edu-cation are the follovving:

Ihya 'Ulum al-Din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences)

Ghazali's ihya, written during his period of retreat, is probably his most important and well known work. The first of its forty books is Kitab al-Ilm, The Book of Knowledge. This, along with the section on riyadat al-atfal, (Children's Play) contains Ghazali's most direct references to education.

Ayyuha l-Walad, (Oh Son)

This short text was written after ihya in response to a request from öne of his students. Its title expresses Ghazali's view that the teacher is like a father to his student.

Bidayat al-Hîdaya (The Beginning of Guidance)

The first chapter of this short text is often read by the novice to his sheikh as a type of initiation. it contains a warn-ing about insincerity in seeking knowledge and a description of the various types of scholar and student.Minhaj al-Mutalim (The Student's System)

There is some controversy över whether this book can rightly be attrib-uted to Ghazali.2 Its content is similar to Ayyuha l-Walad and it is thought to be possibly a summary of Ghazali's writ-ings on education.AH but the last of the vvritings men-tioned above have been translated into English.

REFERENCES

AL-SABKI (n.d) Tabaqat al-Shafiat al-Kubra,vol. 6, Dar al-Marifa, Cairo. AL-ZABIDI (n.d) Itihaf Sadat al-Mutaqin,Beirut.AL GHAZALà � (n.d.) Fada 'il al-Anam, Cairo BUKHARI (1975) Sahih: Book of Knowledge,BeirutTAYALASI (n.d.) Maqasid al-Hasanah, Cairo WATT W.M. (1953) Faith and practice ofGhazali (trans. of Munqidh min al-Dalaf),London.1. Ibn Jizar Al Qairawani d.395H/1003c.e. whowrote Siyostu Sibyan wa Tadbiraha. AbuHasan Ali bin Muhammad Al Qabitid.463H/1072c.e. wrote Adab al-Mualimeen2. According to Haji Khalifa it is the work ofGhazali. However it is not mentioned inVVo/iot al-'Ayn ör Shadharat al-Dhahab ör theHistory ofDamascus by Ibn Asakir.

Al-Ghazali is most famous for his contributions in philosophy, religion and Sufism. He is also known as Algazel in the West. Abu Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Shafi'i al-Ghazali was born in 1058 C.E. in Khorman, Iran. His father died while he was still very young but he had the opportunity of getting education in the prevalent curriculum at Nishapur and Baghdad. Soon he acquired a high standard of scholarship in religion and philosophy and was honored by his appointment as a Professor at the Nizamiyah University of Baghdad, which was recognized as one of the most reputed institutions of learning in the golden era of Muslim history. After a few years, however, he gave up his academic pursuits and worldly interests and became a wandering ascetic. This was a process (period) of mystical transformation. Later, he resumed his teaching duties, but again left these. An era of solitary life, devoted to contemplation and writing then ensued, which led to the authorship of a number of everlasting books. He died in 1128 C.E. at Baghdad. 

Al-Ghazali made major contributions in religion, philosophy and Sufism. A number of Muslim philosophers had been following and developing several viewpoints of Greek philosophy, including the Neoplatonic philosophy, and this was leading to conflict with several Islamic teachings. On the other hand, the movement of sufism was assuming such excessive proportions as to avoid observance of obligatory prayers and duties of Islam. Based on his unquestionable scholarship and personal mystical experience, Ghazali sought to rectify these trends, both in philosophy and sufism. 

In philosophy, Al-Ghazali upheld the approach of mathematics and exact sciences as essentially correct. However, he adopted the techniques of Aristotelian logic and the Neoplatonic procedures and employed these very tools to lay bare the flaws and lacunas of the then prevalent Neoplatonic philosophy and to diminish the negative influences of Aristotelianism and excessive rationalism. In contrast to some of the Muslim philosophers, e.g., Farabi he portrayed the inability of reason to comprehend the absolute and the infinite. Reason could not transcend the finite and was limited to the observation of the relative. Also, several Muslim philosophers had held that the universe was finite in space but infinite in time. Ghazali argued that an infinite time was related to an infinite space. With his clarity of thought and force of argument, he was able to create a balance between religion and reason, and identified their respective spheres as being the infinite and the finite, 9

respectively. 

In religion, particularly mysticism, he cleansed the approach of sufism of its excesses and reestablished the authority of the orthodox religion. Yet, he stressed the importance of genuine sufism, which he maintained was the path to attain the absolute truth. 

Al-Ghazali was a prolific writer. His immortal books include Tuhafat al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), Ihya al-'Ulum al-Islamia (The Revival of the Religious Sciences), "The Beginning of Guidance and his Autobiography," "Deliverance from Error." Some of his works were translated into European languages in the Middle Ages. He also wrote a summary of astronomy. 

Al-Ghazali's influence was deep and everlasting. He is one of the greatest theologians of Islam. His theological doctrines penetrated Europe, influenced Jewish and Christian Scholasticism and several of his arguments seem to have been adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas in order to similarly reestablish the authority of orthodox Christian religion in the West. So forceful was his argument in the favor of religion that he was accused of damaging the cause of philosophy and, in the Muslim Spain, Ibn Rushd wrote a rejoinder to his Tuhafut.

Imam Al-Ghazali's Concept of EducationImam Al-Ghazali’s Concept of Education

Imam al-Ghazali is one of the greatest reformers Islam has produced. His multifaceted service for Din has been acclaimed by the academia through centuries. One of his masterpieces is the Ihya Ulum al-Din (the regeneration of sciences). ‘Ulama say that, should all the books on different disciplines be burnt out, this book is sufficient to recreate them. One of the most appealing topics of this book is the chapter on Knowledge, where the great Imam shed light as to what is knowledge.

He has divided knowledge into two parts:Religious knowledge (Ilm al-‘Áliyah’ ), and secular (or instrumental) knowledge (Ilm al-Áliyah). The former is acquired from the Qur’an and Sunnah. It is the most dignified knowledge and it is without doubt. The second type of knowledge is needed to enhance the understanding of the former since it was a revelation. Imam al-Ghazali subdivided the secular subjects into three subcategories:

Beneficial knowledge: This encapsulates those sciences that will benefit society and helps it to progress, e.g. medical knowledge and mathematics. Accordingly, the acquisition of these sciences and disciplines is Fard al-Kifayyah, i.e. if nobody acquires it, then the entire Muslim community of a particular locality will be sinful.

Neutral Knowledge: This category encapsulates those disciplines that will not really enhance one’s beneficial knowledge but there is nothing wrong if they are studied, e.g. the history of England.

Harmful Knowledge: This category comprises of those disciplines which are harmful, such as black magic and gambling. It is therefore, haram to acquire such knowledge.

In the light of the above, one must be obliged to be careful and be responsible in selecting his career. There are many fields that Muslims must take the lead. It is thus important to focus on these disciplines, and parents should ensure that their children study in the proper environment and with the right Islamic mindset in order to obtain the optimum result. Also it is incumbent for a person to learn the Islamic side of the field he is in.

Article Written by Shaikh Faizal Manjoo ©

Hadith: The Prophet (saw) said: “The acquisition of knowledge is compulsory upon every Muslim”.

Golden Principles of Raising Children

Imam Ghazali (May God Shower His Mercy Upon Him)'s Arabic Book on the Subject from His Three-Volumes Collection of Short Books

"Majmu'a Rasail Imam Ghazali"

Translated into English By Irfan Hasan

10

CHILDREN'S INITIAL EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND ATTAINMENT OF MORAL VALUES INTRODUCTION OF THE BOOK

Adopting an effective method for training children is extremely important and necessary. It is because a child is Allah's trust in parents' hands and the child's heart is like a nice, clean, and simple mirror which, although, is devoid of any types of impressions or shapes, is capable of accepting the influence of all types of impressions and influences and it can be inclined towards any thing you like. Therefore, if good habits are inculcated in the child and if he/she is instructed in knowledge, then the child after gaining such excellent nourishment (upbringing), achieves the real success of this life and of the life hereafter. In this [success], the parents and the teachers of the child become entitled to a share in the rewards [from Allah for good upbringing of the child]. And if bad habits are inculcated (nurtured) in a child and [if the child is] left unhindered (unattended/free) like animals, then he/she gets destroyed after becoming ill mannered. The burden of sin [of suchnegligence] fells on his/her guardian and caretaker. Allah, the Exalted, has said [in the Holy Quran]:

"Ya Ayyuhal Lazeena Aamano Qu Anfusakum Wa Ahleekum Naarun."

"O you who believe! Save yourself and your family from the fire of Hell."

And when the father saves his child from the fires of this world, then as a first priority, it is incumbent (obligatory) upon him to save his child from the fire of the hereafter (Hellfire) and the only way of doing this is that he teaches the child manners and civilization and educate him/her in the best of morals and protect him/her from bad companions and friends and should not let the desire for physical beautification, fine dresses, ornamentation, physical ease, and comfort-seeking settle in his/her heart, otherwise, the child after growing up, will waste his/her precious life in desiring and seeking these lowly things and will get eternally destroyed by them. Instead, it's incumbent upon the father to keep a strict watch and care from a very early age [of his child].NECECCITY AND IMPORTANCE OF PERMISSIBLE (HALAL) FOODFor upbringing of the child and for nursing, [in the absence of the mother] a woman of good character and religiosity should be appointed, who eats lawful (Halal) food because the milk that comes from unlawful food, has no betterment or blessing in it, instead, if the child is brought up with milk that comes from unlawful (Haram) sources, then evil gets permeated into the very fiber (consciousness/psychology/inner being) of the child, and because of that, the temperament of the child gets inclined towards Satanic (evil) deeds. And when [the parent feels that] the child is able to discern between the good and the bad then a complete nurturing of the child should begin. This [phase of child's life] is indicated by the appearance of the initial signs of shyness (Haya/modesty), because when the child, realizing his/her respect and honor, starts to feel shy and because of shyness starts to leave doing certain things, then this is only the result of the light of intelligence emerging inhim/her. This [emergence of the light of intelligence] happens to such an extent that he/she starts to think of some things as good and of some things as bad, and starts to feel shameful about certain deeds and this very realization of shyness (Haya) is a huge favor on the child by Allah, the Exalted. And it's a clear sign that argues for (clearly shows) his/her moderation of the moral values and the purity of the heart. Instead, we should think of it in this way that this consciousness of the realization of good and bad [in the child], is a glad tiding from the nature (i.e. Allah) that this child upon attaining puberty, will possess perfect intelligence. That's why a child with shyness (Haya/modesty), should never be left free (liberated), but instead, making use of his/her shyness (Haya) and discernment [between good and bad], a full training should be given to him/her.AN EXPLANATION OF THE ETIQUETTES OF EATINGThe first bad desire that dominates a child, is the greed to eat more; therefore, it's extremely necessary to teach him/her the etiquettes of eating.

For example, [the etiquettes are] to eat food only with the right hand, to recite "Bismillah" ("In the Name of Allah") in the beginning, to eat from the front [of the plate], to wait for others to begin before he/she does, to not start staring at the food [when others start first], to not even stare at others who are eating, to not eat in an unnecessary hurry, to chew the food properly, to not continuously [or hurriedly] put morsels of food in his/her mouth [but should do that gradually], to not soil his/her hand and clothes with the food [by dropping it]. Sometimes, the child should be fed only the bread so that he/she does not consider the curry [to go with bread] to be a necessity so as to not even be able to do without it. Likewise, one should narrate in front of the child, the undesirability of eating too much, for example, those who eat excessively should be compared to animals. The child should be told to not follow the kids who eat too much and the kids who eat less and arewell trained should be praised in front of the child. The child attention should be drawn towards sacrificing the food for the sake of others [who are less fortunate] by taking care of the needs of his/her companions. The habit should be developed in the child to not care too much about [fine] food and to be content with simple food.AN EXPLANATION OF THE ETIQUETTES OF DRESSINGSimilarly, instead of colorful and silk clothes, the love and desire for simple and plain clothes should be developed in the heart of the child. It should be firmly impressed on his/her mind that to wear such clothes is not appropriate and pious people abhor such ways of dressing. Such things (admonitions) should be told to the child from time to time in a generalized way. And it's an obligation on the parents that when they see any child wearing silky or brightly colored dresses in front of them, then they should express their disapproval [of such ways of dressing] in front of the child and should instill their undesirability [for such dresses] in the heart of the child. The parents should protect their child from 11

meeting with all those children who are accustomed to prosperity, seeking comforts (comfortable lifestyle), and dressing proudly. They (parents) should also protect the child from the company of all those people who tell him/her stories about such ways of indulgence [likeseeking comforts, dressing proudly, etc.]. Any child, who is left unattended [in such things] during his/her initial growth (upbringing), after growing up commonly becomes ill-mannered, liar, thief, tale-bearer, intransigent (stubborn), evil talker, sarcastic, cunning, deceiver, and foolish. The only source of protecting the child from all these evils is good education and training, after that, the child should be admitted into a religious school so that he/she studies Quran and Hadith (traditions of Prophet Muhammad [Peace and blessing of Allah be upon him]), acquires knowledge of the conditions, biography, and traditions of Allah's righteous slaves so that from the early childhood, the love of the saints (May Allah shower His Mercy upon all of them) get established in his/her heart.EPIDEMIC OF POETRYFurthermore, protect the child from romantic poetry and romantic-minded poets and also make him/her stay away from those writers who think that such poetry is an indication of the life of the heart and subtlety of perception [or expression], because such things sow the seeds of corruption (Fasad) and evil in the minds of children.METHOD OF PERSUADING TOWARDS GOOD AND STOPPING FROM EVIL

Whenever the child displays a good quality or displays a praiseworthy action, then father should praise the child and give him/her such a gift that will make the child happy and should praise the child in front of others. If the child then does something opposite [to his/her praiseworthy quality or action], then it's appropriate to show unawareness of it and [the father] should not dishonor or humiliate the child nor should he highlight the fault. Instead, the father [or parent] should not even let the child know that he even thinks that the child has the courage to do such a thing in front of him, especially, in the case, when the child himself/herself tries to cover and hide the fault. It's because revealing the mistakes [of the child] at times, is the cause for the child to become more daring to such an extent that slowly and gradually the child does not even care about his/her faults being revealed. Even after taking such a wise precaution, if the child does the same [bad] thingagain, then it's suitable to rebuke him/her in private and the fault of the bad deed should be revealed to him/her and should be told, "Beware! Do not ever do this bad thing again. God forbid, if this is found by someone, then you will get humiliated in front of the people", [etc. etc. and other statements can be guessed from this].HARMS OF EXCESSIVE SCOLDING

But it should be kept in mind that the child not be rebuked excessively, because it creates a habit in the child to listen to condemnation and scolding and increases in him/her the courage to commit wrongs. And slowly and gradually, the value of admonitions diminishes from the heart of the child.

Similarly, it's necessary for the father that when he talks to the child, he maintains his awe and fear [in the heart of the child] and should rarely rebuke him/her. And the mother should make him/her fear the father when the child is being stubborn and should strictly stop the child from doing bad things.ETIQUETTES OF SLEEPING

The child should be told not to sleep during the day because it creates laziness but he/she should not be stopped from sleeping at night. However, the child should still be stopped from sleeping on a soft bed so that the child's bodily organs will get strong and the body will not get disfigured, due to which the child will not be able to live without comforts. Instead, the habits of sleeping on hard beds, wearing non-fine (simple) clothes, eating simple food should be instilled in the child. The child should be stopped from doing things in a clandestine way because he/she knows that it's bad, that's why the child hides it. If it's ignored, then the child will develop the habit of doing bad things.

Similarly, the habit of walking during the day and exercising should be instilled in the child so that he/she does not become lethargic and lazy. However, utmost care must be taken to ensure that the child does not expose his/her head, knees, thighs, etc. Furthermore, the child should not walk too fast nor should keep his/her hands loose [which is a sign of laziness] but instead, the child should keep his/her hands close to the body and should be active.PROHIBITION OF ARROGANCE AND PRIDE

The child should be prohibited from showing pride on anything from the possessions of his/her parents, his food items, clothes, even from something like his/her writing tablet and ink. Instead, the habit of dealing with all of his/her companions with humility, respect, honor, and having pure (clean/civilized) conversation, should be inculcated in him/her and should not be allowed to take anything from other children. If it's a child of wealthy parents then he/she should be explained that the honor and rank is in giving and not in taking, instead, taking [from others] has in it [the characteristics of] lowliness, humiliation, and insult. If it's a child of poor parents then he/she should be taught that to have greed and to take something from others is a cause of one's own insult and humiliation and it's the characteristic of a dog that it keeps wagging its tail waiting and being greedy for a morsel [of food]. Similarly, the child should be made to dislike gold and silver and shouldbe made to fear the love of these things worse than the love of snakes and scorpions. It's because the love and greed of gold and silver, causes far more damage to children and adults than the harms caused by poison [from snakes and 12

scorpions].ETIQUETTES OF GATHERINGS AND CONVERSATIONS

The child should be taught to not spit publicly, to not pick his/her nose, to not yawn in front of anyone, to not turn his/her back to anyone, to not sit cross-legged, to not sit while putting his/her palm under the chin or while supporting the head with hands because all these are indications of lethargy and laziness, in other words, the child should even be taught the proper manners of sitting. The child should be restrained from talking too much and it should be clearly impressed on his/her mind that all these are shameful things and are not the works of well-mannered children. Furthermore, the child should be completely prohibited from swearing either truely or falsely so that he/she will not develop the habit of swearing from childhood. Similarly, the child should be stopped from starting a conversation first and should have this habit instilled in him/her that he/she should speak only to answer [questions] and that too should be proportionate to the question [asked]. Whensomeone is speaking to the child then he/she should listen very attentively and should get up to create more space for those who are older and then should sit with proper manners in front of them. The child should be stopped from useless (evil) talk, dirty talk, cursing, accusations, verbal abuse and should be prohibited from meeting people who do these things because the evil qualities of [one's] companions, necessarily influence the child [in a bad way]. And the real secret of [proper] training of children is embedded (hidden) in protecting the children from [the company of] bad companions.PATIENCE AND FORBEARANCE

It is also necessary that when the teacher punishes the child then the child should neither scream nor shout nor seek the support of intercession (interference) of someone, instead, [the child] should exercise patience and forbearance. In order to make the child understand this, he/she should be told that to exercise patience is the way (characteristic) of the brave ones and to scream, shout, and cry are the works of those who lack dignity.IMPORTANCE AND BENEFITS OF PHYSICAL EXERCISES

After finishing his/her studies, the child should be permitted to play some good sport, with the help of which, he/she could get rid of the tiredness from the school and to get relaxation. But the child should not be allowed to play so much so that he/she gets tired due to the play [itself]. Because, to completely stop the child from playing and to just keep him/her under the pressure of studies, makes his/her heart dead, makes his/her intelligence nullified and useless, and makes his/her life miserable, due to that, the child starts to look for excuses to get rid of the studies.ETIQUETTES OF RESPECTING THE ELDERS

It's extremely important that the child should be taught the obedience to the parents, teachers, and everyone who is older in age than him/her whether this person is a relative or not. And he/she should be told to look at them with the eyes of respect and should abandon play in front of them. When the child reaches puberty, then he/she should not be allowed to have laziness in cleanliness (personal hygiene) and purity and should not be ignored for missing prayers. In certain days of [the holy month of] Ramadan, the child [before acquiring puberty] should be made to fast in some days and should be kept away from silk, and wearing gold and silver. As needed (as it's suitable according to the need), the child should be explained the limits (boundaries) and laws of the Islamic Shari'ah (Divine laws) and should be made to fear theft, unlawful earnings and food, breach of trust, dishonesty, shamelessness, and all evil things that are born in the temperament (personality) of the childduring adolescence. When a child's upbringing from the [early] childhood will be like this, then by the time the child reaches puberty, he/she will be able to clearly understand the secrets and the wisdom behind these matters.A GOOD THOUGHT ABOUT FOOD

During this stage (childhood/adolescence), he/she should be explained that whatever permissible (Halal) food is there, is also like medicines and the only purpose of them is that the human beings, after eating them, could be obedient to Allah, the Exalted.IMPERMANENCE OF THE WORLD

It should also be clearly impressed upon the mind [of the child] that the world itself is not the purpose [of our lives], and [the world] is unreal, without permanence, and has an ending. Death puts an end to these [material] blessings and the world is only a place we are passing by. It is not a place of satisfaction and [is not] a place to settle. But the world of the hereafter is the real station of peace and tranquility and a place of stillness and satisfaction and the death, at all times, is in ambush, to end the life of the world.WHO IS INTELLIGENT?

In reality, intelligent is the one who provides the capital of reliance (provision needed for one's journey to the hereafter) and good deeds from this mortal world for the eternal life of the hereafter, so that he/she attains a high rank of acceptance before Allah, the Exalted, and the limitless blessings of the Paradise. If the child's initial upbringing would have been 13

good, then during adolescence, this discussion will prove to be pleasing to the self (Nafs), effective, get inscribed on the heart like an [indelible] inscription on the stone, auguring well for the child.

On contrary to that, if the child's mental development had been along the wrong lines, then the qualities of evil, shamelessness, desire for eating too much, greed for fine dresses, ostentation and ornamentation, gaudiness, arrogance and pride, would have been born in him/her, and his/her heart will refuse to accept this fact (i.e. the impermanence of the worldly life and the need to work for the life hereafter) like the dry wall refuses to accept dry soil (i.e. such teachings will not stick to the heart of the child). In summary, these are the initial matters that need to be taken care of to the utmost.CHILD'S NATURE AND PARENTS' OBLIGATION

Since the composition of the child's heart is such that it can accept the influences of both the good and the bad, the righteous and the evil, it's the responsibility of the father and the mother to incline the [heart of the] child either to good or to evil (Imam Ghazali is not giving us a choice in this matter, but instead, urging us to incline the child towards good otherwise the child will automatically get inclined towards evil due to the parents' negligence). Prophet Muhammad (May peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) says:

"Kullu Mauludiy Yauladu 'Alal Fitrati Wa Innama Aabawahu Yuhawwidanihi Aow Yunassiranihi Aow Yumajjisanihi."

"Every child is born on the [true] nature [of God] but his/her parents make him/her either a Christian, Jew, or Magian.""falling like a leaf, falling like a star"

Muhammad al-Ghazali (450AH/1058  – 505 AH/1111 CE)

Muhammad al-Ghazali remains one of the most celebrated scholars in the history of Islamic thought. His exceptional life and works continue to be indispensable in the study of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy and mysticism. The tens of books that he left behind were the result of an inquisitive mind that began the quest for knowledge at a very early stage. In the introduction to his autobiographical work Deliverance from Error (Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, p. 81), al-Ghazali said:

“The thirst for grasping the real meaning of things was indeed my habit and want from my early years and in the prime of my life.  It was an instinctive, natural disposition placed in my makeup by Allah Most High, not something due to my own choosing and contriving. As a result, the fetters of servile conformism fell away from me, and inherited beliefs lost their hold on me, when I was quite young.”

Al-Ghazali’s Life:

Al-Ghazali’s full name is Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Tusi. He was born in 450/1058 in Tus, Khurasan near Meshhad in present-day Iran. He bore the title of respect Hujjat al-Islam (Proof of Islam) for the role he played in defending Islam against the trends of thought that existed at the time.  His father was a wool spinner (ghazzal) and thus, relative to this profession, al-Ghazali acquired this name. (al-Subki, Tabaqat al-Shafi`iyyah al-Kubra, vol. VI, pp. 191-193) Although he was born in Tus, a Persian, non-Arabic land, Al-Ghazali wrote the overwhelming majority of his works in Arabic, the lingua franca of his world.

Before his death, al-Ghazali’s father entrusted him and his brother Ahmad to a Sufi friend. He asked him to spend whatever little money he left behind, to teach them reading and writing. When the money was finished, the Sufi asked them to join a school so that they might subsist. According to Al-Subki (Tabaqat, vol. VI, p.195), schools used to provide room, board and stipend.

Al-Ghazali began studying at Tus where his teacher was Ahmad Al- Radhakani. His next station was Jurjan where he wrote Al-Ta`liqah from the lectures of Abu Al-Qasim Al-Isma`ili Al-Jurjani. He returned to Tus for three years only to leave afterwards for Nishapur, where he joined the Nizamiyyah school and studied under Imam Al-Haramayn Al-Juwaini for eight years until the death of his teacher in 478 AH / 1085 CE. (Al-Subki,Tabaqat, vol. VI, pp. 195-196) During this period al-Ghazali excelled in all the Islamic sciences with the exception of the science of the Hadith; he confessed this in the last paragraph of his work Qanun al-Ta’wil (The Law of Metaphorical Exegesis). This may have been the reason for the presence of  some unsound traditions in his works, such as the famous Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din (The Revival of the Islamic Sciences).

After the death of Al-Juwaini, al-Ghazali went to the Camp (Al-Mu`askar) of vizier Nizam Al-Mulk who founded the Nizamiyyah schools. The Camp was reputed as a meeting place for scholars who debated in the Islamic sciences. al-Ghazali won the respect of other scholars and was assigned by Nizam Al-Mulk to be the teacher at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad. He lectured there between 484 AH / 1091 CE and 488 AH / 1095 CE.  (Al-Subki, Tabaqat, vol. VI, pp. 196-197) This position won him prestige, wealth and respect that even princes, kings and viziers could not match. (Al-Zubaydi, Ithaf, vol. I, p.7)

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During this period, al-Ghazali studied philosophy on his own and wrote Maqasid al-Falasifah (The Aims of the Philosophers) and appeared as if he was one of them. His critique of philosophy followed, in a book he called Tahafut Al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Almost all scholars tend to generalize and say that al-Ghazali gave a coup de grace to philosophy in this book. Indeed, few notice that he was critical of Greek metaphysics and its spread in an “Islamic” dress at the hands of reputed Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. A detailed discussion of al-Ghazali’s relationship with philosophy and science will follow.

The end of al-Ghazali’s career at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad was unexpected. The circumstances surrounding this event became known as the “Spiritual Crisis” of al-Ghazali. He discussed the reason that prompted him to quit his position in Deliverance from Error. After discussing the methodologies of the Muslim theologians (Al-Mutakallimun), the philosophers and the esoterics (Al-Batiniyyah), he chose the Sufi path as the way to acquire indubitable knowledge. He noted though that this method has prerequisites; one should abandon all worldly attachments. Al-Ghazali thought that, in order to implement this, he should “shun fame, money and to run away from obstacles.” (Al-Munqidh, p. 134)  He made it clear that any deed that was not for the sake of Allah was an obstacle. Upon scrutinizing his activities, he decided that his motivation for teaching was not for the sake of Allah. (Al-Munqidh, p. 134) Of this al-Ghazali said:

“For nearly six months beginning with Rajab, 488 AH [July, 1095 CE], I was continuously tossed about between the attractions of worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal life. In that month the matter ceased to be one of choice and became one of compulsion. (Allah) caused my tongue to dry up so that I was prevented from lecturing. One particular day I would make an effort to lecture in order to gratify the hearts of my following, but my tongue would not utter a single word nor could I accomplish anything at all.” (Hayman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 277)

 

Al-Ghazali’s health deteriorated and the physicians gave up any hope for they realized that the source of his problem was not physical. He “sought refuge with Allah who made it easy for his heart to turn away from position and wealth, from children and friends.” (Hayman and Walsh, p.278) He distributed his wealth and departed from Baghdad to begin a spiritual journey that lasted for about eleven years. He went to Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, Madinah, Makkah and back to Baghdad where he stopped briefly. This part of the journey lasted until Jumada Al-Akhirah, 490 AH / June,1097 CE. He continued to Tus to spend the next nine years in seclusion (Khalwa).  He ended his seclusion to teach for a short period at the Nizamiyyah of Nishapur in 499 AH / 1106 CE. From there he returned to Tus where he remained until his death in Jumada Al-Akhirah, 505 AH / December,1111 CE. (Abu Sway, M., al-Ghazali: A Study in Islamic Epistemology, p. 24)

Yet, before delving into al-Ghazali’s ideas, it is important to remember that he lived in what might be described as a post-golden age context. The production of the exact sciences faded away, the Islamic state had grown into a massive caliphate that faced disintegration as the provincial governors gained power. Just before al-Ghazali was born, the institution of the Sultan was introduced or rather forced on Baghdad. The year 450 AH marked the first time a split in power took place between the Sultan, who was the actual ruler, and the Caliph whose role was reduced to dignitary functions. (Ibn Kathir, Al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, vol. XII, p. 66)

It was a classical case of a wealthy and powerful civilization that lost track of its sense of direction and lost sight of its roots, its source of power. The indulgence in material life had led many celebrities to abandon public life and to live in seclusion. It was a search for a meaning of life in asceticism. Sufism thrived before al-Ghazali was born and he ultimately subscribed to the mystics’ path.

Al-Ghazali’s Thought:

Al-Ghazali was an encyclopedic and prolific scholar. He was trained as a jurist in the Shafi`i school which is traditionally Ash`arite in its expression of Islamic faith. He contributed many books to these fields. In addition, he wrote extensively about Islamic mysticism. He wrote about politics and the sects of the time, and he wrote poetry. Yet, in what follows, the discussion will be restricted to his position on science.

The early works of al-Ghazali were in the area of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, in Al-Mankhul fi `Ilm al-Usul, a book on usul al-fiqh. He devoted a chapter to a discussion of the nature of the sciences (al-kalam fi haqa’iq al-`ulum). It should be noted that al-Ghazali’s use of the word “sciences” is general and restricted to the natural or physical sciences; it covers all subjects of knowledge including those of the Shari`ah.  This chapter included important insights reflecting his position regarding science. One of these insights was regarding the definition of `ilm [science].  He said:  “science cannot be defined” (inna al-`ilma la hadda lah). He explained his statement by saying that it was possible to know science and that “our inability to define (science) does not indicate our ignorance about the same science”. (Al-Mankhul, p. 42)

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Al-Ghazali divided the sciences or knowledge into eternal and accidental. Eternal knowledge belongs to God alone. He divided accidental knowledge into immediate (hajmiyy) and theoretical (nazariyy).  The first is the kind of knowledge that one has to know with the beginning of reason, such as the existence of the self. On the other hand, theoretical knowledge is the result of sound thinking (al-nazar al-sahih). Related to this is al-Ghazali’s definition of reason. He said that it is “the qualification which enables the qualified [person] to perceive knowledge and to think about the cognizable.” (Al-Mankhul, pp. 44-45)

While al-Ghazali classified the senses into different categories in terms of their function in acquiring knowledge, he maintained that there were no differences between the sciences once knowledge is acquired, regardless of how difficult the subject of the science is.  This view of al-Ghazali regarding the equality of the sciences, once they are achieved, is consistent with his position regarding his interchangeable use of the terms “science” and “knowledge”.  (Al-Mankhul, p. 48)

The first period of public teaching at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad (478-488 AH/1085-1095 CE) was the time when al-Ghazali encountered philosophy.  In Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, a biographic work that he wrote towards the end of his life, he sketched his quest for knowledge. Al-Ghazali reduced the list of the seekers for knowledge to four groups: the dialectical theologians (Al-Mutakallimun), the esoterics (al-Batiniyyah), the philosophers, and the Sufis (Al-Munqidh, p. 89).  His discussion of philosophy is the most relevant to his position on science.

Al-Ghazali stated that in his quest for true knowledge he started studying philosophy after he was done with `ilm al-kalam, which did not provide “certain knowledge” (`ilm al-yaqin) he sought. In his introduction to the section on philosophy he outlined his approach to this new field. He wanted to pursue philosophy to a level higher than that of the most knowledgeable in the field. Only then, he argued, could one know the intricate depths of the science, as he referred to philosophy. (Al-Munqidh, p. 94)

Al-Ghazali was aware that he could not rely on secondary sources, such as those of the Mutakallimun, in order to study philosophy.  For him, their books included fragmented philosophical words that were complex and contradictory to one another.  Instead, he decided to read books of philosophy directly without the assistance of a teacher. Although he was teaching three hundred students at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad and writing on the Islamic revealed sciences at the same time, in his spare time he was able to master philosophy in less than two years. He spent almost another year reflecting on it. (Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 70) al-Ghazali wanted the readers, through such a detailed account of his effort, to have confidence that he had a thorough grasp of philosophy and that his conclusions are trustworthy.

As a result of his study he wrote two books: Maqasid al-Falasifah (The Aims of the Philosophers) and Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers).  It was al-Ghazali’s intention to write a book that would encompass the thought of the philosophers without criticizing or adding anything to it. Of this objective, he said:

“I thought that I should introduce, prior to the Tahafut, a concise account that will include the story of their aims (maqasid) which will be derived from their logical, natural and metaphysical sciences, without distinguishing between what is right and what is wrong, without additions and along with that they believed what they believed as their proofs.” (Maqasid, p. 31)

This book, which is a pioneer work in its attempt to deliberately present an objective account of the thought of adversaries, was followed by the Tahafut, which included his critique of the contents of the first one. It was this latter work (i.e. Tahafut al-Falasifah) that prompted Ibn Rushd to write Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) which constituted a systematic rebuttal of al-Ghazali’s critique of this mélange of Greco-Islamic philosophy.

In Maqasid al-Falasifah, al-Ghazali divided the sciences of the philosophers into four major categories: mathematical (al-riyadiyyat), logical (al-mantiqiyyat), natural (al-tabi`iyyat) and metaphysical (al-ilahiyyat). (Maqasid, p. 31)  He listed politics, economy and ethics as subdivisions under metaphysics. In al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, he listed politics and ethics as major sections along with the first four. (al-Munqidh, p. 100) Only mathematics and logic will be discussed here.

Regarding mathematics, al-Ghazali thought that it dealt with geometry and arithmetic. Neither of these subjects contradicted reason.  As a result, he did not think that he ought to include a detailed account of mathematics in his book. (Maqasid, pp. 31-32)

Knowledge is divided, in the second section of the book of knowledge of Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din, into `ulum shar`iyyah (sciences of the Shari`ah) and ghayr-shar`iyyah (non-Shari`ah sciences). To the latter belongs mathematics and medicine, which al-Ghazali described as praiseworthy sciences.  The latter sciences are considered fard kifayah (i.e. there should be enough Muslims who are experts in the concerned field to the degree that they can fulfill the needs of the Islamic society). Nevertheless, al-Ghazali criticized unnecessary studies in mathematics that do not have practical applications. (Ihya’, pp. 16-17)

The fact that al-Ghazali categorized mathematics and medicine as fard kifayah is a positive position. This means that the society at large would be committing a sin if they neglect any of these sciences to the

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degree the shortage would have negative impact on the society. In fact, he blamed the students of jurisprudence for their indulgence in minute details of the Shari`ah. The context indicates that they better study medicine instead of specializing in issues in jurisprudence that might never prove to be of any benefit. (Ihya’, vol. I, p. 21) Despite this positive stance, al-Ghazali did not remain consistent in his position.

 

Al-Ghazali had fears that though geometry and arithmetic are permissible, they might lead a person to blameworthy sciences. (Ihya’, vol. I, p.22) He did not discuss the reasons that led him to take such a position. It should be noted that this remark is atypical for al-Ghazali and does not reflect his general position regarding arithmetic, geometry and the exact sciences. The context itself might provide some insight as to why al-Ghazali was cautious in dealing with mathematics and the exact sciences.  During his time, there were no compartmentalized studies, and every student learned all branches of knowledge. Al-Ghazali was afraid that a student might be deceived by the accuracy of mathematics and then generalize and consider all the subjects included in philosophy, including metaphysics, to be as accurate.

In al-Mustasfa min `Ilm al-Usul, al-Ghazali stated that arithmetic and geometry are pure rational sciences that are not recommended for studying. They fluctuate between false, yet plausible guesses, and true knowledge that yields no practical applications. (Al-Mustasfa, p. 3)  This shift from his early position that studying mathematics is fard `ayn might be attributed to his acceptance of the Sufi path. Al-Mustasfa was written towards the end of al-Ghazali’s life when he was deeply absorbed by tasawwuf.

Al-Ghazali did not see any practical application for the study of physics, and thus declared it useless. He knew that physics is concerned with substances and their properties, yet he stated that some of the input of the philosophers contradicted the Shari`ah. (The Book of knowledge, p. 54) Thus practical application, or rather the lack of it, caused al-Ghazali to reject a particular science as the above example, or at least criticize it (Ihya’, pp. 16-17). This position should be seen in the context of the civilizational development of the 5th century AH/ 11th century CE.

Regarding logic, he defined it as “the law (qanun) that distinguishes a sound premise and analogy from a false one, which leads to the discernment of true knowledge.” (Maqasid, p. 36) In reviewing the subjects of logic, which he believed to be neutral in its relationship with the Shari`ah, (al-Munqidh, p. 103) al-Ghazali stated that induction (istiqra’) could be correct only if all parts were covered.  If only one part could be different, then induction in this case could not yield true knowledge.

Al-Ghazali criticized the philosophers on twenty accounts in the Tahafut.  Of relevance to the discussion here is his position on issue number seventeen, causality. Long before David Hume, al-Ghazali said that, in his opinion, “the conjunction (al-‘qtiran) between what is conceived by way of habit (fi al`adah) as cause and effect is not necessary (laysa daruriyyan).” He provided a list of pairs that were usually thought of as cause and effect by the philosophers (e.g. fire and burning, light and sunrise, diarrhea and laxatives). For him, the conjunction between them was a result of the sequence in which Allah created them, not because this conjunction was necessary in itself. Moreover, he thought that it was possible for one of these pairs to exist without the other. He did not see any contradiction since these pairs are the phenomena of nature and nature as such, according to the philosophers own admission, does not belong to the realm of necessity but that of possibility, which may or may not exist. (Tahafut, p. 239)

Al-Ghazali criticized the philosophers’ proof of causality because it was limited to observation (mushahadah) which depends on the senses, a source of knowledge that he could not accept on its own merit. Thus his position regarding causality is consistent with his theory of knowledge. Using the example of fire and burning, he said that “observation could only prove that burning took place when there was fire, and not by the fire.” He held that inert and lifeless objects such as fire are incapable of action and thus cannot be the agent (al-fa`il) that causes burning. To prove his point, al-Ghazali used a proof, which is neo-platonic in its tone, from the arguments of the philosophers.  They held that accidents (a`rad) and incidents (hawadith) emanate at the time of contact between “bodies”, from the provider of forms (wahib al-suwar) whom they thought to be an angel. Accordingly, one cannot claim that fire is the agent of burning.  In addition, he argued that the agent “creates” burning with his will (bi’iradatihi). al-Ghazali reduced the problem of causality to that of “will” which makes it rationally possible for the agent, whom he held to be Allah, not to create burning even though there is contact. (Tahafut, pp. 242-243)

Al-Ghazali presented this theory of causality in order to allow room for the existence of miracles (mu`jizat) that were associated with the prophets, without resorting to allegorical interpretations as the philosophers did. One of the miracles that he chose as an example was that of Prophet Ibrahim. The story was that his people attempted to burn him for breaking their idols by throwing him into fire but no burning took place. In the Qur’an (21:69) it was Allah’s will that the fire would not harm Ibrahim.  al-Ghazali maintained that Allah was the agent (fa`il) of every action, either directly or indirectly (i.e. by the angels). (Tahafut, pp. 243-247)

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Al-Ghazali knew that he could not exhaust all the sciences in his writings. He had an insight that there are more sciences within reach of human beings. He said: “It appeared to me through clear insight and beyond doubt, that man is capable of acquiring several sciences that are still latent and not existent.” (Jawahir al-Qur’an, p. 28)

Al-Ghazali’s Impact on Islamic Thought and Beyond:

Al-Ghazali’s status in Islamic thought ranges from being the “Proof of Islam” and renewer (mujadded) of the fifth century AH, to being declared a non-believer by some of our contemporary “scholars” (Dimashqiyyah, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali wal-Tasawwuf). The unfortunate gap between the two positions reflects the war that ensued between the Sufis and the Salafis, a war that is almost as old as Islam itself. Al-Ghazali left behind a great number of books and treatises. According to Abdurrahman Badawi (Mu’allafat al-Ghazali) seventy-three are definitely his.  One of the most celebrated books is the Ihya’ `Ulum Al-Din  (Revival of Islamic Sciences). al-Ghazali believed that Muslims became entrapped within the minute details of fiqh. This included scholars as well because to a certain extent they had lost sight of the original message of Islam. It is in this context that the Ihya’ poses a challenge to scholars, despite its own flaws that mostly arise from al-Ghazali’s lacked of sufficient knowledge in the science ofHadith, as he admitted in Qanun al-Ta’wil. Al-Subki, an early historian of the Shafi`i school of jurisprudence, listed in Tabaqat al-Shafi`iyyah al-Kubra more than nine hundred weak or forged traditions that he detected in the Ihya’.

Al-Ghazali was the scholar per excellence in the Islamic world. He had literally hundreds of scholars attending his lectures at the Nizamiyyah school of Baghdad. His audience included scholars from other schools of jurisprudence. The list includes Judge Abu Bakr Ibn Al-`Arabi who was Maliki, Al-Khattabi and Abu Al-Wafa’ Ibn `Aqil who were Hanbalites.

Reflecting the influence of al-Ghazali on the Latin world, Manuel Alonso listed forty-four medieval philosophers and theologians who made reference to al-Ghazali. This included Thomas Aquinas who referred to Maqasid Al-Falasifah thirty-one times (Al-Andalus, XXIII). Needless to say, that al-Ghazali is still celebrated in many academic institutions in the West, with numerous orientalists writing about him and translating his books. `Uthman Ka`ak has related that he found a translated copy of Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal in Descartes’ library in Paris with Descartes’ comments in the margin. The numerous similarities between Al-Munqidh and Discourse on Method support Ka`ak’s observations. Ka`ak passed away and I have attempted to locate the book that he mentioned by corresponding with several libraries in France that contain some of Descartes’ book collection, yet to no avail.

Conclusion:

Al-Ghazali rejected conformism or uncritical acceptance of any set of thought including that of the Shari’ah. He sketched his quest for peremptory knowledge (i.e. `ilm al-yaqin) and the ordeal he had to go through in order to achieve it. He reviewed the position of many Islamic groups and others who claimed to be the gate to the knowledge that he sought. His position regarding the sciences slightly differed from one to the other, and from time to time. A science, to be sought, has to be in conformity with the Shari`ah, and has to have practical applications which should prove to be beneficial to the society. It is apparent that by subscribing to the Sufi path, al-Ghazali detached himself from the material world including the exact sciences, which lost whatever status they held in his eyes at one point. Al-Ghazali had a great spirit that roamed and wandered in search of truth. Though originally his search was not in the area of science per se, inculcating such a spirit might be a step in the right direction to scientific inquiry. I began this entry with a quotation from al-Ghazali and I would like to conclude with one that reflects this spirit and leave it open ended, he said:

 

“In the bloom of my life, from the time I reached puberty before I was twenty until now, when I am over fifty, I have constantly been diving daringly into the depth of this profound sea and wading into its deep water like a bold man, not like a cautious coward.  I would penetrate far into every mazy difficulty.  I would scrutinize …!” (Freedom and Fulfillment, p. 62)

 Mustafa Abu Sway         Al-Quds University                                            October, 2001

 

Bibliography (Partial List)

 Major works by al-Ghazali arranged in chronological order:

-----, Al-Mankhul min Ta`liqat al-Usul, ed., Muhammad Hasan Hitu (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 1970)

-----, Al-Wajiz (Al-Ghuriyya: Matba`at Hush, 1318 AH [1901 CE])

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-----, Al-Wasit, ed., Ali Muhyi al-Din al-Qarah Daghi, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Nasr li al-Tiba`ah al-

Islamiyyah, 1984)

-----, Fatawa, ed., Mustafa Abu Sway (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996)

-----, Maqasid al-Falasifah, ed., Suleiman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Ma`arif  bi-Misr, 1961)

-----, Tahafut al-Falasifah, ed., Suleiman Dunya, 7th ed. (Cairo: Dar  al-Ma`arif bi- Misr, 1961)

-----, Mi`yar al-`Ilm fi al-Mantiq, ed., Ahmad Shams al-Din (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1990)

-----, Mihak al-Nazar fi al-Mantiq, ed., Muhammad Badr Ad-Din al-Na`sani (Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-

Hadithah, 1966)

-----, Mizan al-`Amal, ed., Suleiman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Ma`arif bi-Misr, 1964)

-----, Al-Iqtisad fi Al-I`tiqad, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1972)

-----, Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din, 4 Vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah, n.d.)

-----, Al-Maqsad al-Asna Sharh Asma’ Allah al-Husna, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo:

Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)

-----, Bidayat al-Hidayah, ed. Muhammad al-Hajjar (Damascus: Dar  al-Sabuni, 1986)

-----, Jawahir al-Qur’an, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1964)

-----, “Al-Madnun bihi `ala Ghayri Ahlih”, Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam  al-Ghazali, vol. IV (Beirut: Dar

al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)

-----, “Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim” Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam  al-Ghazali, vol. III (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-

`Ilmiyyah, 1986)

-----, “Faisal al-Tafriqah bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqah” Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam  al-Ghazali, vol. III

(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah,1986)

-----, Qanun al-Ta’wil. Published with al-Ghazali’s Ma`arij al-Quds, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-

`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)

------“Ayyuha al-Walad” Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Ghazali, vol. III  (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-

`Ilmiyyah, 1986)

-----, Al-Tibr al-Masbuk fi Nsiyat al-Muluk (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyah al-Azhariyyah)

-----, “Al-Risalah al-Ladunniyyah”, Majmu`at Rasa’il al-Imam  al-Ghazali, vol. III (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub

al-`Ilmiyyah, 1986)

-----, Mishkat al-Anwar, ed., `Abd Al-`Aziz `Izz al-Din al-Siyarawan (Beirut: `Alam al-Kutub, 1986)

-----, Al-Kashf wa al-Tabyin fi Ghurur al-Khalq Ajma`in (Cairo: Matba`at Mustafa Muhammad, n.d.)

Published with `Abd al-Wahhab  al-Sha`rani’s Tanbih al-Mughtarrin. 

-----, Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, eds., Jamil Saliba and Kamil `Aiyyad, 10th  ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus,

1981)

-----, Al-Mustasfa min `Ilm al-Usul, 2 vols. (Bulaq: Al-Matba’ah  al-Amiriyyah, 1322 A.H.)

-----, Al-Imla’ fi Mushkilat al-Ihya’, Appendix, Iyha’ `Ulum al-Din (Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah, n.d.)

-----, Al-Durrah al-Fakhirah fi Kashf `Ulum al-Akhirah. Published with al-Ghazali’s Sir al-`Alamin, ed.,

Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)

-----, Sir al-`Alamin wa Kashf ma fi al-Daryn, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-

Jindi, 1968)

-----, Iljam al-`Awam `an `Ilm al-Kalam, ed., Muhammad al-Musta`sim Billah al-Baghdadi (Beirut: Dar

al-Kitab al-`Arabi, 1985)

-----, Minhaj al-`Abidin, ed., Muhammad Mustafa Abu al-`Ula (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)

-----, Ma`arij al-Quds fi Ma`rifat al-Nafs (Cairo: Maktabat al-Jindi, 1968)

 Translated Works of al-Ghazali 

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1. al-Ghazali, The Book of Knowledge  (Kitab al-`Ilm of Ihya` `Ulum al-Din) ed. and trans., Nabih Amin

Faris (Lahore; Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1962)

2.-----, On the Duties of Brotherhood. trans. Muhtar Holland (Woodstock, NewYork: The Overlook Press,

1976)

3.-----, Freedon and Fulfillment (Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal), Published with al-Ghazali’s “Fada’ih al-

Batiniyyah wa Fada’il

al-Mustazhiriyyah”. ed. and trans., Richard J. McCarthy (Boston: Twayn Publishers, 1980)

4.-----, Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship (from Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din) trans., Muhtar Holland (Leicester:

The Islamic Foundation, 1983)

5.-----, The Just Balance (Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim), trans. and ed., D.P. Brewster (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad

Ashraf, 1978)

6.-----, The Niche for Lights (Mishkat al-Anwar), trans. and ed., W.H.T. Gairdner (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad

Ashraf, 1952)

7.-----, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God (Al-Maqsad al-Asna Sharh Asma’ Allah Al-Husna) trans.,

David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992)

8.-----, The Precious Pearl (Al-Durrah al-Fakhirah), trans. and ed., Jane Idleman Smith (Missoula: Scholars

Press, 1979)

9.-----, Letters, trans., Abdul Qayyum (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976)

 Other Works:

 

Abu Sway, Mustafa, al-Ghazali: A Study in Islamic Epistemology (Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa Dan

Pustaka, 1996)

Al-A`sam, `Abd al-Amir, Al-Faylasuf al-Ghazali (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1981)

Badawi, `Abdurrahman, Mu’allafat al-Ghazali, 2nd ed. (Kuwait: Wakalat al-Matbu`at, 1977)

Laoust, Henri, La Politique De Gazali (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthmer, 1970)

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Al-Imam al-Ghazali bayn Madihih wa Naqidih (Al-Mansurah: Dar al-Wafa’, 1990)

 Al-Sharabasi, Ahmad, al-Ghazali (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1975)

 Al-`Uthman, `Abd al-Karim, Al-Dirasat al-Nafsiyyah `ind al-Muslimin wa al-Ghazali bi Wajhin Khas,

2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1981)

 Watt, W. Montgomery, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University

Press, 1963)

Zaki, Mubarak, Al-Akhlaq `ind al-Ghazali (Beirut: Al-Maktabah al-`Asriyyah, n.d.)

 Al-Zubaydiyy, Murtada, Ithaf al-Sadah al-Muttaqin bi Sharh Asrar Ihya’ `Ulum al-Din (Beirut: Dar Ihya’

al-Turath al-`Arabi, n.d.)

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) is one of the preeminent writers of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Indeed, the attention he has received from numerous writers, translators, and critics from Western as well as Islamic countries testifies to his stature as a world literary figure. While his primary reputation is that of a poet, Iqbal has not lacked admirers for his philosophical thought. He has in fact been called “the most serious Muslim philosophical thinker of modem times.” The frequently used appellation of “poet-philosopher” is thus well deserved. The hyphen in the phrase is all-important: Iqbal’s poetry and philosophy do not exist in isolation from each other; they are integrally related, his poetry serving as a vehicle for his thought. Iqbal wrote poetry in Urdu and Persian, and several collections in each language exist. In the following page a life-sketch of Iqbal is followed by a brief treatment of some of the major themes and literary features of his poetry.

*****

Iqbal was born in Sialkot, in the present-day province of the Punjab in Pakistan, in 1877. He received his early education in that city, where one of his teachers was Mir Hasan, an accomplished scholar who commanded a knowledge of several

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Islamic languages. Mir Hasan gave Iqbal a thorough training in the rich Islamic literary tradition. His influence on Iqbal was formative. Many years later (1922), when the English governor of the Punjab proposed to the British Crown that Iqbal be knighted in acknowledgment of his literary accomplishments, Iqbal asked that Mir Hasan also be awarded a title. To the governor’s remark that Mir Hasan had not authored any books, Iqbal responded that he, Iqbal, was the book Mir Hasan had produced. Mir Hasan received the title of Shams al-’Ulama’ (“Sun of Scholars”).For higher education Iqbal went to Lahore (1895), where he enrolled in Government College, getting, in 1899, an MA in philosophy; he had already obtained a degree in law (1898). In Lahore, a major center of academic and literary activity, Iqbal soon made a name for himself as a poet. One of the teachers of Government College Iqbal admired most was Sir Thomas Arnold. Arnold, too, had great affection for Iqbal, he helped Iqbal in his career as a teacher and also encouraged him to undertake several research projects. When Arnold returned to England in 1904, Iqbal wrote a touching poem in which he expressed his resolve to follow Arnold to England. The very next year, in fact, Iqbal left for study at Cambridge. His choice of Cambridge was probably dictated by the fact that Cambridge was reputed for the study not only of European philosophy but also of Arabic and Persian. In his three years of stay abroad, Iqbal obtained a BA from Cambridge (1906), qualified as a barrister at London’s Middle Temple (1906), and earned a PhD from Munich University (1908).After returning to Lahore in 1908, Iqbal taught philosophy at Government College for a few years. In 1911 he resigned from government service and set up legal practice. Meanwhile he continued to write poetry in Urdu and Persian, Asrar-i Khudi (Persian) was published in 1915. Translated into English as The Secrets of the Self (1920) by Professor Reynold Nicholson of Cambridge, the book introduced Iqbal to the West. Asrar-i Khudi was followed by several other volumes: Rumuz-i Bikhudi (1918), Payam-i Mashriq (1923), Bang-i Dara (1924), Zabur-i ‘Ajam (1927), Javid Namah(1932), Musafir (1936), Zarb-i Kalim (1937), and Armaghan-i Hijaz (1938, posthumously). Iqbal wrote prose also. His doctoral thesis, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, was published in 1908, and hisReconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (with a 7th chapter added to the original set of six lectures, first published in 1930), in 1934. Many of Iqbal’s poetical works have been rendered into foreign languages, including English, German, Italian, Russian, Czechoslovakian, Arabic, and Turkish. His works have also spawned a vast amount of critical literature in many languages.Although his main interests were scholarly, Iqbal was not unconcerned with the political situation of the, country and the political fortunes of the Muslim community of India. Already in 1908, while in England, he had been chosen as a member of the executive council of the newly established British branch of the Indian Muslim League. In 1931 and 1932 he represented the Muslims of India in the Round Table Conferences held in England to discuss the issue of the political future of India. And in a 1930 lecture Iqbal suggested the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Iqbal died (1938) before the creation of Pakistan (1947), but it was his teaching that “spiritually ... has been the chief force behind the creation of Pakistan.” He is the national poet of Pakistan.

II

A detailed discussion of the thematic and literary features of Iqbal’s poetry is not be undertaken here. A few general points may, however, be made.A reader of Iqbal’s poetry is struck by its sheer thematic variety. Iqbal was deeply interested in the issues that have exercised the best minds of the human race—the issues of the meaning of life, change and constancy, freedom and determinism, survival and progress, the relation between the body and the soul, the conflict between reason and emotion, evil and suffering, the position and role of human beings in the universe—and in his poetry he deals with these and other issues. He had also read widely in history, philosophy, literature, mysticism, and politics, and, again, his catholic interests are reflected in his poetry.Iqbal celebrates humanity, in more than one sense. On one level he shows broad acceptance for humanity. In “The Story of Adam”, the protagonist, Adam, plays a variety of roles-those of prophet, thinker, reformer, scientist, inventor, astronomer, martyr, and iconoclast. Adam in this poem is not simply a religious figure belonging to a certain tradition, but represents the whole of humankind. On another level, Iqbal takes pride in being human and has no desire to partake of the godhead of God. To be God is to have concerns and worries that would give one a headache, but to be human is to have that sweet pain called heartache. Humans can hold their heads high in view of their achievements in the world to which they were banished from paradise: if God has made the night, then humans have made the lamp, and if God has made deserts and mountains, then humans have made parks and meadows (“A Dialogue Between God and Man,”). Humans must, therefore, strive to be perfect qua humans, and that is a goal yet to be achieved.The theme of humanity is closely linked in Iqbal with that of khudi(literally, “selfhood”). Khudi is a complex thought in Iqbal. Broadly speaking, it represents the principle of the inner self with an urge to manifest itself Societies as well as individuals have khudi, and it is on the development or suppression of one’s or failure in the world depends,khudi that one’s success   the khudi of slaves, for example, is moribund.Recognition, discovery, cultivation, and assertion of their khudi should, therefore, be the aim of humans. Iqbal’s critique of Muslim societies is predicated on the assumption that these societies have lost their khudi or have allowed it to become seriously impaired. The best way to understand Iqbal’s concept of khudi is by reading poems in which he discusses the subject.Perfection, or rather limitless perfection, is a frequently occurring motif in Iqbal’s poetry. “I seek the end of that which has no end,” says Iqbal in “The Houri and the Poet”, and, in the same poem: “From the spark I seek a star, from the star a sun.” Iqbal sees no end to human potentialities. He wishes humans to embark on a never-ending journey of discovery, and to this end emphasizes the importance of action. Constant action and perpetual movement are in fact the only guarantee of survival in the world. Nations fall behind when they cease to be dynamic and start preferring a life of idle speculation over one of purposive action.But the quest for perfection can give rise to irony. Irony, in fact, fills human life, for while they have been imbued with the desire to achieve perfection, humans have been denied the ability to achieve it in practice. The poems “Man”, “Solitude”, and “The Dew and the Stars” discuss several aspects of the irony of human life. The poem, “The Story of Adam,” though it ends on a more optimistic note, yet implies that it takes humans a long time to discover the most

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important secret of existence.“The heart has its reasons, of which reason is ignorant,” says Pascal. Iqbal, who frequently speaks of the conflict of the head and the heart, would agree, though he would add that while the conflict exists, it does not have to. More often than not it is reason (or the intellect) that belittles the heart (or intuition), but both are essential to a harmonious life; ideally, then, reason and the heart should cooperate rather than clash.Although he has wide-ranging interests, Iqbal essentially belongs to, and speaks from within, the Islamic tradition, employing, for his purposes, the historical, religious, philosophical, and literary resources of that tradition. A full appreciation of Iqbal requires an understanding of these resources, and the notes and commentaries in this volume elucidate Iqbal’s use of them.Iqbal held to the doctrine of art for life’s sake. Acutely aware of the problems of Muslim decadence and backwardness, Iqbal takes it upon himself to shake the Muslims of India and other countries out of their lethargy, urging them to take the path of progress, so that they can gain an honorable position in the polity of nations, He uses the medium of poetry to arouse socio-religious consciousness among Muslims. As a result, Islamic religious and social themes predominate in his poetry. But Iqbal’s vision of a revived religion is far from conservative. He is sharply critical of many of the institutions of historic Islam (of the institution of monarchy, for example), and his vision of a new world derives from the Islamic notions of egalitarianism and social justice. He rejects dogmatism in religion, advocates rethinking of the Islamic intellectual heritage, and stands for the establishment of a forward-looking community. But the conviction of art for life’s sake never allows Iqbal’s poetry to degenerate into bland or crass propaganda. The worldwide acclamation he has won is proof that Iqbal’s strength consists in writing purpose poetry of the highest artistic standards.Ultimately, however, the secret of the appeal of Iqbal’s poetry lies in the personality behind that poetry. Whether he is dealing with a broadly humanistic or a specifically Islamic theme, Iqbal views it from a unique perspective. Consider his boldly critical attitude toward certain aspects of the received tradition, an attitude reflected, for example, in the poems referred above. Unlike almost any other poet in the Islamic tradition, Iqbal enters into a dialogue with God, raising issues the orthodox would consider disturbing. He asks whether Adam’s expulsion from heaven has turned out to be Adam’s loss or God’s own; he challenges God to speak to him face to face rather than through messengers, and, noting the discrepancy between the boundlessness of human ambition and the limitedness of the resources put at humans’ disposal, he asks God whether His experiment involving Adam is to be taken seriously. Iqbal’s view of the role of Satan in the world is also highly intriguing and, as one would expect, highly unconventional (see “Conquest of Nature” and “Gabriel and Iblis”).A notable thing about Iqbal’s perspective is ambiguity, a typical modem quality. Especially when he is talking about metaphysical issues, Iqbal raises some difficult questions, without providing a single “valid” answer. In “Paradise Lost and Regained” the question whether Adam should have sinned or not (each scenario being theoretically defensible) is not answered by Iqbal. In “Gabriel and Iblis” we are left to wonder about Iqbal’s own view of Iblis’ self-justification. And in “Solitude” we cannot be certain why God smiles.In several places Iqbal talks about himself about his Eastern background and Western education, and the contradictions of his own personality; his conviction that his study of historic Islam had furnished him with certain valuable insights which he must share with his people; his hope that his message will spread across the Muslim world, and his apprehension that he will be misunderstood or appreciated for the wrong reasons. Here it may be added that the various attempts made to identify (or label) Iqbal as a Sufi or an orthodox Muslim, as a radical or a reactionary are wide of the mark because Iqbal is too large a figure to fit any narrow, procrustean category; he demands and deserves attention on his own terms.

III

Iqbal had a fine sense of the dramatic, and in his poetry he frequently employs dramatic techniques. Many of his poems are structured like a play, with the first half of the poem building a tension or conflict that is resolved, or raising a question that is answered, in the second half Examples are “Gabriel and Iblis”, “The Dew and the Stars”, “The Houri and the Poet” and “Fatimah bint ‘Abdullah”. Many poems are dialogues, with well-argued positions taken by the interlocutors (“A Dialogue Between God and Man”, “The Dew and the Stars”, “Reason and Heart” and “A Dialogue Between Knowledge and Love”; also the fables). Some poems are one-sided dialogues or monologues (“Give Me Another Adversary”, “The Falcon’s Advice to Its Youngster”). Again, Iqbal carefully weaves the “plot” of a poem, arousing the reader’s curiosity, dropping seemingly casual hints that turn out to be prophetic, providing flashback, and saving his masterstroke for the end. Two excellent examples are “The Night and the Poet” and “The Houri and the Poet”.Iqbal has some favorite images and motifs. The eagle is Iqbal’s favorite bird, and the tulip his favorite flower. We will here say a few words about the tulip. The tulip is a pretty flower, but, when it grows in the desert (Lala’-i sahra’), it combines strength with beauty, for it then represents the assertion of one’s self (khudi) in the face of hostile circumstances. The tulip owes its splendor not to an outside source but to the “scar” inside its heart, its glow being indigenous to it, as befits a flower with akhudi of its own. The tulip is thus a “model” for individuals and nations to follow. In one of his quatrains (“Freedom and Determinism and Philosophy of History”), speaking of the difficult circumstances that alone give birth to new nations, Iqbal says: “From mountains and deserts do nations arise.” Although Iqbal does not mention the tulip in this quatrain, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that, conceptually, Iqbal here has the desert tulip in mind. The cup-shaped flower suggests to Iqbal’s mind several analogies, and in one piece (“Locke, Kant, and Bergson,”) Iqbal, makes consistent use of the tulip image to describe and analyze complex philosophical ideas. It is in view of the deep significance of the flower in Iqbal’s poetry that I have chosen Tulip in the Desert as the title of my volume of translations (Mustansir Mir, Tulip in the Desert,Hurst and Company, London, 2000). The images of the eagle and the tulip illustrate how Iqbal adds to the native literary tradition or makes an innovative use of that tradition (the tulip). Another example in this connection is that of the moth. In Persian and Urdu poetry the moth represents the devoted and self-immolating lover. Like the moth, which keeps circling the light, the lover (a male) desires to stay close to the beloved (a female). But in Iqbal, typically, the moth often represent a reprehensible rather than a praiseworthy quality: the shining light it is in love with is not its own. The moth is to be contrasted with another, the firefly, which, though it has a weak light, can at least call this light its own. The firefly, in other words, is possessed of khudi, but the moth has no khudi. Iqbal often uses a series of images to convey a thought, producing a cumulative effect. In “Fatimah bint -Abdullah,” for

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example, he uses no fewer than four images to express the idea that, even in its present age of decadence, the Muslim Community can produce individuals of exceptional caliber:

O that our autumn-stricken garden had A flower-bud like this! O that in our ashes would be found, O Lord, A spark like this! In our desert is hidden many a deer still. In the spent clouds lies dormant still Many a flash of lightning.

Iqbal is capable of writing biting satire. Two examples are: “Give Me Another Adversary”, in which Satan argues that he deserves a better rival than Adam, and “Scorpion Land,” which criticizes slave mentality.

Mustansir Mir

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