Alexandros Kefalas and Others v. Greece and Another, Athinaiki

Khartopiia AE and Others intervening (Case C-367/96)

Before the Court of Justice of the European

Communities

ECJ (Presiding, RodrÍguez Iglesias P.; Gulmann, Ragnemalm

and Wathelet PP.C.; Mancini, Moitinho de Almeida, Kapteyn ( Rapporteur),

Murray, Edward, Puissochet, Hirsch, Jann and Sévon JJ.)Mr. Giuseppe

Tesauro, Advocate General.

12 May 1998

Reference from Greece by the Efetio-Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) under Article 177 E.C.

Companies--Article 25(1) of Directive 77/91 requiring capital increases to be decided upon by general meeting--domestic law doctrine of abuse of rights could preclude shareholders from obtaining declaration of invalidity of increase carried out in breach of Article 25(1)--that a company was in financial crisis and that capital increase enured to the economic benefit of company and its shareholders could not however justify a finding of abuse--nor could the fact that the shareholder had declined to exercise his preferential right to acquire shares on the increase. The Organismos Ikonomikis Anasinkrotisis Epikhiriseon AE (the Organisation for the Restructuring of Undertakings, "the OAE") was a public body, in the form of a public limited liability company acting in the interests of, and under the control of, the Greek State. Under Greek law the competent minister could transfer the administration of an undertaking in serious financial difficulties to the OAE. The powers of the administrative organs of such an undertaking were to cease upon publication of such a ministerial decision and, although the general meeting of the company was to subsist, it could not remove directors who had been appointed by the OAE. The OAE could, in the course of its administration of such

a company, increase its capital. Such an increase was, however, to be approved by the competent minister and the existing shareholders retained their preferential right to shares but were to exercise it within the period prescribed by the ministerial decision approving the increase. The administration of Athinaiki Khartopiia AE ("Khartopiia"), a public limited liability company, had been transferred to the OAE and an increase in its capital had been *145 approved by the minister whose decision required that the existing shareholders could exercise their preferential right to acquire the new shares within a month of publication of the decision. Mr Kefalas and others were shareholders in Khartopiia but did not exercise that right. They argued, instead, that the capital increase infringed Article 25(1) of Directive 77/91 (the Second Directive on the co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required of companies in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, "the Second Directive"). Article 25(1) required that "[a]ny increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting". Mr Kefalas and the other aggrieved shareholders brought proceedings against the Greek State and the OAE before the Polimeles Prorodikio (Court of First Instance), Athens seeking a declaration of invalidity of the capital increase. They then appealed to the Efetio-Athinon. The Greek State raised an objection of abuse of rights based on Article 281 of the Civil Code, which provided that "the exercise of a right is prohibited where it manifestly exceeds the bounds of good faith, morality or the economic or social purpose of that right". The Efetio-Athinon considered that Article 281 could be applied to preclude the exercise of Community law rights where such exercise would be abusive and that to allow the plaintiffs' claim under Article 25(1) of the Second Directive would, indeed, be abusive because (i) at the time when the administration of Khartopiia was vested in the OAE it was insolvent and its shares worthless; (ii) the capital increase and the subsequent conversion of debt into equity had led to financial recovery by Khartopiia and had assured the value of the shareholders' equity and saved thousands of jobs; and (iii) the shareholders had been given a preferential right to acquire the new shares but had declined to exercise that right. The Efetio-Athinon therefore referred questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling as to whether national laws concerning the abuse of rights could preclude reliance upon Community law rights; whether such an assessment was to be made on the basis of Community law; and whether on the facts as established the plaintiffs' exercise of their rights under Article 25(1) was to be regarded as abusive. Held: SUB(1) Abuse of rights under Community law. (a) The application by national courts of domestic rules such as Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code for the purpose of assessing whether the exercise of a Community law right was abusive was not contrary to the Community legal order because Community law could not be relied upon for abusive or fraudulent ends. [20]-[21] Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereninging Metaalnijverheid (33/74): [1974] E.C.R. 1299 ; TV 10 v. Commissariaat voor deMedia (C-23/93): [1994] E.C.R. I-4795

*146 ; Leclerc and Others v. "Au Ble Vert" and Others (229/83): [1985] E.C.R. 1; Lair v. Universitat Hannover (C-39/86): [1988] E.C.R. 3161; General Milk Products v. Hauptzollamt Hanburg-Jonas (C-8/92): [1993] E.C.R. I-779; and Brennet v. Paletta (206/94): [1996] E.C.R. I-2357, followed. (b) The application of such a national rule was not, however, to prejudice the full and uniform effect of Community law and the national courts were not, when assessing the exercise of a right arising from Community law, to alter its scope or to compromise its objectives. [22] Pafitis and Others v. Tke and Others (C-441/93): [1996] E.C.R. I-1347, followed. SUB(2) Application of doctrine of abuse of rights to Article 25(1) of the Second Directive. (a) The uniform application and full effect of Community law would indeed be prejudiced if a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) were deemed to be abusing his rights because the contested capital increase resolved the company's financial difficulties and so enured to his economic benefit. This was because an increase in capital was designed to improve the economic position of the company and because the decision making power of the general meeting applied even when a company was in serious financial difficulties. Furthermore, to hold otherwise would mean that shareholders of companies in financial crisis could never rely on Article 25(1), and that the scope of that provision would therefore be diminished. [23]-[25] Karella and Karellas (C-19 & 20/90): [1991] E.C.R. I-2691; and Sindesmos Melon Tis Eletheras Evangelikis and Others (C-381/89): [1992] E.C.R. I-2111, followed. (b) The uniform application and full effect of Community law would also be prejudiced if a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) were deemed to be abusing his rights because he had not exercised his preferential right under Article 29(1) of the Second Directive to acquire new shares. This was because to require a shareholder to participate in a capital increase without the approval of the general meeting as a condition for his being able to rely on his rights under Article 25(1) would be to alter the scope of that provision. [26]-[27] (c) Nonetheless, Community law did not preclude a national court, on the basis of sufficient telling evidence, from examining whether by bringing an action under Article 25(1) for a declaration of invalidity of a capital increase, a shareholder was seeking to derive, to the detriment of the company, an improper advantage, manifestly contrary to the objective of that provision (which was to ensure, for the benefit of shareholders, that a decision to increase capital which would affect the share of equity held by them, was not taken without their participation in the exercise of the decision-making powers of the company). [28] Representation *147 A. Tegopoulos and D. Livieratos, of the Athens Bar, for Mr Kefalas and others. M. Stathopoulos, of the Athens Bar, and V. Kontolaimos, Deputy Legal Adviser in the State Legal Department, acting as Agent, for the Greek Government. K. Kerameos and I. Soufleros, of the Athens Bar, for Organismos Ikonomikis

Anasinkrotisis Epikhiriseon AE (OAE). S. Felios and M. Manolas, of the Athens Bar, for Athinaiki Khartopiia AE and others. D. Gouloussis, Legal Adviser, acting as Agent, for the E.C. Commission. P. Mylonopoulos, Legal Assistant in the Department for Community Matters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent for the Greek Government in oral argument. Cases referred to in the judgment: 1. Pafitis and Others v. Tke and Others (C-441/93), 12 March 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-1347; [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 551. 2. Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid (33/74), 3 December 1974: [1974] E.C.R. 1299; [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298. 3. TV 10 v. Commissariaat voor de Media (C-23/93), 5 October 1994: [1994] E.C.R. I-4975; [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 284. 4. Leclerc and Others v. "Au Ble Vert" and Others (229/83), 10 January 1985: [1985] E.C.R. 1; [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 286. 5. Lair v. Universitat Hannover (39/86), 21 June 1988: [1988] E.C.R. 3161; [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 545. 6. General Milk Products v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-8/92), 3 March 1993: [1993] E.C.R. I-779. 7. Brennet v. Paletta (206/94), 2 May 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-2357. 8. Karella and Karellas v. Minister of Industry, Energy and Technology and Another (Joined Cases C 19-20/90), 30 May 1991: [1991] E.C.R. I-2691; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 865. 9. Syndesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklisias and Others v. Greece and Others (C-381/89), 24 March 1992: [1992] E.C.R. I-2111; [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 348. Further cases referred to by the Advocate General: 10. Kerafina-Keramische-und Finanz Holding AG and Vioktimatiki Aeve v. Greece and Organismos Oilonomikis anasygkrotissis Epicheirisseon AE (Joined Cases C 134-135/91), 12 November 1992: [1992] E.C.R. I-5699; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 277. 11. Firma Karl-Heinz Neumann v. Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (299/84), 14 November 1985: [1985] E.C.R. 3663; [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 4. 12. Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlinpackhof (118/76), 28 June 1977: [1977] E.C.R. 1177. 13. Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschlandand R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others (Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93), 5 March 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-1029; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889 *148 . 14. R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh (C-370/90), 7 July 1992: [1992] E.C.R. I-4265. 15. Knoors v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (115/78), 7 February 1979:

[1979] E.C.R. 399; [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 357. 16. E.C. Commission v. Germany (205/84), 4 December 1986: [1986] E.C.R. 3755; [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 64. 17. Van der Bijl v. Staatssecretaris Van Economische Zaken (130/88), 27 September 1989: [1989] E.C.R. 3039. 18. Brennet v. Paletta (C-206/94), 2 May 1996: [1996] E.C.R. I-2357. 19. Faik Gunaydin and Others v. Freistaat Bayern (C-36/96), 30 September 1997: [1997] E.C.R. I-5143; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 871.

Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro 1. The two questions, subject of the present proceedings, referred for a preliminary ruling by the Efetio-Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) call upon the Court to rule whether it is possible to assert abuse of rights in relation to individual rights conferred by Community law. More precisely, the Athens court asks whether the principle of abuse of rights, as defined by national law, can also apply in cases where the right relied upon is conferred by provisions of Community law; and, in the negative, whether in the present case the conditions (under Community law) for determining whether the right concerned has been exercised abusively are met. It should be noted from the outset that the case has arisen from contentious proceedings in Greece concerning the application and interpretation, in a case concerning companies in financial difficulties, of Article 25 of Council Directive 77/91 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent [FN1] (hereinafter "the Second Directive"). The Court is well-acquainted with such proceedings as it has already had several occasions to give very clear rulings to the effect that Article 25 of the Second Directive is also applicable to companies in critical difficulties and subject to special administration regimes. [FN2] In the present *149 proceedings, the Court is therefore called upon, in substance, to decide whether the interpretation it has given of Article 25 of the Second Directive may be set aside, and under which conditions, when the criteria specified by national law for an effective claim of abuse of rights are met. The Court has, in fact, had occasion to consider this question, if only incidentally, in the Pafitis case. [FN3] FN1 [1977] O.J. L26/1. FN2 See Joined Cases C 19-20/90, Karella and Karellas v. Minister for Industry, Energy and Technology and Organismos Anasygkrotiseos Epicheirisseon AE: [1991] E.C.R. I-2691; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 865; Case C-381/89, Syndesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias and Others v. Greece and Others: [1992] E.C.R. I-2111; [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 348; Joined Cases C 134-135/91, Kerafina-

Keramische-und Finanz Holding AG and Vioktimatiki Aeve v. Greece and Organismos Oilonomikis anasygkrotissis Epicheirisseon AE: [1992] E.C.R. I-5699; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 277; and Case C-441/93, Pafitis and Others v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE and other: [1996] E.C.R. I-1347; [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 551. FN3 Cited above, paras 67-70.

The regulatory framework and the relevant case law

Community law 2. It is sufficient to recall here that Article 25(1) of the Second Directive provides that: "Any increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting. Both this decision and the increase in subscribed capital shall be published in the manner laid down by the laws of each Member State, in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 68/151."

The relevant provisions of national law 3. Act 1386 of 5 August 1983 [FN4] set up the Organismos Oikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (Organisation for the Restructuring of companies, hereinafter "the OAE"), a public limited liability company the capital of which is fully subscribed by the Greek State, with the aim of furthering the country's economic and social development (Article 2(2)). To this end, the OAE may, inter alia, take over the administration and day-to-day running of companies undergoing financial difficulties or of nationalised companies, acquire participations in the capital of companies, grant loans, issue bonds and transfer shares to public bodies and private individuals (Article 2(3)). FN4 Official Journal of Greece, EK Edition 107 of 8 August 1983, p. 14. The provisions of Act No. 1386/1983 were subsequently amended by Act No. 1882/1990 (Official Journal of Greece EK Edition A43 of 23 March 1990) in order to comply with the Second Directive, and in particular with Articles 25 and 29 thereof. Needless to say, the case at issue is governed by the provisions of Greek law in force prior to the amendments enacted by Act No. 1882/1990. Pursuant to Article 8(8) of the aforesaid Act, the OAE may even, during provisional administration of an undertaking, decide to increase the capital of the company concerned; this is in derogation from the general rules governing public limited liability companies which provide that only the general meeting has decision-making power in the matter. Former shareholders retain, however, a right of *150 pre-emption on the purchase of new shares, to be exercised within the period stipulated in the ministerial decision approving the capital increase. 4. Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, which provides that "the exercise of a right is prohibited where it manifestly exceeds the bounds of good faith or morality or the economic or social purpose of that right", is of particular relevance here. It is

precisely on the grounds of this provision that Greece challenges the applicability of Article 25 of the Second Directive in the present case.

The relevant case law 5. As indicated above, the Court has already had occasion to clarify the scope and effect of Article 25 of the Second Directive, precisely in relation to the aforesaid provisions of Greek law. Asked to give a preliminary ruling in various proceedings instituted by shareholders opposing capital increases effected by administrative act, the Court ruled in effect that the general meeting of shareholders has exclusive competence to decide alterations of capital. More particularly, the Court ruled that Article 25(1) of the Second Directive has direct effect, [FN5] and that this provision precludes application of a national provision which, in order to ensure the reorganisation of companies in critical difficulties, provides that capital increases may be decided by administrative act with no involvement by the general meeting, [FN6] even when original shareholders are granted pre-emptive rights on the new shares. [FN7] The aim of ensuring a minimum level of protection for shareholders in all Member States, which is the main aim of the Second Directive, would, the Court stated, be "seriously frustrated if the Member States were entitled to derogate from the provisions of the directive by maintaining in force rules--even rules categorised as special or exceptional-- under which it is possible to decide by administrative measure, outside any decision by the general meeting of shareholders, to effect an increase in the company's capital which would have the effect either of obliging the original shareholders to increase their contributions to the capital or of imposing on them the addition of new shareholders, thus reducing their involvement in the decision-taking power of the company". [FN8] FN5 See Karella and Karellas, Syndesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias and Kerafina-Keramische (cited above), at paras 23, 38 & 18 respectively. FN6 See Karella and Karellas, Syndesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias and Kerafina-Keramische (cited above), at paras 36, 37 & 18 respectively. FN7 See Karella and Karellas and Kerafina-Keramische (cited above), at paras 36 & 18 respectively. FN8 See Karella and Karellas, at paras 26, 33 & 39 respectively. In other words, as I have already observed in the Opinion I delivered in the Pafitis case, [FN9] the Court made it clear that, even on the basis of special regulations designed to enable companies in financial *151 difficulties to be restructured, the general meeting may not be deprived of that most essential, unrelinquishable right, namely the right to alter the composition of the share capital, that is to say the assets of the company and of the shareholders themselves.

FN9 Opinion delivered on 9 November 1995: [1996] E.C.R. I-1349, at para. 13. 6. In Pafitis, moreover, the Court further stated, although no specific question had been submitted in this respect, that "the uniform application and full effect of Community law would be undermined if a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) of the Second Directive were deemed to be abusing his rights merely because he was a minority shareholder of a company subject to reorganisation measures or had benefited from the reorganisation of the company. Since Article 25(1) applies without distinction to all shareholders, regardless of the outcome of any reorganisation procedure, to treat an action based on Article 25(1) as abusive for such reasons would be tantamount to altering the scope of that provision". [FN10] FN10 Pafitis (cited above), at para. [70]. This clarification was made necessary because, as was apparent from the order for reference, the judgment of the Court, and with it the interpretation given to Article 25, would not have been applied had the national court reached the conclusion that the facts of the case before it met the conditions required by national law to determine that the right conferred by Article 25 had been exercised abusively. Even before excluding that this had occurred, the Court expressly stated that it was not necessary "to rule as to whether it is permissible, under the Community legal order, to apply a national rule in determining whether a right conferred by the provisions of Community law at issue is being exercised abusively"; it cautioned however that "the application of such a rule must not detract from the full effect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States". [FN11] FN11 Pafitis (cited above), at para. [68].

The facts and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 7. The main proceedings were instituted by certain shareholders who sought to have the ministerial measures effecting an increase in capital annulled on the grounds that they were adopted in infringement of Article 25 of the Second Directive. This time, the case involves shareholders of Athinaiki Khartopiia AE, a public limited liability company subject to special arrangements under Act 1386/1983 since 30 March 1984. On 28 May 1986, the OAE, which had taken over the company's administration, decided--in the framework of its temporary administration and in accordance with Article 8(8) of the Act--to increase the capital by 940 million dr. By Decision No. 153 of 6 June 1986, the Minister for Industry, Research and Technology approved the capital increase and set out the terms thereof, providing in particular for pre-emptive rights, to be exercised within one month *152 of the publication of the decision in the Official Journal, for former shareholders in respect of the new share issue. The former shareholders did not exercise this right. They in fact considered that

the capital increase, decided in the aforesaid manner, was in conflict with Article 25(1) of the Second Directive. On 10 November 1987, they therefore brought an action before the Polimeles Protodikio (Court of First Instance), Athens, seeking annulment of the capital increase. This action was dismissed by judgment No. 5136/1988. 8. On 28 June 1989, the shareholders concerned appealed against this ruling before the Efetio-Athinon. By judgment No. 5943/1994, the latter annulled the judgment of the lower court on the grounds that it was in overt conflict with Community case law in the matter. [FN12] In the same judgment, the Efetio stayed its final judgment and required the Greek State, which had raised the objection of abuse of rights, to produce evidence that the right, conferred by Article 25 of the Second Directive, to bring an action in annulment had been exercised abusively by the shareholders. The national court therefore takes the view that the general rule laid down in Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code sanctioning the abusive exercise of rights could well be capable of application even in cases where the provision relied upon before a court had its origin in Community law. FN12 On the basis of that case law, the court in the main proceedings stressed in its order for reference that Article 25(1) of the Second Directive prohibits capital increases such as that effected for the company Athiniki Chartopoiia AE. More precisely, the national court noted that, according to Community case law, the rule concerned is "set out in clear and precise terms and lays down, without specifying any conditions, a rule providing for the general principle that it is the general meeting of shareholders that must decide upon any increase in capital and not third persons such as the Minister, whose decisions are invalid and do not in principle bind natural or legal persons affected by the measure". 9. After its summary of the facts, the Efetio went on to examine the evidence submitted by the Greek State with regard to the contended abuse of the right conferred on the shareholders by Article 25 of the Second Directive and, on this basis, reached the conclusion that the conditions laid down in Article 281 of the Civil Code had under the circumstances been met. The referring court held that the appellant shareholders had exercised the right abusively in so far as the exercise thereof manifestly exceeded the bounds of good faith, morality and the socio-economic purpose of the right in question. This was stated to be demonstrated by a series of extremely revealing evidence, some of them objective, others subjective. In particular, the national court refers to the company's catastrophic financial situation, which made bankruptcy certain [FN13]; to the evident *153 advantages that the appellants themselves had drawn from the government's reorganisation measures [FN14]; as well as to the fact that the appellants did not exercise their pre-emptive rights in respect of the shares issued after the company was reorganised. FN13 The order for reference states in this respect that "... at the time when it fell under the special régime of Act 1386/[1986]/1983 (...), Athinaiki Khartopiia AE

had due bills to banks and various other creditors of approximately 17,203,894,160 dr in total, it had an acute liquidity problem because of its heavy loan burden, it was lacking its own capital and its assets were not sufficient to satisfy its debts. The shortfall on the basis of its existing assets was of the order of at least 3,500 million dr. Accordingly, even if those assets were liquidated at the best possible market prices, liabilities of that order would have remained unsatisfied". FN14 The referring court notes in the order for reference that: "Share value at that time was essentially negative, whilst with the increase in the capital in the amount of 940,000,000 dr on the part of the OAE and the consequent conversion of liabilities into shares, there was a recovery in the progress of works and the undertaking might be sold to third parties under advantageous terms which would enable liabilities to be discharged as well as a financial guarantee to be given to the former shareholders, on the basis of the number of shares which they continue to hold." 10. The same court questions, however, whether such an approach is consistent with Community law. In its view, the indications provided by the Court in Pafitis leave the issue open, in the sense that it is not clear who (the national court or the Community court), and under the rules and/or principles of which legal order (national law or Community law), is to decide whether or not a right conferred by a rule of Community law has been exercised abusively. Following this line of reasoning, the national court consequently considered it necessary, in order to rule on the proceedings pending before it, to ask the Court to clarify whether, to what extent and under which conditions, it is possible to apply the concept of abuse of rights also in cases where the right relied upon is conferred by Community law. More precisely, it referred to the Court the following two questions for a preliminary ruling: 1. Can the national court apply a provision of national law (in this case Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code) in order to assess whether a right granted by the Community provisions at issue is being exercised by the party possessing it or are there other Community law principles, and if so which, to be found in legislation or settled case law, on which the national court may, if need be, base itself? 2. If the reply to Question 1 is in the negative, if, that is, the Court of Justice reserves such competence for itself, for reasons relating, for instance, to the uniform application of Community provisions, may the specific circumstances as formulated by the defendant-respondent State as an objection, which constituted the issue of proof in judgment No. 5943/1994 of this court, and which were set out succinctly in the previous paragraph of this judgment, or certain of them and if so which, prevent an action founded on infringement of Article 25(1) of the Second Council Directive 77/91 from succeeding?

The first question 11. By its first question, the referring court therefore asks the Court to clarify

whether the possible abusive exercise of a right conferred by a provision of Community law may be assessed by the referring court on the basis of the relevant provisions of its own national law, or whether, precisely because the right relied upon in the proceedings has its origin in Community rules, the abuse of rights should be examined with reference to the general principles laid down in Community law. Clearly, the question of abuse of rights is posed by the national court *154 in general terms, independently, that is, of the Community provision relied on in the proceedings and of the national provision governing abuse of rights under the domestic legal order concerned. The question being asked is in effect whether it is for the national court to decide whether there has been an abuse of rights and whether it may, for this purpose, apply provisions of its own law or whether it must apply the general principles of Community law which may be relevant in the matter and the definition of which is a matter for the Court of Justice. 12. First of all, a clarification is necessary. It is indisputable, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling, that the decision as to whether or not there has been an abuse of rights lies in any case with the national court: and this regardless of whether the abuse of rights is determined on the basis of national rules or on the basis of Community criteria. It goes without saying, however, that in all cases the Court has the power of interpretation, albeit from different angles, in order to ensure that the provision of Community law relied upon is correctly construed and applied. Therefore, the question referred to the Court should be properly understood as seeking to ascertain on the basis of the provisions of which legal order, national or Community, an abuse of rights should be ascertained. For this purpose it is however necessary first of all to determine whether it is permissible under Community law for the application of Community provisions to be subordinated to, and in some cases paralysed by, an abuse of rights. 13. That being said, the starting point for such an analysis can only be the judgment in Pafitis, [FN15] in which the Court had occasion to consider facts very similar to those in the present case. While explaining that the application of a national rule on abuse of rights must not detract from the full effect and uniform application of Community law, the Court in effect confined itself to ascertaining whether in that case the conditions for regarding the right conferred by Article 25(1) of the Second Directive as having been exercised abusively were fulfilled. Basing itself on the interpretation of the rule of Community law at issue, the Court answered this question in the negative. FN15 I would point out that in Syndesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklissias (cited above), the Court did not consider the issue because, although it had been raised by the parties in the main proceedings, no question on it was referred for a preliminary ruling (para. [18]). In this connection, see also my Opinion concerning this case: ([1992] E.C.R. I-2126, at para. 8). As already pointed out, on that occasion the Court expressly stated that it did not consider it necessary to determine whether or not it was permissible under the

Community legal order to apply a national rule in order to assess whether a right conferred by provisions of Community law has been exercised abusively. In substance, therefore, while leaving open the question of principle, the Court ruled out that the shareholders' action, seeking annulment of the capital increase decided on in breach of Article 25(1) of the Second Directive, could be *155 treated as abusive. It did so on the ground that the application of such a national rule, even if permissible, would undermine the full effect and uniform application of Community law. 14. Applying such a solution to the present case, it is clear that the answer can be no different, in the sense that now, just as then, it would have to be ruled out that the shareholders exercised the right conferred by Article 25(1) of the Second Directive abusively. Such a reply was without doubt sufficient in the earlier case, but could well seem too summary here, given that the referring court asks the Court to resolve the issue left open in Pafitis, in other words to clarify whether or not it is permissible under Community law to apply a national rule on abuse of rights--obviously where rights conferred by provisions of Community law are involved--or whether only Community criteria may be used to determine whether such a right has been exercised abusively. 15. That being so, I would first point out that to allow a domestic rule relating, in this case, to the abuse of rights, to consolidate a breach of Community law, in this case the rule that alterations of capital are to be decided by the general meeting, would go against the fundamental principle that Community law has primacy over national law. [FN16] It stands to reason that the provision of Community law concerned would thus be rendered inoperative by virtue of a conflicting principle of substantive domestic law, which would inevitably undermine the full effect and uniform application of Community law. A conflict of this kind--and there is indeed a conflict here--would therefore have to be resolved according to the principle of primacy of Community law. FN16 On this point see also my observations in the Opinion in Pafitis: [1996] E.C.R. I-1349, at para. 27. 16. This conclusion is confirmed by the position taken by the Court in a case where the national court asked whether it could apply a "principle of objective unfairness", which would have resulted in the non-application of a Community provision. The Court did not fail to point out that it would be contrary to the division of powers between the Community and the Member States if it were to be accepted that "a national authority were entitled, or even obliged, not to apply a provision of Community law in a case in which it considered that its application would lead to a result which the legislature would clearly have sought to avoid if it had envisaged such an eventuality when enacting the provision in question. If such a general principle were recognised, it might prevent the provisions of Community law from having full effect in the Member States and would be prejudicial to the fundamental principle that Community law must be applied uniformly throughout the Community". [FN17]

FN17 Case 299/84, Firma Karl-Heinz Neumann v. Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung: [1985] E.C.R. 3663; [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 4 *156 , at para. [25]. In the same judgment, the Court added however that "Community law provides all courts of the Member States with a solution which is wholly in accordance with the division of powers between the Community and the Member States: (...) a court (...) may ask the Court of Justice under Article 177 EEC for an interpretation of the Community provision in question or for a declaration that it is invalid, if necessary, thus avoiding what it regards as an injustice" (at para. [26]). Moreover, the Court had already given a ruling to the same effect in a previous judgment in which, asked to decide whether it was possible to grant an exemption, for reasons of natural justice, from charges due under Community law, it stated that the application of a rule of natural justice for which provision is made under national legislation may possibly be justified in connection with the formalities applicable to the imposition of a charge introduced by Community law; on the other hand, "such a rule may not be applied in so far as its effect would be to modify the scope of the provisions of Community law concerning the basis of assessment, the manner of imposition or the amount of a charge introduced by that law". [FN18] FN18 Case 118/76, Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof: [1977] E.C.R. 1177, at para. [5]. 17. The case law just cited therefore shows that a provision of domestic law cannot be applied if it modifies the scope of the Community rule in question, that is to say if it detracts from its full effect and uniform application: in short, if it would defeat the principle of the primacy of Community law. All things considered, the Court followed the reasoning in Pafitis. Declaring that Article 25(1) applies without distinction to all shareholders regardless of the outcome of any reorganisation procedure, and that consequently "to treat an action based on Article 25(1) as abusive for such reasons would be tantamount to altering the scope of that provision", [FN19] the Court again underscored that a provision or principle of national law can in no case be applied in such manner as to cause the Community legal order to give its "blessing" to an infringement of its provisions. FN19 See Pafitis (cited above), at para. [70]. 18. The foregoing leads to the following first conclusion: it is not permissible under Community law for a national court to apply a domestic rule where that rule would entail a solution inconsistent with Community law. This would certainly be the case in this instance, given that, as it emerges from settled case law and as the national court itself recognises in its order for reference, the domestic rule which the abuse of rights provision is meant to safeguard manifestly conflicts with Article 25(1) of the Second Directive, which is the provision relied upon by the

applicant shareholders for the precise purpose of challenging the violation in question. This conclusion, however, does not fully answer the question referred, since the national court also asks whether there are principles of Community law which are capable of sanctioning cases of abuse of rights. Certainly, it seems difficult even to envisage the existence of a general rule of Community law capable of negating a right conferred by a Community provision, especially in a harmonised field such as the *157 company law field involved here, in confrontation with a domestic provision infringing that right. None the less, given the terms and the scope of the question submitted, I believe a few remarks on this matter are due. 19. Firstly, I would recall that in Community practice the elaboration and application of unwritten principles have assumed an importance which is not insignificant, despite the lack of any express provision to this effect. Besides being used as interpretation criteria, these principles essentially serve to identify the limits on the powers exercised by the administration over subjects and, more generally, to determine the legality of an act or of the conduct of a Community institution or of a Member State. It should be pointed out that these principles are simply created by the Court, as occurs in the national sphere, and they accordingly constitute principles specific to Community law, in the sense that they are not borrowed in individual cases from other legal systems. Therefore, while the Court is certainly inspired by national legal practice in elaborating and defining general principles, it nevertheless always adapts the specific principle concerned to the needs, functioning and objectives of the Community. 20. It would not be superfluous to add here that the fact that the only Community provision which refers to "the general principles common to the laws of the Member States", namely Article 215 of the Treaty, is confined to the field of the non-contractual liability of the Community and to defining the ensuing obligation to make good damage is certainly not to be understood as meaning that the Court is precluded from making reference to the practice of national courts in elaborating and applying unwritten principles in the Community legal order. In fact, the reference to generally accepted principles is a constant in Community case law in which general unwritten principles are affirmed. Indeed, the Court has expressly pointed out that it is for it, "in pursuance of the task conferred on it by Article 164 of the Treaty (...), to rule on such a question in accordance with generally accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental principles of the Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States". [FN20] FN20 Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte: Factortame Ltd and Others: [1996] E.C.R. I-1029; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, at para. [27]. See also para. [41] of the same judgment, where the Court stated that, in the absence of written rules, it referred to the general principles common to the laws of the Member States in areas other than the non-contractual liability of the Community.

However, that affirmation should not be understood as meaning that there are two different categories of general principles: those specific to the Community legal order and those derived from national practice. It is indeed true that certain principles have their foundation *158 in the actual provisions of the Treaty itself, or can at least be traced back to them (I refer here, for example, to the principle of proportionality), whereas others have been illumined and determined by reference to the practice of national courts (for example, the principle of legitimate expectations). None the less, in both cases, the principles concerned are principles which the Community legal order has made its own, that is to say principles which, once enucleated, become an integral part of it. 21. It is in the light of these general observations, therefore, that it should now be determined whether, under Community law, the conditions are fulfilled for elaborating and/or defining a general principle of law relative to abuse of rights. Even legal writers have recently expressed the wish to see this happen. [FN21] FN21 See L. Neville Brown, "Is there a General Principle of Abuse of Rights in European Community Law?" in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. 2, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1994, pp. 511 et seq. In the Opinion I delivered in Pafitis, while noting that the abusive exercise of rights by a person on whom a right is conferred may be contested in nearly all Member States, albeit in different manners and under different conditions, I promptly added that no such rule was then to be found in Community law. [FN22] I have not changed my point of view, in the sense that I do not believe that in the meantime the conditions have been fulfilled for "consecrating" in the Community legal order a general principle pursuant to which one could refuse to recognise as abusive the exercise of a right conferred by a Community provision. FN22 It was precisely for this reason that I came to the conclusion that it is under its own legal order that a national court may, in principle, ascertain whether a right conferred by a provision of Community law has been exercised abusively (see the Opinion in Pafitis, cited above, at para. 28). As explained in that Opinion, such an assessment can under no circumstances detract from the objectives of the provision at issue and, consequently, from its uniform application in all Member States: such a result would clearly have occurred in that case (see paras 30-33). 22. More than one reason leads me to this conclusion. Firstly, I believe that under present circumstances a common definition, drawn from national legal practice, of abuse of rights is not possible. A survey, even approximate, of the way in which this principle is laid down and works in the various Member States only serves to confirm this point. Although it is true that the majority of the Member States recognises the concept of abuse of rights, [FN23] it is also true that in certain States this legal concept, far from having the value of a general principle of law, is confined to regulating

very specific cases provided for by law. [FN24] *159 Furthermore, the tenor and application of such a "principle" vary significantly from one State to another. [FN25] FN23 However, the concept does not exist at all, at least not as such, in the law of the United Kingdom, of Ireland or of Denmark. FN24 This is the case, for example, in Italian law, in which the concept of abuse of rights relates solely to property rights (Article 833 of the Civil Code). Similarly, even if one were to categorise the cases where United Kingdom, Danish and Irish law sanctions certain conduct as entailing application of a concept of abuse of rights, the fact remains that these cases are still confined to certain specified areas. FN25 Although this is in any case a simplification, in certain legal systems abuse of rights covers conduct that goes beyond the limits of the exercise of the right involved (Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal), while in others it relates to conduct which is contrary to good faith and accepted principles of morality (Germany, Greece, Portugal). Moreover, while in certain legal systems the determination of an abusive exercise of rights is based solely on objective elements (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain and Portugal), in others certain subjective elements are required, in particular the intent to harm others (Italy and, according to some writers, France). 23. Certainly, I am aware that these circumstances are hardly decisive. In this respect, I need only recall, besides what I have already stated, that the elaboration of a general principle at Community level does not necessarily require that the principle exist in all the national legal systems or that it be subject to the same conditions and application criteria. These are principles which must be incorporated in the Community order and which, therefore, acquire their own autonomy in function of the structure and the objectives of that order. The fact that it is not possible to arrive at a common, but precise and detailed, definition of abuse of rights by drawing on the general principles common to Member States is significant but it is not the only reason which leads me to deny the existence of such a principle in the Community legal order. I consider that the very characteristics and raison d'être of a principle relative to abuse of rights demonstrate that it is a legal concept which certainly has a home, or at least a foundation, in well-established legal systems, but much less so in a legal order like that of the Community, whose evolution towards integration is far from being capable of being considered to be complete. More generally, I consider that the risk of there being a gap in the system--which is, after all, what the abuse of rights principle, like all other so-called catch-all provisions, seeks to avoid--is minor, or non- existent, in a legal order like that of the Community which, through judicial interpretation and case law in general, is more promptly amenable to adaptation to the needs of society. 24. That said, it is none the less true that any legal order which aspires to

achieve a minimum level of completion must contain self-protection measures, so to speak, to ensure that the rights it confers are not exercised in a manner which is abusive, excessive or distorted. This requirement is not at all alien to Community law; on the contrary, it has been repeatedly recognised in the Court's case law. I refer, above all, to the established case law according to which "the facilities created by the Treaty cannot have the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from them to evade the application of national legislation and of prohibiting Member States from taking the measures necessary to prevent such abuse". [FN26] Similarly, the Court has had *160 occasion to explain that it is permissible for national legal orders to deny the right to rely upon Community law where the conduct of the person relying upon a right conferred by a provision of Community law can be demonstrated to be a fraudulent evasion of statutory law. [FN27] FN26 Case C-370/90, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh: [1992] E.C.R. I-4265, at para. [24]. To the same effect, see, inter alia, Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid: [1974] E.C.R. 1299; [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298, at para. [13]; Case 115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: [1979] E.C.R. 399; [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 357; Case 205/84, E.C. Commission v. Germany: [1986] E.C.R. 3755; [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 64, at para. [22]; Case C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media: [1993] E.C.R. I-487, at para. [12]; and finally Case C-23/93, TV 10 v. Commissariaat voor de Media: [1994] E.C.R. I-4795; [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 284, at para. [21]. FN27 This was the case in Case C-8/92, General Milk Products GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas: [1993] E.C.R. I-779, in which the Court stated that "the position would be different only if it could be shown that the importation and re-exportation of that cheese were not realised as bona fide commercial transactions but only in order wrongfully to benefit from the grant of monetary compensatory amounts. The bona fide nature of those transactions is a question of fact to be decided by the national court" (at para. [21], my emphasis). It was also the case in Case 130/88, Van de Bijl v. Staatssecretaris Van Economische Zaken: [1989] E.C.R. 3039, at para. [26], in which the Court held that the host Member State was not bound by a certificate confirming that the holder had exercised a period of professional activity in the Member State from which he came when "it is clear that during that same period the person in question has pursued his activities in the territory of the host Member State" (at para. [27]). The judgment in Case C-206/94, Brennett v. Paletta: [1996] E.C.R. I-2357 took the same line. At para. [27] thereof, the Court stated that the Community provision relied upon "does not preclude employers from adducing evidence to support, where appropriate, a finding by the national court of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the worker concerned, in that, although he may claim to have become incapacitated for work, such incapacity having been certified in accordance with Article 18 of Regulation No. 574/72, he was not sick at all" (my emphasis).

25. More generally, it is appropriate to recall the statement of the Court whereby "although the national courts may, therefore, take account, on the basis of objective evidence, of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the worker concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny him the benefit of the provisions of Community law on which he seeks to rely, they must nevertheless assess such conduct in the light of the objectives pursued by those provisions". [FN28] FN28 Paletta II (cited above), at para. [25]. The Court thus stated in the case before it that the presumption of abusive conduct on the part of the person relying upon a legal position conferred by Community law could not in any case be such as to require that the worker prove, by other means different from those required by the applicable provision of Community law, that he was actually sick. This was precisely because the objective of the provision, designed specifically to allow workers who fall ill in another Member State to provide a simple medical certificate drawn up by the competent authorities of that State, would thereby have been defeated. On a proper view, therefore, that case did not involve abuse of rights in the true sense of the term but fraud. So, essentially, the Court recognises that a national court may sanction an excessive or distorted use of Community law only where this is not prejudicial to the objectives pursued by the relevant provision, in particular in cases where the provision relied upon is only "apparently" the one governing the circumstances concerned, or when the situation of the person relying upon the right concerned only "apparently" meets what is laid down by the provision at issue. This really means that the Court reserves itself the right, as is appropriate, to define the substantive scope of the Community right at issue, that is *161 to say, to define the intrinsic limits of the subjective legal position concerned. So, reliance on a right may be refused only where it is proved that those limits have been exceeded. From that angle, where a legal position is one conferred by Community law, the question of any abuse of rights which may be raised under provisions of national law ultimately turns into a question of interpretation of the Community provision at issue. 26. This interpretation of the case law to which I have referred is, in my view, confirmed by a recent judgment in which the Court explicitly ruled on an abusive exercise of rights. The case involved a Turkish worker who, despite the fact that he had expressly declared he would return to Turkey after a period of vocational training and had obtained, on the basis of such declaration, a temporary residence permit from the competent authorities in Germany, intended to extend his stay in Germany and sought to rely upon the relevant "Community" provision for this purpose. [FN29] The Court's answer was clear and to the point: "The fact that a Turkish worker wishes to extend his stay in the host Member State, although he expressly accepted its restriction, does not constitute an abuse of rights." The Court then added that the fact that the worker had declared his intention of returning to Turkey after having been employed in the Member State for the purpose of perfecting his vocational skills was not liable to deprive him of

the rights deriving from Article 6(1) of Decision No. 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council of 19 September 1980 "unless it is established by the national court that that declaration was made with the sole intention of improperly obtaining work and residence permits for the host Member State". [FN30] FN29 See Case C-36/96, Faik Günaydin and Others v. Freistaat Bayern: [1997] E.C.R. I-5143; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 871. More specifically, the Court was asked: "Can a claim under Article 6(1) of Decision No. 1/80 be opposed as an abuse of law if the Turkish worker has expressly declared his intention of returning to Turkey after preparation for the work there and the competent authority has authorised him to reside in the country temporarily only in view of that declaration?" FN30 As above, at para. [61]; my emphasis. Once again, therefore, the Court began by defining the aim of the provision at issue and determining its intrinsic limits and then left it to the national court to rule out its invocability only where those limits were exceeded, that is to say where in the specific case the worker's conduct was shown to be fraudulent. 27. So, the Court has essentially allowed each national legal system to apply its own rules of ordinary law (whether sanctioning "fraudulent evasion of statutory law", "false representation" or, why not, even "abuse of rights") to withdraw the right to reply upon rules of Community law in well-defined cases, in which, in the final analysis, such rules were not meant to apply, and where there can therefore be no adverse effect on the uniform application of Community law. In such cases, I repeat, the Court's interpretation may still be necessary in order to define the objectives and the limits of the provision at issue, *162 thereby ensuring that the needs which Community law seeks to safeguard are respected, needs which in this case relate to harmonisation in relation to companies. To sum up, I conclude that at present Community law has no general principle sanctioning the abusive exercise of a right conferred by Community law and that, even if one were to exist, it could not in any event be applied so as to "endorse" a breach of Community law, which would otherwise be the result in this case. Given the wording of the question submitted, I would add, finally, that it is also not possible in this case to refer to established principles of Community law, such as the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations. Nor do I consider it possible to envisage the use of those principles to render inoperative the protection afforded to individuals by Community law, much less to "endorse" an established breach of Article 25(1) of the Second Directive.

The second question 28. By its second question, the referring court asks whether--in the event that it is precluded from assessing whether there has been an abuse of rights on the basis of provisions of its own national law, which would mean that any abuse of rights could only be sanctioned by the Court of Justice on the basis of Community law--the conditions are fulfilled in this case for considering that the

right conferred on shareholders by Article 25(1) of the Second Directive has been exercised abusively. In view of the conclusion I reached on the first question, I consider it unnecessary to rule on this point. Moreover, in Pafitis, [FN31] the issue of the application of the Greek provision on abuse of rights for the purpose of preventing Article 25(1) of the Second Directive from being relied upon has already been considered and resolved by the Court. I shall therefore confine myself to a few brief observations. FN31 Cited above, at para. [70]. 29. I would recall that, according to the Greek court, the shareholders' attempt to oppose an increase in share capital would constitute an abuse of rights, in that, first, the shareholders themselves derive evident economic benefits from this, and second, the appellants have not exercised their preferential rights to take up the new shares issued as a result of the increase in share capital. 30. In so far as the abuse of rights is connected with the company's serious financial difficulties, it seems to me that the objective of the respondents in the main proceedings is not so much to challenge the exercise of the right by the shareholders, but to challenge the provision of the Directive itself, which, as the Court has repeatedly stated, does not permit any capital increase decided on outside the general meeting, even in the case of companies subject to special arrangements. The evidence submitted by the Greek Government, *163 which is entirely concerned with the company's critical situation, is clearly not such as to allow the conduct of the shareholders affected by the capital increase to be characterised in one sense or the other. Moreover, as further confirmation of the foregoing conclusion, the fact that the outcome of reorganisation measures is not foreseeable from the outset and that it would therefore be arbitrary to judge the shareholders' intentions after the fact, particularly in view of the positive results achieved through government intervention, should not be underestimated. In any case, it would be odd to make the abusive character of the exercise of a right dependent on the fact that the capital increase led to an improvement in the company's asset position, that is to say to the very achievement of the main objective pursued by an increase in share capital. 31. Nor do I believe that the appellants can be held to have exercised abusively the right conferred by the Community provision on the grounds that they did not exercise their option on the new shares issued pursuant to the contested capital increase. On this point, it is sufficient to note that, had they exercised their option on the new shares, the shareholders would have thereby endorsed the decision to increase capital taken without the general meeting's consent, a decision which they challenged precisely on the ground that it infringed Article 25(1) of the Second Directive. Under the circumstances, it would be odd, not to say paradoxical, to characterise as abusive the exercise of the right conferred on the shareholders by that provision, when the shareholders themselves wanted to oppose the infringement of this right, brought about, without their consent,

through an increase of capital by means of administrative act. Otherwise, the scope of the rule of Community law at issue would be modified: and one would arrive at a result inconsistent with the result pursued by Community law through harmonisation of the company law rules in question.

Conclusion 32. In the light of the foregoing, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred by the Efetio-Athinon as follows: (1) Community law precludes the application of a national rule which would allow a national court to determine whether a right derived from a provision of Community law has been exercised abusively by the holder of the right, if this would impair its full effect and uniform application. Neither may the national court rely on general principles of Community law for the purpose of making such a determination. (2) The exercise of the right conferred on shareholders by Article 25(1) of the Second Directive, which provides that increases in share capital must be decided on by the general meeting, cannot be characterised as abusive simply on the ground that *164 the shareholders concerned have taken benefit from the capital increase, decided on in violation of that provision, or have not exercised an option to take up new shares. JUDGMENT [1] By judgment of 6 June 1996, received at the Court on 21 November 1996, the Efetio-Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens) referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 E.C. two questions on the interpretation of Article 25 of the Second Council Directive 77/91 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, [FN32] and on the abusive exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law. FN32 [1977] O.J. L26/1. [2] Those questions were raised in proceedings between, on the one hand, Mr Kefalas and others, shareholders in the public limited liability company Athinaiki Khartopiia AE ("Khartopiia"), and, on the other hand, the Greek State and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasinkrotisis Epikhiriseon AE (Organisation for the Restructuring of Undertakings, hereinafter "the OAE"), in which the plaintiffs are contesting the validity of the increase in the capital of Khartopiia effected under the scheme provided for by Greek Act No. 1386/1983 of 5 August 1983, [FN33] which was applied to Khartopiia by decision of the Minister for the National Economy of 30 March 1984.

FN33 Official Journal of Greece, 107, of 8 August 1983, P. 14. [3] The OAE is a public body set up by Act No. 1386/1983. Its legal form is that of a public limited liability company and it acts in the public interest under the control of the State. According to Article 2(2) of that Act, the object of the OAE is to contribute to the economic and social development of the country by means of the financial reorganisation of undertakings, the importation and application of foreign know-how, the development of national know-how and the formation and operation of nationalised and mixed-investment undertakings. [4] Article 2(3) of Act No. 1386/1983 lists the powers conferred on the OAE for the purposes of attaining those objectives. These include the power to assume the administration and day-to-day management of undertakings undergoing reorganisation or nationalised undertakings, participate in the capital of undertakings, grant, issue or take out certain loans, acquire bonds and transfer shares, particularly to workers or to organisations representing them, to local authorities or to other legal persons constituted under public law, charitable institutions, social organisations or individuals. *165 [5] According to Article 5(1) of Act No. 1386/1983, the Minister for the National Economy may decide to apply the scheme set up by that law to undertakings in serious financial difficulties. [6] Article 7 of Act No. 1386/1983 provides that the competent Minister may decide to transfer to the OAE the administration of an undertaking subject to the scheme established by that act, to reschedule its debts in such a way as to ensure its viability or to take steps to place it in liquidation. [7] Article 8 of Act No. 1386/1983 contains provisions relating to the transfer of the administration of the undertaking to the OAE. Article 8(1), as amended by Act No. 1472/1984, [FN34] lays down the detailed rules governing such transfers and regulates the relationship between the persons appointed by the OAE to administer the undertaking and its organs. Thus it provides that the powers of the administrative organs of the undertaking are to cease upon publication of the ministerial decision placing the undertaking within the scheme established by that act, and that the general meeting of the company is to subsist but that it may not remove members of the board of directors who have been appointed by the OAE. FN34 Official Journal of Greece A, 112, of 6 August 1984, P. 1273. [8] Article 8(8) of Act No. 1386/1983 provides that the OAE may decide, in the course of its provisional administration of the company concerned, to increase the capital of that company by way of derogation from the legislation in force relating to public limited liability companies. The increase must be approved by the competent minister. The former shareholders retain their preferential right and may exercise it within a period prescribed in the ministerial decision approving the increase. [9] Following the application to Khartopiia of the scheme provided for by Act No. 1386/1983, the OAE took over the management of that company and decided on

28 May 1986 to increase its capital by 940 dr million. That increase was approved, in accordance with Article 8(8) of Act No. 1386/1983, by Decision No. 153 of 6 June 1986 of the Minister for Industry, Research and Technology. [10] That decision shows that the former shareholders retained an unlimited preferential right to acquire the new shares which was to be exercised by them within one month from publication of the decision in the Official Journal of Greece. The plaintiffs in the main proceedings did not avail themselves of that right. [11] In the plaintiffs' view, the increase in capital decided upon by the OAE is contrary to Article 25(1) of the Second Directive, which provides that "Any increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting." Consequently, they brought an action before the Polimeles Protodikio (Court of First Instance), Athens, which dismissed their application. [12] The plaintiffs in the main proceedings therefore appealed *166 against that judgment to the Efetio-Athinon. The Greek State considered that the plaintiff's application for a declaration of invalidity was abusive, and raised an objection of abuse of rights based on Article 281 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the exercise of a right is prohibited where it manifestly exceeds the bounds of good faith, morality or the economic or social purpose of that right". [13] In its judgment making the reference, the national court considers that Article 281 of the Civil Code may be applied in order to preclude the exercise of rights arising from provisions of Community law where such exercise would be abusive. In the present case, the national court considers that to allow the plaintiffs' claim under Article 25(1) of the Second Directive for a declaration that the OAE's decision authorising an increase in capital was invalid would manifestly exceed the bounds of good faith, morality and the economic or social purpose of the right. [14] The national court based its conclusion in that regard on various findings of fact. [15] First, at the time when it was made subject to the scheme provided for by Act No. 1386/1983, Khartopiia was heavily indebted to banks and other creditors, it had an acute liquidity problem and it no longer possessed its own capital resources, so that its assets were no longer sufficient to cover its liabilities and its shares were worthless. [16] In addition, the increase in capital effected by the OAE and the subsequent conversion of debt into equity led to the financial recovery of Khartopiia. The economic value of the shareholders' equity was secured, the risk of job losses for thousands of workers was averted and trading with numerous suppliers could continue, all with beneficial effects on the national economy. If, by contrast, the increase in capital had not been effected, Khartopiia would have been declared insolvent and its assets would have been liquidated at the request of the creditors, with the result that all the company's assets would have been lost to the detriment of the shareholders, the workers would have been laid off and the national economy would have been deprived of an important undertaking. [17] Lastly, when the capital was increased, the shareholders were given a preferential right to acquire shares, but declined to avail themselves of that right.

[18] The national court decided, with reference to the judgment in Case C-441/93, Pafitis and Others v. Tke and Others [FN35] to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 1. Can the national court apply a provision of national law (in this case Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code) in order to assess whether a right granted by the Community provisions at issue is being exercised abusively by the party possessing it, or are there other Community law *167 principles, and if so which, to be found in legislation or settled case law, on which the national court may, if need be, base itself? FN35 [1996] E.C.R. I-1347; [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, paras [67]-[70]. 2. If the reply to Question 1 is in the negative, if, that is, the Court of Justice reserves such competence for itself, for reasons relating, for instance, to the uniform application of Community provisions, may the specific circumstances as formulated by the defendant-respondent State as an objection, which constituted the issue of proof in judgment No. 5943/1994 of this court, and which were set out succinctly in the previous paragraph of this judgment, or certain of them and if so which, prevent an action founded on infringement of Article 25(1) of the Second Council Directive 77/91 from succeeding? [19] By those questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court essentially seeks to ascertain, first, whether a national court may apply a provision of domestic law in order to assess whether the exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law is abusive, or alternatively whether that assessment must be made on the basis of Community law and, second, whether, in the light of the facts of the case as established in the main proceedings, the right arising from Article 25(1) of the Second Directive must be regarded as having been exercised in an abusive manner. [20] According to the case law of the Court, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, in particular, regarding freedom to supply services, Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid [FN36] and Case C-23/93, TV 10sa v. Commissariaat voor de Media [FN37]; regarding the free movement of goods, Case 229/83, Leclerc and Others v. "Au Ble Vert" and Others [FN38]; regarding freedom of movement for workers, Case 39/86, Lair v. Universität Hannover [FN39]; regarding the common agricultural policy, Case C-8/92, General Milk Products v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [FN40]; and regarding social security, Case 206/94, Brennet v. Paletta [FN41]). FN36 [1974] E.C.R. 1299; [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298, para. [13]. FN37 [1994] E.C.R. I-4795; [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 284, para. [21]. FN38 [1985] E.C.R. 1; [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 286, para. [27]. FN39 [1988] E.C.R. 3161; [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 545, para. [43].

FN40 [1993] E.C.R. I-779, para. [21]. FN41 [1996] E.C.R. I-2357, para. [24]. [21] Consequently, the application by national courts of domestic rules such as Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code for the purposes of assessing whether the exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law is abusive cannot be regarded as contrary to the Community legal order. [22] Although the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of a national court, which is the only forum competent to establish the facts of the case before it, it must be pointed out that the application of such a national rule must not prejudice the full effect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States (Case C-441/93, Pafitis and Others [FN42]). In particular, it is not open to national courts, *168 when assessing the exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law, to alter the scope of that provision or to compromise the objectives pursued by it. FN42 Cited above, para. [68]. [23] In the present case, the uniform application and full effect of Community law would be prejudiced if a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) of the Second Directive were deemed to be abusing his right on the ground that the increase in capital contested by him resolved the financial difficulties threatening the existence of the company concerned and clearly enured to his economic benefit. [24] It is settled case law that the decision-making power of the general meeting provided for in Article 25(1) applies even where the company in question is experiencing serious financial difficulties (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-19/90 and C-20/90, Karella and Karellas [FN43] and Case C-381/89, Sindesmos Melon Tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklisias and Others [FN44]). Since an increase in capital is, by its very nature, designed to improve the economic situation of the company, to characterise an action based on Article 25(1) as abusive on the ground mentioned in paragraph 23 of this judgment would be tantamount to a declaration that the mere exercise of the right arising from that provision is improper. FN43 [1991] E.C.R. I-2691; [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 865, para. [28]. FN44 [1992] E.C.R. I-2111; [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 348, para. [35]. [25] It would mean that, in the event that the company found itself in a financial crisis, a shareholder could never rely on Article 25(1) of the Second Directive. Consequently, the scope of that provision would be altered, whereas, according to the case law cited above, the provision must remain applicable in such a situation. [26] Similarly, the uniform application and full effect of Community law would be prejudiced if a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) of the Second Directive were

deemed to be abusing the right conferred on him by that provision because he did not exercise his preferential right under Article 29(1) of the Second Directive to acquire new shares issued on the increase of capital at issue. [27] By exercising his preferential right, the shareholder would have shown his willingness to assist in the implementation of the decision to increase the capital without the approval of the general meeting, whereas he is in fact contesting that very decision on the basis of Article 25(1) of the Second Directive. Consequently, to require a shareholder, as a condition of his being able to rely on that provision, to participate in an increase in capital adopted without the approval of the general meeting would be to alter the scope of Article 25(1). [28] However, Community law does not preclude a national court, on the basis of sufficient telling evidence, from examining whether, by bringing an action under Article 25(1) of the Second Directive for a declaration that an increase in capital is invalid, a shareholder is seeking to derive, to the detriment of the company, an improper advantage, manifestly contrary to the objective of that provision, *169 which is to ensure, for the benefit of shareholders, that a decision increasing the capital of the company and, consequently, affecting the share of equity held by them, is not taken without their participation in the exercise of the decision-making powers of the company. [29] In the light of the foregoing, the reply to the questions referred must be that Community law does not preclude national courts from applying a provision of national law in order to assess whether a right arising from a provision of Community law is being exercised abusively. However, where such an assessment is made, a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) of the Second Directive cannot be deemed to be abusing the right arising from that provision merely because the increase in capital contested by him has resolved the financial difficulties threatening the existence of the company concerned and has clearly enured to his economic benefit, or because he has not exercised his preferential right under Article 29(1) of the Second Directive to acquire new shares issued on the increase in capital at issue. Costs [30] The costs incurred by the Greek Government and by the Commission, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Order On those grounds, THE COURT, in answer to the questions referred to it by the Efetio-Athinon by judgment of 6 June 1996, HEREBY RULES: Community law does not preclude national courts from applying a provision of national law in order to assess whether a right arising from a provision of Community law is being exercised abusively. However, where such an

assessment is made, a shareholder relying on Article 25(1) of the Second Council Directive 77/91 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, cannot be deemed to be abusing the right arising from that provision merely because the increse in capital contested by him has resolved the financial difficulties threatening the existence of the company concerned and has clearly enured to his economic benefit, or because he has not exercised his preferential right under Article 29(1) of that directive to acquire new shares issued on the increase in capital at issue.

(c) Sweet & Maxwell Limited [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 144 END OF DOCUMENT