How the RightTrounced Liberals inthe StatesIssue #38, Fall 2015

Conservatives havemastered the art of cross-state policy advocacy,while liberal efforts havefizzled. Here’s what hasto change.

Alexander Hertel-Fernandez

& Theda Skocpol

Democrats create an ALEC-killer,”declared the November 9, 2014,Politico headline. “Chastened bythe conservative movement’sstartling success at using nationalmoney to dominate statelegislatures,” explained reporterKenneth P. Vogel, “liberalactivists” were asking progressivedonors to provide a total of up to$10 million a year to finance anew State Innovation Exchange—dubbed “SiX”—to compete with

well-financed right-leaning groupslike the American LegislativeExchange Council (ALEC) that“for years have dominated statepolicy battles, advancing pro-business, anti-regulation bills instate after state.”

State politics loom large forliberals. As Washington gridlockhalts big new national initiatives,states are where the action (orinaction) is to be found onimportant liberal prioritiesranging from legislative

redistricting and boosting wagesto addressing climate change and,of course, expanding Medicaidcoverage for low-income people aspart of the Affordable Care Act(ACA).

But just as state-level action turnsout to be crucial, the legislativeterrain across much of the countrylooks downright disheartening forcentrists and liberals alike.Building on huge electoral gains instate legislatures and governors’offices in 2010 and 2014, hard-

line conservatives have wasted notime in passing state measuresthat gut labor protections and theability of workers to organize, thateviscerate health andenvironmental regulations, cutspending on the poor, shrink taxeson business and the wealthy, anderect new voting restrictions thatdisproportionately affect young,low-income, and minority citizens.Radical policy changes, oftenundoing decades of progress onliberal issues, have not been

limited to traditionally veryconservative areas in the DeepSouth and inner West. “Purple”states in the upper South and once“blue” states in the Midwest havealso been the sites of sharprightward policy turns.

Is the left now poised to shift theskewed balance of power in thestates? Maybe so, but a lotdepends on whether progressiveorganization-builders can figureout why previous efforts toorganize cross-state policy

networks have failed, and discoverways to fashion their own versionsof successful right-wing strategies.

The Conservative TripleWhammy

Across much of America,conservatives can mount powerfulstate legislative campaignsthrough three well-fundednetworks that operate ascomplements to one another.Think tanks affiliated with theState Policy Network (SPN) spew

out studies and prepare op-edsand legislative testimony. Paidstate directors and staffersinstalled by Americans forProsperity (AFP) sponsor bustours, convene rallies and publicforums, run radio and televisionads, send mailers, and spuractivists to contact legislators. Andinside the legislatures themselves,many representatives andsenators, especially Republicans,are members of ALEC, whichinvites them to serve alongside

business lobbyists and right-wingadvocacy groups on national taskforces that prepare “model” billsthat the legislators can advance atthe state and local level, withassistance from ALEC staffers.

Year in and year out, this three-pronged approach ensures that asteady diet of conservativeproposals is on the menu forlegislative consideration andpublic discussion—and whenpolitical openings appear,dramatic policy changes can

result. Michigan, for example, haslong been a Democratic-leaninglabor union stronghold, but right-to-work legislation designed toeviscerate union finances wasenacted there in late 2012, after alightning campaign that featuredreports from the SPN-affiliatedMackinac Center for Public Policy,public rallies organized by AFP-Michigan, and legislative votes inpart choreographed by ALECmembers in key leadership posts.

Blocking bipartisan measures is

also a troika specialty. Forinstance, federal subsidies toexpand state Medicaid programsunder the ACA are so generousthat, even in divided or GOP-runstates, many governors and someGOP legislators with ties tohospital associations andchambers of commerce havelooked for ways to sign on. Yeteven bipartisan efforts backed bybusiness groups have been parriedin many states. In Maine, forinstance, bipartisan legislative

majorities came very close tooverriding vetoes of Medicaidexpansion by a Tea Partygovernor, but a determinedminority of GOPers, many of themALEC members, got publicbacking from AFP-Maine and theSPN-affiliated Maine HeritagePolicy Center to hold firm. In twopivotal states, Missouri andVirginia, the naysaying far-righttroika has prevailed, using activistpressures stoked by AFP andother groups, along with

opposition research and testimonyto legislative commissionsprepared by SPN think tanks. InTennessee, the troika evendefeated a conservative proposalto expand and revamp Medicaidthat was put forward by anextraordinarily popular GOPgovernor, Bill Haslam, who hadjust been reelected with 70percent of the vote.

Trial, Error, andOrganizational Innovationson the Right

Conservative clout in the stateshas been decades in the making,starting from a time when theright was well behind the left. The1960s and ’70s brought manyliberal reforms, and over thosedecades Democrats dominatedover four in ten stategovernments, while the GOP fullycontrolled fewer than one in five.Liberals also wielded influencethrough bipartisan networks ofstate officials, including theNational Conference of State

Legislatures (founded in 1975)and the New Deal-era Council ofState Governments, both of whichpushed for liberal priorities suchas standardized tax systems,improved public programs, andthe professionalization of statelegislatures. Meanwhile, public-sector labor unions were alsogaining clout. By 1970, about 40percent of states permitted at leastsome collective bargaining bypublic employees. Even more thantheir private-sector counterparts,

public-employee unions areinherently political, their veryexistence dependent upon friendlystate legislatures willing tomaintain their organizing rights.More generally, these unions havesupported adequate taxation andspending on education, healthcare, and other public services.

Worried by such liberaladvantages, conservatives hatchedstrategies to push back. In 1973, afar-sighted group of conservativepoliticians and political

entrepreneurs launched theAmerican Legislative ExchangeCouncil as a forum to bring statelegislators together withrepresentatives from businessesand conservative advocacy groups.At first, ALEC had little success. Itoffered few benefits to lawmakers,and many corporations hesitatedto join because ALEC’s earlyagendas were set by movementconservatives like Paul Weyrich,who wanted to do battle with theleft on controversial social issues

like abortion, guns, and the EqualRights Amendment. In a recentinterview with a conservativeDemocratic state legislator fromTennessee, we learned that heattended only one meeting in the1970s and then immediately leftALEC, because the group’s stancesat the time were too far right forhim.

During the 1980s, ALEC leaderslearned from previous setbacksand, step by step, put in place aself-sustaining organizational

model that could advancebusiness-oriented andconservative bills in the statelegislatures and, at the same time,give ALEC the resources it neededto flourish. Starting in the early1980s, recruitment of bothlegislators and corporate memberswas delegated to ALEC chairsappointed within each state. Thelegislative chairs were often partycaucus heads, committee chairs,or leaders in legislative chambers—people well positioned to pitch

membership to other legislators.Similarly, the private-sector statechairs were prominent businessleaders who could tap into theirown social networks to persuadeother firms to join and pay dues toALEC.

ALEC also began helpinglegislators develop and craft bills.Members got access to dedicatedstaffers who could answerquestions about specificproposals, and they receivedpublications offering detailed

advice on how to frame issues andcommunicate with constituents.As recent scholarly research doneby one of us shows, theseresources have been especiallyvaluable for inexperienced andunderstaffed legislators.

Businesses were given a muchbigger role via participation onnew ALEC policy task forces,established to deliberate andprepare model bills in key areassuch as agriculture,telecommunications, and health

care. Heavily regulated firms,especially companies coping withrules in multiple states, now had areason to get on board.Companies in the tobacco, energy,and pharmaceutical sectors wereprominent among businesses thatrecognized the value of promotinglegislative agendas across thestates, where they could oftenaccomplish more than inWashington.

Once in place, these reinforcingorganizational innovations paid

off. By the early 1990s, ALEC hadrecruited hundreds of companies,including major Fortune 500firms, and boasted that just undera third of the some 7,500 statelegislators were members. Mostmembers have been Republicans,but some Democrats have alsojoined, and ALEC officiallypresents itself as “nonpartisan.”This may seem an obvious fig leaf,but the nonpartisan label onpublic materials helps ALECrecruit widely in state legislatures.

Dues are collected from bothlegislative and corporatemembers, but the much heftiercorporate dues are, of course,what fill ALEC’s coffers and haveenabled it to put on posh meetingsattractive to legislators andlobbyists. During the 1990s,hundreds of model bills drafted byALEC task forces were passed bynearly every state legislature.These bills deregulated keyindustries like electrical utilities,privatized state services, and

weakened labor-marketprotections. And that was just thebeginning. Recent analyses one ofus has conducted suggest thatenactments of ALEC-derived statelaws tripled from the 1990sthrough the early 2000s.

Even as ALEC promotedconservative legislation, the rightfound it needed more policysupport in the states. In 1986,leaders at ALEC and the rapidlygrowing Heritage Foundationlaunched a new network of state-

level think tanks focused oneconomic policy. Initially dubbedthe Madison Group, this wasincorporated as the State PolicyNetwork in 1992. Today, everystate has at least one SPN-affiliated, free-market-orientedthink tank. Coordination isencouraged and, indeed, somehigh-profile SPN think tanks, likethe Foundation for GovernmentAccountability (FGA) in Floridaand the Heartland Institute inIllinois, regularly assist sister

affiliates. SPN policy shopsoperate in close coordination withALEC, sometimes sitting on ALECtask forces and providing reports,media outreach, and testimony insupport of ALEC bills.

The final piece of the right’spowerhouse troika in the stateshas arrived through the rapidgrowth of Americans forProsperity, a centrally directed,well-resourced advocacyfederation founded in 2004 thatWashington Post journalist Philip

Bump has dubbed America’s“third-largest political party.” AFPhas paid staff in 34 states (andcounting) and can deploysubstantial resources—staff time,money, grassroots activists—inboth electoral and legislativepolicy campaigns. AFP budgetsand staffing levels haveskyrocketed in recent years,allowing organizations in moststates to hold public forums andmobilize activists to pressure statelegislatures. The organization sees

itself, with good reason, as acounter to public-sector unionsable to combine insider lobbyingwith outside grassrootsmobilization.

Sputtering Liberal Efforts toCounter ALEC

Right and left in American politicstend to keep an eye on each otherand respond when one side gainsadvantage. Fears of liberaladvances motivated conservativeleaders to form ALEC and SPN;

AFP’s sponsors have vowed topush back against unions andDemocrats. Liberals were mostlyfocused on Washington in the1970s and ’80s, but some on theleft did understand the need formore state-level capacity, only tostruggle at marshaling adequateresponses. Time and again, thesame story has played out. Liberalentrepreneurs launched state-focused networks to much fanfare,only to see them fade away—andthen the whole cycle started again.

Liberal initiatives began two yearsafter ALEC’s founding, when theNational Conference onAlternative State and LocalPolicies (CASLP) was started in1975 in Madison, Wisconsin, as “ameeting place for local officialsand others to exchange ideas,bills, and proposals through awide ranging program ofpublications, newsletters, andregional and nationalconferences.” Annual meetingattendance doubled from 300 to

600 in the first five years, andthere were some notablelegislative achievements. But theeffort faded and by the 1980s,CASLP’s founder had moved on toother projects. Some participantsin CASLP tried again in the 1990sto build the Center for PolicyAlternatives (CPA), which aimedto create a network of state andlocal lawmakers to disseminateprogressive ideas and bills.Membership grew and CPA’sbudget nearly reached the size of

ALEC’s, but big center-leftfoundations lost interest by themid-1990s. After its activitiesnarrowed, CPA closed its doors in2008.

Even before that demise, liberalleaders again bemoanedconservative strength in the statesand launched the ProgressiveStates Network (PSN) in 2005.The idea was to publish legislativeproposals, convene nationalmeetings, and help the most left-leaning lawmakers form links to

national liberal advocates andpolicy organizations. But becausemuch of the funding came fromunions struggling with their ownsurvival, PSN—which has nowbecome part of SiX—tended to berestricted in the issues it tackled.Resources and membership neverreached the levels attained byALEC or the earlier left-leaningCPA.

In the post-2000 era, Joel Rogers,a social scientist at the Universityof Wisconsin, launched a raft of

related organizations operatingout of Madison, including thecheekily named AmericanLegislative and Issue CampaignExchange (ALICE), which built anonline library of progressive policyideas for lawmakers, as well as theCenter for State Innovation (CSI),which provided similar resourcesand training to state executivestaff. Unlike PSN, CPA, and ALEC,however, the Madison-basedgroups did not try to enroll statelegislators as rank-and-file

members. In the phrase oforganizer and scholar MarshallGanz, they functioned as “bodilessheads” directed largely byprofessional staffers.

More Success with Center-Left Research Networks

As these efforts to build a counter-ALEC faltered, liberal policyorganizations in Washingtonnurtured two networks of state-based policy researchorganizations, which survive to

this day and in some respects rivalSPN think tanks across thecountry. One network, originallycalled the State Fiscal AnalysisInitiative and recently renamedthe State Priorities Partnership(SPP), is directed by RobertGreenstein’s Center on Budgetand Policy Priorities (CBPP). SPPhas enrolled or stimulated thecreation of policy researchorganizations in 41 states and theDistrict of Columbia so far. Thesemini-CBPPs offer research on

state tax and budget issues, with aspecial focus on programs to helpthe poor. Increasingly, they alsohelp to build political coalitions ofadvocacy groups to lobby statelegislatures and executives.

The other network, called theEconomic Analysis and ResearchNetwork (EARN), is coordinatedby Lawrence Mishel’s union-backed Economic Policy Institute.More loosely knit than the SPPnetwork, this assemblage of 61groups across 44 states and the

District of Columbia disseminatesresearch on wages, job benefits,and other economic issuesrelevant to unionized workers andthe broad middle class.

Each of these networks convenesannual meetings and keeps intouch with affiliates, and SPPholds an additional meeting forstate directors each year. EARNdoes not have many resources toinvest in its affiliates, but SPPdeploys funds from center-leftdonors such as the Ford

Foundation and the Annie E.Casey Foundation to provide someinfrastructure support to affiliates,and it has a steering committeethat thoroughly vets potential newstate affiliates. Yet that process isso slow that some key, historicallydivided states like Tennessee havenot installed SPP affiliates yet.

State legislators are not membersof either SPP or EARN, but inmany places state-based expertshave formed close working ties toa wide range of legislators and

their staffs. Annual budgetdeliberations, above all, promptmany legislators to look for solidnumbers and projections, and SPPaffiliates have gained a reputationfor providing these facts in manystates.

Does it make any sense to havetwo partially competing researchnetworks on the center-left? As welearned in interviews, people inWashington have different viewsfrom those in the states. Beltwayleaders are quick to differentiate

among the networks, with SPPleaders touting their network’sbudget expertise, focus on povertyprograms, and credibility withstate legislators of varyingoutlooks, while EARN officialsstress that their network is part ofthe broad left movement focusedon middle-class and labor issues.On the ground, however, fully 70percent of the states have policyorganizations that participate inboth networks, and more than halfthe states have just one policy

organization enrolled in bothnetworks. State think-tank leaderssee the same differences in styleand expertise that the D.C.directors do, but they don’t muchcare. They see ties to SPP as moresubstantial, because it hasresources to help stateorganizations build capacities.Some directors in conservativestates also value SPP’snonpartisan reputation. “Unionsare not much of a presence in mystate,” one director told us,

emphasizing that his organizationtries its best to maintain space forconversations with conservative aswell as liberal legislators.

Why the Shortfalls on theLeft?

SPP and EARN are solidachievements, to be sure, but thebuildup of liberal policy researchcapacity in the states is arguablyundercut by divisions andcompetition in Washington. Andof course the research

organizations stand alone, withoutliberal equivalents to ALEC andAFP. In particular, efforts fromthe 1970s to the 2000s to build aliberal counterpart to ALEC haveleft behind little more than alitany of abandoned acronyms.

Why did so many investments andso much talent produce so little?Invariably, organizers of theabandoned efforts emphasize toolittle money and uncertaintiesabout long-term funding as thechief barriers to success. Today’s

promoters of SiX clearly also seemoney as the big constraint. Thebroadly shared premise is simple:If only the left would spend asmuch as the right, liberal cloutacross the states would beassured.

There is some truth to thisdiagnosis. Supporters of pastefforts to counter ALEC—including foundations, individualdonors, and labor unions—havenot matched the efforts of right-wing donors and, perhaps more

importantly, have not providedsustained and predictableresources. Fledgling efforts likeCPA have been abandoned asliberal funders switch to a nascentcompetitor. In many ways, thefunding problem has gotten worsenow that unions are strugglingwith declining dues-payingmemberships and adverse legaldecisions that threaten their veryexistence. Of course, the right hasdeliberately gone on the attack tobring about exactly that outcome.

Fickle funding has left counter-ALEC organizers spending toomuch time trying to attractsupport by differentiating eachattempt from the others. EvenEARN and SPP leaders continueto distance the networks fromeach other, mostly so each canmaintain its brand and reputationwith dedicated funders. This isjust one version of a problem thathas long plagued liberal advocacypolitics: Hundreds of groups form,and the leaders of each struggle to

attract donations or grants.Without anyone necessarilyintending it, productdifferentiation becomes theoverriding goal, hinderingsubstantive achievements. Theproblem of too manyorganizations chasing insufficient,short-term funds cannot beredressed by simply havingdonors urge “collaboration.” Atbest, this encourages alliances forshort-term campaigns. At worst, itleads to a lot of fruitless meetings.

Or it prompts organizations to addlong lists of allied groups tosymbolic “advisory boards.” Note,for example, that SiX featuressuch a board on its website,chock-full of representatives fromunions and progressive advocacygroups mostly headquartered onthe coasts. This hardly sends awelcoming message to moremoderate legislators in theheartland, but it probably seemsto SiX like a good way toencourage allied groups to donate

resources and to signal toprogressive donors that everyoneis cooperating this time.

Donors, in turn, have their ownconcerns. Does a new venturehave a sound plan to avoid pastdifficulties and failures? That is agood question, and it brings us toan oft-seen shortfall inunsuccessful efforts to counterALEC. Again and again, liberalorganizers have placed too littleemphasis on leveraging ties withinstates, and have not given enough

thought to discoveringorganizational solutions of thesort that ALEC devised in the1980s, after it moved away fromits original movement-conservative focus on hot-buttoncultural issues.

In development economics, aconcept called “the advantage ofbackwardness” highlightspossibilities for learning from thepast and adapting models frompioneering competitors. Accordingto the late Alexander

Gerschenkron and other scholarswho developed this idea, countriesentering the race to industrializelate could look back at whatworked and did not work forcountries that had developedearlier. Ideally, late developerscould speed things up by figuringout ways to avoid dead ends andcoming up with their ownsubstitutes for needed resources.

In the case at hand, exploiting theadvantages of backwardnesswould require liberal builders of

cross-state policy networks tolearn from ALEC and the right,something they so far haveseemed loath to do. Repeatedly,people exclaimed to us, “We can’timitate ALEC, because they getmoney from business,” or “Theyare just a business front group.”But of course that is not the pointfor organizational learning. Leaveaside the fact that left-leaninglegislative networks cannot buildclout within and across the statesby attracting corporate lobbyists

and collecting business dues, asALEC does. Are there neverthelessfunctionally equivalent ways forliberal organization-builders toimitate, on their own terms, theclever moves ALEC made yearsago in membership recruitment,task-force operations, and supportfor legislators? And are there waysfor liberals to encourage inter-network synergies in the stateslike those in the conservativetroika?

Learning from the Right

We see five areas where SiXleaders—and others endeavoringto build liberal policy capacities inand across the states—might learnfrom conservative experiences.The trick is to look for the left’sown versions of clever innovationsand organizational solutionsdiscovered years ago by the right.

Establish meaningfulmembership. ALEC, AFP, andSPN all draw strength from thebroad and engaged individual andorganizational memberships they

have built. ALEC has bothlegislators and private firms andorganizations as members; AFPhas citizen activists on state-by-state lists; and SPN usesnewsletters, meetings, and surveysto keep in close touch with state-level think tanks and affiliatedgroups. Membership is variouslydefined in these conservativenetworks, but the identities andties deliver information andbenefits. In contrast, progressivealternatives to ALEC have either

restricted themselves to attractingthe most progressive lawmakers(as with PSN) or have notbothered to establishmemberships at all. The liberalresearch networks, especially SPP,offer some benefits to affiliatedorganizations, but the ties arelooser than in the right-wing SPN—and there seems to be no liberalequivalent to the SPN practice ofhaving specialized think tanks likeFlorida’s FGA operate across aswell as within state lines to deliver

extra expertise in key policy areas.

Any effort to advance progressivepolicy-making beyond deep blueenclaves requires offeringconcrete, practical benefits tomembers. As we’ve noted, ALEClearned the hard way thatstressing conservative causes wasnot enough. It gained clout onlyafter it figured out how to offerspecific benefits that a wide rangeof legislators and companies couldreally use—and requiredparticipants to become dues-

paying members to get thosebenefits. Similarly, SPN did betteronce it started conducting surveysof its affiliates to understand theirdesire for services, such ascommunications training. On thecenter-left, SPP has taken somesteps along these lines, and SiXsurely aims to take a page fromALEC by offering research andpolicy expertise to potentiallegislative members, as well asopportunities for members tointeract at occasional meetings.

But to date, SiX seems to beemphasizing national fundraisingstrategies while offering an online“bill library” and promoting a fewprogressive “campaigns”—likely tobe relevant only to a sliver oflegislators in most states. In someways, SiX is following strategiesthat more closely resemble ALEC’searly emphasis on conservativecauses or AFP’s intenseideological activism. Indeed, anopen question might be whetherSiX is not so much building a

counter to ALEC as, in effect,trying to launch a progressivecounter to AFP, making up for thefaltering public-sector labormovement. This might not be abad idea. One interviewee in aconservative state told us hewould not mind seeing an AFP-like federation drumming uppublic support for progressivecauses, leaving his SPP think tankto offer less overtly partisanexpertise. But even if that niche ina new progressive division of labor

were to be the one SiX ends uptrying to fill, SiX would still needto build organizationalinfrastructure—including paidleaders—within each state, as AFPhas done since 2004.

Leverage networks and social tieswithin states. Spreading benefitsis not the only way to build apresence in states, especially notat first. Successful U.S. federatednetworks tap into existing socialties within states, rather than justtrying to attract participants from

afar to attend national meetings orheed communications fromnational headquarters. One statelegislator who attended the SiXinaugural meeting held inWashington in 2014 told us heenjoyed it, but might not go again,because legislators are asked to doso many things and SiX’sofferings, such as the online billlibrary and templates forprogressive issue campaigns,seemed irrelevant to his mostpressing needs in a divided-

government state. Maybe theseresources would matter later, hesaid, if and when Democrats tookover all of his state’s government.

As this underlines, it is going to bea challenge for SiX to buildcredibility in states whereDemocrats or progressives do notcurrently have majorities—whichright now means most states. Thebest way to make progress maywell be to imitate ALEC’s move inthe 1980s of instituting in-statechairs, respected local legislators

who can gradually spread theword and connect others topractical benefits useful even inrelatively conservative states.Another obvious tactic would be towork with SPP-affiliated thinktanks, which in many states havean established track record ofworking with a range oflegislators, not just with thosewho already think of themselvesas very liberal or progressive.Surprisingly, SiX does not includeanyone from SPP on either its

board of directors or its jam-packed advisory board; and SPPdirectors we interviewed told usthat SiX people have not been intouch. This is a worrisomeomission, because building uponalready established social-networkties is a proven way to expandorganizational capacities.

Establish mechanisms for dealingwith competing policy priorities.On the left and right alike—butmaybe more on the left—politicalcoalitions and policy advocates

struggle with how to reconcile andprioritize diverse goals andperspectives. Should a new cross-state network stress bread-and-butter middle-class economics?Helping the poor? Addressingracism or sexism? The fight forvoting rights? Reproductiverights? LGBT rights? Saving theplanet from global warming? Left-leaning coalitions spend endlesshours debating such questions,and usually end up just addingeverything up into humongous

lists of “demands” to satisfyadvocates of every cause. In ourinterviews, organizers wonderedhow they could get anything goingin the states without including allprogressive causes at the table.Meanwhile, state legislatorsalready feel pulled in oppositedirections by competing advocacygroups.

Interestingly enough, ALEC facedan analogous problem decadesago, when it realized thatcompanies had competing policy

preferences and found that theinterests of major corporations arenot always aligned with those ofright-wing activists. To handlethese challenges, ALECinstitutionalized multiple taskforces. Each has exclusiveresponsibility for a major policyarena and includes member firms,conservative organizations, andlegislators who work on modelbills in that domain. The ALECmembers most invested in aparticular policy area are put in

charge of that domain, and withineach task force, the corporatemembers who contribute the mostin dues get the most say.Americans for Prosperity, runfrom the center, offers a differentmodel. AFP ensures that statedirectors and activists stressissues within clear boundaries—matters of taxes, regulations,social spending, voting and unionrights, but not religious or culturalcauses.

Obviously, liberal cross-state

networks cannot directly copy theinstitutional arrangements ALECand AFP have devised, but theyshould think of ways to avoid thecollective-action problemsinherent in assembling coalitionsthat just add up diverse interests.For example, SiX could createnational task forces in some keyareas—such as working-familyeconomics, education, democraticrights, and environmentalprotection and climate change—and ask organizational and

legislator members to choose oneor two to join at a time, dependingon where their priorities lie in anygiven period. Similarly, advocacygroups could sort themselves out abit, rather than insisting onfighting about One Big Agenda.Furthermore, already establishednetworks, such as the NationalCaucus of EnvironmentalLegislators, might want to joinand help support a specific SiXtask force.

Find better funding solutions.

Although conservativeorganizations are staunchproponents of marketcompetition, ironically it is liberal-leaning donors who encourageadvocacy entrepreneurs tocompete for limited, short-runfunding well beyond the point ofusefulness. And even thoughleftists stress the value ofparticipants controlling their ownorganizations, it is ALEC that hasinstitutionalized membershiprights and duties, including

obligations to pay regular dues inreturn for benefits andparticipation on its task forces.

SiX would be smart to movetoward sustained funding fromdues-paying individuals andorganizations, even if the flowswould not be as opulent ascorporate payments to ALEC.Over-reliance on foundationfunding and contributions fromunions and wealthy donors makesliberal ventures, including cross-state networks, vulnerable to

shifting donor fashions orshrinking donor resources. ALECcharges state legislators onlymodest dues, and there is noreason SiX, once it leverages tiesand provides benefits, could notdo the same. Furthermore,although there is no leftequivalent of rich corporations topay high levels of institutionaldues, SiX could chargeinstitutional dues to foundations,policy organizations,environmental groups, unions,

and other entities that want to joinrelevant task forces. Even morecreatively, perhaps foundationsthat want to support SiX could doso by establishing funds to helplegislators with low incomes payfor dues and travel to meetings,and perhaps also establish fundsto which community and citizengroups could apply to cover theircosts of SiX membership and taskforce participation. Why provideresources through dues ratherthan central grants? The answer is

straightforward: Dues, even ifsubsidized, would empowerlegislators and groups themselvesto join and take ownership of SiXtask forces.

To date, SiX is not raisinganything close to $10 million ayear from individual progressivedonors. Funding appeals are goingmainly to unions and foundations,the very organizations that in thepast have often providedinsufficient or sporadic support.As in past start-stop cycles, the

key issues are clear: Will potentialfunders currently on the horizoninsist on realistic plans that reallyenable SiX to reach into stateswhere liberals and labor unionscurrently have little clout? And ifconvincing plans are devised andpresented, will funders get behindthe effort and stay committed?There is little reason for optimism,as long as SiX remains exclusivelyfocused on courting smallnumbers of national funders.

View policy as a means to

political goals. We conclude witha turn back to substantivestrategy. On the left, there is astrong tendency to pursue policiesfor their own sake and to think interms of expert-structuredtechnical proposals rather thanchoosing policy battles likely tocreate future openings.Fortunately, many progressivegroups are currently givingpriority to protecting andexpanding voting rights—althoughthis issue rose on the left’s agenda

only after dozens of states hadalready enacted rules that greatlydisadvantage potential liberalvoters. In other areas, moreover,opportunities to link policy andpolitical transformation aremysteriously missed.

For example, after helping to pushthrough the Affordable Care Act of2010, the broad cross-state HealthCare for America Now coalitionstood down in favor of morelimited campaigns to sign peopleup for benefits and advocate for

health-care consumers. For years,the right has treated state-leveldecisions about buildingexchanges and Medicaidexpansion as major politicalfights. But the left in general hasnot recognized that pressing forfull health reform implementationin all states presents a hugepolitical opportunity to strengthencitizen faith in government and tofurther economic and racialequality. Liberals have notpressured legislators or

Democratic candidates to talk uphealth reform the wayconservatives incessantly pushtheir politicians to bashObamacare and blockimplementation. Strikingly, SiXitself has not made it a top priorityto fight for expanded Medicaid inthe 20 holdout states, even thoughthese struggles happening rightnow, from Georgia to Wyoming toFlorida to Maine, offer an idealopportunity to reap political aswell as social rewards down the

line.

All these considerations bring usback to where we started: Is theleft really building an “ALECkiller” with the State InnovationExchange? It is far too soon to tell.But it is not too soon to say thatSiX and other cross-state networkbuilders on the center-left have alot of organizational and strategiclearning to accomplish. Thechallenge is bigger than simplyraising more money. Networkbuilders have to get out of their

comfort zones in the worlds ofliberal advocacy groups mostlyheadquartered in New York,Washington, California, and a fewother blue enclaves to find andactivate network connectionsacross the vast heartland. And ifprogressives want to gaincredibility and clout in the states,they will need to become far morestrategic about engaging inwidespread policy fights with thegreatest potential to reshape thepolitical landscape in conservative

as well as liberal states acrossAmerica.

Issue #38, Fall 2015

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