ELECTION DIGEST:

ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET

FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayo and Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jusridiction of HRET over the Party list.. and its representatives..

HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC

Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners..

HELD: Affirmative.

The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.  Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees. 

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.  Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the “members” of that House are representatives of districts and party list

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner.  The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as “members of the House of Representatives,” a party-list representative is in every sense “an elected member of the House of Representatives.”  

Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees.  Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.   

By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

ALDABA VS COMELEC

This case is about a law that establishes a new legislative district based on a projected population of the National Statistics Office (NSO) to meet the population requirement of the Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.

The Facts and the Case

The City of Malolos and the Municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong comprise the current first district of the province of Bulacan. In 2007 the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The NSO projected that, using the established population growth rate of 3.78 percent between 1995 and 2000, its population in 2010 will be 254,030.

On May 1, 2009 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9591, to amend Section 57 of R.A. 8754, the charter of the City of Malolos, making the city a separate district from the existing first legislative district of Bulacan.

The Challenge

On June 16, 2009 petitioners Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S. Fajardo, Julio G. Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada, all claiming to be taxpayers from Malolos City, filed the present action, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9591. They point out a) that the law failed to comply with the requirement of Section 5(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that a city must have a population of at least 250,000; (2) that the creation of a separate district amounts to a conversion and requires the conduct of a plebiscite; and (3) that the law violates Section 5(3), Article VI which provides that each district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

HELD: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.

Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been

a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. (CARPIO J. PONENTE)

DISSENT: ABAD

First. Section 5, paragraphs (3) and (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

For a city to merit one representative it should have a population of at least 250,000. A province, however, is entitled to one representative no matter what its population size. In this case, the basis of House Bill 3696 is the certification of the NSO that the projected population of the City of Malolos by 2010

I cannot agree with petitioners’ claim that the Congress gravely abused its discretion in relying on the 2010 projected population of Malolos City as basis for its reapportionment law. The Court has always been reluctant to act like a third chamber of Congress and second guess its work. Only when the lawmakers commit grave abuse of discretion in their passage of the law can the Court step in. But the lawmakers must not only abuse this discretion, they must do so with grave consequences.

Here, nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or population projections in the creation of legislative districts. As argued by the Solicitor General, the standard to be adopted in determining compliance with the population requirement involves a political question. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature.

In fact, in Macias v. Commission on Elections, the Court upheld the validity of a reapportionment law based on the NSO’s "preliminary count of population" which may be subject to revision. The Court held there that "although not final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters of apportionment of legislative districts."

Majority opinion ably written by Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out, however, that "no legal effect" can be accorded to the certification of demographic projection for Malolos City issued by the NSO Region III Director because it violates the provisions of Executive Order 135 dated November 6, 1993 of President Fidel V. Ramos, which requires that such demographic projection be declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board and that the certification be issued by the NSO administrator or a designated officer. In addition, the intercensal population estimates must, according to the Executive Order, "be as of middle of every year."

But Executive Order 135 cannot apply to this case..

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO

FACTS: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption…

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms…… The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)

"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

BATALLA VS COMELEC AND BATALLER

FACTS: Batalla and Bataller were candidates for the position of Brgy Captain in Brgy Mapulang Daga. Batalla was declared the winner but on protest, the results were apparently a tie…as declared by the MCTC. Batalla appealed to the COMELEC,